Talk:Person/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Speculative fiction

Why is Ghost in the Shell singled out? Dnavarro (talk) —Preceding undated comment was added at 02:25, 8 January 2009 (UTC).

Character=Person?

In any sense, especially a legal one, is the a precedent for classifying a fictional character or a non-fictional character as a person? Could one say Harry Potter is an actual person? The reason I am asking is I found that the Supreme Court of Canada head McLachlin chose to make this ruling, which has been used as a precedent to convict people. However, this interpretation seems like a jump, and has not been reflected by amending the Criminal Code of Canada to reflect this interpretation of the intentions behind the criminal code. The judgement in question is "Notwithstanding the fact that 'person' in the charging section and in s. 163.1(1)(b) refers to a flesh-and-blood person, I conclude that "person" in s. 163.1(1)(a) includes both actual and imaginary human beings.".

She preceded this statement with the explanation: "Interpreting "person" in accordance with Parliament's purpose of criminalizing possession of material that poses a reasoned risk of harm to children, it seems that it should include visual works of the imagination as well as depictions of actual people." (for source, see paragraph 38) Is it adequate to reinterpret a specific word like person solely for the purpose of following what you perceive to be Parliament's purpose and what you perceive to be a reasoned risk of harm? But moreso, should legal documents which use words like 'person' not follow in parenthesis (including imaginary people) to avoid confusing the public? Especially after such an interpretation you would imagine the Criminal Code would be amended to avoid future hubbubs. As it is, the precedent decision by Judge McLachlin is not even mentioned in the criminal code, meaning many people will not know of that addition. Tyciol (talk) 01:49, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

In Australia a court case found that a fictional cartoon character was a "person" within the meaning of the relevant state and commonwealth laws. Ttiotsw (talk) 14:15, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

OR?

There is a literature of "personhood", so this article certainly doesn't need to be and probably isn't OR so I will remove the tag after confirming same or paste the OR here. 74.78.162.229 (talk) 15:46, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

rm "Advocates of alternative positions, such as a biological species or potentiality criterion, would instead need to provide arguments against embodied subjectivity as a basis for personhood. For example, one might argue that property claims are made by immaterial minds on immature material bodies, though any claim as to the nature of such minds would be necessarily speculative and would typically involve an argument for Cartesian substance dualism (see mind-body problem)." Will replace with proper text for Cartesianism coordinate with the Lockean and Kantian ones. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.78.162.229 (talk) 16:13, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

So above only thing removed but did do a substantial overhaul on the article cleaning up a mess of problems. Tag in question moved to section given least attention. 74.78.162.229 (talk) 16:55, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

OK, completed an overall facelift on the article. As an example of OR I might have mentioned that effectively the principle of agency for chattel implicit in the assignment to slaves of fractional personhood has its analogy, magnified thousands fold, in the current real political situation in the US where corporations are effective superpersons who form a network of private tyrannies which together completely countermand the formal freedoms of the state framework in a very effective and rigid but diffuse authoritarian system which effectively suppresses anything outside of the world view expressed in the MSM and low-end working class wage laborers are marginal persons at best and more or less complete ciphers taken in the limit as a class. Lycurgus (talk) 15:39, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

"05:52 < Lycurgus> you know what wiki really, really needs? Something to prevent quality regression in articles. It really sucks to go to some important title and see that it's decayed into crap or semi-crap." - Observation by me in freenode.#wikipedia, in re this article. 72.228.150.44 (talk) 11:26, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

Definition of a person

The sentence, "the definition of a person may exclude biological human entities (such as human embryos, or deformed human fetuses that lack major portions of the brain, or adult humans lacking higher brain functions)" is both unsupported by quotation, or reference, and dangerously leading towards an acceptance of such a view (which to put it charitably is at least moot). The very use of the word "may" is liable to induce thinking that what follows is allowed under some ideology or moral system. I invite a revision with a more neutral stand. 83.181.255.143 23:45, 25 August 2007 (UTC) Paolo

I have edited tis seciton slightly and added a couple of references. I assure you, this statement is accurate, and i can find plenty more references if you would like them included. Anarchia 01:56, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

Being born has long been part of the definition of "Person". I can see wanting to change that, but until now that's been the understanding of the word. AThousandYoung (talk) 09:59, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

Per the RS in the Corporation article, a corporation is often legally granted a modicum of "person" status. In extremely popular fiction such as Star Trek or Star Wars, many nonhumans are portrayed as having the same "person" status as humans. I'm not aware of any public outrage associated with such portrayals, so, if in the here-and-now the definition of "person" was allowed to include nonhumans (details to be worked out!), why wouldn't the general public accept it? V (talk) 18:12, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Lede is POV

I take objection to the lede of this article unilaterally declaring "person" equivalent to "human being", when there are well-established uses of the word "person" to mean a category which is, while perhaps largely coextensive with that of humans, not strictly speaking equivalent. Certainly the lede needs to cite humans as the most prominent examples of persons; however, it can't simply state that one is the other, especially when the rest of this article proceeds to go into detail on all the senses of "person" not exactly equivalent to "human". If they were strictly equivalent, then this article would need to be merged into human; but they're clearly not, as the contents of this article demonstrate.

I think instead it should say something more like

A person is ________. The most notable and uncontroversial examples of persons are humans, and the terms are often treated as synonyms, but according to various definitions not all biologically human specimens (e.g. fetuses) are always regarded as persons, and likewise other non-human entities (such as corporations, some non-human animals such as great apes or dolphins, hypothetical extraterrestrials or artificial intelligences, etc) may also be construed as persons.

However, as what exactly it is that defines personhood is itself a tricky and contentious subject (different legal jurisdictions and philosophical theories have different takes on what constitutes personhood), I'm not sure what to put in the blank there, so rather than just being bold and trying something, I'm looking for suggestions. Any ideas?

Perhaps, if there is no common ground to be found between the various differing definitions, it might even better to forgo a straightforward definition of personhood, and just state:

The defining characteristics of a person are contentious and vary between theories. The most notable and uncontroversial examples of persons are humans...

Thoughts? --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:14, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

The lead already describes that there are concepts that fetuses, corporations, etc., could possibly be considered as a person, so I'm not sure how you mean it's POV. I think the hypotheticals are probably best taken care of later in the article—the lead can cover things which already are known to exist. Seraphimblade ^{Talk to me} 07:19, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

It mentions them, but as an afterthought, after defining a person as a human. The first paragraph, aside from etymological and grammatical aspects of the word "person", only says "A person [...] is any individual human being." Since the rest of the article goes on to discuss the many senses of "person" aside from that equivalent to "an individual human being", having the first sentence just define persons as humans is jarringly inaccurate. The rest of my suggestions above, especially the examples of non-human persons and non-person humans, are just exemplary suggestions; it's basically the first sentence, the definition, which I'm concerned about. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:51, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

Strawson on Persons

Pfhorrest and Walkinxyz might be interested to know that when I talked to Strawson (more than thirty years ago) about personal identity, he said that he could not see any problem there. This despite the fact that there was a large amount of work on the subject in the philosophy literature. Strawson was concerned with the problem of the identity of objects and with the mind-body identity problem, but does not seem to have recognized any problem about persons over and above this (at least that was my impression from talking to him).--Logicalgregory (talk) 05:08, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

He could not see any problem there… meaning what, precisely? With his own work, or with the work of others who were critical of him? Or just with the problem of personal identity in general? Walkinxyz (talk) 12:59, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Problem of personal identity in general.--Logicalgregory (talk) 13:07, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Interesting. I guess he's never had an identity crisis. (Yuk, yuk). Even the Stanford Encyclopedia manages to evade the most significant questions about human identity, proceeding along entirely naturalist/empiricist lines. I feel that Pfhorrest's original view was too much like that one, and could benefit from a close reading of Charles Taylor's "The Concept of a Person".

In my class on Identity and Embodiment (taught by the fearlessly brilliant and talented Nikolas Kompridis), we learned about two models of identity:

A

• whatever it is can be understood neutrally
• the identity is independent of our contributions or attributions
• it can be described explicitly; and
• is independent of context

and

B

• mattering (its motivational force) plays a role -> it includes that which is essential to the question "Who am I?"
• our contributions cannot be subtracted
• it has temporal depth, as with a personal history/narrative; and
• is both situated & particular

. Walkinxyz (talk) 16:36, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Self-identity was my favorite topic as an undergraduate, but after graduating in 1978 I did no further work on the subject. My more recent work has been concerned with applying idea, tools and techniques from philosophy in the area of information system design (see logico-linguistic modeling). So, as far as the article on person is concerned, I know the background very well, but nothing about work published after 1978.

I made some suggestions for structuring the person article over at Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Philosophy, these are, however, only suggestions.--Logicalgregory (talk) 04:19, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

New structure for the "Person" article

This is a very rough draft of a possible new structure for the “person”article. It is intended for discussion purposes only (I hope Pfhorrest will make some comments). I have no intention of implementing it in the article unless the other contributors agree. It it is a continuation of what was discussed at Project Philosophy.

The lead would go above Part 1.

Part 1. What the word “person” means (connotation, sense, sinn)

Section 1.1. Etymology and lexicography The empirical study of its use in literature

Section 1.2. Philosophy the analytic study of the term

Section 1.2.1 History (or background) of philosophers thought on this subject

Section 1.2.2 Schools of thought

1.2.2.1 naturalistic-empiricist (description of the school needed). Members: Descartes, Lock, Hume, Strawson, Parfit (expand)

• Are all persons human?

The naturalistic-empiricist philosopher Roland Puccettii defines a person as a “moral agent”. As moral activity need not be confined to humans it follows, according to him, that persons need not be human.

• Are persons physical?

• What is it that makes a person the same person over time?

(just a paragraph or two here then a link to personal identity)

1.2.2.2 non-naturalist / phenomenological views (i.e. Heidegger -> Merlau-Ponty -> Frankfurt, Taylor

• (issues in this school, maybe the same as in the other school or maybe they are different - I don't know)

1.2.2.3 Other schools if any

Section 1.3. Special meanings of “person”

Section 1. 3.1 Law (paragraph on law plus links to law)

Part 2. What counts as a person (denotation, reference, bedeutung)

When is it legitimate to say of a thing that that thing is a person?

2.1 Can animals be Persons? Dolphins are social, have language and intelligence. Also individual dolphins exhibit individual personalities. Should they be called persons?

2.2 Can extra-terrestrials be Persons? We might discover an extra-terrestrials whose civilization is superior to our. Puccettii (above) argues that they would be moral agents and, therefore, are persons.

2.3 (lots of other cases, after the two above)

Part 3. The nature of a person (universal truths about persons) There are certain things that are said to be true of all persons. To understand what it is to be a person one must understand these universal truths.

3.1 Psychology

3.2 Sociology

3.3 Religion Some religions say that all persons are sinners. If a dolphin can not commit sin then it can not be a person.

4. Further reading Puccettii, Roland. Persons, a study of possible moral agents in the Universe. London, Melbourne, Toronto. 1968. Puccetti discusses the question of whether persons can be computers, extraterrestrial or divine beings.

The main problem with this structure is likely to be that the issues in one part are intimately connected to issues in the other parts. Sense can not be fully understood without reference, and universal truths shape our views on sense and reference. I have populated the outline with extra-terrestrials and dolphins to illustrate how the three main sections can be linked together without duplication.--Logicalgregory (talk) 07:28, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

The general angle of this sounds good to me, however I have some critiques. I think 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 would be best merged; describe the history of each school of thought within that school's section, otherwise we'll be repeating a lot of content between the two. "Are all persons human?" seems to immediately raise the question "all all humans persons?"; which, actually, would be the first question I would put in there, and which both seem much broader than the naturalist-empiricist school you list the question under. That in turn seems to segue into all the other denotation problems: "Are all humans persons? How about this kind of human? Or that one? Are any non-humans persons? How about this kind of non-human? Or that one?" The mention of nonphysical persons is a good one that's missing from the article as it stands, and might serve as a good segue between the two: "Are the spirits of dead humans, if there are such things, still human? And either way, are they persons? How about spirits that were never attached to human bodies, like angels or gods? How about other nonhuman animals, etc..."

A mention of personal identity issues {{main}}'d to Personal identity (philosophy) is perhaps good, though I'm actually still not sure that personal identity issues really belong in here; this article is almost entirely about personhood, and the personal identity stuff feels kind of tacked on. A part of me feels like this should be renamed to "Personhood", and "Person" be made a disambiguation page to this, "Personal identity", and whatever else is relevant. If we do have it though, it should also mention the synchronic problem of personal identity (what makes a person THIS person instead of some other?), in addition to the diachronic problem (what makes a person at two different times the same person?).

I'm not entirely clear what the purpose of your third category is; however, I'm starting to think that instead of breaking down views on personhood by field (philosophy, law, psychology, sociology, religion), we just mention all the different views from these different fields as they have things to say about the various subjects.

So I think I would structure it something like this:

• Introduction

1. Different senses or definitions of personhood (with preface on etymological and lexicographical history of the word "person")
   1. Naturalistic-empiricist schools
   2. Phenomenalist schools
   3. Legal definitions
   4. Religious views
   5. etc as necessary
2. Questions about particular categories of beings (with answers proposed by the different positions above)
   1. Are all humans persons? (with preface on history of disenfranchised groups of humans considered "non-persons")
      1. Prenates? (fetuses etc)
      2. Legal minors? (children etc)
      3. Transhumans? (not sure if this shouldn't go under the next section)
      4. Mentally disabled or injured? (retardation, comas, etc)
      5. Dead people? (spirits)
   2. Are all persons humans?
      1. Nonhuman spirits? (angels, gods, etc)
      2. Nonhuman animals? (apes, dolphins, etc)
      3. Extraterrestrial intelligences?
      4. Artificial intelligences?
      5. Corporations?
3. Personal identity questions (maybe? sociological and psychological comments mostly go here, if so)
   1. Synchronic; what makes this person this person and not another?
   2. Diachronic; what makes this person the same person that he was at another time?

• Further reading, references, see also, etc.

This ends up basically merging the minor non-philosophy sections of the current article in with the unsubcategorized heading of the philosophy section (to create section 1 described here), then splitting all the subcategories of the philosophy section out into their own section (to create section 2 described here). With some personal identity stuff tacked on at the end, and other minor improvements throughout. Thoughts?--Pfhorrest (talk) 10:58, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

OK, this is going somewhere interesting. It's very ambitious, which is good. I will have more to say about it later, but I need to get some other work done as well… so this is going to have to wait a couple of days to receive from me the serious thought it deserves. All I will say, for now, is that the list of possible persons is endless, and therefore structuring the article around them may be digging us into a deeper hole than we're already in. However, by analyzing what is at stake in the different answers available to each of the questions, we will likely uncover some insight into personhood. So good stuff. Walkinxyz (talk) 12:03, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

Look forward to your next post Walkinxyz. I will not make any further comment until then.--Logicalgregory (talk) 13:08, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

While the list of possible persons may be endless, the list of categories of beings whose personhood is actually debated in the literature is certainly finite. Corporate personhood is its own thing, artificial intelligences raise issues about things like the Turing test and all sorts of philosophy of mind issues, extraterrestrials are an oft-cited example of possible nonhuman persons (don't know how much there is to really flesh that out though), the personhood of nonhuman animals is a BIG thing of its own (e.g. Great Ape personhood debates)... I'm actually not familiar with any literature (that I can recall) on issues regarding nonphysical persons, but I'll trust Logicalgregory that it exists for now. And there are widely publicised debates about adults with insufficient brain activity (e.g. the Terri Schiavo case), though I'm not sure how much there are sources connecting that to personhood per se without our own original synthesis. Transhumanists make a big deal about the difference between persons and humans so they're bound to be plenty there. Lots of children's rights issues center around the lack of full recognition of personhood for children, though we may have similar synthesis issues there as we might with things like the Schiavo case. But prenates, the whole abortion debate mostly centers around the personhood of prenates, so there's bound to be plenty there too.

Basically, I think whenever there is a debate in reliable sources about the personhood of some category of beings, they deserve a section here. That's how the bunk of this article is structured now anyway, so nobody's really proposing a change to that, unless you are? --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:03, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Proposed new compromise on lead

"A person is commonly construed as any particular human being or, more formally, one with attributes recognized as consisting in personhood. In philosophy, those attributes are often described as the features which typically set human beings apart from non-humans, i.e. as subjects of special concern or importance, however, what those features are said to be can vary greatly depending the particular perspective.

"Depending on the theory or definition, persons may also include non-human entities such as 'higher' forms of animal life, corporations, artificial intelligence, or hypothetical extraterrestrial life; or contrarily, may exclude some human entities such as prenates and the severely mentally injured or disabled."

"In modern (and some traditional) societies, the designation of "person" is often accompanied by corresponding rights, duties and obligations, and in this sense, the concept of personhood is closely tied to concepts of citizenship. In addition, numerous legal, political, and philosophical issues have turned on the problem of personhood, such as the abolition of slavery, the fight for women's rights, the current debate surrounding abortion (e.g. fetal rights and reproductive rights issues), and debates about the legal status of corporations.

[I don't think we need the paragraph about the plural uses of person in the introduction].

Walkinxyz (talk) 10:13, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

I haven't caught up on the rest of the conversation above yet and am unlikely to do so tonight, but I'd like to say that I mostly like this, although some of my old objections still stand. In particular:

• I still dislike the use of "recognition" there. Perhaps another way of restating my objection more clearly in terms of the exact wording here would be this: I would be ok if the article stated somewhere "Someone is recognized as being a person if they are recognized as having attributes recognized as constituting personhood"; but those "recognized as" phrases are a package deal, and if one goes so should all the others: "Someone is a person if they do have attributes which do constitute personhood". The crux of my objection is stating unequivocally that someone is some kind of thing if they are recognized as having some attributes; although I'm happy to include discussion of positions by which the attributes in question consist in some kind of recognition, I think flatly stating (or at least implying) that they do is biased toward such positions. In other words: at least some notable positions (e.g. Locke) do not require anyone to be recognized as a person in order to truly be a person, and we can't bias the article against such theories right in the first sentence. Removing the "recognized as" avoids doing so, and leaves room for the attributes in question to still consist in recognition of some sort.

Actually, I don't think removing the mention of recognition does leave room for the attributes in question. What you are proposing seems very absolutist to me, and while I am no relativist, the recognition of things is a part of the world, too. It's real, and it is part of what constitutes personhood. Our entire conversation seems to be a history of you both acknowledging and disavowing this at the same time. I am not saying that everything about personhood hinges on recognition, but surely something does. Can we not find room in the introduction for that? Walkinxyz (talk) 11:52, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

My point is not about whether or not personhood actually does or does not hinge on recognition, but whether there is consensus amongst all the experts in the field about whether it does. I content that whether or not it does is a controversial matter, and so the wiki can't assert a position on that. Per WP:GOODDEF, the article needs to begin with a clear definition of what the subject matter of the article (Persons) is, and that definition has to be something substantial, not a trivial circular definition; but per WP:NPOV we can't assert anything in that opening definition which any of the more detailed points of view disagree with. So we have to say something like "A person is [...] anything which is X, Y, and Z", where X, Y, and Z are all things that there is no disagreement over. You are saying "A person is [...] anything which is X" yourself, but I hold that you've picked an "X" which is contentious: "recognized as a person".

Saying something like "A person is [...] any being possessing whatever features typically set humans apart from non-humans as objects of special concern and importance" leaves open the possibility that the feature in question is recognition of said being's personhood by other persons. But saying that "A person is [...] anyone with attributes recognized as consisting in personhood" rules out the possibility that the features in question have nothing to do with recognition; it takes a stance on a controversial issue. Would you say, for example, that Locke would agree with that definition? Or Strawson? I'm not saying that they're right or even that I agree with them, but they have notable opinions on the issue and we can't define a person, in the article's own voice, in a way that implies that they are incorrect, because the article must remain neutral.

"'A person is [...] anyone with attributes recognized…' Would you say, for example, that Locke would agree with that definition?"

Yes, if they were the attributes he recognized in persons, he would have to, by his own reasoning. In fact, he begins his own case from the fact of our recognition of "identity and diversity" as such:

Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when, considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity…

That passage reads to me as being entirely within the epistemological realm, like that "Someone is recognized as a person if they are recognized as having attributes recognized as constituting personhood" which I said I was fine with. He's saying that the mind recognizes something as whatever it is (as opposed to something else which may be perfectly similar) immediately upon recognizing it at all; which seems to be driving at differentiating numerical identity from qualitative identity and emphasizing that he's talking about the former rather than the latter. I don't see anything in there claiming that something is what it is recognized as, only stuff about recognizing things thing general.

He doesn't say "in our ability to recognize something as the same as itself, we recognize identity", he says "this is what identity consists in (is consistently present in) – our ability to recognize something as the same as itself." See the point? If I were to say "a person is a being with attributes (mis)recognized as those in which personhood consists" you would not object, at least not on the same grounds. But the meaning is the same – built into every act of recognition is also the possibility of mis-recognition. Walkinxyz (talk) 03:13, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Also, it's not "anyone", but "one" or "someone". I'm sorry to pick at fine semantic distinctions, but they make a difference. And you are over-thinking this. If you can find me a theorist who explicitly disagrees with the fact of recognition, who is also notable for their views on personhood, then I will drop this. Otherwise, I don't think recognition is either trivial or circular to understanding debates about personhood, any more than our recognition of "identity and diversity" is trivial or circular for making an argument about what identity "consists" in (note that this is also the phrase Locke uses, so I am on solid ground here, too).

Can you please clarify what difference you mean to make by "anyone" vs "one" or "someone"? (My objection to "one" is that combined with the phrase about human beings preceding it, it sounds like it's saying "A person is any human being, or one (human being) which...").

I don't think I'm over-thinking this, or that I need sources to object to the use of one particular word. This is an editorial dispute, about how to phrase things, not a content dispute per se; we aren't arguing about whose views or what facts to represent in the article, but about how to state the subject of the article in a way that doesn't bias the article against any of those views. I think you are overly attached to a single word which strictly interpreted implies something which would bias the article. You don't seem to have that bias yourself (although I'm really not sure, you seem to waver somewhere on the edge of it), but the words you want to use strictly imply it: to say that "an X is a Y recognized as Z" strictly says that not recognizing some Y as Z would make that Y actually cease to be an X, e.g. if you were not recognized as having whatever attributes constitute personhood, you would actually cease to be a person, without changing at all yourself. I don't think you actually believe that to be the case, but more to the point I don't think notable positions already mentioned with sources in the article would believe that to be the case; yet the words you want to use literally say that. My objection is just to the use of those particular words; I'm perfectly happy to make the same point you seem to really want to make (recognition of personhood varies, and who gets recognized is an ethically significant issue) in a different way.

This is something like my objection to articles which begin with "[Whatever] is a concept which...", e.g. how Free will used to begin. Free will isn't a concept; free will is an ability, power, capacity, or something along those lines. There are many different concepts of free will, which state in various detail what it is an ability/power/capacity to do; and many different theories stating whether or not we have whatever ability/power/capacity matches some particular concept of free will. But free will is not itself, strictly speaking, a concept or a theory; it is some ability/power/capacity conceived of and theorized about. I'm just making sure that the exact words used are literally correct; I don't think we have any significant disagreement about substantiative content issues. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:29, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

"Joel, I'm not a concept… I'm just a fucked up girl lookin' for my own peace of mind." Yes, you're right Ms. Winslet. Personhood, like free will, is "underdetermined" by its own concept. But interestingly, the concept is also undetermined by the bio-physical entities of "persons". It is a dialectic that is the result of the fact that persons are, at bottom, self-conceptualizing beings. This is a view, to be sure, not the view – just as the opinions on what a "person" essentially is vary. But while I am making a case that the ontological definition of "person" is tied to recognition, I don't think any single ontic case depends on it, in other words, a person is a person is a person, but what that is inescapably has something to do with our capacities of self-recognition, because we are persons and we are also conceptualizers (how do you convey the implications of that in a Wikipedia article?)

"Can you please clarify what difference you mean to make by "anyone" vs "one" or "someone"?

This is perhaps a very fine distinction, but I'll try to make my case for it. (1) "Anyone" slightly connotes a selection from a set of extant entities. "Someone" or "one" slightly connotes either an extant or a possible future entity. (2) "Anyone with (the/any/some) attributes" suggests that there is a test that you can use to see whether someone is a person, and you are about to tell us what that test entails. "Someone" or "one with attributes" suggests that there is a fact about persons in general that I am about to share, which may potentially be modified by some special case in the future.

My objection to "one" is that combined with the phrase about human beings preceding it, it sounds like it's saying "A person is any human being, or one (human being) which...").

We can say "any being" if you like. "Being" has a different connotation from "entity" in that the former has at least a connection to living things, be they "minds", "spirits", or "intersubjectivity" – something I'm not quite ready to part with, and which I think is accurate outside of a strictly legalistic framework (and even there, we have the "spirit" of the law). Anyway, any "person" that isn't human will obviously be such by virtue of an extension of (at least previously) human qualities toward it. Walkinxyz (talk) 03:13, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

I also, between you and me, don't think it's as true of any concept as much as personhood. Although that is not something I can state neutrally, it does inform what I consider to be an important starting point. However, different theorists or scholars would have you believe that what that is, is incorrect, or needs elaboration, or modification, etc. But the very possibility of rational argument about this itself rests on our recognition of a particular argument's reason or lack thereof, and Locke would agree with that, too. Walkinxyz (talk) 16:44, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Another way to put it might be that everyone, no matter their position, agrees that we are asking "What is a person?", and then gives their own answer to that; and that a neutral way of defining "person" would thus be to find a longer question that they would all agree is synonymous to the first question. I posit that "What is it that typically sets humans apart from non-humans as objects of special concern and importance?" is such a longer synonymous question; different parties answer different things, "consciousness that persists over time", "possession of reflexive volitions", "recognition by other persons", etc, are all different answer to that question, but everyone would agree that that is the question we're asking when we ask "what is a person?" A person is thus, most broadly and neutrally, anything that has whatever it is that humans typically have that sets them apart as objects of special concern and importance. That might be recognition; it might be consciousness; it might be reflexive desires; those are the contentious details. But there is some common ground nevertheless; or if not, the term is overloaded and needs disambiguation and then multiple definitions. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:51, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

• As an aside to that, a grammatical issue: I think your use of "consisting in" is backwards, and "constituting" is more appropriate. Something consists in whatever things constitute it; so personhood consists in whatever those attributes are, but those attributes constitute personhood.

I think you have it backwards, actually. Something consists in whatever it is a part of, that is, what it is consistently present in. If it's not there, consisting in the thing, then the thing doesn't have it. If it "consists of" those things, then it is also constituted by them. However, to say that something "constitutes" personhood is always going to exclude some perspective, in a rather one-sided and essentialist way. This, I think is a clue to why you have been misunderstanding my point about recognition, which is not as relativistic as you seem to imagine.

I think you're correct that I was misreading "consisting in" as "consisting of". However the sense of "consisting in" here makes even less sense to me now; that is, I'm not sure at all what you mean by it. Would you object to "... recognized as constituting..."? (I'm trying to tease apart whether "consisting in" is meant to serve the same sort of purpose as "recognized", since you seem to object to "constituting", by itself at least).

Yes, I would object to that, since "consists in" is the term Locke himself uses (and he did set the terms for the philosophical debate). As my point above indicates, the term is also tied to recognition, which is the position Locke begins from in his argument about personal identity. Walkinxyz (talk) 17:07, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

In the passage you quoted above, Locke says that identity consists in this, not that this consists in identity. ("In this consists identity", which Locke uses, is an OVS word-order phrase equivalent to the SVO word-order phrase "identity consists in this"; compare "in Mordor lie the shadows" and "the shadows lie in Mordor", which are also equivalent). The way you're phrasing things is the reverse of that; you're saying that something consists in personhood, not that personhood consists in something. I would be fine to say that personhood consists in whatever. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:29, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

In personhood lie the attributes of persons, and in the attributes we recognize in persons, also lies personhood. They both are true… neither is a "container" for the other. If we are going to ask about what a person is, we should look to real persons, as they are not just concepts… which is I think what you wanted to say about free will.

Regarding essentialism, I think I understand by now that your point in putting something about recognition in there is to show that what constitutes personhood is not a cut-and-dry settled matter. You're trying to avoid saying exactly what personhood is in the article's own voice, because there is disagreement about what personhood is, and different parties at different times in different contexts recognize different beings as persons or not. If that is what you are getting at then we are in total agreement about that; however, as I've been trying to get across, my objection is not with that, but with the literal implication of the way you're trying to say that.

Yes, you are right in how you see what I'm trying to do. But "the way I'm trying to say" it, is as verifiable as a fact can be. As I say, find me a notable theorist who disagrees, and I will back down. Walkinxyz (talk) 17:07, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm basically trying to keep ontological and epistemological phrases matched up with their respective kinds, to avoid saying that something is whatever it is thought to be. Something is whatever it is; and it's thought to be whatever it's thought to be. What it's thought to be may differ between different parties at different times in different contexts and so on; but it still is whatever it is. How we apply words to concepts and how we carve up the conceptual space itself are of course social linguistic matters, but that is no more true of the word and concept "person" than it is the words and concepts "rock", "tree", "table", "chair", etc. The difference is that we haven't, as a society, agreed on how to carve up the conceptual space such that we have a rigorous concept which applies to all and only the kinds of things that the word "person" tends to get applied to; an archetypical philosophical problem if ever there was one. Put another way, we as a society don't quite know exactly what concept properly matches our use of the word "person" (an epistemological issue); but a person truly is anything which does match whatever that concept turns out to be (an ontological issue). If it turns out that there is no single concept which suits that purpose, then "person" turns out to be either an overloaded or empty term.

What something is "thought" to be, is not the same as what it is "recognized" to be (it might help to think of the link between knowing and acknowledging in this relation). We are trying to define the meaning of a term here, not the properties of a an eternal form. And the epistemological/ontological issue is not cut and dried either, because there is, as I say, a normative dimension to what you call the "archetypal philosophical problem". That dimension is essential to its meaning, and it is part of why the debates over personhood matter so much in the first place – in other words, they are also addressed to the question of what a person should be. Walkinxyz (talk) 17:07, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Regarding thoughts vs recognition, knowing vs acknowledging: my point is the same either way, that something is not (necessarily) defined by our attitudes toward it; changing our attitudes doesn't (necessarily) change the thing. (I'm qualifying this, perhaps unnecessarily [no pun intended], to allow the possibility of relativism, even though I don't think either of us is actually a relativist).

Our "attitude" to the thing has nothing to do with it. You can't recognize something if it doesn't exist. But conversely, it is our habit of recognizing things that allows us to see them "as" something (persons) in the first place. So I am saying that, in addition to whatever else it is, a person is something in which we recognize the characteristics of personhood. Again, that isn't all a person is, a person is a being with its own independent existence, too.

I'm not seeing what point you're making about defining the meaning of a term and "the properties of an eternal form", since I'm not a Platonist and don't believe in eternal forms at all. I'm just a stickler about accurate language. Presuming that "person" is a meaningful and not overloaded term, there is some rigorously definable concept which matches our typical use of it; that doesn't mean there is some metaphysical entity in Plato's Heaven embodying that concept, it just means that there is some possible expression which is a precise and accurate synonym for "person", even though there is no consensus about what expression that is.

I personally think (since we're disclosing our personal philosophies), persons are identical and non-identical to themselves. As for your search for a "rigorously definable concept which matches our typical use of it", as Nietzsche said, nothing that has a history can be defined. Interpreting him, that means history permeates our concepts. So in order to learn what the word really means, you need to tell yourself a story about personhood.

As far as the normative dimension goes, I've already acknowledged that in my newer proposal regarding "objects of special concern and importance". If being a person is having whatever typically makes humans objects of special concern and importance, then of course being recognized as a person would be an important concern, as otherwise you would not be treated with the concern and importance you as a person deserved. But that right there shows that you being a person doesn't depend on anyone recognizing you as one; otherwise, beings not recognized as persons would truly be non-persons and so not deserving of the special concern given to persons, so them not getting that concern wouldn't be an ethical issue at all. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:29, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm not just talking how we should treat or regard persons, I'm also talking about the normativity of what the human or person is "to be", and how it is "to be defined". What is at stake in the debates about personhood is how we should define persons.

Saying that a person is anything recognized as a person, taken literally, is defining an ontological issue (what something is) in epitemological terms (what something is thought to be), which is relativistic and thus controversial and not neutral. I understand (I think) that you're not trying to state that; you're just trying to work in the epistemological uncertainty (a person is thought to be many different things by many different parties), which is good, and I want to make that point too. But I think the first sentence is the wrong place to do it, at least the way that you're trying to. Right away in the second sentence is fine with me. "An X is anything which is Y. [However...] Opinions on what 'Y' is vary greatly..." gets the same point across in a more literally strict way than "An X is anything recognized as Y". --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:51, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Once again, I didn't say a person is "anything" recognized as a person, I said it was "one" (or someone) in whom the relevant attributes are recognized. That is a fact, and you will need to find a source to contradict me. Walkinxyz (talk) 17:07, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

In other words, to put it more helpfully to your cause, my definition assumes (perhaps controversially): (1) That personhood exists; (2) That it has some definite attributes; and (3) that a "person" makes those attributes available to our capacities of recognition, i.e. we tend to recognize them when we see them. It is not ALL a person is, in other words, the fact of personhood doesn't rest on arbitrary acts of recognition, but it does tell you something about personhood (and something important about definitions too) that we recognize it when we see it. (If we couldn't, then we couldn't have any confidence in our definitions, either.) Walkinxyz (talk) 12:27, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

I would say that this is equally true of any meaningful concept; but not any more true of persons especially, and doesn't have much impact on the point I'm trying to make. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:51, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

I like your introduction of "said to be" in regards to particular perspectives; that jives with the same point I'm making above very well. The truth of the matter doesn't vary by perspective, but what is said to be true does.

Thanks. Yes, that's right. Walkinxyz (talk) 12:15, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

• A nitpick: I dislike using "animal" in a sense exclusive of humans, which is why I had "other animals" in mine. "other 'higher' forms of animal life" would be an acceptable compromise to me.
• I would say "in many societies" in place of "modern (and some traditional)". It's not universal in modern societies either.

Fine with me. Walkinxyz (talk) 11:48, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

And I'm ok with the lack of plural/grammatical stuff in the lede.

Also per a question of yours way above, please see WP:GOODDEF.

Good progress! --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:43, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm going away for the weekend and have to get ready for that tonight, so I'm not going to have time to address everything said above for a few days at least, but I would like to make one comment before I go. You wrote:

This is perhaps a very fine distinction, but I'll try to make my case for it. (1) "Anyone" slightly connotes a selection from a set of extant entities. "Someone" or "one" slightly connotes either an extant or a possible future entity. (2) "Anyone with (the/any/some) attributes" suggests that there is a test that you can use to see whether someone is a person, and you are about to tell us what that test entails. "Someone" or "one with attributes" suggests that there is a fact about persons in general that I am about to share, which may potentially be modified by some special case in the future."

I think this might be getting at the root of why we're having this disagreement. A good definition is not just a statement of a fact about the thing being defined: it tells you how to identify the thing defined, how to tell what the thing defined is, or as you put it, a test that you can use to see whether something is that thing defined. A Wikipedia article should start with a good definition. It needs to say "This is an article about Foos. A foo (in case you've never heard of one) is anything which fits this description: [...]. Now here are some facts about foos: [...]." The article title tells us what the article is about; the first sentence or two are supposed to give us a good definition of what that is (which, for controversial topics like this, needs to be something very rough and nonspecific, followed by a statement of the controversy, to maintain NPOV; "a foo is something like this or maybe that; there's disagreement about the details"); then, after a good definition is given, the rest of the article is a bunch of encyclopedic facts about the thing we just defined.

If you're trying to say that an important fact about persons is that they are (or should be?) recognized as such, but not that being recognized as such is one of their identifying characteristics, not that it's something we can use to test whether something is a person or not, then that reinforces my point that recognition does not belong in the first sentence, which is our definition for what the things we're about to list a bunch of facts about are. I'm fine if something about recognition is the very first fact we state about persons, so long as its not stated as part of the definition of a person.

Consider for analogy if the article Human began by stating "Humans are the dominant species on planet Earth." That's (probably) a very true statement about humans in general, but that doesn't tell us what a human is; it just tells us an important fact about them. Humans were humans before we were the dominant species and we will still be humans if we cease to be, so it's not part of the definition of a human. Maybe more analogous, to use Free will again, imagine if that article began by saying "Free will is often considered to be in conflict with determinism". That's very true, and incompatibilists might consider it close to a correct definition of free will, if you got rid of the qualifier; but it doesn't strictly tell us what it is, it just tells us an important fact about what people think about it. Whatever free will is, it was that and will continue to remain that regardless of who considers it to be what. What it is is still highly controversial though, so that article has a very broad and nonspecific definition, followed by a statement of its controversiality.

Aside from all that, I still think we need an outside opinion on this conversation. Logicalgregory has only commented on other facets of the article and on how much effort we're spending on these one or two sentences, and the only other person to respond to my WT:PHIL post was Philogo who just said that what we're trying to do might be impossible. If maybe you could post an RFC or a 3PO or something while I'm away, try to get some other people talking in here, I would appreciate it. Thanks. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:40, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Proposed compromise II

A person (from Latin: persona, meaning "mask") is any particular human being or entity with attributes that, depending on the context, are recognized as consisting in "personhood". In philosophy…"

etc. In my opinion, it is impossible to come up with more of a definition than that (as our discussion here has sufficiently demonstrated).

Wikipedia is supposed to be based on secondary sources, information has to be verifiable, and therefore definitions have to be recognized. So in my opinion, this has to be the basis of any future work.

Best,

Walkinxyz (talk) 18:06, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Merge People into this article

Seems obvious to me. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Radiosband (talk • contribs) 10:12, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

The articles seem completely different. Perhaps we need better disambiguators so that readers may find the correct article. — Arthur Rubin | (talk) 13:46, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

These shouldn't be merged at all. Although people is a plural of person, they are not the same thing. The fact is that the word "people" is also a singular noun concept that encompasses a culture, a society, etc. and there is a distinct legal meaning as well, which is included in the article on people. Therefore I am removing the request. Walkinxyz (talk) 02:19, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

I also oppose the merge. A group of humans is an entity worthy of its own coverage, distinct from an individual human. Note that Wikipedia makes the distinction in general as well, having separate articles for group (see also social group) and individual. Stick 2 things together, and you have something new. The Transhumanist 18:18, 2 March 2011 (UTC)

Legal fictions

Perhaps someone can improve the wording and provide a reference for the following, which I've just taken from the page (from a recent addition, that is):

"In regard to all Statutory Legislation (including the Income Tax) a 'PERSON' is a legal fiction and is entirely separate from a 'man-on-the-land' flesh and blood sentient man. You are not a 'PERSON', you have a 'PERSON'."

Best,Anthony Krupp (talk) 12:56, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

I agree Anthony! A person is not a human being. I believe that indeed a person is a "legal fiction" used in the legal world. A " being" cannot be taxed nor does one haave to adhere to the millions of staatutes and legislations. A being born on the soil of the country has an obligation to follow " common law". Common law is the good old common sense - thou shalt not steal, harm another, cause a loss to another being. Any being who does not abide to common law is then tried at court to decide his or her punishment. A person is created when a baby is registered at birth. (in legalese -the definition of register is "to hand over the ownership of") so we therfore are "handing over the ownership " of our child to the state. The state then lables the child as a person. That "person" is then the posession of the state. The state can order that person to be schooled, to have vaccinations, be taxed, be punished for any rule that the state makes up such as riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, or being naked in public?? Basically the person is a slave to the state, being ordered to work and give upto 40% of the money to be given to the state? WOULD YOU AS A BEING BE HAPPY WITH SOMEONE TAKING ALMOST HALF OF YOUR WAGES?? NO? why do we let the state do this to us and treat us as slaves? Our freedom is taken away when we are branded as a person. Is there a way we can live, share food, share trades, share materials aand resourses without the intervention of the state? I believe that there is. Search online for freemans of the land or sovereign of the state. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.223.253.139 (talk) 11:23, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Your position is interesting, but I don't think it's the common understanding of the word "person". Your romantic partner might prefer that you consider her a "person" as well, rather than not… it has nothing to do with "ownership" by the state, however unjust you may think the current social and legal order may be. Unfortunately, Wikipedia isn't the place to make the case for your views. If someone else has made them in a reliable source, they may belong somewhere in the article. However, with respect to the legal s, I think it's best included on the law section, which already covers this. Let us know if you have any further thoughts here on the talk page. Thanks and all the best. Walkinxyz (talk) 19:10, 15 February 2011 (UTC) My apologies, I was referring to the legal definition of the term "person" as in today's society, the term "person" is often used in the legal term and I thought it is prudent that everyone has the information that the term person used in todays english language can be used in both legal and natural term; both which are very different. Perhaps, in the opening paragraph, it could state that the legal term "person" is widely used to descibe the legal fiction which is not to be confused with the natural person or human being.

Compromise on Lead

Thanks to Pfhorrest for his effort to compromise on the lead. I think it captures part of what I was trying to correct about this article (obviously) – but not all of it. The point of my revision was to highlight two things: (1) the common sense, everyday understanding of person as the singular of "people", which is itself is a special kind of plural noun (which is mentioned but too late), and (2) the difference (or connection) between that and its formal definitions. These are both unhelpfully missing. The problem with (1) is important because of the disputes, here and elsewhere, about equating personhood with "human being", which is a little clearer if you bring in the grammatical connection to "people" right off the top. And of course, we do normally mean, by "people", human beings. The problem with (2) is that, unfortunately, the way the second part of the first sentence is phrased seems to break the connection between the everyday and the "formal" definition – namely, the group, which is absolutely essential to what a "person" is. The definition given, of "any entity with attributes constituting personhood…" overlooks this connection, which I would argue is more important to the word "person" than to a subject that has easily definable attributes (you don't talk about "table-hood" or even "civil war-hood"). The very idea of a "formal definition" of persons in any context requires that somebody (other members of the group) recognize it as somewhat legitimate, partly for the reasons highlighted by the last sentence of paragraph one (which, by the way, is a great improvement on my own version). In other words, to put it all together, what this article needs to say about personhood is that the "attributes" of personhood are variable, not essential (but not arbitrary, either). I hope you will see that this was captured in the previous version. Walkinxyz (talk) 12:38, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

For those of us just coming in, is this[1] your revision? PPdd (talk) 01:07, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

I will just add another note. The first sentence as it is phrased is a little misleading. For one thing, the two examples of criteria for personhood (self-awareness/reason vs. rights and duties) tend to go together in most cases. It is rarely possible to see them as "either/or" definitions of being human. But actually, seeing it as "both" is also a bit of a distortion. A significant feature of "personhood", however defined, is that it applies across all BUT the most specialized contexts, without any special criteria to define it. In other words, the "formal" definition that I offered is not to be confused with the specialized definitions that are possible in particular domains. The definition of any entity that has "attributes constituting personhood" breaks down when you try to "test" for personhood (even leaving aside the controversial case of fetuses which, in its intractability, proves my point). Children have rights in most places, but don't have duties, reason or self-awareness until a certain age. They are still persons, but not because they have any of these "attributes" of persons – they are persons because their parents and everyone else sees them that way (it's even a stretch to say that we "call" them persons, so much are they persons). Similarly, mentally disabled people are normally considered "persons", but not because they have the attributes that other people have – many of them lack even what we consider to be most important to persons. However, what is really important is that they are recognized as persons (see Blade Runner for an interesting exploration of this problem applied to non-human robots). Corporations are defined as "persons" legally, but the phrase "corporate personhood", used later in the article, shows you how much this distorts the concept of a person. Corporations may have the same legal status as "persons" as they are "entities" with rights and duties – but they lack the capacities of morality that we expect of persons and are not really considered persons outside of that very special context. Whereas, quite the contrary, a person is usually still a person in any context, unless they have been objectified or "dehumanized" (as Jews were before and leading up to World War II) – to the point that their subjective status as "persons" might have broken down for them. In other words, with personhood, it isn't "either/or", but neither is it "both". It isn't objective or subjective, but a combination of the two. To reiterate, we need an introduction to this article that thematizes the variability of definitions of personhood, without making it seem arbitrary or essential. (And dictionary definitions can't do it – that's why we have encyclopedias). Walkinxyz (talk) 14:08, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

It's a little unclear to me quite what you're saying, but it sounds like you're suggesting either that "person" be defined as the singular of its plural "people", which is tautological and thus trivial (compare "a crow is a member of the set of crows"); or that the definition of a person is socially constructed, and thus that a person is whatever is called a person by other people, which is both biased (social constructivism is a contentious point of view) and also somewhat tautological itself. Perhaps if this is not what you mean you can try to clarify some more?

The objective I am trying to accomplish in the lede is to say that although many human people use "person" and "human" as synonyms, there are notable points of view which say that the definition of personhood is something other than membership in some particular species; but, since such postulated definitions are themselves contentious points of view, we can't just say which of them is correct. Saying a "a person is whatever meets some criteria for personhood" is itself too tautological for my likes (like saying "a crow is whatever meets the criteria for crow-hood"), but paired with the examples of some of the most broad and common criteria (consciousness/self-awareness, and rights/duties) I think it works.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 20:45, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

I understand, but in my view your wording lacks precision. Perhaps I wasn't clear either. What I was trying to get at is that persons are members of a group, a group which is capable of recognizing personhood (even if the individual doesn't have the capacity, i.e. self-awareness, to recognize herself)… whether it's a particular species, homo sapiens, or something else, it's always a group that recognizes (I never said "constructs") personhood. It's not something inherent in the "individual entity". The same is not true of a crow. Crows don't have to be recognized (even in a general way) by fellow crows, and once you know what a crow is, the definition doesn't change. Not so with persons. The objective attributes are still important, but not sufficient. This is not something trivial or controversial about personhood, it's absolutely basic, and borne out by the examples you yourself wrote about abortion, slavery, etc. I believe the wording in my original revision made this point very simply and clearly. Walkinxyz (talk) 01:00, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Hmm, maybe I am still misunderstanding you, but it sounds like the position you are stating is definitely quite controversial. I know you didn't say the word "constructs", but what you're saying sounds a lot like social constructivism: that personhood consists in being recognized as a person by some social unit, much llike how social constructivists construe things like gender or race. That may be a valid position but it's by no means uncontroversial: plenty of philosophers claim in no uncertain terms "A person is anyone who is X, Y, and Z, because...", like some of the ones you yourself added to the Philosophy section. (I am a particular fan of Frankfurt's definition, myself).

Perhaps what you are trying to get at is that which definition of "person" is correct is a controversial matter, unlike with crows? That's a subtle distinction from saying that you have to be recognized as a person to be a person. Given any particular set of criteria for personhood, any being who meets those criteria is a person, regardless of whether anyone recognizes them as such (unless, I suppose, those criteria are constructivist and turn on recognition as such). But which such criteria we should accept is not a settled matter; we are not given a set, uncontroversial definition like we are with crows, so whether or not someone is counted as a person depends on what definition is recognized as correct. If that's the point you're making then I agree it's a good one, but I think the way you're trying to make it needs work. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:35, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

The point I am making is actually the opposite. The definition of personhood is almost always uncontroversial – though there are obviously many ways to use the word, as shown by the dictionary examples. That said, there is still a great deal at stake in the situations where who or what should be included in the concept of personhood – and why – has been challenged. What is at stake is a certain kind of recognition. If you don't see that, then you can't understand the controversies. It is the cases that are controversial, not personhood itself. I think the problem with the way you're thinking about this is that you are fixed on the problem of "definitions", and this is not what an encyclopedia is for, it's what dictionaries are for. There are facts about how we define persons, that are relevant to an article in an encyclopedia, more relevant than any definition. One fact is that how we define persons (in general) requires the recognition of other persons (in general). I'm not talking about determining the personhood of any particular individual, "given" certain criteria. I'm saying that that ISN'T usually how we define personhood. The criteria are almost never an issue until they are challenged or they don't seem to fit a special case (take contemporary animal rights activists, or the imaginary case of androids in Blade Runner, or so-called "post-humans" in general… this is becoming a big issue for scientists at places like MIT). There could never be such a question about crows, because crows don't need our special recognition to be called crows, or at least, they don't have a stake in WHAT we call them. (Unless, that is, we decide to call them persons.)

In any case, dictionary definitions (or philosophical formulas) are not what we need here. Also, I think that Strawson and Locke should be quoted in the philosophy section, with the views of other philosophers, and left out of the introduction. That said, if you want an interesting, and absolutely correct rebuttal of Strawson, read the Harry Frankfurt article that I quoted in the philosophy section and you'll see what's wrong with the way people like Strawson apply certain "criteria" to personhood. ("What concerns Strawson… is the problem of understanding the relation between mind and body, rather than the quite different problem of understanding what it is to be a creature that not only has a mind and a body but is also a person.") Based on what I see of your history here, you might enjoy it. You can read it here. Walkinxyz (talk) 09:50, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

The lede of a good encyclopedia article begins with a definition of the subject under discussion, and that's the part of this article that we are debating, so I think this debate very much is about definitions. We start of with "A person is XYZ." then proceed with "One thing about persons is this. Another thing about persons is that. A third thing about persons is..." etc. The part we're arguing about right now is that "XYZ" there, the first sentence.

Furthermore, I still think that the questions you cite are examples of controversy about the definition of a person. The uncontroversial cases, which I agree are the vast majority of usage of the word, are about typical, healthy, adult, humans. There is very little quibbling about whether any of them count as persons. But every time you get to a case where you're asking "well, does this entity (this fetus, dolphin, android, or corporation) count as a person or not?", you are either (1) questioning the precise definition of a person in wondering whether it encompasses the properties the kind of entity at hand is known to have, or (2) invoking some precise definition of a person in determining whether the entity in question has the properties that meet that definition.

I think perhaps you are thinking of a specific kind of the latter sort of circumstance, where the definition of "person" is taken to be something broad like "something having rights and duties", and then the question is "what kinds of things have rights and duties (and are thus persons) and why". So you are seeing the intension of "person" as given, and the question then is what is the extension of that term. I believe that this is a disguised version of the same question about the definition of personhood. "Why do we attribute rights and duties to archetypical examples of persons such as typical healthy adult humans, and does this class of entities at hand have the requisite similarities to such archetypes to warrant the same attribution of rights and duties?" is just another way of saying "what do we mean when we call typical healthy adult humans 'persons', what are we saying about them that makes us inclined to hold this partial attitude toward them; and does this class of entities at hand fit that description too, and thus deserve the same attitudes?"

That all aside, the mentions of Locke and Strawson are only in the philosophy section right now. There is no mention of them in the lede at all.

Also, I have already read that Frankfurt article several times since many years ago; as I said above, I am a fan of his concept of personhood. I don't think he's making the point you seem to think he is making against Strawson, though. He's saying that Strawson is hanging personhood on some particular mind-body relation, but that he (Frankfurt) believes personhood to be independent of the relationship between mind and body, and rather something else altogether. He then goes on to develop his theory of second-order volitions and how they relate to the concept of free will, and then defines personhood in terms of those such things, with no concern for what the relation might be between the mind in which these volitions/will exist, and any body it is embedded in or connected to. (That is to say, Frankfurt's definition of a person doesn't care if you're a purely deterministic program running on a purely material Turing machine, or a metaphysically free immaterial soul nondeterministically interfacing with your body through the Pineal gland; it only cares about what functions 'you' the mind carry out, and whether they are the right ones to count you as a person). But he is still giving a criterion for personhood; it's just a very different one from Strawson's.

A wiki etiquette request, if I may: please try to make your comments in fewer edits, using preview instead of post-edit-post-etc. The many edits clog up my watchlist and also make edit conflicts more likely, as just happened. Thanks. --Pfhorrest (talk) 11:44, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Sorry about the multiple edits. It's due mainly to my inexperience here. The Strawson and Locke references are in the philosophy section because I moved them in my last edit of the article.

Look, this article has a "C" class in the philosophy quality scale, and I'm trying to improve it. You seem to have a fairly sophisticated grasp of these issues, so this should be simple. Dictionary definitions (e.g. references 2-4) typically list the ways that people use a word. Encyclopedias tell you what's important about the thing the word refers to, and go on to give our best understanding(s) of that thing. In my opinion, "A person is most commonly defined as…" is not the best way to start an encyclopedia article.

The way that I "defined" a person in my original edit, is according to what is important about persons, namely: (1) they are members of a group of people or human beings (though I didn't say they were equivalent to human beings – think of fetuses, who are definitely human beings, but perhaps not yet persons); (2) they are a "someone", not an "entity" (a who, not a what); and (3) their attributes, however defined, depend on the recognition of their fellow group-members, which (4) often varies socially or historically. (We live in modern times, so I started with modern times, and I listed what was important about "persons" in modern times.)

As for your statement that the normal case of persons is "typical adult healthy humans" – that is not what I have argued. In the case of children, stroke-victims, people in comas who still have brain activity, historical figures that are long-dead, and the severely mentally disabled, that definition doesn't cut it. Yet they are still persons. It's also easy to generate lots and lots of non-controversial cases that will not be captured by any definition. That's my point, and that's why you need to tell people what is important about the thing. An encyclopedia article should enable people to use their judgment, not just apply criteria or memorize definitions. (The phrase "self-aware, rational" entity is just copped from the dictionary. Yet it fails as a description of persons if one uses judgment: there are mentally disabled people who don't fit that description, but you can't say they aren't persons.)

I appreciate that you've tried to improve on my introduction, but now that you the logic behind it, please explain why you think you have.

Also, you're wrong about Frankfurt. He defines persons in terms of what people care about, not what "functions" their mind performs. That is the meaning of the second-order volition argument. You should read it again, and not just the quote that I selected.

14:03, 15 January 2011 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Walkinxyz (talk • contribs)

I'm having a bit of trouble understanding exactly what point you are trying to make that I haven't already addressed, and I can't think of anything else to say in response that isn't just repeating myself, so I've asked at WT:PHIL to see if anyone there can lend an outside eye to our discussion and help move things along. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:49, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Addendum: despite what I just said above, I do actually have some things to comment on here that are new.

First I just checked the version before your first edit here, and Locke and Strawson were already in the philosophy section then too. That you misstate the current state of the article, and your own history of edits to it, makes me wonder how accurately you're grasping what's going on here.

In response to most of your four points in the first paragraph, I would be repeating myself for most of them, but in response to your point (2), "who"s are a subset of "what"s. People are a subset of things. "Entity" means the same as "being" (etymologically even); and we can't very well say something like a person is "...every person which..." without being uselessly tautological.

Regarding your list of "non-controversial" cases: the personhood of children, stroke-victims, people in comas, and the severely mentally disabled sometimes is questioned, and historical figures that are long-dead are referred to as people in the past tense, when they were (usually) typical healthy adult humans. Likewise you say "there are mentally disabled people who don't fit that description, but you can't say they aren't persons", but some people do say that.

Regarding Frankfurt, I'd appreciate if you could quote the exact passage you think shows that he "defines persons in terms of what people care about". From my reading he defines a person as someone who has free will, which means someone who has effective second-order desires, which means someone who has effective desires about what desires of his are effective upon his actions, regardless of what ontological mechanism instantiates his mind; that is the "function" I refer to, in the sense of "functionalism".

--Pfhorrest (talk) 06:15, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Sorry. As I say, I'm not too experienced here. I must have been confused about the Strawson and Locke quotes, because I also edited the philosophy section. I am occasionally thrown off by the way full citations appear in the markup language on Wikipedia. Not a good excuse, I suppose. In any case, I don't think citing dictionary definitions of personhood is helpful in the introduction, I think it's lazy.

Second-order volition is the "functional" term Frankfurt uses for caring about your own desires. In his words, "the criteria [i.e. free will] for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives." (my emphasis) Then he goes on to connect the thing we call freedom of the will with our "most humane concern with ourselves".

That's personhood, according to the view you're a fan of – (1) our most humane concern with ourselves (what we care about); and (2) what we regard or "recognize" as most important and most problematical.

"Who's" may be considered a subset of "what's" in naturalistic philosophy, and in the natural sciences. But to say that, ontologically, normatively, people are just a subset of things, is more than a little problematic in practice. Try telling your romantic partner sometime, that he or she is a "thing" and see how he or she reacts. To say, however, that persons are members who are recognized as having the attributes of persons in a given social or legal order is also to distinguish them from things that we treat instrumentally in our practices, including our practices of recognition. Persons may be entities, or beings, too, but that doesn't tell us what makes them the kind of being that is capable of bearing rights, and whose own existence is a problem for it. "Someones" can only be persons, and persons have to be recognized as such, normatively speaking. I don't mean empirically speaking. That is also something at stake in the debates over personhood: who counts as a "someone". It is absolutely fundamental to personhood. My original wording was as follows (with emphasis added):

A person is a member of a group of people or human beings or, more formally, someone with attributes recognized as consisting in personhood, e.g., in a given social or legal order. In modern times, the designation of personhood is accompanied by specific rights, obligations and duties corresponding with their status as persons. In this sense, the concept of personhood is closely tied to the concept of citizenship. Historical struggles for civil rights have also turned on the problem of personhood, as in the fight for women to be recognized as "persons" under the law.

This is, quite frankly more coherent and informative than the current introduction. It also meets your own request to start the article with "A person is X" – whereas it currently starts with "a person is most commonly defined as X" – and just provides you with a dictionary definition. But I will defer to someone else's judgment on this, as I have been trying to discuss and make my case here without just doing reverts and forcing "compromise" without any discussion, as you did.

Walkinxyz (talk) 13:39, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

I think we have a deep disagreement about the interpretation of Frankfurt. When I read that passage you quote, "the criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives", I read that as Frankfurt saying "'Person' doesn't just mean 'human'; rather, its meaning captures whatever it is that we consider to be special about most humans, that sets them from most non-humans, that makes them objects of special concern and importance", with the implication that non-human things might have those same features, whatever those features are, and thus warrant the same special concern (or conversely that some things strictly human might not).

He's not yet saying what a person is, that is, he's not saying what the special features that set persons apart from non-persons are; he's just saying that "person" does not necessarily equal "human". Then, later, he goes on to develop a theory of what those features are which make most humans count as "persons" and which make most non-humans (lacking such features) non-persons. The feature he settles on is having "free will", which he fleshes out as having effective second-order desires. It's that last part which I am a particular fan of, and that is what I consider his criterion for personhood; the first part is just a preface that membership in the human species is not a criterion for personhood, which I also agree with. (– Pfhorrest)

Walkinxyz: Your interpretation is mostly right, as far as it goes. But as for the rest… it's not just my interpretation. The essay on personhood is published in his book The Importance of What We Care About – which should be your first clue. However, if you just step back for a minute and reflect on what a second order desire is – that is, a desire about a desire – it's obvious that, for Frankfurt (as for Taylor, Cavell, and others) what matters to us, what we care about, is inextricably linked to what it means to be a person.

I don't dispute that, on the understanding that "what X cares about" is the important thing (to such theories) in determining the personhood of X (e.g. in Frankfurt, "caring about what you care about" is the key thing), not "what others care about X". I don't think (any more) that you are quite meaning to suggest the latter, but my objection to your proposal is still that it sounds like the latter. It sounds like it claims that the truth of the matter about someone's personhood is dependent on what others think about that someone's personhood; like if people just like you or me for some reason became outcast from society and were no longer considered persons, we would actually cease to be persons in virtue of that lack of recognition. That is the sort of (highly controversial) position I'm trying to avoid the appearance of unilaterally supporting in the article. (Though it may deserve a mention as one of many positions; Stanford has a rather nice encyclopedia article on a concept of personhood which is somewhat like that). --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:42, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

It's a question of what you care about structuring your identity. That is what defines persons on this view – that they are the kind of beings whose identity is structured by mattering (as opposed to consciousness). You are still thinking of it as if we were objects. The point is that we are also subjects. Walkinxyz (talk) 09:14, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Here's a quote from another philosopher that may help put things into context (and which isn't that different from your interpretation):

In a fallibilistic spirit, without beginning from ahistorical or essentialist premises, just what can we say is distinctive (but not necessarily exclusive) to human forms of life? And what normative implications could we derive from the unavoidably tenuous and contestable attempt to state what it is? A number of philosophers, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Charles Taylor, Stanley Cavell, Wilfrid Sellars, and Ernst Tugendhat, among others, have focused on the concept of the person as a key to what is distinctive to human forms of life. Departing from the empiricist tradition for which being a person requires only continuous consciousness and the possession of a body in which it is housed, they propose a non-reductive concept of the person as a being for whom things matter, and matter in a peculiarly human way.

(Nikolas Kompridis, "Technology's Challenge to Democracy: What of the Human?" in Parrhesia 8 (2009), 26.

Pfhorrest: However, writing this out gets me to thinking, perhaps a paraphrase of my paraphrase of Frankfurt above might accomplish what I now suspect you might be getting at, in a way that I wouldn't object to. Maybe something like "A person [...] is commonly construed as any particular human being, or more formally as any being possessing whatever features typically set humans apart from non-humans as objects of special concern and importance. What those features are considered to be varies between different philosophical theories and legal definitions. Depending on the theory or definition, persons may include non-human entities such as other animals, corporations, artificial intelligences, or hypothetical extraterrestrial life; and may exclude some human entities such as prenates and the severely mentally injured or disabled.", followed by what we have now about citizenship and struggle and so on.

Walkinxyz: This is way, way better. It's almost there. But it isn't quite enough to say that personhood varies between different theories and definitions: the history and context of personhood are even more important, because our concepts of personhood are inherited. This is about enfranchisement in an institution (in the broadest sense) that incorporates what it is we take to be most important about our identity. That's why I used the word "recognize", and why I want to emphasize the normative, not just empirical, features of personhood. It is a concept that is particularly determined by its normativity, and therefore underdetermined by what entities it does or does not include.

I would be happy to state that theories and definitions of personhood vary across history and context; but not so happy saying that the true criteria for personhood vary across history and context. Plenty of notable positions on personhood (like Locke's, and Frankfurt's too I would say) are stated such as to imply that, for example, historical figures which were not considered persons by their contemporaries but which meet these (supposed true) criteria for personhood actually were persons, and their contemporaries were wrong. Or that entities not widely considered persons now, if they do meet the true criteria for personhood (whatever those may be), actually are persons now, and common people today are wrong in considering them nonpersons. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:42, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

I never said the "true criteria" vary across history and context! However, it is easy to verify that what we take to be the "true" criteria do vary, as you have demonstrated with this example!

You really need to look at the original wording of my introduction. "A person is a member of a group of people or human beings or, more formally, someone with attributes recognized…" i.e. someone we implicitly agree meets the criteria… whatever they are.

I didn't say someone with the attributes, I just said "someone with attributes" that are recognized. There are no "true" attributes in my definition, but there are still attributes. Those attributes still exist whether we recognize them or not, and so does the person, but in order for them to be part of a formal definition, we do (someone does) have to recognize them somehow, somewhere, sometime…

I think you have been reading it as "someone, with attributes, who is recognized", whereas it should be read "someone with attributes that are recognized".

It is implied, and a condition of there being a formal definition, that there is someone who applies it in a given context. Informally, they are just human beings. Your language is not saying anything different from mine, it's just more contorted. Walkinxyz (talk) 09:14, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Phorrest: This avoids what I object to about your version, in that it does not seem to define personhood constructively as a matter of social recognition of personhood, or tautologically as membership in the group of "people".

Walkinxyz: Recognition doesn't mean that it is socially constructed, but that it is socially determined. The idea of "membership" is not tautological, because I am not talking about membership in a set of atom-like entities – I am talking about enfranchisement in a human institution with a history, with attendant subjective features, rights, entitlements and obligations. (You can't talk about "crow-hood" or "table-hood" unless you're being poetic, but you can talk about personhood because there are subjective aspects to being a person. Tables and crows have other features and qualities – you can speak of "crowness" or "tableness" – but you can't speak of those things in the same you can ask what it is to be a person.

Could you please elaborate on what distinction you are making between "construction" and "determination"? (Likewise, I don't see where you're going with the -hood vs -ness thing). It still sounds like, one way or another, you want to define the personhood of one being in terms of what some other beings think. I'm fine with including that position in the article, but I'm trying to avoid excluding its negation in the first sentence of the article by flatly stating that, in the article's voice, as just what a person is, full stop. --~~

By determination as opposed to construction, I mean that (1) it has a form that is partly (not TOTALLY) social in origin; and (2) it has a form that cannot be rendered fully explicit. In other words, we do not create personhood, but what we do with the concept of personhood changes its meaning. And that meaning is not semantically closed, but open. That is a condition for its definition being contestable, for our arguing about it, and continuing to redefine it. e.g. corporations are a modern invention, yet they are "persons".

The designation "-hood" applies to human "institutions" or ways of being… motherhood, statehood, brotherhood, sisterhood. They distinguish our ways of being in the world from the objects in the world. Objects in the world have qualities that make them the object they are. They have "objectness" and according to some philosophers, they have "objecthood" – as objects in general are part of the human world of being – but they do not really have subjective experience, obligations, rights and duties, the way human and human ways of being do. So e.g. they are not "respondents" or "agents" (unless you romanticize or poeticize them in a certain way which would not be appropriate here). Walkinxyz (talk) 09:14, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Perhaps I can better illustrate my objection by positing a case which I think would be wrongly excluded from the way you put it. Imagine counterfactually that somehow I was not born on Earth but instead lived alone on some distant planet with no contact with Earth or any other intelligent alien life; I have never had any contact with any other persons in the universe, no other person knows I exist, much less recognizes me as a member of any group of them. Yet I remain a person nevertheless, because I have whatever features there are that make me a person. I still deserve whatever special treatment it is that persons deserve in virtue of being persons, despite nobody being around to treat me one way or another.

Interesting thought experiment. How were you "born" without any human contact? (I suppose you could have been "made" somehow artificially… but then we would be right in the middle of a very controversial question about personhood.) How would the concept mean anything to you absent a form of life in which it also meant something to others? We are "second speakers" of our language. The concept of personhood is "inherited" – it takes its meaning from its uses in practice and in our ways of making sense of things.

That example was not such a great one in hindsight because of the complications you name; the new one I gave above (what if everybody suddenly stopped considering you a person; would you really cease to be a person?) is much more illustrative of my concern.

And I'm beginning to think we're mixing up the orders of our discourse here, or perhaps confusing use and mention, or something along those lines. You seem to be talking here about how people learn the meaning of a word and how that word gets applied to different things over time; I'm talking about whatever it is that that word, or rather the concept behind it, rightly applies to. I have no disagreement that what kinds of beings are called or considered or recognized as persons has varied greatly over time, between cultures, between contexts, between legal systems and ideologies and individual thinkers and so on. What I am trying to avoid is the article giving the impression that what kinds of beings actually are persons varies with such recognition. I'm happy to see the article discuss that position, but not to have it assert it as the blanket truth. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:42, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Once again, I gave a "formal" definition, as distinguished from what they "actually are" (i.e. human beings, absent some particular definition) … and the condition of a formal definition is that there are also beings capable of shaping and recognizing definitions – and unless you want to be more Platonic than Plato, capable of recognizing and shaping forms, too.

In essence, what I am saying boils down to the fact that a "person" is not just a biological entity. There are other dimensions to it, other (ontological, normative) "orders of discourse" that are signified by it, and they are not fixed – they couldn't be. But although they are not fixed, they are still part of its definition, and that's what I'm getting at. Walkinxyz (talk) 09:14, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Here's a welcome opportunity to digress into some great science fiction. In the movie Blade Runner, there is a group of androids which have been made in such a way that they cannot be distinguished from human beings. Their physical and cognitive characteristics either match or surpass our own, and they are indistinguishable from us in practically every aspect. But there is a test to differentiate them from humans – an "empathy" test. They are asked a series of questions and their vital signs monitored for symptoms of empathetic emotional response. However, by the end of the film it becomes clear that the methodology is quite problematic. Why? The test itself is conducted without empathy.

Empathy (presumed in the film to be an essential human characteristic) is learned from others. How can we know who possesses that quality, and yes, recognize it in others, if we don't have it ourselves?

Pfhorrest: Back on Earth, people have lots of disagreements about what exactly those defining feature of a person are; but those disagreements have no bearing on whether or not I really am a person or not, only on whether I would be recognized as such (and treated appropriately) if I were known to exist. I would even remain just as much a person even if there actually were no other persons in the universe at all, and so I was in no sense a member of any such group. Whether I deserve such treatment and deserve such recognition -- whether I am a person -- is independent of whether anybody recognizes me as such, or whether there even is anybody to recognize me as such. Or, at least, any such dependence is controversial.

Walkinxyz: Well, fine. But you are driving at (by avoiding) exactly the distinction that matters about personhood. Are you familiar with the epistemological insight that for anything to count as X, it has to be taken as X by some knowing subject? That doesn't mean that there is no objective X, it just means that someone has to do the "counting".

That sounds like exactly the kind of controversial position I am trying to have the article avoid flatly asserting. You may consider it an insight, but unless I am wildly misunderstanding you that's certainly not a position automatically conceded by everyone who hears it. Plenty of people would assert that whatever it is that makes crows crows, tables tables, and people people, anything which has those features is one of those things, regardless of whether there are any knowing subjects around to ask the question. What sets people apart from tables and crows is not anything about the method or mechanism of defining or delineating them, it's in what we value about them. Tables are valued for their usefulness as somewhere to put things at a convenient height; crows are valued, well, not much at all around the places I grew up, poor things; people are valued intrinsically as ends in themselves, or more accurately they (according to many theories) deserve such evaluation.

"What sets people apart from tables and crows is not anything about the method or mechanism of defining or delineating them, it's in what we value about them." Yes, that's right.

Keep in mind, that if this were a "Person (biology)" article, the criteria would be different. All my wording does is offer the every day definition of persons as members of a group of people (members in a strong sense), and a formal definition that acknowledges the role of our judgments about personhood in shaping what it is. At the end of the day, we are responsible for (but that doesn't mean we can just make up!) the word's meaning. Walkinxyz (talk) 09:14, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm happy to see the article talk about why it matters who counts as a person because this special value is usually assigned to persons, but I don't think that's it's a particular quirk in how "person" is defined, which is what the first sentence of an article is supposed to do: define the subject to be discussed. Then discussion of it comes afterward. You are mentioning plenty of things worth mentioning of persons, or at least of various concepts of persons and personhood; I just don't think preloading those concepts into the introductory definition of "what this article is going to talk about" is appropriate. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:42, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Can you point me to the rule on Wikipedia that says the first sentence is supposed to be a dictionary definition? Walkinxyz (talk) 09:14, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

It wouldn't matter if you lived on a planet by yourself. The question would not arise; and there would certainly be no Wikipedia article or discussion (and at this point you're probably thinking "that would be nice" ;-) Walkinxyz (talk) 14:18, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Thoughts? --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:33, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Defining personhood (copied from Talk:WikiProject Philosophy)

Over at Talk:Person, user Walkinxyz and I are having a bit of a debate over how (or perhaps whether?) to define "person" in the opening sentence of the lede. I'm having a bit of trouble understanding exactly what point he is trying to make, and can't think of anything else to say in response that isn't just repeating myself, so I'm hoping perhaps someone here can lend an outside eye to our discussion and help move things along.

Thanks. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:47, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

I think you are likely to go on forever, if you try to find an acceptable definition of “Person” by debate in the discussion pages of Wikipedia. I think an acceptable definition of a person is still a subject of debate in the literature of philosophy. I find three entire books on the subject on my bookshelf: Puccetti, Persons; Williams, Problems of the Self; and Vesey, Personal identity.

and I know of a lot more that do not appear to be cited in the article. However, I have not had time to read the article properly and will get back to you later. --Logicalgregory (talk) 12:00, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

To continue (I had to go to dinner), I suggest instead of talking about persons per sa, you talk about persons as being an area of philosophical debate (like free will and determinism). Something like “in philosophy the concept of a person is the subject of extensive discussion. There are three (maybe more if you can think of them) questions: Are persons human? (Puccetti says aliens can be persons). Are persons physical? (life after death, mind transference etc.) What is it that makes a person the same person over time? (personal identity, self identity)”. I think this approach might be easier. --Logicalgregory (talk) 12:46, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

That seems like the right approach. CRGreathouse (t | c) 17:19, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

I think both Walkinxyz and I already agree that something generally like that is the correct approach; I'm honestly not entirely clear on where our disagreement lies, it seems to me like at least one of us is almost completely misunderstanding the other, which is why I'm hoping some outside eyes could look at our actual discussion and see if they can clarify for us what's going on there.

An aside on this general approach though: I am trying to work within the constraints of some past discussions (to avoid re-igniting them).

1. The first thing is making sure to include a mention that many people do commonly use "human" and "person" synonymously, even though few if any sophisticated definition of personhood make that identification.

"If any"? The Frankfurt essay on personhood mentions that in the first two pages! Walkinxyz (talk) 06:00, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

A debate over that identification over at Human is what brought me to the Person article to begin with, as at the time it began by stating that "A person is any particular human being" or some such, which is clearly non-neutral.

1. The second thing is avoiding opening the article with something like "[subject] is contentious and difficult to define", as that sort of vague first sentence is reviled by certain circles here on Wikipedia and I don't want to draw their ire. Instead I am aiming to do like we did at Free will, and open with a statement of whatever narrow scraps of agreement there is between all parties, and then mention that the rest of the details are contentious.

That last point seems to be what Walkinxyz and I are both trying to do, but neither of us seems to like the other's attempt at is, and the discussion about what exactly we dislike and why seems to be getting murky so I'm hoping someone can glance over and try to clear it up.

Thanks again, --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:42, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

I have now had time to read the Pfhorrest and Walkinxyz discussion and am impressed by the amount of time and work they have put into this. However, I feel they are spending too much time on the head of the Person article when the body needs attention. Might I suggest that the head of the article be left as it for the moment and that a restructuring be undertaken on the body of the article? Perhaps when the body is improved and expanded it will be easier to see what the head should be like. --Logicalgregory (talk) 05:30, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

I would be happy with any improvements to be made to the body. The debate ongoing there now is because I object to his proposed change to the lede, and he is presenting rather detailed arguments in justification of that proposal, which I believe deserve equally details rebuttals. (I don't feel like it's been much work at all; just thinking and writing are easy and fun to do). So of course I would be happy to leave the lede as it stands; but I don't know how Walkinxyz would feel about that, since he dislikes it how it is.

I'm curious to hear what suggestions you have for improving the body. Bear in mind that we already have some articles like Personal identity (philosophy), and we wouldn't want to duplicate the contents of those. I almost feel like this article should be renamed "Personhood" since that seems to be its main subject; and maybe put a summary-style article at Person with summaries of Personhood, Personal Identity, etc?

Also, I'm not too familiar with how wikiprojects work but a part of me feels this discussion should be happening at Talk:Person rather than here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:28, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Yep. Best to put there, and put here, "there is a discussion at Talk:Person about the definition of person and outside help would be useful". PPdd (talk) 01:28, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

As I said, I don't think there would be much of a problem if the article was just about philosophy, so making Person into a summary article with links would be one solution. However, if we want to produce an article that is comprehensible to people with no knowledge of philosophy and who might only be using English as a second language, then the task is more difficult.

I was thinking that it might be possible to develop a template for cases such as this. My idea (which I have not worked through) would be to divide the articles into two sections based on the the distinction between connotation (sense, sinn) and denotation (reference, bedeutung). The first part to deal with what the word person means, the second to deal with instances of reference. The first section of the first part could deal with the etymology and lexicography of the term; the empirical study of its use in literature. The second section of the first part could be the philosophical analysis of the concept of a person; the analytic study of the term. The third section could be special meanings for the term, such as are found in law. The Second part would be concerned with what counts as a person, an alien? a computer? a brain dead human body? The development of a template (be this for the person article on its own or more generally) would have to be a group effort. I have no interest in doing this alone. --Logicalgregory (talk) 08:44, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

(Aside - Did you just say sinn=sense=connotation=meaning and beteutung=reference=denotation=instantiaion=concept=counts-as?) PPdd (talk) 01:35, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

I really appreciate that those working on Wikipedia's philosophy project are taking an interest in this. I do agree that we have been spending a lot of time on the lead, and I would say for my part this is because it sets the context needed for the rest of the article, and there are substantial issues that need to be addressed in how such an important subject is thematized. For my part, I am learning a great deal.

Pfhorrest's idea that we make the opening a statement of what we can agree on, is a good one. And I am still trying to persuade him of the merits of my introductory description, because I think that he misinterpreted it originally and overreacted by changing it.

As for the body, I really like Logicalgregory's suggestion for how to structure the article. But I would be wary of the (somewhat contradictory) suggestion that we turn the Person article into just another specialized philosophy article. There is too much at stake in the debates in broader society to do that. At the same time, the recent suggestion that it be merged with the "people" article goes too far in the opposite direction.

Of course there is a very important place for philosophy on this subject and, unfortunately, the "Personal Identity" article does not do the literature justice. A "Personhood (philosophy)" or "Person (philosophy)" article might be good, but only if someone with the relevant expertise wants to dive in.

What I would suggest is that the philosophy section in the person article cover the most salient division in the philosophical debates over personhood first – that is, the naturalistic-empiricist (i.e. Descartes -> Lock & Hume -> Strawson, Parfit) and non-naturalist / phenomenological views (i.e. Heidegger -> Merlau-Ponty -> Frankfurt, Taylor). Then go into some more esoteric views.

What interests me most is actually the second part of the article (what counts as a person), but I would cast it in terms of the contemporary debates around personhood (rather than abstract thought-experiments), especially given that people will probably decide to search for the article based on those debates – e.g. the corporate personhood stuff, the abortion debates (specifically Susan Bordo's fascinating essay "Are Mothers Persons?") and the promise or threat that "transhumanists" bring to the subject. And this is something I am willing to spend some time on, both independently and in cooperation with others. Walkinxyz (talk) 06:00, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

If the term "person" is ambigous (as shown in Person (disambiguation) it may be pointless in having an article which is not about one of the different senses of the term but attempting to be about all sneses simultanously. The assumtion/implication is that all senses of the term have something in common; is there any reason to make that assumption?Philogo (talk) 03:32, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

Good question. I would say that what they have in common is an impact on our common understanding; and also the understanding of researchers and social scientists, who are concerned with diverse problems and involved in divergent pursuits, but whose work nonetheless affects each others' disciplines and the lives of ordinary people in general. To use a separate but related example, when someone like Rodney Brooks at MIT uses a definition of living things as "machines whose components are biochemicals", it affects more than just the field of robotics. It affects product design, legal regulations and debates in many other other spheres. So yes, I think there is some value in having an article that is about, if not "all the senses simultaneously", then at least "several senses, independently and in relation to one another, in context". Walkinxyz (talk) 04:31, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

A series of overlapping sets do not necessarily all have something in common, but they have more in common than a disjoint series. Finding a commonality is WP:OR and WP:Synth. PPdd (talk) 01:52, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

I have proposed a new structure for the main body of the Person "article". This is in a new section in the discussion page of "person". Hopefully this can start a group discussion.--Logicalgregory (talk) 07:41, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

User:Pfhorrest, regarding your opening question, "WP:Wikipedia is not complete", or some such expression, is a guideline or policy. So if you just sit it out until the techological Singularity takes over all consciousness, the problem will go away, maybe not in platonic space, but here, since there will only be one editor left for a consensus first sentence definition, "I" think (no internal debates, please). You might also want to consult the initial U.S. Consitution, where you can find out what 3/5 of a person is. PPdd (talk) 21:37, 5 February 2011 (UTC)

If the term "person" is ambigous (as shown in Person (disambiguation), (a) if there are reliable sources where it is argued that they all have something in common, then the article should set out the argument citing the sources (b) otherwise it is pointless in having an article which is not about one of the different senses. The belief of an editor that they have something in common is neither here nor there unless they themsleves are a reliable source with publications that can be cited, otherwise the aticle becomes OR. Philogo (talk) 23:57, 5 February 2011 (UTC)

Should this discussion be copied to the article’s talk page? Here is a definition that deals with Pfhorrest’s initial talk page alien being, mind-merge, and fetus as partial person examples (which might be jokingly summed up as “3/5 of a Singularity that fell asleep”) – “an individuated unit of consciousness, or formerly active but still potential consciousness, which is recognized by the user of the term as being a unit by its cognitive capacities, which recognition changes depending on the context intended by the user of the term.” But as with any definition, the above definition can again be extended with additional qualifiers, ad infinitum.

MOS’s “define in first sentence” is a guideline. What goes in as the “definition” should be determined by the intended audience of the encyclopedia. A definition so technical that an ordinary user would be lost after one sentence has little value in an encyclopedia.

There will always be a problem of WP”synth and WP:OR in any philosophy project defining first sentence. Logicalgregory’s suggestiong to build the body before the head seems good. (Building the head based on what is in the body means that a person is determined by what is in the body, not the head … oh well, I guess the definition will not apply to persons who are bodyless heads.) PPdd (talk) 01:16, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

• I'm copying this section over to be a subsection at Talk:Person, where additional comments should go. PPdd (talk) 01:57, 6 February 2011 (UTC)