Talk:Solipsism/Archive 2

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Realism simplier?

"Occam's Razor would then suggest that the existence of reality might be a simpler solution than a massive unconscious mind."

I can't say the above is true, one cannot say which is less of a jump for Occam's Razor to apply to either postulate over the other; starting from your own perception the problem of the unification of all separate phenomon in the universe has the observer in common, and are so solved in a root cause (solely a psychology of sorts). Whereas in the realists view every instance needs to be taken down to a physical cause, which has your own perception dealing in it's presentation to ones own person to be perceived anyway, which may as well equally violate Occam's Razor by the minds eye projecting the external as self-existing and duplicating the steps of systematizing an answer to questions of phenomena. Nagelfar 05:51, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

I'll be honest and say I don't quite understand what you're saying here, but even if you disagree, this is an argument used by realists (so if you have solipsist sympathies, you don't have to believe it). Occam's Razor is just a rule of thumb anyway, so even if you do believe realism to be "simpler," it doesn't prove it. Anyway, I'll just say that if you were to ask a random "man on the street" what the simpler explanation for their favorite team losing the big game was, their star player being injured, or it all being part of a vast cosmic illusion by their own unconscious mind for unknown purposes, I suspect that 99% of them will say the injury explanation is simpler. Not a proof, naturally, but this is not an inherently ridiculous statement that no one believes. SnowFire 15:32, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

There is a difference between common sense and occam's razor. Simplifying a postulate (as much as possible from the standpoint of logical deduction) and the simplicity of understanding things grounded in common sense (from being conditioned by teachings and the interactions of sensory feelings) do not always equal the same. Taking apparent effects to other apparent causes may suppose an external matrix of events to orient oneself by, but the separate question of reducing the origin of it all from an absolute beginning has only ones perception as the sole variable; the eternal observer. You can reduce the matrix of cause and effect to a beginning by the physical quantum sciences by each cause in itself as a logical external-projection of the senses down to a big bang. Though it is still projected as an external from the stand point of ones own perception creating or positing relations as a vehicle for self-orientation and multiplication of experiences unique to the self. Nagelfar 23:46, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

General comments.

I think the early part of the Objections section got somewhat confused between Jiohodi's attempt to move it to the first person and Knucmo's attempt to move it back. I brought back some of the old statements, and generally tried to third-person it up. This had the unfortunate impact of making it much more gendered- using "he" and "him" and the like rather than "I" and "my" and so on, which I think is appropriate here. That said, I've seen admins run around demanding first-person purges even on places like the Free Will page where it would make perfect sense to write in the first person, but oh well. Third person it is.

It should also be noted that I removed the {[fact}} tag that Knucmo stuck in on the morality objection. You don't need to check your facts to know that A->B and "I don't like B" is not a valid argument, regardless of whether A or B are true. I point out that the argument can be salvaged if you can prove not B- that is, that morality exists for sure. But while it would be nice to have more references for philosophical debates on the topic, we don't need to have somebody hold our hand for simple logic.

I also removed the Wittgenstein objection that had been complained about before as making no sense. Again, if anybody wants to redo it so that it's easier to understand for laypeople, definitely go at it and put it back.

Should we remove the current Hinduism section? It doesn't have any content except a possibly out-of-context quote at the moment. Religious writings often need to be looked at holistically; this could well be a prep statement saying that one who has mastered themselves is ready for anything, and doesn't necessarily have a darn thing to do with solipsism. I mean, we SHOULD have a Hinduism section, but a good one, and a bad one may well be worse than nothing. SnowFire 17:22, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

The Wittgenstein argument needs to be reformulated, as it is from a major philosopher, plus, I don't see why it shouldn't feature. There's nothing wrong with "gendered" language; the whole thesis of language being a subconscious expression of patriarchy against women is vapid and has no place on a serious encyclopaedia. As regards the first-person, yes, it needed to be changed, and also some of the remarks were of a very colloquial tone; not ideal for an encyclopaedia. --Knucmo2 18:21, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Well, the reference to Wittgenstein's book is still in the references section. It's that the part of the argument I could understand seemed mostly to be the language argument already in the list; I'd move the reference to his name there, but not being personally familiar with Wittgenstein's work, I would not want to do violence to what he thought by merely guessing at it based on a second-hand explanation of his thoughts. To put it bluntly, I consider myself reasonably smart, and the argument just doesn't make much sense for me. I don't know if that's Wittgenstein's fault, mine, or the person who originally wrote the entry. If there's some merit to the argument, hopefully someone who IS familiar can write up something better than the jargon-heavy old objection.

As for gendered language, not to go too off-track, but there doesn't need there to be a conspiracy for sheer accidents to have subtle effects anyway. That said, the neuter in English is by default male, and I'd rather not mangle the language ("Friends, Romans, countrypeople?"), so gendered terms it is. Still, in situations where they can be avoided gracefully, I don't see why they shouldn't be. SnowFire 19:59, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

As for gendered language, there is no such thing as a sexist language. The APA may think otherwise, I do not for various reasons, one being that it substitutes aesthetic judgment for political one; "The purpose is solely ideological" and fails to understand the nature of language. Another is that it makes the false assumption that words cannot have more than one meaning. But I'm not going to get into an argument as this politically correct thesis rarely comes under challenge and causes flames of indignance from its Orwellian defenders (I have been shot down in flames in real-life debate for this; this is not to say that ad hominem attacks weakened my argument at all). As for Wittgenstein's objection, it does need to be reworded without a precise of jargon where absolutely necessary, otherwise the jargon just becomes empty with an attempt to impress --Knucmo2 23:18, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Is Solipsism Falsifiable?

To Jon Awbrey: If I understand what you say correctly, you're saying that solipsism might be unfalsifiable psychologically, but it's falsifiable logially. This doesn't seem right to me. The original article was clearly not saying that solipsism is unfalsifiable as a matter of "persuading a particular person, with a particular psychological constitution, of the contingency thereof." There are absolutely former solipsists out there who have been convinced that their beliefs were wrong. However, as a matter of logic, no, there isn't a way to falsify solipsism. To do that, we'd need to basically show something along the lines of:

• A is "solipsism is true" and B is some consequence of Solipsism
• Therefore, A->B
• However, B isn't true.
• Therefore A isn't true.

But solipsism doesn't have any consequences we can check. All it says is that your perceptions are all you have, and you will always have your perceptions- and if you lose your perceptions, you will lose your perceptive capability to notice this. Solipsism posits no neutral, outside observer to check instead. Therefore, there is no way to falsify it. We can laugh at it, but not disprove it. Heck, even if we died, went to heaven, and saw Pearly Gates and flights of Angels and so on, a hard-core solipsist could say that this was the latest vision being granted by his mind to his conscious self.

Now, if there's a legitimate debate here, I'm more than willing to have it and perhaps put it in the article eventually, but it seems fairly cut & dry to me. Feel free to say why I'm wrong. SnowFire 19:45, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

• :" Solipsism posits no neutral, outside observer to check instead." Perhaps not neutral, but otherwise quite the contrary: The way I see it, solipsism REQUIRES an outside observer, then goes ahead and says there can't be one. "Self-observation" (e.g. noting one is a solipsist, noting there's nothing else but one's own mind) requires the observer to "split off" into subject and object, the subject being (an) observer and the object (what one believes to be) oneself. A mirror cannot reflect itself! Once this subject-object split ("self-observation") occurs, there is suddenly no longer "only my mind in existence" -- now there's "me" observing (*apart from*) "my mind." Whoops. jkl_sem 20:45, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

And I might add... "Solipsism posits no neutral, outside observer to check instead. Therefore, there is no way to falsify it." Nor is there any way to truth-ify it. It cannot be refuted, perhaps. I don't think it can be asserted as true, either. Where's the outside observer to do THAT? Who's asserting, and to whom are they speaking? jkl_sem 20:54, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

JA: Let's be clear about one thing right from the start. An editor who places a statement like the one below in an article bears the fardel of proof for keeping it there:

Solipsism is logically coherent, but not falsifiable, so it is not testable by the scientific method.

JA: Power outages here — discusion to be continued when the storm passes. Jon Awbrey 20:04, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: SnowFire, the sillygism that you gave above tells me that you are working from an incorrect definition of falsifiability. It is a logical property of a proposition or a theory, equivalent to contingency or defeasibility, and not a pragmatic property, which is more correctly called testability. If X => Y and not Y, then we infer not X, This is an inference that X is necessarily false. But falsifiability is about the possibility of being false, not the necessity of being false. Jon Awbrey 20:24, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Lovely. I have to leave for a bit now as well, but a few things. I wasn't the one who put that statement in there; it's been there for some time (I believe it was added in Normxxx's major rewrite?). That said, as a reminder, this is in the first section of the article that serves as an introduction to the topic. Wordy debates on whether solipsism is falsifiable should probably not be here! If it turns out that there is something to say, then we should replace it with some weasaly "Philosophers disagree on the logical nature of solipsism, with some claiming it to be coherent yet unfalsifiable." Then we make a new section called "Solipsism and Logic" where we place the argument.

As for the burden of proof, you have a point, but I believe this to be a very base claim of solipsism. It follows almost directly from how much epistemelogical solipsism denies. Thus, nobody saw fit to add to that explanation. Anyway, I think that I proved that solipsism is unfalsifiable above. Again, if you see a problem with that, please point it out.

As for your explanation. Again, I don't see how psychology is exactly relevant to a logical issue. You mention that

To say that solipsism is unfalsifiabile is to say that it is a necessary truth, a tautology.

That's not true at all. To say something is unfalsifiable merely means that there is no way to prove the truth or falsity of the proposition. For instance, "there is an infinity whose 'size' is between aleph_null and aleph_one." This statement is provably unprovable. It's impossible to find the answer. That said, the statement still has a truth value; it's just that we'll never know if it's true or false short of divine intervention. I'm sure you can think of plenty of other examples of things that are simply impossible to know, yet can only be either true OR false.

As for your recent comment - I wrote the above before I saw it- rest assured I know something about falsifiablity. To quote from the article you linked: "Falsifiable does not mean false." I'm not saying that Solipsism is necessarily true! We agree, sort of! Saying that Solipsism is unfalsifiable very much admits the possibility of it being false. Saying solipsism is unfalsifiable is NOT a compliment.

I don't particularly want to get into a revert war, but I would humbly suggest that you or someone else either revert back to the old statement or else delete the section entirely until we can get hashed out here what the article should say. SnowFire 20:41, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Discussion of placement is another issue. I simply corrected-in-place the statement that was there. A separate heading somewhere below the introduction is probably sensible. I had no assumption about who put the previous statement there, but as the reverter of my recent amendment you became implicated in the defense of the prior statement. You may of course withdraw your support at any time. Jon Awbrey 20:54, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Well, I think the statement is reasonable, but it would hardly be the end of the world if it was removed. I'd much prefer it taken out if you disagree with it than have it replaced by your current statement, though; I don't agree with what you're saying at all. I'm less of a "you must cite every idea! No original thoughts must ever enter your head type!" than some on Wikipedia, but if you do write your own thoughts, you should be darn certain that they are either clearly true, or else reference them in a style like "some solipsists would say" whatever. Currently, you state as fact something I find a stretch even if it was prefaced by "some logicians say."

Anyway. For starters, there's the fact that logically, psychology and what people believe are utterly irrelevant. It doesn't matter if it's hard to convince people that (True And False) is False; it just is by the rules of the game. You keep on bringing up persuading people, their thought processes, and the possibility that they may be wrong. What does this have to do with anything? I don't see the relevance.

Secondly. "To say that solipsism is unfalsifiabile is to say that it is a necessary truth, a tautology." This isn't true at all, as your own linked article on falsifiability points out. Now, you noted that this might be true if you use the word "testable." I think the word falsifiable is more on point; as you yourself say, testable implies a pragmatic property, while falsifiable says "can this EVER be false logically?" Whether there are aliens on Gamma Hydronis 154 might be untestable currently, but it's certainly falsifiable. On the other hand, the existence of certain entities outside the universe that have no impact upon the universe might well be unfalsifiable, because while it might be true, there's no way to check (at least for people stuck in this universe, which would be all living people).

Lastly, the bit about picking the worst possible case seems to be a straw man. Who's used that to say that solipsism is unfalsifiable? I certainly didn't read that into the previous statement. You'll have to be more clear as to what you're getting at.

In short: The old statement said that the truth of solipsism is unknowable. If you disagree with the fact that that's what it said, then we can try and communicate that intent better in a new sentence. If you disagree with that fact, then can you propose a way to determine the truth of solipsism? SnowFire 02:22, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: First off, we agree that psychological arguments are irrelevant. That is just my point. All of the arguments that I've seen for the claim "Solipsism is unfalsifiable" are based on psychological arguments and betray a confusion of — whatever you want to call them — pragmatic, psychological, or rhetorical arguments with logical arguments. But when someone introduces a psychological argument, you have to meet it on those grounds and try to explain how it differs from a logical argument.

JA: Second off, the old statement said "Solipsism is logically coherent, but not falsifiable, so it is not testable by the scientific method". There was nothing about "unknowable", whatever that means, so let's stick to one claim at a time. Terms like "logically coherent" and "falsfiable" do have definitions in logic. Unknowable? — Who knows? Jon Awbrey 02:36, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Third off, unfalsifiable is not the same as unprovable or undecidable. Those terms also have definitions in logic and they are not the same concept as unfalsifiable. The typical indefeasible is really just a tautology whose syntactic form makes it difficult to recognize it as a tautology. Many strings of characters are simply not meaningful enough to qualify as a proposition that can be judged true or false. But the name for that is "meaningless", not "unfalsifiable". Jon Awbrey 02:44, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: By way of reducing excessive subtext in the article, I'm moving the following editorial comment to the talk page for discussion. Jon Awbrey 04:44, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

I happen to believe that logic is nothing more than a formal language, like mathematics, and as such is a pure creation of the human mind according to a few simple axioms. Correspondence to the physical world is the result of human psychology, not an aspect of reality!

Moreover, the metaphysical solipsist maintains that it is logically possible that only he exists. This supposition does not imply a contradiction nor an absurdity. I know of no satisfactory argument that shows that solipsism implies a logical contradition or some kind of logical absurdity. Therefore, it is logically coherent. As no (satisfactory) physical test of the proposition can be constructed, it is not falsifiable in the popperian sense.

>I am pretty sure it is not a tautology, but many statements that cannot be falsified have the strong flavor of one, even though they clearly may be false, if that has any meaning for such a statement. They can have no empirical meaning!

⇒ _normxxx| ^{<font talk} ⇒ [Special:Emailuser/Normxxx|email]] 04:50, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Normxxx, in collating various arguments pro & con the falsifiability of solipsism, I tried to interpret what you intended by the following remark appended to the line about tautology, but I'm not sure I was successful in figuring out what you meant by it. Jon Awbrey 05:08, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

But of course, it seems to be, as one can have no direct consciousness of any other mind but his own.

As you can see from my addition above, you got my message! Thanks! I would just as soon kill the argument as between the logical and psychological aspects of the question, at least in this place— it might fit OK below, with the other arguments pro and con.⇒ _normxxx| ^talk ⇒ email 05:55, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

To Jon Awbey: I still don't see what you're saying. I mean, I don't want to be rude, but you're grasping at tiny irrelevancies while ignoring my main point. You say:

Third off, unfalsifiable is not the same as unprovable or undecidable. Those terms also have definitions in logic and they are not the same concept as unfalsifiable.

...and so on. So, what is unfalsifiable? Humor me, here. It seems obvious to me that we're working off different definitions, but you haven't said what yours is! I've been trying to make it clear what version I'm using, but you instead object when I use not "logically defined" words. As I've said before, I'm using the definition from the first sentence of the falsifiabilty page-

In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are roughly equivalent terms referring to the property of empirical statements that they must admit of logical counterexamples.

By that definition, if you want to say solipsism is not falsfiable, you need to at least propose some kind of empirical counterexample to solipsism- which I asked you for before. But this isn't addressed at all in your addition to the article, currently.

Lastly, you still address "psychological" arguments that I have never seen made in the article ("I'm insane, therefore solipsism is correct?"), and you claim that they "betray a confusion of — whatever you want to call them — pragmatic, psychological, or rhetorical arguments with logical arguments." Well, fine, enlighten me. Why was my previous argument not logical? What are these phantom psychological arguments you are addressing?

Anyway. I tentatively agree with Normxxx that this should probably be under objections, depending on what you're trying to say. SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Questions about solipsism

JA: By way of trying to proceed incrementally but not cyclically, let's see we if we can estblish a series of base camps that proceed toward the con-summit article.

Definition of solipsism

JA: Question 1. What is the definition of the solipsistic (hypo)thesis, or "solipsism" for short? It is simply not clear at this point that we have (1) a single definition, (2) any coherent definition, (3) any consistent definition, (4) any definition that has its place in the context of an explicit theory of the sort from which any definite conclusions can be drawn. Lacking that fourfold root, I do not see how the article can become anything more than a motley budget of "Urbane Legends About Solipsism" (ULAS). Jon Awbrey 14:48, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Definition of contingent, defeasible, falsifiable

JA: Re:

To Jon Awbrey: I still don't see what you're saying. I mean, I don't want to be rude, but you're grasping at tiny irrelevancies while ignoring my main point. You say:

Third off, unfalsifiable is not the same as unprovable or undecidable. Those terms also have definitions in logic and they are not the same concept as unfalsifiable.

...and so on. So, what is unfalsifiable? Humor me, here. It seems obvious to me that we're working off different definitions, but you haven't said what yours is! I've been trying to make it clear what version I'm using, but you instead object when I use not "logically defined" words. As I've said before, I'm using the definition from the first sentence of the falsifiabilty page-

In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are roughly equivalent terms referring to the property of empirical statements that they must admit of logical counterexamples.

By that definition, if you want to say solipsism is not falsfiable, you need to at least propose some kind of empirical counterexample to solipsism - which I asked you for before. But this isn't addressed at all in your addition to the article, currently. SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: SnowFire, you seem to be reading the Falsifiability intro in a way that seems counter to its intention, which may not be your fault, but simply feedback that it needs to be written more clearly. That article was worked over for quite a long time by a host of editors, of which I was just one, so naturally I blame my co-editors for any defects that remain.

JA: At any rate, the picture I have in my head, which I was too lazy to draw there, is a venn diagram like this:

o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` U ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` ` o-------------o ` o-------------o ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\`/` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/`\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` `P` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` `Q` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\`/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/`\` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` ` o-------------o ` o-------------o ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` x ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o

JA: Let's say that P is the proposition we're targeting. Then all it means for P to be falsifiable is that there exists some counterexample to P, say, the point x in the lower left corner of the universe of discourse U. Jon Awbrey 04:28, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Okay. I think I may see the problem. First off, I misstated myself above. I do not need an actual empirical counterexample (although that would certainly work! It's just stronger than required), I want an empirical test whose result may provide a counterexample.

See, your test above works for something like "all crows are black." You plot every crow in the universe, and if any pop up in ~P, then it's false. Otherwise it's true. However, the general point is that there is some method of determining where that data point falls (look at the crow). That means that by my definition, it is falsifiable. If I go paint a crow white or otherwise find a white crow, I can falsify the statement.

I'm talking about propositions whose truth value cannot be determined. There is no test. Yes, it's on your Venn diagram somewhere. But we simply cannot tell where for sure. My picture would be one from Godel, Escher, Bach showing that in logical systems of sufficient power, there are provable truths, unprovable truths, unprovable falsehoods, and provable falsehoods, all intertwining. I'm thinking of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem by this; there are some things that we might in fact know are true that are nevertheless unprovable from within the system.

Let me try a physics-related example. You wake up one day, but you're in a small unknown room with no windows. You find a note saying that you've been kidnapped by aliens, and are either sitting in a locked room on Earth, or accelerating through space at 9.8 meters per second squared. The walls are perfect and let no radio waves, interstellar radiation, etc. in. If you can succesfully figure out where you are without leaving the room, you can go free! Otherwise, the Earth gets it, or your significant other gets kidnapped, or something bad. Suppose the aliens have kindly also given you whatever scientific measuring devices you like, and maybe kidnapped a few of the world's best scientists to help. How do you figure out the answer?

If you've familiar with your Einstein, you'll know that the answer is "flip a coin."* There is no difference between gravity and acceleration; they are exactly alike in measurement. There simply is no test that can be done. Nevertheless, one of these cases has to be true; there is a truth value.

Now, let me put it to you this way. What is your preferred term for this concept, unprovability? Whatever it is, that's what the sentence meant by "falsifiability." I think falsifiability works as a word too, but if you have a better one, feel free to suggest it.

* (Okay, if you had ridiculously godlike instruments, you might theoretically be able to detect a vague difference across the room via the curvature of the Earth, assuming the Earth is a perfect sphere. But details.) SnowFire 21:26, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

I don't want to be rude, but I think it might be helpful here to state our problem bluntly: Jon Awbrey clearly does not understand what the word "falsifiable" means in philosophy, and is adamant about his misconception. Thank you, Snowfire, for your valiant and patient attempts to get the idea across. Let me see if I can help:

A proposition is falsifiable if one can conceive of an empirical test (experiment) such that at least one possible outcome of that test would prove the proposition wrong. It does not mean, as JA seems to believe, that the proposition is necessarily true, even less that it is a tautology. For example, the statement

The universe is full of pink three-legged elephants, which do not interact with the rest of the universe in any way and never have.

is unfalsifiable: no experiment could disprove it, since the pink elephants by definition do not interact with anything else and therefore could not affect any possible experiment in any way. Being unfalsifiable does not make it true, or even plausible, and certainly not self-evident or tautological. Conversely, statements may be simultaneously falsifiable and true. For example, let's say for the sake of argument that we all agree that the statement

If you drop an apple in mid-air, it will always fall down.

is true (assuming that we are on Earth, standing still, no wind, etc.). The statement is also falsifiable, however: observing a single apple falling upward would provide a counterexample and prove the statement wrong. Even though nobody has observed any upward-falling apple, falling upward is still a possible outcome of the apple-dropping experiment. Popper considered only falsifiable propositions to be scientific. (If you still doubt that this is the meaning of falsifiability in Popper's sense, please read any book or webpage about Popper.)

I will clean up the "Is solipsism falsifiable" section. - Mglg 21:35, 15 June 2006 (UTC)

Logical argument versus psychological argument

JA: Re:

Lastly, you still address "psychological" arguments that I have never seen made in the article ("I'm insane, therefore solipsism is correct?"), and you claim that they "betray a confusion of — whatever you want to call them — pragmatic, psychological, or rhetorical arguments with logical arguments." Well, fine, enlighten me. Why was my previous argument not logical? What are these phantom psychological arguments you are addressing? SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Psychological treatments of solipsism

JA: Here are some examples of psychological definitions of solipsism, psychological reasoning about solipsism, and psychological arguments that solipsism is unfalsifiable. Jon Awbrey 01:54, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

• Solipsism is also commonly understood to encompass the metaphysical belief that only one's self exists, and that "existence" just means being a part of one's own mental states — all objects, people, etc. that one experiences are merely parts of one's own mind.

That's a definition of solipsism, at least a strong form of solipsism distinct from the mere epistemeological version. It has absolutely nothing to do with psychology, or a "psychological definition" (?? What is a psychological definition in philosophy, anyway?). To restate it: "I am all that exists. Everything else is a figment of my imagination." The comment on mental states is merely impressing that all "reality" is nothing more than perceptions coming from inside my head. This is a question of the true nature of reality, not of psychology. -(SnowFire, although not while logged in.) 138.89.233.213 03:21, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: That is one of many statements that are commonly presented as a "definition" of solipsism. Whether it is a real definition is another question, but whatever it is, it is a statement that invokes concepts of "mental states" and "mind", so it's psychological premiss. Any argument that is based on it will be to that degree a psychological argument. That is what the word "psychological" means. In contrast, a statement about what is inside a person's head would be an anatomical statement. Jon Awbrey 03:36, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Yet another example:

• I am all that exists. Everything else is a figment of my imagination.

JA: Imagination is a psychological concept. So the proposed re-statement is yet another psychological statement about solipsism. Jon Awbrey 03:42, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

The problem is that this is confusing the helpful "try and visualize it this way" explanation of solipsism to be a claim of solipsism. By your current logic, you are out-solipsiszing solipsism, and everything in all human knowledge is psychological, because it involves a human mind somehow. This doesn't seem to be a helpful definition of psychological to me. I see psychological as meaning roughly "as relates to the thoughts and actions of humans."

I will try and put things more formally. When we construct the world logically, psychology is a very high-order concept. We need to start with Descartes first, and if we use psychology to prop up our initial statements, we're doomed. So. What do we have to start with? We have our perceptions and our thoughts. This is not up for debate; if you want to debate whether you're actually thinking now, that's fine, but it's not a question solipsism (or most of philosophy) bothers asking. This is an axiom of the system. We have perceptions and thoughts.

Now, what can we do with them? Realists might deduce scientific laws; theists might find God. The epistemelogical solipsist would say "nothing." The existence of these perceptions are the only things we can know for sure. There is no necessary casual link between our perceptions and anything else- the fact that it appears to correspond to some "reality" is cute, but not provable.

The metaphysical solipsist says that not only is there no provable connection between our perceptions and some outside source, but it unilaterally states that there is no connection. There's no proof for this, but lots of philosophical ideas are just "I think this sounds right." In other words, for the epistemelogical solipsist, there is P (perceptions) and it is inside U (the universe). It suggests that anything in U that "crosses over" into P cannot be trusted, because the Universe might be lying about its true nature. For the metaphysical solipsist, P is really all that exists inside U. Since P can't "look outside" of P to see if there's anything else, why not define U to merely be the current box that's P? If that really was the case, there's no way to tell the difference. How can you show the existence of something outside of P when all you can see is P?

Let's put this mathematically. I control U, which may contain some amount of numbers and I can change at any time. You can see the contents of P, which contains 3 numbers at maximum and picks 3 items from U randomly. Can you determine the contents of U (intersect) ~P, that is everything in U not in P? Even if every time you adjust P, you only see 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and {2, 3, 4} is currently in P; can you say that U (intersect) ~P is {1, 5}? No, you can't, because I might have added 6 since then. Heck, I might have taken both 1 and 5 away. Maybe there were only 3 numbers in U the entire time, and I always removed the numbers not currently under observation. Scientists would say that after enough tests, {1, 5} seem a good inductive guess, because I don't seem to be a whimsical God constantly screwing with U. Epistemelogical solipsists merely say "we can't know." Metaphysical solipsists make the logic jump that because it could have been the "remove everything not in P every time" case, therefore that is the case.

All the comments about "it's all in my imagination" is just trying to make the above easier to comprehend for human brains, as well as proffer a possible explanation for what the existence of only perceptions means. SnowFire 15:32, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

Location, location, location

JA: Re:

Anyway. I tentatively agree with Normxxx that this should probably be under objections, depending on what you're trying to say. SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Descartes drops back ... and drops the ball

JA: I have read the following statement from the introduction numerous times now and cannot figure out what it's supposed to be saying. So I'm moving it here for re-examination. Can anybody clarify its intent or rewrite it so that it makes sense? Gratia in futuro, Jon Awbrey 02:05, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

But, in introducing methodological doubt (via Cogito ergo sum) into philosophy, Descartes created the backdrop against which modern interpretations of solipsism subsequently developed and were made to seem, if not plausible, at least irrefutable.

I was going to say that I didn't think that the meaning of that could be recovered and then I discovered the source! The only thing that seems to have been added is the nonsense about "via cogito ergo sum" — "scripto ergo aporias". ^iggy_talk 03:59, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Do arguments against solipsism also apply to a single god who was all there was at some point?

if one thinks of a being -the sole being- existing all alone, nothing to know, no one to learn from nothing to learn... could he have come up with morality and language and all the other things you deny to a solipsist?Jiohdi 20:35, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

the holy trinity of father = source = true nature = the Generator Of Dreams [G.O.D.] the son or the dreamer who actually expeirences the dream and the dream itself (^_^) Jiohdi 20:39, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

Solipsism: "an extreme form of skepticism" or "belief"?

Well, it seams to me that at the very beginning the article falls into the little contradiction. How can solipsism be "an extreme form of skepticism" if, epistemologically, it's a "belief that one's self is the only thing that can be known with certainty" and metaphysically it's a "belief that only one's self exists"?

It's not a contradiction; it's just two different ways the term is used, one epistemologically and one metaphysically. If you use it in the former sense, you go one way, and if you use it in the latter you go another. Unended 06:49, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

You didn't get my point. I was not trying to stress the difference between the epistemology and metaphysics (that's beyond my knowledge anyway :) ) but the contradiction in saying that the "extreme form of skepticism" is a "belief". To my knowledge skepticism should be lack of belief. Let alone an extreme one... :)

Not really. Skepticism is a philosophy, a way of finding knowledge that questions assumptions and takes little for granted; it is not an end. It's entirely possible to be a skeptic and nevertheless believe in reality, science, UFOs, psychic powers, and whatever, just so long as you have proved to your satisfaction that this belief is rational, and maintain a skeptical reserve that you might be wrong. Certainly some skeptics deny everything, but it's hardly required, and it's possible to "lack belief" but do so under grounds a skeptic would deride. SnowFire 16:28, 6 June 2006 (UTC)

Still, I would avoid using the term "belief" with the skepticist point of view. You could say that a skeptic would take something as, say, "probable" if sufficiently proved. The term "belief" is related to the term "faith" that completely opose sceptic thinking. Solipsism can never be proved as the true point of view and therefore can never be taken as "probable" even if "posible" and can never be a true skeptic's weltanschau. :) Moreover, a slightest posibility of solipsism being untrue would make it ethically questionable point of view and therefore should be rejected untill completely proved. Since it can never be proved entirely, nobody can seriously act from the solipsist point ov view, just as nobody realy acts as a true believer in whatever god even if one claims to be, because it's so detached from everyday's reality. So to conclude, it is a bit malicious to conect solipsist fantasy and guessing with a noble skeptic thought, and it should be enough to say that a solipsism is a kind of belief in blah blah...

Skepticism involves a strong belief that reality can be proven, when it fact the only way to prove it is using itself as a proof. This requires a very strong faith in itself, so therefore solipsism would be a natural consequence of extreme skepticism. If you are skeptic enough, nothing can be proven good enough and therefore the conclusion would be that nothing exists. Oh, and to the people above who have claimed to solipsists, you are not, I am. :-)

Well, I am not a philosopher, but if anything, I really love logic and the way it draws conclusions. Your comment has couple of contradictory points. First, "very strong faith in itself" does not exclude the faith in other personalities, or other things as well, so you can not draw the conclusion that solipsism is a consequence of the faith in oneself. Second, if nothing can be proven good enough that doesn't mean that nothing exists – it just means that nothing can be proven good enough. But, I'm wondering what you meant by "very strong faith in itself "? Do you think that Descartes' bases of all the truth (cogito ergo...) is just a strong faith?

There are clearly two quite different meanings of the term solipsism:

• one philosophical position that nothing outside of ones own experience can be known with certainty even to exist (a position which the brain in a vat though experiement pretty much proves, IMHO), and
• one belief that nothing except ones own experience does in fact exist.

The former (the "epistemological" usage) is the extreme form of skepticism, while the latter (the "metaphysical" usage) is the belief. The opening sentences could and should be much clearer about this distinction. I'll give it a shot. - Mglg 02:24, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

• ::Does solipsism just assume that one's own experience can be known with certainty to exist? There's actually no basis for such an assumption. Suppose all experience is illusory, and there is only the void? As far as beliefs vs. philosophical positions, I fail to see the difference (my failure is probably that I'm not a philosopher). One appears to be a position amenable to change, the other a position one has decided to cling to for dear life. So? jkl_sem 15:55, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

What you say here is true Mglg, by my understanding, except for the highly questionable assertion about an extreme form of skepticism. Can't cite it right now and don't want to impose too much on the article. The editors will get it right ultimately, and it'll tend to stick once properly explained. Appreciate seeing your points about it. Any citations handy for the defs you just gave? ... Kenosis 02:55, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

No academic citations, sorry, though for what it's worth the American Heritage Dictionary has: 1. The theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified; 2. The theory or view that the self is the only reality. I just tried to clear up the apparent contradiction the anonymous user above pointed out. I don't myself feel strongly about the "skepticism" statement, I just preserved it since it had been there earlier and did seem to make sense now, once it was made clear that it referred only to the epistemological usage. Would you be happier if I change it to say "also called external world skepticism" which is the term used in the article Philosophical skepticism for the same position? My question is about is the "egoism" statement -- is epistemological solipsism really a valid meaning of "egoism"? Mglg 06:44, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

Thanks Mglg. It'll ultimately get sorted out, I expect. ... Kenosis 06:24, 17 June 2006 (UTC)

Guys, if you continue like this you'll make me cry. :) No way can you mix skepticism and belief in one word even if you call it "epistemological and metaphysical". It clearly deteriorates the value of the skeptical thought. Please, make up your mind. Maybe of some help could be that the "Internet encyclopedia of philosophy" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/solipsis.htm) says neither but: "For the solipsist, it is not merely the case that he believes that his thoughts, experiences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, the only thoughts, experiences, and emotions. Rather, the solipsist can attach no meaning to the supposition that there could be thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than his own. In short, the true solipsist understands the word "pain," for example, to mean "my pain." He cannot accordingly conceive how this word is to be applied in any sense other than this exclusively egocentric one." It is therefore merely mater of choice in attitude towards the exterior of oneself that goes as follows: if senses are not mine then they are no senses at all and therefore I don't care. The alternative could be: if senses are not mine than I can not know if there are senses at all, but then again there is a possibility so I better take care. Since not knowing can not be an excuse for not taking care, it's just an attitude of poor philosophical value. Lack of empathy is sometimes considered as a psychological disorder (autism...) and to make it a deliberate choice is inexcusable. Please, don't call it skepticism of any kind.

Questions about Solipsism section

Some hopefully uncontroversial minor clean-up changes in the last edit, but of note is deleting the "Questions about Solipsim" part near the beginning. It was not well-written and not clear to users without a large philosophical jargon background, which isn't conducive to what Wikipedia is. If Jon Awbey or another person wants to fix that section to be generally accessible, that'd be fine, of course. However, the debate on that seemed to lose steam months ago, and I was waiting to make any changes before consensus could be achieved. Since the debate was stalled, I decided to be WP:BOLD instead.

I did not put back the original statement that caused the brouhaha; for reference,

Solipsism is logically coherent, but not falsifiable, so it is not testable by the scientific method.

I think this still deserves a spot in the article; it was in the old Questions section as "unfalsifiable by the standard of Karl Popper," which I think is silly because that is the standard, basically. A minor note, but perhaps a qualification would work; or perhaps it could be moved to the new Metaphysical solipsism article. SnowFire 17:55, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Edit: Jon Awbey, I see you're back. I wish you wouldn't insist your side was correct, since you edited over my additions extremely aggressively before as well, but fine. I don't want an edit war, but let's resume the debate then as to what exactly you mean. I ran your section past three very smart, college-educated people and we couldn't figure out for sure what exactly you were saying. You'll note that's what I was complaining about above as well. I think that I disagree with your POV, but even if I do, that's not the reason for the deletion; it's because I'm still not even sure what you're saying. There HAS to be a better way to phrase this. SnowFire 17:59, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

JA: What? Just 'cause you think I wasn't paying attention, you think you can sneak your own POV back in? I don't see why posing the questions as questions somehow constitutes a more aggressive insistence on personal correctness than the attempt to hide the fact that there is any question at all. Jon Awbrey 18:52, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

No. Remember our debate up above? I disagreed with your additions then, but being a good Wikipedian, I wanted to hash out our disagreement on the talk page rather than have an edit war. You stopped posting to the debate. I waited two months to see if you would regain interest, and the debate was still stalled, and I still disagreed. So I edited the article. The fact that I waited and at least tried to gain consensus before changing does not imply that I am somehow being evil! You had a very long time to reply, even to say "You're wrong, go away."

Of course deletion isn't the best option, but it's better than having a badly written and confusing piece remain in the article. I would have tried rewriting it myself, but as you can tell from up above, I'm not even sure what the point is. It would be impossible to do justice to whatever was being said if I wasn't sure on the meaning! That's why I was trying to pester you above to figure out what you meant precisely.

Let me rehash again that POV has nothing to do with it. I have no problem whatsoever with opinions different than my own being in the article (so long as they are not presented as fact, natch). However, as a writer of the English language, I can assure you that the current section needs work from, if nothing else, a stylistic perspective. It is not clear to non-philosophers what the heck it's trying to say. SnowFire 19:11, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Snowfire, before you and JA pull out the fists, please note that the "Is solipsism falsifiable?" section, at the time you deleted it, was heavily rewritten by me, so please don't blame JA for my unclarity. If you read my note at the bottom of "Definition of contingent, defeasible, falsifiable" above on this talk page I think you will see that I am on your side. In the falsifiability paragraph I was, perhaps clumsily, trying to make a point that I consider obvious yet conceptually interesting: Since even a solipsist accepts that perceptions consitute proof of existence (if not existence of oneself, then at least existence of the perceptions), therefore every other person than the solipsist has proof that something outside the solipsist does exist, namely their own perceptions. Indeed, that proof is of a form that the solipsist would find acceptable (since he accepts his own existence on similar grounds), if it could only be communicated to him, which it can't. If you still don't see what I mean, please explain what is confusing and let's converge on a way to reformulate it.

I left the reference to Popper, which you deem silly, in the section for two reasons: (1) As far as I could tell, the disagreement between JA and you seemed to stem from his giving the word "unfalsifiable" a different meaning than you and I do: he seems to mean something like so tautologically true that it cannot be false, while you and I (and Popper, and all philosophers of science that I know of) mean something like cannot be proven false by any possible outcome of any conceivable experiment. The first defines a truism, the second a scientifically meaningless statement. This conflict, being about a word, could thus be eliminated peacefully by referring to a precise meaning of that word in the article. Unfortunately the falsifiability article in its present state offers less than crystalline clarity on the matter, so I thought referring to Popper would be the best thing to do at the moment. (2) Referring to a source seems generally preferable to the OR-smelling habit, which we all suffer from, of stating unsourced "facts". I do see that referring to Popper is uninformative to the great majority of readers who don't know his work, so the (his) meaning of "falsifiable" needs to be explained in the article, with Popper's role being only to differentiate this meaning of the word from possible other meanings (which apparently exist, judging from JA's opinion).

I do agree with you that the "Is solipsism one or many?" section was deletable. All it communicated was "Not everybody agrees on the exact definition of solipsism" which is a truism about any concept, and empty unless followed by a list of differing meanings. Furthermore, in its present form the introduction does have exactly that structure: a list of two different meanings of solipsism, so it seems extra pointless to state again that there is more than one meaning, let alone dedicate a section to that message. - Mglg 20:36, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Actually, let me apologize. I will admit to remembering the Solipsism debate only recently and only semi-skimming the section to see that it was still there; I was mostly looking at the talk section. And as you point out, the initial "is solipsism one or many" section is still quite deletable. Additionally, when I brought in the outside observers was only around the time of JA's initial edits. Now that I read it and look at the edit history, I see that you did indeed improve the section greatly. It makes sense. Your point is, as you say, interesting yet obvious in its own way. My preference would be to perhaps put it lower in the article, and not right in the beginning, but it does seem keepable.

As for Popper, that does seem a fair compromise, although I would have perhaps written it more aggressively.

I happen to agree that the initial section on differing definitions of solipsism is eminently deletable, as noted above.

It seems I jumped the gun. Thanks for the clarification, and anyone else have thoughts on the "Is Solipsism one or Many" section? SnowFire 20:45, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, do you mean (with your second-to-last paragraph) that the separation of the two concepts in the introduction is also deletable? That I don't agree with. Currently there are two entirely different ideas being discussed in the article, and the introduction separates them (the rest of the article could do be better job of keeping them separated, but that is a different matter). One meaning is the position that any individual cannot be absolutely certain about anything except his or her current perceptions; the other is a worldview that nothing outside of the self does actually exist. The first meaning borders on the obvious and has IMHO been proven by the Brain in a vat thought experiment. The second meaning is far less plausible and borders on insanity. Various encyclopedias etc. seem to indicate that both these concepts have been referred to as solipsism. It would be highly confusing for Wikipedia to not separate them, if they are indeed both valid meanings of the word. If they are not, we should still separate them, along the lines of "The word solipsism is sometimes also used to refer to the...; this concept is more accurately called ..." though that particular formulation could be a POV can of worms, creating nasty debate about which meanings are "accurate". - Mglg 21:23, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

No, that's not what I meant; the introduction is fine (and, in an unrelated note, agree with your thoughts about the tenability of the two options- the first is timid yet "obvious," the second requires.... a significant leap of faith). I meant specifically the "Is Solipsism One or Many" section which, as you say, is a truism; of course people differ on what solipsism is, and this is already covered in the intro. SnowFire 21:33, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Metaphysical solipsism broken out as article

I note that Jon Awbrey recently created a new article Metaphysical solipsism for one of the two meanings of solipsism discussed in the Solipsism article. The other meaning has no separate article (yet). It seems that there are two logical paths: (A) delete the new Metaphysical solipsism article as a POV fork, or (B) Turn the Solipsism page into a disambiguation page, create a new Epistemological solipsism page, split the contents of the current Solipsism article to the two new pages and merge appropriately with the existing material on Metaphysical solipsism. Comments? - Mglg 20:48, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Reference to Samsara inaccurate

I believe that the reference to samsara is inaccurate here:

Pantheism While solipsism is not generally compatible with traditional views of God, it is somewhat related to Pantheism, the belief that everything is God and part of God. The difference is usually a matter of focus; the pantheist would tend to be identify themselves with being a part of everything in reality, which is actually all God beneath the surface. For instance, many ancient Indian philosophies advocate the notion that all matter (and thus humans) is subtly interconnected not only to our immediate surroundings, but to everything in the universe; that all we can perceive is a kind of vision, Samsara. The solipsist, however, would be more likely to put themselves squarely in the center as the only item of reality, with all other beings in reality illusions. It could be said to be another naming dispute; "The Universe" / "God" for the pantheist is "My Unconscious Mind" / "Me" for the solipsist.

Samsara should be replaced with Maya here, as this is the state of illusion referred to in Hinduism. It is the realization that all perceptions are illusion, or the realization of maya, that is the release from samsara, or cycle of reincarnations. Samsara is used accurately later in the article.

Agreed on maya, though Dharmic thought can also be considered panentheistic. But that; again, is a matter of focus! Khirad 07:55, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

Is solipsism one or many?

For your consideration.

Before adding this to the main page and having it immediately yanked, I would prefer to get a consensus opinion and take care of any editing here on the talk page first.

Regarding: "This section is a stub. You can help by adding to it."

"Is solipsism one or many? Philosophical disputes about the character and the consequences of solipsism hinge on the questions of (1) whether there is anything approaching a rigorous definition of solipsism, (2) whether a unique definition can be singled out as the one and only proper definition, or (3) whether there are as many definitions of solipsism as there are solipsists."

(1): Solipsism, at its essence, states the only truth about Reality any Observer can have knowledge of is that truth which is perceived by that Observer.

(2): All truth is entirely perceived truth.

(3): Solipsism makes no distinction between itself and any other perception or philosophy, and acknowledges every Observer (if there are any others) will view Reality from their own point of view and is prejudiced by their education. Therefore no two observers will ever agree on everything; including what they perceive as the true meaning of solipsism.

cckeiser 03:14, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

Hmph. Hello again, cckeiser. To be perfectly honest, I would be in favor of removing that paragraph entirely as a truism, as noted above in older talk comments; of course people differ on what exactly they think solipsism is, just like every other belief in the world. As for your possible expansions... I would propose that to some degree (2), and especially (3), while consistent with what I read of your ideas, are not necessarily consistent with solipsism. Notably, metaphysical solipsism (as opposed to your poly-soilipsism, which seems to be radical relativism) makes the strong claim that there are no other observers, rendering your point moot. SnowFire 20:26, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

Greetings once again “SnowFire,”

…not necessarily consistent with solipsism.'! Of course it is. It’s pure Solipsism.

The essence of any solipsistic philosophy is ‘All truth is entirely perceived truth.’ You can’t have solipsism without it, and it doesn’t matter if the Observer is one or many.

And actually your critique is entirely consistent with (3).

As for “Metaphysical” solipsism, you got it almost right. The Metaphysical solipsist would say since my mind is ""the only mind I can be certain exists, and if I wish to base my beliefs on only that which I can be certain of, and I cannot prove any other mind actually exists, I must proceed as if my mind is the only mind. In my perceptions of Reality it does not matter if any other mind exists or not, because I can only know the truth that I myself perceive.

It is a perfectly logical and necessary assumption if one is searching for absolute truth.

cckeiser 02:26, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

Is solipsism falsifiable?

When propositions 1, 2, and 3 are taken together Solipsism is un-falsifiable!

cckeiser 01:43, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

Regarding the Realism vs. solipsism objection paragraph

Could it be valid to say that rather than there simply be no meaningful difference between a reality and a large subconscious mind, that it is actually PREFERABLE to give the source of one's experience the title of an external reality due to the fact that there are reasons for the specific nature of the contents of our experiences, corresponding to scientific laws, which depend on the existence of real things (atoms, molecules light, brains etc) wheras with some mysterious "subconscious mind", all relations between experiences would be arbitrary rather than specific? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Uni student2003 (talk • contribs) 07:24, 19 December 2006 (UTC).

philoconfusion:

Please help to distinguish, as colloquially as feasible, solipsism versus existentialism.

Thank You.

[[ hopiakuta | [[ [[%c2%a1]] [[%c2%bf]] [[ %7e%7e%7e%7e ]] -]] 22:46, 26 December 2006 (UTC)

Private language

Surely some discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein's private language argument is needed?1Z 18:17, 14 January 2007 (UTC)

I have put in a bit, what do you think? Ecurbian 13:30, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

I'm not sure this section is adequate. It seems to be very biased. In fact, upon skimming over it, the entire article seems to be needing work. Ah, just my two cents. I'm too lazy to write anything better. --137.195.250.2 (talk) 16:45, 23 October 2008 (UTC)

On its own terms

I have just made an edit to the summary explanation of solipsism near the top of the page. I am not totally happy with it, but I stand by the basic thrust. The key thing is that I felt from reading through that solipsism was not being explained in its own terms, which seemed like the wrong mood for an objective article. Sections of the article can then discuss how other philosphies react to solipsism. It is possible that some of the new material should be further down (under methodological solipsism for example), but my own position is that what I have written is central to solipsism "on its own terms", and I would like to change the header material that states "Assuming it is untrue, solipsism is a source of mental stress in individuals, inducing dissociative mental states". It is strongly biased: one could equally well say, christianity -- the philosophical idea that there exists an all powerfull being who cares about humanity, and interacts with it through historical actions, assuming it is untrue, it is a source of mental distress and leads to psychotic mind states". The suggestion that the page be merged with that of a mental disorder is effectively the (unjustified) assertion that you have to be mad to be a solipsist.

The reason I did not edit that is because I was not sure how to .. help ?

Sorry, if this edit seems pushy, my heart is pure :) we seemed to be vacilating.

Ecurbian 10:17, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

Merge with metaphysical solipsism?

Metaphysical solipsism is only a paragraph long, why is it on its own page? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Peterdjones (talk • contribs) 19:52, 18 February 2007 (UTC).

Merge with solipsism syndrome

I have removed the discussion tag because no one is discussing it, and the suggestion seem spurious. Ecurbian 13:38, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

Attribue argument

So as not to have the page read like a usenet debate, I have removed a counterargument that does not address the original point.

"This objection begs the question. If perception is defined to require an external entity with independent attributes, then it is not clear that what the agent experiences is a perception. Alternatively, if we define what the agent experiences to be perception, then it is not clear that it requires an external entity with independent attributes".

This counterargument misses the point. The solipsist has to admit that there is at least one entity that is not a perception; the entity that is having perceptions. The objection is an argument against the claim that "all is perception", not for the claim that there are external objects.("thus contradicting the solipsist premise that only perception exists.") 1Z 15:39, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

"If the mental states of the solipsist are the only things that exist, making up the fabric of the universe, then that universe operates according to the laws of those mental states. There is no more requirement for machinery to run the thought processes than there is for extra machinery to, for example, run the particles in a classical mechanics universe, or to simulate the bending of space in a relativistic one"

Similar problem. The objection is not that mental machinery is required, the objection is that there is something other than perception going on.1Z 15:58, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

I disagree completely, see also my edit to your second objection below. But, I think there is a strong sense in which there is only one point on which we are disagreeing, something to do with the nature of what is meant by mental states. In the materialist point of view we have thoughts and perceptions that are distinguished for essentially materialist reasons -- perceptions come from outside. In the solipsistic point of view, this distinction is not made, I perceive that 1+1=2, I perceive a red colour. If the problem is with the semantics of the word "perceive" we can use some other word. The point is that the objection asserts the existence of perceptions as defined in a materialist world, and then uses this as evidence against solispism which denies the existence of such things. What we have here is not an argument against solipsnism, but a restatement of the materialist point of view. This is a quibble over the semantics of the word "perception", not a refutation of the basic logic.

Ecurbian 13:32, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Thoughts and perceptions can be phenomenally distinguished. You don't need the materialistic distinction, although it coincides -- for uncoincidental reason -- with the pheomenology.

"I perceive that 1+1=2, I perceive a red colour."

Treating evey mental event as a perception still does not answer the arguemtn as statd. That perception must be an attribute of something.

"If the problem is with the semantics of the word "perceive" we can use some other word."

It is not enough to say you can, you need to do so, to come up with an alternative that does no meet with the same objection. If you think the "logic" can be separated from the language, you need to show how (for isntance, by using P's and Q's formalisation), not just declare that it is possible. 1Z 13:50, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Egoism objection

So as not to have the page read like a usenet debate, I have removed another counterargument that does not address the original point.

"2) The common sense approach: The solipsist position that only one's personal perception exists requires one to hold that all the creations of which one is aware were created within one's own perceptual functioning".

"This objection essentially suggests that to be a solipsist means to have an ego so large as to be socially unacceptable".

What the objection actually says is that solipsism is opposed to common-sense, not that it is socially unacceptable. Solipsists are willing to accept evidence about the indirectness of perception, but they ignore evidence that no single person is smart enough to invent every scientific theory, compose every piece of music, etc, etc.1Z 15:47, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

What the objection to the objection actually says ... is that if the mind of the solipsist is the only thing that exists, there is no requirement that its nature be that of a biological human being, nor that any aspects of itself have to be designed by itself. As such, the inability of a biological human brain to generate all of science in one lifetime is beside the point. A key point is that the solipsistic point of view does not require that the mind of the solipisist was designed by the mind of the solipsist -- in fact that would be a tad circular. The same issues of why something rather than nothing are still left open, as per materialism, but the materialist universe did not have to be manufactured as a product of the materialist universe either.

Of course the mind of a metaphysical solipsist cannot have been designed by something else. So its existence is presumably an incomprehensible miracle. But I have already given a counter-counter-argument to the Superhuman Solipsist objection. The solipsist who goes down that route cannot also use the kind of argument found under the "neuroscience" heading.(Note you have switched from your usual Epistemological Solipsism to Metaphysical Solipsism here. Unsignalled switches of this kind are very confusing to the reader). 1Z 13:40, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Would a restating of the objection and counter argument fix the problem for you?