User:Arrow740/Elst

In this chapter of his book Who is a Hindu? (which would be more faithfully named "Why Hinduism is the best religion"), Elst portrays Buddhism as a corrupted form of jnana yoga, and the Buddha as man who, though enlightened, was simply ignorant of higher Upanishadic philosophy. He obliquely suggests that Buddhists today are still laboring under his misapprehensions. In this page I respond to this chapter, and yes this page will help me plan additions to articles on Buddhism, Hinduism, and the relationship between them. Elst's main points are made by Ananda Coomaraswamy, a proponent of Hindu culture and philosophy in the form of the perennial philosophy (about that, I'll say that calling something "perennial" doesn't make it true).

"a pessimistic and avowedly escapist view of the world."

He does not provide an argument, so I will delay my response.

"Against the cardinal principle of Dukkha, “(all is) suffering”, the first of the Buddha’s “Four Noble Truths”, Dayananda asserts..."

... basically that not everything leads to unhappiness. The editorial parentheses are not helpful. The doctrine of dukkha (which should be understood in the context of the other Noble Truths) is not meant to describe all phenomena as suffering. The point is to indicate that nothing temporal is ultimately satisfactory. By viewing all conceptualizations as unsatisfactory (dukkha) and the self as imperfect (dukkha) the individual is led to constantly re-examine himself and his understanding of things. By never becoming satisfied with impermanent phenomena, the individual is inexorably led to the complete understanding of the self and all things. Thus the concept of dukkha is a diagnosis of relationships and a goad towards higher awareness. By understanding the causes and nature of happiness, higher happiness is attained. In attaching to impermanent and incompletely understood phenomena, suffering results. Elst's qualification of Dayananda's polemic: "at most one could say that all worldly happiness is very unimpressive when compared with the profound happiness of the yogic state of consciousness" is closer to the truth, but still false.

"... just as all happy moments may be considered spoiled by the concomitant fear of losing that which makes happy, all fleeting moments of suffering are redeemed by the ensuing moments of relief resulting in restored happiness. This way, one could just as well say that 'all is bliss'."

He actually proved the truth of the doctrine of dukkha. Clearly there is something which transcends this yo-yo of emotions.

"In Buddhism, the basic vision is negative: life is suffering brought about by the unquenchable thirst of desire; it is what we have to get away from."

This is not true, life is not so described. The doctrine is more subtle as I indicated above. The Buddha tried to teach how to guide your thoughts and actions every moment so as to increase your happiness and self-awareness. That is the doctrine of dukkha.

"In the Upanishads, the awakening to the Self is the crown of all possible happy experiences, a happiness worth seeking for its own sake... This experience is desirable not because it is an escape from worldly suffering, but because it is so terrifically true, a true perception of one’s true Self."

Buddhism does not encourage any grasping, any desires, even desiring happiness. By pointing out the true nature of things and false graspings at illusory conceptualizations, Buddhism guides the individual along the natural path of the dharma.

"As we shall see, even the Buddha himself can reasonably be suspected of incomplete and inaccurate knowledge of other (viz Upanishadic) philosophies, a matter entirely divorced from his undeniable yogic accomplishment."

For the first statement, he will be shown to be wrong. For the second, he makes no mention of why he believes in the Buddha's "yogic" accomplishment. As such he falls into the same trap he accuses the Hindutva polemicists of falling into. Moreover, the use of the term "yogic" either proves that Elst is constrained by his Hindu paradigm, or his intent to shove Buddhism into a Hindu box.

"Indeed, Mahayana itself marks a major step back towards Hinduism, not just because of its adoption of externals like the Sanskrit language and devotional rituals to a legion of divine beings, but in its basic spirit: it aims beyond the monk’s individual salvation (the concern of Theravada Buddhism as of Jainism) to universal salvation for all monks, laymen and other beings, thereby restoring the central Hindu value of responsibility for the world." The footnote reads: "I thank Kedar Nath Mishra, my philosophy professor at BHU, for pointing out how the distinctive features of Hindu ethics and social philosophy can be deduced from the central value of responsibility, which sets Hinduism (along with Confucianism) apart from Jainism and Theravada Buddhism."

If Mahayana is viewed as monolithic, his first sentence is correct. However, Mahayana is far from monolithic, and his sentence is false. As for the footnote, his professor provides an interesting theory, but he has the premise and conclusion of his implication reversed. There is no evidence for this ethic of responsibility provided here.

"Still, the point is well taken: it is true and commendable that the Buddha, like Confucius, chose to keep metaphysical speculation outside his discourse, on the pragmatic plea that life is too short for sterile pursuits which distract our attention from those fields of interest where genuine knowledge and liberating action are within man’s reach."

A grudging admission, and a key insight. I will touch on this issue again later.

"That the Buddha "refused worship" sounds good to us anti-authoritarian moderns, but it is hardly unique, and presenting it as unique is unfair to Hindu tradition. In pre-Buddhist scripture, we find very little "worship" of human religious figures, e.g. we never find Rama "worshipping" his Guru Vasishtha. Fact is that the focusing of a religious tradition in a single person (who was subsequently deified, with the Gods as his servants) is not attested in Vedic literature, which is apaurusheya, "impersonal", part of a hoary tradition not attributed to any single individual."

Sure, but a prime focus of the pre-Buddhist scriptures is invocation of and sacrifices to the various devas. The Buddha pointed out the worthlessness of this practice.

"The Guru is venerated in his impersonal capacity as an embodiment of the realized Self; it is not the person but the universal Brahman which is venerated through him."

But you end up with this.

"Hindus may hold it against the Buddha that he disturbed the world order by focusing exclusively on the "liberation from suffering" through meditation (implicitly disparaging the validity of all non-spiritual pursuits)"

They may, but they would be ignorant. Meditation is only part of the Noble Eightfold Path. As I noted above, thinking correctly (or striving towards it) is a vital element, and there are others equally important. Following the Noble Eightfold Path trains the individual.

Quoting Coomaraswamy: "'The Buddha in a majority of fundamentals does not differ from the Atmanists, although he gives a far clearer statement of the law of causality as the essential mark of the world of Becoming. The greater part of his polemic, however, is wasted in a misunderstanding.' The 'misunderstanding' concerns the seeming opposition between the Upanishadic notion of Self (âtman) and the Buddhist doctrine of Non-Self (anatta/anâtman)."

We will see! Buddhism basically ignores Hindu metaphysics (see fourteen unanswerable questions) and produces its own in Mahayana (though below I note that the Brahmajala Sutta can be seen as a refutation of the Atman doctrine). Indeed, much of this was developed in reaction to Buddhism: see below. The Buddha was amazing because he was so original and dynamic that he was able to start an entirely fresh approach, one which was eventually successful.

"Coomaraswamy explains that 'the distinction appeared clear enough to Gautama and his successors; but this was largely because the Brahmanism against which they maintained their polemic was after all merely the popular aspect of Brahmanism. From a study of the Buddha’s dialogues it would appear that he never encountered a capable exponent of the highest Vedantic idealism, such a one as Yajnavalkya or Janaka (…) It appeared to Gautama and his followers then and now that the highest truths-especially the truth embodied by Buddhists in the phrase Anatta-lay rather without than within the Brahmanical circle.' To Coomaraswamy, however, the same truth was present in the Upanishads, 'where the truth was held, that the Atman is ‘not so, not so’'".

Maybe it is there, but the mesage is ineffective.

"At first sight nothing can appear more definite than the opposition of the Buddhist An-atta, ‘no-Atman’, and the Brahman Atman, the sole reality. But in using the same term, Atta or Atman, Buddhist and Brahman are talking of different things, and when this is realized, it will be seen that the Buddhist disputations on this point lose nearly all their value."

They were not disputing that doctrine directly. Indeed, the monism of Brahman may be a post-Buddha reaction to Buddhism: [1]. However, anatta is the advice to not conceive of any Self, and that is exactly what Atmanists do. More below.

"The Self being pure subject, it cannot be the passive object of knowledge, and in that sense it is unknowable, but in a state of kaivalya ("isolation [of consciousness from its objects]", to use Patanjali’s term) or enstasis, it is subject and object at the same time."

This is an abuse of the word "conscious." The Sikh Gurus also recognized this chink in the advaitin armor and solved it by making it clear that the ultimate reality is a person.

"But, Coomaraswamy observes, there was no dearth of people who had mistaken or non-Upanishadic notions about the Self (equating it with the body, or the brain, or the sense of individual identity, or a transmigrating personality complex called soul), and it is from such people that the Buddha acquired a mistaken understanding of the Self too: 'Either Gautama was only acquainted with popular Brahmanism, or he chose to ignore its higher aspects. At any rate, those whom he defeats in controversy so easily are mere puppets who never put forward the doctrine of the unconditional Self at all. Gautama meets no foeman worthy of his steel, and for this reason the greater part of Buddhist polemic is unavoidably occupied in beating the air. This criticism applies as much to modern as to ancient exposition.'"

The Buddha made it clear that his mission was primarily to the masses. He chose to ignore the metaphysics, except for a refutation of the Atman doctrine. He states in the Dhammapada (verse 279): "Sabbe dhammaa anattaa (all dhammas are without self)." As Rahula relates, the word "dhamma" in Buddhist discourse encompasses all phenomena, including even Nirvana. This is an unequivocal statement that there is no self to be found anywhere: there are more statements to this effect scattered throughout the canon. Another attack on the Atman theory can be deduced from the Majjima Nikaya (see below). The Buddha declared that questions of metaphysics only lead to frustration and anxiety, and proclaimed a pragmatic message. Those who choose not to address certain issues instead of asserting their authority are worthy of respect.

"The confusion need not be blamed on the followers, but may be traced to the Master himself: "The ‘further shore’ is a symbol of salvation used by both parties; in the Tevijja Sutta Gautama suggests that it is employed by the Brahmans to mean union with Brahma (in the masculine [= as a theistic conception of a Divine Person]), whereas he himself means Arahatta [= Enlightenment]. if he really understood the Atmanist position in this manner, it proves that he spoke without knowledge; if he assumed that this was the Brahman position for the purposes of argument, he was guilty of deliberate dishonesty. The latter view should not be entertained. But it is undeniable that Gautama’s dialogue is largely determined by controversial necessity. The compilers of the Dialogues had to represent the Buddha as victorious in argument, and they succeed by setting up a dummy which it is easy to demolish, while the object of nominal attack, the Atman theory, is never attacked.""

Actually it is Coomaraswamy who is constructing a straw-man. The Buddha's main attack on views is expounded in the Brahmajala ("great net") Sutta. It is not clear to me why Coomaraswamy assumes that the Buddha was addressing the highest expression of Atmanist thought in the Tevijja Sutta. Rhys Davids finds that this sutta was inserted later as an attack on the Upanishadic theory of Brahman. They do seem to attack a straw-man, but this may have been intentional as many of the arguments carry over. In any case, the desire for union with a chosen deity was widespread, and Coomaraswamy already admitted that the popular conception of the atman was quite different. It may be that the Buddha was attacking widespread misconceptions among Brahmans (and we can safely assume that he encountered them in abundance). Given Elst's admission that the Buddha purposefully left metaphysical questions unanswered this could be the correct explanation. Further, Coomaraswamy indicates an understanding of the fact that the Buddha did not write the Pali canon, and so we cannot assume it is entirely accurate. This distinction seems lost on Elst. In focusing his attack on Buddhism at the Buddha as portrayed in the Pali canon, Elst has no hope of succeeding, because most Buddhists do not use the Pali canon, but the Mahayana sutras. Now, I will indicate why the Buddha's arguments in the Brahmajala Sutta do attack the Upanishadic Atman theory. The import of this sutta is that any attempt to conceive of a Self traps one in samsara. As I noted above, the Atman theory of the Upanishads is such an attempt. Now more specifically, start here and then look at the fourth category of Ekacca Sassata Ditthi here. The Buddha seems to be saying that identifying any of the three more abstract skandhas as the eternal Self is an incorrect view. That could be seen as an attack on the Atman theory, in which the self is the same as Brahman, which is infinite consciousness. For example according to Swami Nirmalananda Giri here, "the Self is the actionless consciousness that experiences the intellect, mind, senses, and body." Yogic techniques seem to isolate consciousness, which can then be identified as the eternal Self, ground of all being, etc. The Atman theory is that the Self is the essence of the Universe is infinite consciousness. I.e., the consciousness of the individual is the Self. The Buddha specifically catches that view in the great net. The Buddha himself indicated that he experienced this infinite consciousness in the Majjhima Nikaya, in which he again adumbrates anatta. Also see this discussion of the Buddha's Lion's roar. Further, as I noted above, the pronouncements of the Buddha in the Pali canon do not bind the thought of Buddhists in the way other scriptures affect adherents of other religions. The great Indian thinker Nagarjuna further elaborated on the Buddha's assault on all views.

"Gautama constantly accuses others of eel-wrigging, but in the Dialogues he adopts the same method himself. (…) words are interpreted in new senses. In particular, the word atta (Atman) is used in a different sense from that of the Brahman Atmanists, and thus an easy victory is secured by ‘thinking of something else’."

The Buddha was addressing the masses. They used the word atta in the way he deconstructed. We have to keep in mind that the Buddha was alive in the middle of the Upanishadic period and then, as now, Upanishadic ideas were not widespread among the masses. It is likely that then even the Upanishadic connotations of terms were not widespread.

"we find in point of fact that the essential thought of the Upanishads is never grasped by the Early Buddhists, and, is sometimes but obscurely apprehended by modern exponents."

Why should they bother with it? Buddhist thought is much more exact than the Upanishads. The rishis could not make informed statements about ultimate reality without understanding phenomenology, and the first to do that was the Buddha. Shankara's watered-down Mahayana cleaned it up.

"Implicit in Brahman thought from an early period (…) and forming the most marked features of later Indian mysticism-achieved also in the Mahayana, but with greater difficulty-is the conviction that ignorance is maintained only by attachment, and not by such actions as are void of purpose and self-reference; and the thought that This and That world, Becoming and Being, are seen to be one by those in whom ignorance is destroyed."

This is false, this is essential to the Buddha's original message. Coomaraswamy misrepresents Mahayana thought, which views "being" as a very problematic concept.

"The distinctions between early Buddhism and Upanishadic Brahmanism, however practically important, are thus merely temperamental; fundamentally there is absolute agreement that bondage consists in the thought of I and Mine, and that this bondage may be broken only for those in whom all craving is extinct."

Sure.

"Buddhism is exclusively concerned with moksha, whereas Brahmanism has a vision concerning the other goals of life (purushârtha) as well: sensuous enjoyment (kâma), worldly success (artha), and playing one’s part in the larger scheme of things (dharma). The latter notion means both doing the duties befitting one’s status, qualities and station in life, and participating in the cosmic cycles through ritual (e.g. participating in the year cycle by celebrating the seasonal festivals, a cornerstone of every religion)."

Sensuous enjoyment and wordly success are clearly empty of inherent content. By understanding this, the Buddhist paradoxically experiences pleasure at a higher level. Dharma is an essential component of the Buddha's message. In fact it is the essence of the message.

"As Coomaraswamy observes: "In comparing Buddhism (the teaching of Gautama, that is) with Brahmanism, we have then to understand and take into account the difference of the problem to be solved. Gautama is concerned with salvation and nothing but salvation: the Brahmans likewise see in that summum bonum the ultimate significance of all existence, but they also take into account the things of relative importance; theirs is a religion both of Eternity and Time, while Gautama looks upon Eternity alone. it is not really fair to Gautama or to the Brahmans to contrast their Dharma; for they do not seek to cover the same ground. We must compare the Buddhist ethical ideal with the (identical) standard of Brahmanhood expected of the Brahman born; we must contrast the Buddhist monastic system with the Brahmanical orders; the doctrine of Anatta with the doctrine of Atman, and here we shall find identity. (…) Buddhism stands for a restricted ideal, which contrasts with Brahmanism as a pars contrasts with the whole"."

I have already explained the truth of the doctrine of dukkha. Assuming that and the equality of all beings, we understand that the Buddha's message is for all people. Elst might italicize statements that justify his clinging to clinging, but a more realist (and righteously sobering) view is that of the Buddha. I should also note that while the Atman doctrine can lead to deconstruction of the phenomenonological self (and did in advaita), the Anatta doctrine is this deconstruction. The postulation of an inherent Self is alien to Buddhist thought, and is incompatible with the higher forms of Mahayana philosophy. I link to pages below that give some indication of this.

"In spite of this common view, a difference develops in its practical conclusions: "Where a difference of outlook appears is in the fact that the Buddha is content with this conclusion, and condemns all further speculation as [unedifying]; and thus, like Sankara, he excludes for ever a reconciliation of eternity and time, of religion with the world."

Coomaraswamy, like Elst, cannot shed his attachment to impermanent, subjective phenomena. By truly understanding them, deeper happiness is possible.

Now attacking advaita: "But the interpretation of the term Maya to signify the absolute nonentity of the phenomenal world, if it belongs to the Vedanta at all (which is to be doubted: the conception of the absolute nonentity of the phenomenal world is entirely contrary to many passages in Brhadârânyaka and Chândogya, as well as to the Brahma Sûtra 1:2, which asserts that ‘Everything is Brahman’ (…)), is comparatively late; and even in the Rigveda (10:90) we find another thought expressed, in which the whole universe is identified with the ‘Eternal Male’ [= Purusha], afterwards a recognized symbol of the Atman. The same idea finds many expressions in the Upanishads, notably in the saying ‘That art Thou’."

The Eternal Male is actually more in line with Vishishtadvaita and Dvaita. The Upanishads are, as noted, very inconsistent, and lend themselves to theism just as easily as to non-dualism (in my mind).

"This, then, is the proper and original understanding of Upanishadic monism: that the relative and the absolute, the world of form and the formless, the sensorial world and the Brahman, are somehow two states of a single essence, both equally real."

So now the transcendent Brahman is also transcended! Another chink in the armor.

"There is thus asserted from two points of view an irreconcilable opposition of Becoming and Being, Samsâra and Nirvâ?a, This and That. Over against these extremes there appears another doctrine of the Mean, entirely distinct from that of Gautama which merely asserts that Becoming, and not either Being nor non-Being is the mark of this world. This other Mean asserts that the Sole Reality, the Brahman, subsists, not merely as non-Becoming, but also as Becoming (…). In truth, there are two forms of Brahman, that is to say-‘The formed and the unformed, the mortal and the immortal, the abiding and the fleeting, the being and the beyond’. (Brhadâranyaka Upanishad 2:3:1) The Brahman is not merely nirguna, ‘in no wise’, but also sarvaguna, ‘in all wise’; and he is saved-attains Nirvana, knows the Brahman-who sees that these are one and the same, that the two worlds are one. (…) Here the phenomenal world is not without significance, but has just so much significance as the degree of our enlightenment allows us to discover in it.""

We see the effective dualism.

"The similarity with the Mahayana-Buddhist Heart Sutra is more than superficial: "Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form." Here, Mahayana absorbs the Vedic vision, transcending the Buddhist dualistic view pitting emptiness (Nirvana) against form (equated with suffering). As in some other respects, Mahayana appears here as a partial return of Buddhism to its Vedic roots."

He would do well to study the Heart Sutra. The Buddhist dualistic view (the pre-Mahayana view, I assume) is in no way dualistic, and there is no identification of nirvana with emptiness or form with suffering. Suffering and imperfection are caused by false understanding of reality, which gives rise to grasping at illusory form. His last sentence is completely unjustified as he has never demonstrated any Vedic roots of Buddhism. Mahayana is in fact the fulfillment of the Buddha's good news.

"Buddhism extols celibate monkhood above the state of the householder, and makes the latter the ancilla of the former, viz. for providing novices and food to the monastic order."

This is not true in Mahayana practice. Married people are allowed the full initiation except the oaths of celibacy. There is no doctrinal stance.

"The aesthetician Coomaraswamy may understandably not be inclined to world-renunciation, but he ought to consider the possibility that achieving liberation through meditation is a full-time job, one which just happens to be factually incompatible with a worldly career. The latter may be worthwhile in a relative sense, and Coomaraswamy could certainly wax eloquent about the refined mental states needed for and developed by an artist’s creative activity, but that is just not the same thing as the liberation achieved by silent meditation."

There is some truth here. Elst is somewhat preoccupied with meditation. Mahayana proclaims that even seeking nirvana is empty (linking this at the same time giving a thorough exposition of the dharma of ethics).

"I venture to doubt that Karma Yoga (work free from attachment to the fruits of the work) and Bhakti Yoga (devotion) can yield the same spiritual results as Jnana Yoga (meditation)."

Obviously.

"The own-dharma is a form of morality appropriate to the individual according to his social and spiritual position."

It is not right to view social position as a fetter. This Hindu cannot shed his attachment to the caste system, though every religion arising from Hinduism has expressed disapproval of it. Buddhism is the path for everyone.

Upanishadic thought is an array of interesting, contradictory theories. Mahayana analyzes all phenomena and finds them to be empty of inherent content. Read the article on atman (Buddhism) for an introduction. As such, imputing some kind of inherent existence to anything (including the self) is an unnecessary metaphysical appendage, and thinking of it deludes one into duality. This very interesting excerpt from David Loy's thesis is worth reading at this point.

Elst seems to be a defender of Vedic culture against threats to it. I applaud him for his devotion to a worthy cause. I will note that Buddhism is a more mature option, and by viewing it from a Vedic-centered standpoint he has misunderstood it entirely. Aside from keeping related ideas of karma and reincarnation, the Buddha worked from the ground up. It does seem to be the case that in the advanced mystic states, unconditioned consciousness is all that remains (though without object, this consciousness is also not consciousness). The rishis made the mistake of identifying this state with ultimate reality. The Buddha took the techniques of yoga one step further by advocating detachment even from any conception of self or reality. By focusing on the journey instead of the goal, the Buddha eliminated all grasping. Regarding mystic consciousness, Buddhism has taken a more careful approach. Mahayana scholars have termed this quality Buddha-nature. Instead of equating this with a hypothetical ultimate reality, Buddhists understand that even this state is essentially characterized by shunyata. It exists in so far as it is conceptualized (it is form), but no more than that (it is emptiness). How could one say that Void exists? Thus, as with all "entities," its ontological status is between existence and non-existence. Being is emptiness, and emptiness should be cherished as the Buddha-nature essence of all being.

I conclude with a quote from Red Pine's exegesis of the Heart Sutra: