Talk:People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran/Archive 48

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"biggest and most active political opposition group"

The first paragraph of the article currently says

It is also considered the Islamic Republic of Iran's biggest and most active political opposition group.

This is both poorly sourced and a violation of WP:NPOV.

Abrahamian is referring to MEK's popularity in the early 1980s, a long time ago. Katzman only describes MEK as Iran's "most active" opposition group, not the biggest, and is dated to 2001 (20 years ago). This source describes MEK as The MEK, which has been in exile for years, is Iran’s most organised and only armed opposition group. It makes no mention of MEK being the biggest.

Having this statement at the top of the lead without any indication of MEK's unpopularity is very WP:BIASED. High quality journalistic sources published in recent years have called the MEK a "fringe" group: New York Times, CBC News, Washington Post and an expert quoted inNBC News. We have consensus at Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran#Iran-Iraq war that MEK became unpopular inside Iran due to its collaboration with Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war.

I was able to find only one source (currently not in the article) that refers to MEK as the "largest Iranian opposition group" in the context of "opposition outside Iranian borders". But if we include it, we should also consider sources that give the opposite view.VR _talk 22:18, 3 May 2021 (UTC)

The MEK has been the Islamic Republic's main political opposition since the revolution.

• "The MEK has been the leading opposition voice against the Islamic Republic for years."
• "The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran, also known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq or MEK, comprised most of the victims of 1988’s “summer of blood,” and it has been expressly identified by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the driving force behind the recent uprisings. His warnings no doubt helped to justify the killing of 1,500 peaceful protesters last November, as well as the imposition of multiple death sentences in the ensuing months. Ever since coming to power, Iran’s clerical leaders have claimed that the MEK is a cult that lacks meaningful support inside Iran. If that is the case, how can they logically claim that the group is responsible for the ongoing protests in Iran? Why would Tehran spend massive sums of money and decades of political energy on demonizing a movement that allegedly has only a marginal impact? Why would the regime risk its already heavily damaged relations with the international community by using its embassies and diplomats in 2018 to execute terrorist attacks on the MEK in Europe?"
• "But it also continued its anti-regime activities within Iran, where it had emerged as the clerical regime’s most potent and capable foe—the “public enemy number one” of Iran’s ayatollahs."
• "Having been removed from the US list of terrorist organizations in 2012, the NCRI is increasingly being recognized as the most important player in the landscape of resistance to Tehran’s clerical regime — both at home and abroad."

It is a an established fact. Ypatch (talk) 05:01, 7 May 2021 (UTC)

Ypatch you have quoted the sourced improperly and some of your sources aren't reliable.

• "The MEK has been the leading opposition voice against the Islamic Republic for years."

This source also says Many former U.S. officials and Iran experts question the MEK's democratic credentials, as well as the depth of its support base inside Iran...Many independent scholars say the MEK's alliance with Saddam in that long and bloody war turned the group into traitors in the eyes of most Iranians. In the 1990s, the Rajavis instituted a number of cult-like measures to prevent defections.

• This source simply questions Iran's claims about MEK without saying MEK is the largest opposition group.
• You took the third quote out of context, here is the full quote: "But it also continued its anti-regime activities within Iran, where it had emerged as the clerical regime’s most potent and capable foe—the “public enemy number one” of Iran’s ayatollahs. Then, in the late 1990s, the MeK became..." Obviously, this is a reference to MEK's potency before the 1990s. It has no relevance to today. In fact, the same source also says "To its detractors, MEK represents a fringe element that promotes an unpopular, unworkable vision of Iran’s future." And also, Iranian opposition elements remain deeply distrustful of the organization, citing its insular, exclusionary nature and claiming that, among other things, it fundamentally lacks support on the Iranian “street.”
• This source is not reliable as it is controlled by the Saudi gov't, which also funds the MEK.VR _talk 23:17, 10 May 2021 (UTC)

I quoted directly from the sources. About Arab News, show me where it says this is not not a reliable source. Ypatch (talk) 04:13, 12 May 2021 (UTC)

Read Wikipedia:Reliable_sources/Perennial_sources#Arab_News, Arab News is not a good source for matters related to Saudi govt. We have New York Times, Washington Post, CBC News, NBC News all saying MEK is fringe vs Arab News saying they are popular. Which sources are more reliable? NYT or Arab News? So which source should be given more weight?VR _talk 03:02, 25 May 2021 (UTC)

Still waiting for Ypatch's response.VR _talk 02:48, 11 June 2021 (UTC)

The International Policy Digest link provided by Ypatch: "Ever since coming to power, Iran’s clerical leaders have claimed that the MEK is a cult that lacks meaningful support inside Iran. If that is the case, how can they logically claim that the group is responsible for the ongoing protests in Iran? Why would Tehran spend massive sums of money and decades of political energy on demonizing a movement that allegedly has only a marginal impact?" Exactly. Idealigic (talk) 09:15, 12 May 2021 (UTC)

• Idealigic Can you remember your discussion here, when you wrote If we add one POV, then we need to add all, and the lead is not for that? Ghazaalch (talk) 19:55, 12 May 2021 (UTC)

MeK repeatedly claims to be the most influential opposition group in that country, in reality it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded. Ghazaalch (talk) 06:03, 15 May 2021 (UTC)

Can we now omit the disputed sentence from the lede? Ghazaalch (talk) 04:08, 23 May 2021 (UTC)

I am going to remove the sentence if there is no objection. Ghazaalch (talk) 09:43, 5 June 2021 (UTC)

Ghazaalch: You seem to have missed Ypatch and Idealigic's objections. I think we could add the new sources here to the section "Perception" though, and then clean the section up since it's kinda messy. Alex-h (talk) 21:49, 6 June 2021 (UTC)

For now, we can just note both views as I've done here. But I think the sources are being misused and I will wait for Ypatch to respond.VR _talk 01:04, 7 June 2021 (UTC)

I agree that this should go in the Perception section, in the Outside Iran part. That's my suggestion.Ypatch (talk) 05:08, 9 June 2021 (UTC)

Ypatch can explain this revert? If we are going include one POV in the first sentence of the lead then we should include the alternate POV as well. Otherwise this is a violation of WP:NPOV. And giving one POV less weight (by moving it out of the lead) is a violation of WP:DUE.VR _talk 02:48, 11 June 2021 (UTC)

• I fixed all the tagging done by VR. Since everything else is obviously disputed, it should go in the perception section where all the POVs can be explained. Idealigic (talk) 09:42, 28 June 2021 (UTC)

Actually this addition is misleading and implies that MEK is still a major political force. But most scholars including Abrahamian say that MEK peaked in popularity in the 1980s and then its popularity has declined since then. In his final subchapter From mass movement to religio-political sect, Abrahamian argues that MEK's popularity peaked in June 1981 (p 258) and by 1988: The Mojahedin had formulated its own vision...Clearly by 1988 very few outside the inner circles of true believers accepted such a far-fethce vision. (p 281). Conen also says since 1981 until the mid 1980s, the organization lost its social hold in Iran (p 174). There is a long list of reliable (and scholarly) sources that agree that MEK his unpopular in Iran today: Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive 39#Mek Unpopular.VR _talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)

If you think you can make a better edit then make a better edit but don't tag everything or remove it from the lead like Mhhossein did, that is fixing nothing. I will restore the longstanding version until we can come to an agreement. Make a proposal here before making it in the article so we avoid edit warring. Idealigic (talk) 08:14, 30 June 2021 (UTC)

Idealigic if a claim is unsourced or has a citation that doesn't support the text, then this is a serious WP:V issue. Tags are absolutely necessary in that case.VR _talk 15:53, 1 July 2021 (UTC)

I will source and organise the claims (for the second time). By the way, what you did was another WP:CRP violation. The next one I will report it. Idealigic (talk) 13:00, 2 July 2021 (UTC)

I added verification failed tags to sources that don't support the text. You can't use CRP as a an excuse to violate the most fundamental policy of wikipedia.VR _talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)

This edit is problematic. First you are once again misquoting Abrahamnian who says that MEK had declined by 1988. Cohen says that by "the mid 1980s, the organization lost its social hold in Iran" A 2008 journal article said MEK had a "diminished status"; a 2020 scholarly book called it "a spent force in Iranian politics". Another scholarly book says "it gradually lost popularity inside and outside Iran", yet another scholarly source says MEK "lost much of its support in Iran" and "reached a dead end." In fact here are 19 more sources that say that MEK is no longer popular in Iran: Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive 39#Mek Unpopular.

Also who is Iran's "main opposition" is disputed. Since 2009, Mousavi and the Green Movement have been called Iran's "main opposition" by Reuters, Guardian, NBC News and this scholarly source. Before then, a 2008 report said "Since [1979], the group Mehdi Bazargan (and Ibrahim Yazdi)'s Iranian Freedom Movement has existed as the primary opposition to the regime and the concept of velayat-e-faqih." A 1986 artice in the Christian Science Monitor says there isnt just one "main opposition" group, but many including the "royalists".

So why do you insist on putting such a controversial fact in the first paragraph?VR _talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)

I am not misquoting, and the fact that you continue to make these types of false accusations (like Mhhossein) shows you are violating WP:NPA. Idealigic (talk) 08:59, 8 July 2021 (UTC)

• The summary of this discussion serves to show the sentence in question is disputed. As Vice Regent showed by providing reliable sources, MEK's being the largest/biggest opposition group is not a fact and there are serious counter POVs against it. Moreover, if Katzman is referring to MEK as the most active opposition group, then it should be framed as "according to Katamzn..." and hence should be taken to the body (Katzman is should be generalized). If there is no substantiated objection, I am going to act based on this suggestion by Idealigic. --Mhhossein ^talk 12:24, 10 July 2021 (UTC)

Mhhossein you're right, NPOV requires us to attribute contentious views. Idealigic and Ypatch insist that the POV that MEK is the largest opposition belongs in the lead's 1st paragraph, but opposing POVs do not, violates WP:DUE. I'm have moved recently added material by Idealigic to the body.VR _talk 12:53, 16 July 2021 (UTC)

@Vice regent:: This is not "recently added material", that the MEK is the IRI's main political opposition is part of the longstanding text for which you asked more sources to be provided, and I provided them. Mhoossein tried moving this to the body too, so your edit is yet another GAMING of restrictions so you leave with no choice to restore longstanding version again. Idealigic (talk) 14:56, 16 July 2021 (UTC)

@Idealigic: It is clear that the "not recently added material(s)" can be questioned in terms of their sources. They can be challenged if there is rational ground for it to be questioned. --Mhhossein ^talk 05:24, 8 August 2021 (UTC)

RfC follow-up

In closure of the last RfC on cult claims, Chetsford encouraged us to "open a new and more focused discussion as to whether or not the just-adopted shortened form should be modified in the way suggested by VK [VR]."

My proposal is given below and would replace "Designation as a cult" section. Currently that section has 342 words (2200 characters). My proposal would reduce it to 227 words (1600 characters). Please give specific feedback on what is good about it, what is not good about it, and how the not good part can be changed. Please do not simply "support" or "oppose" it, this is not a vote. Proposal:

The MEK has been described as a "cult" by governments and officials in Iran, the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Iraq. It has also been described as a cult by numerous academics, by former MEK members who defected, and by journalists who visited MEK camps in Iraq. Some sources argue that the Iranian government regularly exploits such allegations to demonize the MEK.

According to a US government report, the MEK had "many of the typical characteristics of a cult, such as authoritarian control, confiscation of assets, sexual control (including mandatory divorce and celibacy), emotional isolation, forced labour, sleep deprivation, physical abuse and limited exit options". Critics often describe the MEK as the "cult of Rajavi", arguing that it revolves around the husband-and-wife duo, Maryam and Massoud Rajavi, to whom members must give "near-religious devotion". Members reportedly had to participate in regular "ideological cleansings". Members are forbidden from marrying and those already married were ordered to divorce and are not allowed to see their children. They must suppress all sexual thoughts. According to RAND Corporation members were lured in through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries" and then prevented from leaving.

The MEK is believed to have become a cult to survive. After a major defeat in 1990, MEK leadership ordered all couples to divorce and send away their children.

I am very willing to compromise the text of this proposal to reach consensus. I would be grateful if an outside party (polite mentions of Chetsford, Vanamonde93 and Fences and windows) can help guide our discussion. If this discussion stalls, my next step would be WP:DRN.VR _talk 16:32, 22 February 2021 (UTC)

VR: you are overlooking the main issues with this section: the title, counter views, summary of major points (removing redundancy). For over a year now we've known that the title "Designation as a cult" is not supported by a single source (which would make this heading WP:OR and WP:ATTACK); yet it has not been changed despite my efforts to correct this. You are also not acknowledging the many RSs available that say the IRI pays international press to discredit the MEK through propaganda (which, among other things, involve characterizing the MEK as a cult). Vanamonde already suggested the article is "twice as long as it should be, and is mired in allegations, counter-allegations, and denials by all parties involved" (here is another list of recommendations complied by Idealigic that Vanamonde made to help us fix the article). Let's summarize this text with views on both sides of the argument, remove the misleading heading, and put this text in another section where it makes more sense (like "Perception"; which is what Vanamonde and Bahar have suggested). That is what I'd support. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 17:31, 22 February 2021 (UTC)

Stefka, I did not propose (in this section) a name or location for the text. I proposed replacing what I feel is poorly written text with better written text. In my proposed text I did include a sentence on Iran exploiting cult allegations to demonize the MEK. Once again, what specifically do you dislike here?VR _talk 18:38, 22 February 2021 (UTC)

I was specific in last comment. If it hasn't been obvious already by the countless talk page discussions here, I'll make it obvious now: for a long time there has been relentless attempts to change the narrative of this page, from the MEK being the Islamic Republic's main democratic political opposition, into the MEK "being nothing more than a cult" (the same narrative that the Islamic Republic has spent millions in getting the international press to say about the MEK). I really don't understand why that has been tolerated here. It wouldn't have been tolerated with a Western political group; there are many sources calling the Trump administration a "Cult" ([1] [2] [3] [4] etc...); yet there isn't a single mention about that in that article, and rightly so. Your proposed "better written text" does just that: compiles allegations of entities that have called the MEK a cult, even though there have been US, UK, France officials dismissing such claims (something you fail to say in your version). You're also WP:IDHT the issue with the title. To close, your text uses cherry picked sentences from cherry picked sources to give prominence to a narrative that the MEK is a nothing more than a cult, and that's the equivalent of using Wikipedia as a platform for mischaracterisation. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:39, 23 February 2021 (UTC)

Stefka Bulgaria you yourself admitted, after input from Vanamonde, that none of the sources "dismissed" claims that MEK was a cult. I don't believe I cherrypicked sources. I have yet to find a single scholarly source that says MEK is not a cult. Which scholarly sources have I missed on this topic? VR _talk 13:12, 23 February 2021 (UTC)

VR, you keep responding with WP:IDHT. To put it another way (and that's the last I'll say here) I could use the sources I provided here on the Donald Trump administration being called a cult, and create a narrative (even a section titled "Designation as a cult", as it has happened here) on that article saying the Trump administration is a cult. But obviously, that wouldn't fly. Yet, you are trying to do just that here. Through RfC consensus, we determined to summarise a vast amount of POV pushing into "The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"."[337][338] Various sources have also described the MEK as a “cult”,[339][340] “cult-like",[341][342] or having a “cult of personality”,[343][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[344][345][346]. We really don't need more than this in the article (Vanamonde has been repeating that the article needs to be summarised). Yet here you continue to try to develop a narrative that the MEK is a cult (as well as that the MEK is unpopular). That infringes WP:NPOV.Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 13:54, 23 February 2021 (UTC)

Stefka Bulgaria I am trying to reduce the size: the current version is 342 words (2200 characters), my proposal is 227 words (1600 characters). Unless my word counts are wrong, you seem to have misunderstood. Consider that Ghazaalch just pointed out an entire chapter devoted to MEK's cultishness in the RAND report, and I recently found a book that extensively covers MEK's cultishness (that book is published by Routledge and got a positive review in the Journal of Mental Health). I think 1600 characters (just 0.6% of the article size) is a fair proposal.VR _talk 17:27, 23 February 2021 (UTC)

• @Stefka Bulgaria: It seems that you would like to summarize the section "Designation as a Cult" to Various sources have described the MEK as a “cult”,[339][340] “cult-like",[341][342] or having a “cult of personality”,[343][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[344][345][346] which roughly means Some say MEK is a cult and some say no. Is it the way people write an article? Shouldn't we explain different aspects of cultic characteristics of MeK to the readers who want to know why MEK is called a cult, and why some others say it is not a cult? So I am going to use the chapter Cultic Characteristics of the MeK in the RAND report to improve this section, as I proposed below. Ghazaalch (talk) 04:57, 24 February 2021 (UTC)
• While the suggestion is brief enough – in accordance with the consensus among the users – it is in accordance with WP:DUE and hence WP:NPOV by mentioning all the major viewpoints mentioned by the reliable sources. Digging through the comments, there's NO compelling argument why these well-sourced but brief material should be included in the text. --Mhhossein ^talk 04:48, 1 March 2021 (UTC)

Moreover, I think this version is highly in accordance with the notion by Someguy (that's endorsed by Vanamonde) since VR's version takes the "broad sources" to determine due weight. --Mhhossein ^talk 04:54, 1 March 2021 (UTC)

• At the previous RFC, the matter/suggestion of VR is completely reasonable -- according to the comment of the administrator who closed the previous discussion. This suggestion specifically complies with WP: DUE and WP: Verifiability policies. Not only the current version is brief, but also due to the agreement between all users to use scholarly-sources, this version makes good use of those sources and expresses very important content without mentioning unnecessary details. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:22, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

The most neutral version is the one that already received consensus through the RfC. If VR is interested in cleaning up the article from redundancy, then why not focus on the "Human Rights record" section? There is a lot of redundancy there. Idealigic (talk) 16:16, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

What is clear is that the sources disagree with you. In truth, I mean that the decision for neutrality ought to be based on sources. Deleting some outstanding views can make neutrality problem. Currently, the outstanding comments have been removed. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 06:19, 11 March 2021 (UTC)

• This proposal has many problems. It isn’t neutral. It starts with the “governments and officials” that described the MEK as a “cult”. What about the government officials that have negated these allegations? The same thing with “academics”, “journalists”, and the rest. Also “former MEK members who defected” - have you read the Disinformation through recruited MEK members in the article? Also it’s not that the Iranian government “regularly exploits such allegations to demonize the MEK”, the Iranian government makes up these allegations and pays the press to publish them through a disinformation campaign (). This proposal focuses on all the sources that call the MEK a cult, and leaves out all the ones that say these allegations are disinformation from the Iranian government. It violates neutrality guidelines. I am in favor of making that section shorter, but this is not the way to do it. Barca (talk) 12:40, 9 March 2021 (UTC)

Barca can you present the sources that deny that MEK is a cult? I provided 15 scholarly sources that describe MEK as a cult (Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran#Scholarly sources describe MEK as a cult). How many scholarly sources say that it is not? If you can't find a similar number of scholarly sources that deny the cult allegation then your argument amounts to WP:FALSEBALANCE.VR _talk 02:09, 13 March 2021 (UTC)

I have already given sources in my last comment (and linked to sections with even more sources). You can also see the sources Mhhossein removed from the article that say the Iranian regime pays the press to say the MEK is a cult, and you can see the past discussions where editors have talked about this, like this RFC for example, where Nika2020 provided sources like these.

• "retired US general saying "Cult? How about admirably focused group?".
• "Former French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal criticized the MEK for having a ″cult nature”; while Former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that he was “ashamed” by this statement.
• "Despite these, Rudy Guiliani, president Trump's personal lawyer, addressed a meeting of the MEK at their Tirana compound, saying: "And if you think that's a cult, then there is something wrong with you".
• "An investigation by the European Parliament and the U.S. military concluded that the accusations of it being a cult were unfounded: "the European Parliament’s report uncovered falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence". According to Raymond Tanter, "Tehran uses allegations that the MEK is a 'cult' as propaganda to target liberal democracies, attempting to persuade them to refrain from providing support to the MEK", not addressing claims of being a cult by various journalists.".

That amounts to a lot of sources. Barca (talk) 23:51, 19 March 2021 (UTC)

We were actually expecting to see scholarly sources on your part. It is clear that these claims can safely be ignored in the face of the strong scholarly sources provided by me and Vice Regent. --Mhhossein ^talk 07:23, 24 March 2021 (UTC)

@Vice regent: Do you have comments on this? --Mhhossein ^talk 13:01, 23 April 2021 (UTC)

BarcrMac recently Vanamonde closed an RfC where they said The sources presented below using the "cult" descriptor are patently more reliable than those challenging that descriptor. That RfC included the very sources you mentioned above. Do you have any other objections to the proposal?VR _talk 22:23, 3 May 2021 (UTC)

• "The MEK is believed to have become a cult to survive"? Then " Critics often describe the MEK as the "cult of Rajavi" That is only two sources that have said this according to what you've provided. Then all the things you write about marriage? why? it's already starting to look like the other section about 'Ideological revolution and women's rights'. Would it be acceptable if I propose a way to shorten this section that is not as biased? Bahar1397 (talk) 19:25, 5 May 2021 (UTC)

Bahar1397 I provided 15 scholarly sources that call MEK a cult, in which 7 scholarly sources refer to it as either "Rajavi cult" or "cult of personality [around Rajavi]". Is that not enough?VR _talk 17:25, 12 May 2021 (UTC)

My objection with your proposal, VR, os that it isn't neutral. It starts with the “governments and officials” that described the MEK as a “cult”, when there are other government officials that negated these allegations. The same thing with “academics”, “journalists”, and the rest. Also “former MEK members who defected” (see Disinformation through recruited MEK members). Like I already said, this proposal focuses on all the sources that call the MEK a cult, and leaves out all the ones that say these allegations are disinformation from the Iranian government. It violates neutrality guidelines. I am in favor of making that section shorter, but if we do that, it also needs to be neutral, which now it clearly lacks.

Here are balancing sources copy pasted from other posts:

1* "The United States Congress, United States House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Affairs published an enquiry on derogatory descriptions of the MEK, including "cult"-like allegations. The enquiry found that since 1979, the Iranian government had gone through "extraordinary lengths to shape the international perception and narrative attached to the MEK/PMOI", adding that for years, MOIS had conducted an "information operations' campaign in the West aimed at discrediting and defaming the MEK/PMOI.""

2* "According to Majid Rafizadeh, there is an organized and well-funded misinformation campaign aimed at demonizing the MEK. On July 5, 2010, during a testimony at the Canadian Parliament, John Thompson (head of the Mackenzie Institute) stated that he had been offered $80,000 by a man tied to Iran's mission in Canada, adding that "they wanted me to publish a piece on the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). Iran is trying to get other countries to label it as a terrorist cult.”"

3* "A 2011 report by the General Intelligence and Security Service stated that the government in Iran continued to coordinate a campaign financed by the Iranian intelligence services to undermine and portray the MEK in a highly negative manner. This campaign also involved the media, politicians, and public servants."

4* "According to reports by Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Ministry of Intelligence (Iran)'s main focus (in Iran and abroad) is to monitor and combat the main political opposition, and as of 2016, the Iranian intelligence service continued with its strategy of discrediting the MEK through propaganda."

5* "Political scientist Dr. Majid Rafizadeh stated that “The Iranian regime has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to demonize the PMOI and portrayed it as a group without popular support.”

6* "According to Hamid Bahrami the Iranian regime has ran "a vast and costly demonization campaign against the main Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran", adding that Iran's propaganda against the MEK has spread also in Western and Middle Eastern media."

7*"retired US general saying "Cult? How about admirably focused group?".

8*"Former French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal criticized the MEK for having a ″cult nature”; while Former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that he was “ashamed” by this statement.

9*"Despite these, Rudy Guiliani, president Trump's personal lawyer, addressed a meeting of the MEK at their Tirana compound, saying: "And if you think that's a cult, then there is something wrong with you".

10*"An investigation by the European Parliament and the U.S. military concluded that the accusations of it being a cult were unfounded: "the European Parliament’s report uncovered falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence". According to Raymond Tanter, "Tehran uses allegations that the MEK is a 'cult' as propaganda to target liberal democracies, attempting to persuade them to refrain from providing support to the MEK", not addressing claims of being a cult by various journalists.". Barca (talk) 23:50, 5 May 2021 (UTC)

These "denies " that you mentioned above, have been denied by sources more reliable than what you provided above. According to RAND report for example, MEK's supporters "vigorously deny that the MeK is a cult. They allege that former MeK members and critics of the MeK are either Iranian agents or their dupes. However, interviews with U.S. military and civilian officials, information voluntarily furnished by former MeK members at the ARC, and visits to Camp Ashraf suggest that these denials are not credible. The cult characteristics described in this appendix have been widely reported by former MeK members and by Human Rights Watch.(For example, see Singleton, 2003; Banisadr, 2004, Iran-Interlink, undated, 2008; and Human Rights Watch, 2005. For typical characteristics of cults, see, e.g., Bale, 2001; Lalich, 2004; and Lalich and Langone, undated.) They have also been substantiated, at least in part, by interviews with JIATF-Ashraf officers and by information volunteered by former MeK members at the ARC. Ghazaalch (talk) 14:12, 6 May 2021 (UTC)

• Responding to the ping below from Vice Regent. I don't personally give two hoots whether the MEK is called a cult or not, or how its organizational aspects are analyzed in this article. However, given weighty sources making a given argument, e.g., the MEK shares organizational aspects of a cult, anyone disputing that narrative needs to provide equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions. In particular, academic sources need to be answered by academic sources. I am particularly tired of "The MEK is the subject of propaganda by the Iranian government" being used to stonewall any and all criticism. Reliable sources discussing such propaganda belong in the article, duly weighted, but they are not directly germane to this discussion unless they are explicitly also discussing the cult-like nature, or lack thereof, of the MEK. Vanamonde (Talk) 20:00, 12 May 2021 (UTC)

@VR: What is it that you're trying to add to the article, that isn't already in the article? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:41, 13 May 2021 (UTC)

As TheTimesAreAChanging correctly points out, the current version (that you wrote) "grossly minimizes the many cult-like features of the MEK described in academic sources". Scholars are clear that MEK is a cult. Vanamonde's analysis of sources is consistent with this. At this point any attempts to impede this consensus are WP:IDONTLIKEIT and WP:STONEWALLING.VR _talk 02:52, 25 May 2021 (UTC)

I would also like to add MEK's ideological revolution during which its members had to surrender their individuality to the organization,[2][3] to the lead, since it was omitted based on the same accusation. Ghazaalch (talk) 06:44, 25 May 2021 (UTC)

@VR: We currently have this much in the article about this (in an article that Vanamonde has said repeated times needs trimming):

• Critics have described the group as "resembling a cult".

• The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"." Various sources have also described the MEK as a “cult”, “cult-like", or having a “cult of personality”,[353][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".

• According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Masoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution", which required members an increased study and devotion that later expanded into "near religious devotion to the Rajavis". After its settlement in Iraq, however, it experienced a shortfall of volunteers. This led to the recruitment of members including Iranian dissidents, as well as Iranian economic migrants in countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq". MEK also gave free visit trips to its camps to the relatives of the members. According to the RAND report, the recruited members were mostly brought by MEK into Iraq illegally and then were asked to submit their identity documents for "safekeeping", an act which would "effectively trap" them. With the assistance of Saddam's government, MEK also recruited some of its members from the Iranian prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war. During the second phase of the ideological revolution, all members were forced to surrender their individuality to the organization.

• Five weeks later, the MEK announced that its Politburo and Central Committee had asked Rajavi and Azondalu, who was already married, to marry one another to deepen and pave the way for the "ideological revolution. At the time Maryam Azodanlu was known as only the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi. According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate this 'great revolution'. According to Ervand Abrahamian "in the eyes of traditionalists, particularly among the bazaar middle class, the whole incident was indecent. It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister. It involved women with young children and wives of close friends – a taboo in traditional Iranian culture;" something that further isolated the Mojahedin and also upset some members of the organization. Also according to Ervand Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."[297] Many criticized Maryam Azodanlu's giving up her own maiden name (something most Iranian women did not do and she herself had not done in her previous marriage). They would question whether this was in line with her claims of being a staunch feminist.

• In 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki told the MEK it had to leave Iraq, but the MEK responded that the "request violated their status under the Geneva Convention". Al-Maliki and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice maintained that the MEK had committed human rights abuses in the early 1990s when it aided Saddam Hussain's campaign against the Shia uprising. According to Time magazine, the MEK has denied aiding Saddam in quashing Kurdish and Shia rebellions.

• In a 2004 public release, Amnesty International stated it continues to receive reports[by whom?] of human rights violations carried out by the MEK against its own members.[445] In 2018, Amnesty International also condemned the government of Iran for executing MEK prisoners in 1988 and presented the MEK as being mainly peaceful political dissidents despite reports that they have killed thousands of Iranians and Iraqis since 1981.

• In May 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report named "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps", describing prison camps run by the MEK and severe human rights violations committed by the group against its members, ranging from prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that in two cases led to death. However, disagreements over this provided evidence has been expressed.

• The report prompted a response by the MEK and four European MPs named "Friends of a Free Iran" (FOFI), who published a counter-report in September 2005.[448] They stated that HRW had "relied only on 12 hours [sic] interviews with 12 suspicious individuals", and stated that "a delegation of MEPs visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq" and "conducted impromptu inspections of the sites of alleged abuses". Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (PP), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, said that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was the source of the evidence against the MEK.[448] In a letter of May 2005 to HRW, the senior US military police commander responsible for the Camp Ashraf area, Brigadier General David Phillips, who had been in charge during 2004 for the protective custody of the MEK members in the camp, disputed the alleged human rights violations.[449] Former military officers who had aided in guarding the MEK camp in Iraq said "its members had been free to leave since American military began protecting it in 2003." The officers said they had not found any prison or torture facilities.

• Human Rights Watch released a statement in February 2006, stating: "We have investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the [No Exit] report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted". It provided responses to the FOFI document, whose findings "have no relevance" to the HRW report.

• In July 2013, the United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, accused the leaders the group of human rights abuses, an allegation the MEK dismissed as "baseless" and "cover-up". The United Nations spokesperson defended Kobler and his allegations, stating: "We regret that MEK and its supporters continue to focus on public distortions of the U.N.'s efforts to promote a peaceful, humanitarian solution on Camp Ashraf and, in particular, its highly personalized attacks on the U.N. envoy for Iraq".

• Hyeran Jo, in her work examining humanitarian violations of rebel groups to international law, states that the MEK has not accepted International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits to its detention centers.[452] According to Ronen A. Cohen, the MEK controlled their people most importantly by "abuse of women".[428] According to criticism of Human Right groups, marriage had been banned in the camp.[453] Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in ideology and a revisionist history of Iran. All members are required to participate in weekly "ideologic cleansings".

• Journalist Jason Rezaian remarked in his detailing the connections between John R. Bolton and the MEK that "the few who were able to escape" were "cut off from their loved ones, forced into arranged marriages, brainwashed, sexually abused, and tortured".[455][456] Members who defected from the MEK and some experts say that these Mao-style self-criticism sessions are intended to enforce control over sex and marriage in the organization as a total institution.[270] MEK denied the brainwashing claims and described the former members as Iranian spies,[313] also saying that "any cult' comparisons were coming from the Iranian regime as part of its 'misinformation campaign.'"

• Some MEK defectors have accused the MEK of human right abuses, while the MEK has denied these claims saying they are part of a misinformation campaign by the Iranian regime.

• In March 2019 a Hamburg court ruled that Der Spiegel had "acted illegally in publishing false allegations of 'torture' and 'terrorist training' by the MEK in Albania". In July 2020 a German court ordered the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to remove false information about the MEK including untrue reports of human right abuses by the MEK against its members.

As this shows, the article has been filled with text suggestive of so-called MEK cult attributes. This should be summarized in a more clear manner, but you are trying to add more instead. So I need to ask again: what is it that you are trying to add that isn't already in the article? Once you provide that response, I'll do my best to offer a compromise proposing a trim of what you are trying to add together with what's already in the article. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:02, 25 May 2021 (UTC)

I have been trying to clean up some of this, but Mhhossein won't accept any of my proposals or propose anything himself even though he agrees that this needs trimming. Isn't that WP:IDONTLIKEIT and WP:STONEWALLING? All this content should be in one place and trimmed to keep the most important points only. That is the guiding format used for most Wikipedia articles and it is common sense editing. - MA Javadi (talk) 16:20, 25 May 2021 (UTC)

You were actually trying to mass remove the section and could not justify your proposal even after I asked you multiple times to explain yourself. You even did not follow my offer for compromise. @Stefka Bulgaria: Please focus on the "Cult of personality" section. Also, you need to are responsible here for falsely bringing irrelevant items to our attention. Look at your bullets #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #12 and #13. The mentioned items are not even talking about cultish/cult-like aspects of the group. Can you please stop stonewalling the consensus building process? Given the Vanamonde93's comment, and your failure to find and present "equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions", VR's suggestion needs to be implemented. --Mhhossein ^talk 06:22, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

Looking at that TP discussion, I see MA Javadi justifying and proposing solutions (see here, here here); and even asking Mhhossein for solutions (see here, here, here, here, etc.) - but Mhhossein seems to be sidestepping any form of compromise. In this discussion here, I'm asking what is VR trying to include that isn't already in the article. We all seem to be in agreement that the article is too long and has a redundancy problem, correct? Here is a chance to sum up all the allegations concerning the MEK's "cult of personality" traits in a concise and clear manner. If we all agree that that's what we want to do here, then I propose the following: include only information about who has made these claims, what do the "personality cult" traits involve (summary), and what opposing POVs have said about this. Once this has been determined, we can remove any other redundancy about this (which the article is filled with as I've pointed out above). Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 09:16, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

If you are not sidestepping any form of compromise please stop stonewalling the already built consensus here. What to be covered is largely determined by the reliable sources. It seems there's not further serious objection against the proposal here. --Mhhossein ^talk 14:41, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

Sidenote: Why are you and MA Javadi trying to change this topic to an irrelevant subject? In that discussion MA Javadi was only seeking to mass remove the content without trying to explain which portions are redundant. I showed his suggestion was POVish and I offered him solutions for reaching compromise a couple of times (including here). --Mhhossein ^talk 14:41, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

Soon I will offer a compromise between VR's, Stefka's, and my proposal. I need to prepare it first. - MA Javadi (talk) 18:13, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

Look, Vice regent's proposal covers MEK's cultish nature and has nothing to do with yours being regarding MEK's human rights record. You and Stefka Bulgaria are stonewalling the discussion by skewing this topic. Stop this before it's too late. VR's proposal will be implemented according to this comment by Vanamonde93. --Mhhossein ^talk 01:09, 7 June 2021 (UTC)

Clear statement that MEK is a cult, period

Stefka Bulgaria keeps asking me what is VR trying to include that isn't already in the article. Well currently the article doesn't state anywhere that "MEK is a personality cult", period. We have overwhelming scholarly consensus that it is (Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive_42#Scholarly sources describe MEK as a cult). The article should reflect that. This is just one of the things that is not in the article, but I'm making a new subsection because I don't want this point to get overlooked.VR _talk 01:29, 7 June 2021 (UTC)

Clarification: My exact proposal is to add "MEK is widely regarded as a cult of personality". The attribution is important as per MOS:TERRORIST as Idealigic and Mhhossein correctly pointed out below.VR _talk 04:08, 10 July 2021 (UTC)

I see a section titled "Cult of personality" in the article. The article reflects that already. Barca (talk) 13:38, 8 June 2021 (UTC)

I don't see any sentences in the article that clearly say that. An article's sentences ought to reflect section titles. So if there's no substantive objective, I'll go ahead and put that in the article.VR _talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)

Like Stefka said before, the sentences Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult", "cult-like", or having a "cult of personality" already address this. "Cult of personality" also makes this insinuation. If you do not agree, you can start a RFC. I have seen enough reliable sources in this talk page to challenge what you are trying to do. Idealigic (talk) 13:05, 3 July 2021 (UTC)

Admin Vanamonde has pointed out twice that sources that consider MEK to be a cult are more reliable and should be given more WP:WEIGHT. If you disagree, lets take it to WP:RSN. Given the multitude of sources here and more below, I'm going to go ahead and make this clear in the article. Enough stonewalling!VR _talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)

Just came across a few more scholarly sources that consider MEK to be a cult:

• "Gradually, the MEK has lost much of its appeal to the masses and has evolved into something similar to a religious cult that demanded absolute loyalty to the leadership."
• "Its evolution into a cult demanding absolute loyalty to its husband-wife leadrship has detracted immensely from the movement's credibility in Iran."
• "...the MEK has evolved into a religious cult, not a transparent and democratic resistance movement."

VR _talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)

• Vanamonde's input was done before you even made clear what it was that you were trying to add to the article and RSN is used to enquire about if a source is reliable or not. You are trying put a contentious MOS:TERRORIST label as something that isn't challenged, and there are many problems with that ("Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult", "cult-like", or having a "cult of personality"" already address this. "Cult of personality" also makes this insinuation.) You can start a RFC like other editors have been doing here. Despite the GAMING around RFCs you and Mhhossein are trying to do, your edits are not above RFC consensus building. Idealigic (talk) 08:56, 8 July 2021 (UTC)

Vanamonde's comment was clearly made after VR clarified his suggestion and comments were exchanged between the editors. Also, there is no "label" concern, since VR's suggestion is making proper attributions to scholarly reliable sources. Materials supported by scholarly sources need to be weighed much more than others. I would suggest Vice Regent going ahead with implementing this consensus. --Mhhossein ^talk 07:11, 9 July 2021 (UTC)

No it wasn't, and there is a "label" concern since cherrypicking sources to add contentious MOS:TERRORIST label as something that isn't challenged is a problem. Also there is a lot about cult in the article already. So no consensus for this. Idealigic (talk) 09:18, 9 July 2021 (UTC)

Idealigic and Mhhossein you are both correct about the attribution as per MOS:TERRORIST so here's what I propose:

The MEK is widely regarded to have evolved into a cult of personality...

Scholars believe that the MEK evolved into a cult of personality...

Either of these statements can be sourced to 18 scholarly sources.VR _talk 04:08, 10 July 2021 (UTC)

@Vice regent: Let's look at the following comments:

"However, given weighty sources making a given argument, e.g., the MEK shares organizational aspects of a cult, anyone disputing that narrative needs to provide equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions"
— User:Vanamonde93

"...there is a "label" concern since cherrypicking sources to add contentious MOS:TERRORIST label as something that isn't challenged is a problem."
— User:Idealigic

See? Had Idealigic heeded Vanamonde's comment, they had to provide "equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions"". What is it if it's not stonewalling? As for your suggestions, both are making proper attributions and I think both are correct with the first one being more general and accurate per those weighty sources. Looking at your original proposal, almost everything is well attributed, which is what the guideline demands. What's the difference? --Mhhossein ^talk 12:39, 23 July 2021 (UTC)

@Mhhossein: this has been said, but I will say it again. This is already in the article:

"Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult",[351][352] "cult-like",[353][354] or having a "cult of personality",[355][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[356][357][358]"

Then Vanamonde's closing comments on the RfC about this:

"With the caveat that I am only assessing the arguments and the source material presented here, it's fairly clear that the "critics describe it as a cult" narrative is far more prevalent among RS than the "MEK is a cult" narrative". This is especially true when, as has been discussed, a lot of the sources specifically use the terms "personality cult" or "cult of personality". Analyzing whether or not a personality cult is a true cult or not falls within the realm of original research."[5]

We also have sections "[Cult of personality]", "[Human rights record]", and "[Ideological revolution and women's rights]", all talking about "cult" elements of MEK in detail. The continuing efforts by you and VR to to change the article into "MEK is a cult" narrative is a testament to what you are both trying to do here. Idealigic (talk) 09:44, 24 July 2021 (UTC)

1. This is not in the article. FYI, "Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult"..." is in the lead, but the body does not support this at the moment. Other sections you mentioned are not supporting this.
2. As far as I remember, previous RFCs showed that the sections you mentioned should stand alone. Also, Vanamonde's closing comment is commenting on the correct wording not moving/adding materials.
3. Moreover, Vanamonde closed an RFC as such: The sources presented below using the "cult" descriptor are patently more reliable than those challenging that descriptor.
4. I already showed you his latest comment saying there are "weighty sources making a given argument, e.g., the MEK shares organizational aspects of a cult". With all of these clear cut comments, you are bludgeoning the process, instead of providing "equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions". I hope all these clues be evaluated in the Arbcom case. --Mhhossein ^talk 08:08, 25 July 2021 (UTC)

Idealigic the current text is problematic for several reasons:

• The first sentence in the cult section is The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"
  • This is a straw man argument sourced to a non-scholarly source. By contrast, we have several scholarly sources saying that MEK operates as a cult because it demands absolute loyalty to the Rajavi couple. The absolute loyalty is one of the top reasons, not the "no kids in camp ashraf" rule. This article does a disservice my misrepresenting the real reason scholars consider MEK to operate like a cult.
• The second sentence is Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult",[352][353] "cult-like",[354][355] or having a "cult of personality",[356][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult". This has several problems too:
  • It is phrased as "several sources say X, while other sources say Y". This wording implies equal legitimacy to both views and is hence WP:FALSEBALANCE. You can not equate the 18 scholarly sources that say MEK operates like a cult to three op-eds who provide an alternate view (see WP:RSEDITORIAL).
  • Why is "cult" in scare quotes? It should not be, see MOS:SCAREQUOTES.
  • Why does the text redundantly say "cult", "cult-like", or having a "cult of personality"? Instead it needs to explain to the reader why scholars say MEK behaves like a cult, and the historical context behind this behavior. This is exactly what my version attempts to do while using less words than the current version. In fact, filling up the section with redundant text instead of actual information is another type of straw man argument.

VR _talk 03:30, 26 July 2021 (UTC)

@Vice regent:: Your points are fair enough and there does not seem to be substantiated objections against the consensus. Scholarly sources talk for themselves. That said, they even tried to remove the whole section with all the reliable sources. --Mhhossein ^talk 05:14, 8 August 2021 (UTC)

Extended content
References

Removal of scholarly source

Idealigic can you explain this removal of a scholarly source cited material that Saddam ordered the operation?VR _talk 15:53, 1 July 2021 (UTC)

I reinstated longstanding version because Saddam making orders to the NLA seems WP:UNDUE. If I'm wrong, then please provide more sources which say Saddam made such orders to the NLA and we will compare them to other sources. Idealigic (talk) 12:59, 2 July 2021 (UTC)

The view that Saddam ordered the attack comes from a WP:SCHOLARLY source published by Harvard University Press. Is that not enough? Here's a book published by University Press of Kentucky that says the unsuccessful attack on 26-28 July...That mission was personally assigned to the group by Saddam. Please self-revert.VR _talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)

Why don’ t we quote the second source saying Saddam “assigned” the attack on 26-28 July to the Iranian National Liberation Army “after the successful conquest of Mehran a month earlier, based on the Iraqi’s assumption that the Iranian Army had been considerably weakened and that an additional atack there might be just as successful as the Iraqi liberation battles.”

The rest of the text in that source is also very insightful, we should also include it:

• " On 26 July the Mujahidin Khalq reported that a number of its divisions had opened a large-scale attack in western Iran whose objective was the city of Kermanshah. They claimed to have taken control of two cities - Karand and Eslam Abad Gharb - on the main road leading to Kermanshah. The forces passed through territory inside Iran that had been conquered by Iraq eastward into the Iranian heartland. In its course, they took many Iranian prisoners and seized large amounts of plunder. According to their reports, the residents of the two conquered cities had received their “liberators” warmly. In the battles that took place during the operation, the 27th Division of the Revolutionary Guards, which was deployed in the city of Eslam Abad Ghard, was seriously damaged. However, the Mujahidin were not successful, and their forces did not succeed in advancing eastward toward Hamadan, but were blocked by a counterattack mounted by Iranian reinforcements (Operation “Mersad” on 27 July). The Mujahidin were forced to retreat from the cities they had occupied 72 hours earlier. Their report claimed that they had retreated in order to regroup for further operations directed at bringing down the iranian regime. The Iraqis hurriedly contradicted the Iranian’s accusations that the operation had been carried out by their forces, which had in fact remained at Serbil Zehab and Ghilan-e-Gharb.”

We can also include the other sources that you and Mhhossein have been stonewalling from being included:

• " In spring 1987, the NLA launched its first major operation, code-named "Shining Sun," in the southern province of Khuzistan. Women were organized into two separate brigades, and, for the first time, took the field and fought face-to-face with Khomeini's forces on the front lines. The enemy's forces were shocked to find themselves captured by one of the women's brigades. Scenes of their capture, their surprise evident for all to see, were featured in some of the world's leading newspapers. Despite all the objections you have heard, women were fighting on the frontlines and reality was laid bare. Like their male counterparts, the women of the NLA demonstrated they were capable and qualified. These units took part in the "Forty Stars" operation together, during which the strategic city of Mehran in western Iran was conquered. One of the Khomeini regime's best-armored units was destroyed, and billions of dollars in tanks and weapons were seized as booty. Fifteen hundred of the regime's soldiers were taken prisoner. Immediately after this operation, only a week later, the National Liberation Army staged the "Eternal Light" operation. "Eternal Light was the NLA's largest operation and penetrated 150 kilometers into Iran. The fighting raged over four days. Two cities were liberated, and the NLA reached the gates of Kermanshah, the largest city in western Iran. The Khomeini regime suffered 55,000 casualties in this operation, the first in which women commanded many divisions and brigades. The operation, and in particular the fighting spirit of the NLA's women, had a tremendous impact”

• "The women trained to drive tanks, fire mortars, and conduct an invasion, which launched in 1987 with operations Shining Sun, Forty Stars, and Eternal Light. The NLA claims to have killed 55,000 Iranians before being forced to retreat."

• "On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched another offensive called “Chetel Setareh or “Operation Forty Stars” where twenty-two MEK brigades recaptured Mehran."

• " On 26 July the NLA, advancing under heavy Iraqi air cover, seized Karand and Islamabad-e Gharb.”

• "while according to the MEK, “absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation”. Iraqi Minister Latif Nassif Jassim too denied Iraq deploying air units to help the NLA or that it used chemical weapons to drive Islamic Republic soldiers from Mehran.”

• "In July of 1988, the NLA carried out Operation Mersad (also known as "operation Eternal Light) “in which the two Khuzestani towns of Kerand and Eslamabad were ‘liberated’ from the regime’s troops”. MEK press displayed photos of NLA troops in action and destroyed Iranian regime weapons and equipment.

• "on 29 July the NLA announced a voluntary withdrawal from Islamabad-e Gharb and Karand”

• "In another report by the Komite presented to the Islamic Republic on 15 August 1988, it found that "the more people defected from the Iranian army as a result of the Mojahedin's operations, the more frequent and larger they became." Komite members said in the report that it didn’t know how to prevent MEK achievements, which "had enabled the NLA to conquer Mehran".

• "According to MEK intelligence, the Islamic Republic set up a "Psychological Welfare Committee" made of clergymen chosen by Ayatollah Khomeini. This committee emerged as a think tank. An intelligence document gathered by the MEK said that the Komite advised their leadership that it "had to take the Mojahedin’s speedy developments and attacks seriously as they had demonstrated their ability to penetrate Iranian territory and destroy one of the Iranian brigades".

• "The Mojahedin launched a series of offensives against front-line pasdaran positions. On March 27 of 1988, a brigade-level campaign pushing deep into Khuzistan along an impressive thirty-kilometer front was launched by the NLA and succeeded in capturing 600-kilometer of regime territory along with 508 pasdaran and soldiers from the Iranian 77th infantry division. In this offensive, which was code-named “Operation Bright Sun” and was detailed in an interview later granted by Rajavi, an alleged 2,000 Islamic Republic soldiers were killed and $100 million worth of regime weaponry and equipment was captured and displayed for foreign journalists. The NLA had scored its first victory as a conventional fighting force, and it hoped to bring the regime to its knees, both through its propaganization of the successful offensive and through its new armed program. On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched its offensive entitled Chetel Setareh or “40 Stars” in which twenty-two organized brigades of Mojahedin recaptured the city of Mehran, which the regime had wrested from Iraqi control after the Mojahedin had set up its “provisional government” there. The Mojahedin claimed that absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation, and Iraqi Culture and Information Minister, Latif Nusayyif Jasim, later denied that Iraq had deployed air units to help the NLA or had used chemical weapons to drive the Islamic Republic’s troops from Mehran. In July of that year, a more protracted operation named Mersad or “Eternal Brilliance” was initiated in which the two Khuzestani twins of Kerand and Eslamabad were “liberated” from the regime’s troops. Mojahed press organs displayed pictorials of NLA troops in action, destroyed regime equipment and armored vehicles, surrendered pasdaran and road signs, with the Islamic Republic, marking the direction of the two towns."

• The fanatical legions of the Ayatullah Khomeini suffered another embarrassing defeat last week, this one apparently inflicted by their countrymen. In a cross-border strike from their base in Iraq, the National Liberation Army of the People's Mujahedin, a leftist Iranian dissident group, seized the border town of Mehran and drove its pro-Khomeini defenders beyond the surrounding hills. N.L.A. spokesmen claimed to have killed and wounded as many as 8,000 Iranian troops during the ten-hour battle, code-named Operation Forty Stars. Western reporters brought to the battle scene confirmed that the rebels had captured 1,500 Iranian prisoners, as well as tanks and artillery. Although the Iranians acknowledged their defeat at Mehran, they insisted it had been inflicted by Iraqi troops using chemical weapons. Baghdad denied any involvement in the battle. At week's end, however, Iraq did claim that its forces had recaptured the oil-rich Majnoun islands east of the Tigris River, where Iranian defenders had been entrenched since 1984."

• "In another report by the Komite presented to the Islamic Republic on 15 August 1988, it found that "the more people defected from the Iranian army as a result of the Mojahedin's operations, the more frequent and larger they became." Komite members said in the report that it didn’t know how to prevent MEK achievements, which "had enabled the NLA to conquer Mehran".

• "Right after the ceasefire went into effect, the MKO forces attacked Iran from Iraq in an operation they called Amaliyat-e Forough-e Javidaan [Operation Eternal Light], but referred to as Amaliyat-e Mersaad [Operations Trap] by the IRGC."

• "The reason for this new round of widespread executions was Operation Mersad, a military attack on Iranian forces by the Mojahedin-e Khalq."

• "A Komite report reached the conclusion that in order to prevent the MEK from achieving its goals, a strategy for collecting intelligence needed to be created. The Iran regime carried out the Komite's recommendation and started focusing its activities on MEK supporters in Iran (particularly in Iranian jailhouses). After the Iran-Iraq ceasefire agreement, the regime started executing Iranian citizens accused of assisting the MEK in Western Iran"

• "inflicting heavy casualties on the 77 Khorassan Division"

  Idealigic (talk) 08:54, 8 July 2021 (UTC)

I'm fine with restoring my earlier edit with the word "ordered" replaced with "assigned" as a compromise. Regarding the rest of the text you proposed, wikipedia shows it to be 13,000 characters, which is too much for an article that is already too long. If you think this material is relevant then consider creating a separate article on History of the People's Mujahedin of Iran.VR _talk 04:00, 10 July 2021 (UTC)

Katzman source

@Idealigic: You have reverted my edit and restored a portion which I think is not supported by the cited source on p.97. Can you provide the words from the p.97 of the sources of the text saying MEK is "Iran's most active opposition group"? --Mhhossein ^talk 11:21, 10 July 2021 (UTC)

Mhhossein I checked the source and Katzman indeed says that, you can view the book here.VR _talk 15:38, 10 July 2021 (UTC)

Thank you VR. But we can not wikivoice Katzman's words, can we?– the lead is wrongly reflecting Katzman's words as a fact. --Mhhossein ^talk 15:36, 12 July 2021 (UTC)

Idealigic was right to restore Katzman in the article body, but yes Katzman is being inappropriately in the lead. I have moved that material down.VR _talk 12:53, 16 July 2021 (UTC)

References
References