Talk:United Nations Security Council Resolution 242/Archive 1

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There can be no Doubt what 242 Means: [—Preceding text fragment remained from unsigned January 2007 comments, added by 66.108.183.132 (talk) and Abu afak (talk), removed by PierreFH in April 2007.]

The nature of the resolution

I have moved the debate about the binding nature of Security Council resolutions from the article to here for discussion. Some of it does not relate directly to 242 and should perhaps be a topic in its own right rather than being inserted into numerous articles on resolutions relating to Israel. Of the bits that do relate to 242, I shall argue that any assertion that the resolution is binding should made specifically in relation to 242 and indicate what that means in relation to how the resolution's provisions should be interpreted.

Here is the section that was removed:

The legally binding nature of Security Council Resolutions has been the subject of some controversy. It is generally agreed that resolutions are legally binding if they are made under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the Charter.

The International Court of Justice has interpreted that all UN Security Council resolutions are legally binding, in its 1971 Namibia non-binding advisory opinion. However, this non-binding character does not mean that advisory opinions are without legal effect, because the legal reasoning embodied in them reflects the Court's authoritative views on important issues of international law and, in arriving at them, the Court follows essentially the same rules and procedures that govern its binding judgments delivered in contentious cases submitted to it by sovereign states. An advisory opinion derives its status and authority from the fact that it is the official pronouncement of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.

Many politicians and legal scholars, whose opinions have no legal value, have argued that resolutions are legally binding if they are made under Chapter VII of the Charter only.

It has been argued that UNSC 242 has binding force under Article 25 of the UN Charter owing to its incorporation into UN Security Council Resolution 338 and that it is also binding on Israel and the PLO by agreement owing to its incorporation into the Oslo Accords.

Here is my argument:

One of the problems with claims that 242 is binding is that it is not clear what that would mean or even when it came about. Was it binding from the moment it was passed in 1967 or did it only become binding after the advisory ruling on Nambia in 1971? Perhaps it became binding following resolution 338 in 1973 or only after the Oslo accords in 1993?

Most of these questions relate to issues external to the resolution that take no account of the wording of the resolution itself or the intentions of the Security Council at that time. If the resolution is binding who is it binding on and what are they bound to do?

Looking at the resolution's text suggests to me that it was not intended to have binding force. Take for example Operative Paragraph 3:

“3. Requests the Secretary­-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;”

Clearly the role of the Special Representitive is to help the parties reach an acceptable agreement, not to impose some form of legal obligation. Such disagreements about the nature of the resolution are not new, as official reports to the Security Council in 1971 on the Jarring Mission show:

“Those…statements… made clear the essential differences between them. On the one hand, Israel regarded the Security Council resolution as a statement of principles in the light of which the parties should negotiate peace and, on the other hand, the United Arab Republic [Egypt] considered that the resolution provided a plan for settlement of the Middle East dispute to be implemented by the parties according to modalities to be established by the Special Representative. It was also abundantly clear that there was a crucial difference of opinion over the meaning to be attached to the withdrawal provisions of the Security Council resolution, which according to the Arab States applied to all territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and according to Israel applied only to the extent required when agreement had been reached between the parties on secure and recognized borders between them.”

Under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter the Security Council has a range of powers from acting to facilitate an agreement among the parties under article 33 to recommending the terms of a settlement under article 37. Israel’s interpretation of 242 appears to correspond to the Security Council acting under article 33 while the Arab interpretation seems to assume action under article 37. As already noted the role of the Special Representitive strongly suggests action under article 33 while the reference to secure and recognised boundaries suggests that these can only be defined by agreement. Both the withdrawal provision and the ‘peace’ provision in Operative Paragraph 1 are referred to as principles to be applied, with no hint that these are recommendations whose implementation might be viewed as binding. Similarly the provisions in Operative Paragraph 2, especially the necessity for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, might be fine as a principle, but not as an implementable plan binding on the parties.

Obviously if 242 was known to invoke article 37 its provisions would have to be interpreted in a different light and questions about its binding nature might come to the fore. However since the wording of the resolution seems designed to preclude anything that might trigger subsequent enforcement action, I remain to be convinced that there is any reason to think the resolution has binding force.--87.194.196.40 (talk) 21:57, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

It was never binding; despite the claim of some of the ICJ's members to the contrary, Chatper VI resolutions have never been binding under international law, and their claim to the contrary hasn't affected that. The consensus of almost all legal scholars and experts in this area backs this up. Jayjg ^(talk) 18:24, 3 February 2008 (UTC)

John McHugo

According to his own biography http://www.trowers.com/site/default.asp?s=35&ctID=5&cID=28, substantially all of John McHugo's career and professional reputation is based on his work as an advocate for Arab interests. This is not to say that his work or viewpoints lack merit, but there can be little doubt that he approaches the Israeli / Palestinian situation with a predisposition and therefore should not have bold-faced paragraphs devoted to his narrow arguments in a purportedly evenhanded article about UN 242. Vjam calls my revisions "vandalism", but one might say the same about his obsession about spending a good portion of July, 2006, rewriting this article to his own liking and to reflect his own biases.

Taking the trouble to reorder and improve (IMO, anyone is entitled to disagree) and alerting people to what you are doing is not usually considered vandalism. Blanking a section of an article anonymously and without explanation usually is. The predisposition of a writer is not a reason to censor their views, provided they are provided in the context where differing views are presented (for example CAMERA, who you seem to insist must be presented as if they were a neutral source). You claim yourself that McHugo has a professional reputation built on the work cited in the article, which really just points to it being noteworthy, rather that excludable.

Also, please don't forget to sign your posts. --Vjam 18:02, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Wikipedia's definition of vandalism is "any addition, deletion, or change to content, made in a deliberate attempt to compromise the integrity of the encyclopedia. The most common type of vandalism is the replacement of existing text with obscenities, page blanking, or the insertion of bad jokes or other nonsense. Fortunately, this kind of vandalism is usually easy to spot. Any good-faith effort to improve the encyclopedia, even if misguided or ill-considered, is not vandalism"

Will you please explain why you think I am deliberately attempting to compromise the integrity of the encyclopedia? Also, the very first fundamental principle of Wikipedia etiquette is the assumption of good faith, to wit "Assume that others are trying to help Wikipedia rather than harm it, unless there is clear and present evidence to the contrary." Please explain what clear and present evidence you have that my edits are an attempt to harm Wikipedia.

I acknowledge McHugo's reputation in order to not bring discredit to someone simply because I disagree with him. However, there are thousands of excellent advocates publishing on both sides of this issue none of whose opinions are any more relevant than the others. McHugo's "Dogs on a leash" argument is one brief, isolated example from a much larger paper whose arguments are in any event clearly one-sided. Furthermore it is not even a grammatically consistent argument since "dogs" is the subject in McHugo's example and "territories" is the direct object in UN 242. If we look at the sentence "Dogs must be kept on leashes", are we to assume that each dog must be tethered to every single leash simultaneously? If the sentence read "Dogs must be kept on all leashes", this would be absurd. But I digress. My main point is not to argue against McHugo on the merits, but simply to point out that every other authority cited and/or quoted in this article was an actual party or close contemporary observer to the diplomatic birth of UN 242 and I don't see why McHugo deserves special dispensation in this article ahead of any of the thousands of other advocates on either side of this controversial issue.

Additionally, you reverted out my other edits having to with arguments on the partial withdrawal interpretation being consistent with the "whole document" doctrine and my objection to having CAMERA qualified as "pro-Israel" when no other source in the article is qualified as "pro-Palestinian", "anti-Israel" or somesuch.

Furthermore, Vjam, I do want to commend you on the improvements you made to the organization of this article; the current issue-oriented structure is indeed substantially better than the previous pro/con laundry list; and the overwhelming majority of your edits have served, IMO, to improve this entry. However, I strenuously object to your characterization of my edits as vandalism, your further efforts to defend this point of view, and your repeated attempts to censor my edits by reversion. My edits were motivated by nothing more than a desire to improve upon an already-good article and to bring some additional balance to what, IMO, had become a slightly biased presentation.

Finally, as to signing my entries I haven't yet had the desire to register with Wikipedia as I hadn't really planned to have to spend this much time defending myself here. However, my name is David and you already have my IP address. If you want to know more about me, just ask -- but here is not the best place to continue. --August, 18 2006

I'm not really accusing you of anything much. Your contributions from a new anon IP with no explantation seemed to me like vandalism. You seem to know a lot about Wikipedia protocol for a brand new editor.

McHugo is a leading academic lawyer on this subject, and so his contributions are worthy of inclusion. If you don't think so, then I'd suggest waiting for a consensus, otherwise I think your edits, however intentioned, look like censorship. I'm sure someone else will pop along to contribute soon. Your arguments against McHugo are something you're entitled to, but please don't insert them into the article (this would be original research, against WP policy). Your opinion doesn't change the fact that what's cited in the article is widely cited elsewhere and worthy of inclusion.

On CAMERA, this needs "pro-Israeli", since this is an important fact without which the reader might be misled. I'm not sure this applies anywhere else in the article, but if you think it does, then maybe a similar qualifier might be needed there (eg if it is fact that John McHugo is known for his stance on Arab issues, then maybe the article should say so). --Vjam 21:12, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

First of all, you are free to claim vandalism as much as you want, but it is telling that you choose to completely ignore Wikipedia's well-considered definition of such. Furthermore, you continue to violate the principle of good faith by refusing to permit me to post edits. To the best of my knowledge John McHugo has never attempted to have his voice heard here, so it is nonsensical and insulting for you to accuse me of censorship for removing an example from one of his papers. As I explained in detail earlier, my motivation for doing so is relevance and respect for the principle of Neutral Point of View, the primary guidepost of Wikipedia. The only one doing any censoring here, is you -- including your repeated removal without discussion of my addition to the section on the "whole test" doctrine.

I tried to be charitable by complimenting you on the bulk of your work, but you continue to respond by making bad-faith attacks on my motives and activities, by censoring my edits, and by misrepresenting Wikipedia editorial principles in an effort to force your interpretation of this issue upon all of us. I am aware that Wikipedia would prefer that this type of discussion take place on personal Talk pages, or otherwise away from the main content areas, however I remind you that this dialogue began with you violating Wikipedia protocol by characterizing my good-faith edits as "vandalism". --August 18, 2006

You are trying to censor the article. You are trying to remove one POV which you do not agree with. Your reasons are not valid. It is not the case that points of view are not allowed, and you need a much stronger argument as to why these arguments are irrelevant.

I'm sorry, but if you want to be taken in good faith, don't start edit wars. Don't blank sections anonymously. Do watch the 3RR rule. --Vjam 12:29, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

The person censoring this article is you, and the one who started this edit war was you when you blatantly violated Wikipedia's editorial protocols and principles of etiquette in order to protect the POV you inserted into this article last month. You have repeatedly removed material in the "whole text" section without comment. Also you are trying to use the "pro-Israel" label on CAMERA to discredit their views, and two editors objected just yesterday. Nevertheless, you reverted the edit back to your own biased POV. Finally, the only reason McHugo has a section is because you put it there without any consensus whatever. It is biased and irrelevant, and I removed it. This is not censorship. Contrary to your nasty assertion, my reasons are entirely valid. If you insist on elevating a narrow argumentative point taken from one isolated and partisan law review article into a general legal principle, you are the one who should come up with some arguments. So far you have no arguments, only personal attacks. Your edits appear to motivated by an extreme partisan bias and a desire to deny others the rights correct the POV that you insist on trying promote here. You also engage in the exact type of activity for which you publically condemn others. Some people call that hypocrisy. --August 19, 2006

It is important that CAMERA is not cited without it being clear that it is not an impartial source, particularly since its legal opinion here is unorthodox.

I'm not trying to deny you the right to edit, just the right to remove whole sections of text which I feel have a rightful place in the article. If you think there is a problem with the section, you should engage in discussion about it first and try to achieve a consensus. The section is not "biased and irrelevant". It supports one side of the case (as does everything cited in the "semantic dispute" part of the article), and and it comes from a published law journal. --Vjam 17:52, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

I have retained McHugo's example in its entirety but have moved it so that it does not appear in the "Legal Interpretation" section. Like I said at the beginning of this Talk section I know that McHugo is a well-respected and serious solicitor, however the "dogs in the park" analogy is just that, an analogy; in and of itself it is not a legal argument or principle of jurisprudence like the other content in that section. Therefore I thought it appropriate to move the content. I also don't believe that this example warrants an entire section heading, so I removed that, but I want to emphasize that that the entire content of this example has been retained in the article.

Since you feel that CAMERA's impartiality should be flagged, I thought it only fair to do the same with McHugo. And, finally, the slight revision to Mchugo's credentials (Towers and Hamlins, and Edinburgh University) come directly from his own biography page at Towers and Hamlins. --August 19, 2006

Vjam, you state On CAMERA, this needs "pro-Israeli", since this is an important fact without which the reader might be misled. That sounds like poisoning the well, and a deliberate violation of WP:NPOV and WP:NOR. Does CAMERA state it is "pro-Israel"? Jayjg ^(talk) 02:34, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

It's beyond dispute that CAMERA is pro-Israel, so it would be breach of WP:NPOV not to mention this fact. It's also not OR, in the same way the phrase "the Pope, a Catholic..." would not be OR. CAMERA's website makes it clear that it is interested only in correcting "skewed characterizations (which) may fuel anti-Israel and anti-Jewish prejudice" - ie its work is one-sided.--Vjam 11:53, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

The CAMERA website says, "A non-partisan organization, CAMERA takes no position with regard to American or Israeli political issues or with regard to ultimate solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict." Furhtermore, CAMERA provides links on its websites to the Palestinain National Authority, Electronic Intifada, the Mossawa Center, The Palestine Chronicle, the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Al Jazeera, Arab News, The Daily Star, Gulf News, and the Jordan Times -- among others.

Vjam, what is the basis for your assertions that "It's beyond dispute that CAMERA is pro-Israel and "it is interested only in correcting 'skewed characterizations (which) may fuel anti-Israel and anti-Jewish prejudice'"? Is it your opinion that any organization whatsoever whose mission involves even partially the correction of anti-Jewish prejudice is, ipso facto, pro-Israel? What does that say about you? Something here is beginning to smell really, really bad.

Your other recent edits were reverted back because it is now clear that you are behaving with bad faith on this issue. 201.53.27.33 13:04, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

McHugo has now been removed entirely because the paper from which this example came questions Israel's right to exist as a sovereign entity.201.53.27.33 13:12, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

It can't be reasonably disputed that CAMERA is pro-Israel. It's mission isn't "partially" the correction of (what it sees as) anti-Israeli bias. That is what it has been set up to do. Its entitled to do that, but it can't be presented as an unbiased source. Further, the claim made in this case by CAMERA is false and not supported by any analysis or evidence in the article linked to. It is, therefore, not acceptable to present it as if it is authoratative and impartial.

McHugo's article doesn't deny Israel's sovreignty. In fact, he explicitly makes the opposite case. Even if you were right about this, it would not be good grounds for censorship, provided the views expressed were made soberly and analytically.

Bad faith how? All I'm doing is trying to prevent the deletion of material which I think belongs in the article. --Vjam 13:39, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Your contentions about CAMERA are entirely your opinion which you do not support with any sources. CAMERA itself disputes your characterization, so you are without any doubt at all in violation of Wikipedia's OR and NPOV polcies and almost cerainly are also "poisoning the well" when you continuously place the label "pro-Israel" in front of their name. Don't do this again unless you can support your edit with a reliable published source. You also claim with respect to McHugo that your are only trying to prevent the deletion of material. This is false, since yesterday I offered a compromise solution supported by detailed discussion that would have allowed the material to remain and you rejected it summarily. Therefore, your motives clearly are more ambitious than simply trying to include the disputed material. For these reasons and the recent prior history documented in this Talk section, I accuse you of bad faith and am confident that I could successfully support that contention if this issue ever comes to arbitration. I will also take this opportunity to remind you that the 3RR rule does not apply to the correction of bad-faith edits.201.53.27.33 14:35, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

CAMERA is quite clear that it is non-partisan; your insistence on characterizing it otherwise is original research and poisoning the well. WP:NPOV does not mean "Vjam's POV must be represented in the article". Please stop. And, if you are not already aware of it, please familiarize yourself with WP:3RR, which you are close to violating. Jayjg ^(talk) 14:37, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Although I'd continue to contend that this misleads the reader and is not in complaince with NPOV, I'll be willing to drop the CAMERA issue if my includion of the opposing picture given by the World Court is allowed to stay. Jayg has tagged this as OR, although I'm not sure I can see how this is justified (see separate discussion below).

I'm also not especially insistant that McHugo has to have his own sub-heading. However, a reasonable alternative needs to be suggested. Dumping the text out of context in the "French version" section is not satisfactory and can't possibly be the best option.

If you guys can't live with this, then I'd suggest it will be about time for mediation.

Please note, there's nothing in the 3RR policy about bad faith edits. However, since its two against one at the moment you probably needn't worry.--Vjam 17:40, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

I've moved the McHugo section back where it was, please accept this as a holding position, since that's where it was when you found it. On a more minor note, I don't think we need quite so much information about the different places he spends his working life (eg the name of his firm, which department of the university). Whilst I can understand your suspicion that he is "pro-Palestinian", some supporting eveidence is needed in order to turn this suspicion into fact and allow it into the article. --Vjam 17:46, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

To begin with, moving that material back is a violation of 3RR, though I'm not going to report you for it. Please be cognizant of this in the future. More importantly, the very fact that you insist that the World Court material is an "opposing picture" indicates that you think the World Court material is a counter-argument to the CAMERA material, and, in fact, refutes it. I remind you again of WP:NOR, which excludes material if "introduces an argument, without citing a reputable source for that argument, that purports to refute or support another idea, theory, argument, or position." WP:NOR is not something we can bargain about here; all Original Research must be removed from the article, regardless of what quid pro quos article editors would like to make. Jayjg ^(talk) 17:53, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

I don't think I've breached 3RR (apologies if I have, and in which case cheers for the soft line), you're maybe miscounting.

I think you're trying to impose an interpretation of WP:NOR which is not correct. My view is that I didn't put in anything unsourced, didn't add any spin and didn't synthesise, so how can there be OR? I don't think your contention that everything cited in an article must refer directly to the subject matter in the title of the article is sustainable.

I also don't think its reasonable to be asking me to find additional material directly mentioning 242. I don't think this would be to challenging, since so much has been written on the subject, but it would be an offline job, and I'd prefer to see if this is suggested through mediation (which I hope you'll agree to) first. In the meantime, my view is that the fairest thind would be to leave the material in there, complete with your doubt-inducing OR tags.--Vjam 18:51, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Vjam, citing sources is not good enough to avoid the WP:NOR problem; one must actually cite relevant sources, on the subject of the article. I've quoted the relevant section of WP:NOT again and again; you attempted to refute CAMERA's argument with an argument that you synthesized out of a 1924 World Court ruling, and the later Vienna Convention. You even prefaced your argument with the word "However," making it clear as day that this was a counter-argument meant to refute the former argument (and removing that word will not solve the problem - it's still a counter-argument). I can't understand why you think it is "unreasonable" to actually have to find material that is directly on the subject of the article, or why that's not sustainable; I've almost never had any difficulty doing so when I've edited, and if I do have difficulty, it's an immediate sign to me that I'm trying to build my own arguments, not cite reliable sources. This is a simple policy issue, and I don't see why you would balk at finding relevant sources, particularly as you don't think it would be "challenging". There's no emergency here, the material wasn't in the article before, and it doesn't need the information in it for the day or two that it will take you to find it. We should start from a position that material should be added to an article only if it meets Wikipedia's content policies; until then, it should remain elsewhere. Jayjg ^(talk) 19:07, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

No, because I'm disputing that what you are asking is necessary, and I don't want to do it unless I absolutely have to, which is why I'm suggesting mediation. If the upshot of that is that it needs doing, then I'll do it.

You now also seem to be saying that I'm synthesising the case with the Vienna Convention reference, which isn't so. The case speaks for itself, and I'll be happy to let the convention go for now.--Vjam 19:16, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

I find it astonishing that you are so reluctant to comply with policy; you say there are sources directly tying these things to 242, you say it's not so hard to find them. So why not find them? Does the Vienna Convention reference directly refer to 242 or not? If so, where? Jayjg ^(talk) 19:22, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm saying you're wrong in your assertion that it needs to in order to be citable. I'm reluctant to comply with your version of policy, which IMO is different from actual policy. --Vjam 19:29, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

It's not "my version" of policy, it's "actual policy". The NOR policy says in this section (last sentence) that the "precise argument, or combination of material, must have been published by a reliable source in the context of the topic the article is about." That couldn't be more clear. And you have not found any of this material in the context of 242. Jayjg ^(talk) 20:24, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

semantic dispute

There is no evidence provided that there is actually a "dispute" over the meaning of the resolution by any side. So why is this actually in the article?

Spending 3 quarters of the article examining the alleged semantic "dispute" is brushing aside the reality of the resolution

Yes, I agree. Where is the evidence that there is a semantic dispute at a diplomatic level? I have only heard of this "dispute" from pro-Israelis arguing in forums and in person, but never from a high ranking Israeli or pro-Israel official. Rm uk 05:33, 28 December 2006 (UTC)

There is no real dispute, the resolution explicitly didn't call for the withdrawal from all the territories. The dispute comes up when Arab supporters try to say that the resolution calls for full withdrawal which it doesn't. Amoruso 23:36, 30 December 2006 (UTC)

Where is the sited source of their being a semantic dispute?

full text of resolution note shown, why?

Why isn't the full text of this resolution available? It clearly reads:

"The Security Council...[a]ffirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force... (emphasis added)" (UNISPAL)

The bottom line is that, regardless of whether "the" is relevant or not (although it is), the resolution clearly states that "the fulfillment of Charter [of the United Nations] principles requires...the application of both...[w]ithdrawal... (emphasis added)" AND "[t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force..."

To this day only TWO Arab states involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Egypt and Jordan) have completed the second portion of this resolution, and Israel has completed its end of the resolution as it pertains to the lands of these two states occupied by Israel following the Six Day War. How could this be overlooked?? It is the continued belligerency and threat and disacknowledgement and disrespect from other Arab states that keeps this resolution from truly being fulfilled! You can go on talking about Israel's responsibility to withdraw from occupied lands, but you can not go on ignoring the responsibility of the Arabs to accept Israel's sovereignty and "their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force..."

I write this here because I honestly don't have the time to edit the article with this information, but I feel it is imperative that someone take it upon himself to bring this article up to par by removing this most obvious of biases, and letting visitors read the entire resolution and not just a single, overplayed line.

---

then Israel would already have fulfilled that request by returning the Sinai Peninsula? in 1979 which constitutes more than 90% of the territory.

I've never actually seen an Israeli source claim that. The only relevance of the definite/indefinite article is in the question of whether Israeli is obliged to return to the old border line (in particular, the Green Line), or whether a new border line could be negotiated in the peace treaty.

But most countries delegates debating the resolution at the Security Council debate had a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories in mind.

Is that why they voted for the amendment removing the article?

Which they meant would mean that the long term goal would be complete withdrawal.

There's a limit to the depth to which we can go while analyzing a document. A resolution implies only as far as its operative clauses go - the rest is pure speculation.

neither does it state which should come firs

This resolution is not a solution, it calls for peace negotiations on certain principles, but it doesn't involve action on its own right!

--Uri

It calls on Israel to withdraw from [the] (see sematic dispute later down) occupied territories (of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights) in exchange of an end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. So far, Israel has only withdrawn from the Sinai in exchange of peace with Egypt. Peace with Jordan was achieved by withdrawal of territories claimed by Jordan. Syria is not willing to make peace because its official position is that Israel has to withdraw first before any negotiations could start. West Bank and Gaza is still held because Yasser Arafat refused to end the conflict in the Camp David 2000 Summit. see also http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/UN/unantisem.html

Der Eberswalder 16:28, 20 Nov 2003 (UTC)

---

"Opposers of the "all territories" reading remind that it was specifically disapproved by the UN Security Council, which is clearly seen in the fact that the phrase was amended."
--This text suggests that the text was considered and amended by the Security Council. Is that true? What I remember is that the text was amended during the backroom dealing that went on before anything was actually put to the SC. Does anyone have evidence otherwise? --Zero 05:07, 12 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Support this, and propose to amend. The previous draft resolution was not amended by the Security Council, an entirely new draft was brought in (which became 242). Also "..specifically disapproved..." is misleading. Specific is otiose (they can't have non-specifically disapproved it), and there is nothing to suggest that the Security Council disapproved it for any particular reason. --Vjam 19:06, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

Note

It's important to note that Resolution 242 was the product of negotiation between the various mambers of the various Security Council members as well as the Israelis and the Arabs. Once it was drafted by Lord Caradon of Britain, there were no amendments proposed, because any change in its langauge would have caused support for it to collapse. When people refers to suggested changes, they are probably referring to the earlier drafts submitted by the United States, the Non-Aligned Nations, the Soviet Union, and the Latin American nations. The John McHugoarticle I linked discusses the negotating process behind Resolution 242; although it obviously takes a pro-Palestinian viewpoint, I think it's very convincing.

How could Caradon argue for both "all" and "not all"?

Moving this to talk: Lord Caradon, the British representative to the Security Council who drafted the language of 242, stated in 1981: "It was from occupied territories that the Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not possibly subject to any doubt as a matter of fact...East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict. I[t] was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the Resolution insisted." In: Caradon, [Lord] Hugh, et al. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity. Washington, D.C., Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981. -- I would definitely agree that this quote is ambiguous. Since he does not mention "all" or "the", and the areas mentioned do not have natural borders, I don't see why it was included in the "All" section. OTOH, Caradon's other quote makes his position clear. ←Humus sapiens←ну? 07:45, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

Moving this back to the article. Obviously, Caradon has made two seemingly inconsistent statements, but it's not okay to prefer one over the other. --Vjam 13:56, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

What has changed re:S/RES/242 in 1988?

The resolution advocates a "just settlement of the refugee problem" but doesn't specifically mention the Palestinians, who were not represented in the debate. This was one of the declared reasons why the PLO rejected the resolution until 1988, when the PLO's legislative body, the PNC voted to recognize Israel within the pre-1967 lines.

I am leaving the first phrase in the article and moving the italicized text to Talk. To stay, "the declared reasons" need a citation. If this is true, our readers are owed an explanation what has changed in 1988: was the resolution revoked or the Palestinians became represented in the debate over the 242? ←Humus sapiens ^ну? 00:31, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

Arguments in favor of all territories

In my opinion, the arguments in this section are extremely weak. The fact that the French version contains a definite article is, in my view, far less important than (1) the inadmissibiity of acquisiton of territory by force (2)the fact that the Israeli position is unsustainable because it leaves undetermined which territories it can retain and which territory it must withdraw from. Plus, I make an argument as to why the lack of 'all' or definite article before territories does not undermine the Palestinian position that the pre-1967 ceasefire lines be the starting point of negotations, with any territorial exchanges being mutual and reciprocal.

Therefore, I respectfully request that the Wikipedia editors include my changes.

My head is going to explode

I thought the Clinton "how do you define sex?" was confusing, this is over the top :) You have to be a rocket scientist to figure this one out, imho. I know the authors are trying there best but I read it a few times and my head is still spinning...... Tom 14:46, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

Proposal to move stuff around

Unless there are strong objections, I propose to restructure the "Semantic dispute" section. Having "for" and then "against" IMO makes it more difficult to follow the arguments, since you have to scroll down to see the other side of the case, so I'm proposing instead an "issue by issue" structure. This would also be less adversarial.

I'm not proposing to remove or add any evidence or arguments. I do think there are some issues with the material there, but that's to be dealt with separately. --Vjam 14:40, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

Have now made a first revision by cut and paste. Appreciate that it probably needs a good copyread. --Vjam 16:43, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Done some copyreading, but stopping for now (there is still tidying to be done though). I have made a couple of substantive changes:

• Took out the reference to arguments based on "de territoires" being bad French. The article stated that this was a claim sometimes made, then debunked it. Conclusion: it's not a serious argument, so why have it in the article at all.
• Took out a quote by Arthur Golderg, which was about Israel's right to recognition, and not about the semantic dispute.
• Added a a paragraph before Security Council members quotes - this started abruptly and was IMO hard for the reader beforehand. --Vjam 19:00, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Have now also added the paragraph on the Golden Rule. --Vjam 19:10, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

Have now made further significant changes:

• Added a the section on dogs in parks
• Removed a quote from Brazilian UNSC delegate, since it was not a full representation of what was said (but I intend to re-insert a fuller version)
• Removed a quotation each from Caradon and Rostow - the article contained two quotes in each case which were by the same author and said exactly the same thing, with slightly different wording --Vjam 21:33, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

This article states that the spanish version suppoorts the english version, which is no true acording to the UN webpages. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/242%20(1967)&Lang=S&Area=RESOLUTION Moreover, according to the french wikipedia, the russian and chinese versions support the french as well. I leave this here for discussion and think the article should be changed as soon as possible, so I request editors to do so.

I feel that the new moved around version is both more difficult to follow than the original one (organized along anti and pro readings) and also more biased in its pov. The way that it is structured, it seems to give selective and directed attention to the all terr readings. It doesn't seem to mention the context (in which Arab states specifically asked that it read "all" and their flat out rejection and its passage without reading "all." It also fails to discuss the issues involving the lack of final status borders. (The Green line is not a legal border but an armistice line. One of the critical requirements is that all relevant parties peacefully negotiate final status borders prceisely because none exist.) The way it is written, the failure to include context reads as if the "all" terr readings is the only natural one.

Original research additions

Vjam, you've added material which looks like original research; specifically the material about 'Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions' and 1986 Vienna Convention. Was any of that material raised in respect to UNSC Resolution 242, and particularly as regards the French vs. English texts? Clearly not in the case of the former, since the World Court case was in 1924, UNSC Resolution 242 was in 1967. I remind you that of the WP:NOR policy again, specifically the part that that excludes material if "It introduces an argument, without citing a reputable source for that argument, that purports to refute or support another idea, theory, argument, or position". That is, in fact, exactly what you have done here. Unless you can find some source which discusses these ideas in the context of UNSC Resolution 242, please remove it. Thanks. Jayjg ^(talk) 15:36, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Hi Jayj. Since the material introduced cites a primary source, I find it hard to see how it can be interpreted as OR. The WP:NOR page doesn't say anything to support your contention that the source has to mention 242. Please explain your logic here. The case cited here is the leading case on the question at hand (ie how inconsistent versions of a document should be treated). If this case came after 1967, it would be legally irrelevant, so what you seem to be saying, in effect, is that caselaw can never be cited in WP (?). --Vjam 15:54, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

You can cite primary sources on the specific topic of the article; for example, you can cite primary sources on UNSC Resolution 242, quoting the English and French texts. However, you cannot use primary sources to build an argument about them. Here you are taking primary sources on other topics, and using them to build an argument that the Mavrommatis case and the Vienna Convention have bearing on UNSC Resolution 242, and, in fact, lead one to a particular conclusion regarding its application. If we allowed this kind of original research, the pages would be filled with various editors building their own legal cases for and against, well, really, whatever they wanted, citing what they believe to be relevant case law, and their own interpretations of that law. You need to find a source which discusses these cases in the context of UNSC 242 - we can't include the material simply because User:Vjam believes it has bearing here, and interprets it to mean xyz. Jayjg ^(talk) 16:10, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Jayg, you seem to me to be creating your own version of WP:NOR. "Original research is a term used in Wikipedia to refer to material placed in articles by Wikipedia users that has not been previously published by a reliable source." The material I've put in consists of inserting a quote from a published decision of the World Court. This can't possibly be construed as OR. Additionally, I haven't tried to synthesise the source with anything else, and I haven't added any commentry that could be disputed. Please cite me the rule you think I am in breach of. --Vjam 16:29, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

On the contrary, it's an obvious violation of WP:NOR - almost a textbook example, in fact. You are building an argument here, without quoting a source for that argument. I dispute that Mavrommatis and the Vienna Convention are relevant to UNSC242. Where is the reliable source which states that these cases are applicable to UNSC242? Please provide a source which directly states this. Jayjg ^(talk) 16:36, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

WP:NOR doesn't say anything about whether or not contributions have to be relevant to the article. Clearly, an irrelevant contribution should go. But this is a different issue to whether what I've put in constitutes OR. Something is not OR simply because its relevance can be disputed. if you don't think it's relevant, then you should maybe make a case for its exclusion on those grounds. As I see it, I've used a simgle, authoratative, verifiable source to attempt to answer a question raised in the article. I haven't added to it, taken away from it or tried to spin it in any way. There's no way this is OR. It wouldn't seem to me in keeping with WP:NPOV if, in answering a question of international law, an unsupported assertion from a clearly biased source is citable but the leading legal decision on the matter is not. --Vjam 16:59, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

On the contrary, WP:NOR states that the information must be directly related to the topic at hand - the stuff you've brought is clearly not directly related. Again, it is classic OR, and it astonishes me that after this long editing you don't realize it. And it's not me that has to prove Mavrommatis and the Vienna Convention are irrelevant, but rather you that must prove they are relevant. All you need is a reliable source that says something like "however, based on Mavrommatis and the Vienna Convention, we must interpret UNSC242 according to the French text". Even more astonishing is your misunderstanding of verifiability, which is that we publish information which is verifiable, not information that we believe to be "true". Everyone thinks they know the truth about things; unfortunately, it turns out that people often disagree about what that truth is. You think it is "true" that Mavrommatis and the Vienna Convention are relevant to UNSC242, in fact the "leading legal decisions" regarding them. I'd like you to verify that please, by providing a reliable source which states that Mavrommatis and the Vienna Convention are applicable to UNSC242, in particular regarding the English vs. French versions of the text. Jayjg ^(talk) 17:47, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

The topic at hand is introduced by the previous paragraph. It is whether the normal practice of the UN is to consider a document solely in the language of the introducing party. The paragraph cited is directly relevant in a very obvious way (it's from the case that decided otherwise).

If it comes to it, I'm sure I'll be able to find something directly talking about the relevance of the case to 242. However, this would be mean work on my part, and I don't see that this is necessary for the time being. The relevance is plain, and doesn't need spelling out. If we were to apply your logic consisently, I'd suggest, it would make quite a mess of Wikipedia. --Vjam 18:03, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Your continued arguments for your case are all very interesting, but forbidden in articles, by policy. Please find those sources very soon; until you do, I'm afraid we're going to have to remove the material. And, in fact, we do apply policy to Wikipedia consistently, or certainly try to. If there are areas where it has not been applied, then they need to be fixed, but that doesn't excuse this article from policy. Jayjg ^(talk) 18:20, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Vjam, your edit [1] is a clear example of original research. There is an argument by CAMERA. You then introduce your own argument. You say "however," and proceed to outline your own legal argument, citing decisions that you say are relevant. That's not allowed under WP:NOR. You must find a reliable source who makes that argument i.e. a source who cites those decisions in relation to 242. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 19:35, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

The NOR policy says in this section (last sentence) that the "precise argument, or combination of material, must have been published by a reliable source in the context of the topic the article is about." So you have to find a source who presents the argument you're making, and who does so in the context of discussing 242. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 19:40, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

It isn't my own legal argument, its the argument of the court. It applies to UN Resolutions generally, and it's an unnecessary hoop-jumping excercise to say that clarification is needed in terms of a citiation that 242 isn't an exception to this. --Vjam 19:46, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

But it is you who is saying this. You must instead find a reliable source that says it, and in this case that would mean a legal source. See WP:NOR and WP:V. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 20:45, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

The court wasn't arguing this as regards 242, that's for damn sure, not unless they had a crystal ball and were looking 43 years into the future. You say it's relevant to 242. I say "two versions possessing equal authority" do not exist; as the CAMERA argument makes clear, the English version is the only one with authority, since that is the version that was actually voted on. Now go find the many sources you say you should be able to find regarding this; if it's so obvious, then many people will have made that argument. Jayjg ^(talk) 19:51, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Jayjg, we're not going to resolve this. Please agree to mediation. Unfortunately I don't have a law library annexed to my house, or I'd do as you suggest immediately. In the meantime, I don't think its acceptable to use an interpretation of policy, which I dispute is correct in any case, to suppress material that goes against your viewpoint. --Vjam 20:06, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm not sure why we can't resolve this. To begin with, you said finding relevant material would be easy. Second, it's unclear on what grounds you still think it is not an "acceptable intepretation of policy" - what is it about "the precise argument, or combination of material, must have been published by a reliable source in the context of the topic the article is about" that seems unclear? Can you explain why you don't think that applies? I've found more than one source that cites Mavrommatis, yet does not agree with your thesis; for example this and this It's clear that people like Eugene Rostow, framer of 242, and Dean of Yale Law School did not agree; why should we assume your understanding of international law regarding this is better than his? Your bad faith and uncivil claim that I am "suppressing material that goes against [my] viewpoint" is unwarranted; material that violates our content policies should not be inserted in articles. And it's certainly not acceptable to violate policy to insert original research, solely because it accords with your viewpoint. Jayjg ^(talk) 20:22, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Jayjg, the articles you cite don't address the question, they just cite the case in different contexts. I've no idea what Eugene Rostow thought on this matter. In purely technical terms, the material is clearly against your viewpoint, and you are (rightly or wrongly) suppressing it. Apologies if this came accross as offensive. If the matter is as clear cut as you are suggesting, please agree to mediation and I'm sure you will win quickly. --Vjam 20:30, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Vjam, you're the one who's trying to insert material that serves to advance your POV, and you're doing so without citing a source that shows what you're saying is (a) correct and (b) relevant. (1) You quote the decision as saying where two versions exist that have "equal authority" etc. Which reliable source has said these are two versions of 242 that have equal authority? (2) You quote the decision as saying "one of which appears to have a wider bearing ..." Which reliable source says of the two versions that one of them has a wider bearing? and (3) Which reliable source says explicitly that the decision you cite has a bearing on 242? Without a reliable source, what you're doing here is an unambiguous example of OR. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 20:52, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

For the record:

;Definition:Original research is a term used in Wikipedia to refer to material placed in articles by Wikipedia users that has not been previously published by a reliable source. It includes unpublished material, for example, arguments, concepts, data, ideas, statements, or theories, or any new analysis or synthesis of published material that appears to advance a position — or, in the words of Wikipedia's co-founder Jimbo Wales, that would amount to a “novel narrative or historical interpretation.”

— Wikipedia:No original research#Definition

-- Avi 22:19, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Vjam, within the past few days you have made several appeals to the value of establishing consensus wrt to content. It seems clear to me at this point that there is a consensus on this OR issue, yet for some reason the consensual principle doesn't appear to interest you so much at present. You have complained to Jayjg about the time you would have to spend sourcing your argument (this, despite claiming elsewhere that doing so would be very easy), yet what about the time we will have to spend working through a formal dispute resolution process?201.53.27.33 23:25, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Vjam, I would agree with the others. The article has been re-written with a biased pov and selective application of material. For the others, I'd also recommend renee beres as another citation. He is a political science professor whose area of expertise includes international law. He has written extensively on the subject.

Reliable Sources

While it is reasonable to cite the opinion of groups like CAMERA on matters which are simply matters of opinion, I question the competence of CAMERA on matters of UN procedures and law. Competent sources in that case would be UN officials and experts in international law. --Zero^talk 13:11, 21 August 2006 (UTC) Besides that, their case is based on a false claim. One can see from the debate [2] that both versions were present. This claim about "the one voted on" comes out of nothing; I suspect they just made it up. --Zero^talk 13:11, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Zero, would you mind commenting on the original research issue? Jayjg ^(talk) 15:09, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

It is a real mess, about twice as long as the ideal. Some passages, for example the "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" section, read like original research. They might be reports of reliable sources but it is the onus of the inserter to establish that. Adding "some believe" or similar is not enough to make original research palatable. It seems to me that the rules are pretty clear on this. Also, given the large amount of available material that is sourcable to government spokespeople, diplomats directly involved, and eminent experts, we can afford to raise the "reliable" barrier to exclude random commentators and interest groups. --Zero^talk 11:16, 22 August 2006

(UTC)

Zero0000, I agree with much of what you say and have been trying as time permits to clean things up a bit, cite sources, etc however the new organizational structure of this article makes it quite difficult to rid the entry of OR as you rightly comment. I actually don't mind many of these recent organizational changes and in several important ways prefer them in principle to the old structure (notwithstanding the POV problems that accompanied some of the new material -- a separate problem from organizational OR) , but I cannot at this point meaningfully rebut your observation that to date nobody has provided good sourcing for the relevance of applying principles such as "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" and "presumption against uncertainty" to UN SCR 242. One may suspect that these are relevant and applicable principles of jurisprudence here, but you are right to claim OR until such contentions are properly sourced. I have been thinking about this and have some ideas I wouldn't mind implementing about how this article might be restructured around topics such as ("inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war", "secure and recognizable borders", "French vs. English text", "Camp David Peace Accord", "recent efforts of the 'Quartet'", "Saudi proposal for comprehensive peace", "Israel's understanding of her obligations under 242" etc. However, I am reluctant to do this for three reasons -- time involved, reticence about undoing or redoing so much work of other editor(s), and fear about having my own hard work substantially redone in a tough and possibly bad-faith edit war. A balanced and informative presentation of this issue conforming to exemplary standards of Wikipedia editing is something I would very much like to see here and would therefore be willing to make the time to work hard towards such an end, but my second two constraints are more difficult to reconcile. Advice from more experienced editors would be much appreciated on these points. Additionally, the way the article is starting to look now I am tending to agree with you that the CAMERA reference (and perhaps a couple of others) may no longer be so relevant of a source, but given the strong discussion that has recently taken place around this point (to which I contributed) I would want to hear from some other interested editors befor taking it out. Finally, I don't agree with you that this article is "about twice as long as the ideal" as you say; I think it seems that way because parts of it are a "real mess". However, ideally it could be even longer than it is now and still become an excellent article at some point.Dasondas 14:53, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Inadmissibility of Acquisition of Territory by Force

Zero0000, IMO there is a general lack of understanding on this point that may require a separate section in this article for elaboration. "Inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force" is indeed one of the bedrock principles (some would say the cornerstone) upon which UN SC 242 is based, however it is POV to present this principle isolated from the other bedrock principle (and, others would say, alas, the cornerstone of UN SC 242)of "secure and recognizable" boundaries. It is a misunderstanding of diplomatic history (and, I believe international law as well) to present arguments suggestive of Israel's (presumed) obligation to withdraw from all territories on the principle of "inadmissibility" without simultaneously elaborating on her rigths to "secure and recognizable" boundaries. It is for this reason that so much of the diplomatic history of this issue for the past 40 years has centered around efforts at a negotiated settlement between the parties rather than a settlement imposed by upon the Israelis by force of will of the Security Council.

I have therefore reverted your edit because it is not appropriate to a discussion of the narrower semantic issue, but I will be more than happy to see the excised part of this quote appear in a more suitable context in this article because I agree with you that it is highly important and needs to be properly developed. In fact, if I find the time to elaborate this article along the lines I have been discussing, I would look for and include that quote myself if someone else doesn'tDasondas 15:07, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

The "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force" is mentioned in the preamble precisely because the abolition of the right of conquest (established by the Covenant of the League of Nations) is the relevant governing prinicple in international law. --Ian Pitchford 15:16, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

The clause of the preamble you reference actually " emphasiz(es) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security". It is POV to make edits with only the first half of this clause in mind. I already said that I would like to see this quote included in the article, but only in its proper context. If you feel very strongly about its inclusion, please take the time to make the appropriate room for it rather than tacking it on to the discussion of a much narrower issue. If you do this (I probably will get around to it myself at some point if nobody else does), your point will actually be strengthened.Dasondas 15:31, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

This article is chock-full of original research arguments. Rather than debating this on the Talk: page, we need to be citing sourced arguments in the article. We can't decide what the appropriate arguments are; verifiable sources need to make those arguments for us. Jayjg ^(talk) 19:48, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Jayjg, I agree and so, apparently, does Zero0000. Do you think that a reorganization of this article around sectional topics that have been at the forefront of diplomatic debate between the parties (I suggested this above in the Original Research topic) would aid in the replacement of OR with NPOV verifiable sources?Dasondas 20:00, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Thinking of moving things around part deux: I find the new organization of the article both confusing and biased relative to the previous version. Before, it simply had the all arguments and not all arguments organized and clear. Now, they are folded into one another, making it hard to follow the issues. The article is also organized in such a way as to further only one point of view (and includes many original arguments in its efforts to push that point of view). For example, the resolution was drafted and passed in English. Yet, the French language translation is provided first. Another example of the original arguments include the arguments about the "inadmissibility" argument. Arguing that an alternative reading of "not all" violates this OR arguing that it would mean that Israel is the sole arbiter of how much and what land from which it should withdraw are merely straw man arguments. As the actual drafters pointed out, their intent was not all BUT the actual amount must be resolved through peaceful negotiation among all relevant parties. The idea is that the West Bank and Gaza are NOT part of Israel. But, they are not part of any other country either. They are in legal limbo until and unless all relevant parties can peacefully negotiate final status borders. I suggest a revision and will print it out, work through and identify the issues, and perhaps speak to an atual legal expert in this field and prepare an alternative that preserves the arguments of each side but does so clearly and a neutral pov. affinity292

I agree with much of what you say, and I think it will save you time and heartache to discuss your proposed changes first before implementing them. Also, one reason I haven't taken a stab at the reorganization yet is the substantial time involved; I would welcome a good effort to try and move this article back towards a truly NPOV presentation that placed historical diplomatic facts ahead of any speculative legal interpretations -- however I believe that a proper reorganization of this article will have to be very well-sourced and cited to survive attempts at agressive re-editing. Fortunately there's an abundance of material available for someone with the time and energy to compile and organize it. I look forward to your efforts and hope that I have something to contribute.Dasondas 01:42, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

this is not a chapter VI decision

They might have considered this a chapter VI decision (mentioned in the discussions) but in the end, it was not. If it was, they would say "Acting under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations". example:[3] This appears in every resoultion that acts under chapter VI. Generally, the Israel-Arab resoultions AFAIK were never made under chapter VI. Both chapter VI and VII are binding decisions and chapter VII provides military options and more active options rather than economical sanctions.

The resolution itself won't be binding, as usual, except that IN THIS CASE, both Israel and the Arab states agreed upon it. The agreement means in international law that it IS binding. Therefore binding the semantic land for peace, the 1948 borders (should be mentioned) and the end of belligerent activities.

Btw, this common mistake of referring to any resoultion that's not by chapter VII as falling in chapter VI is wrong. Most resoultions in the conflict like mentioned don't fall in either chapter (which is the reason they aren't binding, although some say they should be binding anyway...) Amoruso 04:02, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Could you elaborate please on "the 1948 borders (should be mentioned)". I didn't get that part. Thanks. ←Humus sapiens ^ну? 04:30, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

The language of the resolution called for withdrawl only from territories of the 1967 war and said "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area" which means that when the Arab states accepted this resolution, they accepted Israel's full sovereignty in the areas conquered in 1948. Which means there can never be further allegations that Israel shall withdraw to the 29 november 1947 partiton plan lines. This is important because Hamas for example doesn't recognise this border. And Hamas are coordinated with Syria on this...

Also, it's important to mention that all these quotes from politicans etc about S.C 242 and whether it's chapter VI and whether it's binding - they are all irrelevant. We're dealing with International Law and so only the sides relevant to the resolution can agree or disagree with it, while legal scholars like Casssese can also comment on it but not a foreign minister and not any professor in a university. Clearly, whoever says that "resolutions relevant to the conflict" are Chapter VI resoluitons, is wrong. They're not. One can simply read the resolutions and see it. Amoruso 06:20, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Oh, you mean 1949? Where does the claim that the Arab states ... accepted Israel's full sovereignty in the areas conquered in 1948/1949 come from? AFAIK, 1949 Armistice Agreements#Cease-fire line vs. permanent border were explicit in saying _not_ the permanent border. Also, Palestinians were not even a party to the agreements. ←Humus sapiens ^ну? 07:00, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Regarding the lack of relevance of authors and other politicians: I respecfully disagree. For one thing, they are subject matter experts. Also: 1) the context and history may be extremely important in understanding what the law means. When the legislators are asked "does it mean x?" And they respond, "No. It does not." And you vote for it anyway and perhaps do or don't tag a comment on to your vote saying "I think it means x anyway" that tells a very different story about what the law means. 2) If law is found to be ambiguous in its meaning, "legislative intent" is often an important part of the Judicial process in interpreting what it actually means. affinity292.

Reactions and responses

Why is there no mention of the reactions to the resolution? Certainly the responses and views of Israel and the Arab countries directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict should be included here. What about the infamous "three no's?" This article can go a lot deeper than just the content and the "territories" vs. "the territories" semantic dispute. I think the land for peace article should be merged into this section. --GHcool 07:15, 27 December 2006 (UTC)

Untrue that "none of these included the phrase 'the territories'"

I've removed the passage within quotes above, because the failed Latin American draft did refer to "all the territories." Gni 20:37, 8 January 2007 (UTC)

Violations of the Resolution

Why isn't there a section on how Israel, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt violated the resolution? It seems pretty important to me. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 70.165.18.76 (talk) 17:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC).

And now what...

There seems to be another important part of the puzzle that hasn't been discussed. Who did Israel win the land in question from? Jordan and Egypt NOT some state called "palestine." Therefore, for those arguing the position that Israel surrender sovereignty to someone in particular, that someone in particular would be Jordan and Egypt. However, both of those states have formally renounced any claim or interest in having that land.

I'm not arguing that Israel should keep it (neither are 98% of Israelis). However, the land is in legal limbo sovereighty-wise until and unless all relevant parties stop violence and peacefully negotiate final status borders. affinity

POV

Someone has introduced some flagrent POV into this article:

The first issue addressed by UN Resolution 242 is the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The first stipulation mandates, "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." Since that time however, Israel has continued to occupy territory seized during the conflict and is even constructing a wall around some of these areas.

Israel has continually asserted that the UN resolution doesn't require a full withdrawal, even while this contradicts the UN Resolution's insistance that territory can not be acquired by war. Israel also generally prefers to focus on the latter part of the resolution first, which calls for the "termination of all states of belligerency" in the area. ...

It is also important to note that "Palestine" comprises 100% of Jordan and Israel and the West Bank and Gaza.

I will work on editing the piece to excise POV such as "however, Israel has continued to occupy territory seized during the conflict and is even constructing a wall around some of these areas" and "Israel has continually asserted that the UN resolution doesn't require a full withdrawal, even while this contradicts the UN Resolution's insistance." Gni 17:57, 13 March 2007 (UTC)

I respecfully disagree with your assessment even though I can understand why you might believe it to be true. The resolution allows Israel to administer the land UNTIL and unless all relevant parties peacefully negotiate final status borders. It does not allow Israel to simply "take" it and make it part of Israel. However, it doesn't "give" it to anyone. It was Jordanian and Egyptian (both of whom have formally relinquished their claims since...) Israel is not in violation of 242. However, every Arab attack is a violation of 242 and provides Israel the opportunity/justification for remaining in administrative control. As for the fence, 1. it has the purpose of protecting civilians (Arab and Israeli) from harm. 2. It is movable. Over 90% of it is chain link fence with sensors on either side. If and when the Arab side is prepared to seek peaceful coexistence with instead of genocide against Israel, the fence can be easily dismantled and moved to wherever all relevant parties negotiate the final status borders to be. As it stands, you seem to have a profoundly biased pov and are expressing a desire to "fix" the page by moving it to reflect your own bias.

The "Land for Peace" should be it's own page.

Statements by Security Council Representatives: Quote by Vasily Kuznetsov

The quote by Soviet Delegate Vasily Kuznetsov ("there is certainly much leeway for different interpretations...") needs a citation. We don't know if the quote is incomplete, in what context it was made, or even if the quote is accurate. Also, if Kuznetsov did not believe that Resolution 242 did not require a full withdrawal, then why didn't veto the Resolution? Given that the large majority of Security Council members favored a full withdrawal (as evidenced by the statements made by SC members before the adoption of Resolution 242), how could Lord Caradon have gotten them to agree to a resolution that could be interpreted as giving Israel the right to determine the extent of its withdrawal?

--PierreFH 19:50, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

For the record, this is the statement by Kuznetsov in the 11/22/67 meeting of the Securitty Council, after it adopted Resolution 242:

Thus, in the resolution adopted by the Security Council, the "'withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" becomes the first necessary principle for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East. We understand the decision taken to mean the withdrawal of Israel forces from all, and we repeat, all territories belonging to Arab States and seized by Israel following its attack on those States on 5 June 1967. This is borne out by the preamble to the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/8247] which stresses the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". It follows that the provision contained in that draft relating to the right of all States in the Near East "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries" cannot serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israel forces on any part of the Arab territories seized by them as a result of war.

PierreFH 20:00, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

SMB/. The actual words quoted are I believe contained in a passage by Kuznetsov on the 9th of Nov 67, S/PV. 1373 and refer to the concept of secure and recognised boundaries that appeared in the US draft S/8229, not the UK draft. I cannot access this document, but he reiterated his position, though not those words, on 15th Nov in S/PV. 1377 as below:

115. You will recall that at the 1373rd meeting of the Security Council the

Soviet delegation drew attention to this very important part of the United States draft resolution and asked the United States delegation what its attitude was to the question of the withdrawal of troops. Today, though we tried hard to find a clear answer to that question somewhere in the very long statement Of the United States representative, our efforts were unsuccessful. I should therefore like to return to that part of the Soviet statement which referred to this matter and draw the attention of the Council to it. We said at the time:

"The absence from the United States text of any substantial clarification of what is meant by the withdrawal of troops `from all' territories, and the exclusion of any reference to the fact that the subject under discussion is the recent conflict, must be considered in conjunction with the appearance in the United States draft of phrases such as 'secure and recognized boundaries'. What boundaries does this refer to? What is behind the idea of 'secure and recognized boundaries'? Who is to decide how secure these boundaries are and who has to recognize them? To all these questions the United States draft provides no answer but leaves the field wide open for different interpretations and constructions, including interpretations which still make it possible for Israel itself arbitrarily to establish new boundaries and to withdraw its forces only to those lines it considers appropriate. And the interpretations by Israel, which asserts that the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 approved by the Security Council are not binding on it, go very far." [1373rd meeting, para. 152.]

You also ask a very interesting question concerning why Kuznetsov didn't veto Resolution 242 if he knew it did not require a full withdrawal. I suggest the answer is that after 5 months of debate this session was the last chance for a resolution. So if Kuznetsov had vetoed the UK draft there might have been no resolution and no call for any withdrawal whatsoever. I think by 22 Nov that it was clear that 242 was the best the USSR was going to get. Thus some of the attempts by representitives to suggest full withdrawal interpretations that are not actually in the text they were voting on, are in reality an attempts to muddy the water. That fits with what Caradon said just before the resolution was passed:

I am sure that it will be recognized by us all that it is only the resolution that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear. S/PV. 1382 para 61.

Last point, there was also a genuine breakthrough in the Indian (Mali, Nigerian) position on 22 Nov, highlighted in bold below:

53. In other words, the draft commits the Council to the withdrawal of Israel forces from the whole of Sinai, Gaza, the Old City of Jerusalem, Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River and the Syrian territory. This being so, Israel cannot use the words "secure and recognized boundaries", contained in sub-paragraph (ii) of operative paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom draft resolution, to retain any territory occupied in the recent conflict. Of course, mutual territorial adjustments are not ruled out, as indeed they are not in the three-Power draft resolution co-sponsored by India. This is our clear understanding of the United Kingdom draft resolution. Our vote on the draft will be determined accordingly.

'Mutual territorial adjustments' recognises the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal to mutually agreed secure and recognised boundaries. This goes to the heart of the fine balance in the resolution between the two central concepts, recognition that Israel had never had borders that its neighbours were willing to recognise, ie secure and recognised boundaries, and the inadmissibility of the aquisition of territory by war, where aquisition refers to annexation not occupation. Since restoring Jordan's annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem would also be inadmissible, and since neither Jordan nor Egypt recognised the pre existing boundaries, the UK, US idea of limited territorial revision made perfect sense. /SMB

NPOV: The Drafting Process

The article, despite its title, sheds very little light on how 242 was drafted and adopted by the Security Council. As it stands now, the section is basically a collection of quotes that support the Israeli interpretation of 242.

The section (and other parts of the article) refer to Arthur Goldberg and Eugene Rostow as two of the the "drafters" of Resolution 242, but nowhere is this claim substantiated. Given that the resolution was submitted by Britain, not by the United States, I do not see why Goldberg's statements should be given any more prominence than any other statements made by Security Council members involved in negotiating 242. The prominence given to a Eugene Rostow, a mere Under-Secretary of State, is even less justified.

Given the amount of the attention this article gives to the lack of a definite article before 'territories', more attention should be placed Resolution 242's language "Emphasizing the Inadmissibility of Acquisition of War". This language is very similar to that of the draft Soviet resolution submitted on November 20th ("the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war is inadmissible."). In contrast, the draft SC resolution submitted by the United States (S/8229, the Security Council member most favorable to Israel, contains no such language. . Intellectual honesty compels those who focus on the Given that Lord Caradon said that "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war" is the 'overwhelming principle' of Resolution 242, the inclusion of this language in Resolution 242 deserves as least as much emphasis as the absence of 'the' or 'all' before 'territories'.

I would emphasize once again that a strong majority of Security Council members supported a full withdrawal, and they would not have voted for Resolution 242 if they thought it would require only a partial withdrawal. Nor would Egypt & Jordan have supported Resolution 242 if that was the case.PierreFH 22:32, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

I think the whole section really needs to be cut down and summarized. Basically, the resolution was worded deliberately ambiguously because on the one hand, the US and/or UK would have vetoed if it were explicit in requiring Israel to withdraw from all territories, while on the other hand, the USSR would have vetoed if it were explicit in allowing Israel to only withdraw from some territories. The muddled compromise was a sentence that does not explicitly mean one or the other, allowing all countries to vote for it and afterwards claim that it says what they prefer it to say. But we don't need 10 pages of quotes to explain all that. --Delirium 05:42, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

SMB/ I think the whole page needs to be overhauled with a structured analysis of what 242 means based first and foremost on the wording of the resolution. The Resolution was drafted by Lord Caradon and just before it was passed he said:

59. Thirdly, I would say that the draft resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the resolution, the whole resolution and nothing but the resolution...

61...I am sure that it will be recognized by us all that it is only the resolution that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear. S/PV. 1382 para's 59 - 61.

Taking his first point, that the resolution is a balanced whole, it seems to me that we need to analyse it as a balanced whole not taking one bit at a time. From his second point we need to expect that the wording is clear unless it proves otherwise. If one takes the text as a balanced whole the wording is clear. But to see this one has to recognise that the primary disagreement between the parties was not about the extent of the withdrawal but about what the resolution was. Israel saw it as a framework outlining the principles upon which a negotiated settlement between the parties should be based. Egypt and Jordan saw it as plan for ending the conflict to be implemented under the guidance of the Security Council's Special Representative. (UN doc. S/10070 4th Jan. 1971) So Israel saw the withdrawal to secure and recognised boundaries being contingent on a formal peace with each of it's neighbours while for Egypt and Jordan the first part of the plan to be implemented, prior to any negotiations, was a full Israeli withdrawal back to the June 4th lines. Lines that Egypt and Jordan did not recognise as Israel's boundaries, and which being armistice lines, i.e. where previous fighting had stopped, were as "inadmissable" as the post 67 war lines. The "inadmissibility of the aquisition of territory by war" principle is part of the preamble and therefore has general applicability, i.e. to both the pre and post war lines. So the interpretation that it applies solely to the withdrawal phrase mandating a full withdrawal back to pre war lines makes little sense. Hence it seems that 242 is proposing a withdrawal to secure and recognised boundaries agreed between the parties. This is consistent with the inadmissibility phrase, the some territories interpretation of the withdrawal phrase, and the 'secure and recognised boundaries' in the 'peace' phrase. This corresponds to Israel's framework for peace interpretation of the Resolution and is consistent with the treaties Egypt and Jordan negotiated and signed with Israel many years later. It is also consistent with the fact that all the other principles of the Resolution are equally clear but non prescriptive. For instance, the need for a just solution to the refuge problem is clear, while exactly how to achieve it is not detailed. I cannot see how the text supports the initial Egyptian/Jordanian interpretation but would be happy to have this demonstrated before I go any further. As to the question why countries that wanted a full withdrawal voted for 242? I think that after 5 months this was probably the last chance for a resolution and therefore the best they could get. The US, UK and USSR all had veto's, but if the USSR had used its veto and there had been no resolution calling for a withdrawal, that would have played into Israel's hands. /SMB

Syria, 242 & 338

85.210.219.219, good work finding the acceptance statement. The point is that accepting 338 logically entails accepting 242, by the text of 338. Drysdale & Hinnebuch's exact words- "..In March 1972, [this was in a speech by Assad (JZ)] Syria itself "conditionally" accepted UN Resolution 242 (provided it guaranteed total Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and Palestinian rights). On the eve of the war, Syria again told the UN secretary general it did not object to a 242 based settlement... pp.105-106 ; "It formally accepted resolution 338 regarding the cease-fire (which embraced resolution 242), interpreting these resolutions to mean an end to the state of war, Israeli evacuation from all occupied territories, and the recognition of Palestinian rights." p. 108 There's no dispute that Syria accepted both resolutions back then among serious sources that I am aware of; others say the same thing. D & H seemed to be the best source I had (the book grew out of a study group led by Cyrus Vance and Richard W. Murphy, with Farouq al-Shara, Daniel Pipes, Edward Djerejian, Vitaly Naumkin, Itamar Rabinovich and Fred Lawson participating.) Worrying about conditions of Syrian acceptance of 338 in particular seems out of place in the intro, because then one should pick apart everybody else's conditions, interpretations and reservations and how they changed, for 242 and 338 and, and Israel did undertake to implement 338. I was planning on doing something like that for 242 in the article on the Jarring Mission (I started before Leifern created the article  ;-). Imho, the only thing additional appropriate in the intro is the sequence (and perhaps publication) of acceptance; Syria already gets more space than the others. John Z 21:58, 8 May 2007 (UTC)

SMB\ Thanks for supplying the D&H quote, I haven’t been able to get hold of the book. I agree with your points about avoiding too much detail in the introduction, the irrelevant reference, that Syria has a lot of space in the introduction, that 338 shouldn’t be debated there, and that there were many nuanced positions held by the parties. However my point is that the UN is taking a very clear position on Syria’s rejection of 242. The wording of S/10070 is pretty strong for an official UN report and S/10070 is quoted almost verbatim in the part you objected to.

Turning to D&H, you quote the book as claiming that Syria formally accepted 242 but in that passage the book only states that Syria ‘formally accepted resolution 338 regarding the ceasefire (which embraced resolution 242)…’ It then notes that Syria had its own particular interpretation of the resolutions, but fails to note that Syrian acceptance was conditional. Even if Syria had formally accepted 338 unconditionally and as drafted, and it did neither, the most one could say is that it had belatedly implicitly accepted 242. A possibility not precluded by the version you rejected.

Looking at the acceptance letter, I think it moves Syria’s actual position from clear rejection of 242 to implicit conditional acceptance by means of constructive ambiguity. For instance it is not clear whether Syria’s acceptance of 338 is conditional on other parties’ undertakings to implement 338 itself or their undertakings to implement Syria’s interpretation of 338. The latter seems most likely in practice, (Syria didn’t attend the Dec 73 Geneva peace conference ‘required’ under 338) and would mean an Israeli undertaking to withdraw to the June 5th lines. A condition not met to this day. Also Syria’s original rejection of 242 was precisely because it didn't require a withdrawal to the June 5th lines (S/PV 1382 Mr Tomeh (Syria) Nov 22nd):

11. While there is a mention of the withdrawal of Israel forces, this reference is almost nullified by the absence of any time limit or any modus operandi for ensuring this withdrawal. No clearer proof could be given to illustrate the ambiguity of this withdrawal than its description by Israel-Zionist sources. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's Daily News Bulletin of 20 November describes it in these words: "Israelis are known to have indicated unofficially that Israel 'could live' with the British formula. The draft does not spell out Israel's withdrawal as to timing, nor does it say that the withdrawal is to be to the pre-June 5 armistice lines."

So basically Syria’s demands haven’t changed at all but it has managed to engineer a change in the perception of its stance from clear rejection during the Jarring mission to ambiguous acceptance once the mission had ‘failed’.

How about a text stating as follows:

Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon entered into consultations with UN Special respresentative Jarring over the implementation of 242. Syria the other state concerned did not accept the resolution during the Jarring Mission. /SMB

S/10070 dates from January 1971. There is no debate that Syria had not accepted the resolution then, but it is not really relevant to later events. The phrase quoted "However, Syria the other state concerned did not at that time or later accept the resolution" is fine for 1971, but in 2007 it is just plain false, and entirely inconsistent with even an uncharitable interpretation of the 1973 (or 1972) acceptance. 338 was a ceasefire resolution, and the parties eventually ceased firing - a bit after 338 was passed - a few more resolutions etc were necessary. I believe that was a major Israeli "undertaking to implement the resolution" (338) that Syria wanted! It is also very misleading to say that Israel has never undertaken to withdraw to the June 4 lines in this context - Rabin's "pocket" or "deposit" - Syria certainly claims it has, which is what is relevant.

Here is Fred Khouri in his Arab Israeli Dilemma (2nd ed, p.374) "President Assad of Syria, whose position had also been enhanced by the war, formally accepted SC 242 when he accepted SC 338 calling for a cease-fire, thus indicating a willingness to accept the existence of Israel...."

Here is Saadia Touval's The Peace Brokers p. 238 (According to Abba Eban, "the standard work on mediation in the Middle East") - "Although Israel, Egypt and Syria accepted implicitly the conference when they accepted Resolution 338 ..."

Here is Conor Cruise O'Brien's (formerly UN rep of Israel's neighbor Ireland) "The Siege" p.544 - Both states [Egypt and Syria] had accepted Security Council Resolution 242 (eventual recognition of Israel) and 338 (direct negotiations) ..."

Those are just the other sources I have that I could find at the moment.

I think that especially in an introduction we should simply say Syria accepted 242 in 1973 (And Jordan, Egypt, Israel & Lebanon accepted in 67- 68). "Accepted 338, which embraced 242" would be OK with me. Anything else would be treating Syria differently from everybody else, and is basically OR. The previous sentence basically treats the other 4 countries' acceptance. Afaik it is a universally accepted fact that Syria accepted 338 and 242 (of course with its own hedging, like everybody else). If it "engineered a change in the perception" it was universal, just like Israel & Jordan & Egypt & Lebanon did when they engineered a change in perception that they had accepted the resolution. After the 73 war, Syria and Israel negotiated and signed documents, which partially implemented 242 and 338 - the disengagement of forces, Syria gaining a bit of the Golan Heights won in 67 by Israel including Quneitra. After 1973 all the states involved acted as if Syria had accepted the resolution, like the other 4 states. Syria didn't attend Geneva because it didn't include the Palestinians; they were not opposed to it in principle. And of course they attended Madrid which was explicitly based on 242 and 338. Ciao, John Z 05:48, 11 May 2007 (UTC)

SMB\ I accept that the original quotation fails to make clear that the Secretary General’s remarks only apply up to the date of his speech. It should have. I inferred the S.G. to mean that Syria’s boycott of the Jarring mission was taken as rejection of the resolution itself. But that goes too far. I will therefore reluctantly accept your second proposed amendment: "Accepted 338, which embraced 242".

Regarding your statement that Syria conditionally accepted 242 in 1972, here is what President Assad said during his revolution day speech in March 1972:

“I say this in reply to several inquiries which say we in Syria are against the Security Council's resolution and that Egypt supports the resolution. We support the Security Council resolution when interpreted as providing for the withdrawal of the enemy from the Arab territory occupied in 1967 and as a confirmation, assertion, and realization of the rights of the Palestinian people. We are against this resolution when it is interpreted as the realization of new gains for the enemy, consolidation of the aggression, and a stab at the rights of our Arab people in Palestine.” Itamar Rabinovich The Brink of Peace p26

I think one could argue with as much justification that this represented a rejection of 242. But that’s probably OR too. Here is how Rabinovich describes it in his preface to the above quote:

“In the course of his Revolution Day speech Asad, for the first time, accepted Security Council Resolution 242, albeit in a conditional and very specific fashion”

I am beginning to feel that once one is allowed to stray too far from the text of what one is accepting, 'acceptance' and 'rejection' lose any real meaning. Hence my last proposal (which is not a retraction of my acceptance above):

"Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon entered into consultations with the UN Special respresentative over the implementation of 242. However, Syria the other state concerned did not."

I leave it up to you.

On another point, according to Rabinovich the 1974 Disengagement of Forces agreement wasn’t signed by Syria.(pg 28):

“It is noteworthy that the disengagement agreement was not actually signed by Syria. When the time came to sign the agreement in Geneva in June 1974, Syria authorized an Egyptian general to sign on its behalf. The message was clear-Syria was willing to negotiate with Israel indirectly in order to deal with the outcome of the 1973 war and, marginally, with that of the 1967 war, but it was not willing to extend the recognition implied by signing the same agreement. Denying recognition and avoiding or at least minimizing direct contact were traditional tools of Arab nationalist resistance to Israel, and Hafiz al-Asad was determined to demonstrate that he remained the champion of that resistance. Indeed, although the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel was seen as a first step in an unfolding process, as time went by its Syrian-Israeli counterpart came to be seen more as the final chapter of the October War and less as the initial phase of a potential peace process.”

Other accounts say it was a Syrian officer as part of the Egyptian delegation. Either way the substantive point of 'non recognition' still contrasts with the view of Fred Khouri you quoted. /smb

Very glad we have come to some agreement - the "embraced" phrase. I'll change it now and reorder a bit. Saying that Syria did not enter into consultations isn't enough because it leaves the question hanging. Syria should not be treated differently - looking at the original interpretations of all the other states, one can equally well interpret their "acceptance" as rejection. I think it would be a good idea to eventually put down exact dates and links and references of acceptances somewhere as this info is hard to come by on the web. Interesting about the disengagement agreement. John Z 20:43, 13 May 2007 (UTC)