Talk:Philosophical zombie

amnesia

The state of philosophical zombie is possible when people don't remember what have they done, from a certain point in time, under the influence of different substances (e.g. alcohol, muscimol) but they are reminded by the people around. They realize that things happened just before that moment:"where am I?", "what happened?", "what have I done"?

dumb

I can envision (although it has no basis in reality or rationality) that a plant can grow without light. Therefore plants dont need light to grow? This article seems to be dedicated to the thought of one contemporary fly-by-night "philosopher". Why does this exist? Mercster (talk) 04:41, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

A few things:

1. You should post at the bottom of the talk page not the top.

2. The quality of the argument isn't relevant. Wikipedia's criterion for inclusion is notability, i.e. discussion in reliable sources, of which there has been lots in philosophy and to some extent neuroscience.

3. If you can find a reliable source making a similar counter-argument, add it. But it seems you misunderstand the argument... the form is not 'Where P is conceivable, P is true', but rather (to vastly oversimplify) 'If it is conceivable that P but not Q, P and Q are not identical'. Light and plants are in fact ontologically separate (though causally related), which is all the zombie argument seeks to show about the brain and qualia. Gazelle55 (talk) 09:29, 18 March 2018 (UTC)

The same?

If we have a flashlight which is emitting light. Then we try to imagine a flashlight which is exactly identical and in the exact same environment, except it is not emitting light. But this could not be; there would have to be a physical explanation for why one flashlight was emitting light. 75.118.170.35 (talk) 01:30, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Not the same. You can see the light. You can't see a person's feelings. This article is about theoretical people who act like they have feelings but don't. Someone the Person (talk) 20:15, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

I understand what the article is about. But it doesn't matter whether or not we can see the light or see another person's experience. You could not have two flashlights that were physically identical in every way, except one of them is emitting light and the other is not. If one is emitting light and another is not, there would have to be some physical difference. Similarly, if we have two people physically different in every way, we couldn't have one with conscious experience and another without, there would have to be some physical difference. If it were otherwise, I would have no reason whatsoever to believe that anyone else in the universe had conscious experience.--RLent (talk) 20:34, 28 September 2009 (UTC)

Mistake

The concept of philosophical zombie, as presented in the article, is flawed. The reason is that a zombie does not lack sentience. A zombie has sensation, perception, and understanding. It sees and recognizes objects. The zombie, however, lacks will. Its internal will is absent and has been replaced by the will of another being. As such, the zombie obeys an external will.Lestrade (talk) 13:59, 17 October 2009 (UTC)Lestrade

You made this argument already; see the talk page's archive. It remains wholly inappropriate for the talk page. ^L_Wizard @ 19:03, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

Inappropriate? It relates to the very essence of the concept of philosophical zombie. A zombie has intelligence but lacks its own will. An automaton, on the contrary, lacks intelligence but acts on its own will. Why wouldn't a reader want to know this?Lestrade (talk) 00:13, 4 June 2014 (UTC)Lestrade

Deletion of the survey

This user erased a section of this article as you can see here calling it original research. It is obviously not original research: it's an academic research and was made by David Chalmers and other professional philosophers. Should we replace the section?--Pokipsy76 (talk) 13:05, 22 June 2010 (UTC)

zombies in scifi (not what you think)

Hope this can be of use: Robert J. Sawyer's Mindscan talks about 'zombies' a bit. Long story short, these people upload their minds into cybernetic-ish bodies with a quantum fog but their flesh-and-blood bodies still live on. This old chick called Karen's son sues the uploaded Karen b/c real Karen died and the son wants inheritance (Karen's filthy rich and a great author). One of the lawyers makes an argument that Karen could be a 'zombie'. (Wow, I just realized this sounds like the biggest soap. It's so not) It goes through the whole ethical/philosophical argument. Might it be proper to mention this? --- cymru lass ^{(hit me up)}⁄_{(background check)} 14:01, 1 November 2010 (UTC)

Maybe... if it is the philosophical zombie concept used in SciFi. Rursus dixit. (^mbork³!) 11:58, 14 November 2010 (UTC)

Ambiguous second para

The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly a thought experiment used in arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly arguments against forms of physicalism, such as materialism and behaviorism.

What side use it? I think that a philosophical zombie argument would be an "error" used by some kind of realists, and that it would best be attackable by strict empirists, claiming the meaninglessness of trying to define/use concepts that aren't fundamentally measurable. The para is pretty confusing on how zombies are used and who are destroying them. Rursus dixit. (^mbork³!) 11:58, 14 November 2010 (UTC)

A similar question is: "are the zombies good or bad?" Rursus dixit. (^mbork³!) 11:59, 14 November 2010 (UTC)

What if some people, because of they genes don't have qualia?

Some people may not have qualia, because in they genes no special atoms or molecules structure or somthing. They are dead, but everything in they brains and they behavior is the same, but just not enough something in brain, some special particles, which makes qualia (human becoming alive because of qualia). For example, there is such physical law, according which, if in human genes or brains is 10 or billion special atoms, then human by law of cosmos have qualia and isn't dead. And at what speed neuroimpulses in brains creating qualia for our senses and sense and understanding, that I am absolutly alive? Can it be speed of light (communication neuro impulses and qualia)? Of course it's need to be seriously stupid or psycho or sleeping or not the one, really to believe, that there is material explanation of qualia. Why philosophy even trying to state, that qualia may aper from matter? There no way, that consciousness and qualia is connected to signals in brains. Who can explain why philosophy so too much counts on material (qualia - understanding and felling, that you are not dead is result of material atoms interactions), like logical explanation of qualia? Perhaps I am the one, thats why? But let's assume, that everyone thinks he is the one and only he have qualia and then no need for philosphy to hide true, that qualia is impossible from material, but philosophy still don't states it as 100000 time more possible reality, than that qualia is result of material interactions of particles. Or isn't it scientific? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Versatranitsonlywaytofly (talk • contribs) 18:59, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Chalmers argument is misrepresented in this article.

The argument presented here has not much to do with the actual zombie argument by David Chalmers. What is said in the first step here:

1. If physicalism is true, then it is not possible for there to be a world in which all the physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but in which there are additional facts. (This is because, according to physicalism, all the facts are fully determined by the physical facts; so any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is entirely indistinguishable from our world.)

is explicitly denied by Chalmers in his book (1996) in the context of his zombie argument. Chalmers indeed argues that if physikalism is true, then conciousness is physical, so there must be conciousness in every world that is physically identical to our word. Then he argues that a world without conciousness that is physically identical to ours is logically possible. The conlusion is that physicalism is false. But he claims in no way, that a world that is physically identical to our world could not contain facts additional to the facts in our world, if physicalism was true. (Of course there could be additional nonphysical facts in such a world. For example, angels could exist in such a world.) What he says in the first step of his argument, is more that things that exist in our word, could not fail to exist in a word physically identical to our word, if physicalism was true.

My english does not suffice to correct the article, so I just write this to warn the reader, that the article gives a wrong impression of Chalmers argument.

Sebastian. 130.75.46.244 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 15:30, 8 February 2011 (UTC).

Proposal to change step 1 of the argument

As explained above the first step of Chalmer's zombie argument is misrepresented in the article. It now reads

1. According to physicalism a world is not possible in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but in which there are additional facts. This is because, all facts are fully determined by physical facts so any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is entirely indistinguishable from our world.

Firstly, this statement is incorrect. Physicalism claims that everything in our world is physical, not (necessarily) that worlds in which there is additional nonphysical stuff are logically impossible. Of course a physicalist would usualy not deny, that worlds which are physically like our word, but in which there exist additional nonphysical things like ghosts/angels, are logically possible. He just claims that our world is not like this. So step 1. as it is explicated in the artice does not make much sense. But more impotantly, Chalmes never uses a step like this in his argument. I propose to replace this part of the article by something like:

1. According to physicalism all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical. Thus, if physiclism is true, a logically possible world, in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world, has to contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular conscious experience would have to exist in such a possible world.

2. But in fact we can conceive of a world, which is physically like our world and in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world), and we can not see why it should not be possible.

3. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows by modus tollens.)

This would definitely be a more accurate summary of Chalmer's argument, although it may not be completely accurate. It would be very nice if someone who is a native english speaker could replace the summary in the article by something like this.

Sebastian. 217.93.223.208 (talk) 23:50, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

Perhaps someone has updated the article since you posted this, but I can't tell the difference between the current formulation of the argument and what you have here. If there is still an issue, can you update here clarifying on what is wrong with the current formulation as stated? (I would be happy to help) Jay Dubya (talk) 01:33, 30 March 2014 (UTC)

"Logically valid?"

How is Chalmers' argument "logically valid" and how is that not POV?

Is this logically valid?

1. Some people believe water comes out of the water faucet. 2. If water really comes out of the faucet, it must come out of the faucet in an alternate dimension as well. 3. It is possible to conceive of an alternate dimension where it looks like water is coming out of the faucet but it isn't really water. 4. Water does not come out of water faucets. Water is a lie. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.181.161.34 (talk) 10:08, 20 August 2013 (UTC)

Funny. I came onto the Talk page to thank everyone for not demanding a citation or the sentence you take issue with. I thought, for a moment, that the encyclopedia had succeeded in producing content without the need for a fallacious appeal to authority. Seriously; I was so excited I wanted to come here to express that excitement. Oh well.

Modus tollens is not usually considered a "point of view" (let's focus on basics for a bit). Modus tollens is a rule of inference that has been accepted as correct for thousands of years - these are rules that are widely seen as one of the hallmarks of all rational thought since the beginning of civilization. Rules of inference are older than geometry. If someone wrote A^2+B^2=C^2 would you call that "POV"? When talking about "logically valid", the author is referring to the specific, term-of-art as opposed to one of the word "valid"'s other uses in everyday language. There is a whole article on it, validity, thats not so bad. What it means in a nutshell is that, in the argument stated, the conclusion follows from the premises. Now what you wrote above is what I will, charitably, call a "non sequitur". The conclusion does not follow from the premises. Honestly, thats probably the least of the issues with it but its a place to start. Let's examine the issues.

1. "Some people believe water comes out of the water faucet." This is a statement that is dependent on empirical observation to determine its truth value. Whatever else you might say in 1, it will have absolutely no bearing on Chalmer's argument. Chalmer's argument is explicitly metaphysical. What you *believe* is wholly irrelevant. What most sane, competent people (like Chalmers and Nagel) can conceive is what is important. Delete.

2. "If water really comes out of the faucet, it must come out of the faucet in an alternate dimension as well." This is a proposition: "If A is true, then B is true." Your premise B is one of the most insane things I've ever read on Wikipedia (congrats), but lets see where you go with this.

3. "It is possible to conceive of an alternate dimension where it looks like water is coming out of the faucet but it isn't really water." This is not a proposition. This is a premise. It is unrelated to premises A and B in the prior proposition. In B, you said that water must come out of a faucet in an alternate dimension. In premise C, you say that some water-like substance is coming out of a faucet in an alternate dimension. You do not mention if its the same dimension as mentioned in B, but it doesn't matter. They still aren't connected. This is wholly different than Chalmers, where it is clear in every relevant proposition that he is referring to conception and a theory of physicality. Its what allows us to connect Chalmer's propositions to one another.

4. "Water does not come out of water faucets." What made me laugh about this was not just the ridiculous nature of this, but that you ended your entire comment here, as if this single line was so profound no further explanation was needed. Amazing. I've edited the second sentence out as I simply refuse to type it, and because it is nonsense it is irrelevant to the discussion. Seriously though, this is called "denying the consequent". Let's express it more clearly:

1. (nonsense)

2. If A is true, then B is true.

3. C is possible.

4. Therefore, A is false.

To make this easier, think of Chalmer's argument in its most general form also (compare with the base formulation on the article page if you need to, P=A and B=Q):

1. A is true and B is not true.

2. If A is true and B is not true then C is false.

3. Therefore, C is false

See the difference? Now in addition to the issues with validity, you are taking wild flights of fancy with the truth values of your premises. Your argument *depends* on all of this stuff about alternate dimensions to be true. Chalmer's argument does not depend on any way for zombies to exist in some alternate universe, it doesn't depend on anyone to believe that they exist. It depends on them being conceivable. Which they are. Your argument depends on radically departing from a present understanding of quantum and newtonian physics to satisfy truth premises.

I'm not sure what the point of this exercise was. Its possible you were trying to disprove Chalmers. Its possible you were trying to use the same form as Chalmers to use a reductio ad absurdum to try to "break" modens tullens. Jay Dubya (talk) 01:15, 30 March 2014 (UTC)

They just phrased it badly, doesn't make Chalmers' argument make a lick of sense.

So let's play by the rules, and say that we are in facetious disagreement that water wetness is something dependent on the physical properties of water. It is assumed to be an unmeasurable sensory difference basically like qualia are supposed to be.

Then the only question is that, is it conceivable that when a faucet opens up a flood of water from a conceivable different world, that said water would lack wetness?

Chalmers says conceivable (A is true and B is not true because I felt like it), therefore water being wet has nothing to do with water and we must posit some kind of nonsense dualism to account for it.

172.218.204.55 (talk) 02:21, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

No. None of this is logically valid. Premise C is specifically invalid

C. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.

We can conceive of a world indistinguishable from our world but in which its distinguishable from our world? No. we cant. In order to describe the 'indistinguishable' world we need to distinguished it.

The fact that we can conceive of yellow lego trucks indistinguishable from green lego trucks but in which they are made out of yellow legos --------- UTTER NONSENSE — Preceding unsigned comment added by 132.241.215.28 (talk) 06:20, 18 May 2014 (UTC)

Pyschopaths as Philosophical Zombies?

I stumbled on this article while researching a publication on psychopathy which actually extended from my work on an experimental project I call the "Zombie Apocalypse Diaries."

Ironically, I may have stumbled on true zombies, even while considering the philosophical zombie as the subject of the project - a reality "show" billed as a fictional perspective on reality wherein the problems we face in industrialized society were blamed on a "zombie virus."

What I realized is that we have two developmental pathways as human beings. We can develop individually, without need for empathy; or we can develop socially, in a social environment, where empathy develops.

In my mind then, a philosophical zombie, or perhaps another, and real, type of philosophical zombie, is the psychopath or any person lacking empathy or moral reasoning. This would be the closest to the "soulless zombie" mentioned by not described in the main article.

Here is a person who does not reason morally. They are not fit for society.

Worse is that we place psychopaths in charge. This is likely a holdover from placement of psychopaths in charge of military and other conflicts. They are ideally suited to military leadership as they lack moral reasoning. But moral reasoning is vital to an effective society.

Additionally, I would characterize psychopaths as primary zombies. But when in position of influence, such as leadership, or in the media; psychopaths have powerful capability of "spreading" their lack of empathy, creating "secondary zombies." So not only do we now have the potential for a very reason philosophical zombie, but a second type - a person affected with an empathy disorder.

An excellent example of how this mechanism takes place, and of a real physical zombie, is the State of the Union address by President George W. Bush in 2002. Here we had a nation in psychological trauma, eager for guidance. What we got was completely lacking in empathy, which influenced people who heard it, and led to such wonderful things as the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the murder of Osama Bin Laden which in turn led to a signicant increase in law enforcement killings of unarmed and innocent citizens.

Worst of all is that our society's design - capitalism specifically, is no more than the result of our having trusted these zombies with leadership and the formation of our economy and society.

Examples of historical philopshical zombies would then include what we already know as monsters: Hitler, Musselini, all of the serial killers, and many more.

The implications are tremendous, and I have begun drafting a paper on the subject, the abstract for which goes something like this:

Human beings can develop to become one of two basic types: a lone, survivor type, or a social type. These disparate types are determined by a developmental pathway which entails empathy. On the one hand, the survivor type does not need empathy and thus does not develop the skill. But in a social being, empathy is necessary and develops. But a developmental disorder where empathy is not developed, the individual becomes the wrong type, unable to develop moral reasoning spontaneously, and thus becomes at-odds with society. This disorder is not only present and ubiquitous in our society, but is the very reason for our societal strife. The survivor types seem to present as natural leaders – and are excellent as such in conflict situations where ruthlessness is beneficial. It seems our reliance on psychopaths, those who lack empathy due to lack of development of the skill, extended from military, to societal. This does well to explain our seemingly militaristic society and its intolerance to empathy and its derivatives. Further, these people who lack empathy, can, in position of leadership and influence, draw away empathy from others, enforcing their views of society. If allowed to lead a society to fruition, conflict both among and within society is of course inevitable.

This abstract reflects the duality between humans and philosophical zombies, whom I describe as psychopaths.

I am currently seeking feedback on the paper and will try to return here to update this section with the results.

My project can be found on YouTube under the username zapocalysediaries if you wish to have futher insight into my thoughts on the matter.

My proposed paper can be found at www.wolveswolveswolves.org/moralreasoning/Theory26Dec13.doc and is in Microsoft Word format.

-Michael Wolf — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.78.109.43 (talk) 23:13, 26 December 2013 (UTC)

Logically valid?

Shouldn't it made more explicit that Chalmers is assuming that consciousness does in fact exist (and that eliminative materialism is wrong)? Hasire (talk) 20:39, 29 January 2016 (UTC)

Couldn't hurt, I suppose, but the implication's clear. If subjective consciousness doesn't exist, then neither do zombies, since they are defined as being distinct from humans as regards their consciousness. Sneftel (talk) 14:05, 1 February 2016 (UTC)

I'm going to do a big rewrite of "responses" section

I think the section should be renamed "debate" I'll be using Chalmer's paper "two-dimensional argument against materialism" as the template. He lays out the debate and major players quite effectively. I'll try to preserve as much of what is in the section already. For instance, this copy that I thought was quite good:

The zombie argument is difficult to assess because it brings to light fundamental disagreements about the method and scope of philosophy itself and the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument may think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great deal of philosophical work. However others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland and W.V.O. Quine, have fundamentally different views. For this reason, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy

Let me know if you'd like to discuss and I'll invite you to my sandbox to help (assuming that's the way this is normally done).DolyaIskrina (talk) 17:44, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Hi DolyaIskrina, what's the current state of the rewrite? I'd be happy to help. This article is such a mess, and the responses section in particular needs a cleanup... I did a bit a few months back but there's lots left to do. Could you let me know the source(s) for that paragraph? I'd like to add a citation in the article. Gazelle55 (talk) 17:41, 18 April 2021 (UTC)

I know it will be hard to believe, but I never got around to working on it. The quote above is a paragraph that is currently in the article that I thought was good. As to using Chalmers' paper as a template for organizing the section, here is the paper. He has a bunch of different headings under which he lumps the different counter arguments. I think it's helpful, but it would probably be UNDUE to list all the detractors' arguments and then Chalmers' retort every time. The same issue came up on Hard Problem of Consciousness. I can't tell yet how busy I'm going to be over the next week, so while I wish I could commit to a productive collaboration, sadly I may do the more annoying thing of waiting to see your edits and then nitpicking. Nothing personal, it's just how my brain works. Sometimes I have to be irked into action, which also make me irksome. Along those lines, I'm going to open up another heading below to discuss the lead. Whether or not this article should be about "Philosophical Zombies" or "The Philosophical Zombie Argument". Thanks for doing all this work. DolyaIskrina (talk) 14:26, 19 April 2021 (UTC)

No worries about any delays (or nit-picking!). I'm happy to start on this, though it will probably be a while before I have a chance to do much. One brief thought for now: I agree with using Chalmers' long 2009 paper for the overall structure, since it does seem to double as a literature review, but we might also want to consider Robert Kirk's SEP entry on the topic and take the best of both sources. (Although, I think they both broadly divide the critics into type-A and type-B materialists.) I agree with not including all Chalmers' responses, since he occupies the minority position in the debate. Will reply to your new section below when I have a chance. Gazelle55 (talk) 15:46, 19 April 2021 (UTC)

Prior art

Wittgenstein in 1953's Philosophical Investigations: "420. But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?" — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.247.204.214 (talk) 03:10, 13 June 2019 (UTC)

Definitely sounds relevant, do we have a source connecting that to p-zombies? I'm just worried about WP:SYNTH. Gazelle55 (talk) 17:42, 18 April 2021 (UTC)

Frankish's Anti-Zombie Argument

Can anyone think of a reason not to include Keith Frankish's Anti-Zombie argument? I don't know how well it has been received by the Philosophical community. https://nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/k0711/kf_articles/blob/master/Frankish_Anti-zombie_eprint.pdf It is ultimately an attack on the notion that conceivability entails metaphysical import. DolyaIskrina (talk) 22:13, 3 November 2019 (UTC)

DolyaIskrina, I'm a year and a half late, but I say include it for sure – it is certainly within scope. Frankish's article is mentioned briefly in the "History" section but deserves more than that. This article is such a mess lol. Gazelle55 (talk) 17:32, 18 April 2021 (UTC)

Kurt Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions

I'm not sure what the procedure for adding the info to the article is, but given it's publication coincides with the formal birth of this theory, I feel compelled to bring up Kurt Vonnegut's 1973 book Breakfast of Champions. It describes pretty much the exact same philosophical concept where in a character becomes convinced that he is the only actual individual in the world and all other humans are machines perfectly replicating human existence. Aside from the word machine being substitute for the word zombie it's an identical concept published a year before the term was coined. I don't know if this is coincidence or if Vonnegut was familar with the writings of David Chalmers, but I think the use of it by a popular author around the time time as it's formal creation is warranted a mention somewhere. Cillian flood (talk) 14:25, 4 April 2021 (UTC)

I love that book. However, it is not an example of a PZombie argument. It's an example of the problem of other minds, solipsism, and also I think a type of psychosis or sociopathy. All of which predate both PZombies and Vonnegut's book by decades and centuries. Cheers DolyaIskrina (talk) 19:29, 15 April 2021 (UTC)

Thanks Cillian flood for posting, it sounds like a really interesting book. I agree with DolyaIskrina, though, it may not be exactly on topic. The litmus test would be whether a reliable source connects it to the topic of philosophical zombies. Best, Gazelle55 (talk) 17:29, 18 April 2021 (UTC)

Questions about the current version of the lead

I think it's important to have the idea of "thought experiment" or "argument" higher in the lead. Per WP:LEADFOLLOWSBODY, this article is really about Chalmers' Conceivability Argument, so starting with an isolated definition of P Zombies seems like we are making the WP:ISATERMFOR error. That might explain why at least one reader above thought the article was about a type of actual person or a mental condition. It'd be like having the Knowledge Argument article called "Mary the Color Scientist". "She a hypothetical scientist.." I think "hypothetical" doesn't do enough work to make it clear to the average reader what the heck is going on. Same issue came up with Boltzmann Brain. I get that we want to make it clear that other philosophers like Kirk have used the term first, but still. I don't think renaming or merging is the solution, because most people will encounter Philosophical Zombie before Knowledge Argument. I merged "Veil of Ignorance" with "Original Position", and I'm now regretting it, since Veil of Ignorance is what shows up more frequently. Still the redirect gets you there. Cheers. DolyaIskrina (talk) 14:56, 19 April 2021 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: Mind-Body, section 18

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 22 August 2022 and 10 December 2022. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Paulshollander, Wikiknowledge8, Jeff2213, Schooluser33 (article contribs). Peer reviewers: Lucaslanni521, Katiestano.

— Assignment last updated by Schooluser33 (talk) 04:03, 10 December 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: Mind-Body, section 16

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 22 August 2022 and 14 December 2022. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Willraschkowan, Dparisien01, KAlszko (article contribs). Peer reviewers: Lyanna labrecque, Abby Abergel, T1xan15, MaxiiBoii, Alexabowers, BrianSintimm.

— Assignment last updated by Jovanna.lanbaxter (talk) 17:34, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

In the context of artificial intelligence

There's a general consensus in AI research that a large language model could scale smoothly with advances in technology, to the point where it would be indistinguishable from a general intelligence-- it wouldn't really *be* an AGI, but it would be functionally identical; a sort of philosophical zombie. Atomic putty? Rien! 18:25, 13 January 2023 (UTC)

That is now a reality, I believe? BlacklightMG (talk) 01:07, 30 August 2024 (UTC)

Even if one accepts that an LLM-based entity could be functionally identical to a GI, stating that it could not be an AGI is begging the question, with the same potential objections as are raised for PZ arguments and the Chinese Room argument. I don't see anything specific about tensor-based GIs that elucidate the issues here, compared to, say, hydrocarbon-based GIs. Sneftel (talk) 13:46, 11 September 2024 (UTC)