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C

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  • Jiaohua
    • Billioud 2011: Confucian Revival and the Emergence of "Jiaohua Organizations": A Case Study of the Yidan Xuetang
    • Billioud 2007: Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival in China as an Educative Project
  • Anshen liming 安身立命
    • Billioud & Thoraval 2008: Anshen liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism
  • Confucian ritual religion 礼教 / 禮教 → Merge with Confucianism, add 「敬天法祖」天祖教[1][2]
    • Billioud & Thoraval 2009: Lijiao: The Return of Ceremonies Honouring Confucius in Mainland China
    • 2016: Lijiao: Between Rites and Politics
  • Taiping Taoism, influence on folk Taoist orders and folk salvationisms

BH

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HU

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ET

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Census statistics, 2000–2021

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Religious affiliations in Estonia, census 2000–2021*[3]
Religion 2000 2011 2021
Number % Number % Number %
Christianity 319,770 28.5 310,481 28.4 298,410 26.8
–Orthodox Christianity 143,554 12.8 176,773 16.2 181,770 16.3
–Lutherans 152,237 13.6 108,513 9.9 86,030 7.7
–Catholics 5,745 0.5 4,501 0.4 8,690 0.8
–Baptists 6,009 0.5 4,507 0.4 5,190 0.5
–Jehovah's Witnesses 3,823 0.3 3,938 0.4 3,720 0.3
–Old Believers 2,515 0.2 2,644 0.2 2,290 0.2
–Pentecostals 2,648 0.2 1,855 0.2 2,310 0.2
–Adventists 1,561 0.1 1,194 0.1 950 0.1
–Methodists 1,455 0.1 1,098 0.1 1,390 0.1
–Other Christians 223 0.02 5,458 0.5 6,070 0.5
Estonian Neopaganism 1,058 0.1 2,972 0.3 5,630 0.5
–Native Faith (Maausk) – – 1,925 0.2 3,860 0.3
–Taaraism – – 1,047 0.1 1,770 0.2
Islam 1,387 0.1 1,508 0.1 5,800 0.5
Buddhism 622 0.1 1,145 0.1 1,880 0.2
Other religions** 4,995 0.4 4,727 0.4 9,630 0.9
No religion 450,458 40.2 592,588 54.1 650,900 58.4
No answer*** 343,292 30.6 181,104 16.5 141,780 12.7
Total population 1,121,582 1,094,564 1,114,030
*The censuses of Estonia aurvey the entire population older than 15 year of age.[3]
**Mostly other modern Paganisms, with a smaller number of other Eastern religions and Theosophical movements.[3]

Line chart of the trends, 2000–2021

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Census statistics 2000–2021:[3]

  Orthodox Christianity
  Lutheranism
  Other Christianity
  Other religions
  No religion
  Not stated

FR

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Religious affiliations in France, official statistics 1851–2020*[4]
Census National survey
Religion 1851 1861 1866 2009** 2020**
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Christianity 35,679,364 99.7 37,293,230 99.8 37,953,831 99.8 28,421,898 45.5 22,142,107 34,0
—Catholicism 34,931,032 97.6 36,490,891 97.6 37,107,212 97.5 26,860,255 43.0 16,280,961 25.0
—Protestantism and other Christians 748,332 2.1 802,339 2.2 846,619 2.3 1,561,643 2.5 5,861,146 9.0
——Calvinism 480,507 1.3 480,436 1.3 515,759 1.4 - - - -
——Lutheranism 267,525 0.7 281,642 0.8 286,506 0.8 - - - -
——Other Protestants and Christians - - 40,261 0.1 44,354 0.1 - - - -
Islam - - - - - - 4,997,257 8.0 7,163,623 11.0
Judaism 73,965 0.2 79,964 0.2 89,047 0.2 c. 310,000*** 0.5 c. 320,000*** 0.5
Buddhism - - - - - - c. 310,000*** 0.5 c. 320,000*** 0.5
Other religions 26,348 0.1 1,295 0.003 1,400 0.004 c. 310,000*** 0.5 651,238 1.0
No religion 3,483 0.01 11,824 0.03 22,786 0.1 28,109,569 45.0 34,515,637 53.0
Total population[5] 35,783,170 37,386,313 38,067,064 62,465,709 65,123,843
*1851–1866: census of the whole population. 2009–2020: survey of a large sample of adults.[a]
**The absolute values for 2009 and 2020 have been extrapolated on the basis of the approximated percentages.
***In these cases, the absolute values have been rounded since the percentages were the same.

Ethnic

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Religion by ethnic origins in France, 2020 national survey[4]
Ethnic origins Christianity Catholicism Other Christians Islam Judaism Buddhism Other religion No religion
French without immigrant origins 40 32 8 1 0 0 0 58
French with immigrant origins
First-generation immigrants 32 15 17 44 0 2 1 21
French-born with immigrant background 27 8 19 32 1 1 1 39
Overseas French native origins
First-generation overseas French natives 56 38 18 10 0 1 1 33
Overseas French native background 51 33 18 2 0 0 1 46
Algerian origins
First-generation Algerians 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 11
Algerian background 4 3 1 64 0 0 0 32
Moroccan and Tunisian origins
First-generation Moroccans and Tunisians 0 0 0 89 1 0 0 9
Moroccan and Tunisian background 5 3 2 65 4 0 0 25
Sahelian African origins
First-generation Sahelian Africans 10 7 3 84 0 0 0 5
Sahelian African background 8 5 3 77 0 0 0 14
Gulf of Guinea and Central African origins
First-generation Gulf of Guinea and Central Africans 77 34 43 9 0 0 1 13
Gulf of Guinea and Central African background 57 14 43 14 0 0 0 29
Other African origins
First-generation other Africans 49 20 29 38 0 1 0 12
Other African background 35 20 15 31 0 0 1 33
Turkish and Middle Eastern origins
First-generation Turks and Middle Easterners 14 5 9 72 0 0 0 13
Turkish and Middle Eastern background 10 4 6 67 2 0 0 20
Southeast Asian origins
First-generation Southeast Asians 14 11 3 1 0 35 2 48
Southeast Asian background 8 5 3 1 0 23 1 66
Chinese origins
First-generation Chinese or Chinese background* 7 2 5 0 0 21 0 71
Other Asian origins
First-generation other Asians 20 12 8 26 0 13 16 24
Other Asian background 20 8 12 19 0 0 23 38
Portuguese origins
First-generation Portuguese 79 67 12 0 0 0 0 21
Portuguese background 56 40 16 0 0 0 0 43
Spanish and Italian origins
First-generation Spaniards and Italians 47 40 7 8 2 1 0 42
Spanish and Italian background 45 38 7 1 0 0 0 54
Other European origins
First-generation other Europeans 58 27 31 3 0 0 0 38
Other European background 45 35 10 1 0 0 0 53
Total French population** 38 29 9 10 0 1 1 51
Highlights in each ethnic category (horizontal row) indicate the respective largest and second-largest religious category (vertical row).
*The surveyors were unable to distinguish first-generation Chinese immigrants and French people with Chinese background from past generations.[4]: Drouhout et al. p. 41. 
**The results from the total population in this table are different from those in the table above because the surveyors calculated them on slightly different age cohorts.[4]: Drouhout et al. p. 48. 

DC

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[[File:Longquan Tempel van Groot Mededogen (36652929241).jpg|thumb|Former [[Calvinism|Calvinist]] church, now Longquan Temple of [[Chinese Buddhism]], in Groot Mededogen, [[Utrecht]], [[Netherlands]].]] [[File:Peckham Mosque.jpg|thumb|Former St. Mark [[Anglicanism|Anglican]] church, now Peckham Mosque, in [[Camberwell]], [[London Borough of Southwark|Southwark]], [[London]], [[England]].]]

  • Brown, BCallum G. (2013). The Death of Christian Britain. Routledge. ISBN 9781135115463.
  • Clarke, Brian P.; Macdonald, Stuart (2017). Leaving Christianity: Changing Allegiances in Canada since 1945. McGill-Queen's Press. ISBN 9780773551947.
  • Hawley, George (2017). Demography, Culture, and the Decline of America's Christian Denominations. Lexington Books. ISBN 9781498548403.
  • Peterson, Paul Silas, ed. (2017). The Decline of Established Christianity in the Western World: Interpretations and Responses. Routledge. ISBN 9781351390422.

The decline of Christianity is a phenomenon that, beginning in the twentieth century and continuing in the twenty-first century, is happening in the countries of the Western or Westernised world (Europe, North America, Oceania), in some countries of Eastern Europe, as well as in some non-Western developed and developing countries, to traditional, established forms of the Christian religion, that is to say those historically, socially, culturally and politically consolidated Christian denominations, with or without legal status as the offcial state religion, which until the first half of the twentieth century were the majority religions in these countries. Alongside the secularisation of thought, state institutions and social life, these countries have witnessed a decline in belief and membership of Christian churches and the rise of "various competing religious communities and worldviews".[6] According to some scholars, this decline is occurring not only to traditional, established forms of Christianity, but also to its newest "supposedly robust" forms, such as Evangelicalism.[7]

As of 2019, Christians were 64% of the population of the European Union,[8] 63% of both the populations of Western Europe and Eastern Europe,[9] 76% of the population of Southern Europe,[9] 68% of the population of North America,[9] 65% of the population of the United States,[10] 56% of the combined populations of Australia and New Zealand.[9]

RC

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[[File:Dao-Priester Liu De Ming.jpg|thumb|Priest Liu Deming of Wudang Taoism in Germany.]] [[File:TaoistTemplejf4950 12.JPG|thumb|Altar of the Three Pures at the Thai To Taoist Temple of [[Caloocan]], [[Metro Manila]], [[Philippines]].]] [[File:泰山碧霞祠香亭.jpg|thumb|Bixia Ancestral Temple]] [[File:Baihe Temple (2).jpg|thumb|White Crane Temple in [[Wuzhou]], [[Guangxi]].]] [[File:Qingjiao Ciji Gong 20120225-05.jpg|thumb|Qingjiao Ciji Temple, dedicated to Baoshengdadi, in [[Haicang District|Haicang]], [[Xiamen]], [[Fujian]].]] [[File:杭州.玉皇山.福星观（玉龙殿） - panoramio.jpg|thumb|Temple of the Jade Dragon (玉龙殿 ''Yùlóngdiàn''), part of the Fuxing Taoist Temple (福星观 ''Fúxīngguān'') in [[Hangzhou]], [[Zhejiang]].]] [[File:延生观 10.jpg|thumb|Main hall of the Yangsheng Taoist Temple (延生观 ''Yánshēngguān'') in [[Zhouzhi County|Zhouzhi]], [[Xi'an]], [[Shaanxi]].]] [[File:化女泉 06.jpg|thumb|Taoist temple at Huànǚ Spring (化女泉 ''Huànǚquán'') in [[Zhouzhi County|Zhouzhi]], [[Xi'an]], [[Shaanxi]].]] [[File:Interior of a Confucius' Temple in Urumqi, Xinjiang (40181777935).jpg|thumb|Urumqi Confucian God of Culture Temple]] [[File:Tai Shan 2015.08.12 12-49-02.jpg|thumb|Taishan temple worship]] [[File:Taishan (1598).JPG|thumb|Yuhuang Temple Taishan]] [[File:Yiyang Nanyan Shiku 2017.11.26 13-04-13.jpg|thumb|Nanyan Grotto]] [[File:(1)NSW Taoist Centre 003.jpg|thumb|NSW Taoist centre]] [[File:Seattle - Woodland Park Presbyterian Church (1919 building) 01.jpg|thumb|Seattle Taoist Studes Institute]] [[File:Temple DaBogong.JPG|thumb|Singapore Dabogong Temple]]

  • Wang, Xiaoxuan (2019), "'Folk Belief', Cultural Turn of Secular Governance and Shifting Religious Landscape in Contemporary China", in Dean, K.; Van der Veer, P. (eds.), The Secular in South, East, and Southeast Asia, Global Diversities, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-89369-3_7, ISBN 9783319893686, S2CID 158975292 p. 149

RR

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  • Saunders, Robert A. (2019). "Rodnovery". Historical Dictionary of the Russian Federation (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 565–567. ISBN 9781538120484.
  • Gordeeva, Irina (2017). "Tolstoyism in the Late-Socialist Cultural Underground: Soviet Youth in Search of Religion, Individual Autonomy and Nonviolence in the 1970s-1980s". Open Theology. 3 (3): 494–515. doi:10.1515/opth-2017-0038. S2CID 171774453.
—Map above: Percentage of people choosing Orthodox Christian teaching in school curricula by administrative subjects of Russia.
—Map below: Percentage of people choosing religious (green) versus secular (red) teaching in school curricula by administrative subjects of Russia.
—According to official 2014-2015 data of the Ministry of Education: 45.04% of Russians chose "secular ethics"; 32.7% chose "Orthodox Christianity"; 18.19% chose "world religious cultures"; 3.55% chose "Islam"; 0.39% chose "Buddhism"; 0.07% chose other subjects.[11]
Examples of the syncretism of Russian folk Orthodoxy or dvoeverie ("double faith"):
—Left: The Fiery Chariot of the Word, a 19th-century Old Believers' icon representing the Theotokos as Ognyena Maria ("Fiery Mary"), fire goddess sister of Perun.[12]
—Right: Saint Christopher in a 17th-century icon from Cherepovets. A transmission of the ancient Egyptian god Anubis, equated with the Slavic god Veles. Officially banned by the Russian Most Holy Synod in 1722, this representation is preserved within the Old Belief.[13][note 1]
The Fiery Chariot of the Word—19th-century Old Believers' icon representing the Theotokos as Ognyena Maria ("Fiery Mary"), fire goddess sister of Perun. An example of the syncretism of Russian folk Orthodoxy or dvoeverie ("double faith").[14]

The movement of the Old Believers was the crystallisation of a "mass religious dissent" towards the Russian Orthodox Church, seen as the religion of the central state and the aristocracy, that has always been present throughout Russian history, and that has had a profound impact on the socio-economic and political charater of Russia, being a precursor to the theories and practices of later socialism. The Old Believers were the coalescence of pre-Christian Pagan, Gnostic, and unofficial Orthodox currents, while the Molokans were sects which came into being under the influence of Western Christianity. Historically, at least one quarter of the popultion of imperial Russia belonged to these schismatic movements.[15]

The movement of Sophiology was codified within the Russian Orthodox theological tradition.[16]

Moreover, since their inception in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Russian revolutionary movements had sympathy for folk Old Belief and sectarianism, promoted their study and even drew upon them to formulate new religions for the masses, for instance the early Bolsheviks' "God-Building" movement.[15] Joseph Stalin spported the early ideas of a "Slavic Vedism", that is to say the common Indo-European origin of ancient Vedic and Slavic cultures.[17] The scholar Aleksandr Pyzhikov attributes the success of the Soviet project to the "collective psychology" of the Old Believers.[15]

when the policies of perestroika ("restructuring") and glasnost ("openness") allowed for more initiative and freedom for religious organisations.[18]

Russians gravitated to a variety of both established and emerging new religions to fill the "spiritual vacuum" left by the collapse of Soviet ideology.[19]

This, together with the rise of a wide variety of new religious movements, continues the synthesis of the long-time tradition of Russian esoteric and spiritual philosophy and folk religion.[20]

and "Orthodox"[21]

The scholar Ullrich Kleinhempel has indeed found that there is an overlapping between the categories of those Russians who identify themselves as "believers without religion", Russian esotericism, Eastern/Hindu, Neopagan, and new religious movements, and even those who identify themselves as "Orthodox", representing a long-established, syncretic Russian spiritual tradition.[21]

According to the scholar Ullrich Kleinhempel, most of those who identified themselves as Christians without denomination in the 2012 Arena Atlas are most probably adherents of forms of Protestantism who choose not to identify as "Protestants", chiefly Baptists and Pentecostals.[22] At the same time, the category of those who identified as "believers without any religion" likely represents the fluid milieu of Russian esotericism and pantheistic-panentheistic philosophies, which have been firmly entrenched in Russian spiritual culture for long time, and are interwoven with the categories of "Paganism" and "Hinduism".[23] The same category of "Orthodox", and the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy, has always been intertwined and interacting with esoteric and philosophical traditions which were often identified as "popular Orthodoxy" or "double faith" (dvoeverie),[24] going from the preserved cult of Mokosh, to Sophiology and the theme of "Holy Russia".[25] The category of "believers without religion" may also contain new religious movements such as Roerichism, which are crystallisations of the Russian esoteric and philosophical tradition, Eastern and Neopagan ideas.[26] This Russian esoteric, Eastern/Neopagan, and New Age spiritual culture is viewed as part of high and mainstream culture in Russia, unlike in the West where it has remained a marginal phenomenon. It also has a role in Eurasianism, the contemporary leading cultural and political view in Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church has inclusive and tolerant attitudes towards some of these movements (though they represent its primary challenge and competitors) compared to Western Protestant and Catholic churches.[17]

The Old Believers originated as the channelling of a "mass religious dissent" towards the Russian Orthodox Church that has always existed throughout the history of Russia. As a response to a series of reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church enacted by Patriarch Nikon since 1653, a large part of the Russian population "went into schism" (Raskol). The schismatics (Raskolniks) saw the central government and the Church as the "kingdom of the Antichrist", and were persecuted with increasing taxes and even the burning of whole villages. It is estimated that at least one fourth of the population of the Russian Empire belonged to these dissenting religious movements, which were the coalescence of Pagan, Gnostic and unofficial Orthodox currents.[15]

The Old Belief had a pivotal role in the rise of a Russian capitalism which bore characteristics of socialism: The Old Believers lived in peasant communities where resources were collectivised in trusts called obshchak ("commune"). The persecutions came to an end with Catherine II's policy of enlightened absolutism, and in 1777 she permitted by decree to the peasants (may of whom were Old Believers) to enroll in the merchant classes. The Old Believers saw the opportunity to gain independence within a hostile state, and obshchak were invested in collectively owned business entreprises, which infused Russian capitalism with Old Believers' collectivist ideas.[15]

In the 1840s, the government of the empire began to investigate domestic grassroots capitalism; one of the investigators, August von Haxthausen, was one the first to study and classify folk religious movements throughout Russia in 1843. He distinguished folk religions into "Old Believers" who pre-dated the Raskol and, in his opinion, continued Pagan and Gnostic traditions; "Old Believers" who arose in the seventeenth century as a consequence to Patriarch Nikon's reforms; and Spiritual Christianity (or Molokanism), a group of sects which came into being after the Raskol, during the reign of Peter the Great, under the influx of Western Christianity. The elites began to talk of a "folk Orthodoxy", a hybrid faith different from official Orthodox Christianity, which harboured beliefs which were perilously close to Western socialism: universal equality, collective property, and rejection of hierarchy. This gave way to new persecutions.[15]

In the mid-nineteenth century, the findings of the studies were made public and folk religious dissenters attracted the sympathy of Russia's progressive political circles. Afanasy Shchapov noted that dissenting folk religious movement, desite the diversity of beliefs, were all unified by their opposition to the state and the Church, and defined them as a spatially dispersed "oppositional religious confederate republic". Early revolutionaries (Alexander Herzen, Nikolay Ogarev, Mikhail Bakunin), Narodniks (Populists), and early Bolsheviks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century continued to be interested in Russian folk religious dissenters and their radical forms of society. In his A Writer's Diary, Fyodor Dostoevsky defined Old Belief as "the people's Orthodoxy", or the "horizontal Church", opposed to the "Orthodoxy of the elites". Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich was assigned by the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party the task of studying "Russian schism and sectarianism", and in 1908–1910 a faction of the Bolsheviks, represented by Anatoly Lunacharsky, Alexander Bogdanov, Maxim Gorky, and Vladimir Bazarov, formulated the "God-Building" movement (Bogostroitelstvo), whose aim was to create a new religion for the proletariat through a synthesis of socialism with folk religion. The studies of this period provided a better understanding of Old Belief, also clarifying the distinction between the Popovtsy ("Priested") Old Believers, opposed to official Orthodoxy but integrated into its institutional framework, and Bezpopovtsy ("Priestless") Old Believers, without sacerdtal hierarchy or formal institutions, representing the more Pagan variety of popular religion.[15]

Hinduism in Russia is to some extent intertwined with Russian esotericism and Neopagan movements, as they legitimise each other in the light of the shared Indo-European roots of Slavic and Indian cultures. The idea of "Slavic Vedism" was strongly supported by Joseph Stalin, who sought for autochthonous roots of ideological legitimisation.[17]

According to the scholars Ullrich Kleinhempel and Veronika Chernishkova, new religious movements are to be identified within the large population of "believers without religion", overlapping with the long-time traditions of Russian esotericism and spiritual philosophy (even cultivated within the "Orthodox" establishment), new Eastern and Neopagan movements.[27] The scholars Brigit Menzel, Michael Hagemeister and Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal have studied these various phenomena under the overarching name of "Russian New Age".[28] According to Chernishkova, a common denominator of these movements is pantheism, the idea that God is the universe itself, an "interconnected energetic oneness", and is to be found in humanity, too; thus these movements are characterised by an absence of "sacred–profane" and "divine–human" dichotomies, and a soteriology of this world (salvation is the welfare of this world), and belief in reincarnation and ascension through levels of psychophysical existence.[29]

Some scholars also include aong these movements Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism, Rodnovery and the spread of Siberian shamanism,[30] though the latter two claim societal, governmental and legal acceptance as "traditional religions".[31]

The paradigmatic example of syncretic yet self-defined Christian new religious movements in Russia is the Church of the Last Testament (Vissarionism)[32] and the first forms of Tolstoyism.[33] Tolstoyism is a loose syncretic religious movement which began in the late nineteenth century, was suppressed in the 1930s, and enjoyed a revival in the 1970s and 1980s, based on the ideas of Leo Tolstoy.[33] Its first wave combined ideas of Christian socialism, anarchism and pacifism,[34] while since the 1970s Tolstoyans began to absorbe Eastern religious ideas.[35] Foreign new religions, such as the Unification Church and the Church of Scientology, were able to enter Russia since the 1990s and engage in large-scale proselytism at all levels of society, in forms unseen even in Western countries.[19]

Other Theosophical, Roerichian or New Age-inspired movements in Russia include the Bulgarian-originated Universal White Brotherhood (Dunovism), founded in the first half of the twentieth century by Peter Deunov and Omraam Mikhaël Aïvanhov, and its Ukrainian iteration the Great White Brotherhood (Yusmalos), founded in the 1990s by Yuri Krivonogov and Maria Tsvigun.[36]

Other New Age movements in Russia include Radasteya,[32] Bogoderzhavie ("God-Power", or the Interregional Social Movement of Spiritual Union), and the belief in the spiritual healing power of pyramids (pyramidology), led by Alexander Golod and Valery Uvarov, with tens of specially-built "Golod pyramids" throughout Russia and a large pyramid citadel being built in Tomsk under the direction of Uvarov.[37] The 2010s saw the rise and worldwide spread of AllatRa, a Russian-Ukrainian New Age religion.[38]

Data from the early 2000s showed that about 10% of the Russian population, or 15 million people, belonged to new religious movements. Studies covering seventeen years of observation have shown that new religious movements are the most dynamic and fastest growing among all religions in Russia.[39]

  • In 2019, the Russian Public Opinion Research Center estimated that 65% of Russians were Christians (63% Orthodox, 1% Catholic and 1% Protestant), 5% were Muslim, 6% were believers without religion, 15% were not believers, 6% were undecided and 3% were "unknown". Religious beliefs varied considerably among age groups, with Orthodox being 74% among 60+ years-old Russians and 23% among 18 to 24 years-old Russians, Muslims being 1% and 9% in the same age groups, and not religious people being 14% and 37%.[40]
  • In 2015, according to data collected for the "Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project" by the Association of Religion Data Archives, 48.2% of Russians were Christians (44.6% Orthodox, 1.5% Pentecostal, 1.1% Protestant, 0.5% Catholic and 0.5% other Christians), 10.6% were Muslims (10% Sunni and 0.6% Shia), 1.4% were followers of ethnic religions, 0.5% were Buddhists (0.4% Vajrayana and 0.1% other Buddhists), 0.1% were of other religions, 8.2% were not religious and 31% were "unknown".[41]
  • In 2013, Sreda conducted a small-sampled survey of religion among the scholars participating to the research project "Faith and religion in modern Russia", mostly young and well educated. The result was that 47% of them were Christians (39% Orthodox), 4% were Muslims, 3% were atheists, 3% were of other religions, 13% were not religious, and 30% did not answer.[42]
  • In 2015, according to data collected for the "Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project" by the Association of Religion Data Archives, 58.1% of Belarusians were Christians (50.3% Orthodox, 5.9% Catholic, 0.8% Pentecostal, 0.7% Protestant and 0.4% other Christians), 0.3% were Muslims, 0.1% were followers of other religions, 40.3% were not religious and 1.3% were "unknown".[43]
  • In 2015, according to data collected for the "Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project" by the Association of Religion Data Archives, 48.1% of Hungarians were Christians (32.7% Catholic, 12.1% Protestant, 0.3% Pentecostal, 0.1% Orthodox and 2.8% other Christians), 0.1% were religious Jews, 0.2% were followers of other religions, 19.6% were not religious and 32% were "unknown".[44]
  • In 2018, according to a study jointly conducted by London's St Mary's University's Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society and the Institut Catholique de Paris, and based on data from the European Social Survey 2014–2016, among the 16 to 29 years-old Czechs 8% were Christians (7% Catholic, 1% other Christians), 1% were of other religions and 91% were not religious.[45]
  • In 2015, according to data collected for the "Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project" by the Association of Religion Data Archives, 5.6% of Czechs were Christians (3.9% Catholic, 0.9% Protestant, 0.2% Orthodox, 0.1% Pentecostal and 0.5% other Christians), 0.1% were Buddhists, 0.2% were followers of other religions, 24.3% were not religious and 69.8% were "unknown".[46]

MNG

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R

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S

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  • Oraon, Karma (2002). Dimension of Religion, Magic, and Festivals of Indian Tribe the Munda. Kanishka Publishers. ISBN 9788173914867. p. 131 have "become conscious of the value of their religion and have begun calling it as Sarnaism"
  • The Eastern Anthropologist. 23–24. Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society. 1970. {{cite journal}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help) p. 173
  • Srivastava, Malini (2007). Department of History, Ranchi University (ed.). The Anthropologist: International Journal of Contemporary and Applied Studies of Man. 9. Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society. {{cite journal}}: Missing or empty |title= (help) p. 327 Christian Mundas returning to Sarnaism
  • Virottam, B. (2003). Department of Anthropology, University of Delhi (ed.). Journal of Historical Research. 63. Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society. {{cite journal}}: Missing or empty |title= (help) p. 43 Sarna Dharam or Sarnaism "drew its ingredients from both inside and outside India"
  • Alles, Gregory D. (2017). "Are Adivasis Indigenous?". In Johnson, Greg; Kraft, Siv Ellen (eds.). Handbook of Indigenous Religion(s). Brill. pp. 247–262. doi:10.1163/9789004398436_009. ISBN 9789004346710. S2CID 182248464. p. 253
  • Pulloppillil, Thomas (1999). Identity of Adivasis in Assam. Indian Publishers Distributors. ISBN 9788173410802. p. 62 Munda
  • Patmury, Joseph (1996). Doing Theology with the Poetic Traditions of India: Focus on Dalit and Tribal Poems. PTCA/SATHRI. p. 158 Oraon
  • Oraon, Karma (1988). The Spectrum of Tribal Religion in Bihar: A Study of Continuity & Change Among the Oraon of Chotanagpur. Kishor Vidya Niketan. pp. 27 ff
  • Singh, Kumar Suresh (2002). Birsa Munda and His Movement, 1872-1901: A Study of a Millenarian Movement in Chotanagpur. Seagull Books. ISBN 9788170462057. p. 172 Birsaism teaches endogamy, and therefore intermarriage is possible only among Sarnaists / p. 230 Birsaites have replaced the picturesque rituals of traditional Sarnaism with a religion of simple prayers and inexpensive rituals. / Ulgulan ("The Upheaval") religio-political movement started by Birsa Munda from Chotanagpur, aimed at freeing Munda tribals from colonialism by recreating ancient traditions.
  • Srivastava, Natish (1992). Changing Values and Tribal Societies: A Comparative Study of the Munda and Oraon Values Orientations. Inter-India Publications. ISBN 9788121002790. p. 143
  • Schulte-Droesch, Lea (2018). Making Place through Ritual: Land, Environment and Region among the Santal of Central India. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. ISBN 9783110540857.

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  1. ^ 任文利. 《儒教作为“国民宗教”的向度考察》. 《原道》. 2017年2月7日, (第23辑).
  2. ^ 《天祖教——傳統宗教述略》張豐乾 《論當代儒學發展前景兩大問題》李英華
  3. ^ a b c d Official census data from Statistics Estonia:
  4. ^ a b c d e f Official statistics yielded by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and its predecessor, the General Statistics of France (SGF):
  5. ^ "Demographic indicators (metropolitan and whole France)". Institut national d'études démographiques (INED). 2019. Archived from the original on 13 February 2022.
  6. ^ Peterson 2017, "An introduction to the essays and to the phenomenon of established Christianity in the Western World".
  7. ^ Hawley 2017, p. xvii.
  8. ^ "Discrimination in the European Union", Special Eurobarometer, 493, European Commission, 2019.
  9. ^ a b c d Brown, Davis; James, Patrick (2019), Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project - Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), Association of Religion Data Archives, doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/7SR4M. Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, North America, Australia/New Zealand.
  10. ^ In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues At Rapid Pace, Pew Research Center, 17 October 2019.
  11. ^ Religious and secular subjects in Russian public education, Russian Ministry of Education, archived from the original on 2020-04-24.
  12. ^ Rouček, Joseph Slabey, ed. (1949). "Ognyena Maria". Slavonic Encyclopedia. New York: Philosophical Library. p. 905
  13. ^ Duquesne, Terence (2012). "Anubis". The Encyclopedia of Ancient History. John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah15038. ISBN 9781444338386.
  14. ^ Rouček, Joseph Slabey, ed. (1949). "Ognyena Maria". Slavonic Encyclopedia. New York: Philosophical Library. p. 905
  15. ^ a b c d e f g Smirnov 2020, passim.
  16. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, p. 7.
  17. ^ a b c Kleinhempel 2015, pp. 11–12.
  18. ^ Kravchouk 2004, p. 510.
  19. ^ a b Kravchouk 2004, p. 511.
  20. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, passim; Smirnov 2020, passim.
  21. ^ a b Kleinhempel 2015, passim.
  22. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, p. 2.
  23. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, pp. 3–5.
  24. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, pp. 5–6.
  25. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, pp. 6–8.
  26. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, pp. 8–12.
  27. ^ Chernishkova 2014, p. 1161; Kleinhempel 2015, passim.
  28. ^ Menzel, Hagemeister & Glatzer Rosenthal 2012.
  29. ^ Chernishkova 2014, p. 1162.
  30. ^ Menzel, Hagemeister & Glatzer Rosenthal 2012, pp. 273 ff, 293 ff, 328 ff.
  31. ^ Kleinhempel 2015, p. 3.
  32. ^ a b Chernishkova 2014, p. 1161.
  33. ^ a b Gordeeva 2017, passim.
  34. ^ Gordeeva 2017, p. 495.
  35. ^ Gordeeva 2017, pp. 509–513.
  36. ^ Shterin, Marat S. (2010). "Great White Brotherhood". In Melton, Gordon J.; Baumann, Martin (eds.). Religions of the World: A Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Beliefs and Practices (2nd ed.). ABC-CLIO. pp. 1243–1245. ISBN 9781598842043.
  37. ^ Uvarov, Valery. "Project 12".
  38. ^ Alsabeh, Farid (25 January 2020). "Spiritual development and salvation, 101. A brief introduction to Allatra, the Russian new-age religion". Medium.
  39. ^ Kravchouk 2004, p. 513.
  40. ^ "Press Release №2203: Orthodoxy and Baptism". Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM). 14 August 2019.
  41. ^ Brown, Davis; James, Patrick (2019), Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project - Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), Association of Religion Data Archives, doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/7SR4M. 2015 data for Russia.
  42. ^ Varshaver, Evgeny; Gorokhova, Olesya Viktorovna; Kostenko, Veronika Viktorovna; Pavlova, Julia Valeryevna, eds. (2014). "Вера и религия в современной России" [Faith and religion in modern Russia] (PDF). Sreda. ISBN 9785990515710. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 April 2020.
  43. ^ Brown, Davis; James, Patrick (2019), Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project - Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), Association of Religion Data Archives, doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/7SR4M. 2015 data for Belarus.
  44. ^ Brown, Davis; James, Patrick (2019), Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project - Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), Association of Religion Data Archives, doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/7SR4M. 2015 data for Hungary.
  45. ^ Bullivant, Stephen (2018). "Europe's Young Adults and Religion: Findings from the European Social Survey (2014-16) to inform the 2018 Synod of Bishops" (PDF). St Mary's University's Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society; Institut Catholique de Paris. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 March 2018.
  46. ^ Brown, Davis; James, Patrick (2019), Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project - Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), Association of Religion Data Archives, doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/7SR4M. 2015 data for Czechia.


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