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Archive 1

Current concerns

Of particular concern in the early 21st century is the possible regulation of the internet with respect to net neutrality. Various proposals have been made by some economic interests to prohibit charges to content originators by carriers (internet service providers) based upon bandwidth consumption (the amount of traffic generated) and to prohibit discrimination in the level of service provided. Carriers argue that since they must finance the capital costs of improved delivery mechanisms, that the providers of material should bear the cost of delivery. Content providers argue that the cost is paid for by the consumer through expensive cable, digital subscriber line, and broadband wireless fees, with the principal argument being centered about favoritism and discrimination, in that certain delivery services may be connected financially to content providers, whom the carriers could then favor while discriminating against outside providers. The most effective form of discrimination would be for the carriers to provide slower service to uncooperative outside providers (providers not owned by or paying a toll to the carrier).

The danger of any regulatory action to enforce net neutrality is that the regulatory process would become captured by one or even both of the factions involved, who could then apply pressure upon the regulators by their influence upon the political process. Who would remain without significant influence in this process would be the consumers, who (it is argued) are at present becoming quite powerful in many locales by their ability to change providers (although generally only within a duopoly of cable TV internet or telephone DSL services). The ease of switching has gradually increased since third party e-mail services, free home pages in social networks, and customer controlled personal web sites allow the switch with few side effects, such as the need to notify all correspondents of a new address and additional access methods such as access by radio (WiFi) and satellite methods are gradually improving. The argument against regulation centers upon the consumer's ability to switch (as a countervailing force) and the likelihood of regulatory capture by the politically and financially powerful non-consumer interests involved.

Whether the industry has competition or is a monopoly is a key factual question underpinning the arguments over the danger of regulatory capture; the power which could be exerted through regulatory capture is generally already possessed by a monopoly. -Dwinetsk 23:40, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

A less controversial example

Let me first add my voice to those others who say that the municipal wi-fi example is a very poor choice of example. There is simply too much going on with it. I would like to see it dropped.

I think that there are much clearer examples of regulatory capture that serve the function of clarifying the notion to those unfamiliar with it and will be much more broadly recognized as an instance of regulatory capture. In brief the case of the FDA blocking import of drugs from Canada could not be defended in terms of ensuring that medications sold in the US are "safe and effective". But the effort could only be motivated (rightly or wrongly) as protecting the temporary patent monopolies that the drug developers had been granted. What makes this case less controversial is that even those who support the FDA ruling should acknowledge that its intent had little to do with safety and efficacy of the meds, but was about protecting the industry (for good or ill).

A more controversial set of examples would come from socialist societies with state ownership of key industries. In those cases the regulators (government) and the regulated (the industries) are one and the same. But I suspect that it would be better to avoid those examples. JPGoldberg 22:55, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

I believe we can find some peer reviewed studies on municipal wifi that would settle whether the issue is one of regulatory capture. Regulatory capture and political economy often overlap; although I agree that we can find much better documented historical examples of regulatory capture.

There are a large number of studies on the effect on broadband penetration on GDP and employment in the US. Even the FCC openly admits that they feel they are involved in regulatory capture; read the FCC reports on cable prices rising faster than inflation for the past two decades and extremely restricted competition in the broadband market. All attempts at deregulation or enforcement of rules that would increase competition in the broadband market have met heavy industry resistance. The FCC openly publishes reports that show that the FCC spectrum auctions are structured to favor incumbent wireless network service providers.

This article needs to include information about the well covered regulatory capture instances with the FDA and FCC. Industry groups like the RIAA and industry unions should also be mentioned as they are used to enforce collusion market strategies that would otherwise be illegal or infeasible. FCC spectrum auctions would be a good starting point. This article needs more peer reviewed journal and literature references.

We should recruit an interested economic historian for this article; it would greatly improve the quality and depth. Agalmic (talk) 01:27, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

Removing Possible Examples section

I'm removing the section because it looks like its nothing more than a collection of accusations and a soapbox for people advancing their political beliefs. The free wi-fi example has been covered above, and the other items offers arguments without counter-arguments, which violates WP:NPOV. Then again, if counter-arguments were given, without sources it'll be another batteground, another WP:NOT no-no. I'm not saying examples are out of the question on this page, but I'd like to see a well-researched example here instead with plenty of scholarly sources. hateless 00:12, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

The ICC comes up as the first search result for "regulatory capture" classic example, so I've restored that example and expanded it with a source. hateless 00:35, 20 June 2007 (UTC)
ICC is a very good example; it needs more information however. I really wish I had more time for writing articles; Friedman gave very good coverage of the ICC in "Free to Choose" if anyone wants source material for this section. Agalmic (talk) 01:29, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

Engineer in Canada

The way the "trademark on Engineering" example is described, it does not look necessarily like regulatory capture which involves the regulated gaining control of the regulator. The example seems to describe a cartel forming through the use of trademark law. A case of regulatory capture would be if there was a government body that certified engineers and an Engineering association was able to control that body to exclude non-members. I'm removing it. PrometheeFeu (talk) 16:13, 16 October 2010 (UTC)

recent article

A somewhat prominent recent article explains one case (though it doesn't use the actual term "capture"): http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 -- AnonMoos (talk) 21:09, 3 March 2011 (UTC)

In his interview with Amy Goodman on February 22, 2011, the author of the article, Matt Taibbi does use the term "regulatory capture". I don't recall hearing him say it but once and it was very much toward the end, but he did use it. Btw, if you go to Google and type in the title of article, "Why isn't Wall Street in jail?", you get 2,820,000 hits, which spells out what "somewhat prominent" actually means. Marrante (talk) 14:29, 4 March 2011 (UTC)

Removal of the FAA from the list of examples

The FAA paragraph at best, is convoluted. At worst, it is a disparaging remark about an agency who deserves more respect. The CAB may or may not have been an oligopoly but RTCA most definitely is not. The primary influence that deregulation sought to change, was CAB regulation of pricing. This is similar to deregulation of telephone service. In terms of businesses financially able to build the so-called "last mile", the term oligopoly would apply to it.

RTCA, Inc, a volunteer non-profit agency with international membership, shields the FAA from the likelihood of becoming a victim to regulatory capture. The change made in September 2009 isn't relevant because the current beneficiaries are the same as those who benefited before the change. The term "customers" has no defacto meaning.

On a personal note, the FAA, particularly the engineering side, routinely behaves a standard to which other government agencies have yet to parallel. The safety and reliability of aviation software is a model to which any company who produces software can aspire. It is the envy of medical device software and of banking software. In contrast with the record established as a result of certification requirements, is the record established by medical devices, banking software, and desktop operating systems.

Kernel.package (talk) 19:00, 13 March 2011 (UTC)

Food and Drug Administration

There was only once source for the section on the FDA and I removed it:

"FDA Corruption & The Specter of Regulatory Capture". Regulatory Affairs Associates. Retrieved 1 March 2011.

This is not a legitimate source, it is from a website advertising a consulting firm's legal services in fighting the FDA. DFS (talk) 22:03, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

Canada examples

This section needs a citation, and failing that, should deleted. There is a very good case to be made for CRTC capture, but we need to indicate the research. --tranquileye (talk) 18:42, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

NRC section

The section on NRC is misleading.

  • Every request for a reactor license was granted, because the course of action when a request is likely to fail is to withdraw it, rather than waste time waiting for an official rejection. Moreover nobody is going to put in substantial money into filing an application only to have it denied. The person who made up this argument obviously knows nothing about this process, it's considerably more complicated than applying for a building permit.
  • What does the Fukushima accident, which happened outside of NRC's jurisdiction, have to do with a plant in Vermont? Classical guilt by association.
  • About Vermont: the anti-nuclear clowns are saying that NRC is supposed to be independent from politics when the state officials want a nuclear power plant built, but that it should respect the political will when they want a plant shut down. So which should it be?
  • The problem about the leaking pipes was not that somebody at Entergy was lying but that the audience did not know the difference between buried piping and underground piping. http://yesvy.blogspot.com/2010/02/miscommunication.html
  • Regardless of the above, the leak was trivial and the media attention it received was an example of radiation hysteria rather than legitimate concern.
  • UCS and Greenpeace are notoriously unreliable sources about nuclear power, for instance Greenpeace claimed that 4 Japanese nuclear plants had a serious accident when in reality one suffered a serious accident, one had minor problems and two shut down without problem.

--Tweenk (talk) 08:39, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I also note that it is overwhelmingly based on a single source that uses mainly quotes from anti-nuclear activists as its factual basis. Furthermore there appears to be no way to factually disprove such claims. When faced with evidence against this notion, the accusers will just move the goalposts. --Tweenk (talk) 08:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Funny, I count five unique sources used in the NRC section, although it's true that one is used several times. The connection between the Vermont plant and the Fukushima Daiichi plant is that they use the same reactor design. Surely this is of some interest to Vermonters. The article now contains this information; my apologies for having inadvertently left it out before. Quotes from anti-nuclear "clowns", as you call them, are no less legitimate than those from nuclear industry "experts", who are well-paid for their statements. The "clowns" may well be more legitimate, if they prove more accurate and trustworthy when a nuclear accident takes place. Unfortunately, if it was the "experts" that everyone heeded, after the accident, it's little comfort to finally be accorded credibility from those who hurl names. Marrante (talk) 11:10, 19 May 2011 (UTC)
You might also be interested in this article, "Do NRC Inspectors Have the Training and Expertise to Do Their Jobs?", which begins, "A host of inconsistencies in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) oversight of spent nuclear fuel storage is leading to increased public health and safety risks, according to a new report issued by the Commission's Inspector General (IG). The report, released May 19, found that the training and expertise of NRC staff who inspect independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) is mixed:..." I'm guessing you consider the Commission's own Inspector General to be a reliable source? Marrante (talk) 20:41, 23 May 2011 (UTC)
This section is now amended by an additional paragraph dealing with an AP investigation of the NRC that addresses these questions. Marrante (talk) 05:45, 24 June 2011 (UTC)

Federal Reserve / NY Fed

These sections ought to be expanded or removed. These are supposed to be examples of capture, yet the section on the Federal Reserve mentions no examples. The section on the NY Fed mentions the bank bailout, which is not a great example of capture. The definition of capture is that the agency pursues private special interests at the expense of public interests, but there are lots of people who see a public interest in not letting the banking system collapse.

Maybe it's not a great example of capture to you, but it sure works for me and for a lot of other people, such as the author of the quote at the end of the section. The banking system was in danger of collapse, but it is in no trouble now. The rest of the country, which was also in danger of collapse, is in the same or worse straits. The Fed was set up to regulate the banks, but it serves them instead, as with the bailout. How is that not capture and a great example of it? Bloomberg says the bailout added up to $12 trillion. Where is the public interest in giving the bankers who caused the problem that kind of money while the rest of the country loses their jobs and homes? Marrante (talk) 21:58, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

I'm not saying it wasn't in the banks' interest to get bailed out. I am saying it was arguably also in the public's interest to maintain a functional banking system. (Does it needs explaining why banking is crucial to the economy?) That makes it a bad example of regulatory capture.

No it doesn't. There's more than one way to skin a cat and keep the banking system afloat. The banks could have been nationalized for a period of time, rather than bailed out. That was what they were afraid might happen and were eager to forestall. The bailout was their preferred solution and the Fed went along with the plan rather than push for some sort of nationalization as Paul Krugman and others were proposing. The banks didn't want nationalization and it was taken off the table. That makes it an excellent example for capture, though it's true, I should (and will try to) find a source that states that clearly for those, such as yourself, who seem not to realize there was more than one solution to the problem. Marrante (talk) 18:55, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok, but now we're fighting over a smaller scrap of land. It's not capture that *something* was done to mitigate the financial crisis (specifically AIG, here), instead you say it was capture that Fed chose the means it did. I'm more sympathetic with with that smaller and more nuanced claim, but the article ought to specifically explain and support it. Likewise for the secrecy charge. Sure, it sounds suspicious, but it's not immediately clear to me that the Fed's stated reasons for secrecy are dishonest or contrary to the public interest. Bottom line is that I guess I've seen too much facile opinionating on the right and left that just assumes without explanation or defense that the banks and the public/taxpayers don't have interests in common.

"Facile opinionating on the right and the left" - sounds fine if you're talking about a myriad of other topics, but you want me to say that bankers have the same interests as the public? Maybe in Canada or once upon a time, when the bank was a small, local and boring business that had a stake in the community, but now? I don't know how you can even make such statements with a straight face. A look at income distribution and how the gap between top and bottom has been growing for the past 30 years (and accelerated since 2008) makes it clear how foolish a statement that is. Look at Iceland. Take a look at the riots in Greece, Spain, France and England. Will Italy be next? This is all caused by governments captured by banks trying to make the public pay the bill that the bankers ran up. The banks want to party, but everyone else gets austerity programs shoved down their throats. How is it that the bankers claim no one knew the crash was coming, but Krugman, Gary J. Aguirre and Mark Pittman were able to predict it? Marrante (talk) 23:54, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok, we're having a political argument now. Weird, because I doubt we're politically that far off, but it should only underscore the point that there's an objectivity problem with this section.

As far as the interests go, you already conceded that the public has an interest in having a functional banking system, and you can't doubt that it's in the banking industry's interest, to, well, bank. So QED, you have at least that shared interest. I didn't say the two sets of interests are identical (no two entities have exactly the same interests by definition, and it's almost as unlikely they'll have NO shared interests). As far as I can tell, you are just assuming that anything that helps the banks violates the public interest. What about sensible financial regulation that would ensure long-term stability of the banking sector? Good for the banks AND the public, wouldn't you say? (The fact that banks would/did fight this means only, as events have pretty well proven, that they have a lousy apprehension of their own risk levels, not that it isn't in their real interest to be so regulated.)

So, all I ask is that if you are going to give an example of regulatory agencies violating the public interest, you should explain how the public interest was violated in your example. You have to look at the interests involved, the choices open to the actors, etc. Best to cite a scholarly article on it, but really that's probably going to require original research, which doesn't belong on here anyway. Hence it's probably not the best example to use to show regulatory capture on Wikipedia. Being a bad example of something doesn't mean it can't also be true.

You've made or implied a number of claims so far in defense of this section. So far, they are 1) the AIG bailout was unnecessary to serve any public interest in preventing financial collapse (i.e. simple gift from the Fed), or 2) that other, more public friendly means were within the Fed's authority within the time window it was working with, or, your most recent claim, 3) that the crisis was intentionally precipitated because the bankers knew they would get bailed out. (Strangely, you bring up Iceland and Britain, which nationalized their banks.) Number 2) strikes me as very possible, but I'm not just going to believe because you said so, and I wouldn't put it on Wikipedia just because I believed it.

I'm not opposed to amending the article and believe I mentioned that yesterday, early on. The list of countries was just about all the upheaval caused by the financial crisis and was just my visceral reaction to the idea that the banks and the public have the same interests. Post-1929 till recent years, yes, but today, I don't see it, except on the most superficial basis in that the public needs a financial system and banks want to exist, or perhaps on an objective basis in which the desire for obscene profits is recognized by all as being bad for the public. I have no time to continue this discussion. You are wrong that I think anything that helps banks is against the public interest, but banking should be boring, conservative and regulated like it was after the Glass–Steagall Act. If it's exciting with wild profits for a few, it's against the public interest, as has been demonstrated by the global financial collapse. More of same, in the form of bailouts, was not in the public interest. Sensible financial regulation will be fought tooth and nail by the banks and their minions in government. I will look at doing more with the article, but I have tried to keep the sections brief. I can't work on it at present, but when things calm down around here, I will get back to it. Marrante (talk) 06:53, 20 July 2011 (UTC)

The OCC and the NY Fed

To the authors I say thank you. Some have argued this article is leftist propaganda or violates POV. I disagree. As a physicist I place great emphasis on observables. This article is nothing more than a list of observables that has been arranged in a particular way - the reason it stands out is that rarely are said observables listed in such context, most probably due to the fact that none of the protagonists are incentivised to ever release collated information of this matter. Further, on "being left", there is a relatively famous paper written on the economic consequences of being a lefty - Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991) show that positive economic performance in terms of GDP growth, inflationary pressures and unemployment rates are highly correlated with leftist cabinet compositions and strong unions. To keep this is context, it should be noted that AGL also find that poor economic performance is related to leftist government and weak unions, or rightist government and strong unions. A rightist government with weak unions is related to stronger economic performance - but not as pronounced as leftist government with strong unions.

On the topic of the OCC, there just is not enough frankly. Allow me to elaborate - The following is my summary of Spitzer's own article sourced from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/AR2008021302783.html and Harvard Law Review, Vol. 120, No. 2 (Dec., 2006), pp.627-634 " Federal Preemption. State Attorney General Power. Southern District of New York Rebuffs New York Attorney General's Bid to Regulate National Banks. Office of the Comptroller ofthe Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)"

Eliot Spitzer, current Governor of New York and former NY Attorney General, gives a scathing account of the Bush administration. Mr. Spitzer suggests that the Bush administration took an active role in protecting the interests of banks at the expense of middle classes leading up to, and during, the subprime crisis. How? A rare event in American politics occurred when all 50 state AGs reached a unanimous consensus on predatory lending. Predatory lending may take the guise of misrepresenting the terms of loans, making loans without regard to consumers’ ability to repay, making loans with “teaser” rates, like ARMs, that later ballooned astronomically, packing loans with undisclosed charges and fees, or even paying illegal kickbacks. Governor Spitzer was spitting with rage (excuse the pun) at the situation and he and his AG colleagues made a concerted effort to protect American home owners, through individual and collective state litigation. The AGs of America entered into settlements with many subprime lenders and enacted laws aimed at curbing such practices. In an incredible and under-publicised event, the Bush administration embarked on an aggressive and unprecedented campaign to essentially void the efforts of all 50 state AGs. The administration used the OCC as the vehicle for its obstruction, for the first time in its 140 year history, the OCC “was used as a tool against consumers”. The OCC invoked a law dating back to 1863 (National Bank Act) allowing the formal opinions of the OCC to pre-empt all state laws, thus effectively rendering the unanimous opinions of all 50 AGs null and void. The OCC went even further than this, preventing states from enforcing ANY of their own consumer protection laws against national banks. Naturally, such a course of action provoked all 50 state AGs and all 50 state banking superintendents to actively fight against the administration. Not only did the administration dismiss the opinions of the legal advisors on which the US is built, but it issued federal lawsuits via the OCC to stop any investigations into mortgage lending banks issued by the offices of US AGs! The rationale of the OCC and banks was that curbing predatory lending would exclude lower income Americans from access to credit. Governor Spitzer suggests that banning predatory lending would in no way jeopardise access to legitimate credit, rather, it would ensure borrowers got appropriately priced loans and would have mitigated the subsequent foreclosure rates and thus the degradation of the entire American economy. Is this yet another case of elitists buying power? It certainly was not done on a rational and academic basis, or even a legal one, as the AGs of America will testify. When it comes to big business and banks in particular, the story today is the same as the story told by history, money can buy the law. Governor Spitzer concludes his thoughts on the matter of the subprime lending crisis by saying, “The tale is still unfolding, but when the dust settles, it ( the Bush administration) will be judged as a willing accomplice to the lender who went to any lengths in their quest for profits. So willing, in fact, that it used the power of the federal government in an unprecedented assault on state legislatures, as well as on state AGs and anyone else on the side of consumers”.

On the NY Fed, one might be interested to see Gorton and Metrick (2010), "Regulating the shadow banking system", for a thoroughly brilliant alternative view of the recent financial crisis. Gorton and Metrick argue that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999(House) and 2000(Senate), allowing the repeal of Glass-Steagall (1933) and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956), in conjunction with The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, may have caused the financial crisis. MAY is a key word here, as the authors admit trying to pin down the single root cause of the financial crisis “involves mostly guesswork” and that “there is no comprehensive data measuring the repo market”. What is not in question, however, is that Citigroup (as they are now known) expended the greatest amount of resources lobbying on those two particular pieces of legislation (Opensecrets.org will confirm this if you search for "bankruptcy" and "banking" using the "issue" search function - look at 1998-2001 and see if any firms stand out. This is the $figure of what insiders call the "find, grind and mind" of lobbying - find the client, grind out the legislation to favour said client, then mind the legislation (particularly in the hours leading up to key House and Senate votes) even AFTER the bill has been signed into law). In return Citigroup were "allowed" to consolidate with Travellers - creating a "Universal Bank" which could offer traditional residential finance, as well as offering insurance and securities trading. I say "allowed" to consolidate as Citigroup was trading as a single entity in 1998, well before the laws allowing it to do so were actually passed. I see there is a referenced article on this already on wikipedia. Citigroup were given a waiver on the implicit understanding that they could force the legislation they wanted through Congress within 2 years. Incredible gall really, assuming that you can change the law - what would otherwise have been an expensive gamble for Citi and Travellers was a sure thing. The bankruptcy reforms were equally as important to Citigroup - the 1999 Act created a bankruptcy safe harbour for repos. The strategic importance of which led to repos becoming "virtual money", especially when collateralised using dual-sourced securitised bonds - one source would be Citigroup itself. The other source would be the off-balance sheet SPV created by Citigroup. A neat trick to be sure, insuring yourself with your own loans. It doesn't even appear to matter if the bonds are junk, just as long as nobody holds onto them long enough to find out - lets make the repurchase agreement the next day but between now and then Citigroup will use your real money for risky investments. When you add in repothecation the job is complete. Well, almost. See, if those collateralised bonds are actually ABSs (in particular CDOs and their higher powers), nobody will ever find out how much they are fundamentally worth. Why? Well according to Roubini, it would take a high powered personal computer about 3 days to worked out the value of a single mid-powered CDO. This is why ABSs are generally known as being information insensitive, i.e. the cost of determining the fundamental value of these assets is so great that even to the most informed investor, this outlay would negate the profitability of purchasing or holding such an asset. Thus when the value of ABSs and their corresponding CDSs fell it was not profitable for firms or individuals to determine what their stock was fundamentally worth, rather investors expunged them from their balance sheets. Coincidentally the volume of repos (and also commercial paper it must be pointed out) declined massively in unison with the ABS/CDS market. A tenuous suggestion made by me (not Gorton and Metrick) is that perhaps a significant fraction of the increase in US house prices was due to banks being incentivised to repackage and securitise debt in this way to create virtual repo money capital. The demand for high yield debt encouraged banks to lend indiscriminately to service their expanding repo markets - when ABSs could no longer be used as collateral in repurchase agreements due to questions over their fundamental values, house prices and pretty much the entire Western economy tanked. 92.4.235.253 (talk) 21:44, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

Thank you for the compliment, support and especially for the information you posted here. I think this article could grow to be very long, so long it would need to be split into two or more articles. (And you are forgiven the pun.) Marrante (talk) 22:48, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

Name Change At BOEMRE

Um that agency (aka. former MMS) split into two last year, and hence no longer operates under that name. Marking section as "dated". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.108.237.62 (talk) 02:07, 17 February 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for calling attention to that. I have updated the section and removed the flag. With one agency changing its name twice and splitting into three organizations, it gets pretty complicated and hard to keep track, so I just left it under the second name for now, but it states right at the top that what was once MMS is now three separate organizations and gives their names. Marrante (talk) 07:54, 17 February 2012 (UTC)

Neutral Point of View

I think this article violates Neutral Point of View, and is not that informative.

There is a stub under Capture that's better and should be brought over and expanded:

In public choice theory and political science, capture is said to occur when bureaucrats or politicians, who are supposed be acting in the public interest, end up acting systematically to favor particular vested interests. The theory of capture is associated with nobel laureate economist George Stigler, one of its main developers.

Public choice theory holds that capture is inevitable, because vested interests have a concentrated financial stake in the outcomes of political decisions, thus ensuring that they will find means—direct or indirect—to capture decision makers.

While this inevitablist application of rational choice theory appears to be excessively pessimistic about government, capture is a commonly observable phenomenon.

I think examples are important. One might provide examples without violating neutrality by framing the examples in terms of who alleged regulatory capture and why, and perhaps providing discussion on hypotheses other than capture that could result in the appearance of capture. An example might be the practice of hiring from regulatory bodies: sure, it may look like it "proves" capture by showing that regulators were using their posts to prepare themselves for more lucrative private work, but it may also reflect the fact that regulated industries need regulatory experts and hire the expertise from the best source -- the industry's actual regulator.

• (I agree with the above: first and foremost, the article needs to provide a good definition of what the word "capture" means (that's what the majority of readers will be looking for, and many of those readers will have no education in Economics, or be unfamiliar with what the denotation and connotations are, or they'll possibly speak English as a second language) and the majority of the examples probably deserve separate articles that could be linked to rather than stated at length (and with polemic purpose) in this context. Obviously, if the article didn't have a U.S.-centric focus, the list would be much longer still (nearly infinite) and would represent governments from all around the world, etc.; a longer list of examples of that kind would also need to be a separate article.) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jep Tong (talk • contribs) 21:04, 27 June 2012 (UTC)

See also - concentrated benefits and diffuse costs

‎Jytdog recently deleted concentrated benefits and diffuse costs from the see also section because it "has nothing to do with regulatory capture". Isn't the problem with regulatory capture that it concentrates benefits and diffuses costs? --Xerographica (talk) 00:54, 11 December 2012 (UTC)

I guess it is related. I retract that comment. But I'll replace it with this -- CB/DC is more about lobbying per se. Regulatory capture is more about regulators themselves thinking of industry's best interests instead of the public's. This doesn't always lead to greater costs for the public. For instance the Southwest Airlines scandal mentioned in the article probably was a "concentrated benefit" for Southwest but cutting corners on maintenance probably allowed them to keep ticket prices cheap which was, rather, "diffuse benefits" for the public. If a plane would have crashed, this would have been a "concentrated cost" for the people who died. So there isn't a one-to-one reading of CB/DB onto regulatory capture. But the bigger problem is that the concentrated benefits and diffuse costs article says nothing about regulatory capture, and maybe more importantly, it says almost nothing meaningful -- that article is of terrible quality as its tags indicate. If it were not of bad quality and would make some direct statement about regulatory capture I could see how the external link to it would be helpful to readers. I clicked on the link and said WTF and came back and deleted the link. Maybe we could re-add it when the quality of that article is decent.Jytdog (talk) 01:39, 11 December 2012 (UTC)
How is the quality of the article supposed to improve if people aren't directed to it from relevant articles? There's nothing in Wikipedia See Also policy about not linking to stubs. The only criteria is that the links be at least "peripherally" relevant.
Regarding the concept itself...the basic idea is that the cost of any regulation/rule/law should not exceed the benefit. But the only way to ensure that benefits are greater than costs would be to allow taxpayers to directly allocate their taxes. Taxpayers would not choose to give their taxes to government organizations that did not give them "enough" bang for the buck.
Regulatory capture and CB/DC are simply the negative externalities of rational ignorance. And people are only rationally ignorant because they have a vanishingly small say over how their tax dollars are spent in the public sector. --Xerographica (talk) 09:36, 11 December 2012 (UTC)
That sounds mighty ideological. Look if you want to restore the link go ahead. Since you appear to care about this issue a lot perhaps you could work on making the CB/DC article better.Jytdog (talk) 15:13, 11 December 2012 (UTC)
What's mighty ideological about market economies? Is it ideological when you go to the store and purchase bread...or when you help fund the World Wildlife Foundation? What would be mighty ideological about a taxpayer going to the EPA website and making a contribution to environmental protection? Market economies are simply the structure that allows for the maximum free expression of each person's preferences. Regarding the article...I doubt that I could articulate the concept better than David Boaz has in his passage in the article. --Xerographica (talk) 18:31, 11 December 2012 (UTC)
Right, just looked at the history of those three articles and you are the one creating them. You are clearly very committed to an ideology that minimizes the role of government and in getting ideas that support that ideology into Wikipedia. Not only are they not Good Articles - WP:GA - they express much of what Wikipedia is not - WP:NOT - please see especially WP:NOTSOAPBOX. I am not interested in engaging with you on these issues.Jytdog (talk) 19:58, 11 December 2012 (UTC)
If you believe that these three topics aren't notable enough to warrant their own entries...then put your money where your mouth is and nominate them for deletion. If you truly were not interested in engaging with me then obviously you would have already refrained from doing so. If you say things that are BS..."minimizes the role of government"...then I will call you on your BS by pointing out that tax choice says absolutely nothing about the tax rate. Whether the tax rate was 5% or 25% or 75%...if people could choose which government organizations they gave their taxes to...then it would still be tax choice. --Xerographica (talk) 20:24, 11 December 2012 (UTC)

{{example farm}} tag

{{example farm}} creates a notice that an article "may contain excessive, poor, or irrelevant examples." I don't necessarily think any of the examples here are poor or irrelevant, but I do think their sheer number is excessive, especially in the US (it also resulted in a bloated TOC, which I've modified). Perhaps we could have a spinoff article, such as List of captured agencies, but that seems problematic. I'd rather just see the examples trimmed. Some seem to have POV issues anyway (the New York Fed section says "[Tim] Geithner became the 'bailout king'"), so they might be a good place to start. --BDD (talk) 21:37, 8 January 2013 (UTC)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

The part on the Superfund does not appear to be an example of regulatory capture since the EPA is not acting in favor of a company by its own choice, but due to the law.Skingski (talk) 21:39, 5 June 2012 (UTC)

Legislative capture, then? —Tamfang (talk) 00:10, 6 June 2012 (UTC)
As you please, but does not belong here IMO Skingski (talk) 19:25, 7 June 2012 (UTC)

The new content of the EPA section is nothing but unsupported opinion (NY Times editorial is about as substantial as the references get) and it's over two years out of date. Anybody object to deleting it? 174.102.97.248 (talk) 21:34, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

Revision to Regulatory Capture - ACNC

Hello, I saw your revision to Regulatory Capture and noted your comments indicating that you believed that the Australian Charities and Not-For-Profits Commission are incompetent rather than captured. Notwithstanding that I cited a quotation from an Australian Senator, this was just used as an example to underpin the evidence in the rest of the section. The evidence I cited provides strong support to conclude that the ACNC (Set up to Regulate the Charity Sector and "maintain, protect and enhance public trust and confidence in charities through increased accountability and transparency") is captured by the Charity Sector and advances the interests of it, rather than regulates it.

I note that the definition of Regulatory Capture indicates that it is a form of government failure and would argue that failure is akin to incompetence. In this case, the regulator has failed to regulate and is captured by the Charity Sector in Australia.

I believe that the evidence i cited is stronger (or as strong) than the World Trade organisation (International Examples), which relies on the opinion of an academic and of the Food and Drug Administration and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency US examples.

I also did not include that the Australian government has now legislated to repeal the ACNC as this information is included in the ACNC wikipedia entry.

I'd be grateful for your feedback and hope we can reach some consensus.

Umpo apisdn (talk) 10:00, 18 August 2014 (UTC)

As I wrote in my edit note, "incompetence is not regulatory capture, and one guy called it that, in quotes, is not sufficient to include it in this category." The definition of regulatory capture provided in the article says that is "a form of political corruption that occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating." That is what makes it different from plain old incompetence, or other forms of corruption. Would you please provide a source explaining how this agency fits that definition -- specifically how it "advances the interests"? Also, I went and looked at the WP article on this agency. I see that you added content about the legislation to abolish it. This is legislation, not reality yet. Legislators do crazy stuff all the time (like efforts in the US to abolish the Department of Education) that have no hope of becoming law. No one can know if this is meaningful until the process plays out. It also seems like there is some political football going on here. Finally, in the content you added you included strange content about things that happened in the UK and a bunch of WP:OR (like citing what happened on their facebook page and twitter account -- that appears to be your own "reporting" and this is not what editors at WP do. Jytdog (talk) 12:21, 18 August 2014 (UTC)

DC Taxicab Commission

I don't know all of the drama behind it myself, but whatever plan is referenced where DCTC was going to kill UberX did not come to fruition. UberX is easily available all throughout DC, and has been for at least a year and a half. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.242.200.26 (talk) 20:46, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

What's not reliable here? (and why?)

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Regulatory_capture&type=revision&diff=662215802&oldid=662191024

Derntno (talk) 17:21, 14 May 2015 (UTC)


Canadian Transportation Agency

This section is dedicated to discussing the following proposed addition:

In February 2013, the Harper Government appointed <redacted> vice chair of the Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA).[1] <redacted> had been a registered lobbyist and the President and CEO of the Canadian Business Aviation Association from 2008 until the date of his appointment.[2] Prior to that, from 2006 to 2008, <redacted> was a registered lobbyist and the President of the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC).[3]
In 2015, the Federal Court of Appeal criticized a decision of <redacted> for lacking clarity and being inconsistent with past decisions of the CTA.[4] In May 2016, the Federal Court of Appeal agreed to hear an appeal from yet another decision of <redacted>.[5] — Preceding unsigned comment added by Gabor Lukacs (talk • contribs) 20:44, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ "Appointment to the Canadian Transportation Agency", Transport Canada (February 13, 2013). Retrieved March 19, 2013
  2. ^ "Canadian Business Aviation Association / Association canadienne d'aviation d'affaires" Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. Retrieved May 22, 2016
  3. ^ "Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC) / Association du Transport Aérien du Canada (ATAC)" Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. Retrieved May 22, 2016
  4. ^ Lukacs v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2015 FCA 269, para. 40.
  5. ^ Order of the Federal Court of Appeal, dated May 20, 2016, granting leave to appeal.

This was marked as raising WP:OR and WP:BLP issues. First, I am hoping to understand the WP:OR issue. Gabor Lukacs (talk) 20:46, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

In which source that you provided, does it say that this is an example of regulatory capture? Jytdog (talk) 20:48, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
I just redacted the content you copied here because, as I said, this content violates WP:BLP and BLP applies to talk pages as well as article content. Jytdog (talk) 20:49, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
How can other members engage in the discussion if they do not see what the discussion is about? While I appreciate your vast experience on Wikipedia, my understanding is that such decisions are, ultimately, made by the community, are they not? Gabor Lukacs (talk) 20:53, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
I do take an issue with your attempt to argue WP:OR and WP:BLP simultaneously. I am happy to discuss each topic separately, but it is not possible to discuss two things at once. Gabor Lukacs (talk) 20:54, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
The BLP violation arises because you have added original research making a claim about a living person, so yes the OR issue is first. Again, what source that you provided calls this an example of regulatory capture? Jytdog (talk) 20:56, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
If you intend to describe "original research" so broadly, then any and every article can be attacked. Drawing reasonable conclusions from well-established and undisputed facts is part of an editorial task. However, if you wish, I can refer to a number of sources raising the same issue. Will that make any difference? The facts are undisputed. Gabor Lukacs (talk) 21:00, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

Jytdog Did you see the references that I added? Gabor Lukacs (talk) 21:15, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

Hm, please see your talk page. Jytdog (talk) 21:41, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
I saw it, and responded. Gabor Lukacs (talk) 22:06, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

References on regulatory capture

Airline fees, services, advertising and on-time performance (last paragraph), published by the Public Interest Advocacy Centre

[1]

[2]

Lac-Mégantic: Loose Ends and Unanswered Questions (page 32), published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (January 2015)

The first source is a transcript of testimony by Michael Janigan, Executive Director and General Counsel of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC). It does not name the person, but speculates that there is some kind of regulatory capture with the Canadian Transportation Agency with regard to airlines. It does not support the content above. (We could use this to make the more general claim that is supported, but we would to WP:ATTRIBUTE the claim to Janigan. See WP:SPS)
Can this not be found in the "evidence" of the committee hearing? 22:12, 22 May 2016 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Gabor Lukacs (talk • contribs)
The second source is like the first, in which you (!) make the claim that there is regulatory capture at the CTA with regard to airlines but you didn't name the person in your quote either; you made a general statement. This could be used for the general claim, also with attribution.
in the third source is weak - it is an interview with you published in a blog. In this interview, you do call the appointment of Butler "regulatory capture" with regard to airlines. So now we could make that claim, with attribution. But this is a very weak source. (please read WP:RS to understand how we evaluate sources)
The fourth source is a white paper by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives that says that there was regulatory failure involved in the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster and that the TSB (part of the CTA) failed to describe that in its report; it claims this is partially the result of regulatory capture. This document doesn't name Butler at all.
So there is one source, and a weak one at that. Hm. Jytdog (talk) 22:05, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
Is the appointment of a lobbyist, without any cooling-off period, not an example of the "revolving door" type of regulatory capture that has been discussed earlier in the article? Gabor Lukacs (talk) 22:09, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
That is your conclusion. You are interpreting a primary source and we, as Wikipedia editors, cannot do that. Please see WP:PRIMARY which is a section of OR. This is policy - you cannot interpret primary sources. Cannot. Especially not to make a BLP claim, and especially not when you are operating under BLPCOI. This is what I mean about cautioning you to be extremely careful.' You are new to Wikipedia and you are heading directly over a cliff. Jytdog (talk) 22:16, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
It is not a conclusion, but rather a tautology or analytic proposition (see Analytic–synthetic_distinction). The "revolving door" has been identified in the article as a form of regulatory capture within the item itself. The fact is that <redacted> was holding a position where he was deriving financial gain from acting in the interests of the industry that he is now regulation. This is an undisputed and uncontroversial fact.
The goal is not to attack anyone's character (which is the reason that I began to use <redacted> instead of the name of the person); at the same time, there is factual information here that, in my respectful view, does belong to Wikipedia.
Instead of a destructive argument, can you propose a constructive solution, namely, a way of incorporating uncontroversial and undisputed facts in a way that leaves drawing a conclusion to the reader? Gabor Lukacs (talk) 22:26, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

Sure I can work with you. everything in Wikipedia starts with sources, and the stronger the sources, the more likely it is that content will "stick". The sources you provided are all weak with regard to the claim that the CTA has been captured. Not un-useable, but weak. You would know the sources on this topic better than I. Has there been discussion in the mainstream media in Canada of the CTA having been captured and if so can you provide them, or is this something we can only source to advocacy groups? Once we have sources I can work with you to build content about this. Thanks. Jytdog (talk) 23:00, 22 May 2016 (UTC) (redact Jytdog (talk) 23:39, 22 May 2016 (UTC))

Discussion about how to build the content

Thank you for agreeing to work with me on building the content. Gabor Lukacs (talk) 23:07, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

The undisputed fact is that <redacted> had been, up to the day of his appointment, a chief lobbyist for the industry that he is now regulating. This information is available not only on Ombudsman's website (which I provided links to), but also mentioned as a fact in this article [3]. Perhaps, as I understand you propose, it is better to let the reader to draw conclusions from this fact.

I found allegations of regulatory capture in the evidence of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications: [4]. The example of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission was also included based on comments made a such a venue, if I recall it correctly.Gabor Lukacs (talk) 23:17, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

You are not getting this. Everything in WP needs to be actually based on reliable sources. Period. No extrapolating. If you want to answer my question above, that would be the place to start. Jytdog (talk) 23:21, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
Are you suggesting that the evidence of a committee of the Senate in Canada is not a reliable source? Gabor Lukacs (talk) 23:26, 22 May 2016 (UTC)
I suggest you read WP:VERIFY, WP:OR, WP:NPOV, and WP:BLP and craft well sourced, neutral content and propose that here on the Talk page. Please read WP:RS for guidance on sourcing. Jytdog (talk) 23:40, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

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FCC and net neutrality

Some text on this point was added by a new account. I removed per WP:SYN as, contrary to the added text, no commentators in the three sources cited (formerly footnotes 44, 45 and 46) made any reference to regulatory capture. The sources must make that conclusion, and cannot simply be critical of the new FCC chairman for being pro industry. They must explicitly refer to whatever is happening as capture. Figureofnine (talk • contribs) 21:11, 14 May 2017 (UTC)

That was a good catch, thanks. There are refs that specifically talk about regulatory capture with respect to this. Will add back the content citing them in a bit. Jytdog (talk) 18:10, 15 May 2017 (UTC)
Figureofnine, Jytdog, here is one such source Offnfopt(talk) 15:25, 27 July 2017 (UTC)
Adding the diff link here for easier access Special:Diff/780399939. Offnfopt(talk) 22:08, 28 July 2017 (UTC)

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What regulatory capture is?

The examples section is ridiculous. Accusations do not regulatory capture make. --91.145.73.92 (talk) 14:19, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

If all you saw were accusations, you didn't read very closely. Marrante (talk) 18:38, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

It seems the most basic definition of "regulatory capture" isn't even prominently and adequately addressed! "Regulatory capture" is where the regulatED become the regulatORS. Waterflaws (talk) 21:49, 28 November 2017 (UTC)

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Lead section needs expanding

The Lead section is only one paragraph. And a beautiful one it is! How rare in Wikipedia! However the Lead is missing some key points. (Most Leads are 4 paragraphs.) Excerpts:

Wikipedia:Manual of Style (lead section)

intro: The lead section (also known as the introduction, lead, or lede[1]) of a Wikipedia article is the section before the table of contents and the first heading. The lead serves both as an introduction to the article and as a summary of its most important aspects.

The lead should be able to stand alone as a concise overview of the article. It should define the topic, establish context, explain why the subject is interesting or notable, and summarize the most important points—including any prominent controversies. The emphasis given to material in the lead should roughly reflect its importance to the topic,....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Lead_section#Provide_an_accessible_overview Introductory text Provide an accessible overview The lead section should briefly summarize the most important points covered in an article in such a way that it can stand on its own as a concise version of the article. ...It is even more important here than for the rest of the article that the text be accessible. ...avoid lengthy paragraphs and over-specific descriptions,... In general, specialized terminology and symbols should be avoided in an introduction. Mathematical equations and formulas should not be used except in mathematics articles. Where uncommon terms are essential to describing the subject, they should be placed in context, briefly defined, and linked. The subject should be placed in a context with which many readers could be expected to be familiar. ...

Bold emphasis added. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3873:FCD0:EE4F:74F8 (talk) 20:45, 16 October 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford



Here is some Big Picture stuff that I think should be added to the Lead.
From the below section; Theory:
"For public choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with a high-stakes interest in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies in attempting to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether."
...From the first two paragraphs of The theory of economic regulation by George J. Stigler:
"The state --the machinery and power of the state-- is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries."
"Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. ....onerous regulations, however, are exceptional and can be explained by the same theory that explains beneficial (we may call it "acquired") regulation."
However, to avoid jargon, I prefer "beneficial regulation" to "acquired") regulation," and standardizing the term, (perhaps Stigler's term; "acquired" regulation, should prolly also be lightly explained/defined)?
I think remove "For public choice theorists," because it falsely implies that the topic is only of concern to a narrow group. (It also looks like an "ad.") I see the same kind of narrowing elsewhere. If appropriate, these specialists can be better explained in the body. I think it's an error to imply Regulatory Capture is a tiny esoteric (thus insignificant) sub-specialty.

Shouldn't Stigler's near "inevitability of regulatory capture" be in the lead? Some sources seem to hide or devalue it. ("Regulatory Capture 101" WSJ) Wasn't that a major part of his Nobel prize?

The body seems much better than most Wiki technical articles regarding jargon. But I still see some academic paralysis, where academics are seemingly more concerned with not making an error than they are with communicating Big Ideas. That results in tedious lawyerly contract-type lingo rather than good writing and clear communication. Wiki guidelines explicitly state that they prefer communication lingo to peer-review or journal/academic styles— that Wikipedia is NOT NOT NOT a peer-reviewed journal. In at least one place the lingo just appears overly formal, stilted, thus slow and unclear. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3873:FCD0:EE4F:74F8 (talk) 15:56, 17 October 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

Removed intro description of regulatory capture as "political corruption"

I've changed the introduction paragraph to remove the reference to political corruption, as not all forms of RC are corrupt. Lower down the article describes two types of RC, one being based on money and the other on "cultural capture" where one-sided lobbying leads the government agency to see things from the industry point of view without any need for corrupt incentives. Instead I've moved the reference to government failure up to the top, and also added a back-reference to RC in the government failure article. PaulJohnson (talk) 14:30, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

Both types are corruption. One meets one definition of corruption, for gain, the second meets another definition of corruption, as in defeats the purpose of the agency. Visit a dictionary, wikipedia's definition of corruption falls short.
Agree. 40 handy dictionaries with English definitions that include the word corruption: https://onelook.com/?w=corruption&ls=a Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:B596:626E:D7:4B38 (talk) 16:43, 20 October 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

Lede section highly PoV & thus misleading.

Above I said the Lede was beautiful. Nope, it's highly PoV to the point of being misleading. Today I followed the misleading defining links/definitions, which highlighted the possible bias in the text.

The Lede paragraph and especially the lede sentence definition is an extremely Libertarian (Party) PoV. Libertarians hate government and worship the magical invisible hand of laissez-faire unregulated economics as perfect. This is contrary to most definitions where "government" is not used or is faintly used.

Instead, most definitions use terms like "regulatory agencies" or "policymakers or political bodies — regulatory agencies, in particular" or "regulatory bodies." That PoV strongly intensifies when one follows the inline links/definitions. From the many definitions, for example, I believe even self-regulated organizations such as Wikipedia could become captured to some degree by the same greedy bodies that (say) try to control public opinion, etc.

Lede Paragraph quote: 

Regulatory capture is a form of government failure which occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of special interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating.[1] When regulatory capture occurs, the interests of firms or political groups are prioritized over the interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. Government agencies suffering regulatory capture are called "captured agencies".

So re-writing using those inline definitions on the Lede sentence we have: 

"Regulatory capture is a form of an economic inefficiency caused by a government intervention, if the inefficiency would not exist in a true free market which occurs when a  regulatory authority, regulatory body or regulator is a public authority or government agency responsible for exercising autonomous authority over some area of human activity in a regulatory or supervisory capacity, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of special interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating."

Regulatory capture is caused by government!!?? Oh really?
Here are some other definitions without that bias: 

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp  - Regulatory capture is a theory that regulatory agencies may come to be dominated by the interests they regulate, rather than the public's interest.... Regulatory capture is an economic theory that says regulatory agencies may come to be dominated by the industries or interests they are charged with regulating. The result is that the agency, which is charged with acting in the public's interest, instead acts in ways that benefit the industry it is supposed to be regulating....

https://knowledgeproblem.com/2013/01/04/what-is-regulatory-capture -  “Regulatory capture” occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies — regulatory agencies, in particular — to further their own ends.... Another term for regulatory capture is “client politics,” ...  

https://study.com/.../lesson/regulatory-capture-definition-theory.html  - Regulatory agencies are created to protect consumers but evidence suggests all regulatory bodies fall prey to regulatory capture. Regulatory capture occurs when regulatory bodies protect and advance the agenda of the industry it was formed to regulate. These regulatory bodies become known as captured agencies.   — Why Does It Happen? Nobel Prize winning economist George Stigler suggests capture will become the norm for any regulatory agency....

IOW, the current "evil government" definition is more political, but the consensus definition is more economically motivated. Please replace the the misleading definition and the other same unfounded Libertarian economic assumptions scattered over the article. (I do predict strenuous & powerful objections.)   —Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3044:A2C3:2683:987B (talk) 16:21, 7 November 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

References

  1. ^ Regulatory Capture Definition, Investopedia, retrieved October 2, 2015

Example.

I hereby invite @Kolyvansky: to explain why it is a good example and not WP:UNDUE attention to detail. Kleuske (talk) 21:00, 12 May 2020 (UTC)

Any example must include some detail that make it a specific instance of the generality discussed. That's what this example does. To which details do you object? Tertius51 (talk) 21:50, 1 July 2020 (UTC)

WP:V/WP:RS/WP:SYNTH Fails

@Experienced hand: I have remove some of the sections, since none of the sources cited actually mentions regulatory capture. Sources for the claim that protective motorcycle clothing is subject to regulatory capture include Facebook, somebody's profile page, a commercial website, which does not breathe a word on "regulatory capture", and of course wordpress, because, why not? Claiming, in Wikipedia's voice, that this is a well sourced example of "regulatory capture" is a total failure to abide by the policies mentioned. I will be back to look at other sections critically. Kleuske (talk) 12:46, 15 October 2021 (UTC)

Usage by TERFs

Gender Critical feminists frequently accuse universities, social media sites, charities and various public bodies of being captured by transgender activists. This tends to be called "institutional" rather than "regulatory" capture, though the overall effect is much the same. One example noted already is Helen Joyce's Trans: When Ideology Meets Reality. I don't know that these claims have ever been investigated by any neutral party. Robin S. Taylor (talk) 22:10, 9 March 2022 (UTC)

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