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Why?

Man to all conspiracy nuts, just answer me: Why the **** ths US needed a enourmous catastrophe like that? Just for a Cause to go to WAR and mobilize the masses? If i knew that japan will attack, and has mobilised its whole fleet, i can be prepared and still have a reasonable cause to go to war...

From that adage "Timing is everything." - Why did not the earlier incidents in the Atlantic not bring a declaration of war?

Because Hitler was going out of his way to avoid it, & Congress seems not to have given a damn? Trekphiler 01:33, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
"... & Congress seems not to have given a damn?" A review of Congressional Record, 77th Congress, First Session, Volume 87, Part 8 shows the details of Stark's report to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs regarding the Greer incident. Stark let's it slip that the US was the aggressor, that delivering mail to Iceland was a cover story.
Also, see Stark's 22 September 1941 letter to Hart " ... We are now escorting convoys." Imagine FDR going to Congress and asking for a declaration of war ... where the US "fired" first!
What political party controlled each house of Congress and occupied the White House at this time?
"Congress seems not to have given a damn" I don't recall a declaration of war, & a submarine firing on an American destroyer is casus belli regardless of the circumstances, had Congress chosen to see it as such. And Greer wasn't the only "shot". Recall Rueben James.
"Imagine FDR going to Congress and asking for a declaration of war ... where the US "fired" first!" Which is the other side of my argument; Hitler didn't want a war, either... Trekphiler 15:55, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
So, in fact, Congress did "give a damn" and had hearings. You may recall from the US Constitution, the President asks for the declaration of war. FDR did not ask. Why? If FDR wanted so badly to be in a war against Germany, why not go the Congress and ask for a declaration of war?

Breaks

I added a bit on "such breaks as existed". Holmes & Blair (& I think Kahn) mention them; evidently, they were only into the additive table. This would be important in the ultimate reading of JN-25B, but I'm not qualified to say (tho the article should!) how the additive table breaks assisted. Trekphiler 11:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

For those perhaps a bit "more qualified" ... from Kahn's The Codebreakers circa 1967, page 47 is: "Cavite was spottily reading JN25 messages - which revealed nothing about Pearl Harbor - until December 4, when the superencipherment was suddenly changed. As a message that moved on the COPEK channel put it: 'Five numeral intercepts subsequent to zero six hundred today indicate change of cipher system including complete change of differentials and indicator subtractors X All intercepts received since time indicated checked against all differentials three previous systems X No dupes.' "

As a comment - an extraordinary piece of writing from 1967. As questions, perhaps "Trekphiler" might: (a) posit why quoted passage is so significant? - i.e., Cavite was spottily reading JN25 messages ... and (b) on December 4, 1941 what variant of JN25 was being read as noted by Kahn, for example was it JN25b7? ..., and (c) COPEK means what?

Love to be able to tell you, but for "(c) COPEK means what?", it's clear it's a hi-lev/hi-security comm channel, but beyond that, BTHOOM... IIRC, it's the codeword for the USN's top code system, equal (roughly) to the Flag Officers' Code (I think). "Significance"? I think Kahn means, "don't overstate the case", which is what I was getting at. Kahn is doing what Rochefort, Fabian et al. would've been doing: saying, "this change means something's up", without knowing what or where, especially since it was the second change in under 6mo; same change happened before Midway, & guess what? Many see "spottily reading" & think it was a gold mine; I'd say it was more a case of a few words here & there, maybe no more than knowing they were on the right track. And yes, IIRC, it's JN-25B & it went to -25C just before Midway (but I can't find it in Blair & I don't have Holmes or Kahn at hand...) Kahn should say; check the index for the JN-25 refs. BTW, CAST moved to Corregidor 9/41. (I've got Blair open...) Trekphiler 01:45, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

Germans

What is the fascination with the Germans? Kuhn was a poseur & Popov was a double; Prange deals with them in exhaustive detail, & dismisses them as significant. Trekphiler 11:19, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Read the wikipedia article about conspiracy theories. A common theme is that people just can't deal with the fact that another people deemed as "inferior" struck a heavy blow against them. Therefore, some other people of not "inferior" stock have to be involved. Usually people on the own side, but I guess in this case the Germans were also a good choice, much better than the Japanese, who apparently up to Pearl Habour were mostly seen as comical short men with a funny language. thestor 12:25, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

You definitely got that right. MacArthur refused to believe it was Japanese pilots hammering him in the Philippines. And the conspiracy nuts don't get one thing: a conspiracy implicitly means the Japanese were too stupid to do it alone... Trekphiler 02:11, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

Sabotage

I deleted & rewrote this:

"In addition, Short had sent coded messages to Washington that, when decoded, said he was making preparations for a possible attack. With Washington thinking Short was understanding the situation there was no need to risk breaking security by being more blunt in the warnings. However, Short had changed his code words without informing Washington; or, as it now known, General Short did in fact notify Washington what his specific alert was, as is on the record with the signature of General Gerow and others, and they did not disabuse that with any specific changes to Short's Alert Level. Therefore, his messages that indicated he was preparing for a possible attack were meant to say he was preparing to guard against only sabotage which Washington accepted without any change."

As it is, it isn't clear, & his alert level wasn't the issue. Moreover, his instructions were to expect sabotage, not air attack. Trekphiler 11:42, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Sorry about the delay in reply. I've only just noticed this comment. I think the point here is that had Washington understood Short's changes in the meaning of his report ("I have instituted alert level 3"), there might have been more understanding in DC that Short wasn't preparing for an actual attack, but was thinking sabotage. In short, part of the problem is that what Short was reporting wasn't what DC thought he was doing. And some of htat was due to the redefinition of the meaning of alert level designations. And that was due to Short's innitiative in changing them. ww 16:09, 11 August 2006 (UTC)
Sorry about the delay in reply. (I've just come back to this page...). I wasn't aware Short had changed his codewords or alert ratings, so maybe I sounded stupid; as rewritten since I posted, it's clearer & more accurate. I did intend to make the point DC didn't correct him; now I see why not. Nevertheless, I can't help think any error falls on DC as the senior command; if they didn't know, they should have. Trekphiler 10:22, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Sounds a bit harsh to me, after all, how should DC have known that Short introduced a new alert system, where the state of alert usually used for full war preparation was now intead sabotage alert? He was effectively speaking another language to DC, but made it sound (though not mean) the same as the old one. thestor 12:27, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

Maybe I'm not clear (again, still). I'm of the general opinion it's the responsibility of the senior command to know when Short "was effectively speaking another language", because (unless I'm very mistaken) he'd have to get permission to change the alert status designators, & DC should know about it; if not permission, he should (must?) inform DC, & DC should definitely know about that. Maybe most of all, I have a problem with people (still!) trying to hang it on Short (& Kimmel) & excusing DC. Evidently, senior officers never get punished. (Cf Mi Lai, Tailhook, & Abu Ghraib, just to name 3 offhand; a Lt, a 2.5-striper, & a chicken Col? Four stripers deserved to go down for Tailhook, & the SecDef should be gone for Abu Ghraib.) Trekphiler 02:19, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

"... Four years after Pearl Harbor this ultimate responsibility on the part of Washington was finally admitted by Gen. L. T. Gerow, chief of Army war plans in 1941. He conceded that Gen. Short was justified in assuming his defense alert number 1 had the full approval of the Army high command. This admission followed the reading to the congressional committee of excerpts from the Staff Officer's Field Manual, stating that the general staff is responsible for making sure its instructions to field commanders are understood and for enforcing execution of such instructions." [Morgenstern, copyright 1946, Pearl Harbor - The Story of the Secret War, ending paragraph on page 84.]

Thank you!! That's exactly what I meant! Trekphiler 02:21, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

Windy

Evidence of a "winds execute" is so flimsy, & the "winds" issue adds so little, IMHO it should be deleted. Trekphiler 12:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

" ... In Las Vegas, I was warmly received by Marie and Ralph Briggs, who put their lovely house at my dispossal so that I could talk to Ralph about his experiences at length, thus enjoying the first interview he has ever given since leaving the U.S. Navy as to how he received the Winds message. I was pleased that I was able to show him the first documentary proof from the Australian archives that his story could now be confirmed after so many frustrating years." (emphasis edded) [Rusbridger and Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor in Acknowledgements, page 14, 1991]

James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII

Quote from the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate article

James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII (Summit, 1991) which posits that while the Americans couldn't read the Japanese naval code (JN-25), the British could, and Churchill deliberately withheld warning because the UK needed US help. Sir Nave was an Australian cryptographer whose diaries were used in writing this book; he later distanced himself from its content. A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time. The information shown in the Appendix is of interest to note, especially a true copy of SRN-116741.

Requests

I think we should provide references substanciating the above mentioned claims :

  • If the sentence : he later distanced himself from its content (diff) is true, we should know when this distanciation was made, and in which publication this distanciation was made if it was ever made.
  • If the sentence : A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time (diff) is true, we should know who, (when, in which publication) made the check.--Teofilo talk 14:09, 3 January 2006 (UTC)

Explain your edits better here jamaskin. I believe some of your information would improve this artcile, however its filled with wild speculation, jargon errors, non encyclopedic edits, and info. some that already has been addressed. Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV_tutorial#Accusations

I also agree that some clean up is needed within this article.

" All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures for their situations."

What about the B 17s being caught on the ground un-camouflaged on Clark Field, well after Pearl Harbor? What about the dive bomber pilots in the Philippines without their airplanes? What about canceling the plan to stock food and other supplies on the Bataan Peninsula?

The ticky-tacky response is that Phillipines wasn't Federalized until after MacArthur made most of his monumental misjudgements and too late to repair them before the Japanese arrived on a roll. More substantially, MacArthur was at least thinking, though deranged thinking, about a land invasion by the Japanese, and making preparations, though wrongfooted ones. Pearl Harbor didn't even take that much precaustion against an attack -- no torpedo nets, minimal long distance partolling by the B-17 and PBYs they actually had, thought that wasn't enough to manage an all directions, continuous surveillance, actually ready anti-aircraft guns (ammunition was in locked sotage when the attack began!!), failure to get the radar stations in actual operation as opposed to training mode (where they had long been) or to get the early warning center at Pearl (where Lt Tyler was) actually operational, etc, etc
As for the mismanagement in Phil of those planes, leading to their total loss, it clearly wasn't due to any plot from Washington to deprive MacArthur of information. Those planes were hit about 9 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. There was pleanty of warning time to do something more effective than burn on the runway.
Guam, Wake, the Canal, etc all took seriously the late Nov warnings and would not have cuaght so flatfooted as was Pearl. Smashed to be sure, but at least they were awake enough to notice the attack before the planes came around the mountains on their attack runs. There was more disdain for what they'd been warned about in Pearl (on all sides) than would have been acceptable to me had I been Marshall or Knox or Roosevelt. ww 00:54, 23 March 2006 (UTC)


Split

Article seems to get a bit long, should i split it out? --Striver 18:41, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

It'd be better to trim it it if it's too long. I don't see a logical split. -Will Beback 21:50, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
Please read Wikipedia:How to break up a page--Striver 22:57, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
I see now that you put a split marker above the bilbiography. I still believe that this article has too much casual writing, is too-weaselly, and would benefit by shortening.
For example:
  • Another point brought up in the debate is the fact that neither Admiral Kimmel or General Short ever faced court martial. It is suggested that in order to do so the military would have had to release information they did not want to see the light of day.
Who brings up this point? Who suggests?

Suggest research on Myron C. Cramer, US Army's Judge Advocate on orders of Stimson. Extant reports/findings triggered denial of Short's courts martial, and the efforts of US Army officers Henry Clausen and Carter Clarke.

  • However this is much more likely (or perhaps not) to be part of the radio deception program to mislead enemy intelligence into believing that the units and commands of the Kido Butai were continuing to exercise off Kyushu and the Western Inland Sea.
How do we know what is more likely (or not)?
-Will Beback 23:18, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

The first example is about verifiablity, and it can be fixed. The second example is pov and need to be qualified in order to be npov, "x states that y is probable" instead of "y is probable". I have not read the entire artilce, im a new-bee in this topic and dont know more than i have listened on some interviews. However, i like the topic. In any case, does that mean that we should not break that part out? --Striver 23:22, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Splitting out the bibliography would mean removing the sources, and I don't see how that would help. -Will Beback 23:33, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
ok. --Striver 23:40, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Why is there no mention of this documented note ?

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Warning of an Attack on Pearl Harbor, 27 January 1941

[Telegram: Paraphrase]

TOKYO, January 27, 1941-6 p.m. [Received January 27-6: 38 a.m.]

125. A member of the Embassy was told by my ------- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

GREW


Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 617-618

The note was mentioned in the discussion of intelligence about the attack at Attack on Pearl Harbor. It is not now thought, nor was it then, to have been 'real'. And in fact, given the timing, it was almost certainly not as Yamamoto had only just begun to consider it. No planning, even preliminary, was underway at the time, if memory serves. If it reflected a real proposal, it was not the one which actually resulted in 7.12.41. This was one of several reports which suggested such a thing. None came with sufficient evidence that they compelled belief. ww 21:33, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

Proposal to split out bibliography?

This article was split from attack on Pearl Harbor sometime ago, and has rather grown since then. The bibliography has also grown, though it remains unsatisfactory as of now. Splitting it out would force a reader interested in the subject to chase down three articles, before even getting to any of the original sources. I don't think we've so much of a problem with the article as it stands that it makes much sense to force the reader to those lengths, despite a longish article. It will make no difference to WP hardware/software, and will not unduly increase load time over even a slow Net connection (this article is essentially all text). I see no reason to bother, and a couple not to.

It would be a little neater though, evening off article lengths a little. ww 05:23, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Intresting article

Here is a intresting article on US Gov using Problem-reaction-solution: [1]. --Striver 20:27, 7 August 2006 (UTC)


article is getting well out of hand

I've been a contributor to both this and the main Attack article for some years now. So this observation comes from a longish perspective.

This article is now so sloppy that it is an Wikimbarrassment. Editors have been adding snippets of entirely opaque evidence to paragraphs which attempt to summarize current understanding of <whatever>. This is simply bad writing, aside from content problems. And there is much similar stuff.

WP articles are not places to list raw evidence for or against. To the extent WP is a place for raw evidence at all, it is the Talk pages which are. WP articles should summarize the state of knowledge about this or that topic, NPOVishly. In this case, that knowledge includes the facts that there are many arguments in favor of (one or another sort of conspiracy), that essentially all are controversial, that most are supported by some (also controversial) evidence, and all by much (also controversial) speculation. That's fair enough to note in a well-written and well-organized way in a WP article, but embedding the reader in a tarball of entirely opaque references to evidentiary bits (which are not themselves presented) is not. And, the bibliography is contaminated by allegations of bias and incompetence, again without much in the way of evidence.

In short, this article is likely inevitably to be the resultant of pushing and pulling of dispute about events and intents, and so somewhat clangerous, but it has now reached a stage of dissolution and failure to meet WP standards that is rapidly approaching (if not already passed) so low a quality as to suggest its deletion.

Comments from other editors, please? ww 16:01, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

>> I agree this article is an embarassment. I was going to attempt to clean it up some but I think there is no way to do that without junking half of it and starting over. The Attack on Pearl Harbor United States preparedness section covers most of the relevant material and is better written, sourced, and wikified. The only value I see in this link is a separate discussion of the various inquiries that followed the attacks, and possibly a discussion of the conspiracy theories that have been written. For the latter, the model might be a similar article on Kennedy assassination theories? I think the article can be saved though...a discussion of the conspiracy theories are worthwhile if only because so much has been written on them to date, much like the Kennedy assassination. ppfleiger 19:13, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Please don't delete this article. Otherwise all the conspiracy stuff would end up in the main Pearl Harbor article. -Will Beback 20:50, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
I came to thsi article today knowing nothing about it (except perhaps watching one TV documentary). Although it is a bit disorganised and in need of tidying up, I found it informative.Billlion 14:20, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Its got some good stuff. However one person "jamaskin" is putting in unsupporting, wild and incorrect information. If anyone has questions as to why I remove his materical let me know. I'd be glad to discuss.

It's got some excellent stuff. I've been reading in this area for 25yrs, & I learned things. Trekphiler 10:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Talking head

Just some assorted comments. I added this:

"(This was in part due to fears of compromise as a result of poor security, after decrypts were found in a wastebasket.‹The template Talkfact is being considered for merging.› [citation needed])

I've seen it in a couple of places, but I can't cite a source offhand. Can somebody?

You are correct, there are many references to this incident; following is an early one -

"... The tightening may have resulted from several scares that Washington had just had. In March, State lost MAGIC memorandum No.9. A horrified Army intelligence officer once found another MAGIC memorandum casually discarded in the wastebasket of Brigadier General Edwin M. (Pa) Watson, the President's military aide. In Boston the F.B.I. picked up a man connected with the cryptanalytic work who was attempting to sell information on it. The worst fright of all came in the spring of 1941. ..." [Kahn, The Codebreakers, 1967 edition, page 26]

What was the "worst fright" that came in the Spring of 1941?

I also added this:

"In Short's defense, it should be noted he had training responsibilites to meet, and the best patrol aircraft, B-17s and B-24s, were in demand in the Philippines and Britain, both of which had higher priority."

From the Knox Report (from December 15, 1941), General Observations Section, (Hearings, Part 24, page 1753):

" ...Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well disposed antiaircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns. ..."

Actually, the best defense would have been to detect the Kido Butai with B-17s or PBYs before they launched & make them turn back... Trekphiler 09:29, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
Just in case, just how many PBY's (PBY-5) were delivered to Pearl Harbor in 1941 and when? Any known "air worthiness" problems with those birds? And, during that same period, how many were shipped aboard via Lend-Lease? And, who made that decision? (See Gannon's Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Nation under Attack published in 2001, note 78 from Chapter Six "War Warning.") And where were the B-17's destined for; Pearl Harbor being a "stop over" point for the trans-shipment to where?
Not an "air worthiness" ish with the PBYs so much as "unavailability". Bellinger had (IIRC) 54 PBYs in HI, only about a doz actually assembled & flying, the rest in the pipeline being uncrated & assembled. B-17s were en route to Luzon, where they were supposed to deter the Japanese... (The plan was to attack Japan if war broke out, recovering them in Siberia. This plan was approved by MacArthur beforehand. He denied it postwar.) Trekphiler 03:00, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
Well, not quite. You might look into Gannon's text regarding PBY-5 engine problems, viz., "run in" procedures ... cracked cylinder-heads, oil leaks, ... And, the lack of spare parts was due to ...?

and this:

"(The third, Saratoga, was in routine refit in Puget Sound.)"

Also, re. Lyttelton's comment, except for his remark, "Japan was provoked into attacking", he has the situation exactly right. Take a look at what FDR was doing in the Atlantic. There was plenty of casus belli to go around for Germany or Congress to declare war; neither was willing. Trekphiler 10:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

The assorted attacks on US vessels were on the high seas, and IIRC, not a result of a deliberate policy to start a war. FDR did take numerious actions which were decidely not even handed (Lend-Lease, the takeover of convoy escorting in the Western half of the N Atlantic, etc). US personnel were killed an ssin[ps sunk by the Germans and FDR refrained from asking for a declaration. I think the causus belli were not from the British, the other nation active inthe N Atlantic, but from the Germans. And that FDR didn;t go to war over such incidents speaks to a reluctance to do so, not a devious plat to find a way to do so. ww 22:05, 13 February 2007 (UTC)
Or does it speak to Stark's comments about the US being the agreeosr?
I have to disagree. "[T]akeover of convoy escorting in the Western half of the N Atlantic" is most certainly not an act of a neutral. Neither is the order to report U-boats to RN escorts. An order to shoot U-boats on sight is definitely not. (That alone was casus belli, had Hitler chosen.) As for German actions, shooting 1 USN DD (Reuben James?) & sinking another (Greer?) (I always get them switcthed...), is casus belli, had Congress chosen. I suspect FDR didn't ask for a declaration because there wasn't enough public (or political) outcry over Reuben James & Greer (which makes nonsense of the oft-repeated fiction of Lusitania, no?), or maybe he was hoping Hitler'd do it for him. Either way, keeping Japan peaceful was crucial, which is why the orders to all Pacific commands were full of "let Japan make the first overt act" instructions (which the conspiracy loons take as evidence of conspiracy, rather than an effort to avoid war...). Trekphiler 08:18, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

Who "fired" the first shot on the Green in Lexington? And, who "fired" the first shot at the Old North Bridge in Concord? Or, the American Revolutionary War was started by a "shot" - "Heard Around the World" - but by a party which cannot be identified.

FDR and his War Cabinet simply could not risk that - there could be no question as to who "fired first" - exactly who.

See Beard, Charles Austin, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 - A Study in Appearances and Realities, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1948 - Chapters V and VI ("In Case of Attack" in the Atlantic and No Call for "Any Declaration of War"). For example, page 173, " ... The supplying of munitions to belligerents, using the American Navy to convoy ships to belligerents, and shooting at German submarines, are acts of war, in purpose and in reality. They will and are intended to carry the United States into full and open war. ..."

Why did not that happen in the Atlantic? Stark talked too much is why; this then led to the later FDR dicta of "first overt act " of war and "firing the first shot."

To clarify, I believe it was, if not a concerted plan, certainly a concerted effort by FDR to give Britain maximum aid, & to fulfill his promise come into the war; my guess is, FDR understood that would be the best thing he could do, per WW1. In the event, he was proven right; Hitler (& McCollum) saw that, too. Too bad the conspiracy nuts can't see it. Trekphiler 05:52, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

Some more stuff. I deleted "Corregidor" because I'm unclear it was on Corregidor at the time in question, & it'd been in Cavite for years before that. If somebody's sure of the location at that date, put it back. I rewrote

"If she had been directed to investigate the source of the planes"

to

"If she had been correctly directed to the source of the planes,

The Kido Butai had been picked up by DF; Holmes notes, due to an inability to distiguish reciprocal bearings, common to DF at the time, Halsey was sent the wrong way. Trekphiler 05:52, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

After your comment here, I'm not sure we disagree at all. Very confusing. As for Cavite / Corregidor, Station CAST started out at the Navy Yard and was moved to Corregidor during the retreat. It stayed there until evacuated by submarine after pushing the equipment they couldn't take with them into the bay. It's a famous account. CAST personell ended up in Australia as part of the Combined Bureau under MacArthur. It was they who got the soggy sheets found in the buried trunk at Sio New Guinea. Major break into Japanese army crypto systems. Hilarious description of that as well, with sheets hanging from stings all over the Bureau offices as they tried to dry them out. ww 21:08, 11 March 2007 (UTC)
"After your comment here, I'm not sure we disagree at all. Very confusing." Evidently I'm not making myself clear, which appears to be a common habit of mine. Probably I'm assuming knowledge where not everybody's got it. I did know CAST moved, just not when (without Blair or Holmes handy); I was busting Stinnett for putting them on Corregidor instead of at Cavite, without recalling, at the time he was talking about, they may have already moved to The Rock. (IIRC, it was just before the invasion; I don't have Blair to hand.) Blair does say 17 crypto guys were taken out by Seadragon, including CO Lt Rudy Fabian, in 12/41, & she went back for "the last 17", incl one of the linguists (cf Seadragon page; I put it in), but IIRC, that still left a bunch of them behind, to serve as infantry in those ridiculous dyed-yellow uniforms, which has to be the stupidest use of highly skilled & -trained people, which the Navy was short of, I've ever heard of. Trekphiler 09:29, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

Some suggested references:

The Breaking of the Japanese Army's Code by Joseph E. Richard, in Cryptologia, October 2004, Volume 28, No. 4, pages 289-308.

The Flaw in the JN25 Series of Ciphers by Peter W. Donovan, in Cryptologia, October 2004, Volume 28, No. 4, pages 325-340.

The Indicators of Japanese Ciphers 2468, 7890, and JN-25A1 by Peter W. Donovan, in Cryptologia, July-September 2006 issue, pages 212-235. (re: Sio, New Guinea - see page 225)

Bring a Tableau and Coloured Pencils.


Follow-on comment "... due to an inability to distiguish [sic distinguish] reciprocal bearings, ..." See Hewitt Inquiry, page 565, "... unilateral... " No such "inability" in US Navy systems existed in 1941; first patent for double-loop/sense antennae granted to Marconi Radio in 1907 (so-called Bellini Tosi (B-T) goniometer). US Naval Research Laboratory licensed design in 1920's, See Howeth XXII & Appendix M. (15 June 2007)
Inability may be too strong; Holmes says "difficulty" or "problem", IIRC; I'm guessing lack of experience by operators. Trekphiler 09:29, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
Holmes (aka Alec Hudson), who the Engineering Building at the University of Hawaii is named after, plotted locations (often said of ONLY merchantmen) - he was not a "radio wave propagation" kinda' guy.
Jasper was also accused of "planning" the 3/42 "attack" on Pearl by 2 Japanese flying boats (from a Sat Eve Post story he wrote...). (Postwar, prof of Math, IIRC. Curious thing: Ian Fleming worked sigint & was a writer prewar, too...) Trekphiler 03:00, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
Izzy and Eric would be proud; still however, not a "radio" guy! Fleming - not curious, a lunch on ALSOS anytime.

intercepting IJN encrypted traffic

There is a recent note here suggesting that the US had been intercepting IJN traffic for some time and therefore....

The US had indeed been intercepting some IJN traffic for many years. For example, the Panay incident, during which such interception and decryption made clear that the attack was not accidental as claimed by the Japanese, but deliberate.

However, traffic which is not broadcast can't be interecepted, and even intercepted traffic must be decrypted and then analyzed to yeield full information. For the period preceding the PH attack, the Japanes were planning and training in Japan (very little radio trafic) or were on radio silence from the attack force ships combined with a spoof operation from radio operators left behind in japan when it sailed. And, in any case, as is only sensible, the Japanese, including the IJN, were regularly changing thier crypto systems and for any given crypto system the keys in use.

["... with a spoof operation from radio operators left behind in japan ..." See Layton's And I Was There, bottom of page 317: "It's the same ham-fisted radio operator who uses his transmitting key as if he is kicking it with his foot." Seems at least one IJN radio operator was not left behind ... and on the Akagi no less.]

So any discussion about "intercepting IJN' traffic must be explcit about what IJN system, the break status at the time, whether the signal was actually braodcast so it could be intercepted, etc. No blanket statement can be given, without misrepresetnation. As the crypto people say, the Devil is in the details. Taht's true about discussion of crypto as well. ww 16:17, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

I took out the entry in bracktes "makes no sense, IJN codes were read years prior to Pearl Habour" and put in the explanation from the article about the Japanese military code, namely that since the IJN didn't see much action in the war against China, there was not only less to transmit, but even more rarely was it needed to do so via radio. thestor 12:20, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

" ... In 1924 the Navy established a Communications Intelligence Organization under the Code and Signal Section ..." [Safford, SRH-149 A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States prepared 21-27 March 1952, partially declassified and relased by NSA on 27 October 2005, page 4.]"

I deleted

"Notwithstanding the above, a statement by Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty (US Navy retired) about the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese Nanshin (southward) fleet movement, from his article “Background of the Secret Report,” National Review, December 13, 1966, page 1261, has: “… When the Japanese Task Force emerged from Kamranh, it was shadowed and trailed by our submarines, so Washington was alerted as to the composition, course, and speed of this group of vessels. In addition, through our breaking of the Japanese codes, we were alerted as the destination of this particular group, it being known that the ships were headed for the KRA Peninsula, Khota Baru, their destination, was also broken out of code. ..." {fact} That is, " ... our breaking ..." of Japanese operational naval codes ... yielding specific intelligence."

as irrelevant to Pearl Harbor, and "yielding specific intelligence" is from the movement cypher, which it's acknowledged OP-20-G had broken, not JN-25. Also, can somebody clarify why, " suggest a check of a true copy of SRN-116741, and why this message is so significant)." should be included? Trekphiler 14:57, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

Another of those factual deletes, this also from a direct quotation from a cited source. To note, the rationale used ... "as irrelevant to Pearl Harbor" and the specific movement cypher is highlighted. The operative wording here is: "In additional, through our breaking of the Japanese codes, ..." - (1) those same "codes" were beginning used by the entire IJN at that moment, those forces moving South, toward Pearl Harbor, and elsewhere; (2) there is no specific mention of a particular code - movement or otherwise.
The moderators/editors should note this deletion has no basis in fact, and is the second such by user Trekphiler in this article now under discussion.
Reference to National Review deleted above has been fact-checked; it is absolutely correct and relevent to this discussion - fair dinkum!
From History of GYP-1 (MRRB, Record Group 38, page 35) " ...The reading of messages in Baker code before Pearl Harbor, however, must be considered a qualified success. Current messages were read on Corregidor but they were few in number and invariably ship movement reports: arrivals and departures, together with some fragmentary schedules. ..." [Or, some JN25 "Baker" messages were - intercepted, decoded, translated, and read for intelligence - before Pearl Harbor. Not "zero" or "none" - but some.] USER: Trekphiler seems badly informed on this topic.
"Or, some JN25 "Baker" messages were - intercepted, decoded, translated, and read for intelligence - before Pearl Harbor." I was wrong about that. So be it. I stand by the deletion as irrelevant to Pearl Harbor. The reference (read it) is to IndoChina. And (read it!) "invariably ship movement reports", which is, more or less, what I said... Notice I never said "none", just "none in reference to Pearl". If you're convinced this off-target reference is worthy in reference to Pearl, feel free to put it back. All I'd ask is, narrow the focus. This reference seems thrown in for its own sake. Trekphiler 06:24, 20 August 2007 (UTC)
The deletion of the material was from the article's paragraph heading "JN-25". It is entirely appropriate there having a contribution to our understanding of the timing and level of penetration of JN-25; this being very germane to the overall topic of Pearl Harbor.

As the "mess" here was made by USER "Trekphiler" (as well as elsewhere), even with the contrition I was wrong about that. - whose obligation is it to clean them up? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 172.134.230.17 (talk) 11:59, August 20, 2007 (UTC)

Lend-Lease program

The line was added that the Lend-Lease program might have "provoked" Japan into attacking the US at Pearl Harbor. According to my knowledge, Japan had no real concern about Germany, the Axis agreement was one of convenience rather than real alliance. The "provoking" would be over the US embargo of oil and other materials to Japan. The USA also provided assistance to China. Every source I've read makes it pretty clear that this embargo left Japan with two choices, either end their war with China and scale back their Empire, or attack. See: Greater East Asia War in the Pacific. Fanra 21:14, 21 June 2007 (UTC)

Who authored the Lend-Lease Program legislation, which FDR signed into law as H.R. 1776?

" ... scale back their Empire, ..." - regarding that "Empire."

Treaty of Portsmouth, Root-Takahire Agreement, Treaty of Versailles, Olney Corollary (of the Monroe Doctrine) comparative to Stimson Doctrine (e.g., Yap Island).

FDR

Personally this whole debate is kinda stupid. so what if FDR knew about it. WE got into ww2 anyways and kicked some butt. would you have had him come up with a dumber reason than revenge? trcole123 15:05, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

This page is for discussing improvements to this article, not a place to air your personal opinions on the subject. DarkSaber2k 15:07, 27 June 2007 (UTC)


From Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War by George Morgenstern (Devin-Adair, 1947), end of Chapter 20 -"Who Was Guilty?" " ... The people were told that acts which were equivalent to war were intended to keep the nation out of war. Constitutional processes existed only to be circumvented, until finally the war-making power of Congress was reduced to the act of ratifying an accomplished fact."

Or, those "complicated moves" in FDR's approach "short of war" and US-Japanese foreign policy ... leading to the US entry into WWII.

Learning to add

I added "This is evidence of lack of manpower"; I'm inclined to also add, "CAST only had one." (because I'm fairly sure). Can somebody who has sources at hand confirm & add? I also added clarification here:

"Mentioned, for instance in Blair, Silent Victory, & Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets; it is also mistakenly used to explain the intercepts at the time of Midway in the film of the same name.</ref> to mislead enemy intelligence into believing the units and commands of the Kido Butai were continuing to exercise off Kyūshū and the Western Inland Sea; such commnuications in a combat zone (where radio silence was essential) would be by flag or blinker (another factor Stinnett and others conveniently ignore)."

And I added

"In addition, Roosevelt authorized U.S. destroyers to report U-boats, then later authorized "shoot on sight". Neither is the act of a disinterested neutral."

(which I mention above). Trekphiler 04:54, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

And I deleted the {{Fact}} tag from " Neither is the act of a disinterested neutral." Unless you believe it is & are prepared to offer evidence to that effect, I stand by that statement. Trekphiler 01:30, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

This is not expressed in a neutral way.

Just at the beginning:

It may have been the failure to process and use this information effectively that has led some to invoke conspiracy theories rather than a less interesting mix of mistake and circumstance.

the text is suggesting a way to view things and is clearly sympathizing for it. The phrase "less interesting mix..." seems to suggest that what lead people to have a POV about this topic is the mere fact that it is more interesting and the implicit consequence is that they are biased.--Pokipsy76 12:14, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

One problem this article must deal with is the reason for so much activity in the alternate theory world. Extensive and very long lived.
Concern - whatsup with hearsay "IIRC" and "BTHOOM" compared to relevant references shown encylopedia'?
This sentence offer one reason for this in a lead paragraph. It is not, and should not be taken to be as this editor has, be understood as pejorative with regard to tany alternative theory. It is, in fact, an alternative theory in itslef, in an odd way. Should be kept as it. 67.86.171.92 13:55, 6 August 2007 (UTC)
It makes no sense to specify in the discussion page the way to take the sentance: we should just use sentances that cannot be taken as pejorative in any way. That sentance is not of this kind.--Pokipsy76 08:16, 7 August 2007 (UTC)
Or, implied happenstance versus discernible pattern.
Moreover it's not up to wikipedia to make speculations about what "may have been", it's not enciclopedic, you only have to report fact, sources and relevant *sourced* opinions of people that have a relevance.--Pokipsy76 15:29, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
Thank you! Very sucinct and on point for this article and its discussion section. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 172.132.13.129 (talk) 17:46, August 22, 2007 (UTC)

Henry Clausen

Have added an article on Henry Clausen and the Clausen Report. Perhaps someone knows when (if) Henry Clausen died, and what the C in Henry C. Clausen stands for? Hugo999 11:25, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

Richmond, CA - 1993 (Masonic/Scottish Rite Ceremony); "C" stands for Christian. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.165.183.212 (talk) 11:53, August 27, 2007 (UTC)

Midway ‹The template Talkfact is being considered for merging.› [citation needed]

Removed the tag. If you doubt it, rent the damn movie. It features Fonda (as Nimitz) asking Holbrook (as Rochefort, mistakenly promoted to Fleet Intel Officer) if the intercepts (in JN-25, tho it's not named) aren't the same kind of deception used prior to Pearl Harbor, which is the ignorant screenwriter not knowing the difference. Trekphiler 20:13, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

Mene, Mene Tekel Upharsin.
Rather, a tad more factual, " ... In this connection, it may be recalled that Rochefort expressed nothing but scorn for the suggestion that his organization had been taken in by radio deception. According to Rochefort, the Japanese did not even try any serious deception. (See: article citations: (a) No. 19 Villa and Wilford, page 548, and further comment (b) No. 13 Layton's And I Was There, page 547). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.136.199.234 (talk) 15:49, 15 September 2007 (UTC)
Which only reinforces my belief the {{Fact}} tag was ill-advised, & my point... Trekphiler 19:39, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

only obsolete ships at Pearl -- carriers gone. Means something?

This article contains no discussion about why only obsolete old ships were in port at the time of the attack, while the valuable new aircraft carriers happened to be at sea. It's not good enough to say that they were only thought of as being useful for reconnaisance. The aircraft on them were fitted with guns and bombs - wheras reconnaisance aircraft would mainly need to fly economically. Does anyone know why the aircraft carriers were not in port on 7-Dec-41, please? --New Thought 16:29, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

"One rationale here, of many, relates to the on-going effort to bolster the B-17 fleet in the Philippines as a strategic force against Japan. See in Layton's text an insert of a chart showing the RoA (i.e., radius of action) of the B-17 C&Ds (as well as the B-24 C&Ds and the very "short-legged" B-18A). The carriers were used to place aircraft at Wake and Midway, those to act of air cover as the B-17s were being ferried during their hops to the Philippines. Of course, that is just one rendition of the story ... there are many others. -jamaksin"

I believe I can answer. Hopefully this site will help http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/ "An intersting site with much good material.

(However, a real bastion of objectivity for many, and not so for many others. -jamaksin")

Pure dumb luck. Fears of Japanese attacks on Midway & Wake →reinforcement transported by CV→no CVs in harbor. And Sara was under refit, ditto. This isn't in dispute. (I haven't seen the "escort B-17s" argument before, but I haven't read Layton, either...) Trekphiler 10:59, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

And you wonder why your comments were removed by the mods?(SS)

205.188.116.73 (AKA Jamaskin) please don't vandalize ("viz., Using exact references to make needed corrections to obvious errors of omission and bias - jamaksin") the page anymore and keep your comments here. Also please show me a copy of pg 111 from the NA. The doc that starts out "Station H November, 1941. Naval Movement reports...

If you can post any errors here, I would be happy to read them. (SS)

"Two specific citations - both within the public domain were provided in full - to this query and were posted as such. Along with those was a note regarding call sign HA N 8, also of 28 Nov. As these citations and note have been removed, I cannot help you. -jamaksin"

Put them here because my copy states: 28 Nov (Call) HA N 8 (Identification) (Blank) (Indicator) Code movement (Position) (Blank) (Time) 0810 (Sheet) 94069 I posted a copy here As you can see there are no handwritten comments on the original document in the code movement for call sign RU SI 8. Nor is there any comments written under HA N 8.

(SS)

(SS) - See Dr. Wilford's MA thesis as cited in article section for the FOIA-released version [Declassification Authority: OD3012, Initialed By: KG, NARA Date: March 5, 2000] of this document; fact-checked as correct (copyright 2001).
For the readership, in Stinnett's Day of Deceit (hardcover or paperback) on pages 50-51 are copies of the same IJN message. The one on page 50 was released in 1979, page 51 has the FOIA-released version without the redactions. This should be noted as to the types of information the FOIA process can reveal.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 12:54, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Seems to be some confusion. Obviously we are talking about different documents with different information ScottS 20:57, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

No confusion at all. You cite an earlier release, not the FOIA-released document. You also seem not to recognize that redactions also occur using "white out" tape or liquid. For an example of this method - See SRH-051 Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs with date 13 January 1977. On the first page, just under "On-the-Roof Gang" is a faint "white out" tape mark, the next page has even more such "tape" marks.

[Should the readership wish to pursue the FOIA process for this document, understand that it can be very unpredictable.]

Dr. Wilford's MA thesis Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941 by Timothy Wilford, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of Ottawa, February 5, 2001, Copyright: Timothy Wilford, Ottawa, Canada, 2001. It is PDF file of approximataly 8.17 MB (197 pages) having significant appendix material. It is available from the following:

(a) University Microfilms Inc. (aka UMI) 

    Bell & Howell Information and Learning
    300 North Zeeb Road
    Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
    (Toll-Free 1-800-521-0600)

(b) National Library of Canada 

    Acquisitions and Bibliographic Services
    395 Wellington Street
    Ottawa, ON K1A 0N4

(c) ProQuest On-Line Service (This a subscription service at proquest.umi.com) 

    Dissertations and Theses Database

(d) From Dr. Wilford himself with permissions for fair use

(d) Other individuals or other sources.

The Appendicies begin on page 143, the FOIA-released "Naval Movement Reports" for 28 Novemeber 1941 appears on page 154. To note, "blackout" and "white out" redactions are seen throughout these Appendicies.

To stress here - this document has a copyright. OK I wasn't sure what you were talking about. What's the cheapest way to get his article with all the context? I'll check it out. ScottS (talk) 17:44, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

The least expensive means of acquiring the complete thesis (197 pages) as you also express a desire for the "context" is from someone who will send a copy to you. Save that, a copy of just page 154 of the thesis may suffice. You may know someone who has access to ProQuest, for example. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 10:56, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:30, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

See Declassified document reproduced at the National Archives Authority: NND 003002 By: BA NARA Date: 9/14 62 StaHmovements pg 111 ~Scott There is nothing blacked out on the pg 111 document. —Preceding unsigned comment added by ScottS (talk • contribs) 21:10, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

Wasn't the bulk of the US battleships at Pearl? That was hardly a collection of "old and obsolete" ships, to the naval establishment then it was THE warfleet. For the suggestion that only expendable ships were at Pearl to work,the USN ought to have kept back their newer, most modern battleships. It was hardly even possible to fully appreciate the impact of carrier-based airpower before the pacific war. And note that at Taranto (as well as at Pearl Harbor) the planes hit stationary ships, at least in the later case also achieving total surprise. It was only natural to assume that aircrafts would be unable to achieve this against a fully alert battlefleet maneuvring out in the ocean. thestor 12:34, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

Well, no. The heavies were considered the "main fleet", but most of the BBs at Pearl that morning were old & slow by comparison to the newest, & obsolete for the duties they'd have been called on for when the PW started, i.e. TF escort (as I've said repeatedly on Talk:attack on Pearl Harbor, without anybody actually listening... Moreover, it wasn't "total surprise" nobody thought was achievable, but successful sinkings against maneuvering ships; JUDGEMENT & Mitchell's stunt were against anchored ships. Sinking PoW & Repulse put paid to that notion PDQ. Trekphiler 01:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
Okay then, but where were the brand new battleships of the USN during the attack then?
Atlantic Fleet, where the greater perceived threat was. Portsmouth, I think. Trekphiler 15:57, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
On reflection, I suppose the conspiracy loons think that is evidence of conspiracy, too. Trekphiler (talk) 12:55, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

Huh?

I deleted

"For clarification of the possible neophyte naivete of Reference Note 4, other authors like Stinnett, and sans Zimmerman, however know that various terms were used for the IJN Operations Code. For example: from the Notes section of Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), page 341, (1) note 31, from Whitlock is " ... We called the system the 5-Digit code." and (2) note 33, "In 1941, the US Navy called the system the 5-Num code, not JN-25, according to Robert Hanyok, Center of Cryptologia History, Fort George C. Meade, Maryland." (3) Kahn's Codebreakers (1967 edition, page 47) has "Five numeral intercept ..." (4) Layton's And I Was There on page 77, "This 'AN' cipher, later to be designated JN-25, was radically ..." (5) Holmes, in his Double-Edged Secrets uses "five-figure" exclusively thoroughout. (6) Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined, top of page 28 has: " ... to the USN as the 5-Numeral code, AN-1 code, ..." And, of course, (7) the "true copy" US Navy translation of SRN-116741 uses "Naval Code D" - an interesting message for several reasons."
Or, seven (7) specific citations to the IJN Operations Code - none being JN-25 (any version). From reference (2) above, Stinnett shows he clearly knows about "JN-25" but, more importantly, tells us why not to search the 1941 records for that nomenclature.

It's not clear to me what this is intended to explain or clarify, tho it smells like an apologia for Stinnett's ignorance of the JN-25 designator. It's not in question it was widely known as "5Num"; the question is, how could Stinnett not know "5Num" ="JN-25". Trekphiler 19:39, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

Stinnett correctly stresses "5Num" (or similar) and not JN-25 (any variant) for a very specific reason; clearly one that escapes you - or better, one for which you are not au fait. If you do not know that Stinnett "knows" the difference, then you seriously mis-read his book, i.e., if you read it at all. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.135.244.236 (talk) 22:05, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

"if you read it at all"? Stinnett makes a point in the book of denying he's ever heard of any connection between "5Num" & "JN-25" or being aware they're the same thing. "seriously mis-read his book"? He's so busy trying to find conspiracies, it's hard to take him seriously. He's contradicted by his own sources, & he can't see it. He can't get basic facts straight. And I misread him? Trekphiler 22:56, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

Your " ...denying he's ever heard of any connection between '5Num' & 'JN-25' ... " is demonstrably false. Another of your errant deletions above, from Stinnett, page 341, is found " ...and note 33, 'In 1941, the US Navy called the system the 5-Num code, not JN-25, according to Robert Hanyok, Center of Cryptologia History, Fort George C. Meade, Maryland.' " is, prima facie the "connection" which you erroneously deny. Stinnett knows the difference, and more over, the rationale.

When can we expect another contrition " ... I was wrong about that - again." anytime soon? Do brush up in this area - e.g., noodle SRN-116741! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.162.206.109 (talk) 11:05, 20 October 2007 (UTC)


Read it again. He expressly denies ever hearing of "5Num" being called JN-25; don't tell me it's not "Navy official", 'cause I never said it was. "noodle SRN-116741"? Bit hard, not living in DC... BTW, if you've got a beef with people using JN-25 (as you evidently do), blame Blair, Kahn, et al., who all call it that... Trekphiler 20:00, 20 October 2007 (UTC)
Your critical reading on this topic, even with those 25+ years you boast of, seem not to have profited you much. The 'hissy-fit" on Stinnett, now pointing to Kahn, ... is but another example. Kahn's citation in your yet another errant deletion has in fact the usage "Five numeral ..."
As to SRN-116741, in your lucubrations, and as a hint for you, See: Layton (which you should have read by now, and if not your lack of expertise is obvious), page 249, beginning with " ... But it is possible that OP-20-G ..." for a partial copy of this message. For a true and complete copy See: Rusbridger and Nave, Appendix 6, message beginning: "(da) KE SA 3 All Ships and Stations ..." If you are not aware of this text, another knock against your self-appointed expertise - your hole is getting deeper.
"So, now that you have "researched" SRN-116741 ... why is it so significant?" Good question. It doesn't bear on Stinnett's denial at all, so why are you making such a fuss? Or can't you stand your "hero" being flawed? Make a note. Kahn et al. have called it JN-25, whether always or not, and have continued to do so. So why is it Stinnett (our subject here, not the content of SRN-116741) denies knowing? Hell, he quotes Rochefort using JN-25, as if he (i.e., your hero) has never heard it before. Wherefore SRN-116741? (And don't count on me ever being contrite.) Trekphiler 06:09, 13 November 2007 (UTC)
Not to bore the readership, from above is " ...note 33, 'In 1941, the US Navy called the system the 5-Num code, not JN-25, according to Robert Hanyok, Center of Cryptologia History, Fort George C. Meade, Maryland.' Or, to the point, Stinnett wrote that note. Seems (a) he knows JN-25, and (b) also knows its many other designators and the dates that span their individual usage.
And, " ... don't count on me ever being contrite." As a remark - you already have been, lest you forget your "I was wrong about that." above. But, do keep digging. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:52, 13 November 2007 (UTC)
Bravo in your efforts to make this about me, instead of the content of the article. Trekphiler 13:24, 30 November 2007 (UTC)


If Im too brash with my changes let me know. I hope to to add more when time presents itself. I feel the page needs lots of work and clean up. I'd also like to better explain both sides of debate. Beware of fractured comments with ellipses from the usual suspect ScottS 10:08, 1 December 2007 (UTC) Scott

"If I'm (sic) too brash with my changes let me know." - will do. "I'd also like to better explain both sides of debate." - do let's, as facts are facts.
As a "test case" of intent and accuracy the two sides, and the tenets of Wikipedia's "Talk" page, consider two examples:

A. From the book review essay "Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit" by John C. Zimmerman (Intelligence and National Security, Volume 17, Number 2, Summer 2002, pages 127-146), on page 136, in the paragraph beginning "One of Stinnett's more controversial claims ...' is the sentence "However, all of the other Pearl Harbor literature calls it JN 25."

Is that Zimmerman sentence correct - Yes or No?

B. Jacobsen, comments on the testimony of Fabian, in Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Effort on JN-25B (Cryptolgoia, Volume 27, Issue 3, July 2003, pages 193-205). At the bottom of page 193, the ending sentence is "He also testified that all of their intelligence information came from traffic analysis, not cryptanalysis." This comment uses as its reference (footnote no. 5) the Hewitt Inquiry.

As taken from the Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry:

"Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic; rather than from the decryption of Jap messages."

Is Jacobsen misquoting Fabian's Hewitt Inquiry testimony - Yes or No? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 12:44, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

How many revisionist errors are highlighted within those texts? I would greatly suggest simply reading the FULL articles in the further reading section. Taking the just the first author mentioned as a test case, (upon reading the relevant text) who has made more errors. Zimmerman or Stinnett? The fact that you continue to focus on JN-25 terminology only highlights the shortcomings of your position. 67.126.206.163 16:26, 2 December 2007 (UTC) Last comment by Scott ScottS 16:27, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

For others an explanation. The problem is that Stinnett believes the terminology JN-25 is part of some sort of conspiracy. Stinnett believes that those who use JN-25 are (his own words "Unable to accept the truth and falsify the record." Over the history of Pearl Harbor works, very few authors in other Pearl Harbor literature solely refer to the code as a 5-Num” system or “Code Book D,”.

The 5-Num” system or “Code Book D is a designation that later changed to JN-25. But no authors have had some sort of ridiculous tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation of “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.”

Here is what author of "Battle of the Wits" Mr. Budiansky stated: I should also mention here that Mr. Stinnett has some tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.” In fact the documentary record is absolutely clear that the main Japanese Navy operational code, which Mr. Stinnett refers to as the “5-Num” system or “Code Book D,” is exactly the same code system that from 1942 on was usually designated by the U.S. as JN-25. Everyone in the U.S. Navy who worked on it subsequently referred to it as JN-25, regardless of the several different earlier designations that were used.

For more reading here is the last time he brought this point forward http://66.218.69.11/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=jamaskin+JN-25&fr=yfp-t-501&u=www.freerepublic.com/focus/user-posts%3Fid%3D125621&w=jamaskin+jn+25&d=DTQsDfL9Pp5W&icp=1&.intl=us ScottS 16:59, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

Seems there is just a partial reply to the "test case" - only question A being addressed. At the start of this "Talk" section is a list of seven citations, all non-JN 25. Zimmerman's qualifier of "all" is incorrect. There is an irony here, because on page 137 of Zimmerman's article are found "AN" and "AN-1" - so, in fact Zimmerman contradicts himself in his own article. [In your reply, you have "Everyone in the U.S. Navy who worked on it subsequently referred to it as JN-25,..." - suggest you check the publication date of Holmes text - as JN-25 never appears.]
To be noted also, question B is not addressed. So, is Jacobsen misquoting Fabian's testimony from the Hewitt Inquiry? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.162.112.48 (talk) 12:10, 3 December 2007 (UTC)

While that may be the case regarding Holmes it hardly undermines the position regarding Stinnetts pet JN-25 conspiracy theory. If your not going to address questions in return, then I'd say I'm quite happy with my current batting average. ScottS 17:54, 3 December 2007 (UTC)

Stinnett's point regarding JN25 is quite simple. He correctly stresses that the JN25 (in any variant) terminology was not used in 1941. He is in fact helping researchers by telling them not to waste their efforts by looking for the designation JN25 in the 1941 materials.

As the first "test case" reply was not as precise as it might have been, and is incomplete in not addressing item B (Yes, Jacobsen did misquote as shown.), but Budiansky was mentioned. A second "test case" may clarify and extend our consideration.

In a special issue focusing on INTELLIGENCE LIAISON - Liaison Among Nations, "Special Issue on American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000", Intelligence and National Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Summer 2000), with editors Stafford and Jeffreys-Jones, is a Budiansky article The Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Cooperation, on pages 49-73.

Note 20, on page 71 of this article has:

"OG-20-GY, CNSG 5750/198, Crane Files. These files include month by month reports, each bearing a contemporaneous date-stamp, which tally OP-20-G's progress against JN-25 and all other codes that OP-20-G was working on throughout 1940 and 1941. JN-25 was at this time known as the 'AN' or the Japanese Navy 'Operations Code', and these reports unequivocally establish that the Operations Code was not being read by the United States prior to Pearl Harbor - unsubstantiated claims by Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorists to the contrary notwithstanding. See Stephen Budiansky, "Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor", Cryptologia, 24 (2000) pp.119-30"

Budiansky's cited usage is “AN” and not JN25A confirming Stinnett's point. “AN-1” (or JN25B) while also noted in the cited report, is not used in Budiansky's article..

Now, extending the scope, from The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing by David Kahn, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1967, page 47, is found:

"The information obtained, Rochefort said, 'was not in any sense vital.' Cavite was spottily reading JN25 messages - which revealed nothing about Pearl Harbor - until December 4, when the superencipherment was suddenly changed. ..."

The question: As Budiansky's " ... unequivocally establish that the Operations Code was not being read ..." is quite different from Dr. Kahn's " ... was spottily reading JN25 …” - one being mutually exclusive of the other - who is correct?

[N.B., From Dr. Kahn, it is December 4, 1941, and also note Cavite versus Corrigedor.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:41, 4 December 2007 (UTC)


"Stinnett's point regarding JN25 is quite simple. He correctly stresses that the JN25 (in any variant) terminology was not used in 1941. He is in fact helping researchers by telling them not to waste their efforts by looking for the designation JN25 in the 1941 materials."

Let's stick with the first point for now. It doesn't seem that simple. See quoted Stinnett ....believes that those who use JN-25 are (his own words "Unable to accept the truth and FALSIFY the record." We understand that JN25 wasn't terminology used in 1941 and wasn't used until early 1942. Why would Stinnett state that unless he thinks there's something more. Did he recently change his mind? He also stated: "By focusing on the wrong designator for Japan‘s naval code, Mr. Budiansky steers his readers in the wrong direction and prevents their accurate examination of Code Book D."

Also is there any reason why Stinnett mentions Budiansky having “close ties” to U.S. intelligence agencies.

I also see zero reply to my questions. Hmm... ScottS 15:44, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

So, as a recap from the about: (a) Zimmerman is incorrect, (b) Jacobsen misquotes, and (c) while Budiansky supports Stinnett's stance regarding JN25 usage in 1941, he is at variance with Dr. Kahn on the pre-Pearl Harbor JN25 messages read. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 16:46, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

I'm still waiting to finish the discussion on "a". Irony or not, YOU ARE the one who wanted to discuss "accuracy". ScottS 16:56, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

Is the Zimmerman sentence referenced accurately quoted? Yes or No? Is the Zimmerman (simple declarative) sentence referenced correct? Yes or No? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:39, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

So you want a yes or no answer to a question you already know with the intent to fling mud rather than give people the context of the articles and debate? If you want a no answer (he was wrong) I'll be happy to give it. But I'm still waiting for more discussion and an answer. ScottS (talk) 17:40, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

Seems to me Stinnett is setting up a "straw man". By making it about whether it's "JN-25" or "Code Book D" or something else, he can avoid dealing with the substantive issue, i.e., there was nothing of consequence about Pearl Harbor in it. Not unlike th arguments above: apologia for Stinnett, not addressing the real issue. Trekphiler (talk) 08:12, 6 December 2007 (UTC)
Item A was a simple interrogative sentence. It was bounded as were the replies - "Yes" or "No." It simply asked a question about a sentence in Zimmmerman's article - nothing more and nothing less. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:20, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

Trekphiler, one suggestion is that it could be to mislead readers so that earlier JN-25A successes are applied to the more complicated JN-25B. Jamaskin here is taking the debate out of context and looking for any sort of victory he can get. Strawman is one good word out of many I would use in this little discussion.ScottS (talk) 16:57, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

"...in the paragraph beginning "One of Stinnett's more controversial claims ..." is the sentence "However, all of the other Pearl Harbor literature calls it JN 25." Or, one "context" explicitly and clearly provided. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 10:27, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

That must be why I had to explain the context. sigh....ScottS (talk) 16:51, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

Excepting your "context" (not to confuse the reader on JN25A and JN25B) is the wrong context. The proper context is that Stinnett is not making a controversial claim at all; Zimmerman is simply wrong in his assertion. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.244.43.222 (talk) 18:15, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

I think there's enough here for others to understand your disingenuous nature. ScottS (talk) 20:32, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

To the extent that you may now know the differences revealed in FOIA-released documents - perhaps. The difference between "blackout" versus "white out" redactions (from above) may be a step forward for you. Regarding FOIA, due credit is owned to Stinnett, Wilford, and others for their rigorous pursuit.
So, any surmise on why Sheet No. 94644 remains classified? Many FOIA requests for it have been denied. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:19, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

So what's your expiration date for non-sinister classification? 55 years 60 years...67.. years? ScottS (talk) 16:49, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

"non-sinister classification" ... ? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 20:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
"Stinnett is not making a controversial claim at all"? That everyone who calls it JN-25 (including Rochefort, no less, who lost friends in the attack) is part of the conspiracy? Stinnett isn't making a controversial claim, he's making a lunitic claim. Not to mention his fundamental thesis implies Japanese incompetence & totally ignores the evidence of what FDR was actually doing (presumably because it's inconvenient to the conspiracy theory). Conspiracy is fashionable. Unfortunately for Stinnett et al., it's not nearly so commonplace as simple stupidity. Trekphiler (talk) 21:28, 7 December 2007 (UTC)
The "controversial claim" wording is Zimmerman's - not Stinnett. Zimmerman's statement is incorrect; the qualifier "all" makes it so, as the numerous references given show. Bounded question, bounded answer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 10:17, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

To others, see how this guy works. To jamaskin, I think you went to the Stinnett "Because I said so" school of debate. Your recent error was already pointed out to you. By the padding of your posts seems now your looking for a victory elsewhere. 68.125.142.2 (talk) 16:18, 8 December 2007 (UTC) ScottS (talk) 16:20, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

"... Stinnett 'Because I said so 'school of debate"? Perhaps Hegelian dialectic with supportive citations is more appropriate. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 20:20, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
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