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As far as I know, the full quotation from Descartes is: dubito, cogito, ergo sum: I doubt, I think, therefore I am. Although I am not a rationalist myself I believe this should be mentioned as a counterweight for the cool and self-assured reputation (which needs not to be wholly incorrect) of rationalists. Sjoerd de Vries

This has been done, Sjoerd, though not because of their "cool" nature, however much of a Fonz the Rationalists may have been! --Knucmo2 21:59, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

Philosophers still use rationalism to talk about the tradition begun by Descartes. This is the sense that, for example, Robert Brandom intends when he describes his philosophy as rationaist. ---- Charles Stewart 08:01, 20 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Indeed, in most of the world this is the more common meaning of the word.

MWAK--217.123.73.210 13:09, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Summary, etc.

It's of course true that the artificial distinction between Rationalists and Empiricists means that describing either group in a summary is going to be extremely difficult, but we have to be careful not to turn the summary into a complex and lengthy disquisition. More importantly, perhaps, Leibniz and Spinoza certainly held that, in principle, all knowledge (and certainly not only "metaphysical knowledge") could be gained through reason alone; they also held that in practice we depend upon other methods, and especially science. Descartes is more complex, and consequently less easy to pin down, and the text of the article needs to bring out that fact. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 6 July 2005 08:23 (UTC)

I've started a minor rewrite (mostly rearranging, with a bit of expansion and clarification); does this look better? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 6 July 2005 08:39 (UTC)
OK, I see your point. When I refered to "metaphysical" knowledge, I was just trying to express the fact that all the rationalists thought that metaphysics had to be based on reasoning from self-evident axioms, but that they differed on what other kinds of knowledge could be so derived, and were generally (somewhat) less interested in deriving other kinds of knowledge in this manner. Anyway, you're right that my version was repeating in the introduction information that was in other paragraphs. Cadr 6 July 2005 11:31 (UTC)
It would be nice to expand this article, but we have to avoid overlapping too much with the articles on the individual philosophers. Any ideas? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 6 July 2005 16:08 (UTC)
This is just an idea Mel, and it might sound out of place on this particular page. Nevertheless, Plato was a definite precursor to rationalism, with his many arguments for reason over the senses (knowledge of the world not based on the senses but the forms etc.), and it might be worth mentioning him in a pre-Descartes section along with any other philosophers that ascribed to reason. --Knucmo2 15:49, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
I threw in brief reference to Plato in the Rationalism article recently (though without any serious attention to fact-checking the whole article)-- Plato is yet more pertinent here. The ongoing back-and-forth between rationalism and empiricism may deserve brief further description too. Fact is, even Plato, for instance, regarded the earlier Sophists as quite un-empirical. So the back-and-forth has always occurred in the context of progress towards better understanding of the natural world, with another generation of rationalists coming along and saying, essentially, let's not get hogtied by "positivism" here, and then the speculations get a bit ambitious. Descartes is, of course, the poster child for both rationalism and solipsism (perhaps also for dualism) and in some sense a direct descendant of Plato, the reason being that he was essentially working on his own version of the a priori "Forms". Along came the empiricists and essentially said "we need a reality check here" and ended up going overboard in the opposite direction. So the debate is interesting and it seems to me worthy of mention in this article, perhaps including passing mention of Plato and Aristotle as a similar pair of polarities in the historical debate...Kenosis 17:34, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, Aristotle is just as much an influence, I'd have said, together with mediaeval and renaissance philosophy. Mention of the main influences would be fine, but more would overbalance it.

Making clearer the differences between the "big three" would be a good thing, as would material on philosophers such as Malebranche, Arnauld, Gassendi, et al. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:13, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Why would Descartes be a "poster child" for solipsism? Kenosis' account of the relationship between the so-called rationalists and empiricists is conventional and somewhat simplistic. Leaving aside the fact that, in many ways, Locke et al. were closer to Descartes in many ways than were Leibniz and Spinoza, the relationships between the six big names were much more complex (as were those between Plato and Aristotle). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:46, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
It was intended to be simplistic for these purposes (the introductory content of the article in Wikipedia on Continental rationalism, expected to be read, inter alia, by persons who are unfamiliar with the material). And quite true that there are many overlaps here. The issues I intended to bring forth here are:
(1) Descartes, in the context of his day, falls on the same side of the basic debate as Plato did in his.
(2) Descartes, in this regard along with Spinoza and Leibniz, was presuming (to borrow on Kantian terms a bit) an "underlying" "noumenal" realm that could be accessed by reason alone, with Descartes in particular failing to acknowledge the full extent to which he was in fact building on an empirically derived framework (providing, according to Descartes, that one exercised adequate rational doubt).
(3) Descartes is indeed a "poster child" for dualism
(4) A brief reference to an analogous polarity between Plato and Aristotle seems to deserve brief mention, because, other distinctions aside, Plato was presuming that a priori knowledge is accessible with reason. So was Descartes, at which point the empiricists chose to weigh in.
(5) While I was not advocating such a discussion in the article, Descartes was in fact off on his own spin (hence solipsist). That is an unsustainable mode when it dominates a discussion in any given day, and has a certain tendency to lead to wilder and wilder speculations and "outrun" the ability of one's contemporaries to do "fact checks" or "reality checks."...Kenosis 19:18, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Another thing. It's good to see you here. I appreciate the depth of your insight into the issues as I watch you and Knucmo2 work to develop this article further...Kenosis 19:29, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

"Simple" can be good, but "simplistic" involves oversimplification. With regard to the specific points:

  1. My view is that this is too much of a simplification to be helpful.
  2. The claim that Descartes assumed an underlying noumenal realm involves reading into him something that I don't find there (Spinoza is the closest of the three to a sort of Kantian notion, but even he is very different). Descartes was very clear about the need for experience (mediated by the scientific method).
  3. "Poster child" is presumably North American slang, but in so far as I understand it, it's probably true with regard to dualism — not solipsism, though.
  4. Plato believed in a distinct realm of Forms or Ideas, accessible in experience, after philosophical work, by the philosopher. Descartes believed in nothing like this; for him a priori knowledge is achieved through the use of reason, not by experiencing anything like the Forms. I agree that Descartes was in part influenced by Plato, but not so directly, nor to the exclusion of other influences. (Much more important are the influences of Suarez and others, and that has more claim to be mentioned in the article.)
  5. I'm not sure what you're taking "solipsist" to mean (or "off on his own spin", in fact). Well, actually I don't really understand any of your last point; could you explain further? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 20:55, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

I was the one borrowing on Kant, not Descartes. But the principle is the same; as I recall, his line of reasoning from Meditations arrives at just such a realm (after, of course, he arrives at the famous conclusion that he himself is not a fantasy). Plato, incidentally, arrives at his forms in a way quite similar to that of Descartes. As Aristotle (in his later years) responded to Plato, so the empiricists responded to Descartes. Leaving the editors here with the task of making reasonable decisions how (if at all) to represent these matters in a way that's meaningful. You, however, are the one presently doing the work, along with Knucmo2, so I will need to be content to wish you good regards on it for now...Kenosis 22:25, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you have in mind with regard to a sort of noumenal-world view in the Meditations. Could you specify?
Again, you'll need to be more specific with regard to the comparison between Plato and Descartes; which line of reasoning do you see in both of them?
I certainly agree that the "empiricists" (in common with all other philosophers for the next century or two (or more) responded to Descartes, though I think that the relationship between Aristotle and Plato was somewhat different.
Thanks for your good wishes; I'd decided not to get involved in philosophy articles again, because the acrimony was worse than that encountered in almost any other part of Wikpedia (even in politics and religion it tends to be disguised a little better), so I'm a bit reluctant to continue with this. but we'll see. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:11, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
My take is this: If there are things-in-themselves (noumena) as differentiated from phenomena then Descartes leaves with his schema and even his duality somewhat intact after the damage assessment is over. Same with Plato and his Forms. Slice it however one likes, the philosophal approaches of both Plato and Descartes are highly a priori-oriented, even after they give due credence to the empirical method. Aristotle preferred to see in the whole of nature all the necessary attributes for discovery without reliance on an a priori system, and so did the empiricists (however much of a quandary they themselves got into with their opposite one-sided approach). Centuries later, William James identified the "demarcation line" quite succinctly: "The directly apprehended universe... requires no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a continuous or concatenated structure." And therein lies the rub — start speculating about what lies "beyond" and the door is wide open for all kinds of speculative tomfoolery. Enter, at that point, both Aristotle and the empiricists with stern expectations for reality checks.
But, I believe you've already phrased it well in the article by cautioning the reader about oversimplification, and also acknowledging that the classifications are useful for basic organizational purposes. So far so good, as I see it...Kenosis 18:13, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

Expansion

I have expanded this article, pinpointing the thought of the three great Rationalists, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Leibniz's section I believe is a little thin on the ground, and the other two may have room for improvement. I have left Kant in there for now, in that I like the section that was wrote on him. --Knucmo2 12:02, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Note that the principle of pre-established harmony doesn't explain mind-body interaction, as at the level of monads there's no such thing as body (it's a well-founded phenomenon). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:38, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

It's important not to turn this into an article about three philosophers; it should be about rationalism (in so far as that really existed). Discussion of content should also take place here, not in long comments in the article itself.

What? Since this a discussion of philosophers' work and the differences between them, the overlap is inevitable. Leibniz was dismayed by the lack of freedom (look at the sources I gave you) in Spinoza's system and its lack of reliance on Catholic theology, and Leibniz, as a pious man (whose project was to try and reconcile his religious beliefs with science) reacted to these radical ideas of Spinoza. It wouldn't bother me at all if either us were to abolish the idea of Leibniz's reaction to other thinkers in the article, but they served as useful contrasts between the thinkers, as I remember you declaring that differences between the philosophers need to be amplified. --Knucmo2 19:05, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Leibniz was Protestant... Moreover, his system lacked freedom to exactly the same extent that Spinoza's did, and for much the same reasons. Why do you think that Leibniz had one project, or that it involved the reconciliation of science and religion?
The philosophers should be examined with regard, not to their specific positions, but to the approach that led to them being called "rationalists" (and to the things that militate against that sort of labelling). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Think before you type. Where did I say that he only had one project? I am fully aware that the man, as a polymath had numerous aims. Don't you think that works such as "The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on Reason" (1714), and Discourse on the Conformity of Faith with Reason (Introduction to the Theodicy) point to a project of some sort of desire to reconciliate faith with science? Mechanics, and the sciences for Leibniz, are rooted in metaphysics; the mathematical and scientific laws of the phenomenal realm point point to the rational God of his system. Science and religion are therefore linked. He also believed reason would contribute to a reconciliation of the schism caused by Reformation. You are right in that Leibniz was a Protestant, but he believed in the validity of Catholic theology also, and as already mentioned, was not hostile to Catholics. --Knucmo2 23:04, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
  1. "whose project was", not "one of whose projects was".
  2. You're confusing reason with science.
  3. Why do you find it impossible to admit that you've made a slip. You said: "Leibniz was dismayed by [Spinoza's system's] lack of reliance on Catholic theology"; that is not consistent with his being a Protestant, no matter how little hostility he felt towards Catholics. That "he believed in the validity of Catholic theology" might be true, but he didn't believe in its truth. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Well, mainly it might be for the very same reason that you are guilty of the same thing, unwilling to accept that you are wrong on any issue whatsoever. I am stating this now before I pen any more responses. You are uncollaborative, and I refuse pointblank to collaborate with such an obstinate editor who enjoys to nitpick over minor issues and then transvalue them to mean something really big. For instance, why didn't you just correct my slip-up on grammar above rather than didactly mention it here? That directly contradicts your point that I refuse to admit mistakes. That is probably you, who is refusing to do that. I also notice you have not bothered to respond to my proposed settlement for this article yet, indicating evermore that you'd rather argue the toss with me than try and approach some settlement as regards this dispute. Correct me if I am wrong, for this point may very well be an argument from ignorance, but I am only going on what I have witnessed this as I write. I could have corrected the typos you made in your posts, but now I do not feel sufficiently charitable enough to do so. As for Leibniz's position, he did obviously believe in the validity and truth of some of the Catholic theology of his time, in that he tried to reconcile their principle of authority with the Protestant's freedom of action. He even wrote a statement of Catholic creeds entitled "Systema Theologicum", a piece of Catholic theology. With Des Bosses he reckoned that he could give an account of transubstantation acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants. Yes, he did think that reason would have been sufficient to heal the breach between the churches. So it is perfectly consistent with Leibniz's approach, in that he wanted a united church. Leibniz was concerned about preference between a doctrine of faith (as he was religious, I imagine) and an observation derived from the laws of nature and reason, and given that Leibniz said: "Science also serves as the foundation for friendship, which is only solid and lasting if it rests on reason" (Phil., VII, 43, 45, 46-7.), its fair to see how he thought science and reason as compatible. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

First:

K: "Where did I say that he only had one project?"
ME: "'whose project was', not 'one of whose projects was'."
K: "why didn't you just correct my slip-up on grammar above rather than didactly mention it here?" (!)
A linguistic slip-up, nothing more. --Knucmo2 17:14, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

Secondly:

K: "Leibniz was dismayed by [Spinoza's system's] lack of reliance on Catholic theology"
ME: "Leibniz was Protestant"
K: "he believed in the validity of Catholic theology"
ME: "that is not consistent with his being a Protestant"
K: "he did obviously believe in the validity and truth of some of the Catholic theology of his time" (my italics, to bring out the slide).

Oh, I can't be bothered with the rest. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 16:44, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

You can't be bothered because it's unclear as to what you are showing. You simply asserted the case that it's inconsistent, offering no justification for this other than your own oracular pronouncements - whereas I showed you evidence that he did believe in and trust the validity of some of the Catholic theology of his time with several examples, but go ahead, dismiss these too, its your tried and tested method. I didn't assume when I said: "lack of reliance on Catholic theology" that he believed all of it, so no slide can be said to have taken place, this is an illusion supplied by you to buttress your point, nor does it invalidate the examples I gave you, o Holy Oracle. --Knucmo2 17:14, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

With regard to a couple of substantive issues:

  1. The comment on innate ideas is oversimplified (especially given Leibniz's complex and sometimes obscure discussion).
  2. You keep saying that people like Descartes state or declare things; they argue.
  3. Leibniz certainly responded to Descartes, but the extent to which he's responding to Spinoza is much less clear. That he did so in the way and for the reasons that you give (which owes a great deal to a view of the issue developed later) is far less clear.
  4. It's a good idea not to lose your temper quite so early in a discussion. I have indeed read Leibiz, at great length and in depth — not only for both of my graduate degrees, but for papers and books that I've written, and for the teaching that I do, of which Leibniz is a regular part. That we disagree should not immediately be put down by you to my ignorance — that's not a very philosophical attitude. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:42, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
1. Point one is of course true - but it is invariably an idea associated with rationalism. If you had bothered to look, it was placed in the introduction, not the place for a lengthy excursus on a subject. A key idea is introduced, and simplified in an introduction, and then elaborated upon elsewhere. If you did an article on historical materialism, would you want to write about the complexity and the difference between Marx/Lenin's conception of it, all in the introduction? Of course not.
Just because something is in the summary doesn't mean that it can be oversimplified. Moreover, it's not clear that it's central or essential to any of three philosophers (though a certain view of them once led to its being exaggerated by historians of philosophy). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Well, innate ideas are essential to Descartes's position. And plus, why do you think the empricists attacked the idea of innate ideas??? If for nothing else it serves as a contrast to the empiricist viewpoint. It is so very obviously part of the rationalist position, and, just as one example, direct yourself to the Rationalism vs. Empiricism page at Stanford, a fine example, which makes judicious mention of it. Again, I think you are making the assumption that I am accused of in that we only disagree because you have superior knowledge of the philosophers in question. Descartes held that innate ideas are attributes of the human mind planted there by God, and these were held to be foundations for all other knowledge (as well as the Cogito). This was disputed by Locke, an empiricist.
No, innate ideas play no essential rôle in Descartes' main arguments, and certainly not as the basis of the cogito. This is a frequent (and sloppy) claim that used to be made by commentators, but you won't find it in Descartes. He mentions innate ideas, and seems fairly clearly to believe in their existence in some form, but that's a different matter.
As for your point about "the empiricists" attacking innate ideas, it depends upon the false and anachronistic assumption that any of these philosophers saw themselves as part of one or other group; that division came later, with Kant. Locke was arguing against a notion, not against a philosophical school whose existence he didn't recognise. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
The cogito is an essential, and supposedly indubitable basis for Descartes' system of knowledge. Descartes writes, of innate ideas: “on first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as remembering what I knew before”, furthermore, "[W]e come to know them by the power of our own native intelligence, without any sensory experience." Descartes is referring to what happens when the Cartesian method is used to discover innate ideas. Look at this page here too, which I trawled from Stanford: [1], which makes reference to primary and secondary sources by philosophers.
Of course the cogito is an essential and undubitable basis for Descartes' system; it's just not an innate idea. Without references or even context for the Descartes quotations, I can't comment. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Context was there, I was talking about innate ideas (What part about the sentence that precedes it: "Descartes writes that" do you not understand?) and that was not hard to see whatsoever (Innate ideas are grasped by reason. The quotation was from Descartes' Meditations, but I am not in the habit of footnoting quotations on editorial pages. You shall simply have to take my word for it, or open your own copy of it. I was not arguing that the cogito was an innate idea however, though I can understand as to why this misinterpretation has arose. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
If I can be unwise enough to butt in, I think this is a misunderstanding caused by an ambiguity in one of your sentences. You said: "Descartes held that innate ideas are attributes of the human mind planted there by God, and these were held to be foundations for all other knowledge (as well as the Cogito)". One reading of this implies that innate ideas are the foundation of the Cogito. I presume you intended the other reading, where the Cogito is one of the foundations for knowledge. Cadr 16:41, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
That the empiricists attacked innate ideas is not something I dispute. It just so happened that we've (and people before us) historically made a distinction between them in order to perhaps pigeonhole them. That Locke did argue against innate ideas, as an empiricist, shows a contrast with the rationalists. Leibniz argued for innate ideas too, pace Malebranche and Locke, and tried to show how they were possible in New Essays On Human Understanding. --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
You seem to have misunderstood what I said about innate ideas. there were various philosophers who held various positions and offered various arguments; it's possible to divide them up in many ways, all equally sensible. Largely because of Kant, one way – rationalists/Empiricists – has become standard, but it's artificial, and often misleading. That Locke argued against and Leibniz for innateness of different kinds (and they were often arguing about very different sorts of thing — innate knoeledge, principles, abilities, dispositions, etc.) is indisutable; to say that "the empiricists" argued against "the rationalists" is anachronistic. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Yes, Locke, as an empiricist argued against them, not because he was an empiricist. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
2. Point two is trivial. You may state or declare things, but that does not of necessity mean them to be true. Germany may state that someone has invaded their territory, or they may declare it, or they may even argue about it. Philosophers do declare matters, in that they reveal things, or make them manifest, or that they affirm things to be true. They also state things in that they set their arguments forth in words. My style therefore is fine. But I'll let you keep thinking that its a "substantive issue"!
The essence of philosophy is argument, but a common misconception is that it's the laying out of "deep" or significant opinions or beliefs. We should make sure that we don't pander to the popular view. yes, as a philosopher I do think that the nature of the philosophivcal enterprise is important; I'm not sure why you don't. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
You're making an irrelevant tempest out of an irrelevant teacup. What's more your mischaracterising my view, in an attempt at setting up a straw man. I have never denied that argument is part of philosophy (Where on earth have I ever said that???). You called to attention my use of verbs, which I showed to be valid in accordance with their definition, and now you want to make the invalid jump from this into accusing me of being non-philosophical!! This is a fine example of fallacious argumentation. For what it's worth, Plato referred to knowledge as "justified true belief", and declaring and asserting things are all done in the course of argument usually. I shall not nitpick over the use of verbs anymore like some sterile linguistic philosopher, and it is not pertinent to the issue WHATSOEVER. If I am grossly ungrammatical, then of course I am at fault for my LANGUAGE, not for my philosophy.
We seem to differ in that you think that one can use whatever words one wants so long as one's heart's in the right place, while I think that using the right word in the right place is an essential part of communication. i don't know what more to say, except to hope that your emotional rsponse has temporarily blinded you to the implications of what you're saying. Incidentally, Plato didn't refer to knowledge as justified true belief; that is one view that he considered in the Theaetetus, to be criticised, though I'm not clear in any case what relevanmce that has. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
I showed you the validity of the words that I used by providing definitions. It is not merely because I think their "heart's in the right place", a curious, if somewhat supercilious dismissal, but one which cannot be said to invalidate my point. If anyone is blind here, it is you who called me unphilosophical in your previous point, because of my usage of words (!) and then illogically inferred that I didn't think argument wasn't part of philosophy (What are we doing here?) The words themselves were not inherently unphilosophical any way. Then, I am accused of "emotional responses" to your posts. Sorry, but I am not wanting to shout you down in anyway, nor have I been the one mischaracterising other's views in an attempt at fallacious argument. That seems to me, an emotional response for you to keep in check also. Indeed, I said Plato referred to knowledge as "justified true belief" (I realised it was not a quotation from the Theaetetus) and that the account shows what a role beliefs play in philosophy. A belief is a conviction about the truth of the proposition. If someone disagrees with this belief, or does not like the justification for it, THEN they engage in argument. Beliefs therefore, are a massive part in philosophy, and they are frequently presupposed by philosophers, when they state or declare them in the course of their argument. I shall nitpick about this no more. --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
It's worrying that you took a comment that one of your arguments was unphilosophical as a personal attack on you as unphilosophical. This is another indication that your emotional heat is leading you astray. Similarly, it's disturbing that you take my request that we describe philosophers as arguing rather than merely stating as a claim that you don't think that argument is philosophically important.
That beliefs are propositional attitudes is one view (and one that I broadly sympathise with), but not the only one. Moreover, that knowledge is a kind of belief that meets certain consitions is a view that Plato rejects; he holds that belief and knowledge are distinguished in large part by their objects.
I clearly wasn't claiming that beliefs aren't important to philosophers; I was saying that when one presents the work of philosophers it can be misleading to present them as being primarily defined by their conclusions rather than by the arguments they offer. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
It is worrying that you are now twisting the meaning of your original arguments in order to suit your latest ones; you said: "Yes, as a philosopher I do think that the nature of the philosophivcal [sic] enterprise is important; I'm not sure why you don't." The nature being argument. Thus, you clearly said that I don't take argument as important. My "emotional heat" has not led me astray one etch on this matter, but this is just another example of knee-jerk dismissal by you rather than consideration. As for your last point, you're contradicting yourself yet again. You said: "but a common misconception is that it's the laying out of "deep" or significant opinions or beliefs". Deep, insightful beliefs are laid out in the process of philosophy, and they are part of which lead to arguments and conclusions. Your original point was a minor one about my use of verbs (which you thought was a substantive issue) and you made a sweeping generalisation from this that I didn't care for argument in philosophy. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
3. Point three confirms my point adroitly. Since the time of your dismissal of my sources, and the time you've posted this remark on "issues", no sufficient time will have passed for you to have read any of the sources I've offered to you, let alone any time to consider them, or reconsider your own viewpoint. What's more, you simply say its clear that he definitely did respond to Descartes. Well, please show me this, for this seems just as unclear as the Spinoza reception, which is far more convenient to resolve given the historical information I have given you to read (but which you have not, as of yet). It is granted that Leibniz called Descartes' system "defective".
I'm surprised that you're still talking as though I don't have an intimate knowledge of these philosophers, and that I rely upon your references to inform me of their work. Both Spinoza and Leibniz make many references to Descartes, both making explicit reference to him in developing their own systems of thought; this is beyond debate, a matter of simple fact, and it's surprising that you think it unclear. Leibniz's meeting with Spinoza gave rise to some work on matters such as the ontological argument, and Leibniz was indeed aware of his positions more generally, and largely disagreed with him, but I know of no argument that this played a significant rôle in the development of Leibniz's own thought. (Try looking up "Descartes" and "Spinoza" in the index of a collection of Leibniz's works. The Loemker edition, for example, has twenty-eight entries for Spinoza, all but one single-page mentions, and sixty-four for Descartes, more than half of them spanning multiple pages. While both Spinoza and Leibniz wrote substantial works on the philosophy of Descartes (such as Leibniz's "Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes" (1692) and, of course, Spinoza's "Descartes' Principles of Philosophy" (1663)), Leibniz only wrote one short and fragmentary piece on Spinoza, devoted to the ontological argument and to possibility. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
To talk as if you DID have an intimate knowledge would be to make a false presupposition, as you've given me no other reason to suppose this other than your word and a few corrections about where I've gone wrong on Leibniz, parts that where wrote entirely from memory. I don't doubt you have some knowledge of Leibniz, but you are unwilling to address the sources given. I would say THAT is ignorance. Alfred Weber said: "The life of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, like his doctrine, forms the counterpart of Spinoza's." If you wish to doubt the veracity of the sources I have presented to you, then that is your own separate enterprise. Write to the authors themselves. But I notice you still haven't bothered to read them. You may have better things to do, but until that, don't bother dismissing my contributions please. Note that I presented an actual reference to Leibniz! Perhaps you've addressed these sources in these books of yours? 28 is not enormously smaller than 64. Plato and Zeno perhaps have unequal places in terms of reference in Aristotle's work, but that doesn't lessen the significance of Zeno's arguments against motion and the effect they had on Aristotle does it? Or the course it had on the physics book he wrote. You seem to be arguing that frequency determines significance. Even if Leibniz didn't consciously react to Spinoza, his theory his in contradiction to Spinoza in quite a few ways. Philosophers can work against each other without making it explicit (the conclusions of their theories may imply an objection to a precedessor). It would hard to be deny that their meeting had a great effect thought that is impossible to determine. It is worth mentioning the difference in the article, something YOU specifically appealed for.
  1. Primary sources trump secondary.
  2. As I made clear, it isn't simply a matter of 28 vs 64 (though I'd have thought that more than double was fairly significant). The mentions of Spinoza almost all consist of single lsentences on one page (and closer inspection reveals that some of them are in editorial footnotes); more than half the mentions of Descartes cover more than a page, often significantly more. You go on to appeal to interpretation and surmise, which we can't depend upon. We can say that Leibniz disagreed with Spinoza, but not that (we think it's obvious that) he wrote as he did in response to Spinoza. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
My sources that I gave, as secondary as they are, are more than just interpretation and surmise, and actually, I believe I referred you to a Leibniz source also, whilst quoting some illuminating passages from his work. However, I believe we are approaching a settlement on this matter in that we can mention it was opposed to Spinoza's theory but not wrote directly in response to thereof. That would be fine, from where I stand. --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
4. Point four is pathetic and patronising. I appreciate you may have had a solid education in Leibniz, but your dismissals rather than showing why my sources are not as good as yours did not suggest this. You have clearly not had enough time to comment that the sources I gave are not "clear". It's very possible that we have both read Leibniz but are coming towards it from different angles, which will of course depend on our own individual readings of it. This would be unfortunate. I didn't accuse you of ignorance per se, I simply gave you sources to justify my belief. If you teach in philosophy, then you are a valuable asset to Wikipedia. --Knucmo2 18:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
?? How is it patronising to object to your assumption that, because we disagree, I can't have read Leibniz? Again, the use of words like "pathetic" and "patronising" seem designed merely to raise the emotional temperature; why? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Not at all. I found you accusing me of accusing of something I didn't. I asked you to read the sources I gave to you for my case, but you haven't yet. I have plenty more sources too, and of course my knowledge of Leibniz. The raising of emotional voltage in no way diminishes my commitment to the cause here, nor my capacity to argue, to resolve some sort of dispute. As such your charge is irrelevant here. I can hardly be said to have been uncivil.
Well, actually referring to another's comments as "pathetic and patronising" is uncivil on any account, but I've been trying to avoid accusations of that sort; I'm simply trying to get you to calm down. You might think that your emotional state doesn't affect the clarity and cogency of your arguments, but that would make you non-human. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
I've recognised that an emotional state in my case changes the focus my argument rather than distorts it, though I've never it lost so much on Wikipedia (nor in any debate AFAIK) as to start shouting at others. If I have created a climate of "greater conflict and stress" I will accept responsibility for my part of it, though I hope my recent posts can point the way to some sort of agreement. --Knucmo2 10:54, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
As for Leibniz answering the mind-body problem, yes he did, by simply denying that there was dualism. Mind and body are composed of the same substance (monads). This could be elaborated in the article with some degree of coherence and relevance.
This article is about rationalism; the place for an explanation of Leibniz's philosophical position is in an article on Leibniz, surely. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Now you wish to deny the significance of Cartesian dualism in relation to rationalist philosophers and that subsequent RATIONALIST philosophers wanted to plug the gap or abolish it? Fantastic. Go ahead and delete the parts on Spinoza's rationalism that deal with it. --Knucmo2 22:49, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Descartes is the only one of the three so-called rationalists to have been a Cartesian dualist; Locke was a Cartesian dualist, and though Hume isn't, he leans towards it more than either Spinoza or Leibniz. You seem to be confusing an important thesis of one philosopher with a defining element of a supposed school. If anything, dualism is significant precisely because it marks one of the ways in which this distinction is faulty. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
Descartes' dualism is clear enough to me as his theories go. He seems to have given it a clear exposition in the Meditations, by separating the mind and the body, so no, there is no confusion here. Indeed, Meditation VI refers to "And Of The Real Distinction Between The Mind And Body Of Man". My point was that the great Rationalists in the article have approached the "problem" by postulating different solutions. Spinoza penned a pan-psychical response to the mind-body problem and Leibniz wanted to do away with it, introducing Monads. As you said, there is significant evidence of Leibniz having read Descartes in his works, so Leibniz must have been aware of the quandary of Cartesian dualism. I didn't mean to say that Leibniz nor Spinoza were Cartesian dualists. --Knucmo2 10:09, 13 April 2006 (UTC) --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
  1. But where do you find me arguing that Descartes wasn't a dualist?
  2. He didn't separate mind and body, he argued for a Real Distinction between them; although he believed (as a Christian of a certain sort) that the mind survived the body's death, he recognised that he couldn't demonstrate this. It's logically possible that mind and body be separate (and hence they can't be the same thing — they're really Distinct, are different substances), but it may not be possible given the nature of the world. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
And where did I accuse you of denying Descartes' dualism? I was simply saying that Descartes explains his dualism clearly, not an accusation of your lack of knowledge (I believe I've given you credit enough for your knowledge elsewhere). Separation and distinction should be taken as synonyms in my point above. In talking about the mind, and the body, he gives them separate attributes, and as you say, it's logically possible that the mind and body can be distinct and separate. That notwithstanding, your point above: "It's logically possible that mind and body be separate (and hence they can't be the same thing — they're really Distinct, are different substances)" is not relevant here as its a comment on the truthhood of dualism, not pertinent to the article. This is the end of my involvement forthwith. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

"Separation and distinction should be taken as synonyms in my point above"! This, together with some almost wilful misreadings of what I've said mean that there's little point continuing with this discussion.

The main point is that whatever is written in the article should be sourced, and involve no original research. Let's make sure that that is the case. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 16:36, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

You've taken the above point and generalised it to most of the other points I made, dismissing them as "wilful misreadings" despite offering no sort of response to them, a wilful false generalisation if ever there was one. If my misreadings were indeed misreadings, they were certainly not misread perversely. That sort of a false presumption isn't very philosophical, nor is it warranted. I have offered, as you have, sources both primary and secondary (actually, you've mentioned barely any throughout this debate) The discussion must cease, for Wikipedia is not an academic battleground --Knucmo2 16:59, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Arghhh, I'm not gonna bother striking through any of the above, it should be preserved, if only as a reminder to me and others be more civil. I apologise for being frequently uncivil and aggressive during this debate. We've managed to avoid an edit war, a positive, and I shall instead hope to find a consensus based on the principle mentioned above: WP:NOT --Knucmo2 14:12, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
We've both been getting over-heated. Perhaps we can put all the above behind us and start again. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:11, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

Ockham's Eraser

JA: Under the rubric, "Do not ramify subtext beyond necessity", I am moving one editorical comment to the talk page, so that it can be archived for all posteriority. Jon Awbrey 12:27, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

Leibniz developed his theory of monads in response to both Descartes and Spinoza <!-- this is speculation (and not convincing, to be honest), because he found that Spinoza's response to the [[mind-body problem]] did not allow for [[individuation]]-->.

On speculation

JA: The way I read them, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza are not just rational thinkers but speculative thinkers, and we need to exercise caution to avoid a type of misunderstanding that often arises in presenting the work of speculative thinkers. A speculative reasoner can present one sort of speculative system on a Monday morning, a very different system on a Tuesday afternoon, and an utterly fantastic system on a Sunday evening. But they can be, and in the case of these three, certainly were, just as acquainted with ordinary reality as anybody has to be in order to get through life, and they do not of necessity contradict themsleves anymore than Walt Whitman did. In the case of Leibniz especially, his speculations about what God knows and when he knows it have to be keep in a separate hamper from his knowledge of what we "fallible and mortal finite information critters" (FAMFIC's) know and how we come to know it. Jon Awbrey 12:48, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

They are historically classed as rationalists as opposed to empiricists. They may be speculative but then so were the idealists (even more so perhaps). Pretty much every philosopher, amateur and professional is in consensus about this. Hence on my course when I was taught about the rationalists, Spinoza, Leibniz et. al were mentioned. What are you on about when you talk about FAMFIC's? --Knucmo2 18:04, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

Malebranche et al.

As already mentioned, the less prominent rationalists have no mention in the article as of yet. How are we to go about mentioning their rationalist "credentials" without turning it into a full summary of their works. Somehow, the distinctly "rationalist" parts have to be emphasised. Is Gassendi a rationalist by the way? --Knucmo2 18:03, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

Well, as the category "Rationalists" is artificial and a bit vague in the first place, it's not easy to say definitively who ought to be placed in it. On the whole, I'd say that Gassendi shares enough with the Rationalists to be included (though his views on, for example, the possibility of deriving scientific knowledge through the senses changed through his life, and his scepticism and Epicureanism might be taken to set him apart from the Rationalists). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 20:53, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
Hmm, I agree that the distinction is a little artificial. How about Malebranche? I'm not overly familiar with his works as I am with Gassendi's. Two good books that collaborators on this article might want to read are Cottingham, J. (Major Descartes scholar) Rationalism and Aune, B. Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism: An Introduction, as they are valuable secondary resources we'll be able to use for the article and they're notable for their clarity in drawing out similarities and differences between the philosophers. --Knucmo2 21:35, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Requested Move: Should Continental Rationalism be merged with the Rationalism article?

I vote no. As a user with a PhD in Philosophy, I think that (a) the current Continental Rationalism article provides a sober, satisfactory description of some of the modern rationalist philosophers, but (b) the current Rationalism article veers into what many academic philosophers think of as fringe material involving free thinking and anti-religious humanism. (a) Philosophical rationalism is generally seen as following a distinctly separate path from empiricism, but (b) humanistic "rationalism" is often seen as closely allied with contemporary scientific empiricism. Bottom Line: I don't think that the prospects are good for merging these 2 articles. I'd suggest instead that the current Rationalism article be left as is and that Continental Rationalism be expanded into something like Rationalism in Academic Philosophy, so that the thought of classical and medieval philosophical rationalists like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas can be included, as well as 20th century philosophical rationalists like Brand Blanshard or Henry Veatch. --WikiPedant 03:18, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

You are saying precisely what I have been trying to say. I propose not that they be merged, but that rationalism should either redirect here or continental rationalism should be moved there. The content currently found at rationalism could be moved to something like rationalist movement. As is, it gives many people the wrong impression of what rationalism means in philosophy. Srnec 04:27, 12 July 2006 (UTC)
Yes, Srnec, now I see what you have in mind. Your suggestion works for me. It keeps the articles separate and rightly gives the name Rationalism to the academic philosophical stream. Sorry for misunderstanding your intent. --WikiPedant 18:08, 12 July 2006 (UTC)
Because nobody else but you has responded to dispute tags and move requests, I have unilaterally moved rationalism to rationalist movement and made the former a redirect here. There is a disambiguation page at rationalism (disambiguation). I still think this page ought to be moved to rationalism and continental rationalism ought to redirect there. Srnec 20:16, 12 July 2006 (UTC)
I agree that the correct next step is to move this page to Rationalism and redirect Continental Rationalism there. --WikiPedant 21:07, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: People are not following the proper protocols for page moves. When they do, I will vote that the best name for the philosophical position commonly associated with Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, et al. in Enlightenment Days and let us say Chomsky in recent times is just plain vanilla Rationalism. And please, I don't want to return here in the Fall and find an article entitled Just Plain Vanilla Rationalism. Jon Awbrey 21:18, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

Removed redirect and placed existing content in rationalism

I've removed the redirect from rationalism to here, and placed the current content from this article in that one. Judging by the discussion above, this article may be merged anyway, and I have no judgment or strong opinion about such a move. But a redirect from "rationalism" to "continental rationalism" makes little sense. If there's any strong disagreement about that, by all means revert. ... Kenosis 23:47, 14 July 2006 (UTC) ... I also added stub sections for Plato et al and the neo-Platonists, with no judgment about how exactly that should all be sectioned in the end. ... Kenosis 23:49, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

Folks, take a look at meta:Help:Moving a page and Wikipedia:How to fix cut and paste moves. It's not just a cut-and-paste. Banno 00:40, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: We are in the middle of considering a move from continental rationalsim to rationalism. The way this usually goes, Nightstallion or somebody will check out the vote after few days and do the move or not accordingly. I do however continue to stress that continental rationalism is a misnomer given the geography and history of the "position" that standardly goes by the name rationalism, as anybody can check in the literature if they believe in that sort of fact-checking nonsense. Jon Awbrey 02:56, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Requested move

Survey

Add *Support or *Oppose followed by an optional one-sentence explanation, then sign your opinion with ~~~~

Discussion

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I'm not ready to vote on this (in part because it seems that someone didn't quite follow etiquette here -- the rationalism page has already been turned into a redirect; that should have waited, moi), but it seems to me we need to consider whether we really need this change. Note: I'm a philosopher, and, myself, say "rationalism" to refer to the thought of Descartes, Leibniz, and (generally) Spinoza. But now that Wikipedia is becoming international, we need to keep in mind the broader perspectives of people from Asia, South America, etc. It might be seen -- somewhat goofily or not -- that three European dudes shouldn't be able to "own" as important a word as rationalism.

Basically, what do we lose by keeping this article at Continental rationalism, and opening the article like so:

"Continental rationalism (generally referred to simply as "rationalism" by scholars of European philosophy) is an approach to philosophy ..."

?

Not trying to be difficult; I've just been starting to appreciate how much many users around the world are frustrated by the Western focus of the English Wikipedia (which has become the de facto international Wikipedia). And, again: what do we lose by saying "Continental rationalism"? Note, also, the use of the term 'Continental rationalism' is not at all "rare" in the U.S. and Canada. --Cultural Freedom talk 2006-07-13 07:07 (UTC)

JA: The term "Continental" is inaccurate and misleading as rationalism is a logical element of many philosophies that are found on many other continents both before and after the fluorescing of the Big Three Enlighteners of undergraduate philosophy courses. The basic tenet is the pertinence of rational concepts, or concepts of the reason, and it is thus a minimal form of opposition to nominalism. This is the reason for its being taken up in the late great cognitive revolution by Chomsky and others as a counterpoint to the nominal replacement for psychology proper that was represented by behaviorism. Making sense of its influence through history is nearly impossible under the onus of the label "Continental". Jon Awbrey 14:02, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

The adjective "Continental" should be dropped from the name of this article. Rationalism is one of the most established currents in philosophy, ranging from the Ancient Greeks (not usually considered "continentals" in philosophy) to contemporary North American philosophers. I believe there was a rationalist school in classical Hindu philosophy, but have no expertise in this. There were certainly rationalists among the major medieval Islamic philosophers (largely under the influence of Aristotle). The modern continental rationalists (Descartes through Kant) as well as all of the other schools and time periods can be suitably covered in subsections of a single article on rationalism. It is simply unacceptable for an encyclopedia of any consequence to fail to have a primary article on philosophical rationalism. WikiPedant 17:13, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

I admit to not following protocols, but that was because the situation was already confusing and I think there was misinformation. The primary purpose of moving rationalism to rationalist movement and redirecting it to continental rationalism was to draw attention to the problem and to fix the major problem of misinformation: rationalism in philosophical discussion describes continental rationalism. The word has connotations outside of philosophy that have led it to be applied to many different schools and modes of thought which are not in any way rationalist (note I did not say rational). Rationalism, in philosophy, is shorthand for continental rationalism. Rationalism may have more than one dictionary definition, but only this sense is an encyclopaedia topic. The fact that people like Richard Dawkins have inappropriately misappropriated the term for themselves does not change its actual meaning even if many people (non-philosophers to be sure) have accepted this "new" definition: similar to using "materialism" as a synonym for "greed." Srnec 17:23, 13 July 2006 (UTC)
No prob about not following protocols! I also believe in the WP "Be Bold" dicate. I have no problem dropping "Continental" from the name, as long as the article is (or becomes) about rationalism in general. Right now, it's almost entirely about Continental Rationalism :). --Cultural Freedom "talk" 2006-07-13 17:52 (UTC)

JA: Similar problems affect the philosophical use of the term Pragmatism, which has come to have many meanings among both literate and illiterate philosophers in addition to the ordinary variety of popular and non-technical uses. Rather than lend diplomatic recognition to every new "movement" that comes down the pike, it was thought preferable there to create a catch-all article Pragmatism (non-technical). You might find this a better idea in this situation, too. Jon Awbrey 17:40, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

After examining the Pragmatism (non-technical) page, I'm inclined to think that it should be redone as a standard Widipedia disambiguation page. This seems to be exactly the kind of situation that disambiguation pages are intended to deal with. Srnec has already created a Rationalism (disambiguation) page, and I think this will serve well as the "catch-all" for Rationalism. WikiPedant 21:13, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: Probably best to discuss all that at Talk:Pragmatism (non-technical usage). But I can fill you in on the features of its peculiar history — not all of which I know about — that are pertinent to the situation here. The page was once a lot larger but had a lot of content deleted by one editor back in April that nobody else has gotten around to giving a second look, and it just got rewritten by the addition of some new material that is still in flux, and so it does look a little "dabby". But it was not intended as a dab page so much as place to treat the everyday meanings of the word pragmatism. Most likely the name would eventually be shortened to something less awkward sounding. Jon Awbrey 21:30, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

Let's stay on-topic here, folks. Banno 21:50, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

The real problem here is that continental rationalism and the modern rationalist movement are so different as to be almost antonymous: most people describing themselves falsely as "rationalists" because (it seems) they oppose "religion" are in fact empiricists, which would be the opposing philosophy of rationalism. This is why there can be no overarching rationalism page. We need a rationalist movement page and a continental rationalism page with a dab page. The question, then, is: should rationalism be the dab page or the site of continental rationalism? I vote to keep it the latter in accordance with most encyclopaedias and philsophical usage (it is a philosophical term). Srnec 03:07, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: Rationalism is not a school, it's an aspect of almost any, er, rational philosophy. Some philosophers emphasize this aspect more than others, and depending on arbitrary thresholds in the eye of the observer they get classified as "rationalists". As I have already pointed out, the fact that things like grammatical categories — say, NP, VP, etc. — are rational concepts, that is to say, concepts that extend beyond the finite empirical data given, is an important feature of "modern" cognitive science since the mid 1950's. For another example, even though Peirce is known for roundly criticizing significant features of Cartesian philosophy, he concurs with Descartes on the importance of rational concepts in this sense, and this is in fact one of the things that separates Peirce's original version of pragmatism from the radically naive empiricisms that James and the early but not the late Dewey sometimes drifted off into. Jon Awbrey 03:22, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: As for the term "modern rationalism", this is a non-notable neologism that is not recognized in philosophy. The fact that anybody with a radio talk show these days can declare a new "movement" in pop philosophy, and most of them already have, witness truthiness, does not make that movement notable in reputable philosophical circles. Jon Awbrey 03:30, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

What are you trying to say? I, too, would not call rationalism a school, but is not an aspect of almost any philosophy. Empiricists may be rational, but not rationalistic. Some schools of rationalism and empiricism may share concepts, but they differ foundationally. Srnec 03:46, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: Let's see if we can find some common definitions. How about the informal definition of rational concept that I gave above? Do we share an understanding of the difference between rational concepts and empirical concepts? For example, the rational concept of a Sentence is something that covers an infinite number of instances, whereas my empirical concept of a Sentence covers exactly the finite number of sentences that I have seen in my finite experience up to this point in time. Jon Awbrey 03:58, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Srnec 04:03, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: Okay. Then let's see if we agree about the uses and abuses of ideal types, analytic ideals, what are more humbly known as textbook caricatures. For example, I am mostly concerned with scientific inquiry, and I find that all scientific inquirers, in actu, are mixed cases of empiricists and rationalists, no matter how the textbooks classify them, and no matter even how they might have depicted themselves, in armchairum. Do you observe this too? Jon Awbrey 04:16, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

As a rationalist, I do find that it is impossible to think without a priori knowledge and scientific inquireres are no exception. Certainly any scientist who wishes to maintain his sanity (or the sanity of his science) would be forced to abandon a Humean scepticism, which they could only do, while accepting Humean empiricism, if they accepted certain rationalist presuppositions. I hope that made sense. Srnec 04:32, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: I'll take that as a yes, if only because it's late here, and I want to rush on by the nuances of a priori that might still force us to backtrack later.

JA: Now, scientific inquiry is really just a disciplined form of common sense, in a reflective and self-critical sense of common sense. And so common sense, which nobody gets through their day without, is a mixture of empirical and rational ingredients. That is, to come toward the middle from the rationalist side, even people who easily fess up to using rational concepts will also admit to using classes of rational concepts that they find themselves, willy nilly, testing against experience for the sake of judging their utility. Maybe some concepts are excluded from that testing, but hardly all of them are. Are we still on the same page about all this? Jon Awbrey 05:00, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

Science is not "commonsense". It is anything but the obvious. See quantum mechanics. Be clear with your terms in discussion. --Knucmo2 15:48, 29 July 2006 (UTC)
What types of "rational concepts" can be "test[ed] against experience for the sake of judging their utility"? And what does this mean epistemologically? It only means that we accept some rational concept as being good for attaining some end if we already accept the likelihood of the future resembling the past, which is a rational concept, for it certainly cannot be determined empirically. In the end, we haven't verified anything empirically even if we test some rational concept against experience. I don't think were still on the same page, but perhaps I should say that "common sense" may just refer to those assumptions which we accept as grounded without being commonly aware of their ground. Whether they are grounded or not, or whether that ground is empirical or rational is the real question. Srnec 18:32, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: In the realm of lingusitics we have the rational concepts of a Language, a Sentence, a Noun Phrase, a Verb Phrase, and so on.

JA: One of the things that we expect of rational concepts is that they will have definitions that can be reasoned from in a purely a priori deductive manner, without any necessary reference to any realm of experience outside the experience of reasoning with the elements that are admitted into a suitably well-defined domain. And there is no doubt that we have something approaching a pure rational system in the example of formal language theory. Historically speaking, of couse, we never would've thought of such things if it had not been for our natural interest in natural languages, but once the realm of formal abstractions is formed it tends to rule itself by its own rules, as if it were autonomous and independent of experience.

JA: But I think that even Cartesian linguists like Chomsky consider themselves to be engaged in an empirical science of linguistics, and so they must bring the purely rational concepts and rubbery definitions of Language, Sentence, Part of Speech and so on to meet the road of actual parts of speech, real live sentences, and natural languages. And they will judge rational concepts of all of these things as being more or less useful for explaining the properties of their putative empirical instances.

JA: Something like that is what I think I had in mind when I wrote that hazy stuff late last night. Jon Awbrey 19:25, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

But would not a rationalist regard actual language as an expression of conceptual language? That is to say, language exists in the mind without being accessible to the senses. We can express it in writing (visual), speech (audial), braille (tactile), and many other ways which utilise the senses, but ultimately the sensible language derives its value from "fundamental properties of the mind" which are not empirical. Language can be contrasted with jibberish: I can construct a language of my own, but I can also construct jibberish and they are distinguishable. Whether or not either language actually exists, I can differentiate them based on these "fundamental properties of the mind". That is to say, I need not have actual languages to know what is fundamental to language. That actual languages possess these features is not empirically derived, but known aforehand. I can't see that language is dependent on sense experience. Can you explain why language must be accessible to the senses to be known? Or am I misunderstanding you? Srnec 20:25, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: I don't know what a person whom you call a rationalist would say say about language, since I don't know whether we are using that word the same way. So maybe it's time to go back and see if we've made any headway with the initial question.

JA: I started out with the following statement:

JA: Rationalism is not a school, it's an aspect of almost any rational philosophy. Some philosophers emphasize this aspect more than others, and depending on arbitrary thresholds in the eye of the observer they get classified as "rationalists".

JA: And you expressed puzzlement with this in the following words:

What are you trying to say? I, too, would not call rationalism a school, but is not an aspect of almost any philosophy. Empiricists may be rational, but not rationalistic. Some schools of rationalism and empiricism may share concepts, but they differ foundationally. Srnec 03:46, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: So we agree that rationalism is not a school, but just what sort of thing it is we have yet to decide. Just off the top of my head I called it an aspect of any philosophy that employs reason. This is probably because I consider the bare use of rational concepts to be the birth of rationalism. But we are many things at birth that we are not yet conscious of being, so maybe I should wait until a thinker is conscious of using rational concepts before I call him or her a rationalist. What do you think?

JA: Or maybe we should reserve the term rationalist for the thinker who is not merely a user of rational concepts but who asserts and truly believes that he or she has no need of anything else but rational concepts — well, they usually say in principle here. How about that? Jon Awbrey 21:04, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

To call it an "aspect of any philosophy that employs reason" is too broad. I think we may both have equivocated on the meaning of the term "rational concepts", but I'm not going to re-read this whole discussion. I think consciousness of rational concepts is still too broad. Your subsequent definition seems too narrow. I think most rationalists would assert that we have need of more than rational concepts to discover certain things. I cannot rationally deduce the colour of an apple, but I cannot know anything empirically without rational concepts first. They are precedent and foundational. To be able to know everything knowable in principle without recourse to empiricism is, I believe, a minority viewpoint even among those who are clearly not empiricist but tend towards rationalism. Unless of course one argues that all is reasoned by God and not known to him empirically, but to finite beings, such knowledge is inaccessible. This may be knowable if we recourse to empiricism founded on some divine characteristic (as Descartes did and as C.S. Lewis did). It seems to me now that the best definition of rationalism defines it as that philosophy which considers all knowledge to be ultimately grounded in reason and places empirical knowledge in a secondary position. Or, "reason is necessary for all knowledge and nothing is known solely empirically." Perhaps this is what you've been saying. How do you find this defintion? Srnec 21:28, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: That nothing is known solely via experience I take to be a no-brainer, but that's just me. But are you saying that your definition of an empiricist is someone who thinks that some things are known solely empirically? Is there really any such critter? I mean someone who actually thinks that, not just someone who says they think that. Jon Awbrey 21:38, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

I agree. The definition now sounds too broad. But did not those British empiricists (like John Locke) allege that man was born a tabula rasa on which was engrained the content of experience alone? I checked Encarta (because it was easy) and it defines empiricism that way:
a doctrine that affirms that all knowledge is based on experience, and denies the possibility of spontaneous ideas or a priori thought.
Its definition of rationalism is far broader and vaguer:
a system of thought that emphasizes the role of reason in obtaining knowledge
So there definitely exist people who would (I think) accept the definitions I gave above. Whether those are the best definitions still seems up in the air. I think perhaps rationalism begins at "all knowledge is a priori" and migrates to a middle ground which still emphasises reason, while empiricism begins at "all knowledge is a posteriori" and migrates to a middle ground which emphasises experience. Srnec 23:18, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: It's common to observe that there's quite a bit of wiggle room in that concept of "based on experience", and there are at least three different ways of reading a priori, somewhat analogous to the three nuances of the Greek archein, which can mean (1) to begin (2) to lead (3) to rule. But a couple of Golden Buddha Margaritas at our Chinese restaurant have left me in an East-West krater too deep to see the rim, so I'll have to leave this until the dawn. Jon Awbrey 03:18, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

GF: In the description of René Descartes' rationalism, isn't the sentence "Descartes thought that only knowledge of eternal truths [...] could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method." contradicted by the first sentence in the second paragraph: "Descartes therefore argued, as a result of his method, that reason alone determined knowledge, and that this could be done independently of the senses."

Compromise, continental rationalism and the rationalist movement

There are two distinct forms of rationalism; the first is a philosophical school deriving from Descartes, opposed to empiricism, and dealt with in the present article. The other relates to humanist ideas of the 19th century, and is closely allied with secularism and scepticism, and is dealt with at Rationalist movement. (Incidentally, that page needs work).

My preference is to have the present article moved to rationalism, and disambiguation links to the other pages; this reflects the more common usage.

Septentrionalis, would this be an acceptable compromise? Kenosis, I'm afraid I disagree with your reason given above. i think that the two forms of rationalism are sufficiently distinct that it would be misleading to include mention of Descartes and co. in the Rationalist movement article. I hope you will agree to not including it.

Failing that, perhaps Jon, Wikipedant, and Srnec would accept moving the disambiguation page to rationalism and leaving this material here. Although not my preferred option, I would be willing to accept this.

Let's work towards a compromise, before the talk page becomes a quagmire. Banno 23:28, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

It should be pointed out that, should this page be moved, there would be a considerable workload involved in disambiguation and re-directing links to this article. Banno 23:38, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

Nothing quagmirish yet, just friendly discussion on a philosophical definition. Your proposal is my proposal. Srnec 23:44, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: In the sources that I have found so far continental rationalism is a subtopic under rationalism. It usually noted that (1) that the label continental rationalism was concocted much later and (2) few of the writers so labelled would have considered thenselves members of a single "school", especially one that amounted to an "ism" of such extreme beliefs. Jon Awbrey 15:42, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Both points are true. But the title of the present article is continental rationalism, not just rationalism; that is, the subject of the present article should be the philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza. Some might think recent edits preempt the results of the discussion by unilaterally merging rationalism with continental rationalism. Might I suggest that the article not be further edited until a consensus is reached? Banno 19:54, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: There is compromise and then there is compromising the integrity of articles. I have documented what rationalism normally means in philosophy. All of the standard reference works that I have looked at so far say roughly the same things. Continental rationalism is a label that some use for a period in the history of rationalism, and others object to as a misleading concoction of textbook writers from a later age, so there's not much use having a separate article for it, as main articles on the main lights already exist. I just don't find reputable sources referring to anything called the Rationalist Movement, so that is at present a non-notable concoction. We can always do what we had to do with Pragmatism, and document the non-technical uses in a separate article, or maybe just a paragraph about "general use" somewhere. Jon Awbrey 20:10, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

"I have documented what rationalism normally means in philosophy." Yes, you have; but in an article entitled, specifically, continental rationalism. If your edits are kept, then there is no choice but to move the article to rationalism. Does anyone object to doing this? Banno 20:37, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: What are you saying? Four people, including yourself, have already voted to rename this article to Rationalism. Jon Awbrey 20:44, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: I am writing the article on Rationalism. The title Rationalism redirects to here. Jon Awbrey 20:48, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

If that does not strike you as an odd task to set yourself, prior to the movement of this article to rationalism, then I am at a loss. Consider the point moot.Banno 21:43, 16 July 2006 (UTC)
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