This is an archive of past discussions about Truth. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.
Of the two reference Kneale & Kneale, one is in quotation marks, the other is not. Is the second reference a paraphrase?
JA: The whole paragraph preceding the citation is my summary of their information about the Dissoi Logoi.
Since this part of the article is outside the section on philosophy, should the article mention that Kneale & Kneale's views differ from the views of mathematical logic? Are these views standard in philosophical logic? Rick Norwood21:11, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The last I knew they were well-respected as historians of logic. I don't see any big math log issues here. What are you thinking about specifically? Jon Awbrey21:22, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
RN: Certainly the Oxford University Press is a well respected publisher. The book by K&K got mixed but overall favorable reviews. But the idea that validity can be defined in terms of truth goes against the usual definition of validity in mathematics. I assume that where K&K are coming from is to define a "valid" argument as one which never leads from true premises to false conclusions. I find that perfectly reasonable, but it goes against the mathematical idea that a "valid" argument is simply an argument that follows certain prescribed forms (the axiomatic approach). The more I think about it, though, the more I'm coming around to K&K's viewpoint, in so far as I understand it. Rick Norwood23:49, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Not all that important for the use intended in the historical overview. Sure, once an abstraction is formed, you can pretend it fell out of a clear blue sky if you wish, but the fact is that it took centuries and centuries to extract it from tons and tons of conceptual pitchblende. Jon Awbrey00:22, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Which is simpler? Ascribing or Asserting?
JA: Kenosis, yes, I saw you add that before, and I see that superfluists think that asserting is simpler than ascribing truth, but I think that's an assumption that has yet to be examined critically. Maybe that's not our job, but I think it's fair game to call attention to it, being that it arises from common sense and all. Jon Awbrey21:48, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
A reasonable distinction; best to avoid the extra quandary there. I think the article proper and the "Philosophy" section (boy what a "section", talk about loooong) is close to having a very reasonable summary introduction, and thanks for stating it so straightforwardly there...Kenosis22:06, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Really just a figure of speech, if it draws too much attention it will probably have to hit the cutting room floor. Jon Awbrey00:24, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
RN: It's a nice figure of speech, though, and resonates well with the figure of speech at the end of the preceding paragraph. Rick Norwood00:26, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
I just saw this Rick. I apologize then. My intent was to bring it back to a relatveily non-specific implication that different theorists perhaps have found different ways out, while others may not have. Collectively it's still up for grabs, as evidenced by the lack of agreement. I thought it would be too contentious to have it imply that none have found their way out (and along comes the inevitable editors who think, well, my favorite theory has found its way out)..Kenosis04:37, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: This is from: Ramsey, F.P. (1990), Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. I haven't looked to see if there are any online versions. Jon Awbrey17:18, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
But before we proceed further with the analysis of judgment, it is necessary to say something about truth and falsehood, in order to show that there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle.
Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions. The proposition to which they are ascribed may be either explicitly given or described.
Suppose first that it is explicitly given; then it is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.
They are phrases which we sometimes use for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument.
So also we can say 'It is a fact that he was murdered' or 'That he was murdered is contrary to fact'.
In the second case in which the proposition is described and not given explicitly we have perhaps more of a problem, for we get statements from which we cannot in ordinary language eliminate the words 'true' and 'false'.
Thus if I say 'He is always right', I mean that the propositions he asserts are always true, and there does not seem to be any way of expressing this without using the word 'true'.
But suppose we put it thus 'For all p, if he asserts p, p is true', then we see that the propositional function p is true is simply the same as p, as e.g. its value 'Caesar was murdered is true' is the same as 'Caesar was murdered'.
We have in English to add 'is true' to give the sentence a verb, forgetting that ' p ' already contains a (variable) verb.
This may perhaps be made clearer by supposing for a moment that only one form of proposition is in question, say the relational form aRb; then 'He is always right' could be expressed by 'For all a, R, b, if he asserts aRb, then aRb ', to which 'is true' would be an obviously superfluous addition.
When all forms of proposition are included the analysis is more complicated but not essentially different; and it is clear that the problem is not as to the nature of truth and falsehood, but as to the nature of judgment or assertion, for what is difficult to analyse in the above formulation is 'He asserts aRb '.
It is, perhaps, also immediately obvious that if we have analysed judgment we have solved the problem of truth; for taking the mental factor in a judgment (which is often itself called a judgment), the truth or falsity of this depends only on what proposition it is that is judged, and what we have to explain is the meaning of saying that the judgment is a judgment that a has R to b, i.e. is true if aRb, false if not. We can, if we like, say that it is true if there exists a corresponding fact that a has R to b, but this is essentially not an analysis but a periphrasis, for 'The fact that a has R to b exists' is no different from ' a has R to b '.
JA: Another choice tidbit, the concluding paragraph, p. 51 in the Mellor edition:
My pragmatism is derived from Mr Russell; and is, of course, very vague and undeveloped. The essence of pragmatism I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or, more vaguely still, by its possible causes and effects. Of this I feel certain, but of nothing more definite.
Sentence moved here from intro to Philosophy of truth for futher discussion and development
I just removed this, and am putting it here for further development and, if necessary, analysis...Kenosis 16:08, 25 April 2006 (UTC) ... This sentence is correct, but far too much for the introduction, because it immediately plunges us into the likes of Hegel, Husserl, Sartre, Derrida, etc...Kenosis16:10, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Where they intersect the studies of language and reasoning, the topics marked by the use of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are technically discussed under the three heads of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude. .... 16:08, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: You are the one who is raising the issue, I'm already on record as advising against it, but I just mentioned the conventional names for ease of discussion. Wasn't really planning a date with the Continental on this one, but these are the names that even Russell, Quine, and Company use to discuss these topics. Jon Awbrey16:20, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Jon, more than fair enough, and correct too. But this can be discussed elsewhere, affording the editor(s) an opportunity to explicate these extremely difficult issues in some kind of summary fashion (if you think that's possible)...Kenosis16:25, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
What I did in that intro paragraph was use the opportunity to give the reader an intuitive perspective on one form of triad out of many that attach (belief/sentence/"fact"-referent), give a couple of real life examples that people can relate to immediately, say that there are, inter alia, two major threads or loci of current theory development (one focusing on belief, one on sentences), and give in the most common of colloquial terms a perspective on inevitable complexity. It was certainly not my intention to actually deal with those complexities in theoretical terms, at least not in the intro...Kenosis16:32, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: This is standard terminology for talking about assertion, belief, denial, knowledge, and so on. I think they even attribute propositional attitude to Russell. Ramsey's contributions were made in the context of earlier work by BR and LW that I was about to cite at the appropriate place, and it's a good idea to work the soil a bit before doing so. Also, it's best not to treat "belief" as an isolated phenomenon, as that leads to peculiarities in its own rite. Jon Awbrey16:45, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The use of the term "fact" has become problematic ever since BR and LW "adopted" it as one of their favourites, in the process dismissing the entire history of previous usage and making up a "new, improved" way of talking to which they alone were privy. So it has in the meantime become necessary to re-embed their innovations in some semblance of historical context. Jon Awbrey16:54, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
As we can see from both the historical and contemporary discussion, all these terms become problematic every time philosophers get their hands on one for the purposes of analyzing truth. As we can also see, the word 'fact' has proven sufficiently durable that science (despite theoriteical fallibility) likes it, and law uses it (despite abdication of definitions and analysis of truth), and everyone knows what the question means when the issue is "well, how do you know it's a fact? There is no need to try to substitute a debatable term of art here...Kenosis17:03, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I'm not objecting to the word, I use it all the time. The problem arose when some folks made up a new way of using it. The traditions preserved in law, in medicine, and so on are precisely the old-fangled ways that got overwritten in the process. So it takes some re-lucidation. Wasn't going to do that in the introduction, just when it comes up later on. Jon Awbrey17:23, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
I suppose Wittgenstein is culpable here, but ground zero is Bertrand Russell. Maybe there's some simple way of explaining that in the context of Formal definitions, where the reader, having hopefully gotten some perspectives, can dig in more intensively should she or he wish to do so. I think it's a trap actually, one of those traps where they--whoever exactly 'they' may be--put leaves on top and you end up falling on the spears in the pit underneath, to try to explain this to the reader in an alticle such as this....Kenosis17:48, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Sentence removed from "Relative versus absolute" section
"For example, Moral absolutism describes assertions that moral claims such as "abortion is wrong" or "charity is good" are either true for all people in all times or false for all people in all times." ... 17:10, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Moral "truth," especially when framed in terms of good, bad, right, wrong, is not relevant to this section, except perhaps to explain why it's not relevant. Moral truth is a generalized observation or assertion (taken as true) of what people do, not of what they should do, or alternately, it can be a generalized observation (taken as true) of what happens when people do certain things. It's usage is archaic, and goes back centuries to when "moral philosophy" was the study of human behavior. When you argue with the king, your odds of being boiled in oil are significantly increased, etc., therefore the words like 'should', 'must', 'right', 'wrong', etc., quickly attach to such an observation. Assertions such as "Persons who always follow the Ten Commandments go to Heaven; while those who do not go to Hell" are assertions of a moral truth. An assertion such as this would today be more consistent with what I imagine is the intent of the section on Truth in religion. Predicates such as 'right,' 'wrong,' 'good,' 'bad,' etc., are not predicates of moral truths, or at least have not been seen this way in philosophy for quite some time....Kenosis17:28, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
No offense, Kenosis, but you seem to be confusing several issues. Moral absolutism, as such, is not a descriptive moral position, it is a normative position that derives from an absolute standard. As such The absolutist claim that "abortion is wrong" is not a claim that "most people think that abortion is wrong" but rather implies the prescriptive claim "having an abortion is never the right thing to do". And it is this implied claim that is (taken as) truth. While morality did at one point occupy the space now filled by social science / philosophy, it was never the same thing as them. While moral theorists of the past (and in the present) did study human behavior, morality never simply stopped at the study of human behavior — this study was always directed towards normative claims like the above. The king "example" is really quite ignorant of what moral thinking has looked like, and the kinds of reasons people have had for saying "this is right", "that is wrong" (and no, they usually aren't in the form "the king told me to" or "God told me to", unlike some things we see in the "modern" world :-)) If you need modern references for this sort of usage, I would direct you towards Russ Schafer-Landau's Moral Realism, which, to be fair, is not in and of itself a normative text (it deals with metaethics), but is interested in providing a ground for normative claims like the above.
You are, of course, right (hmmm...) that 'right', 'wrong', 'good', 'bad', etc. cannot in and of themselves be described as moral truths, however, sentences (we are dealing with predicates after all) such as "the right thing to do is..." can be taken as moral truths (in essence, this is how the categorical imperative works). Note, however, that most predicates are not in and of themselves truths, e.g. 'red', 'quick', 'the barn', 'hell'. This is why, which this article at present completely overlooks, predicates are occassionally referred to as "truth-makers", in order to make sense of talking about whether a sentence like "the present king of France is bald" is true or not (notice that the quoted sentence contains absolutely no truth predicates, and yet it is still a claim that can be true or false). As an aside, this article seems to be increasingly drawn only towards things that can be expressed in the form "x is true...", which is getting very far away both from a philosophical notion of what can be true (we are dealing only with second-order truth claims) and from the intuitive notion of what can be true (for example, "it is going to rain tomorrow"). The danger of this is that the article is quickly devolving "truth" into a subset of the philosophy of language, that is to say, it is more concerned with the type of sentences (or whatever) that contain a truth predicate then with what truth itself actually is, which is the purported topic of this article (see the introduction).
Finally, if you look at it very closely, you will see that "people who follow the Ten Commandments go to Heaven, those who don't go to hell" is really not all that different from "abortion is wrong", insofar as they are both truth claims. Ig077418:13, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
True that there are overlapping issues here, but I am not confusing them, and instead am responding to the confusion of these issues. Predicates such as 'good', 'right', 'bad', 'wrong' etc are not truths. They are advice columns, or alternately, veiled threats of a punitive response. And moral absolutism is just one part of this wider problem, in that adherents of such positions fail to adequately analyze where the terms "right" and "wrong", good and bad, derive from. "Moral truth" in its common usage is an unfortunate misnomer, and perhaps deserves its own section so this can be better explained. Appreciate your thoughtful challenge about the issues. I will take some time to review and research further as soon as I get a chance, and report back to you on this page. This issue has been nagging me for awhile anyway, because I don't know the specific lineage and progression of these various positions well enough to articulate the details....Kenosis18:28, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Depending on how one defines "moral absolutism," anyone in the world can be defined as a moral absolutist. Take the following moral claim for example: "it is wrong for a person to nuke the entire world and to destroy all life on Earth." About 99.999% of the Earth's population would be a moral absolutist if that were an example of moral absolutism.
Now consider another example: "it is wrong to curse" Probabily 50%+/- of people would agree with that as a "meta-ethic". Another example: "it is wrong to jaywalk." Very few people in the world would hold that as an absolute.
Therefore to give the example "abortion is wrong" is to make a straw-man out of the subject of moral absolutism. Probably, very few people would hold that as a moral absolute, unless it were put into a more detailed context such as "abortion is wrong when done purely for convenience."
just some thoughts (left unsigned by 206.169.227.77 19:01, 25 April 2006 (UTC))
The problem is not the positions or the description of the positions such as moral absolutism. The problem is that moral "truth" such as a statement of what is right, wrong, good, bad is not a form of truth, and doesn't belong in this article except to explain the misunderstanding. What predicates such as right, wrong, good and bad are are typically either advice, demands, statements of expectation of behavior, veiled promises of reward, or veiled threats of an unpleasant result or of punitive action (either by the talker or by some social, legal, political or spiritual power other than the talker) should the person to whom the statement is made fail to follow the implicit demand for a particular course of action.....Kenosis19:01, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
The core issue is the fundamental existance (or non-existance) of a meta-ethic. That could be referenced through a monotheistic deity or through an appeal to a humanistic ethic as "true" as the law of gravity. It is basically an issue of absolute vs. relative ethics.- that basically references a monotheistic vs. pan/polytheistic (or athiestic) base of truth. (left unsigned by 206.169.227.7719:12, 25 April 2006 (UTC))
I take it you do see how quickly one gets farther and farther from ideas of truth and closer and closer to expectation and demand, though? This is somthing that has been clarified for at least a century-and-a-half or two among philosophers who wanted any respect from other philosophers...Kenosis 19:16, 25 April 2006 (UTC) .... In any event, please make such claims, if NPOV and derived from credible source(s), in the provided section on Truth in religion...Kenosis19:22, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Section on Truth in religion is provided. Kindly make this point in the section on Truth in religion, with appropriate reference to the source of the point being made, so it is not your own research but rather that of a credible source. I feel certain you will find many citable sources that assert similarly....Kenosis19:32, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Kenosis, let me try to explain myself a little better. You write in your response to me:
Predicates such as 'good', 'right', 'bad', 'wrong' etc are not truths. They are advice columns, or alternately, veiled threats of a punitive response.
This is, of course, a valid interpretation of what is meant by 'good', 'right', 'bad', 'wrong', etc. To me it looks a bit like a form of noncognitivism, a particular meta-ethical (not in the sense that the anonymous user above meant) stance which holds that such statements do not have a truth value but are (in one if its more extreme forms) nothing more than saying "Yeah!" or "Boo!". This is not, however, the only interpretation of moral statements (thought a lot of sentences of the form "x is a good thing to do" seem this way). Other thinkers have held that moral statements can in fact be true or false propositions. For example, in her book Natural Goodness, Phillipa Foot proposes that judgments of right and wrong should derive from how closely the action(s) in question lead to the approximation of a good human life. She further proposes that this "good human life" is not a poorly defined concept (though it is not fully articulatible), just in the same way we can speak of a good life for a dog or the like. On her account, then, to say something is "good" is to say it approximates a good human life, and hence, one can be mistaken or correct in proposing that a certain course of action is right or wrong.
That being said, there is an important difference between this notion of truth (i.e. a statement taken as true) and the question of what truth is. As I tried to bring out in my comments above, to keep this article relatively focused, it needs to concentrate more on what truth itself is and less on the notion of "true sentences" (which brings in a whole truck-load of the philosophy of language and epistemology, apparently). This is quite similar, I think, to some comments Banno made earlier rejecting the inclusion of "things that are true". On the other hand, as a philosophical project, the search for a notion of "truth" that is not is somehow separate from epistemology, language, art, and the like perhaps will end up something like the idea of "knowledge" in Plato's Theaetetus. Ig077421:28, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
Response to lg0774 (is that an L or an i at the beginning?): I agree with your last paragraph in general. Certainly the confusion over whether philosophy of truth should be limited to a mere analysis of what is and what is not a "true sentence" misses the point of what the completed analysis is about, and like-it-or-not ends up dealing with the questions of epistemology anyway in order to fulfill its objective. Either that, or it of necessity limits itself to easily verifiable minutiae and an odd enjoyment of semantic whooptidoopti. In a word, it gets so wrapped up in the logic of it all that it easily misses the everyday propositions that people make in illogically formed sentences that must be reinterpreted and shoehorned into the analysis--and the person 'on the street' is typically about ten steps ahead of these kinds of analyses. And no matter what route one takes, the analysis of truth has today virtually replaced epistemology, or at least encompassed the vast majority of it in some form or other. I have no idea where the editors could properly draw the line here, except it is clear that the boundaries are not clear.
As to those writers who might conceivably still adhere to the idea that moral preferences, expectations or demands are "truth", they are at least as far OB as those who attempt to fit the analysis into some kind of foolproof logical machine. As to Phillipa Foot, without having read her work, I would be surprised to find that she might be arguing to extend the word truth to encompass her schema, except to the degree that a preference for truthful orientation may be understood to be part of a preferential route to a "good human life" (a whole separate analysis)....Kenosis00:21, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Ah, I see a bit more clearly where you are coming from. Authors like Foot are not trying to assert that all moral statements, i.e. anything anyone might say is a good/just/noble/whatever thing is a true statement. First of, Foot et al. do not often talk about morality as "preferences" etc. but as propositions. In other words, according to them, moral statements are not just "I think that it is a good thing that..." but the same kind of statement as "It's raining today" — in fact Foot, after writing a paper called "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives", later recanted that idea as unconsciousable. The idea is to avoid the pitfalls of moral relativism by establishing that there are certain facts ("moral facts") by which we can objectively judge an action as good or bad, right or wrong. That said, it was probably the right thing to remove the sentence you did. PS: It's an 'i'. Ig077405:39, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
So we pretty much end up where William James did in saying that "... the right is only the expedient in our way of behaving." That is to say by "expedient" that evidence of results must be put forward to make a cause-and-effect relationship of some kind before properly arriving at a summary category such as "good" or "right." (Or is Foot arguing that we're all supposed to know or feel what is good or right in some way that we can or should agree on?) Well either way this is always interesting to me, and will no doubt continue to be discussed and debated well into the future...Kenosis02:23, 2 May 2006 (UTC)
Notes and references
I notice that the first 13 notes and references are in one form, the rest in another. This should be standardized. Rick Norwood22:48, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Various wranglers' comments are already immortified. I think that it's probably more productive to work on content right at the moment, though. Jon Awbrey00:54, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Peirce's Pickwickian Protocol also comes up in this connection. But it's been a long day, so I'll probably have to let you all sleep on that one. Jon Awbrey01:22, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember. The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is "saying to himself", that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to remember is that the man's circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual
organism. It is these two things alone that render it possible for you — but only in the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense — to distinguish between absolute truth and what you do not doubt. (Peirce 1905, CP 5.421).
RN: Trying to avoid original research, but to cast doubt on the importance of Peirce's analysis, he seems to assume that all minds are the minds of intellectuals. I know lots of people, artists and musicians especially, whose thoughts are not "mostly of the nature of language". One artist, in particular, reports that he almost never thinks in words, though he is intelligent enough to understand what that means (he's read Hamlet, the quintessential person who thinks in words). He thinks in pictures. I suspect, in fact, that the language centered people are a minority. Second, most people are Goddam selfish, and think people like Pickwick are fools, to give a moment's thought to their "club" of friends. They have no larger "person", not even their emergent selves. Desire leads to action, and their lives are a fragile balance between lusts and fears. Rick Norwood12:52, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Peirce's sense of language is quite a bit broader than that — he's probably talking about signs in general, and thus for him thought in general, but uses the word "language" to emphasize the aspects of signs that depend on a partially pre-established medium of communication with an essential dialogical quality, even if it's communing with Nature or talking to one's future self. Freud, by the way, speaking of die Lust, said some curiously similar things. Jon Awbrey13:24, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
RN: Moore's paradox is interesting, but I think it says more about psychology than about truth. For example, I know lots of people who can say, truthfully, "Black people are equal to White people, but I don't believe that Black people are equal to White people." People entertain beliefs that they know are contrary to fact all the time. I suspect, for example, that superstitious people could say, truthfully, "It is not bad luck for a black cat to cross your path, but I believe that it is bad luck for a black cat to cross your path." Rick Norwood12:56, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Dis Tincture & Dat Tincture
JA: I won't say that I'm yet in the clear on this — it's forced me to begin excavating some old thoughts, having to do with referential opacity and all that rot, that I layered down my first thunks on more than 30 years ago — but I'm pretty sure that the distinction between speculation and commitment really is generally acknowledged by all of the writers in view, and it's a distinct distinction from the one that we see at issue in the flationary controversy, which is pinned in another place. Jon Awbrey20:50, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Discussion of the following paragraph:
There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it. What the distinction consists in, however, inspires more answers than general agreement. Language does not fail to provide us with many ways to mark the distinction, even if we fail to say what it is. In ordinary parlance, the things that one says about a subject are expressed in predicates. If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence. Is this the same thing as asserting the sentence? This question serves as a useful touchstone for distinguishing several of the major theories of truth.
There are two separate points of significance in this paragraph, and the language juxtaposes the two unnecessarily. Let's parse 'em, separate 'em out, and say it so it can be understood...Kenosis21:13, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I hope that the distinction between contemplating a proposition and asserting or believing a proposition is clear. This is not necessarily a matter of language only, as pragmaticians are constantly pointing out, though they usually get their fingers bit off for their troubles in so indexing. So there's more to what the difference really consists in than the mere devices of language, for example, erecting turnstiles () in front of propositions or applying truth predicates to them.
JA: The above distinction is not at issue in the flationary dispute, since that whole dispute takes place interior to an assertive context. Jon Awbrey21:34, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Re: There are two separate points of significance in this paragraph, and the language juxtaposes the two unnecessarily. Let's parse 'em, separate 'em out, and say it so it can be understood ..." (Kenosis).
JA: Sure, but baby steps. At this point, I'm wrestling with Russell, Ramsey, Tarski, Quine, and Company, and every now and then I notice something that has to be said way up front in order to prepare the way for that. I am trying to keep it to the minimal necessities, though, as it tends to balloon otherwise. Jon Awbrey21:45, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
There is too much fluff in there. Two significant points are being made. (1) There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it. Not all theorists deal with it, and those that do deal with it have not found agreement on how to deal with it. (2) In ordinary parlance, the things that one says about a subject are expressed in predicates. If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence. Is this the same thing as asserting the sentence? This question serves as a useful touchstone for distinguishing several of the major theories of truth. 'nuff said-- no fluff, no muff the explanation... Kenosis22:04, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: There's just a couple of problems with the plainer version: (1) It does not say what the previous version said, and (2) What it says is just plain wrong. There are two different dimensions of distinction and variation here, and the simplified redaction completely con-flates them. Time for dinner, will try to explain it more later on. Jon Awbrey22:38, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
"There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it. What the distinction consists in, however, inspires more answers than general agreement. Language does not fail to provide us with many ways to mark the distinction, even if we fail to say what it is. " ... 22:45, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
This set of statements does not effectively lead into the discussion of truth predicate, and gets lost before the first point is complete. Please let's fix it, then reinsert it in an appropriate place...Kenosis22:45, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
OK, I begin to see where the confusion might be here, though. Are you actually trying to say that the difference between contemplating and asserting is what is driving the issue about where the line should be drawn about "truth predicate"? These are separate issues, the neglect of contemplation/assertion differentiation and whether language has its own truth predicate (all of which is the fault of excess reductionism of course) ....Kenosis22:52, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: As I lay trying:
There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it. What the distinction consists in, however, inspires more answers than general agreement. Language does not fail to provide us with many ways to mark the distinction, even if we fail to say what it is. In ordinary parlance, the things that one says about a subject are expressed in predicates. If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence. Is this the same thing as asserting the sentence? This question serves as a useful touchstone for distinguishing several of the major theories of truth.
JA: No, I meant what I said:
There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it.
JA: So that isn't what the flationary dispute is about, as people generally don't waste time disputing what both sides generally acknowledge. So we can safely put that issue behind us. Jon Awbrey23:15, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Then we are agreed, as I had hoped, that they are two separate issues. How do we state the issue of contemplation/belief so that (a) it is clear, and (b) it does not interfere with or unduly confound the issue of predicate that is the subject of the Tarski et al vs. Kripke et al dispute...Kenosis23:21, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: That's what I been tryna do. The next line was this:
What the distinction consists in, however, inspires more answers than general agreement.
JA: Just because people acknowledge that there is a distinction between this and that, does not mean that they can say exactly what the difference is. That's partly why I changed the old word "recognition" for "acknowledge", as recognizing a distinction connotes slightly more grasp of its nature, I think. Gotta run, Pistons in the Playoffs. Jon Awbrey23:28, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: We're on the talk page, having an informal discussion. I abstracted a generic statement. It applies to theorists, too. In other news: Pistons 109, Bucks 98. Jon Awbrey02:24, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: To continue. There is a distinction that may be described as a difference between contemplating a proposition and asserting or believing that proposition. The distinction itself has nothing to do with psychological states, even though psychological states may be used to illustrate it, as there are purely formal mathematical differences that serve just as well to illustrate the same distinction.
JA: So even though people agree that there is a distinction, there are many different stories as to what it's all about. Linguistic turners tell one sort of story, pragmatists tell another sort of story, and I can't really think of one that everybody agrees with. Jon Awbrey02:36, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Some of what you are calling puffery is simply the fact that it sometimes takes more words and more complex syntax to say something correctly than it does to say it wrongly. It's crucial in a matter of linguistic analysis to maintain a clear distinction between objects and their signs. One has to maintain a distinct level of subject terms and predicate terms and not confuse them with what they describe, subject matters and properties of subject matters, respectively. Yes, it's a pain in the brain to do so, and it may sound like excess verbiage to some, but it really can't be helped. The following simplification may sound plainer, but it's just plain wronger on these scores. Jon Awbrey22:28, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Philosophical discussions of truth can be classified according to what aspects of truth they take as their subject matter, and what they proceed to say about their subject matter. The two kinds of terms involved in this are the subjects and the predicates of the discussion, respectively.
This stuff makes people go nuts. That is what Tarski and Kripke are arguing about, what Ramsey et al are reacting to. No, this issue is not settled, and our explanation should reflect same...Kenosis22:34, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: They are not talking about the difference between contemplating and asserting. I know this about Tarski and Quine for sure, as failing to make that distinction is tantamount to the confusion of use and mention that both rail on endlessly against. The flationary line in the sand is elsewhere. Jon Awbrey22:44, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Re: The 'Truth predicates section - it might help if it were made clearer that there are other predicates - besides "is true" and other truth predicates. Making it clear that predicate here is being used in the same way that saying that "is red" is a predicate will make the section more familiar & less uncertain. Also might be worth noting what subjects truth predicates can be applied to - usually/only entire propositions - and thus unlike most other predicates. But then this is what comes later (re deflationary) too --JimWae06:56, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
On Sartre, Husserl, Heidegger, and the existential truth
A note about the following passage in the introduction section of Philosophy of truth: ("Where they intersect the studies of language and reasoning, the topics marked by the use of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are technically discussed under the three heads of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude.") The only reason I am not vigorously objecting to the use of this sentence is that it serves as a warning shot across the bow to reader/editors priming for an opportunity to throw in any old choice of their favorite POV's, that this stuff is not simple. As it stands there are now two additional difficult points thrown into this "introduction," one on monadic and polyadic predicates, and the one I just mentioned. The average reader, thankfully, is immediately afforded an opportunity after this sentence I just quoted to grab onto something they can take into the rest of the article, hopefully without giving up completely. One more complicated addition to this intro and it is kaput for most readers. I think it has said quite enough in its present form, and any additional data should be added elsewhere in the article in a section titled "More on technical terminology in the philosophical analysis of truth" or some such approach...Kenosis00:47, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I have no idea what you are talking about. This language was introduced because you chose to throw in a discussion of dirt-elevating devices, and I have simply mentioned that experts in the field, even straight-laced British aristocrats, call them spades. If you would let me have two thoughts in a row, I will get to the examples from Russell and Quine at the appropriate points in the article, and the average readers might just learn something if you would only let them. Encyclopedias are for pushing the envelope of one's knowledge, not for imposing the limits of one's knowledge on others. Jon Awbrey02:54, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
The last sentence of this commentary above brings me back to the dissoi logoi, which is a very apt introduction in my estimation... so who is the "one" here, the writer? or the average-or-median reader (take your pick between average and median) interested in obtaining a manageable perspective to bring into her or his life?...Kenosis03:27, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Not my job to decide. I don't have the data to make those estimates. My estimate of the reader is "one who is about to become better informed". So all I know is that if we're going to present a subject, then it's not a good thing to fake it. I tried to advise against dragging belief and knowledge into this any more than necessary, as I've been on some discussion lists where we argued about this stuff for 3 or 4 years with no real progress to speak of, and those were pre-informed readers. Plus I know that it's hard enough dealing with simple attitudinals like assert and deny. But if we're going to delve into all that, then I can't in good conscience just sluff it off with a lot of conventional non-wisdom. Jon Awbrey03:48, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
The current intro is, in my judgment (judgment here assumed to a truthbearer [sic], which, if one admits the term, could be true, false, or partially true) a more effective servant to the cause and effect of Wikipedia than the any of the previous versions. Geez!...Kenosis04:00, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
Formal definition section
JA: I'll be putting some stuff in the formal definition section that I've been collecting from some of the primary sources this week. I'm not saying that it will all end up there, but at least I'll be able to develop it in a continuous context. If it seems a little disjointed at first, please bear with, it's partly because somebody keeps snipping out every bit of connective tissue in my heels. Jon Awbrey04:44, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
NP by me... do have a g'night, OK? . Nice work Jon; there are, by my review of it at least, some fine insights included in the article (after Banno, JimWae, Rick Norwood, Ancheta_Wis et al managed to hold it together somehow)... more of a core structure to bring into the future here at least, whatever specific course it may take from the current stage of development.... Kenosis05:17, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
On "dirt-elevating devices" & "average readers"
Now the following material is stuck in "Propositional attitude":
"[Also of] interest here is the very basic distinction between belief and an assertion based upon belief (or in the case of something judged to be an intentional falsehood, an assertion not based upon belief). Some theorists use belief or thought as the focal point in their analyses, while others use statements or assertions as the focal point. Either way, the analysis is quite complex, and the philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. In day to day life, both belief and statements commonly come into play in our attempts to discern truth from falsehood ("How could she possibly believe what she just said?," or "He obviously believes it, but he's wrong.," etc.). And both must be compared with concepts of what the facts are. As reflected in the discussion in this article, what exactly the "facts" are, and how we are to discern truth from falsehood, truth from partial truth, mistaken belief from true belief, are not at all simple questions."
Perhaps I should have used the words "a statement" rather than "an assertion". But the purpose of this paragraph is, per the Wikipedia guideline to say it to the reader even if it seems obvious to us the writer/editors, early in the article before getting into the beginning of the major theories. You may not think so because you're smart, but among the questions that naturally occur to readers, it seems to me, is how the day to day issues such as lies, misstatements, erroneous belief, misunderstandings, mishearing, misreading, etc., fit into the overall picture here. And an average reader deserves, in my estimation, a reasonable, very understandable review and a statement or two of how, and if possible why, the darn discussion is difficult and complicated. And the average, even below average, reader should still be able to walk away with the very basics if that's where they choose to stop. What about the obvious question "whaddya mean, difficult question? facts are facts", or "no, it's all relative and you can't really prove anything." This paragraph I just gave is not now and was not then intended to be micromanaged and parsed fully for every possible implication from the perspective of every logical positivist, pragmatist or other theories, at least not at the stage of presentation at which it was offered. It was intended to be a sketch. Fact is, this kind of sketch would better serve the "average" reader if it completed the issues of belief/statement by the talker (lies and inadvertent mistakes), and statement/belief by the hearer (mishearing, misunderstanding, misreading, or a pretense thereof), which is what it did earlier, and other editors found that one reasonable too, even if not perfect when deleted by Jon Awbrey. The reader, at that stage of reading, does not need to know what intentionality is in relation to modality and propositional attitude; they already know what the intentions are--either to accurately represent belief, or to inaccurately represent belief, "on purpose" as they say. The typical reader (not the top ten percenters here) deserves this basic review before diving into the dirt of the myriadic technical "funhouse" of some of the commentators....Kenosis12:32, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
As to average readers: Jon Awbrey, you took SAT's and compared notes with other people or at least were informed where you fit into the "curve", you have at some point over the years heard a very large sample of other students' comments in classes and no doubt rolled your eyes many times, gotten feedback from teachers, profs, etc., and know full well what an "average" reader is, and you do have adequate data to make a reasonable assessment about the average or typical reader, or should. It is our task as editors to respect this fact, rather than to expect every homemaker and high-schooler who checks in here to raise their innate abilities to the point where they can grasp the technicalities of Russell and Quine and the like before being given an opportunity to review, or learn for the first time, these basics. And I wasn't even asking to bring it down to a grade school or early high-school level, which we probably should briefly accommodate as well before diving in to the tough stuff. Truth, approximate truth, half-truth, lies, inadvertently false statements, misunderstandings, intentional misunderstandings--where the heck are they in this article? We already had this stuff right up there for the reader in two different forms that were at least palatable, and that other editors found reasonable, and both versions gave the reader an opportunity to intuitively grasp the thought/word/fact triad on both the sending and receiving end of a language transaction. And we then proceeded to attach the technical crap to it right in the beginning of the article. Ridiculous. Have a good week. I'm going to go work on something else for awhile. Please, respect those average readers up high in the body text..Kenosis12:32, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: From what I've seen so far the reader-cum-editorship of WP is a bit more diverse than what you describe, so I will continue to write for the whole curve. The subject in hand is one that has suffered from misleading popularizations, and I will try to avoid adding to that. The issues about approximation, belief, fact, knowledge, intention, thought that you mention are far more complex than a mere mention of conventional notions can cover, and tossing them into the mix without first getting some technical concepts into play can only serve to befuddle. There are as many different theories about propositional attitudes as there are about truth — that stuff about the thought/word/fact triad is far from being standard, and suffers from a prevailing confusion about fact — and you can't say more than platitudes about them anyway without an organized discussion. Jon Awbrey13:40, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
That is why I didn't refer to the triad per se, but rather stated what the three relationships are. There is a relationship between belief and fact, there is a relationship between statement and fact, and there is a relationship between belief and statement, all applicable on both the sending and receiving end of a language transaction. And when you say the words "on purpose" or "intentionally" the three relationships account for all normal notions of truth, approximate truth, lies, half-truths, misstatements, erroneous beliefs, mishearings, misreadings, misunderstandings and pretending to misunderstand. Simple, no need to dumb this down or obscure it, just state it straight up. Then go after the tough stuff after putting these things forward for the reader, and stating that the issues have turned out not to be so simple. The rest of the body text can speak for itself as to the difficulties. Have a good week Jon...Kenosis14:05, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
And as a matter of fact, if it's said straightforwardly enough, there is even room to include a brief note of caution or introduction to the difficulties about how the word or other signifier and its related associations interpose upon one another within the [thought, concept, image, belief] corner of the triad here, and even how entertaining/considering and understanding/believing are not strictly separated and ill defined, and how the transaction must be made repeatedly among to gain mutual understanding of what the words are intended to mean, how difficult it can be to pin down what "fact" is, and in the same stokes will be helping the reader to begin to understand some of the difficulties. This is all do-able without befuddling the later explanations (not all of which necessarily explain that much anyway)...Kenosis15:28, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Maybe you really think this is simple. Maybe you've only heard one story about it. I have explained that the mere use of the word "fact" is problematic here, partly because of a certain bifurcation that occurred in modern times as to its usage. For that and other reasons, its better to speak of "reality". The other stuff that you are talking about is called semiotics or semeiotic, and yes indeed it's a fine bunch of concepts whose careful introduction would vastly help to clarify matters, but it's already been hooted down. Jon Awbrey15:18, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
RN: For what it's worth, I strongly agree with Kenosis on the necessity to keep the article readable, expecially in the beginning. Rick Norwood14:59, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Everybody agrees about the need to keep the article readable. Everybody agrees about the propositional baditude of eminently readable but false statements. The disagreeable part comes with deciding which is which. Jon Awbrey15:10, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I'm not talking about the difficulty of deciding what the facts are. I'm talking about the impossibility of talking about a fact without referring to a sentence or a proposition, and thus remaining stuck on the flypaper of language. So you are not really comparing facts and propositions, you are comparing two propositions, one of which you have stuck the label "fact" on. If you're getting a sense of deja vu it's because this is the whole assertion thing all over again, only in a different disguise. It doesn't really help avert confusion to introduce a surplus of disguises. Jon Awbrey16:24, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
The proposition you assert, that our choices are limited to technical obscurity and falsity, is false. ( Johnnie and Jimmie are in a room together, and Johnnie hits Jimmie. Mother comes in and demands an explanation of what happened. Johnnie says Jimmie hit his head against the wall 'cause he was getting wild. Mother goes to reveiw the newly installed videotaping system for the playroom, and proceeds to play it back for everybody. Case closed. Now, is Johnnie stepping forward to say that it is not a fact that he hit Jimmie and also lied about it? because there is a philosophical problem with what a "fact" is? because there is a very complex conceptual problem with what a lie is? There is no question among the three whether Johnnie understands what "hit" means, nor about what "wall" means, nor about what "wild" means. What Johnnie has done is to use already agreed upon symbols whose mutual understanding has long been intersubjectively verified to everyone's satisfaction in the room, and stated a non-correspondent version of events with the intention of using those agreed upon words to create an image in Mother's mind designed to shift blame onto Jimmie. Hi story seemed coherent (hung together), despite Jimmie's protests, until the videotape was played for all to see. This is what we call a lie, an intentional mis-re-presentation) There are some basics to be explained in the article, well before we encounter any difficulties Jon... Kenosis17:41, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Your assertion of what I assert is false. I keep trying to keep it simple at the outset. I keep trying to introduce a few basics that are needed to approach the difficulties. I have recommended staying with one modality until we can clear that up. Adding multiple modalities of belief and fact and intention and so on may make for diverting narrative, but it does not help clear up the reigning confusion. Jon Awbrey18:18, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
Nor will anything else except choice of best reasonable generic words for the intro, with a one-sentence or half-sentence note to the customer that the technical terms may vary depending on your location in the minefield... Kenosis18:19, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
Truth and a Pinion
JA: I'll be assembling a budget of quotations here while I try to get them in some kind of (archeo?)logical order for the article. As usual, for ease of analysis, I will break the longer passages into bite-sized chunks. Jon Awbrey13:14, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
Dummett, Michael (1993), Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
One of the things that Frege saw is now a commonplace, namely that the concepts of meaning and truth are inextricably bound together. A failure to perceive this underlay the classical 'theories of truth', developed contemporaneously with Frege's work, theories like the correspondence theory and the coherence theory. Such theories considered meaning as given. They did not ask, "What, in general, renders (an utterance of) a sentence true?", but, "What, in general, renders a proposition true?".
Here a proposition is what the utterance of a sentence expresses: to grasp the proposition, you must know what the sentence means. Hence, in asking the question, "What, in general, renders a proposition true?", we are presupposing that the meanings of sentences can be taken as given in advannce of a knowledge of what renders them true or false.
In the presence of such a presupposition, however, no non-trivial answer can be given to the question. Almost anything could be taken as rendering some sentence true: it depends on what the sentence means. In fact, it is by grasping what would render it true that we apprehend what it means.
There can therefore be no illuminating account of the concept of truth which presupposes meaning as already given: we cannot be in the position of grasping meaning but as yet unaware of the condition for the truth of propositions. Truth and meaning can only be explained together, as part of a single theory. (Dummett 1993, 15).
I think the article is now infinitely better than it was a week ago. Since I haven't done much of the writing, I plan to give it a read through to catch any repetition or inconsistency that the authors may be too close to catch.
I agree there. For all that I've somewhat resisted some of the changes, the article is shaping out a lot better than it was before. Ig077405:26, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Propositional attitudes
"Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions, in many different modalities, are in the air at once. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves."
This seems to say that propositions underlie propositions. Earlier, I thought those colorful, flavorful things in the air were "statements", and that propositions underlie statements. Rick Norwood01:27, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Due to popular demand, I'm making a concerted effort to introduce new concepts in the vernacular — is "vernacular" in the vernacular? beats me — so this statement is shorn of all the pretension that you may rest assured is soon to come, for those who like that sort of thing. Anon! anon! Jon Awbrey02:18, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Oh, I see what you were asking. No, the sense of it is that propositions underlie propositions-plus-toppings, like the crust of a pizza underlies the modal sauce, cheese, olives, pepperoni, mushrooms, whatever. Jon Awbrey04:24, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: No, it's because the term "substantive" is a neologism invented by a band of johnny-come-lately deflaternity brothers, not to mention a misleading misnomer. It's about to be edited out in favor of something more accurate, TBA. Jon Awbrey02:12, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Theories of truth as substantive
"These theories all hold that truth is some kind of substantive quality or a relation between things beyond what is expressed by the surface grammar of sentences that truth predicate truth or falsity."
JA: An earlier version of the sentence was like this:
"These theories all hold that truth is some kind of substantive quality or relation between things beyond what is expressed by the surface grammar of sentences that predicate truth or falsity, such as "Snow is white is true".
I still maintain that you cannot meaningfully command a proposition. To command something does not mean to make something so. To command something means to give something orders. Rick Norwood02:15, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Maybe a small amount of idiomatic license, or poetic license for the sake of rhythm and meter, but not all that much. It is more important to make sure that the big three of Declarative, Imperative, Interrogative are represented in the list. And this is supposed to be the informal introduction, remember? Suddenly now I'm not being technical enough for ya? Critics! Jon Awbrey02:24, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The illustration is so truly inspiring that I'll overlook the wee bit of correspondence theory bias represented by that mirror she holds aloft. Jon Awbrey12:32, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Still not sure what I think about that illustration (compliments to lg0774, do we have to write a permission letter on that?); though I do appreciate some visible life on the page. Surely the queen has no clothes on this topic; and now we're in a league with National Geographic...Kenosis17:14, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Isn't that the naked truth? I just pulled the picture off of Wikimedia Commons, which claims its public domain so it should be ok. Ig077417:22, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Ig0774 added Image:La Vérité, par Jules Joseph Lefebvre.jpg and marked it without a understandable edit summary (+blatant theft :-)) and marked it as minor.[1] I don't believe that the nude image in its current form has much to add to the article. I think it would be better for readers to have a cropped version that shows her neck area and up, then have that version link to the full origional image. However, as Jon Awbrey posts out, the mirror is showing one point of view about truth. Perhaps it would be best to not use the image in any form on this article. --Midnightcomm20:32, 30 April 2006 (UTC)
In fairness to Ig0774, there was a light-hearted dialog going on among at least 5 others, for whom the summary made sense. Granted, someone who does not view the history on a daily basis might not appreciate that there was conversation that previously transpired. I am shifting your edit and listing the conversants, in keeping with your edit. --Ancheta Wis21:06, 30 April 2006 (UTC)
Come to think of it, the thread included (rough chronological order)
Now at least the fate of the image will be in some type of context. Obviously, the content of the article does not hinge upon the visual art. I believe the point of the image was to get some sort of Featured Article status out of all of this, as in the Icelandic edition. --Ancheta Wis21:06, 30 April 2006 (UTC)
Stepping on toes...
Just reading through the article and I stumbled across this little gem:
If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence.
Now, I see where it is going, but doesn't this kind of prejudge the issue of truth? After all, some deflationary theories hold just that "if one says sentence, then one is predicating the truth of that sentence" (and now to tread on people's toes and get myself thoroughly reprimanded for being so bold) and this is quite like what Derrida says somewhere, that when I say something, I am promising that I will say the same thing tomorrow (which is as close to "truth" as you can get with Derrida). Plus, to say that a sentence is true but not assert it strikes me as being either dishonest or mad... Ig077418:01, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Not sure what you're saying here, but I hope that you have not bought the deflationary flattitude so thoroughly that you think they have the right to censor other folks' traditional ways of talking. Censure, yes, censor, no. Jon Awbrey18:10, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
I'm not saying that sort of thing should be censored. There are really two concerns: one is the prejudgment of the issue that this is supposed to introduce (I don't buy into the deflationary stuff, but some people seem too) and the other is the common meaning. It strikes me that in everyday speak, that sentence says "If ones says that a sentence is true then one says that the sentence is true". It might be easier just to say "if one says a sentence is true, is that the same as asserting the sentence?". Ig077418:19, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The sentence that you quote is a perfectly succinct and straightforward explanation of what a truth predicate is. People who talk in this normal way are not to blame for the linguistic muddle-slinging of a few confused rabble-rousers. Jon Awbrey18:25, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Note on my edit you just reverted: I wasn't arguing with your choice of verb tense (though I did change it), I was arguing with your choice of words. "Found from"? That just doesn't sound right to my ear. Neither does "becomes standard... under" Ig077418:07, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Sounds idiomatic to me. "From" has the sense of "since", but "from" is used here since "since" would not be idiomatic. The association of meaning and truth under the heading of semantics has become standard since Frege. Jon Awbrey18:18, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The interepretation of this or that line from Plato or Aristotle as promoting a correspondence theory of truth is just plan nonsense, like a lot of retrojective reading. So I note and make formal objection to one more instance of POV bias in the ordering of subsections. This is enough to make me now put a POV tag on the article. Jon Awbrey18:04, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Well, at the very least, correspondence theory sees itself as deriving from the Scholastic dictum Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei, whatever the "truth" of it may be". Ig077418:25, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Plato is a coherentist to a significant degree‹The templateTalkfact is being considered for merging.›[citation needed]; Correspondence was Aristotle's gig‹The templateTalkfact is being considered for merging.›[citation needed]--it's the same old conundrum; either way. We didn't deal with Plato because it's too complicated for this article. Coherence was, in the main, fiirst characterized by the great rationalistic systems of the continental philosophers' sepculative side. And it has for about the same amount of time as the Correspondence been recognized as fitting into math, and later, symbolic logic. They're the two main theories.
Correspondence and Coherence go first; the rest are built upon these. That's the way the earlier editors consensused it, and that's the way we proceeded with it. It was a prudent course. If we wish to argue over whether Constructivist should be introduced before pragmatic, now that's a reasonable debate here....Kenosis18:35, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: These characterizations are ones that are commonly made from a particular POV, and all of them are not just "arguable" but have been widely argued in the literature. Jon Awbrey18:40, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I see no reason not to adopt a lexicographic default order. If the sections are written in a way that makes it look like the POV's are not independent, then that's a POV problem with the article. Unless one can prove a logical dependence among their axioms, if you can find their axioms, that is. Jon Awbrey18:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
POV my foot. This is quite standard. Correspondence and Coherence were the two theories originally accepted as the main "Theories of Truth", to which was added Pragmatic. Then came Constructivist Epistemology, which has continued to flourish as Social Constructivism and the like, after everyone lost track of Peirce's James's and Dewey's contributions and gave 'em other names lilke instrumentalism, etc. Then came Consensus, which is an extremely modern view...Kenosis18:46, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: There has been an accumulation of POV problems with this article that I have frequently noted and made objection to, but tolerated in the interests of doing more productive work. Other editors have noted the same bias. But this is the last straw. The fact that accounts written from the Corr-POV are called "standard" and imposed on the whole is part of the problem. There are many other equally "standard" interpretations of the ancients, medievals, renaissance writers. The lack of awareness of this is another aspect of the Corr-POV bias. Jon Awbrey19:03, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Out of due respect for the potential problems here, editors have chosen not to refer specifically to the ancients, excepting the one brief reference to "goes back at least to the classical Greek philosophers". If that's the issue, then delete it for now. I will not object to that in the least because all these theories are basiclaly 20th century reviews of the whole historical matter in the wake of Peirce, James, Dewey, Russell, et al, and those who followed....Kenosis19:10, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I simply reached an impasse in trying to munge my way through the article, especially as I started to look up sources on some of the other theories, and found that the other POVs were all being described from the Corr-POV. So I began by doing what is for me a perfectly standard move, and reordered the topics in alphabetical order. I was a bit surprised that this should be a problem for anybody. I know the history well enough to know that there is no time order for these theories. That is fairly easy to document. Unless someone can prove a logical dependency, there is no reason not to roll the credits in a default marquee order. Jon Awbrey19:33, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
I'm sorry and a bit disheartened to observe that this article is turning into an attempt to override several very well established encyclopedias of philosophy with an approach that uses the other theories of truth as a mere lead in to the work of Charles Peirce and Awbrey. This trend should be reversed and the article given back over to its cause, the broader cause of Wikipedia and its readers...Kenosis19:29, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Precisement! All my other philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias present these theories in alphabetical order. Jon Awbrey19:39, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
Proportional spacing?
JA: Did WP just convert to proportional spacing, right & left justified? Or is that just something in my monad? Jon Awbrey03:08, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Having carefully considered the matter for several weeks now, and pending the day when somebody shows me that Aristotle described his theory of truth as "substantive" — it's actually conceivable, but I will wait for the citation — I will be re-labeling traditional accounts as traditional, in accord with the applicable "truth in labeling" statutes. Jon Awbrey04:10, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
NP by me; how 'bout main theories. ;-) Point being, well, maybe the religious perspectives are correct ("know thyself," said Jesus of Nazareth; why does Goedel come immediately to mind here — you can't know yourself, at least not fully, etc etc. Sometimes one needs to back up a bit, as this is extremely tough material for everyone unless you have a surprise videotape to draw upon — and suddenly Sartre seems to have a handle on it and is looking mighty pretty, until........). Turns out Aristotle didn't say half of what was later pinned on him; neither did Plato, yet the analogies are apt as to the context in which the two originally argued. Then again, I listened to Derrida in person and up close in 1994, maybe 1995, and he said he keeps going back to Aristotle — go figure. If we stay on the task, and if overall perspective is kept, we'll get the article as right as right can be.....Kenosis06:02, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: One of my reasons for doing this is that I've decided from further reading that there is probably some insinuation of "essentialism" implied by the label "substantive", and I think that this charge, if it be that, is a caricature of the traditional account of truth. Jon Awbrey04:16, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
Jon, just put a reasonable summary paragraph up front, take a break, and come back to it with a fresh perspective, OK? Maybe another editor will have a fresh perspective on the material you've added too. The extensively peer-reviewed encyclopeidas have already, by and large, covered all the main material here, and somewhere in the English language there is a reasonable way of summarizing it...Kenosis06:42, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
Ignoratio elenchi
JA: Re:
Obviousely, these questions can not be answerd (even in principle) without clear definition of truth.
JA: Enormousdude, your persistent remarks have been noted, considered, and consistently rejected on account of the fact that they miss from the outset what are some of the main questions of the article, which are precisely whether truth is something that demands definition and whether it can be defined if so. One of the tasks of the article is to present the various answers to these questions that have been brought forward over three millennia. Jon Awbrey13:56, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
Redundancy theory article
I have moved the long set of quoted material from Ramsey over to the article on Redundancy theory of truth. I am wondering how much of this material is necessary to the article on Truth. Or is it currently being worked on in some fashion?...Kenosis02:17, 2 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Still in labor. I imagine there will be a series of contractions before final delivery. Or making a smaller version here of a bigger article elsewhere is probably a good idea, all in the fullness of time. Jon Awbrey16:14, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
Anything further on this? Can we collapse this and link to the article on redundancy theory? Or is there a plan currently being developed here? ....Kenosis02:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
Befuddlement
Regarding this dif [2] - this can't be what Kneal & Kneal said, surly?
Escape from befuddlement seems easy enough if one observes that it is not the verbal expression, the sentence, to which the predicates of truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states. (Cf. Kneale & Kneale, 16). (Banno's emphasis)
Did they really claim that one cannot attach truth or falsity to a sentence? Frege was mistaken, presumably? [3]
If this is indeed a correct statement of their point of view, I strongly recommend that we use another source! But since the paragraph in which this befuddlement occurs is superfluous, perhaps it should just be removed? Banno03:32, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
On the second part of the dif:
recent trends in linguistic-analytic philosophy tend to focus on sentences and their corresponding abstract contents, called propositions.
Few analytic philosophers talk of propositions - it is far more common to speak of sentences. hence the change. Banno03:35, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
The distinction here is between "statements" which do not contain variables and "sentences" which may contain variables. Every statement is, by definition, either true or false. Sentences, on the other hand, cannot take truth values unless modified in some way, as by a quantifier. Thus "He is an initiate." is a sentence containing the variable "he" and its truth value is dependent on the value of the variable. A sentence containing a variable can be viewed as a function, in this case between the domain of all persons and the range {T, F}. If the sentence is quantified, then it takes on a truth value: "All persons are initiates" and "No person is an initiate." are false, "Some persons are initiates." is true. Rick Norwood16:03, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
| On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean (1919)
|
| Let us illustrate the content of a belief
| by an example. Suppose I am believing,
| but not in words, that "it will rain".
| What is happening?
|
| (1) Images, say, of the visual appearance of rain,
| the feeling of wetness, the patter of drops,
| interrelated, roughly, as the sensations
| would be if it were raining, i.e., there
| is a complex 'fact composed of images',
| having a structure analogous to that
| of the objective fact which would
| make the belief true.
|
| (2) There is 'expectation', i.e.,
| that form of belief which
| refers to the future;
| we shall examine
| this shortly.
|
| (3) There is a relation between (1) and (2),
| making us say that (1) is "what is expected".
| This relation also demands investigation.
|
| The most important thing about a proposition is that, whether
| it consists of images or of words, it is, whenever it occurs, an
| actual fact, having a certain analogy -- to be further investigated --
| with the fact which makes it true or false. A word-proposition, apart
| from niceties, "means" the corresponding image-proposition, and an
| image-proposition has an objective reference dependent upon the
| meanings of its constituent images.
|
| Russell, OP, p. 309.
|
| Bertrand Russell,
|"On Propositions: What They Are And How They Mean" (1919),
| pp. 285-320 in 'Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950',
| edited by Robert Charles Marsh, Routledge, London, UK, 1956.
On the traditional accounts of truth
Re: "rev -- accounts, treatments, etc. are perfectly standard terms in lit, "theories", however, they are not": ?? I say give'm a B just to get 'm outta my classroom. Whatever...Kenosis02:57, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
Subjects & Predicates
JA: Subject and predicate are not essences, they are roles that terms play in a particular discussion or "theory". For example, a discussion of grammar will have as subjects of discussion certain grammatical categories, among which are the noun phrase (NP) and the verb phrase (VP), etc. 02:50, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
Gobbledigook (that's intended to be a euphemism). That collides nearly head-on with the truthbearer camp. I don't think you've seen the bottom of the well here yet. Personally I'll bear with you on this because you've asked for forbearance while you're working on it, but there remain some major organizational issues to be resolved here. ...Kenosis03:03, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Unfortunately, we are for the moment saddled with a peculiar usage that has become current in a peculiar backwash or eddy of literature, to wit, or not, the term "truthbearer". The least that we can do is make it clear that this is but one of several terms that might have been chosen for the central subject of discussion. And it is more logical to take up this genus, and the specious truthbearer, before taking up the sorts of thing that we say about them, specifically, that they do or do not in fact bear truth. Jon Awbrey03:08, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
If it's specious, then get it out of there, or explain it straight up. Today, the term truth bearer is variously and often loosely applied according to the definition we provided. Right now those sections are self-contradictory and do not present a useful picture of the lay of the land in philosophy as of today. What are we trying to say, that when a "philosopher" applies the words "is true" then it's a truth predicate, but when an amateur applies the words "it's true" it is a truth bearer subject to the additional application of the words "is true" or "is not true" by a professional philosopher?? ... Kenosis14:40, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: In presenting a particular tradition of thought, I always try from the outset to do that as "internal critique", using their terms of choice as well as can be done up to the limits of logical consistency. Phrases like "I'll be hornswoggled, you're right, Socrates" are always called "truth predicates". The thing that Socrates uttered just beforehand is called by some a truthbearer. I'm not even sure from what you say now whether we are yet on the same talk page about that.
If certain turns of philosophy that became all the rage in the 1900's did not have this attitude of "Before us the Void, After us the Flood", it would be possible to carry out the internal critique and still place them in a context of other traditions, but that is almost impossible to do in the case of certain forms of gravitas singularity, cause you keep getting sucked into a philosophical locus from which no light can escape. Jon Awbrey15:10, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
If the intent is to present the historical use of "truth predicate" and the quirksome legacy it has left us, then please do so without being so oblique about it. The question presented at the end of the truth predicate section is not only a useful touchstone, but rather the source of about half the confusion in the field. Best to say so straight up.. Kenosis14:40, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
State of the Art-icle
JA: Reflecting on the current state of the article overall, it's main defect at present seems to be its lack of balance with respect to anything beyond literal-minded language-bound truth, and a rather geeky pinheaded take on that. I'm all for giving geeky pinheads their due — some of my best friends are geeky pinheads — but even the average reader we hear so much about knows that there's much more to the subject of truth than that. Previous complaints from others about this issue once led to the inclusion of a token statement about aesthetics and artistic truth, but that seems to have gotten lost somewhere along the way. Approaching the relation between literal truth and figurative truth requires a broader perspective at the outset, one in which truth-in-so-many-words and truth-in-terpsichory are seen as special cases of truth in general. Just a little something to think about as you muse on that picture of Truth. Jon Awbrey14:12, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
Brief paragraph removed from new section on "Truth and the conduct of life"
"Truthfulness refers to when one says what he thinks is the truth in good faith. Even though a habitual liar may say the truth for deception purposes, he would not be characterized as truthful. However, someone who is truthful may unwillfully say something false, thinking it is true."15:30, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
The statement is invalid unless, for example, "unwittingly" replaces "unwillfully". If "unwillfully" is kept, then that someone is untruthful. If that someone thinks it is true, and uttered it, then, that one is unreliable, at best, or perhaps a con man. But then those who were to take those statements to be true might characterize themselves as gullible, once the truth be known ( that the lie is out). Ancheta Wis16:05, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
Section moved to bottom of body text for now
I have moved this section to the bottom of the body text in the article, unless or until it can be written so it contributes something to the large section on Philosophy of truth. What are the intentions of this section? What is the "good of logic"; what makes sense in the original context of "logos" makes little sense today, unless you're a total positivist with blinders added. What is a blockquote on navigation through life doing after presentation of the standard micro-analytical techniques of philosophy of truth? What is the relationship of the blockquote to the paragraph that follows it? How are honest intentions informative here? What does Habermas' position have to do with the discussion where it was earlier placed in Philosophy of truth section? I happen to like the Buddha quote, but it neither follows from nor helps explain what was/is presented prior to it. How on earth does the extremity of evidentialism follow from the Buddha quote?; if anything it appears to follow from the sentence purporting to define truth as "the good of logic". This stuff needs a lot of work and attention to organization and content...Kenosis16:18, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
Truth and the conduct of life
Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation (αρετης κυβερνητικης), do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow sailors? (Plato, Alcibiades, 135A).
In classical formulations, truth is defined as the good of logic, where logic is seen as a normative science, that is, an inquiry into a good that seeks descriptive knowledge of this value and procedural knowledge of the means to achieve it as a goal (Peirce, CP 5.39). In this view, truth cannot be discussed to much effect outside the context of inquiry, knowledge, and logic, all very broadly considered.
Honest intentions play a unique role in the ethics of epistemology. Jurgen Habermas understands truthfulness to be one of the dimensions of valid speech. (Habermas 1979) The moral importance of honest intent is underscored by the remarks of Buddha: “Herein someone avoids false speech and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, not a deceiver of people. Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing," and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen." Thus he never knowingly speaks a lie, either for the sake of his own advantage, or for the sake of another person's advantage, or for the sake of any advantage whatsoever.”[1] In its most extreme form, the obligation to tell the truth may manifest itself as a strong form of evidentialism, which holds that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence". (Clifford 1877)
I tried to add new material around the Buddha quote to make it relevant, and less of a non-sequitur. (The paragraph, as I now read it, still seems to come a bit out of left field when put in context. Damnit.)
Compare Habermas, Buddha, and Clifford's views. They're all about the obligation which one has to tell the truth. That's quite explicit in Clifford's sentence, so I'm confused by your confusion.
This is not the way I analyze the material here. Buddha's view has to do with an orientation towards right speech, a central aspect of which is an intention to seek conformity with reality and speak it thusly. Evidentialism has more to do with demanding verification for everything. Two completely different things. And none of this fits in with the "good of logic", normative science, and Charles Peirce's pragmatic approach, let alone with Plato's statement about requiring navigation (i.e., the exercise of human consciousness and the attachment of same to acts of will). ...Kenosis17:13, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
And, in my analysis of this article and the broad range of readership that has a warrant to involve themselves in discussion of a word such as "truth", what this article could use is a well-thought-out section of interest to non-philosophy buffs. Philosophers are lost in the woods on the discussion generally, and this article, despite some fine efforts, is even "lost-er" than the sum of philosophers generally...Kenosis17:27, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
They're not completely different things, they're both guidance towards right thought (and speech).
Indeed, they aren't especially related to the first paragraph, which is why I said they ought to be connected. Agreed that this article requires work, I only just arrived here after listening to complaints from the usual suspects. Lucidish18:03, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
Truth in religion etc
The table of contents is out of control. It needs to be collapsed. The "truth in religion" section is perfect for collapsing, either as a part of the 'disciplines' section (I don't see what's so objectionable about that) or as a subsection of a new section on 'truth in ethics'. In any case, I'm really quite puzzled about what the subsections of the religion section are doing. Lucidish17:08, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
I disagree. What there is, in my estimation of it, is too lengthy a treatment of Truth in philosophy, and that section is perfect for collapsing as to several section within. By all means go for it if you can get it past other editors. The section on Truth in Religion, which crosses over into non-rational, non-empirical revealed and doctrinal beliefs, is shorter than about half the sections in Philosophy of truth. The evidence thus far is that people occasionally check in here wanting to deal with the question of truth in religion, a separate one from truth in science, law, etc., and also a separate issue from the treatment of truth in philosophy...Kenosis17:18, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
What do you disagree with? I just want to get rid of the subsection parititioning, not the material. Lucidish18:05, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
The subsections in the Truth in religion section are currently placed to delineate separate issues, from separate traditions, in separate time periods, placed by separate editors, from one another. Presumably we haven't heard the last of the slants yet; Wikipedia's only five years old or so, and there's still, well, a long time to go here... Kenosis19:02, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
Ok. I think that's unnecessary, because if they're single paragraphs then they don't deserve subsections, and if they grow to be more than what they are, they'd be pushing the boundaries of the irrelevant. This article is huge right now, and it doesn't need irrelevant material. Lucidish19:18, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
I beg to differ. I could, without even drawing on other Wikipedia articles, expand any single one of those three or four main topics currently in that little section to a 50KB article with a little bit of time on my hands--easily--and also find a number of new relevant slants without being the least dismissive of issues of credibility because they are "revealed" or "doctrinal". And as you already know, some of the real fun then starts when such truths meet up with "rational" and "empirically derived" "truths"...Kenosis 21:46, 7 May 2006 (UTC) An additional thought, Lucidish. Perhaps the other slant on the doctrine of "right speech" actually should belong in the Truth in religion section-- not sure...Kenosis21:46, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
While the Truth in Religion section obviously needs work, it is an important view of Truth that is almost entirely different from Truth in Philosophy. Revealed religions claim to know the truth in an absolute form, as indicated by the bumper sticker, "God said it. I believe it. That settles it." Rick Norwood20:47, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
I find the arguments here severely misplaced, because these little sections are mere tokens prepared for future development-- if they do not work out in the end, they can always be removed down the road. One thing I have noticed is that having the section on Religion allows editors with a religious slant a distinct place for their views. Another thing: if you look back through the talk page you will see that there remains some more interesting material to include in the section on Truth in law. Just haven't gotten around to it quite yet....Kenosis20:58, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
I have taken the step of removing some of the more offensive material in terms of length from the Philosophy of truth section, which is excessively lengthy without significant improvements in what it explains and/or summarizes. I have shortened, for now, the section on Coherence theory, which was disproportionately focused in specifics rather than summaries, and also very significantly shortened the Redundancy theory section, which was widely disproportionate in its focus on specifics (originally it was 6-7 times the length of the "main article" on that theoretical approach). There's more to do here, but now there's room for the previously designated (by other editors) sections on Law, Math, Religion, you name it...Kenosis20:54, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
Jon has worked hard on those sections. I hope he understands that there is a place for that work, but in a more specialized article. Rick Norwood21:03, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
All this material is in the relevant articles word for word. The additional material in the Coherence theory section did not say much more than the summary paragraphs already did; except to drop a couple names and cites, and that's what the "main article" is supposed to be for. The redundancy theory section was even more in the same vein. I analyzed that series of quotes, took my time with it, and at the end of the day, what they said was already summarized in the first summary paragraph of that section. Jon did some good work and diligent work with it, but at the end of the day you end up in exactly the same place: "Snow is white is true" is the same as "Snow is white" at least according to Ramsey. Fact is, half of what is now the second paragraph of the Redundancy section also doesn't add much to the article, except that the second paragraph helps explain quickly what Ramsey meant by "linguistic muddle" and reinforces certain ideas about propositions that were introduced earlier in the article, leaving the more specific analysis for the "main article" on the subject. ..Kenosis21:36, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Critics, they just gotta be bitchin' about something all the time, even if it's outa both sides of their mouths. No sooner do they get done railing against "academic" language then they turn to lambasting this or that casual phrase or natural idiom. It think it must arise from some need to destroy at all costs. Jon Awbrey17:36, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
Enough with the hyperbole. Critics my foot-- you asked for patience while you were formulating these various concepts. I researched diligently as well, and took complimentary tacks with you both actively and, in the last two weeks, more passively in response to your request to allow you liberty to work on some of these difficult concepts that many of the best philosophers have had major problems with. And I have engaged you in friendly bantering and sometimes challenging arguments while steadfastly seeking a readable article. The result of this sometimes challenging discussion between us, and among other editors as well, is a more useful and articulate article on the whole...Kenosis18:09, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
Avoiding unnecessary obliqueness does not mean backsliding into musing and meandering. You've done this sort of thing before (musing in real time while editing), and you've pulled yourself out of it before. Why begrudge thoughtful edits? I don't begrudge your points in the slightest, and when they show a point that appears useful for the reader, you know darn well I always submit to you and other editors on such points. When they are merely proprietary and stubborn, I feel differently about it. I will get back to this process of content management later...Kenosis18:09, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Sorry about the pique-experience, but I have also sat back on many an occasion and watched you flush a month's worth of BTT&S down the Crapper, and this is another one of those times, and most of it was utterly pointless. The trade-off between accuracy of writing and facility of reading is always a judgment call, but it's especially aggravating when people are inconsistent in their criticisms. It's called (DIYD)2, damned if you do, damned if you don't. Jon Awbrey19:06, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
Geez here. All our contributions, revisions and deletions are a matter of public record. Show me an axample of something of significant importance to readers that went down the crapper on my initiation, preferably one that is just BBT&S without being primarily BS. And even if there are one or more instances of what you just asserted, why wasn't it retrieved and replaced in an appropriate setting? I speculate the most likely reason is insufficient importance to the presented topics here on Wikipedia. If by "crapper," you mean "relevant main article", if want to apologize that offshooting the specifics of the various subtopics is often required because the marquee article doesn't necessarily have room for all of the desired meanderings, including those I myself fancy. If by "crapper" you mean an organizational or heirarchical schema other than your preferred one at any given moment, then I must plead guilty to a number of counts on that charge...Kenosis19:59, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
And incidentally, not only have I had my own share of contributions flushed completely (an event most editors will readily recognize as quite familiar to their experience), but also, I have withheld large quantities of specifics in favor of summaries and links, as an encyclopedia of this kind expects as a method of presentation. Such a method allows readers of varying levels of interest to link if they choose, or pass it up in favor of a quick summary if that's their preference...Kenosis19:59, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: What I keep saying here is this. Digging a hole and filling it again, iteratum ad infinitum, is not productive. I can write in any number of styles, so long as it does not lie and mislead. But there has to be some consensus about pitch and tone or it just becomes one big howl. Going back to the third person impersonal GEV, after earlier complaints about ease of reading and disembodied abstraction, is just going in circles. Tossing in the absurd complaint that the pronoun "one" is not third person, is simply incoherent critique. It is trivial to go back and rewrite everything in third person passive voice, but I already know what that will lead to, as we've already been there, that is to say, having been there has already been. Jon Awbrey20:18, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
As we all know, or should know, these are not necessarily complaints, but quick summary notes justifying or explaining the edits. We also know, or in my estimation should know, that occasionally such a comment may be interpreted to be a complaint, especially when there is a succession of specific small edits, even if it is not intended to be argumentative or directly critical. And if it is directly critical, so what?...Kenosis21:17, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
On the other hand if such an edit was judged to be trivial, then the relevant edit(s) should have been left standing as is. I would summarize without going into detail at the moment, that my last full reading of this article (today) leads me to arrive at a personal judgment that the article is significantly better organized and informative than a month ago. That does not mean we put a lock on it, at least not without a clearly determined consensus that we should raise the ante of justification for succeeding edits at some point. Plainly there is a bit more work to be done. I see your request for specifics below--I'll deal with this point by point soon as I have a chance. Talk with ya' a bit later...Kenosis21:17, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
Attitudes, propositional and otherwise
JA: Kenosis, please make your objections specific. The use of more casual vernacular forms in this section, the participatory "we" and so on, was introduced in direct response to requests for a more readable style. Overall, I think that it works in this case to shift gears between more informal and more formal styles. The lion's share of this subject matter was introduced and initially written by others, against my initial advice about broaching this keg'o'worms in the article on truth — I did no more than introduce standard terminology for the issues, all of which is rather well linked to standard topics in WP and also to peer-reviewed sources. It is always possible to add more, but you did not seem to be pushing in that direction at the moment. Jon Awbrey18:16, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes, and they are also discussed under the headings of intentionality and linguistic modality.
JA: No, it does not. No more than any other link in WP. Propositional attitudes are discussed in linguistics, logic, and philosophy under the headings of intentionality and linguistic modality, about which topics WP happens to have articles. Of course, this could be said more explicitly, if it were passively-aggressivelypea thought to be necessary by some abstractly impersonal pronoun-bearer (also spelled pronounbearer), but really, folks, cf. No-brainer and Fog of war. Jon Awbrey18:54, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
IG: Rather agree with JA's comments above. What in particular do you dispute about the section? The inclusion of "we" does not seem to address solely JA's POV (though the only citation in the section might). Further, how would one source a claim like "What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so."? What is implicit here is the English language as it is used. That said, numerous sentences in this particular section could use significant clairification/simplification, but this is a problem with much of JA's (often poetic) prose as a whole (this is not a critique per se of JA's writing, which is often lucid, though it is often epic, but rather a call to make the article more comprehensible to the average speaker of English. I cite the following as an example of what I mean:
The variety of attitudes that a proposer can bear toward a single proposition is a critical factor in evaluating its truth. One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, especially when viewed in light of the proposer's intentions. For example, we frequently find ourselves faced with the question of whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs. Discrepancies here can occur for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, we usually call that a lie.
JA: Before Kenosis began his recent round of edits on the first Propositional Attitudes section, the paragraph read like this:
One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, perhaps with intention thrown in for good measure. For example, we frequently find ourselves faced with the question of whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs. Discrepancies here can occur for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, we usually call that a lie.
JA: That still seems rather direct and to the point to me. But in the process of trying to guess what sort of problem Kenosis was having with it, while still preserving the main point, I added the additional clarifications that you see. As far as additional sources go, there is a second section on Propositional Attitudes that quotes Russell on the use of the term, as he is often credited with having coined it. But the two discussions got split when Kenosis groused about not raising his pet belief versus knowledge issue early enough in the article. Jon Awbrey03:54, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
Hello again. I got called out on a job and just got back. I'll respond to the request for specifics after I take care of some necessary things at the home base here...Kenosis02:11, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
Here's a quick tentative shot at trying to avoid a complete point by point analysis of what I think are the relevant issues, lest this article about "truth" become an article about everything conceivable in the world. Residual judgments about recent events relating to this article can likely be rectified by a careful review of the recent edit history of the article.
As we can readily agree I think, there are either an infinite number, or nearly infinite number, of ways to write an article. Among the many ways to say the section on "Propositional attitudes" is as follows immediately below. (Hint: I do not agree with the assertion that the chosen examples among the various modalities of propositional attitude, in what was previously the third and fourth paragraph of this section, are necessarily separate points. The evidence for this is that several references to modality relationships were already combined in the paragraph leading up to the reference "Awbrey & Awbrey" ("...relationship between belief and knowledge, and discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions.")) And for the sake of current argument I have even thrown in two extra sentences for good measure while still seeking concision of this section. The first three sentences of the first paragraph are left as they appeared as of late yesterday. All of this except for the beginning of the first paragraph is framed in the third-person voice... Kenosis06:31, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
Propositional attitudes
What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes, also discussed under the headings of intentionality and linguistic modality. Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once.
Differentiating among the many different attitudes a person can take toward even a single isolated proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Of very central importance is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, which frequently involve further judgments about the proposer's intentions. Common questions such as whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs can involve discrepancies for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is judged to be intentional, it is usually called a lie. At least three judgments are being made in such an instance: (1) what the assertion appears to be intended to convey, (2) what the person's belief appears to be, and (3) what the facts appear to be. And the further judgment about whether it is a lie is actually an inference from the combination of these three judgments, all of which are frequently debatable. Other key comparisons of multiple modalities involve the relationship between belief and knowledge, and discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, phenomena that call for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995).
Some theorists take assertions and propositions to be the focus of their analyses, while others take beliefs and thoughts to be the focus. In either case, the analyses of the many kinds of real-life situations can be quite complex, and philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. In day to day life, both assertions and beliefs commonly come into play in attempts to discern truth from falsehood. Common questions such as "How could she possibly believe what she just said?" or statements like "He obviously believes it, but he's wrong," may not have clearcut answers either in philosophy or in real life. Both assertions and beliefs must be compared with concepts of what the facts are, or what is known to be the case. As discussed in the sections below, what makes a statement a "factual" statement, what exactly are the "facts," and how to differentiate truth from falsehood, truth from partial truth, mistaken belief from warranted assertion, are not at all simple questions. 06:31, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: I cannot figure out from the above what specific objections you have. I cannot even keep track of all that "j^th sentence in the k^th paragraph talk" without opening up a second window. I'll try again after another cup of coffee. But my first impression of the proposed rewrite is that it is rather less sparkling, harder to understand, and has one paragraph that is way too long. It is generally a good idea to put high order abstractions and applications to concrete examples in separate paragraphs, even when the examples are used to illustrate the ideas, as people have a notorious tendency to confuse "the example of the theory" with "the theory of the example". Lunch! Jon Awbrey15:30, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
I am beginning to believe that it's possible I may have taken WP:AGF just a tad too seriously at the moment -- the specifics I will get back to later if necessary. For the present I continue to AGF. The primary point above was to show that this section should be no more than three, maybe four paragraphs long at maximum, even with additional material added.
Here is another example, one of thousands possible, without the two added sentences, which explains neither more nor less than the existing material. As before, all of this is in third person voice except for the introductory sentences of the first paragraph, which I left alone. (I imagine you could even collapse the just-inserted Russell blockquote into one sentence with a reference and integrate with some further thought)..Kenosis16:41, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
Propositional attitudes
What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes, also discussed under the headings of intentionality and linguistic modality. Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once.
Differentiating among the many different attitudes a person can take toward a proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Of very central importance is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, which frequently involve further judgments about the proposer's intentions. Common questions such as whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs can involve discrepancies for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is judged to be intentional, it is usually called a lie. Other key comparisons of multiple modalities involve the relationship between belief and knowledge, and discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, calling for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995)
Some theorists take assertions and propositions to be the focus of their analyses, while others take beliefs and thoughts to be the focus. In either case, the analyses of the many kinds of real-life situations can be quite complex, and philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. In day to day life, both assertions and beliefs commonly come into play in attempts to discern truth from falsehood. Common questions such as "How could she possibly believe what she just said?" or statements like "He obviously believes it, but he's wrong," may not have clearcut answers either in philosophy or in real life. Both assertions and beliefs must be compared with concepts of what the facts are, or what is known to be the case. As discussed in the sections below, what makes a statement a "factual" statement, what exactly are the "facts," and how to differentiate truth from falsehood, truth from partial truth, mistaken belief from warranted assertion, are not at all simple questions. 16:52, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: I have read this ten times now, and it's just too compressed and confusing. There are too many very distinct ideas Procrustified into each single paragraph. Cognitive digestion demands smaller chunks. The connotations of the word "intention" are slightly different in the assertion-belief context than they are in the inquiry-problem context, and it doesn't help to mush them together too quickly. Analysis of the nuances could be given, but maybe not here, not now, so it's best to just lodge them in well-marked contexts. The 3rd person GEV just does not help matters here, so I see no reason to force a cookbook recipe on what is obviously a high-altitude kitchen. Jon Awbrey18:34, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
Confusing?? Compared to what?? Cognitive digestion?? Perhaps then, start by eliminating the following serious stretches of relevance in such a case (Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, calling for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995)). If digestibility is now your concern, you end up with a whole lot less for the reader to have to digest, as below...Kenosis20:26, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
Propositional attitudes
What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes, also discussed under the topics of intentionality and linguistic modality. Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in different attitudes, intentions and linguistic modes are in the air at once.
Differentiating among the many different attitudes a person can take toward a proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Of very central importance is the relation between the modes of assertion and belief, which frequently involve further judgments about the proposer's intentions. Though descrepancies can occur for many reasons, when the departure of assertion from belief is judged to be intentional, it is called a lie. Other key comparisons of multiple modes involve the relationship between belief and knowledge, and various discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions.
Some theorists take assertions and propositions to be the focus of their analyses, while others take beliefs and thoughts to be the focus. In either case, the analyses of the many kinds of real-life situations can be quite complex, and philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. In day to day life, both assertions and beliefs commonly come into play in attempts to discern truth from falsehood. Common questions such as "How could she possibly believe what she just said?" or statements like "He obviously believes it, but he's wrong," may not have clearcut answers either in philosophy or in real life. Both assertions and beliefs must be compared with concepts of what the facts are, or what is known to be the case. As discussed in the sections below, what makes a statement a "factual" statement, what exactly are the "facts," and how to differentiate truth from falsehood, truth from partial truth, mistaken belief from warranted assertion, are not at all simple questions. 20:27, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
I've just changed modalities to modes in three places in the above draft. There is no need to use "modalities" when modes will readily replace the oblique term of art and when "modalities" has already been introduced and exampled with a link or three. I also changed the last sentence of first paragraph a bit...Kenosis02:13, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Pause for a bit
Both Jon and Kenosis have valid points, however, in the midst of finding the Tao, or true way of writing the article, the needs of the reader appear to have been neglected. The article is written at a graduate school level, and while I find that refreshing (in fact, this article contains some of the best prose to be found in the encyclopedic milieu), it is unlikely that the 8th grade student who looks up "truth" on Wikipedia will have much of a clue as to what the writers of the article meant to communicate. Note that this objection does not indicate any support for the proposition of "writing down to the reader", for it is part of the writer's task to elevate the level of the reader, but there is a ne plus ultra that decrees that as the point of writing is to communicate, writing that is in essence or effect obfuscatory, whether intentionally or no, fails to do so. •Jim62sch•23:04, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
As a student of Heidegger, I might contend that there is no writing that is not in essence or effect obfuscatory, but one silly old German aside, your point is essentially the point I've been trying to get across for a while now... Thank you for putting it so clearly. iggytalk23:15, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: I realize that there's some redundancy between the 1st and 2nd non-quote paragraphs of the PA section, but I'm about to insert some more material from Quine in the gap, when I can get a round tuit. Jon Awbrey02:50, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: The German version of Reader's Digest is called Das Beste. One of my German profs in college expressed the suspicion that this was some sly wag's allusion to a famous line from Goethe's Faust:
Das Beste, was Du wissen kannst, Darfst Du den Buben doch nicht sagen.
JA: Roughly:
"The best that you know you must not tell to boys."
That's not the sort of digestion I meant. I meant something with a little more meat left on the bones. Jon Awbrey03:25, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
The introductory section of Philosophy of truth is turning into a monster. What are we to do about this Sargasso Sea situation that is inexorably developing? Where is all the shunt-off material in the articles proper (Propositional attitude is 1/6th the size of the section on Propositional attitude in the article on Truth. Even if it were the same length or larger, all this does not belong in the lead-in to the major theories of truth. There is nothing in that section that couldn't be summarized in a couple brief paragraphs, with a caution that one must be prepared to see that there are different attitudes and modes and intentions, and link to elsewhere. Problem is, there is no bottom to this well, and we ought stop this expansion before anyone gets too invested in what they've put out into the public domain here...Kenosis03:17, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: I remind you once again that I said from the outset that the subjects of belief and knowledge were way too big and hairy to raise in this article. But we are working on it here now so I don't see any reason not to keep working till it reaches a satisfactory condition, then we can worry about how the folks who wrote the PA article will feel about it. One bloody fight at a time, that's my motto. Now, can't we get back to working on the substantive, er, important problems that this article still faces, and put off the cyclic fashions in cosmetics and the do-or-diet craze till later? I came to WP to get away from go-nowhere discussion groups. Jon Awbrey03:36, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
I disagree. The relationship between belief and statement explains most of the issues in daily life for most readers, allowing them something to take home, so to speak, prior to proceeding to the theories section. But, I'm going to remove all that stuff as of now, and experiment at home and/or on the talk page to see if a separate section can be developed for more average readers in the near future. I think we should be able to get each of the introductory sections down to two paragraphs each, three very short ones max, so we don't deaden the minds of near everyone before they get to the theories. We need just enough up front so they can understand what all the minimalist bantering is about, and ne plus ultra...Kenosis03:48, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
OK, done. We can revisit statement vs. belief issues later in another section such as the "Truth in daily life" or whatever it was. Here's what remains, which should be no more than two or three quick paragraphs leading into theories of truth. If there's too much meaningful material here, it belongs in another section or article...Kenosis04:05, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
What sort of name shall we give to verbs like 'believe' and 'wish' and so forth? I should be inclined to call them 'propositional verbs'. This is merely a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the form of relating an object to a proposition. As I have been explaining, that is not what they really do, but it is convenient to call them propositional verbs. Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that because it is a psychological term, and although all the instances in our experience are psychological, there is no reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological. There is never any reason to suppose that sort of thing. (Russell 1918, 227).
In linguistics and logic, the formal properties of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are treated under the headings of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude. (Cf. Quine 1956).
What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes, and they are also discussed under the headings of intentionality and linguistic modality.
Many problems in human communication, and even personal integrity, arise from the circumstance that the same proposition may be affected by various propositional attitudes and expressed in sundry linguistic modes at one and the same time. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus we are brought back to matters of language and logic. Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interrelation.
Key comparisons of multiple modalities involve the relationship between, assertion and belief, belief and knowledge, and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, phenomena that call for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995).
Some theorists consider assertions and propositions to be the raw material of their analyses, while others suppose beliefs and thoughts to be the focus of their examination. In either case, the ensuing analyses of concrete situations can be quite complex, and the philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. ...04:05, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Here's an example of what this section should look like in terms of length and complexity. And, I don't think you need the Awbrey&Awbrey material here, but I left it anyway. This should cite to Russell, but not quote him in a blockquote....Kenosis04:27, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Propositional attitudes
What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes. (Russell 1918, 227). Propositional attitudes are also closely related to the topics of intentionality and linguistic modality.
Many problems in human communication, and even personal integrity, arise from the circumstance that the same proposition may be affected by various propositional attitudes and expressed in different linguistic modes at one and the same time. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, there is no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus the analysis inevitably includes aspects of linguistics and logic.
Differentiating among the many different attitudes a person can take toward a proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Key comparisons of multiple modes involve the relationship between assertion and belief, belief and knowledge, and various discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, calling for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995).
Some theorists take assertions and propositions to be the focus of their analyses, while others take beliefs and thoughts to be the focus. In either case, the analyses of the many kinds of real-life situations can be quite complex, and the philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. ...04:27, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Or, it could read like this, with the Awbrey material elsewhere in the article as appropriate (it's a useful set of concepts; I just am not sure it is centrally relevant enough to belong prior to the major theories section)...Kenosis05:14, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Propositional attitudes
What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes. (Russell 1918, 227). Propositional attitudes are also closely related to the topics of intentionality and linguistic modality.
Many problems in human communication, and even personal integrity, arise from the circumstance that the same proposition may be affected by various propositional attitudes and expressed in different linguistic modes. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, there is no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus the analysis inevitably includes aspects of linguistics and logic. Differentiating among the various attitudes a person can take toward a proposition can be critical in evaluating truth. Some of the key comparisons of multiple modes of proposition involve the relationship between assertion and belief, belief and knowledge, and various discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions.
Some theorists take assertions and propositions to be the focus of their analyses, while others take beliefs and thoughts to be the focus. In either case, the analyses of the many kinds of real-life situations can be quite complex, and the philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. ...05:15, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Does that Russell citation seem a little... strange... to anyone else? I mean, we are talking about "propositional attitudes" and in support, we quote a guy who says "Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that"... I mean, I realize he's a pretty standard source for the term, but still... iggytalk06:26, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Having recently had an e-mail discussion with a French author in which I chided him for his almost mind-numbing use of "nous" (we), I'm happy to see the "we" go as it is ambiguous in its purpose. Is it the royal we? Is it in respect to things "believed" by the majority of people. Is it merely the author's way of goading people into agreeing with him -- "I write "we" as my position is one all must share, and if you don't you are an outcast"? •Jim62sch•09:20, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
I have made another change to the second paragraph above, rather than post another whole draft...Kenosis15:06, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Sentence removed from last paragraph of Philosophy of truth intro
" The things that can be said about any of these representations, signs, or truthbearers are expressed in what most truth theorists describe as truth predicates.‹The templateTalkfact is being considered for merging.›[citation needed]" . 04:51, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
I intended that for the entire paragraph, sorry that I was not clear about that.
Anyway, this needs a cite too "In a number of recent discussions that focus on linguistic analysis, the vehicles of complete thoughts are described as truthbearers, with no intention of prejudging whether they bear truth or falsehood."". Revent discussions by whom? In what forum? •Jim62sch•09:07, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Jim, a relevant cite for this basic statement is provided in the section on "Truthbearers". We still have a minor amount of cleanup work to do on these introductory sections... Kenosis03:28, 12 May 2006 (UTC)
sentence from Propositional Attitudes section placed here for preservation
Placed here for preservation and analysis as to content. Some of this is redundant to the the sentence that contains another long list of propositional attitudes... Kenosis15:36, 10 May 2006 (UTC).
"In linguistics and logic, the formal properties of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are treated under the headings of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude. (Cf. Quine 1956)." 15:36, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
another sentence from Propositional Attitudes section placed here for preservation
Placed here for preservation and analysis as to content. A close reading of the Russell quote indicates that it is not necessarily correct that propositional attitudes are not psychological attitudes proper. The list of verbs given as examples of propositional attitudes includes examples to which psychological attitudes are either directly attached or inextricably intertwined. A more thorough explanation of this highly complex situation can perhaps profit the reader if put in another section or article (e.g., the article on Propositional attitude, which currently has vast potential). ... Kenosis15:49, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
"Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interrelation." ... 15:49, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
We-ism & Recent Discussions
JA: Jim is forgiven for being in medias res — then again, who isn't — and I would not wish on anybody the misery of reading the archives of past "truths", but many things that would be obvious to the veterans of our local version of the "truth" no doubt need to be explained in the article.
We often have, er, discussions are often had with regard to mathematics writing about this business of "we-ism". In the ∀day discourse of mathematicians, this is neither the royal "we" — it is well-known that mathematics, unlike psychology, has no El Camino Royale — nor the "we" of plural authorship, but instead the democratic or participatory "we", as in "We, the People". It is so prevalent in casual math speech precisely because of the importance of exercises and proofs, which one is supossed, as they say, "to read with a pencil". In other words, math is a form of inquiry most of whose sense is missed if disembodied spirits do not bother to embody themselves in chalk-smudged and elbow-greasy bodies. Jon Awbrey13:14, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Ockham Chainsaw Massacre
JA: With regard to this query:
Does that Russell citation seem a little... strange... to anyone else? I mean, we are talking about "propositional attitudes" and in support, we quote a guy who says "Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that"... I mean, I realize he's a pretty standard source for the term, but still... iggytalk06:26, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Yes, "truth is strange, stranger than fiction" (Byron), which is precisely why I gave the complete quotation instead of the Reaganesque 1-liner substitute thereof. Of course, many will continue to prefer the myth. Which is one of the things that made the Late Great Era Of Scientism so Late. Jon Awbrey13:46, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
I believe I have neglected to compliment Jon Awbrey on his prolific research and understanding of so many of the details of this immensely complex set of subjects, particularly the technical aspects and subtleties of the formal linguistic, semiotic and logical aspects. Seems like we now have about ten new articles to work on all of a sudden... Kenosis15:57, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Et tu, Brute? Meanwhile you murder to dissect. Jon Awbrey 16:02, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Oy vey already. This article on truth is a well with no bottom. There's been a great deal of progress on it, however imperfect...Kenosis16:58, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Answering questions about truth in the lack of definition of truth
There are a couple of stupid statements in the very introduction - someone maintains putting them up.
These statements are related to questions about truth. Can someone explain how to answer questions containing term truth without definition of the term? About WHAT are these questions then?
JA: Please be more specific: Which couple of "stupid statements"?
The following statements: Standing beside the issue of definition are many other issues about which scholars have various views. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we know something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute?
There is a terrible logical contradiction here. First sentence here says "standing beside the issue of definition..." which means (correct me if it does not) - apart, separately, away from the issue of definition. And then the very next sentence says: "What sorts of things can properly be called true or false?" What do you mean here by the term true? The definition issue is deliberately set aside (means that the term truth or the term true was said to NOT define yet).
By other words, the question "What sorts of things can properly be called true or false?" contains undefined term (true) - therefore, there is no question yet. What exactly is asked? About what subject (or object) exactly is the question?
All further questions are similar - they are in direct logical contradiction to the requirement not to specify the meaning of term they use. How can question be asked if the term the question is using is left undefined?
JA: Meanwhile, please cease and desist from continuing to add that same line to the introduction that you've added many times before, that we have already discussed many times, and that has been rejected, among other things, for betraying a failure to grasp the elements of the question at issue.
Please, show that you DO grasp the elements of the question by providing clear understanding of the term of the discussion (the term truth). Enormousdude19:52, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
We all understand the importance of definitions, when there is one to be had — one of the main questions at issue here, as what we put here reflects in some small degree the vastening literature on the subject, is precisely whether there is a definition to be had. Jon Awbrey22:16, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
Without definition there is not much you can discuss - because you simply do not know what you discussing, right? Say, we want to discuss some term, - say ses, but without specifying clearly what is thge meaning of this term. And then we say: "Apart from the issue of definition, what sort of things can properly be called ses or non ses?" How legitimate is this kind of question (not to say about what should be the answer(s) to it)? My opinion - not legitimate at all - simply because the term ses has not been defined yet. Enormousdude19:52, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
Enormousdude, that's what the whole debate is about, and what the various theories are arguing about (that people can't agree on a proper definition), which is why the editors chose to say it like it is. You can't prove the answer to any of these questions; you only can show what the arguments and theories are. Read the theories for yourself. One says truth should cohere, or hang together, fit together. Another says truth should correspond to reality. Ok, fine, but who makes up the definitions of what corresponds to what? One set of theories says it's by consensus, that people do it interactively. OK, fine, but consensus keeps changing, and it's hard to tell what it is, and there's always some minority view or other. Another set of theories say the definitions are constructed by whoever's in power. OK, fine, so do you define truth as what the king says/ or what the president or the mayor or your father says? Pragmatic and other theories are various combinations of these views. And the minimalists get all over the other theories, by saying that's ridiculous, the words "it's true" don't say anything about the original statement that the original statement didn't already say, except to agree with it. And on top of it, no one can define to everybody's satisfaction what on earth the "facts" are. Even science has to admit its newer theories are all tentative, and even the accepted theories every once in awhile get proven wrong, or partially wrong, or expanded into another dimension of understanding (i.e. another dimension of truth). What are you supposed to do, set up a court to decide who's right when people disagree about the facts? There are not, and cannot be, enough courts in the world to keep up with everyone's disagreements. And as we know today, even the courts are often wrong in figuring out what the facts were or are.
This article introduction stated the truth of the situation just as it exists, to the best extent it is possible to determine and sum up the situation that actually exists (there's yet another truth problem, which is why the other editors haven't much begrudged your attempts). The way the intro is written is not the only way to do it, but it's a true way. For every definition of truth you can give, there's a bunch of very intelligent people who will say "Oh yea, but how about this, and how about that?" and come up with a different approach, and that includes the dictionaries. I hope this helps explain the situation in this article ...Kenosis00:26, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
Kenosis, I appreciate your survey of the issue and see that you are educated enough to see the problem (many editors don't even understand that there are logical problems here, by the way). My concern is even more simple. We try to use some particular combination of 4 characters (truth) without specifying what exactly we mean by this specific combination (moreover - some editors try to suppress ANY explicit association between the combination and other known terms (like fact, reality, etc) - which would greatly help to clarify the usage of the term under question (truth)). Why then you (and anyone else who avoids the definition of this combination) use this particular combination - if you are not sure what this combination stands for? There is no meaning in the term if it has not been defined - it only represents just a bunch of characters.
You know, to me it is so strange that people try to use words without clearly understanding their meaning first. If we claim that we are capable of discussing truth, then the very first thing is to clarify WHAT exactly we are talking about, right? Because if no clear definition is given, then anyone is free to assign ANY meaning to these 5 characters - (and be truly correct in his/her definition), including but not limited to logically contradicting and even mutually exclusive definitions. Then what? Then no futher discussion (not to say -consensus) is possible - simply because each participant has different meaning of the term truth.
And is not the large volume of philosophical mumbo-jumbo about truth all about? Anyone is using his/her own proprietary definition of truth - and is correct, simply because there is no common definition of the term truth.
Therefore, the conclusion is clear - the word truth has no definition (therefore, no specific meaning), and the usage of it is therefore very arbitrary (to taste) and can perfectly contradict to any other specific usage of the same word. Obviousely that in this case any discussion involving the term (truth) is meaningless.
That is why definitions of key terms are so important (because only then productive and logically non-contradicting discussion can take place). Basicly, if one can't define the object he/she is talking about - then one simply does not understand what he/she is talking about.
understood UEnormousdude. Your references to "mumbo-jumbo", exact definition, etc., are exactly the problem. Perhaps sleep on it, look again at the problems (Theories of the truth(s) of people's 'truth(s)' and those who say "that's true" because their mother, father, or the queen or king, or their military drill sargeant, or the money, told them that's what to say, or because it merely "hangs together" or "rings true" to them for whatever their motivations may be?). The editors here spoke it pretty much like it is. There is no agreed definition...Kenosis02:16, 12 May 2006 (UTC)
