Talk:Submarine Command System

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This article has been mentioned by a media organization:

Corfield, Gareth (1 June 2017). "Trident nuke subs are hackable, thunders Wikipedia-based report". The Register. Retrieved 29 June 2017. The authors also quote, more or less verbatim, part of the Wikipedia entry on British submarine command software.

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I have problems with the Channel 4 article. While it is suitable to back up the claim of "some controversy", that's about all it's good for.

It claims British Aerospace was an active company in 2004. BAe became BAE Systems in November 1999.
It's out of date - AMS is referred to a lot and no longer exists.
It suggests that the Windows based SMCS will effectively be the same as that running on any commercial desktop and will encounter the same problems - that is rediculous.
I have operated Win 95, Win 2000 and Win XP and have had very little problems. Errors are mostly caused by the user in my experience, either doing things they shouldn't be doing or failing to maintain virus protection etc. And SMCS is operated by Royal Navy personnel. I would like to highlight that the British military is not manned by conscripts but by highly trained professionals. Mark83 17:37, 18 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Inevitably, some of the references in an earlier news report will have been superseded. However, the C4 news report still poses the (as yet) unanswered question: how do you prevent surplus Windows code from executing inadvertently in a military system, and why is it less risk to use Windows than (say) a cut-down version of BSD in which surplus code can't execute because it just isn't there?

BTW I too have used Win 95, Win 2k, Win XP. Also RSX-11, VMS, MacOS, Mac OS X, FreeBSD, Solaris, OpenBSD, Win 3.11, RedHat, SuSE, MS-DOS, OS-360, and numerous specialised real-time kernels. This is why I can tell the difference between software which is bullet-proof and software which is made by Microsoft. Shlgww 20:36, 18 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Surely they will be using a cut down version of Windows, just as they would have used a cut-down version of BSD? I can't argue with your experience of Windows and other operating systems, just as you can't argue with mine. It just depends what you need and expect of it surely? Personally I think a lot of the "controversy" is sensationalism. A lot of the hype suggests that BAE nipped down to PC World, bought a Windows disc and shoved it into the Royal Navy's subs! Do you really believe BAE, the MOD, the Royal Navy, even Microsoft (if they've any input at all) are really incapable of tailoring an OS to their needs? I don't. A lot of the article seems to anti-BAE. I am a layman as far as this article goes, however I would suggest BAE are as qualified as anybody to undertake this work. Through the British Aerospace history they have the BAeSema experience etc. and through the GEC-Marconi/MES history they have the Ferranti Naval Systems and Plessey Naval Systems experience. Not to mention the fact that GEC not only built the subs themselves but also a lot of the consoles that operate SMCS.

As far as the article being superceded. Sure, I can't argue with the AMS element. However the article was written in 2004 I think, so my point about BAe/BAE stands. That tells me the journalist made a very obvious and lazy mistake, what else has he/she got wrong? Mark83 21:04, 18 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

According to the sworn testimony of Bill Gates, given under oath to the US Courts in April 2002, in his capacity as Microsoft's Chief Software Architect, a cut-down version of Windows isn't possible. So if BAE have indeed built a cut-down version of Windows for this purpose, Gates was either incompetent or lying on oath. Neither of these possibilities would build trust in Microsoft. According to the limited information vouchsafed by the MoD to parliament, SMCS-NG (and its related products) are kept under control by a layer of middleware which limits what applications can do. That's fine for applications. Middleware (since it sits above the OS) can not dictate to the OS, its kernel, and its scheduler what the OS itself is going to do, and when its various parts will run. According to all the presented evidence, SMCS-NG runs on Windows-2000. The live system contains vast tracts of Windows code, under Windows' control, which are not needed for the purposes of the SMCS functions. Nobody will say how this surplus code is prevented from inadvertent execution in a live SMCS-NG system. For a system in command of a nuclear weapons platform, this is an unprecedented state of affairs. Shlgww 08:36, 19 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

This is all an hypothesis. You seem to have a very firm grasp of technical issues. However can you say definitively that BAE are incapable of making the software do what it wants and preventing it doing anything it shouldn't? There seems to be a conspiracy theory going on, as if BAE has picked the least suitable, lease stable platform for their SMCS. There must be a reason. What commercial or selfish interest has BAE for picking Windows? What interest has BAE or Microsoft in producing an unstable control system for the UK's nuclear deterrent fleet? Mark83 10:33, 19 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

This must be some new and improved use of the word "hypothesis" with which I am unfamiliar. I assume that Bill Gates' sworn testimony is true. I assume that what MoD has told the UK parliament is true. I assume that BAE's press releases are true. Ergo SMCS-NG runs on Win2K. I know that applications and middleware can't ultimately tell an OS what to do. (If this part is confusing to you, you really need to study systems architecture and operating system design until it becomes clear to you.) So I know that there's a heap (joke) of surplus, uncontrollable Windows code in each SMCS-NG system. Nobody denies it's there. Nobody will say how it is to be prevented from inadvertant execution. Nobody will guarantee that it's safe or secure. It's bizarre. There's an old software tool called "lint". We used to use it to clean out surplus code from C programs - get rid of the "fluff". Once upon a time, people thought it truly important to get rid of surplus code from programs, and hence to guarantee that surplus code couldn't execute with unforeseen results. This was considered essential engineering practice. Now they're prepared to run multi-million pound command systems containing literally millions of lines of unknown surplus code. It's truly, truly bizarre. Compare and contrast the approach taken by OpenBSD. Read on and weep. Shlgww 17:43, 29 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

In practice SMCS NG has been seen to be noticeably more reliable than the previous versions based on Solaris. I don't ascribe this to the OS at all. The key to this reliability is the application software and the use of more COTS software (or rather less bespoke software) for the HCI. The point about preventing execution of unwanted software also applies to Unix, you could eliminate unwanted software from a distibution, but would that really be sensible? Its also worth noting that this is NOT a safety critical system. Despite the title it does not control the submarine, its reactor nor the Trident strategic weapons system. It is used as a a tactical information system and a (torpedo) weapon control system. And the weapons control aspects are limited and safeguarded.Kangerooz 16:00, 18 December 2006 (UTC)[reply]

If you are able to cite evidence rather than hearsay for increased reliability of SMCS-NG, please post it. Take care to avoid breach of UK legislation. It would be surprising if, after five years' further development, SMCS-NG were not improved over its predecessor. The issue of controversy was not whether SMCS-NG could improve on SMCS-on-Solaris; rather it was whether SMCS-OSS - the proposal to migrate to Open Source UNIX (Linux or BSD) - would yield a better SMCS sooner. By cutting out surplus code, SMCS-OSS would have been a lean solution with ancillary advantages. These include the ability to run on leaner hardware (perhaps fanless) with reduced thermal and acoustic footprint, hence improving submarine stealth; plus the immediate capability to run the submarine intranet as a Grid, for increased distributed processing power. We can't be sure how well this would have worked for SMCS, because it wasn't done; although we can see that such technology works well in the Linux world. Leaving in unwanted software is the direct opposite of sound engineering practice. As Antoine de Saint-Exupery expressed it: "Your Design is complete not when there is nothing more to add, but nothing more to take away." Shlgww 06:32, 28 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

An interesting discussion. When I first heard about this proposal I thought it was joke. I've been using various versions of Windows for years now, from Windows 3.1 to Windows 7, and anyone who thinks Errors are mostly caused by the user in my experience obviously hasn't used Windows enough. I actually like Windows, or at least the general principle, however even the most generous of Windows supporters couldn't claim the Operating System as reliable. it's too complex and buggy, the programmer's left hand often doesn't know what the right hand is doing, the source code is 'company confidential', i.e., nobody outside Microsoft has any idea how Windows actually works - Microsoft tells third-party programmers that Windows will do such-and-such a thing when they issue a particular call, but, due to hidden bugs, Windows often doesn't - or falls over, and it is also slow, soaking up processor power and memory footprint.

To use such a system in situations where lives are at risk is quite frankly, a decision bordering on imbecility. And if expanded to include the control of shipboard nuclear weapons, e.g. possible future nuclear-armed torpedoes, then quite possibly criminal. The mind boggles.

Incidentely, I don't have any personal views on this - I couldn't care less as I won't be one of those having to use the system. But it does shed light on the thinking processes (or lack of them) that go on in the MOD and UK Government these days. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.248.116 (talk) 15:25, 11 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Accessibility

Someone already seems to have added the appropriate tag (albeit to this talk page), but this article is missing an introductory paragraph. Something that explains in a couple of sentences what exactly a "submarine command system" does, preferably put in words by someone familiar with the subject. -- MiG (talk) 12:40, 26 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Reference [1], [9]

Command & Control Systems410 Error - Page Removed Gc9580 (talk) 08:03, 15 June 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Civil Action No. 98-1233 (CKK), Direct Testimony of Bill Gates, Defendant's Exhibit 1507, 22 April 2002. This link is dead (the URL name can't be resolved). Is there another site that hosts the text from the referenced document? Garyvp71 (talk) 13:18, 23 May 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Other navy/military uses of windows

It might be worth noting in this article other military uses of Windows, including some Nimitz Aircraft Carriers as well as some armored vehicles iirc http://www.neowin.net/news/navy-carrier-to-run-win-2000 — Preceding unsigned comment added by TeeTylerToe (talk • contribs) 18:17, 27 January 2013 (UTC)[reply]

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