Talk:Principal–agent problem/Archives/2016
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Dr. Cabrales's comment on this article
Dr. Cabrales has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
It seems quite complete, but it would be better with some more technical background, as the cheap talk entry.
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
Dr. Cabrales has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:
- Reference : Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2012. "The Appeal of Information Transactions," Economics Working Papers we1224, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economia.
ExpertIdeasBot (talk) 11:00, 28 May 2016 (UTC)
Dr. Corgnet's comment on this article
Dr. Corgnet has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
* The article is (as is typical in Wikipedia) accurate but relatively unstructured.
- Missing references are:
- For incentives structures, I believe reference to firing incentives should be included: G.S. Becker, G.J. Stigler Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers J. Legal Stud., 3 (1) (1974), pp. 1–18 B. Corgnet R. Hernán and S. Rassenti Firing Threats and Tenure in Virtual Organizations: Incentives Effects and Impression Management” Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 97–113 (with R. Hernán and S. Rassenti) W.B. MacLeod, J. Malcomson Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment Econometrica, 57 (2) (1989), pp. 447–480 C. Shapiro, J. Stiglitz Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device Amer. Econ. Rev., 74 (3) (1984), pp. 433–444
- For the subjective performance evaluation paragraph: Baker, G., Gibbons, R., Murphy, K.J., 1994. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1125-1156.
- It would be valuable to mention that principal-agent models have been applied in non-business fields such as Biology. Also, when talking about applications a reference on using principal-agent to understand Brain functioning would be of value, see references below:
"Resource Allocation in the Brain" R. Alonso, I. Brocas and J.D. Carrillo, Review of Economic Studies (2014)."From Perception to Action: an Economic Model of Brain Processes" I. Brocas and J.D. Carrillo, Games and Economic Behavior (2012).
"The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization" I. Brocas and J.D. Carrillo, American Economic Review (2008).
- References to principal-agent model with non-standard preferences such as loss aversion would be of great value (behavioal contract theory):
- On loss aversion in principal-agent models: De Meza, D. and D. Webb. (2007): “Incentive Design under Loss Aversion,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(1), 66-92. Herweg, F., Muller, D., and P. Weinschenk (2010): “Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion,” American Economic Review, 100(5), 2451-77. Corgnet, Brice, Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez. 2015. "Revisiting the tradeo between risk and incentives: The shocking effect of random shocks". Working Paper 15-05, Chapman University. - On social preferences in principal-agent modes
Englmaier, F. and A. Wambach (2010): “Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion,” Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 312-328, July.
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
Dr. Corgnet has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:
- Reference : Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez, 2015. "Revisiting the Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks," Working Papers 15-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.