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Archive 1

Citations

Here some resources for the AFC article, and perhaps Reorganization plan of United States Army - Four major commands

LRPF

Next Gen Ground Vehicles

FVL

Network

Air, Missile Defense

missile defense (S-500 and proposed THAAD variant)

Please discuss below: --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 13:55, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

found:
  1. EurAsian Times Desk (May 26, 2018) S-500 Anti Missile System Decades Ahead of American THAAD
  2. Kris Schies (29 Dec 2018) 1 answer
  3. Bart Hendrickx (Monday, October 11, 2021) capabilities Aerostat: a Russian long-range anti-ballistic missile system with possible counterspace
  4. Dr Carlo Kopp, AFAIAA, SMIEEE, PEng (June 2011, Updated April, 2012) Almaz-Antey S-500 Triumfator M Self Propelled Air / Missile Defence System / SA-X-NN Самоходный Комплекс Противоракетной / Противосамолетной Обороны С-500 «Триумфатор-М»
  5. THAAD
  6. Defenseworld.net Analysis (Thursday, August 16, 2018 @ 01:35 PM) Battle of the Air Defense Systems: S-400 Vs Patriot and THAAD
  7. Defenseworld.net Analysis (Thursday, August 16, 2018 @ 01:35 PM) Battle of the Air Defense Systems: S-400 Vs Patriot and THAAD

Soldier lethality

Acquisition

Basics

Readiness

--Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 03:48, 19 July 2018 (UTC)

Interconnected factors

While trying to determine the location for Future Vertical Lift (FVL), I came upon a recursion: the 6 top-priority capabilities, including FVL, depend on a balance of the 6 top-priority capabilities, a chicken/egg problem. This is similar to the problem of determinining the location of Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), which has multiple locations; it appears that FVL has multiple locations.

There is a citation for FVL, but right now the director of the FVL CFT is not located at the Aviation COE, and the CG of the Aviation COE explicitly stated that FVL depends on the other 5 top-priorities. The modus operandi of AFC, to fail quickly at each of the top priorities, sets bounds for a CFT requirement; thus relaxing the requirements until some mixture of the top-6 priorities produces a do-able solution by the vendors, appears to be the paradigm for AFC.

It appears that 'time to market' is the driving factor for FVL; the Army cannot afford to drag out the process. The director of [AMRDEC] has stated "AMRDEC cannot afford to waste time moving a program of record from development to fielding. Sometimes this process takes 10 to 15 years ...".

BG Walter Rugen, director of the FVL CFT, has stated that speed of deployment to the Army [brigades] is his top priority, given that a reliable, producible, powerful, unmanned vertical lift prototype is still in the future.[1] --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 12:06, 21 August 2018 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ New Army aircraft will be durable, lethal, unmanned for modern conflicts
I commend you on your through research. Unfortunately, I do not have the time to fully invest in the expansion of this new command. I will help out in bits ans pieces whenever I can. Keep up the good work! Neovu79 (talk) 05:19, 26 August 2018 (UTC)
Resolved. Walter Rugen is at Fort Rucker. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 13:26, 31 August 2018 (UTC)

New contracting mechanisms

If you study DIUx, you will see that they figured out a new way to fund DoD projects: "Other Transactions Authority ". Should I dive into this for the AFC article? --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 19:38, 29 August 2018 (UTC)

Operational control

My current problem is documenting the relationship between ATEC's Aviation, Maneuver, Maneuver Support and Sustainment, and Mission Command Test Directorates (at Fort Hood) and the CFTs, who will need to test system requirements before they can detect failures in the deliverables. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:33, 1 September 2018 (UTC)

Apparently the COE CDIDs are transferred, but the ATEC test Operations are TBD. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 02:47, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
Found citations for ATEC[1] / JMC[2] / joint[3] operations. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 12:45, 6 September 2018 (UTC)
It's a G-8 level question: some concept (CDID) has found traction; but now there is a cost to funding a test of its operational impact; the units of the Army can then use the concept to train to, given their mission; using Mission Command Battle Lab,[4] Mission Command Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID),[5] and TRADOC Analysis Center[6] AFC then adds up the pieces needed to run the operational test (in terms of budget, time available left in the development schedule, whether there is a unit (Joint or Army) available with that mission -- or maybe this is a G-1 decision or JMC decision) and sees if there is a match. Then ATEC or JMC looks at its infrastructure for room, and adds the CFT/CDID project item to the list for operational evaluation. The selected Army units run the operational test. So apparently ATEC's Aviation, Maneuver, Maneuver Support and Sustainment, and Mission Command Test Directorates fit in here; AMSAA processes the results for a materiel development decision. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:54, 6 September 2018 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ (January 2011) Implementing Acquisition Reform: The Decker-Wagner Army Acquisition Review
  2. ^ Maj. Brett Lea,24th Press Camp Headquarters (5 Sep 2018) "Army establishes Futures Command; U.S. Army JMC at Fort Bliss is operational arm" Fort Bliss Bugle
  3. ^ Matthew Ahlquist and James Di Pane (August 16, 2018) Army Futures Command Will Give the Army an Opportunity to Become a World-Class Innovator
  4. ^ Mission Command Battle Lab
  5. ^ Mission Command Center Of Excellence (MC-COE CDID)
  6. ^ TRADOC Analysis Center, Fort Leavenworth

I took care to cluster some relevant citations as evidence for management gaps in OPCON --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:23, 12 September 2018 (UTC) What these Citations, # 57, 58, 60, 62, and 65 seem to document is: 'gaps in Operational control (OPCON) are failures in the concept of operations (Con_ops)' (for some mission). --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:23, 12 September 2018 (UTC)

ARCIC date

December 2018 , reported by Breaking Defense

RDECOM date

April 2019 , reported by Breaking Defense. Actually, the command was transitioned early: 31 Jan 2019. However compare to the recommendation of the Decker-Wagner report (2010), which shows that more work needs to be done in this part of the acquisition process. See the article history for references to Decker-Wagner. Comments appreciated. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 18:52, 17 March 2019 (UTC)

Potential materiel; location of its article

Potential materiel could be covered in an 'Air and Missile Defense' link, for example; I have been tracking the MHTK[1] (miniature hit-to-kill) interceptor. It's a miniature THAAD interceptor, but for SHORAD basically. But the IBCS is new capability because a network of sensors allows greater coverage than the sensor systems built for a single interceptor.

Where do other editors think this potential materiel might be covered? --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 23:36, 11 September 2018 (UTC)

Compare the recommendations of Decker-Wagner 2010:[2] for example re-establish the difference between IRAD and B&P, where the defense contractors make "investment in Independent Research & Development (IRAD). In many cases, IRAD investments are focused on Bid and Proposal (B&P) activities relating to current Army needs."

Note that MHTK is IRAD. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 19:03, 17 March 2019 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ MHTK interceptor
  2. ^ [https://www.breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/07/Decker_Wagner_implement_plan_Jul_2011.pdf (July 2011) Implementing Acquisition Reform: The Decker-Wagner Army Acquisition Report]

Swarming tactics

The newest Deputy Commanding General for EUCOM is a veteran of a battle which defeated swarming tactics (His unit got a Presidential Unit Citation for it). There are multiple potential locations for this material. Do any editors have suggestion for this material on swarming? Swarming has a long history, of course, and the tactic is no panacea for victory, as evidenced by its cost in men and materiel. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 15:30, 12 September 2018 (UTC)

Acquisition Corps

To all editors: Acquisition Corps is now a blue link. You are welcome to improve the Acquisition Corps article as well as this one. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:35, 22 February 2019 (UTC)

Synthetic training environment (STE)

"The Synthetic Training Environment will interact with and augment live training, which is the primary training approach for the Army. This concept will allow the Army to provide a single STE that delivers a training service to the Point of Need. The capability will train all Warfighting Functions and the human dimension across all echelons with Joint and Unified Action Partners in the context of Unified Land Operations."

The Train the Trainer scenario is one application in a Synthetic training environment. Land mass / terrain databases are another. The SFAB scenario of an indoor attack is another visualization scenario. The Soldiers get a lot more out of these kinds of training sessions, and they learn more, plus they get to repeat over and over until the necessary movements are in their muscle memory. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:22, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

What this brings home to me is the place of drill: '"I was told later on by the doctors that had they not started CPR when they did, that would have been it. I would not have survived," Thurston said. "They seriously saved my life."

Turner said he just reacted instinctively, using what he had learned as a Soldier.

"All those skills and training that I had just kicked in automatically," he said. "That was amazing to me. I never really thought about it until it was over. We were able to save this gentleman's life and there were no previous rehearsals or anything." '[1]

References

  1. ^ Sean Kimmons, Army News Service (August 8, 2019) Former Army Ranger helps save man on commercial jet

--Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 10:42, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

OMFV — possible interim

Here is a citation, already in the Reorganization plan of United States Army "Video: 30mm cannons and a new network: Here's what the Stryker brigade of the future will look like" which discusses the upgraded Stryker ICVD (Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon) which has already been fielded to 2nd Cavalry Regiment (United States) in Europe.

Since Defender Europe 2020 has been re-scoped, Strykers could still present overmatch, particularly since the marshy wetlands of Eastern Europe are an inconvenient possibility. Any heavy armor BCTs would have to operate from well-engineered (think paved) ground. If that is the case, then Stryker BCTs would have a place with allies and partners, at a time when the Optionally manned fighting vehicle (OMFV) is far in the future.

ICVDs can still carry 9 infantry soldiers (minute 1:40 of the cited video). 269 Stryker ICVDs are planned for FY2022 (enough for 3 BCTs). --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 22:55, 18 March 2020 (UTC)

Splitting the article

The article could be split thus:

  1. "A" Summary (current status as compared to IOC) -- Done.
  2. "B" Infrastructure of Futures command -- Refs are done
  3. "C" Modernization of the Army over the 6 priorities (by CFT and PEO) -- Refs are done, to be expanded
  4. "D" Future directions (long term i.e. by 2049) -- Refs are done
  5. "E" History of the Army's reform efforts (really the introduction) -- Refs are done

Any other suggestions? --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:44, 25 September 2020 (UTC)

@Ancheta Wis: Article size is too large mostly due to overciting. I'd have a look at WP:CITEKILL. NonsensicalSystem(err0r?)(.log) 13:07, 30 September 2020 (UTC)
The enyclopedia has tools, available to all editors, such as Wikipedia:Tools/Navigation_popups which allow the reader to determine the content of an enyclopedia reference while reading the article. For example, when I hover my cursor over the Pop-ups link, I can read the contents of the link's lead without leaving the article or losing the train of thought. There are other tools (such as mw:Page Previews) which perform this parts of this function as well. Recommended. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:02, 11 October 2020 (UTC)
If we look at the citations, which are dated, what the Army says it is setting about to do is actually happening as projected, given that a commander has been assigned and funding is provided. It is being documented by citations as we read. So we need the citations, which I have selected to verify the projections, and we then wait for additional evidence, and cite it, as we find it. That means more citations. See WP:UNDERKILL, which addresses its adjunct, WP:CITEKILL. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:42, 11 October 2020 (UTC)
I just consolidated 30 clusters of references under single refn macros. Popups only work for a single refn at a time. It is still possible to float the cursor over a single link to read each ref, one popup at a time to get the flow of the citations which are backing up a statement in the article. For budgeting especially, it is possible to see how some capability is being considered for the Army, or not, over time. This will become more relevant as the Army attempts to protect its modernization projects in the face of expected budget cutbacks in the coming years. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:01, 25 November 2020 (UTC)

CCDC or Devcom, or both?

We need to find the messaging source: which is it, CCDC or Devcom. Devcom has a logo, CCDC is the acronym. The commanding general has his bio under Army.mil Futures CCDC

--Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:21, 19 November 2020 (UTC)

Use of Wikipedia:reFill 2

A series of good-faith edits relying on Wikipedia:reFill 2 has introduced errors of authorship, title, and date. I am reverting to the last known good version. The intention of those edits will be used as a guide for updating the article in the future. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 06:10, 21 September 2021 (UTC)

The instructions for reFill 2 advise a manual check for errors after applying this tool; this has not yet occurred. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 06:10, 21 September 2021 (UTC)

Please use a manual check for errors after applying an automated tool; the same errors of attribution are occurring after applying the autonated tool. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 13:02, 15 December 2021 (UTC)
Found more reFill 2 - induced errors. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:50, 10 April 2022 (UTC)

Markup improvements

Thanks to GraemeLeggett's markup technique introduced recently, it is now possible to track developments which are occurring over presidential administrations. It also illustrates the technical difficulty following the article, which documents the need to track unity of command. The Army persists across adminstrations, and its institutional memory is designed to last for decades, as shown by the article. This suggests that the 2021 CSA papers #1 and #2 would be one guide for organizing the article, over the 2020-2036 timescale. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:06, 25 September 2021 (UTC)

Readability

There are two main obstacles to reading at the moment:

1) citation overkill - breaking up sentences with a[1][2][23][4][5]lot of markup which has[6][8][9][10][11]same effect as putting in pauses. Bundling a lot of citations into a single grouped citation is brushing the problem under the carpet (the carpet in this case being the Notes section)
2) business style speak eg "The ability to punch-through any standoff defense of a near-peer competitor is the goal which Futures Command is seeking" which translates as 'Futures Command is looking to develop a system that can penetrate the defences of near-equal military'. GraemeLeggett (talk) 09:45, 25 September 2021 (UTC)
As an example of the problem, see the application of APNT (assured positioning, navigation, and tracking); thus on the future battlefield a commander is as equally on the frontline as a footsoldier. The combat brigades have two command posts to address the survivability issue — one is on the move, the other is operating at a safe standoff distance. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 10:05, 25 September 2021 (UTC)
The satellite constellation in low earth orbit is the Army's proposed solution to the APNT problem. The chief of staff of the army is suggesting that no army will want to get into this kind of conflict, once they understand the kind of capability that is being built, and for which the combat brigades are currently training. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 10:15, 25 September 2021 (UTC)
The G-6 needs to acknowledge that this would be a problem. But I can't put that into the article, until the JADC2 solution is in place (2025). --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 10:31, 25 September 2021 (UTC)
I found the G-6 article to be revealing because it appears that the Army and the Air Force solved the 2020 Covid interconnection problem in two different ways. (The Air Force used their zero trust capability.) --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 13:19, 25 September 2021 (UTC)
The soldier lethality refs cite the ability of IVAS (i.e., ENVG-B) to connect to ITN. This solves a problem for the leaders of paratroopers who are regrouping after a jump.-- Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 13:02, 25 September 2021 (UTC)

History section missing

There ought to be a section that says where this command comes from. A summary of when it was proposed, approved established, and any important changes. GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:38, 25 September 2021 (UTC)

 Done AFC stems from another article. I cited the Decker-Wagner report earlier; RDECOM was not disestablished, as the Decker-Wagner report recommended, but was only transferred into AFC. Ryan D. McCarthy and James McConville were the primary drivers (they worked on it every day), with prioritization from Mark Milley, and financial support from Mark Esper who funded the command using Army money, by terminating other Army projects. Congress has supported the effort, since. The major innovation was to use cross-functional teams to circumvent the natural growth of Army bureaucracy. 'Bull' Holland has cogent suggestions for AFC, as mentioned in the article. I have not seen other reports on the hoped-for changes to Army culture. DoD has attempted to use CFTs but the dynamic is not the same, as Army projects are smaller. The Synthetic training environment (STE) CFT has potential for reaching not just the brigades, but also the general populace. Capability gaps can be inferred by following the citations. The obvious gap in hypersonics was addressed by the entire DoD, not just by the Army. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 15:09, 25 September 2021 (UTC)
A link to another article is not done, per Wikipedia:Summary_style guideline it needs a summary of the text at the other end of the link. GraemeLeggett (talk) 15:27, 25 September 2021 (UTC)

Overciting

At the moment this article page size stats are

  • Prose size (including all HTML code): 76 kB
  • References (including all HTML code): 534 kB

Which even allowing for the code for formatting refs, that seems an inbalance; visually, the article is about 50% text, 50% references. GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:07, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

The references document the Conflict continuum which is playing out over the next three decades. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 14:37, 20 December 2021 (UTC)
As an example, the role of a TCM spans an entire branch of the Army; it's a command position; I just used an efn to note that. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 03:55, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

very hard to follow

This article is very hard to comprehend. I'm a fairly intelligent person, and after I read through it, I don't understand much. I tried some copyedits but I don't have a frame of reference from which to help rewrite the article. Are there any military experts who can help?--Eatthecrow (talk) 21:57, 11 March 2022 (UTC)

@Eatthecrow, I have added more links, including an explainer for the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 —The MDO concept. The explainer's Note 2 is a 5 point narrative for a sample scenario (such as a globally integrated exercise from 2019, illustrated in general terms by TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1). The information window closed down shortly afterward: Please let me know if there is anything more that you need (I might not know the citation that you may need, but if you ask, perhaps we might start to converge upon a useful answer). --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 18:37, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
awesome, I appreciate you helping. I'm going to see if I can work on the page some more today too. Eatthecrow (talk) 18:04, 18 March 2022 (UTC)
@Eatthecrow, There have been some additional developments: Secretary Christine Wormuth has clarified[1] the Army Acquistion relay race. Just as in relay race#Rules and strategy, someone starts the race, Futures Command holds the baton first, and actually sets the direction of the effort.[2] As new runners prepare to take the baton, the Army Secretariat selects the likely next runners in the relay.[3] As the baton nears the next runner, additional judges at the competitive event adjudge whether handoff of the baton is successful, in a repeating cycle until the goal is reached.[4] --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 13:51, 5 May 2022 (UTC)
There is now a 180-day timer set by Congress' FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which funds the Army, on AD 2022-7, asking for clarification of roles and responsibilities for modernization, at the Army's Department, Secretariat, and Army Command levels.[5] As my 16:11, 6 May 2022 (UTC) comment below stated, the responsibility for proponentcy of modernization (about six dozen individuals play a role in grabbing the baton, at different parts of the relay race) is going to have to be clarified. 2028 and 2035 are deadline dates. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:01, 24 June 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Secretary Christine Wormuth (3 May 2022) Army Directive 2022-07 (Army Modernization Roles and Responsibilities) 6 pages
  2. ^ Jen Judson (4 May 2022) In new directive, US Army reins in Army Futures Command
  3. ^ Jaspreet Gill (4 May 2022) EXCLUSIVE: New Army directive shakes up modernization enterprise
  4. ^ Breaking Defense (5 May 2022) New Army directive shakes up modernization enterprise
  5. ^ Andrew Eversden (24 Jun 2022) House lawmakers ask Army: Who’s in charge of massive modernization program?
To start, I removed the Too many Links tag. The article had a lot of links stripped out. Note 1 is the place to start. The CFTs basically are for Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Signal (the network), Air Defense, and Infantry. The Network as of 2022 is now the focus of development (It is called JADC2). It may be instructive to contrast this article with the Russo-Ukrainian war, which has a very different focus. But a US-centric article does not cover the Russian Army's weaknesses; there was a section here, which got split off to Power projection.
Overmatch has been the Army's goal. The world situation has been Standoff, which is also Putin's assessment. However China plans for hegemony by 2049 (See power projection).
Next, see the History section, which is US Army-centric. Finally, Multi-domain operations is Futures Command's path of development, which is a part of the DoD approach (starting with JADC2). --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 22:30, 11 March 2022 (UTC)
Re-reading, I can see how the multi-domain task force (MDTF) could be hard to understand, as it covers multiple phases of the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), which is classified to boot. But the key point is that the Army now has a strategic fires component with a 1725 mile range (LRPF). I have not seen a description of the JWC, except what I can read from the citations, an understanding of which I built up over the past 4 years. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:40, 12 March 2022 (UTC)
I added a more basic link: multi-domain operations task force. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 03:01, 12 March 2022 (UTC)
I added an MDO explainer. I encourage you to install Wikipedia:Tools/Navigation popups so that you can read the article's thread of discussion by floating your cursor over the link, without losing the context of the parent page. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:05, 13 March 2022 (UTC)
I have added more links, including an explainer for the TRADOC MDO concept. Please let me know if there is anything more that you need. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 00:27, 14 March 2022 (UTC)
I've read this particular passage several times and I still cannot comprehend it:

The TRADOC capability manager (TCM) for Strategic Missile Defense (SMD) has accepted the charter for DOTMLPF for the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT).

I cannot even undersand how it is significant and why this needs to be cited.
This entire article contains too much of obscure military terminology which is appropriate for a publication of the US Army, but not for an online encylopedia. It needs to be rewritten in plain English. --95.29.163.65 (talk) 08:55, 6 May 2022 (UTC)
2nd SBCT/4th ID Stryker fires FGM-148 Javelin, 28 April 2022 at Fort Carson, Colo.
Thank you for asking; TRADOC is a 4-star Army Command (for training and doctrine). A TCM is a military expert, in this case, for missile defense, who has agreed to recommend and writeup Doctrine (the D in DOTMLPF) in behalf of the entire Army (and therefore the nation). This TCM, by accepting the charter for DOTMLPF, becomes a direct report of the TRADOC 4-star. In effect, the TCM becomes an extension of the 4-star. It's a big responsibility for that officer, who also would serve the SMDC 3-star, who probably acts as a sounding board and resource. It works both ways; the relationship shows how this hidden Army of experts can delve across many levels of rank and expertise across the entire Army. Please don't hesitate to ask more questions! As you learn more, you can add it to the encyclopedia, yourself. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:11, 6 May 2022 (UTC)
A DOTMLPF document is written in plain language, that nests in the hierarchy of documents, so that the Soldiers (and citizens) can understand it. Thus we (as editors) would benefit from this TCM's written work.

I propose that I hat everything below the line, to close this discussion, as your point is taken. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:36, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

One of the things I believe that Futures Command has done right, is to do away with the artificial rank barriers in Futures Command's CFTs (sergeants working with, and alongside, generals wearing casual clothes —don't get me wrong, I would think that their roles would still be acknowledged with the proper use of titles, to acknowledge their respective responsibilities. What I am getting at is AFC's need for expertise, regardless of rank). Secretary Wormuth, I think, in her Army Directive 2022-07,[1] is working to acknowledge the Army Secretariat's ('the Pentagon') responsibility to 'grasp the baton' in the relay race that is Army modernization.
The part that leapt out at me is the role of the ASA(ALT), who is the Army Acquisition Executive. The ASA(ALT)'s Program Executive Officers (PEOs) run the military's contracts. A PEO, or PM, ran the project to mount a CROWS-J on a Stryker (see image on the right. Stryker platoons already have Javelins. What is new is the CROWS working with a Javelin. The image has more detail if you hover the cursor over it.). The 2018 version (AD2018-15) that Sec Wormuth is refactoring attempted to kick-start Acquisition by making the Principal Military Deputy of the ASA(ALT) (who is at the Pentagon), simultaneously a deputy commander of Futures Command, in Austin. This didn't happen. But the 2018 directive came before Zoom meetings and COVID-19. So the Army is still working on the Acquisition problem, as I read it. The Modernization part is from AFC. The sobering part is the 2028 and 2035 Readiness time frame for the future. As you can see, it appears that it's really going to take that long, unless the Army Secretariat can somehow rise to the problem. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 16:11, 6 May 2022 (UTC)

Please understand that I'm not asking you to explain all the fine details, these would only be appropriate for an article on the U.S. Army's acquisition process. Wikipedia is not a manual, textbook, guidebook, or scientific journal (WP:NOTTEXTBOOK). The articles need to be accessible for everyday readers. Therefore unnecessary proprietary language and description of internal policies and procedures needs to be removed. Instead provide key facts/statements and a concise summary of what is going to be achieved by this particular development. Something like "The Army started development of operational procedures for the BMD battle management system" followed by some references, preferably ones drawn from secondary sources instead of primary or tertiary ones (WP:PSTS). Right now there is too much focus on primary sources like U.S. Army publications and the article looks as an indiscriminate collection of unnotable news reports, however Wikipedia is not a newspaper (WP:NOTNEWS). --95.29.163.65 (talk) 22:00, 6 May 2022 (UTC)

Some history: Before AFC was begun in 2018 (Army Directive 2018-15),[2] it was an initiative of then-acting secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy and then-Vice Chief of Staff James McConville (in their roles); they took its proponency as the Modernization command. Before that time there were about six dozen Force modernization proponency leads (as indicated in the tables of Army Regulation 5-22).
Ryan McCarthy's interest in Modernization stems from his experience as an aide of Robert Gates, who cancelled Future Combat Systems, and who adjudged that Joint Forces Command was redundant. The six dozen proponents of Force modernization (AR5-22) —each with a primary interest, but with an incentive to preserve their current working solution (a local maximum)— produce an inertia which a unitary proponent for Modernization would overcome, if there were one. Unfortunately Army Directive 2018-15[2] is now rescinded. Perhaps elements of this directive might be reasserted. Modernization is part of the Acquisition process, and seeks overmatch, which perceptive rivals must heed, or else face ruin, as they risk becoming less capable, and eventually incapable (think China after 2000 years of empire).
The encyclopedia does have a Current events portal which consumes News events, and seemingly small items form a critical mass which then demand coverage,[3] like the Javelin anti-tank missile. The Javelin is an Acquisition success story,[3] and has earned its place in history via the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
In 2018 as AFC was forming, the editors of the encyclopedia began to document its formation; at that time, I noticed that United States Army Acquisition Corps was not yet covered in the encyclopedia; its corresponding civilian ASA(ALT) —pronounced: a salt— was covered. ASA(ALT)'s PEOs are only sporadically covered to this day. The AFC process was documented, as a literature appeared, per the No Original Research injunction. However coverage of Futures is built-in to the topic, which is antithetical to the standard Narrative approach of the encyclopedia, as a Future is a hypothetical (which lies at the root of my interest in this topic). In addition Sustainment and Acquisition are themselves founded on hypotheticals, as DoD Under Secretary for Sustainment and Acquisition LaPlante pointed out in a 6 May 2022 press conference.[3][4]
Modernization produces competition for resources, a relay race of initiative (the 'baton' for which cells of the DoD compete, or risk irrelevancy, and therefore cancellation). McConville does call the modernization effort an infinite game, like the IBCS entry in this race, or the hypersonics, or the National Defense Space Architecture, or drones,[5] etc.
Students at West Point or ROTC might ask themselves how they might solve the Missile Defense problem as Skeet shooters, perhaps armed with FIM-92 Stingers, using Thales's theorem (where the respective velocities of target missile and interceptor missile are the legs of a right triangle (the hypotenuse being the anchoring situation, analogous to standoff). The angular field of view for the Stinger seeker head then becomes twice the arcsin of the ratio of the velocities of target missile and Stinger missile. By plugging in values for other interceptor missile velocities, which are available in the encyclopedia, one can get a feel for the solvability of the Missile Defense problem, for various geometrical, cost, and deployability scenarios. Thus missile defense need not be a multi-billion dollar problem, given a resolute-enough defense force of Soldiers standing their ground. This would actually save money, since interim Force Protection could be implemented by MANPADS, surrounding the Tactical Operations Centers, THAAD batteries. MDTFs, and Air Defenses etc. A higher-tech solution, which the Pentagon would naturally favor, from technology-based systems from vendors, also take time to implement. A lower-tech solution using existing materiel would solve the near-term Readiness problem. This would allow the Army an organic 2028/2035 development time frame for its higher-end interceptors. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:36, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
You keep throwing random facts instead of addressing my concerns, so I conclude you are not interested in a meaningful discussion. --95.29.160.105 (talk) 17:01, 15 May 2022 (UTC)
The answer to raising the issue that the article resembles a wall of impenetrable text is not another wall of impenetrable text. See WP:AUDIENCE and WP:TECHNICAL for policy and guidance on article writing. GraemeLeggett (talk) 20:06, 15 May 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Secretary Christine Wormuth (3 May 2022) Army Directive 2022-07 (Army Modernization Roles and Responsibilities) 6 pages
  2. ^ a b Secretary Ryan McCarthy (27 Aug 2018) Army Directive 2018-15 (U.S. Army Futures Command Relationship With the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
  3. ^ a b c Valerie Insinna (6 May 2022) After DoD’s $1.5B move, Army and Marines rush to buy new Javelins, Stingers
  4. ^ Defense Daily (6 May 2022) DoD Draws $1.5 Billion To Replenish Stockpiles, LaPlante Says Goal Is For 'One-To-One Replacement' Sustainment and Acquisition are themselves founded on hypotheticals
  5. ^ Stephan LaRose (served on the Close Combat Lethality Task Force)(6 May 2022) A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES ON THE DEBATE WRACKING THE MARINE CORPS Force 2030

GMD and IBCS

I have not yet seen a citation for the GMD connection to IBCS, which is why I am flagging the latest addition. There is another layer that needs realization (meaning launched, and in orbit, waiting) in the National Defense Space Architecture before this claim can be substantiated. So I can only wait for that specific connection between GMD and IBCS. It would have to be in software, first, before IBCS could even claim this otherwise. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 22:33, 8 May 2022 (UTC)

Space Development Agency#Tranche 0 capability begins with the initial launch of Tranche 0 -- Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 17:39, 13 April 2023 (UTC)

The newest edit says that new systems need to be compatible with IBCS, which I read to be the NGI (next generation interceptors), not the BMC3 system of today, which is hard-wired to the GDIs. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:11, 9 May 2022 (UTC) If you look at the Northrup diagram that Sydney Freedberg cites,[1] the connection to GMD is via C2BMC (an earlier system), not IBCS. So the connection is indirect, and not in the architecture, but via an adaptor. The NGI would need to provide a straight connection to IBCS.[1] --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 01:29, 9 May 2022 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ a b Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. Army IBCS: Joint, Up To A Point. Breaking Defense. 15 May 2020
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