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Battle of Yarmouk
Part of the Muslim conquest of Syria and Byzantine-Arab Wars
Muslim and Byzantine Troop Movements before the battle of Yarmouk
Date August, 636 Location Near the Yarmouk River Result Decisive Rashidun victory Territorial changes Levant annexed by Rashidun Caliphate
Belligerents
Byzantine Empire, Ghassanid Kingdom,	Rashidun Caliphate (Rashidun army)
Commanders and leaders
Heraclius Constantine III † Theodore Trithyrius Jabalah ibn al-Aiham † Dairjan † Vahan Buccinator (Qanateer) Gregory	Khalid ibn al-Walid Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah Amr ibn al-A'as Shurahbil ibn Hassana Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan
Strength
20,000 - 150,000 (modern estimates) 100,000 - 400,000 (primary sources)	7,500 - 40,000 (modern estimates) 24,000 - 40,000 (primary sources)
Casualties and losses
50,000 killed (modern estimate) 45% killed (modern estimate) 70,000 - 120,000 killed (primary sources)	4,000 killed

The Battle of Yarmouk (Arabic: معركة اليرموك, also spelled Yarmuk, Yarmuq or Hieromyax) was comprised of a series of engagements between the Rashidun Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire over six days in August 636, near the Yarmouk River, along what is today the border between Syria and Jordan, south-east of the Sea of Galilee. The battle marked the first great wave of Islamic conquests after the death of Muhammad, heralding the rapid advance of Islam into the then Christian Levant. The battle is also considered to be one of Khalid ibn al-Walid's most decisive victories, and cemented his reputation as one of the greatest military strategists and cavalry commanders of the Islamic conquest in the Middle Ages.

Prelude

In 634, after the death of the caliph Abu Bakr, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab became the new caliph. While Abu Bakr had been successful in invading Syria, Umar was determined to extend the reach of his kingdom and continued the conquest deeper into Syria. Though previous campaigns led by Khalid ibn al-Walid were successful, he was never in the good books of Umar and was replaced by Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah.

The Muslim armies were small in numbers but outmanoeuvred the Byzantines at several occasions. The Byzantines on the other hand hoped that the Muslims would weary as other tribal leaders had before them and avoided battles with them. It was at the Battle of Ajnadayn that a composite Muslim force was formed and outnumbered the Byzantines to take over most of the land in what is now southern Syria and Lebanese territories.

This Arabian movement disturbed the Byzantine emperor Heraclius who in a foray, sent his brother Theodore at the head of the troops of the Syrian province to fight against the invading Muslim army. The Byzantine armies were, however, decisively defeated at Ajnadayn and Theodore was killed. The Arabs later advanced up the trade route that went east of Jordan and over to Damascus and Orontes valley. Tiberias, Baalbek, and Homs fell into the hands of the Arabs without much struggle and the Muslims captured Damascus later that year. From there on, the Muslims continued their conquest across the Levant.

Preparations for battle

Soon after the capture of Damascus, the Muslim armies defeated a Byzantine garrison at the Battle of Fahl and conquered most of Palestine and with Damascus under their power, the Muslims were just a march away from Antioch where Heraclius resided. Now seriously alarmed by this debacle and holding a personal vendetta against the Muslims, he started preparing an army for battle.

Byzantine army

Months later, after previous incursions by the Rashidun army, emperor Heraclius assembled two large armies in Syria in late-635 to halt the Arab invasion. The two armies headed southward, one comprising mainly of Armenian levies was commanded by the Armenian prince Vahan (or Mahan as some texts suggest) and of Christian Arabs headed by the sheikh of the Banu Ghassan Jabalah ibn al-Aiham. The other was led by Theodore Trithyrius and consisted of mixed troops but mainly of Byzantine Greeks.

By May 636 Trithyrius moved ahead out of Antioch while Vahan, unsure of the Rashidun strength, followed later gathering troops from other Hellenised towns, recruiting Buccinator (Muslim texts name him Qanateer), a Slavic prince leading an army of Slavs and other European contingents falling under Gregory and Dairjan. In most Muslim accounts the size of the united forces was stated as being above 100,000 sometimes even 200,000 to 25,000 but several modern sources estimate the real number of troops being lower that that range. These estimates suggest numbers close to 100,000, or 80,000, or 50,000. The assembled army consisted of contingents of Byzantines, Slavs, Franks, Georgians, Armenians and Christian Arabs, all contributing to internal conflicts.

The rest of the imperial army led by Vahan was launched from Antioch and northern Syria some time in the middle of June 636. It was at the fortress of Shaizar, that the Muslims first came to know of the preparations being made by Heraclius through Roman prisoners. Upon hearing that a large army had been assembled by the Byzantium to resist the Arab invasion, Muslim armies became terrified and evacuated the previously captured lands of Orontes valley and Damascus and resorted southwards in the territory of the Jordan river.

Being geographically divided up in each direction, Heraclius sought to exploit this situation and planned to attack and destroy each of these Muslim corps separately by putting a large concentration of troops against each of them in turn. Thus, reinforcements were sent to Caesarea under Heraclius’s eldest son Constantine III, probably to tie down Yazid's forces there so that it would not move to join other Muslim corps to help them.

Qanateer was advised to move along the coastal route up to Beirut, then approach Damascus from the west and cut off Abu Ubaidah. Jabala would march from Aleppo on the direct route to Emessa via Hama, and hold the Muslims frontally in the Emessa region. The lighter-armed but faster moving Christian-Arabs would thus be the first to contact the Muslim Arabs. Dairjan was to move between the coast and the Aleppo road and approach Emessa from the west, thus striking the Muslims in their flank while they were held frontally by Jabala. Gregory would advance on Emessa from the north-east and attack the Muslims in their right flanks at the same time as they were struck by Dairjan. Finally, Vahan’s army would advance behind the Christian-Arabs and act as a reserve.

See also: Byzantine army

Rashidun army

Alert to the possibility of being caught with separated forces that could be destroyed in detail, as Heraclius indeed planned, Khalid, in a council of war, advised Abu Ubaidah to pull back from northern and central Syria, as well as from Palestine. Then, he concentrated the entire Rashidun army in the vast plain of Yarmouk – which was suitable for cavalry charge and from there it would be easier for the caliph to send reinforcements and thus a strong, united force could be fielded against the Byzantine armies. The position also was beneficiary, due to its close proximity to Najd (a Rashidun stronghold), in case of retreat. Abu Ubaidah, being the Muslim commander-in-cheif, thus ordered the commanders to surrender the territory under their control and withdraw the army to Jabiyah. In addition, he ordered the commanders to return the jizya or tribute payed by the people back to them.

The Rashidun army thus moved towards the Yarmouk plain, and established a line of camps in the eastern part of the plain of Yarmouk. No major conflict occurred except for a minor skirmish between Khalid's elite light cavalry Mobile guard and Byzantine Advance guard. A few days later, the Byzantine army – proceeded by the lightly armed Ghassanids of Jabla – moved forward and established their camps just north of the Wadi-ur-Raqqad. Vahan was instructed by Heraculis, not to start battle until all avenues of peaceful negotiation had been explored. Grogory and then Jabla were sent by Vahan to negotiate but their efforts failed. Before the battle, on Vahan’s invitation, Khalid came to talks but still with no result. Meanwhile Caliph Umar sent a reinforcement of 6,000 troops, mostly from Yemen as well as 1,000 Sahaba (companions of Muhammad), among them a 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr, the first battle in which Muslim forces were ever engaged. The army also included citizens of the highest rank, such as Zubair, Abu Sufyan, and his wife Hind bint Utbah.

The Muslim army, finally assembled at Yarmouk, was divided into four different groups. Coming out of the captured Homs (known as Emessa at the time) was the retreating army moving south-eastward, led by both Abu Ubaidah and Khalid. The second under Amr ibn al-Aas was stationed in Palestine; third under Shurahbil stationed in Jordan and the last under Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan at Caesarea.

See also: Rashidun army and Mobile guard

Battle

Map detailing the location of the area where the battle took place in its present geography.

The battlefield lies about 65-kilometres south-west of the Golan heights, an upland region currently on the frontier between Israel, Jordan and Syria, east of the Sea of Galilee. The battle was fought on the plain of Yarmouk which was enclosed on its western and southern edges by a deep ravine, known as Wadi-ur-Raqqad with banks about 30 m deep. This ravine joins the Yarmouk River, a tributary of the Jordan River on its south. The stream had very steep banks from 10–30 m deep. On the north lay the Jabiya road and to the east lie the Azra hills, although these hills were outside the actual field of battle. Strategically there was only one prominence in the battlefield – a 100 m high elevation known as the hill of Jamu'a (meaning gathering). For the Muslim troops concentrated on it, it gave a good view of the plain of Yarmouk. What now is a ravine on the west of the battlefield was accessible at a few places in 636 AD, and had one main crossing, a ford, where the village of Kafir-ul-Ma stands today.

Khalid upon retreat from the north manoeuvred to choose this field of battle, because he judged it most useful for cavalry operations, and because it allowed a clear line of retreat to Arabia. Although Khalid was kept from being a commander-in-chief of the Rashidun army by that caliph Umar, he offered his services as a commander of the Muslim army until the battle was over. Abu Ubaidah's military credentials were not as high as Khalid's so it was given to him that day.

Taking up command, Khalid reorganized the army into infantry and cavalry regiments, with cavalry making up a quarter of the 40,000-man army. Khalid further divided the army into 36 infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments; he formed some of the cavalry into a mobile guard that was held in reserve. Over the course of the battle Khalid would repeatedly make critical, decisive use of this mounted reserve. Meanwhile on the Christian end in late July 636, Vahan sent Jabala with his Ghassanid forces to check the strength of the Muslim front, but they were repulsed by the mobile guard under Khalid. After this initial operation, no military activities occurred for a month.

Troop deployment

Modern estimates of the sizes of the respective armies vary: between 15,000 - 100,000 for the Byzantine army, and 7,500 - 25,000 for the Arab army, with exaggerations on both sides by older historians. These figures come from studying the logistical capabilities of the combatants, the sustainability of their respective bases of operations, and the overall manpower constraints affecting the Romans and Arabs. Most scholars, however, agree that the Byzantine army and their allies outnumbered the Muslim Arabs by a sizeable margin. Muslim sources place the number of Muslim troops at between 24,000 and 40,000 and the number of Byzantine forces at between 100,000 and 200,000.

Vahan deployed the Imperial Army forward of Allan. He used his four regular armies to form the line of battle, extending from the Yarmouk to south of the Hill of Jabiya. The right wing was commanded by Gregory with the army of Qanateer on his left. The centre was formed by the army of Dairjan and the Armenian army of Vahan-both under the command of Dairjan. The Roman regular cavalry was distributed equally among the four armies, with each army deployed with its infantry holding the front and its cavalry held as a reserve in the rear. Ahead of the front line, across the entire 12-mile front, Vahan deployed the Ghassanid army of Jabala, which was all mounted on horses and camels. This army acted as a screen and skirmish line, until they would be joined by the main army. The army of Gregory, which formed the right wing, used chains to link its foot soldiers together. All these foot soldiers had taken the oath of death. These chains were in 10-men lengths, and were used as a proof of unshakeable courage on the part of the men, who thus displayed their willingness to die where they stood and not retreat. The chains also acted as an insurance against a break-through by enemy cavalry.

The army was lined up on a front of ten miles, with its left on the Yarmouk River a mile before the ravine began and its right on the Jabiya road. The center of the army was under the command of Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah (left half) and Shurhabil bin Hassana (right half). The left wing was under the command of Yazid and the right wing was under Amr ibn al-A'as. Both left and right wings were given cavalry regiments under command, to be used as a reserve for counter attack in case they were pushed back by the Byzantines. Behind the center stood a cavalry regiment reserve along with a mobile guard under the personal command of Khalid. When Khalid was occupied in the conduct of the battle, Zirrar ibn al-Azwar would command the mobile guard. Each of the four corps had nine infantry regiments, which were all formed on a tribal and clan basis, so that every man would fight next to well-known comrades, and the army pushed out a line of scouts to keep the Byzantines under observation.

Events

The battle started on 15 August 636 At dawn both armies lined up for battle and were a little less than a mile apart. Before the battle would commence, George rode up to the Muslim end and converted to Islam, secretly vowing to support the enemy. The battle began with regular skirmishing and fights between champions. At midday, Vahan attempted a limited offensive through the Byzantine infantry to test the strength and strategy of the Muslim army, and if possible, achieve a breakthrough wherever the Muslim front was weak. On some parts of the front the fighting was intense, but on the whole the action of this day could be described as steady and moderately hard. The Muslims held their own. The Byzantine forces did not reinforce their forward infantry, and at sunset the action ended with the two armies separating and returning to their respective camps.

On 16 August 636, Vahan in a council of war decided to launch his attack just before dawn, to catch Muslims unprepared at the time of morning prayers. He planned to engage the two of his central armies with the Muslim centre to stall them while the main thrusts would be against the wings of the Muslim army, which would then be either be driven away from the battlefield or pushed towards the centre. To observe the battlefield Vahan had a large pavilion built behind his right wing with an Armenian bodyguard force. He ordered the army to prepare for the surprise attack.

Unknowingly to the Byzatines, Khalid had placed a strong outpost line in front during night to counter surprises, which gave the Muslims time to prepare for battle. At the center, the Byzantines did not press hard, as this was meant to be a limited attack to pin the Muslim central corps in their position. Thus the center remained stable. But on the left wing of the Byzantine army, the Qanateer, commanding a force of mainly Slavs, attacked and forced the Muslim infantry to retreat. Amr, the Muslim right wing commander ordered his cavalry regiment to counter attack, which checked the Byzantine advance and stabilized the battle line on the right for some time. Khalid aware of the situation at the wings, ordered his mobile guard and the reserve cavalry on the right to assist the right wing infantry. The Slavs attacked from both sides by Muslim cavalry retreated to their original position and Amr regained all the ground he had lost while starting to reorganise his corps for another round.

The situation on the Muslim left wing where Yazid commanded was slightly serious. Whilst the Muslim right wing enjoyed assistance from the mobile guard, the left wing were retreating back to their camps. Here the Byzantines had broken through the corps. The testudo formation that Gregory's army had adopted moved slow but also had a good defence. Yazid used his cavalry regiment to counter attack but was repulsed. After a period of stiff resistance the warriors of Yazid finally fell back to their camps and for a moment Vahan's plan appeared to be succeeding. The centre of the Muslim army was pinned down and its flanks had been pushed back. Although being forced back, neither flank had broken only their morales were severly beaten.

With the position on the right stabilised, the mobile guard cavalry moved towards the left to raise morale. The retreating Muslim amry were met by the ferocious Arab women at the camps. Led by Hind and Khaula bint al-Azwar, the Muslim women dismantled their tents and armed with tent poles and charged at their husbands and fellow men signing an improvised song that Hind had also sung at the Battle of Uhud.

“O you who run from a constant woman

Who has both beauty and virtue;
And leave her to the infidel,
The hated and evil infidel,

To possess, disgrace and ruin.”

This boiled the blood of the retreating Muslims further and they fled back into the battlefield. A young tax-collector Zarrar ibn al-Azwar, listening to the song sung by his sister Khaula, charged the the front of the army of Deirjan who commanded the left half of the centre in order to create a diversion. In this sudden counter move, Zarrar broke through one of the European contingents and killed Deirjan which the Byzatine right was falling back. With enough diversion being created, the mobile guard cavalry, which had approached the other end, attacked the flank of Gregory. Here again, under simultaneous attacks from the front and flank, the Byzantines fell back, but more slowly because assuming their formation the men could not move as fast. At sunset the central armies broke contact and withdrew to their original positions and both fronts were restored along the lines occupied in the morning. The death of Dairjan and the failure of Vahan's battle plan left the Imperial army relatively demoralized, whereas Khalid's successful counter-attacks emboldened his troops.

On 17 August 636, Vahan pondered over his failures and mistakes of the previous day. What bothered him the most was the loss of one of his commanders. The imperial Byzantine army decided on a less ambitious plan, aiming to break the Muslim army at a specific points. The battle resumed with the Byzantine attack. After holding the initial attacks by the Byzantines, the Muslim right retreated toward their base camp followed by the retreat of the right half of the Muslim center., but the corps were able to reorganize some distance from the camp for a counter-attack. Knowing instantly that the Byzantine army was focusing on the Muslim right, Khalid launched an attack with his mobile guard, alongwith the Muslims right's cavalry, on the other end of the Byzantines where Qanateer commanded. The combat soon accelerated into a bloodbath. Many fell on both sides and by dusk the Byzantines had been pushed back to their former positions and the situation restored to that existing at the beginning of the battle.

18 August 636, the fourth day was to prove decisive. Vahan decided to persist with the previous day's war plan as he had been successful in inflicting damage on the Muslim right. Qanateer led two armies of Slavs against the Muslim right and right half of centre with a little assistance from the Armenianas and Christian Arabs led by Jabala. The Muslim armies were forced back but held position at the right wing with the Slavs while the right half of the Muslim centre gave way after repetitive attacks by the Armenians and Christian Arabs soldiers under Jabala. While the Muslim right was preoccupied, Khalid entered the fray yet again with this mobile guard. He feared a general attack on a broad front which would make it impossible for him to repulse and as a precaution ordered Abu Ubaida and Yazid on the left centre and the left wings respectively to attack the Byzantine armies at the respective fronts. The attack would result in stalling the Byzantine front and preempt a general advance of the Imperial army. With his mobile guard, Khalid struck the advancing Armenians. He divided his mobile guard into two equal groups of which one would attack at the Armenians at the front, while leading his own cavalry group, Khalid galloped round behind the fighting Muslim army appeared against the Armenians at their front. This three-pronged flanking manoeuvre against the Armenians and Christian Arabs with extreme cavalry-enabled force led the Armenians to retreat towards their original position. The Slavs were left alone in the battlefield without the Armenian support and soon retired as well. Shurahbil's and Amr's positions were secured.

While Khalid and his mobile guard were busy with this end of the battle throughout the afternoon, situation on the other end was worsening. Byzantine horse-archers had taken into the battlefield and had prevented Abu Ubaidah and Yazid from penetrating into their lines. Many Muslim soldiers lost their sight to Byzantine arrows on that day, which thereafter became known as the "Day of Lost Eyes". The veteran Abu Sufyan also lost one eye. The Muslim armies fell back except for one regiment led by Ikramah bin Abu Jahal, which was on the left of Abu Ubaidah's corps. Ikramah had called on his men to take an oath of death and to go down fighting without retreat. While these four hundred men attacked the Byzantine front, the other armies reorganised themselves to counter-attack and gain their lost positions. All of Ikramah's men were either seriously injured or died that day. Ikrimah and his son Amr, a childhood friend of Khalid's were mortally wounded and died later in the evening.

Early on 19 August 636, the fifth day of battle Vahan sent an emissary to the Muslim camp for a truce for the next few days so that fresh negotiations could be held. Abu Ubaidah nearly accepted the proposal but was restrained by Khalid. Khalid had been terribly sad at the death of his friend the earlier day and gave in to him emotions while also devising a clear-cut offensive strategy. On Khalid's insistence he sent the envoy back with a negative reply, adding:

We are in a hurry to finish this business!

Khalid knew that the Byzantines were no longer eager for battle. Up until now the Muslim army had adopted a largely defensive strategy, but Khalid now decided to take the offensive and reorganized his troops accordingly. All the cavalry regiments were grouped together into one powerful mounted force with the mobile guard acting as its hard core. The total strength of this cavalry group was now about 8,000 mounted warriors, an effective corps for an offensive attack the next day. The rest of the day passed uneventful.

On 20 August 636, the final day of battle, Khalid formulated a simple but bold plan of attack and immediately put it into action. With his massed cavalry force he intended to drive the Byzantine cavalry entirely off the battlefield so that the infantry, which formed the bulk of the imperial army, would be left without cavalry support and thus be exposed and helpless when attacked from the flanks and rear. At the same time he planned to push a determined attack to turn the left flank of the Byzantine army and push them toward the ravine to the west.

While the Muslim centre and left wing engaged the Byzantine armies on their fronts to pin them down, Khalid deployed his cavalry and charged the Byzantine left flank. At the same time he also dispatched a mounted regiment to engage and pin down the Byzantine cavalry on the left. The infantry was then engaged into battle simultaneously with the cavalries.

The Slavic infantry under Qanateer resisted the attack but without support from their cavalry they fell back and retreated towards the Armenian armies of Vahan. The Muslim armies focused entirely on dibanding them the same way they did the Slavs. Vahan noticing the huge cavalry formation the Muslim ordered his cavalry to come together and counter-attack the advancing massed Muslims but was not quick enough; before Vahan could organize his disparate heavy cavalry squadrons, Khalid had galloped his cavalry back to attack the concentrating Byzantine horses, falling upon them from the front and the flank while they were still manoeuvring into formation. The Muslim horsemen were lightly armed and fast versus the disorganized and disoriented Byzantine cavalry that soon broke contact and dispersed to the north, leaving the infantry to its fate. With the cavalry retreating towards the north including the mounted corps of Jabala, the infantry lay unguarded and Khalid now turned his focus onto them attacking the Armenian army of Vahan from the rear. The Armenians were strong fighters but without support from Jabala reserve light infantry their line broke and they fell back.

As the Armenians retreated, it was the unit of Trithyrius that accepted Khalid's mighty blows and soon the entire Byzantine army was in full retreat. Part scattered in panic and others fell back in good order to the west towards Wadi Ruqqad. Khalid now turned this retreat into a rout, taking his cavalry towards the north-west so that no troops could escape from there, though before he could seal off all the gaps, a few thousand Byzantine troops escaped towards Damascus by way of a bridge at 'Ayn Dhakar over the deep gorges of the ravines of Wadi Ruqqad. In the confusion of the rout, Zarrar had already captured the bridge as part of Khalid's plan the night before. A unit of 500 mounted troops were sent through to block this passageway. In fact, this was the route Khalid wanted the Byzantines to retreat along all the time. The Byzantines were surrounded from all ends now. Some fell into the 200-meters deep ravines off the steep slopes, some tried jumping into the water only to be smashed on the rocks below and some were killed while fighting. The remaining put their hands down and surrendered but the Muslims were unforgiving and they administered a massacre taking very few prisoners.

Aftermath

Immediately after this operation was over, Khalid and his mobile guard moved north to pursue the retreating Byzantine soldiers; he found them near Damascus and attacked. In the ensuing fight the commander-in-chief of the imperial army, the Armenian prince Vahan who had escaped the fate of most of his men at Yarmouk, was killed. Khalid then entered Damascus where he was welcomed by the local residents, thus recapturing the city.

When news of the disaster reached the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius at Antioch, he was devastated and enraged. He blamed his wrongdoings for the loss primarily referring to his incestuous marriage to his niece Martina. He would have tried to win over the province if he had the resources, rather he resorted to the cathedral of Antioch where he observed a solemn service of intercession. He summoned a meeting of his advisers at the cathedral and scrutinized the situation. He was told almost unanimously and accepted the fact the defeat was God's decision and a result of the sins of the people of the land including him. Heraclius took to the sea on a ship to Constantinople in the night.

It is said that as his ship was set sail, he bade a last farewell to Syria, saying:

Farewell, a long farewell to Syria, my fair province. Thou art an infidel's (enemy's) now.
Peace be with you, O' Syria - what a beautiful land you will be for the enemy.

Haraclius abandoned Syria with the holy relic of the True Cross on-board, not just to protect it from the invading Arabs but also for his own protection at sea. It is said that the emperor had a fear of water. After abandoning Syria, the Emperor began to concentrate on his remaining forces for the defence of Egypt instead. The Byzantines again were defeated by the Muslims led by Amr ibn al-A'as – who had commanded the right flank of the Rashidun army at Yarmouk.

Bibliography

Primary sources

• Ibn Ishaq, Sirah Rasul Allah, 750.
• Al-Waqidi, Maghazi Rasulillah, 8th century.
• Theophanes the Confessor, Chronographia, 810-815.
• Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, 9th century.
• Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, History of the Prophets and Kings, 915.
• Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, 1377.

Modern sources

• Gibbon, Edward (1788), The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Strahan & Cadell: London
• Donner, Fred McGraw (1981), The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton University Press, ISBN 0691053278
• Runciman, Steven (1991), A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade, Penguin Books: London, ISBN 0140137068
• Elton, Hugh (1994), "Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests (Kaegi)", The Medieval Review, University of Michigan Library, Scholarly Publishing Office {{citation}}: External link in |title= (help)
• Nicolle, David (1994), Yarmuk 636 A.D.: The Muslim Conquest of Syria #31, Osprey Publishing
• Kaegi, Walter Emil (1995), Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521484553
• Treadgold, Warren (1995), Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, Stanford{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Treadgold, Warren (1997), A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Gil, Moshe; Broido, Ethel (1997), A History of Palestine: 634-1099, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521599849
• Haldon, John (2001), The Byzantine Wars, Arcadia Publishing, ISBN 0752417959
• Kaegi, Walter Emil (2003), Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521814596
• Regan, Geoffery (2003), First Crusader: Byzantium's Holy Wars (1 ed.), Palgrave Macmillan: New York, ISBN 1403961514
• Akram, Agha Ibrahim (2004), The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed - His Life and Campaigns, Oxford University Press: Pakistan, ISBN 0195977149
• Kennedy, Hugh N. (2006), The Byzantine And Early Islamic Near East, Ashgate Publishing, ISBN 0754659097
• Kennedy, Hugh (2007), The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In, Weidenfeld & Nicolson: Great Britain, ISBN 978-0297846574
• Khalid ibn al-Walid, Encyclopædia Britannica (2007).

External links

• Battle of Yarmuk, 636

Category:7th century conflicts Category:Battles involving the Byzantine Empire Category:Battles involving the Rashidun Caliphate Category:Battles of Khalid ibn Walid Category:636 Category:Battles of Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah