User:Arnoutf/80yrswarcutout
The date for the formal start of hostilities is often cited as the execution of the statesmen Lamoral, Count of Egmont and Philip de Montmorency, Count of Hoorn, on the main square in Brussels on June 5, 1568. This execution (for their protest against the Spanish Inquisition) was the beginning of a wave of destruction (Spaanse furie), seen as a counter-attack to the Beeldenstorm, by Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 3rd Duke of Alba across all of the provinces, ending poetically four years later in the total destruction of Lamoral's home in the (far) north, Egmond Castle, along with the neighbouring abbey.
Leader of the Dutch Revolt
[edit]After the executions of the Counts of Egmond and Horne, the revolt was left to be led by their former partner (also former governor of these lands), William the Silent. He had been targeted for execution along with his colleagues, but having somewhat more diplomatic intelligence (he had been groomed as governor by Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and grown up with his son Philip II, and therefore knew him, his country, and his politics well), he managed to stay a step ahead of his persecutors, and he escaped capture. He was only finally murdered by a spy in 1584.
Diplomatic recognition
[edit]The young republic gained some diplomatic recognition when the two belligerents contracted the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609. International diplomatic recognition did not occur however until 1638 with the state visit to Amsterdam by Marie de' Medici, who herself was on the run, though the Dutch council did not know it at the time. When the truce failed to lead to a satisfactory peace treaty in 1619, the conflict resumed in the form of a conventional war between the Dutch Republic and the Spanish Empire which developed parallel with the Thirty Years' War (though it was not formally part of the latter). Beyond the European Theatre, the war was also fought in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies overseas.
New border between North and South
[edit]The Dutch Republic made some territorial gains in the Spanish Netherlands but did not succeed in regaining the entire territory lost before 1590. The end result of the war therefore was a permanent split of the Habsburg Netherlands into two parts that roughly corresponded with present-day Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg. Overseas, the Dutch Republic gained (through the intermediary of its two chartered companies, the United East India Company and the Dutch West India Company) important colonial possessions, largely at the expense of Portugal. The peace settlement was part of the comprehensive 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which formally separated the Dutch Republic from the Holy Roman Empire. In the course of the conflict, and as a consequence of its fiscal-military innovations, the Dutch Republic emerged as a Great Power, whereas the Spanish Empire lost its European hegemonic status.
Orange's problems with his creditors were intensified when he started to take an active interest in the French Wars of Religion in November, 1568. In that month he led an easily dispersed Huguenot incursion into France. Of course, developments in France were of eminent importance for the Protestant cause in the Netherlands also, and members of both religious blocs mutually supported each other in both countries. Orange and his brothers joined the army of the Prince de Condé in 1569. Orange returned to Germany later in the year, but his brother Louis remained in France. After the Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in August, 1570 he joined the Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny in a hare-brained scheme to promote French unity by invading the Netherlands.
Like his predecessors, Philip had to ceremonially affirm those constitutional documents (like the Joyous Entry of Brabant) before his accession to the ducal throne. Beyond these constitutional guarantees, the balance of power between local and central government was guaranteed by the dependence of the central government on extraordinary levies (Beden) granted by the States-General when ordinary tax revenues fell short of the financing requirements of the central government (which occurred frequently, due to the many wars Charles waged).
Though he was in the Netherlands[1] in January, 1556,
, as he had to divide his attentions between England (where he was king-consort of Mary I of England), the Netherlands, and Spain. He therefore appointed
had legally defined heresy as "treason against God" (or lèse-majesté divine) an "exceptional crime" that was outside the purview of normal legal procedures as laid down in the Netherlandish legal privileges. He therefore
more than 1,300 people were executed as heretics, far more relative to population, than for instance in France
In the province of Holland, for instance, there were riots in the late 1550s during which the mob freed condemned persons before their execution
, issuing from the Council of Trent,
that were traditionally in the gift of the high aristocracy. The new bishops were to take the lead in the enforcement of the anti-heresy placards and to intensify the Inquisition
that were traditionally in the gift of the high aristocracy. The new bishops were to take the lead in the enforcement of the anti-heresy placards and to intensify the Inquisition
at an audience for about 300 members of the Compromise which Margaret found rather intimidating. (According to legend the petitioners were dismissed as gueux (beggars) by one of Margaret's courtiers; the rebels would later use that name as a rallying cry). Margaret was sufficiently impressed to order the suspension of the placards pending Philip's final decision on April 9.
Many returned from exile. Calvinists started to organize open-air sermons outside the city walls of many cities. Though these meetings were peaceful, their size alone caused anxiety for the authorities, especially as some of the people attending bore arms. Then, the situation deteriorated rapidly. On August 1, 1566, 2000 armed Calvinists tried to force entry to the walled town of Veurne. Shortly thereafter Calvinist weavers from the industrial area around Ypres attacked churches and destroyed religious statuary.
The authorities at first did not react. The central government was especially disturbed by the fact that in many cases the civic militias refused to intervene. This seemed to portend insurrection.
However, news travelled slowly and the court in Madrid had received a rather exaggerated impression of the severity of the situation. In September, 1566 Philip had decided to travel himself to the Netherlands to restore order, but debate among the two factions at the Spanish court, led by the Duke of Alba and the Prince of Eboli, about the advisability of this journey grew fierce. Eventually it was decided to send an army from Italy under the command of Alba. Margaret's emissary arrived at the court on April 17, 1567, the same day when Alba departed on his mission, too late to prevent the fateful intervention
Alba's army of about 10,000 Spanish and Italian mercenaries reached the Netherlands by way of the Spanish Road in August, 1567. Alba was supposed to act as military governor-general, while Margaret would remain in office as Regent. Alba acted in such a presumptuous way, however, that Margaret soon resigned in protest. Alba thereafter was in sole command.
. The victims of the repression were found in all social strata. A total of about 9,000 people were eventually convicted by the council, though only 1,000 were actually executed, as many managed to go into exile. One of the latter was Orange, who forfeited his extensive possessions in the Netherlands, like most of the people being proscribed. The victims were not necessarily only Protestants. For instance, the Counts of Egmont and Horne,
The many exiles found asylum in the few areas in neighboring countries that welcomed Calvinists, like the Huguenot areas in France, England, and Emden or Wesel in Germany. Many were ready to join an armed fight, but the fate of the rebels at Oosterweel had shown that irregular forces did not stand a chance against well-disciplined troops. A better organized effort was needed and to lead such an effort Orange was uniquely well-placed. As a sovereign prince of the Holy Roman Empire[2] Orange was in a sense the equal of Philip, in his capacity of Count of Holland, for instance. Orange was therefore entirely within his rights to make war on Philip (or, as he for the moment preferred, on Philip's "bad advisor" Alba). This was important in a diplomatic context as it legitimized Orange's efforts to hire mercenaries in the principalities of his German "colleagues," and enabled him to issue letters of marque to the many Calvinist seamen who had embarked on a career of piracy from economic desperation. Such letters elevated the latter, the so-called Sea Beggars, to the status of privateers, which enabled the authorities in neutral countries, like the England of Elizabeth I of England, to accommodate them without legal embarrassment.[3]
eanwhile, Alba force-marched north and defeated Louis at Jemmingen. While this happened, Orange himself had assembled an army of 30,000 German mercenaries. He now proceeded to invade Brabant, but soon experienced opposition from the towns and cities on his route, who refused to open their gates to his army. Alba, having returned from the north, blocked his way to Brussels, but refused battle in a Fabian strategy, confident that Orange's money would soon run out. Finances were indeed Orange's Achilles heel, as he had difficulty borrowing sufficient funds for lack of collateral, in view of the forfeiture of his Dutch lands. Within a month (after the Battle of Jodoigne), Orange's army started to melt away
t Alba had financial problems of his own. At the time, Philip was in the middle of an expensive war with the Ottoman Empire, and up to the Battle of Lepanto (1571) was so hard pressed that he could not afford the additional cost of the army of occupation in the Netherlands. Besides, Philip did not see why the Netherlands themselves should not pay for the restoration of order.
After he ran out of regular revenue in 1569, Alba convened the States-General to arrange for permanent financing for his army. He proposed a number of new permanent taxes: the tenth penny on all sales, and the twentieth penny on sales of real property. The States-General would agree only to a one-off hundredth penny on the value of real property, however. Even this tax was so unpopular that it proved later almost impossible to collect.[4]
Alba went against the States General 's financial difficulties forced him to keep pressing for permanent taxes, instead of the temporary subsidies the several provincial States granted him to fend off his designs to loosen their financial grip on the state. When the States-General continued to resist his demand for the tenth and twentieth pennies, he resorted to an attempt to unilaterally impose those by decree on July 31, 1571. This "taxation without representation" would prove to be a more important way to unite the country in opposition against the Spanish Crown than the religious question ever was. Alba's high-handed attempts to collect the taxes in the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht, for instance, where local officials were threatened with high fines for refusing to allow collection of the taxes, and also in Flanders and Brabant, put the local magistrates in personal danger of mob violence if they complied with those attempts. Alba's policies in this way opened up a serious breach between the central government and even loyal provincial and local governments.[5] 's financial difficulties forced him to keep pressing for permanent taxes, instead of the temporary subsidies the several provincial States granted him to fend off his designs to loosen their financial grip on the state. When the States-General continued to resist his demand for the tenth and twentieth pennies, he resorted to an attempt to unilaterally
Ironically, the two taxes were never successfully implemented. But the obduracy of Alba in pursuing their introduction alienated even the ultra-loyalist Catholics, who had no objection against his other repressive measures. By the Summer of 1572, Alba finally relented, but it was too late then to repair the damage. The failure to find a permanent solution for Spain's problems in financing the army of occupation, on the other hand, would in the longer term prove an even greater threat to her grip on the Netherlands.[6]
The decision proved to be fateful in view of a setback for the Orangist case in England. The Sea Beggars in that country outwore their tenuous welcome there when they continued their attacks on neutral shipping, especially of the Hanseatic League. When the Hanseatic ambassador complained to Elizabeth, she decided to expel the Sea Beggars. This coincided with the withdrawal from the Brill garrison and the Sea-Beggar leaders Willem Bloys van Treslong and Lumey in their desperation for a new base decided to take that city. They
the royal stadtholder of Holland (who had replaced Orange in 1567) The insurrection now had a (tenuous) territorial foothold on Dutch territory.
Even more important proved developments in the sister province of Zeeland.
to rise against the Walloon garrison on April 6. They asked Treslong to send reinforcements from Brill, which arrived April 20. Flushing was one of the two Marquessates Orange had bought at auction in 1558[7]. The other one was
The conceit was that Orange was still the legitimate representative of Philip in the two provinces, as he had been before 1567. The question was whether the local authorities would play along with this conceit
Surprisingly, with some prodding from the Sea Beggars and local civic militias and Orangist activists, many did.
Orange's representative in North Holland,
in two months' time in a combination of persuasion and armed force, managed , all members of the States of Holland. In South Holland t
Boussu tried to turn the tide by convening the States in The Hague for late July. But the rebel majority of the cities convened their own session of the States in Dordrecht[8]. When Philip Marnix of St.-Aldegonde presented his credentials as Orange's ambassador to this first session of the Rebel States of Holland in Dordrecht on July 18, only the important merchant city of Amsterdam, and Schoonhoven held out as members of the States for the Crown. Rotterdam, temporarily held by Boussu, sent its representatives soon after. Only Delft (the second city in importance) remained neutral for the time being.[9]
. When Philip Marnix of St.-Aldegonde presented his credentials as Orange's ambassador to this first session of the Rebel States of Holland in Dordrecht on
The events in Holland and Zeeland triggered a wave of revolts in other northern provinces. Gelderland was invaded by
was still busy in France. He crossed the border into the Netherlands with a small Huguenot army and managed to take the fortress city of
At the time Alba was severely short of funds to pay his mercenaries, and he had to take out a personal loan to persuade a few German regiments to put Mons under siege in June. On the other hand, Orange personally assembled an army of 13,500 men at Venlo to come to his brother's aid in early July, despite his own severe financial difficulties. However, the Rebel States of Holland sent him a bond for 500,000 pounds in early August, the first instance of the financial intervention that kept the Rebellion alive during many difficult years. When Orange crossed the Meuse River on his way to relieve his brother in Mons, many cities opened their gates to him, unlike his experience in 1568. While Alba pressed the siege, Orange arrived near Mons on September 12. Learning that his camp was poorly guarded, Alba surprised him with a night attack the next night, which forced Orange to withdraw by way of
Louis now surrendered Mons honorably (i.e. without his troops being made prisoners of war). In any case, the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in France on August 23, 1572 had dealt such a crushing blow to the Huguenot cause that for the moment no aid could be expected from that quarter. Alba now decided to make an example of Mechelen. He allowed his troops to sack Mechelen in a three-day frenzy of murder, rape and pillage, starting September 29. This had the intended effect on other cities that had shown signs of sympathy for the Orangist cause. They hastened to pledge their renewed loyalty. This kind of exemplary punishment of entire cities would soon become a policy of the Spanish army
To understand the nature of Alba's campaign to reconquer the Rebel provinces a short digression on the military terrain in Holland is in order. It is well-known that Holland is one of the few inhabited areas in the world that are "below sealevel." This does not mean that Holland would fill up like a bath tub if the sea gained entry. As a matter of fact, the sea is only a serious threat during severe storms when the tides reach extraordinary heights. In normal times, the real danger comes from above: the low-lying areas have difficulty draining precipitation. In the 16th century, when the technology to efficiently drain those areas was still lacking, Holland was therefore covered with extensive shallow lakes, while the slightly higher land in between consisted of waterlogged bogs. Difficult terrain for an army to manoeuvre in, in other words. In practice, a marching army had to use the elevated dike roads along water courses to get around in this country, and these narrow venues were easy to choke off by a determined enemy. Both the royalist and the rebel army therefore made extensive use of sconces, often apparently in the middle of nowhere, to deny their opponents freedom of movement.
On the other hand, though an obstacle to a land army, a watercourse may be a transport route for one equipped with (shallow-draft) vessels. Both sides therefore tried to use water craft to circumvent each other, often while at the same time blocking the other side with new water impediments. It is important to understand, that in this war at least the rebel side did not passively accept the terrain, but actively tried to change it dynamically by inundating large areas. This was possible, because of the fact that the area has lots of subdivisions of varying depth (so-called polders), surrounded by dikes that enabled the inhabitants to manage the water table. Breaching a dike would allow water from higher areas to fill up adjoining lower areas, in theory. In practice much depended on the time of year, as water was lacking in Summer, and also the direction of the prevailing wind often frustrated attempts to speedily inundate areas.
Finally it is important to remember that even in the 16th century Holland was already highly urbanized with most of the approximately 500,000 inhabitants living in towns and cities. The cities were generally walled, but the fortifications were in 1572 still of the old-fashioned Medieval variety, with curtain walls that were vulnerable to siege artillery. The architecture of the trace italienne had not yet penetrated Holland as it would soon do. Cities had their civic militias, but these were mainly used to keep order, and were of dubious value in case of a military conflict, like a siege. However, the Dutch militias already used a relatively high number of fire-arms, more so than the Spanish infantry that still mainly relied on pike men. Dutch cities already heavily relied on foreign trade for their food supply, as the surrounding countryside was more suited to dairy farming (and hence cheese production) than wheat growing. The reliance on Baltic grain, however, again made the cities vulnerable to sieges and starvation tactics.
He then proceeded along the coast of the Zuiderzee toward Amsterdam, which loyal city he intended to use as a base for an assault on Holland proper. On the way he encountered the small town of Naarden (not a fortress at the time) which surrendered on November 22, 1572. Fadrique decided that setting an example was in order, and he allowed all citizens (including the Catholic priest) to be herded into their church, which was subsequently set on fire. All 3,000 citizens perished. Contrary to his expectations, this imbued the cities he would next besiege with an unreasonable tenacity in their resistance, born from desperation. The atrocity may well have doomed his efforts at pacification[10]
decided that setting an example was in order, and he Contrary to his expectations, this imbued the cities he would next besiege with an unreasonable tenacity in their resistance, born from desperation. The atrocity may well have doomed his efforts at pacification
Next, Fadrique approached the city of Haarlem by way of the dike road along the IJ river and the Haarlem lake, then still a large inland lake. The city had recently been reinforced with mercenary troops in the pay of the Rebel States. When Fadrique laid siege in early December, the city council secretly tried to capitulate, but
Several attempts of rebel mercenary forces, sent by Lumey and Orange to relieve the city, were repelled by the besiegers. Meanwhile, Fadrique's siege artillery repeatedly reduced sections of the city's curtain wall to rubble, and repeatedly the defenders filled these breaches with makeshift ramparts during the following nights. They made good use of their fire-arms in repelling two Spanish attempts to take the city by storm in December, 1572, and January, 1573.
Starving the defenders therefore seemed the only way to success. During the Winter months, when the waterways were frozen over, the city was adequately supplied with sleds crossing the ice. However, when thaw set in Fadrique was the first to use the weapon of inundation. He had the IJ dike cut, which allowed Amsterdam war galleys to bring in men to build an important earthwork to neutralize a pesky Haarlem fort, called the Vig, that was successfully defended by Walloon and Scottish mercenaries. To counter this move, Orange brought together a fleet of a hundred lake vessels manned with volunteers in April, 1573. This naval attempt was, however, beaten back and Haarlem was effectively cut off. An overland attempt with a large force of rebel volunteers was ambushed by the besiegers with large loss of life on the rebel side in July. Haarlem, near starvation, therefore surrendered on terms on
buying off a sack with a large indemnity. The denial of their well-deserved sack of the city prompted Fadrique's soldiers to stage a month-long mutiny to protest their arrears in pay, during which they amused themselves by drowning the hapless garrison in the Spaarne river, though they left the citizens alone
more so as the province of Holland was now effectively cut in two at the middle. However, the siege had taken so long that the Spanish campaign had lost momentum and other centers of resistance had had time to improve their defenses.
more so as the province of Holland was now effectively cut in two at the middle. However, the siege had taken so long that the Spanish campaign had lost momentum and other centers of resistance had had
in the North of Holland where he failed to rush the gate, while the defenders at the exact same time were reinforced with mercenaries. When Orange subsequently ordered the
This excursion was an additional waste of time anyway, as North Holland was of secondary importance strategically.
in South Holland, just as his father surrendered the reins of government to the new governor-general Philip had appointed, Requesens. Leiden had relatively few professional troops in town, so here the defense relied mostly on the civic militia. The siege actually encompassed two phases, the first one ending in March, 1574, when the besiegers temporarily lifted the siege to deal with an incursion into Limburg by a mercenary force led by Orange's brothers Louis and Henry of Nassau-Dillenburg. The rebel mercenary forces were slightly more numerous than the Spanish troops under Sancho d'Avila that Requesens sent to oppose them. The opposing forces battled on April 14, 1574 on the Mookerheyde and the ill-disciplined German mercenaries of the Nassaus were routed. Both of Orange's brothers died in the field.[11]
, now under command of Francisco de Valdez. Orange now decided to take out all the stops. He asked the States of Holland in a session on June 1 to assemble a field army of volunteers to help lift the new siege of Leiden. The States had more confidence in strengthening the city garrisons and despite Orange's threat of resignation voted only increased funding for the garrisons. Orange would have to save Leiden without an army in the field. Meanwhile, Valdez had been taking precautions against flooding the countryside around Leiden by posting guard forces on the IJ dike and the Meuse-river dike near Vlaardingen. As inundation now was Orange's only option, he had to breach the river dikes further upriver and along the Hollandse IJssel river. This had the disadvantage that water would have to flow against prevailing westerly winds from the relatively low-lying polders around Delft and Schiedam to the slightly more elevated drainage district of Rijnland around Leiden. The States authorised this on July 31, 1574, promising compensation to the affected peasants and landowners. Those peasants nevertheless objected often violently. In Gouda the garrison of English mercenaries was employed to open the sluice gates as the civic militia was not trusted to do this[12]
, now under command of Francisco de Valdez. Orange now decided to take out all the stops. He asked the States of Holland in a session on June 1 to assemble a field army of volunteers to help lift the new siege of Leiden. The States had more confidence in strengthening the city garrisons and despite Orange's threat of resignation voted only increased funding for the garrisons. Orange would have to save Leiden without an army in the field. Meanwhile, Valdez had been taking precautions against flooding the countryside around Leiden by posting guard forces on the IJ dike and the Meuse-river dike near Vlaardingen. As inundation now was Orange's only option, he had to breach the river dikes further upriver and along the Hollandse IJssel river. This had the disadvantage that water would have to flow against prevailing westerly winds from the relatively low-lying polders around Delft and Schiedam to the slightly more elevated drainage district of Rijnland around Leiden. The States authorised this on July 31, 1574, promising compensation to the affected peasants and landowners. Those peasants nevertheless objected often violently. In Gouda the garrison of English mercenaries was employed to open the sluice gates as the civic militia was not trusted to do this[13]
The water progressed only slowly. By early September progress stalled completely at the boundary between the Delfland and Rijnland drainage districts, which was formed by an elevated dike. This dike was defended by Valdez, so breaching it was difficult. However, on September 11, thirty-five galleys managed to breach the dike at an unguarded point and the water was allowed to progress again. Only when the wind changed at the end of September, however, did the depth of the inundations become sufficient to allow the rebel galleys to reach Leiden.
Though the sieges of Haarlem, Alkmaar, and especially Leiden are iconic in Dutch history, and they were strategic in the first stage of the war, their significance should not be overrated in a military sense. Spain had not been decisively defeated and would be back when invaded the province from the South, and in short order , mainly because the local magistrates disobeyed Orange's order to inundate the surroundings of their cities. This foray was dangerous, but once the inundation weapon was successfully deployed Hierges was forced to retreat
Hierges' appointment had followed the capture of Boussu in the important naval Battle on the Zuiderzee of October 11, 1573, in which a royalist fleet was defeated by a Sea-Beggar squadron under Cornelis Jansz Dircks. This result rendered the Zuider Zee "a rebel lake," enabling them to blockade the loyal city of Amsterdam, which contributed decisively to it finally being reconciled with the States in 1578. The rebels had attained naval supremacy in Zeeland also, after their victories over royalist fleets in the Battle of Borsele and the Battle of Reimerswaal. The latter battle doomed the loyal city of Middelburg on Walcheren island, which had been under siege from rebel forces since the very beginning of the Rebellion in 1572, and had held out with the help of a Spanish garrison. This siege lasted even longer than the siege of Leiden. Middelburg surrendered in February, 1574 due to starvation.[14] However, this did not end the struggle for Zeeland. In the Summer of 1575 Requesens ordered Cristobal de Mondragon to attack the Zeeland city of Zierikzee, during which the Spanish troops made a daring portage across the shallow channel between Tholen and Schouwen-Duiveland.[15] The siege lasted until Zierikzee's surrender on July 2, 1576. The very same day the Spanish troops started a fateful mutiny. Their pay had been in arrears for two years, because Philip in fact had gone bankrupt. He actually defaulted on all government debts in September 1575 and his Genoese creditors understandably did not extend further credit under the circumstances.[16]
The Spanish mutineers abandoned their new-won prize, Zierikzee, and marched on the capital city, Brussels, on the way sacking the hapless city of Aalst. For the still-loyal majority of provinces, this was the straw that broke the camel's back. They had reluctantly backed the royal government against the Rebellion, but now their own safety was threatened. The Council of State, which was in sole charge of the country since March, 1576, when Requesens had suddenly died, now authorized the States of Brabant to raise troops to protect Brussels. This proved to be a mixed blessing. On September 4, Jacques de Glimes, a commander of these troops, staged a coup d'état in which he arrested the Council and purged it of its Spanish members. The government now passed into the hands of a cabal, led by Philipe de Croÿ, Duke of Aerschot, stadtholder of Flanders and an old rival of Orange from the early 1560s. Though nominally loyal to Philip the new Council allowed the States-General to be assembled on the initiative of the States of Brabant and Hainault (which the previous government had prohibited on the express orders of Philip). The States-General, without the two rebellious provinces, soon started peace negotiations with the States of Holland and Zeeland on the basis of abortive talks that had been held in Breda in 1575. These earlier talks had failed over the demand that all Spanish troops should be withdrawn, but now the parties could easily agree on this point. There was also agreement on the suspension of the placards against heresy and the demand that there should be freedom of conscience (as distinguished from freedom of worship). Freedom of worship was still a step too far for both the Holland Calvinists (who had prohibited the exercise of the Catholic religion in 1572) and the Catholics in the other provinces. The compromise, promoted by Orange, was that both religions should be tolerated side by side, and this principle appeared to be enshrined in the Pacification of Ghent, but the formulation was ambiguous, which caused many difficulties later. This peace treaty was speedily ratified by both parties when the Spanish mutineers went on a murderous rampage in the Brabant city of Antwerp on November 4, known as the "Spanish Fury."[17]
From Pacification of Ghent to Union of Utrecht (1576-1579)
[edit]The Spanish mutineers marched on Brussels, on the way sacking the city of Aalst. The loyal provinces, had reluctantly backed the royal government against the Rebellion so far, but now a loyal city had been sacked. With the death f Requesens the States of Brabant raised troops to protect Brussels. Philipe de Croÿ, Duke of Aerschot, stadtholder of Flanders took over governemtn and allowed the States-General soon started peace negotiations with the States of Holland and Zeeland agreeing on the demand that all Spanish troops should be withdrawn. There was also agreement on the suspension of the placards against heresy and freedom of conscience. The Pacification of Ghent was signed after the Spanish mutineers went on a murderous rampage in the city of Antwerp on November 4."[18] The entire Netherlands now appeared to be in rebellion against Philip, though all still professed loyalty. The next regent, Don Juan only arrived in the Netherlands on November 3, too late to influence events. The States-General induced Don Juan assent to the Pacification in the Perpetual Edict on February 12, 1577. The Spanish troops were withdrawn. to Italy (after having been paid off by the States-General). The Edict stated that the Catholic religion was to be maintained everywhere, but again the meaning of this statement was ambiguous: as the Catholic extremists interpreted the stipulation, it meant that Protestantism should eventually be eradicated even in Holland and Zeeland (the heretics being given a grace period to wind up their affairs and leave quietly). Such an interpretation was unacceptable to the States of Holland and Zeeland, who withdrew temporarily from the States-General and would henceforth keep aloof from its doings, even when Don Juan broke with the States-General in July, and fled to the safety of the citadel of Namur.[19]
Henceforth there would be four centers of power in the Netherlands, all tugging in a different direction: Don Juan, as the leader of the royalist faction, for the moment based in the provinces of Namur and Luxembourg, which both rejected the authority of the States-General; the States of Holland and Zeeland, with their Calvinist leadership, quietly going their own way, while paying lip service to Orange's leadership; the States-general under the leadership of the States of Brabant and a coalition of Orange and the Calvinists in Flanders and Brabant; and finally the faction of conservative Walloon nobles, temporarily allied with the States-General, but already looking askance at Orange and the "wild men" in Flanders and Holland. In view of later historiographical simplifications it is noteworthy that in this period Orange distanced himself slightly from the States of Holland and Zeeland, the latter taking a more and more particularist "Dutch" and intransigent Calvinist viewpoint, whereas Orange tried to unite the entire Netherlands. For that reason he often tended to take the view of Brabant, where he had been made ruwaard (lord Protector) at the behest of the Brussels mob in October, 1577[20] For the same reason, Orange promoted a policy of "religious peace" (meaning the toleration of the practice of both Catholicism and Calvinism side by side throughout the country), which unfortunately was unacceptable to diehards in both camps.[21]
After the flight of Don Juan, the faction around Aerschot in the States-General engineered the appointment of the younger brother of Emperor Rudolf II, Archduke Matthias, a cousin of Philip, as "alternate" governor-general of the Netherlands by the States-General.[20] This was done behind the back of Orange (who nevertheless accepted Matthias) and the States of Holland (who did not). Matthias would prove a pliable figurehead for the States-General government, but he did not bring any material advantages to the table, as his brother did not allow the possibly hoped-for military assistance.
Meanwhile Philip's financial difficulties were straightened out by the end of 1577.[22] This enabled him to send a new Spanish army from Italy, as usual by way of the Spanish Road, under the command of the son of the pre-1567 Regent, Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma. These troops arrived in January, 1578, and enabled Don Juan to go on the offensive. Soon they were venturing into the territory of the States-General, where they were blocked by an army of approximately equal strength under the former royal stadtholder of Holland, Count Boussu, who had become an adherent of the States-General. Exploiting a tactical error, Parma personally led a cavalry charge and routed the States-General's troops in the Battle of Gembloux on January 31, 1578. This victory allowed the royalist forces to advanced as far as Leuven, with opened its gates to them. The position of Brussels thus threatened, the States-General retreated to Antwerp. Orange now persuaded them to raise new troops. With a subsidy of Queen Elizabeth, who tentatively started fishing the muddied waters of the Netherlands, the Calvinist Count Palatine was engaged to raise an army. At the same time, Orange arranged for François, Duke of Anjou, the brother of king Henry III of France, to be recognized by the States-General as "protector," in exchange for 10,000 French troops. The Duke had already been in contact with an anti-Orange group of Walloon nobles, known as the Malcontents who hoped to use his services against the detested Calvinist forces that had temporarily seized power in Arras (then part of the Netherlands). Orange's move checkmated them for the moment. To forestall this double threat, Don Juan struck at the forces of Count Boussu at Rijmenam, where (after initial success against English mercenaries, commanded by Sir John Norreys) his troops suffered devastating casualties in a well-prepared ambush on August 2, 1578. Don Juan was now forced to retreat to Bouges near Namur. There he suddenly died on October 1, 1578.[23]
The forces of the States-General were not able to exploit this sudden advantage, however. Neither Anjou, nor the Count Palatine were able to control their ill-paid troops. Both soon left and their troops attached themselves to either the Malcontents, or the Calvinists at Ghent. This enabled Parma, who had succeeded Don Juan both as governor-general and as commander-in-chief, to embark on a dangerous offensive along the eastern border of the South Netherlands, northward to the formidable fortress of Maastricht. This city guarded a bridge across the Meuse river, which formed a strategic entry point from Germany into Guelders, and other provinces downstream. Parma carefully prepared the siege of this strategic prize. He first made a foray westward into Brabant, where he defeated the States' army at Borgerhout near Antwerp on March 3, 1579, so as to forestall efforts at relief. Then he invested Maastricht, carefully building a system of contravallations to guard against attempts to drive his besieging forces away. This indeed thwarted an attempt at relief by an army under Orange's brother John VI, Count of Nassau-Dillenburg, the States-General stadtholder of Gelderland, in June, 1579. The Maastricht garrison (1,200 Scottish and English mercenaries and 4,000 civic militia) repulsed two assaults by Parma's troops, before those broke in on June 29. Parma, nor his deputies, were able to prevent a massacre of the garrison and Maastricht civilians.[24]
While all this political and military manoeuvring was going on in the Southern Netherlands, in the north the States of Holland were quietly taking care of the security of Holland, keeping aloof of the States-General and Orange and generally being unhelpful in the financing of the troops of that august body (which consequently were mostly paid for by only Brabant, as Flanders was equally unhelpful). Holland preferred to spend its money on building and improving fortresses on its extended borders. The apparent freedom of the younger Alba's army to enter the province and roam at will had made it clear that something should be done to "ring-fence" the province with fortresses. According to the military theory of the time, no army would bypass a well-placed and garrisoned fortress, because that would leave its supply-lines dangerously exposed. A ring of fortresses therefore posed a credible deterrent to a would-be invader. Previous to the war the province had been rather backward in its fortress architecture, not having upgraded its medieval fortifications according to the new insights of Italian engineers that were all the rage in mid-16th century Europe. Besides, the existing walled cities were often ill-placed to act as links in such a protective fence (with fortuitous exceptions like Zutphen and Haarlem which had a strategic significance "by accident," for which reason Fadrique had gone after them). The province therefore soon embarked on a program of building new, and upgrading old, fortifications after the Pacification of 1576, during the respite of hostilities this offered. First Gerrit Adriaansz. van Nispen and later Adriaan Anthonisz. of Alkmaar, Holland's "masters of fortresses," directed the construction of trace-italienne type fortresses that could put Parma's architect Gabrio Serbelloni to shame.[26] They introduced an important improvement by substituting sloping earthworks for the usual brick walls, making the forts almost impervious to artillery fire. The new fortresses were also placed to guard strategic invasion routes on the perifery of the province. Among the new fortresses were Geertruidenberg, Zevenbergschen Hoek (both across the Hollands Diep in Brabant, as the north bank of that estuary was sparsely populated), Gorinchem, Loevestein castle and Woudrichem (at important confluences of rivers), Muiden and Naarden (on the eastern approaches of Amsterdam), all famous from later wars[27]
The States dealt with the problem of the royalist enclaves, held over from the Rebellion, like Amsterdam and Haarlem, by political means. In accordance with the Pacification, arduous negotiations with the Catholic city governments were held that resulted in so-called "Satisfactions" of their grievances. Haarlem swore allegiance to Orange as stadtholder for the States-General on January 22, 1577 and set aside one of its churches for Calvinist worship. In exchange the city was readmitted to the States of Holland. Boussu, now in the employ of the States-General, was charged with the withdrawal of the royalist garrisons of Haarlem, Weesp and Muiden, which was problematic, as they had not been paid in a long time and demanded their arrears. Holland eventually grudgingly covered this bill[28]
Amsterdam was a harder nut to crack, as the regime in that city was more intransigently royalist. On the other hand, they had cause for complaint as the Sea-Beggar navy continued to informally blockade Amsterdam's trade in contravention of the Pacification. When help from Don Juan proved infeasible, Amsterdam sued for an arrangement in September, 1577. The States of Holland, however, preferred to subdue the city by force, instead of engaging in negotiations (despite Orange's imprecations). Dutch troops started to invest Amsterdam, but thanks to mediation by the States of Utrecht (a province that had been consistently on the royalist side during the Rebellion) a "Satisfaction" was agreed on February 8, 1578. Calvinist exiles were to be allowed to return, but they would not be free to worship according to their preference; only the Catholic religion would be practiced. This was the mirror of conditions elsewhere in Holland. The old militias would be re-formed, and Amsterdam would not be liable for debts of the States contracted during the Rebellion. However, after the return of the exiles they staged a bloodless coup on May 24, 1578, ousting the city government and expelling its members from the city. This so-called "Alteration" brought Amsterdam again fully into the fold of the Dutch province, and eliminated the strategically dangerous chink it had formed in its armour.[29]
Most importantly, the province went on a diplomatic offensive to improve its eastern defenses in depth. Holland and Zeeland had already formed a defensive union in 1575. After the Pacification Holland went in search of a web of defensive alliances that would ensnare other neighboring provinces. First was neighboring Utrecht which had been a base for both Boussu and Hierges during the Revolt. Hierges was recognized as stadtholder by the States-General after the Pacification. He also acted as stadtholder of Gelderland. Unsurprisingly, he declared for Don Juan after the latter's breach with the States-General. This evidently posed a problem for the States-General which had to depend on Holland to dislodge him. The province was happy to oblige a formal request from the States of Gelderland to send troops, as this allowed them to kill two birds with one stone: the companies of foreign mercenaries that garrisoned the Holland cities were almost as impopular as the Spanish troops. Their presence was now superfluous, and idle mercenaries were often a plague, as any father who wished to deliver his daughters intacto to the altar could confirm. Paying them off, however, was difficult, as their pay was often in arrears. It was cheaper to foist them off on other provinces and then "forget" to pay their arrears[30]
Sending superfluous companies of mercenaries off in the service of the States-General was therefore a gambit that suited both Holland and the central government in Brussels. These troops were often used as new garrisons in the Southern provinces (e.g. in Mechelen, Antwerp, Brussels and Maastricht) once Brabant had become the principal theater of war after Gembloux. They also helped drive out Hierges from Utrecht and the Germans of Nicholas von Polweiler around Roermond (then part of Guelders) and in the cities of Overijssel. This was important, because these cities of Deventer and Kampen, governed by staunchly Catholic regents, still controlled the States of Overijssel. Dislodging Polweiler therefore signified delivering the States in the hands of Holland's friends in Overijssel[31]
Though at first the interests of Holland and the States-General in this sense converged, they started to diverge the more gains Parma made in the South. For Orange and the States-General the theater of Brabant was pre-eminent in the war, but by 1579 Holland had a greater interest in using its troops to protect its friends in the eastern provinces. The same went for its money, which may have been even more important. With Holland being more and more reluctant to help finance the war for the States-General, the military situation got more and more dire for the latter, which allowed Parma to make threatening gains in the direction of areas of strategic interest for Holland in the east etc.; a vicious spiral in other words. If the Dutch Regenten had seen the strategic implications of Parma's advances, like Orange did, things might have turned out differently, but unfortunately they did not. Instead they preferred to formalize a defensive union with their by now generally friendly eastern and northern neighbors. This Union of Utrecht treaty[32] was signed on January 23, 1579 in the city of Utrecht by the representatives of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, the Ommelanden around Groningen city, and the stadtholder of Gelderland, Orange's brother Jan, who presumed to sign for the divided States of Gelderland[33] Later, the provinces of Friesland and Overijssel would adhere to this Union, as would a number of cities in Flanders and Brabant, like Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, and 's-Hertogenbosch, which had fallen into the hands of radical Calvinist city governments, after popular revolts from October, 1577 onward.[34]
- ^ Unless otherwise indicated, "Netherlands," and "Netherlandish" refer here to the entire area of the Habsburg Netherlands and its inhabitants, whereas "Dutch Republic" and "Dutch" will refer to the country, currently known as The Netherlands, and its inhabitants
- ^ The principality of Orange in present-day France at the time was an independent fief of the Empire.
- ^ As a matter of fact, the English probably welcomed the opportunity to obtain cargo and ships at fire-sale prices, when the privateers came to dispose of their prizes; the arrangement was mutually beneficial.
- ^ Tracy, p. 77
- ^ Israel (1995), pp. 167-168
- ^ Israel (1995), p. 168
- ^ The titles of Marquess of Veere and Vlissingen allowed him to become "First Noble" of Zeeland, and entitled him to a seat in the States of Zeeland.
- ^ Israel (1995), pp. 174-175
- ^ Tracy, p. 83
- ^ Tracy, p. 92
- ^ Tracy, p. 95
- ^ Tracy, pp. 96-97
- ^ Tracy, pp. 96-97
- ^ Israel (1995), p. 181
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Tracy, p. 99
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Koenigsberger, p. 262; Parker, p.127; Parker mentions that Spain had to default on its loans in 1560 (after a war with France), 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647 and 1653, every time putting the war effort in jeopardy; the 1575 default led directly to the 1576 mutiny of foreign troops in the Army of Flanders, Parker, p. 127
- ^ Koenigsberger, pp. 260-272; Tracy, pp. 135-136
- ^ Koenigsberger, pp. 260-272; Tracy, pp. 135-136
- ^ Tracy, pp. 137-138
- ^ a b Tracy, p. 138
- ^ Israel (1995), p. 195
- ^ The system of "contributions" Requesens adopted in 1574 outside the areas where regular taxes could be collected, helped to augment revenue from the Netherlands (though it did not help avert the mutiny of 1576). Parma later "improved" on this system of forced contributions by regularizing the arbitrary exactions of the Spanish troops in the form of brandschattingen, to a system of formalized extortions, in which communities paid "protection money" to the Spanish "superintendent of contributions" to avoid being sacked, Parker, pp. 120–122
- ^ Tracy, p. 141
- ^ Tracy, p. 142
- ^ In old Dutch the word for "garden" often means "fence."
- ^ Tracy, pp. 149-150
- ^ Tracy, p. 150
- ^ Tracy, p. 152
- ^ Tracy, p. 153-154
- ^ Tracy, p. 156
- ^ Tracy, p. 159; Israel (1995), pp. 191-192
- ^ The treaty is often called the "constitution" of the Dutch Republic. This is only partially true, however. This "constitution" in the main consisted of the constitutional framework that had organically grown in the Burgundian and Habsburg Netherlands in the previous decades, which structure was simply retained by the Republic. However, the articles of the treaty provided additional building blocks for the constitution by providing an explicit framework for the budding Confederation.
- ^ Ironically, Jan van Nassau was reluctantly accepted by the anti-Orange and anti-Holland bloc in the Gelderland States, because they mistook him for a Lutheran moderate, and as such a bulwark against Calvinist encroachments; Israel (1995), p. 191
- ^ Israel (1995), pp. 193-196