Talk:Neuroscience of free will/Archive 1

Archive 1

WP:N

I propose this page be added to WikiProject Neuroscience. Tesseract2 (talk) 06:11, 25 March 2010 (UTC)

Redirect?

I redirected for the following reasons:

- I made another, identical article called: Determined Will to which this article can link from Free Will for everyone looking it up. I made sure the main Free Will article links there. That is where I have added more information. I am going to add more studies there. This is because of my main point...

- If it is agreed that the names are equivalent, then the difference is that this content, and the content I will add on that Determined Will page, really DOES discuss a Determined Will. That is, if we have Determined Will, people should know about it. And for people to know about it, it needs to have a name besides "not free will".

-Words do matter. They give ideas form and allow them to spread.

For those reasons, I redirected.

I do not agree with the redirect. I have two main reasons. The first is that wikipedia should conform to a neutral point of view. "Determined will" prejudges the issue in favor of the idea that all of the neuroscientific evidence conclusively and clearly comes down on the side of their being no free will. The second is that article titles should be informative. Determined will is not informative to someone who just stumbles across the article. Neuroscience of free will, on the other hand is quite clear. By the way, as you are new here, I'll mention two things: first you shouldn't do a redirect in the way that you've just done, since it loses things like page histories and talk pages; see Help:Moving a page. Second, you should sign your posts by typing ~~~~. Cheers, Edhubbard (talk) 12:57, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

Good, constructive input. I see your logic. I have moved the additional information to this article, and made some minor re-organizations.

Glaring Problems

References #13 and 14 have not been able to be reproduced, see

The effect of transcranial magnetic stimulation on movement selection. Sohn YH, Kaelin-Lang A, Hallett M. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2003 Jul;74(7):985-7.

Those references and corresponding sections should be removed or AT LEAST heavily modified to include this study that is more recent and was unable to reproduce the results.

As for the name of the article mentioned above, I agree that determined will is too presupposing, and not a NPV. However, I think maybe better than Neuroscience of free will is Neuroscience of Choice or Neuroscience of Decision Making, b/c free will introduces philosophical terms, which may or may not be the realm of science. Just a thought.

I'm not sure about your interpretation of reference #18, but I am withholding judgment atm b/c I have not read the article.

I'm not sure about your interpretation of reference #19. For starters, the article is referring to the SMA, not the pre-SMA. Secondly, although they said they saw "reactivation". Here is the passage: "Rather than before the action, we found a reactivation of the SMA, the SACC, and of parietal areas that was specific and limited to the Preference and Free conditions (Figure ​(Figure3),3Figure 3), during and after action execution." The conclusion that this supports anything is not included, but appears to be your personal inference (unless you can cite it).

There are other issues with this article that I can't get to right now.Grouphug (talk) 01:52, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

Gave the section about reference #19 a re-write. Do check out #18, it's fascinating.

That is a very interesting suggestion- I suppose really what is being discussed here IS the Neuroscience of Choice.

Tesseract2 (talk) 00:06, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

Should this even involve free will?

There is a difference between making a free choice, and our choices controlling our bodies. Perhaps the will is free to choose, and will do this or that freely, but its relation to the body's actions are separate. You can assume someone has complete libertarian free will, for example, where his actions do not reflect his choices, and this does not hinder free will, our ability to choose A or B, in any manner. Maybe include a section where it shows the difference between free will and body control. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.234.246.112 (talk) 02:15, 23 April 2010 (UTC)

The Neuroscience on this page pertains very directly to discussions of free will.

I am not sure I understand "a difference between making a free choice, and our choices controlling our bodies". So you are saying that a creature may not control its body or actions but it may still have "free will" and be said to make free choices? But what free choices are being made by a creature that cannot control its actions?

Also, consider the following: a computer can "choose" whether to auto-correct my typing even though it does this according to laws of physics.

Tesseract2 (talk) 22:36, 23 April 2010 (UTC)

I do not understand IP's comment either. I'd rather say this has to do with free will only in part. Two issues are overlooked: A) whether or not the participant may decide (not) to do the experiment; B) since the issue at stake is not whether every single choice is free but if at least one is ever, the Matsuhashi and Hallett experiment actually plays in favor of free will, since there are indeed (at least some) instances in which the veto occurs less than a few hundereds of seconds before the action. This happens in only a minority of cases, but given the assumption that this should never happen then it's unexplianable that it happens within the proposed model. In fact this confusion was apparent in the fact - which I corrected - that the experiment was reported in contradiction with the figures displayed (this is a general confusion; because the model predicts zero events in the region [T,P], and because the experiment validates the model to some extent, then zero events were observed, which is of course false). --Gibbzmann (talk) 10:17, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

---------

About your first point (A)

I think it speaks to prior suggestions that, whether we actually change the name of the page or not, this topic should include some information about the psychology of decision making. Being a neuroscience page, I think this article would be better served to stick to these kinds of detailed mechanisms rather than general decision theory, although we should try to add some relevant links to that kind of stuff.

I have more problems with your arguments in (B)

The last line about Matsuhashi and Hallett's study reads "In the end, since T — like Libet’s original W — was found after movement genesis has already begun, the authors concluded that the generation of awareness occurs afterwards or in parallel to action, but could not be the cause." That is, whether or not "every single" choice was caused by conscious intention is EXACTLY what is at stake. What the authors were looking for, and found, is evidence that movements usually begin before we are aware of them. Of course I say usually because we need to average across repeated trials due to error in any one trial.

So just when do movements begin? About 2.9 seconds before the actual action according to the Bereitschaftspotential (see TimingIntention_fig2, On the left, the lower of the two pictures). When do we become consciously aware of our own intention to move? Only about 1.8 seconds before the actual action (See TimingIntention_fig1, upper left).

So most of the time we see action starting before awareness. The authors thus concluded that, since awareness does not always precede action, it must not be the cause. This allows us to explain why awareness varies so much with respect to movement genesis: it is free to do so because it is not the cause of movement genesis. In other words still, if our conscious intention (T) were what caused movements to initiate, they should always precede the earliest phases of that generation of that movement (BP1). The evidence presented here suggests this is not the case.

Also, I am actually not sure why you say "since there are indeed (at least some) instances in which the veto occurs less than a few hundereds of seconds before the action." Where are you getting that information? From the top image, the histogram of actions? That histogram is showing that participants can mostly veto at 200ms before and action, but that they fail to veto around 100ms before an action (again, this is point P of no return).

Are you also sure that you are not confusing the Kühn & Brass study under "The vetoing of actions, also subconsciously initiated?" It may be that I am missing something.

I am adding a paragraph to try and explain their experiment better, but I will have to clarify it later.

Tesseract2 (talk) 19:52, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

Secondary sources, as soon as available, would be more helpful, and indeed I might have got confused with freedom of vetoing. But let's say that if I hear the veto order (the tone) then I'm inclined to suspend for (let's say) about two seconds my natural inner clock for my otherwise natural spontaneous intention to move my finger. This is plausible, even psychologically sound in some sense (because I've been given an order which in general nature is an order not to act). All this would have nothing to do with awareness and yet it would produce exactly the diagrams in the paper.

Additioanlly, I still wonder how much this has to do with free will, and especially so given that your own lengthy explanation deals primarily with awareness (but this is not neuroscience of awareness). I don't question that a section is in order here, but rather that it might have been given undue weight.

Your addition to the section has one problem though. It generalizes the 1.8 seconds interval to all particpants in the experiment, while it being only one individual's T and not even an average of any sort. As I clarified in one figure caption, T ranged wildly from 2.5 seconds to 0.6 seconds across individuals.

Finally, you're right and my previous observation here was moved by the fact that I was totally ignorant of the fact that the conclusions about awareness are not drawn from the paper standing on its own, but from it in conjuction with results about brain signals. It stills stands however that the fact that the average start of my brain's activity precedes the average start of my conscious intention does not imply that every conscious perception is preceded by brain activity. This would require a systematic one-to-one match in every single event of an experiment (bar errors). --Gibbzmann (talk) 00:46, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

Your input remains constructive, and I have edited the article again to distinguish between the example subject's T time and the averaged T time across all subjects.

You mention the possibility of a confounding participant strategy: delaying action. I will add the relevant details from the study; they actually did request that subjects wait at least several seconds before beginning their movements after being stopped by a tone.

As far as this having something to do with free will: do you not think it is extremely relevant to the free will hypothesis that there is evidence that perhaps our actions (including the action of thought) are all initiated subconsciously? That our conscious selves may be merely late observers of what our body is already doing? Of course this is the strongest interpretation of these studies, but my point is simply the relevance to the idea of free will.

I am afraid I am not clear on your final argument. You mention "conscious perceptions" that may not be preceded by brain activity??

Tesseract2 (talk) 04:36, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

I'll start a new talk session about Kühn & Brass, more concerns there. Let's continue focusing here. Of course I do believe awareness to have to do with free will, but: First, it might be just part of the problem; secondly, more importantly, that awareness does not inform execution of an action does not imply that awareness does not inform planning of an action. I'm not arguing that falsely or retroactively attributed awareness is irrelevant, I'm just pointing out that, given the space that it receives here, if anybody drops here would be convinced that it's all that there is to it.

I once submitted myself to an experiment made of two rounds, weeks apart from each other. Based on a couple of things I noticed the first time, I made the informed decision not to submit myself to the second round. I'd bet that if for some reasons I hadn't become aware of that which went on the first time, then I would have participated in the second round. So, swithing off my awareness would almost certainly had resulted in me showing up in both sessions. Even if I became aware of my responses the first time just after I executed my tasks, I still became aware of them and planned accordingly afterwards.

Back to my criticism that I didn't explain all too well. BP signals do not imply that every single action is preceded by 2.8s of pre-planning, but just that on average some actions present a pre-signal that long. It is still consistent with some finger movements being initiated, lets' say, only one second before action, and some others 2, or 2.8 seconds. People confuse an averaged signal with the fully representative individual signal.

Conscious perception is of course the signal of some brain activity. But the claim here is that, because the average among all my brain's signals shows >0 magnitude some 2.8 seconds before action, then every movement is preceded by 2.8 seconds of brain activity, then if I'm not aware of most decisions until 2 seconds ahead of time it must mean that I'm always late. --Gibbzmann (talk) 17:10, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

You mention that the results for finger movements have not yet been proven to generalize to other actions such as thinking, it’s true. You also mention planning and its implications for free will. After all, if the moment of a decision is subconsciously processed, what does that mean for how we plan?

I will try to add, to the main article, that these questions would need answering? Tesseract2 (talk) 04:00, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

Concerns about "The vetoing of actions ..."

First off, the whole section is entirely based on one publication which received zero citations, therefore we should be cautious to give it such full and unchallenged credit. I have a list of concerns:

A. This has more to do with the whole page, in connection to this particular section, rather than with this section only. While all sections are supported by individual references, the overall strategy of construction of this page might be affected by some little bias. For example, in Matsuhashi and Hallett the BP signal was taken as strong support for the thesis that voluntary actions are all systematically preceded by 2.8 seconds of brain planning. Here (Kühn and Brass) we have an implicit dismissal of such tenet, as the maximum duration of each experiment was 2 seconds and yet the authors drew their main conclusions assuming some actions were voluntarily initiated within that time-frame.

B. I think that Libet had a different proposal and the title of this section might be misleading, despite the very authors concluding with a remark relating to Libet. Libet I think asserted that a self-paced movement could be freely and deliberately vetoed until the last instant, despite incoscious pre-planning of that movement. Such self-imposed vetoed might not have been pre-planned with such long preparation. Here instead we have commands. In this experiment the veto is never totally and spontaneously self-inflicted, but majorly over-imposed. It is formally a veto, but a commanded action in essence.

C. The well-supported conclusion by the authors, in my opinion, is that in some occasions we might have a tendency to feel as having deliberately chosen (a) despite the timing is more consistent with (a) having been non-consciously executed. Conversely, and apparently not explained by the authors, but clear from their data, there is a 100% reliability that when we perceive that we failed to deliberate we are actually right (unsuccessfully labeled decide-trials are all consistent with the action having taken place too early to deliberate). The latter observation leads me to question whether the conclusions are all well supported (how can we be 100% confident that we failed to decide when we actually did fail, if we have little clue about when we freely decide), and whether we should wait for relevant discussions of the paper in relevant journals to embrace it whole-heartedly in WP. --Gibbzmann (talk) 17:48, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

A response

It's true, Kühn and Brass’ paper has not yet been cited and I will mention as much on the page.

About (A) I am not clear what you mean here. Perhaps it is worth reminding that Matsuhashi and Hallett were comparing the earliest planning phases of movement (the Bereitschaftspotential) to the timing of the conscious intention. This was done studying voluntary, self-paced movements. Kühn and Brass’ study was pursuing a very different hypothesis (not awareness of intention to move, but awareness of a veto process) using reaction times for stimulus-response actions. Stimulus-response actions have been proven to even use different neural pathways, and Kuhn and Brass don't even make any mention of the Bereitschaftspotential. My point is that the two experiments are reasonably unrelated methodologies. But again, I may have missed your point, unless you have confused these two generally confusing experiments?

Yes, I agree that self-paced movements and stimulus responses are different. But M&H did not explore self-paced movements, but self-paced-ready-to-stop-immediately movements. And K&B did not explore stimulus-response reactions, but stimulus-response-followed-by-decision-making reactions. Show me the neural pathways for such actions then. I think K&B failed to discuss the main point of their finding. Why do you get a bymodal distribution in the first place? The emergence of two types of responses has no explanation. Do you have one? Are we just jokes animals that most times prefer to wait twice as much the time we really need to decide, for no reason whatsoever, with all the disatvantages that this delay takes in survival? Therefore I was simply assuming the "conscious" response should have similar neural pathways than to the K&B experiment. Given the wild hypotheses I've read, this would be just reasonable.

I will now TRY to address you concerns mentioned in both sections (B) and (C).

This WP page is not strictly about Libet’s views, although you will note that both Libet’s (and one Max Velman’s) original beliefs in a “free won’t” ARE in fact mentioned. Indeed it was exactly those beliefs that Kühn and Brass wished to explore.

I am a little unsure about your argument regarding the “over-imposed veto” and “100% reliability...for failed-decide trials”, so again I will try to offer some relevant information.

In Kühn and Brass’ experiment, the types of trials were Primary Response Trials (PRT), Stop Trials (ST), and Decide Trials (DT). Since reactions times could only be collected if the subject actually pushed the button, we only actually have data for certain outcomes of certain trials. These include the PRT (which averaged a reaction time of about 600ms), failed-to-stop ST (although they are not on the graph, they also average 600ms) and some DT. As I explained, an impulsive response might take 600ms, as we see with PRT (e.g. "act as fast as you can") and failed-to-stop ST (e.g. “I gave you the stop signal at the last minute, why didn’t you stop!?”). Anyway, the DT are the last key to the experiment. The DT must be further sorted into those trials that were Failed-to-Decide DT (the subject acted impulsively - giving us the usual 600ms) and those where the subject claims they Successfully Decided. Those "Successful Decide DT" are what the authors doubt, and I have added a diagram to the main article to try and make this more clear.

I understand this all too well. Let me just anticipate that all that you have explained is a list of "commands". I think Libet was referring to no such commands. For vetoing he did not intend anything near the problem of how we respond to someone who either commands us to stop or commands us to decide. He was referring to self-paced movements, over which, without any extarnal intervention, we suppress our will at the last minute.

In the end, since subjects are not 100% accurate reporting in which trials they Successfully Decided to Go (i.e. not to veto the button press), and which trials they acted impulsively, the authors concluded that the occasional decision not to veto is never a conscious one.

Again, this has no basis. The hypothesis that I'm conscious only some of the times is equally consistent with the data, even in case I cannot always tell the difference (but most times, yes). Someone tell me why do we get a bymodal distribution and not one identical to simulus-response. At the very least, there are two neural pathaways. At the very least, this is perfectly consistent with having maximum confidence with the secoond pathways ("conscious"?), and confusion about the first ("non-coscious but I don't realize it"). Plus, again, how do I ever recognize with 100% confidence the times I failed to do what I wanted to do?

Note that this study does not depend on Matsuhashi and Hallett’s experiment.

By the way, Failed-to-Decide DT are defined as trials “in which participants report that they were not able to inhibit the ongoing response in order to choose between responding or not”. Accuracy on these trials does not invalidate the authors' conclusion, it is to be expected.

Really? Let me just point out that any experiment is meant to demonstrate an hypothesis, not depend on it, or on any other unproven hypothesis.

Say the veto is a subconscious process: we are only “alerted” after the fact of our mind's decision, so it is easy to imagine that we might get the alert “Decision to veto!” too late.

Yes, but this is an hypothesis. You cannot say that you proved that we are not conscious when we decide, using somewhere crucially an hypothesis about how coscnoiusness works. My points were examples of alternative explanations, but when you claim to have proven something you cannot turn the tentative explanations into facts.

Plus, stil doesn't answer why do we recognize that we didn't "want" to do it?

In other words, the authors might argue that we label a DT “Failed-to-Decide” because we KNOW that we acted and yet we had the feeling we wanted to veto. In other, other words: we are not deciding consciously, we are only getting tipped off that our feeling of veto does not match our action.

Are you implying that the authors demonstrated that we don't decide consciously using also the hypothesis that we don't decide consciously?

So what about Successful DT? What matters is this: again we KNOW we acted, but it seems we cannot tell the difference between having acted impulsively and having had time to think.

False. We can tell the difference most times. In fact, we can tell the difference every single time when we are sure that we failed. When we claim that we didn't fail, on the other hand, in a minority of cases we are wrong. How this alone has proven beyond doubt we are NEVER conscious when we decide is someghing so illogical that almost totally escapes me. Hear, I don't believe that it's false that we don't act unconsciously, nor that we do for that matter. But whence you claim you settled it, ...(actually, gravely enough, WikiPedia also claims it)

That is why the authors concluded that the decision process must not be conscious: we should not be making that mistake!

How about I'm conscious some of the times? How about consciousness is not a binary state but continuous? I mean, they stettled it. Come on.

I didn't mean for this to be as long as the actual journal article... Hopefully I've given you a lot to reply to! Tesseract2 (talk) 03:10, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

I still think this publication is completely unrelated to the Libet claim about the veto process, despite the fact that the authors claim it of themsleves. Without secondary sources I will soon change the title of the sections. --Gibbzmann (talk) 10:11, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

Some notes about changes in pogress

I see that you have elaborated over part of the changes that I proposed, trying to keep the core of them. However you also removed one point which I think is essential to clarify the anlysis, althoug I might have not put it in the best way. You had it like this: "IF deliberation is a conscious process, subjects should never confuse failed-to-decide trials (impulsive RT of 600ms) with successful decide trials (later RT's, around 1000ms)". I put an addition which you removed. You probably didn't fully notice my concern. There might ba a total confusion between what one calls "failed-to-decide" trials, whether they are "failed-to-decide" based on what the participant declared, or based on retrospective analysis by the experimenter. Here, for example, you mean "failed" based on reaction times, which is a distinction that the experimenter makes. It could easily be confused with "unseccessful decide" trials like in the figure, i.e., instances in which the particpant recognized that he failed, as explicitly asked by the experimenter to the participant. It should be emphasised when the authors rearrange thir result based on their interpreting analysis, which is clearly distinct from the mere reading of the results, which is objective. One should be absolutely clear about what he means by the fact that the participant "failed" to decide. That he was too quick to repsond? Or that he said he failed to decide? --Gibbzmann (talk) 16:24, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

Another Response

About your edits:

• I welcomed the removal of some potentially biased language.
• I removed the sentence including “the authors retrospectively reconstructed those trials in which...” I did this because the journal article by Brass & Kuhn uses “retrospective reconstruction” to refer to the hypothesis that it is only after an action has been performed that the human mind builds a full representation of the timing within the consciousness. I was not clear about your use of that hypothesis in the sentence removed, but I tried to add the information that I thought you were getting at.
• I have done some re-writing to hopefully improve clarity even more. As always, let me know what you think about the edits.

About our discussion on M&H

• Your argument that M&H are actually measuring “self-paced-ready-to-stop-immediately” movements is interesting. Could it be that the process of performing an action is somehow changed when we think we may need to interrupt it? M&H mention one such change: some participants might enter a sort of ‘race game’ where they try to perform their action quickly enough not to get interrupted – although this change would not damage their research design. Whether there are any OTHER changes, I don’t think scientists know for sure, and I have edited the article to reflect yet another degree of tentativeness. As for some of your other questions, you should check out Haggard’s “Towards a Neuroscience of Volition” in the reference section. For one, it discusses the two different neural pathways I mentioned.

About our discussion on K&B

• I am not sure why you said “K&B failed to discuss the main point of their finding”. Hopefully my more recent clarifications have addressed that suggestion?
• I do not think you have justified how “this publication is completely unrelated to the Libet claim about the veto process”. You say that Libet “was referring to self-paced movements, over which, without any extarnal intervention, we suppress our will at the last minute.” Is that necessarily true? When walking, for example, might we not suppress the next step forward because of new external information: a puddle on the sidewalk? My point is just that, while I would agree with a “call for more information about the human mind”, this article is clearly related to (again, not conclusive on) our understanding of the human ability to veto.
• You mention that you are able to formulate an alternative hypothesis involving occasional consciousness? Please explain, unless I address your concern in the next section about K&B's conclusion...

About K&B’s conclusion specifically:

• ”The act of vetoing cannot be consciously initiated” I am not sure, but one of your objections to that conclusion seems to be that it is based on a premise regarding consciousness. I think will try to present the argument in stages, since I suspect you disagree with the conclusion 2 if phrased thusly:

• (premise 1) If the decision process is conscious, we should recall whether we just made a conscious decision or not.
• (premise 2) Subjects failed to detect the absence of any stopping or decision making in those early decide-go trials, and wrongly labelled them “successful decide” when they should have labelled them “failed to decide”
• (Conclusion) Subjects demonstrated “retrospective construction” on early decide trials.
• (Conclusion 2) Subjects were actually demonstrating “retrospective construction” in late decide trials as well. This explanation allows for extra time spent processing subconsciously before a retrospective construction. On the other hand, a conscious veto process cannot explain the early decide trials.

Tesseract2 (talk) 16:48, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

P.S. I see what you mean about the confusion regarding failed/successful decide trials - I will clarify. I was wrongly thinking I say that early decide trials "are, really, failed to decide trials" since you accurately pointed out success or failure is a label given by participants. Tesseract2 (talk) 17:03, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

*Some scattered, incomplete, answers on my part, for now. On Libet and "When walking, for example, might we not suppress the next step forward because of new external information: a puddle on the sidewalk?". Well, Libet contested explicitly that the veto he was referring to is the kind of veto used (for example) in stabilizing a rifle (which constantly takes into account the evolving situation). Time and time again he also clarified that the act being vetoed must be endogenous. More later. --Gibbzmann (talk) 17:33, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

*About your reply to my previous “K&B failed to discuss the main point of their finding”. Well, maybe I did exaggerate a little bit. The point being, that in my opinion, if one expected that consciousness is retroactive, then 1000 ms responses should not exist. The existence of one kind of delayed response in addition to the "normal" quick response, as IF we think and deliberate, even though we actually don't, is a puzzle maybe quite as big as the other one.

*Alternative hypothesis. Well, I'm not pretending they're more plausible than others. I'm only claiming that there are simple explanations that don't involve the non-existence of cosciousness, equally compatible with the finding of the experiment. In other words, it really seems too much that Wikipedia would implicitly suggest that the experiment has one only explanation, with a full endorsement of the authors' (fully legitimate) hypothesis.

For example, here's one such hypothetical mechanism (you don't need to endorse it, but just see that it deserves existence). I'm conscious of my decisions some of the times. Other times I just approve of my decisions, which were "instinctive". To remain a self-confident animal with a coherent view of my actions, which more often than not are driven by factors over which I have no control, then I just force my consciousness to beielve that I chose also those actions which I merely approved of in retrospection. But this doesn't imply NO action is ever deliberate, of course.

In a word, retrospective construction demonstrated for some actions (the emergence of the left peak) does not imply retrospective construction for ALL actions. --Gibbzmann (talk) 00:31, 11 May 2010 (UTC)

You're welcome to check out my edits, as always. I tried to incorporate the changes you made recently and have created an actual criticism section. Tesseract2 (talk) 07:59, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

Invitation to Wikipedians

Do not be intimidated by the long discussions about methodology - you owe it to Wikipedia to publicize any suggestion that MIGHT make this page better!

-Tesseract2 (talk) 17:17, 17 June 2010 (UTC)

I haven't followed this page very closely, but I did notice that nowhere does it cite a critique that I found useful when I read a bit about these experiments. The critique is by the notable philosopher Alfred Mele, and it appears in an edited book published by OUP, so it merits being taken seriously. Possibly efforts to include it would stir up the page in a constructive way -- after reading it, I found my own view (plus interest) in the experiments somewhat changed. An example excerpt is:

Roedinger and coauthors (this volume) write, 'Clearly conscious intention cannot cause an action if a neutral event that precedes and correlates with the action comes before conscious intention.' This claim should strike readers as surprising. Consider the following claim: Clearly, the burning of a fuse cannot cause an explosion of a firecracker if a lighting of a fuse that precedes and correlates with the explosion comes before the burning of the fuse. Obviously, both the lighting of the fuse and the burning of the fuse are among the causes of the explosion.... Might it be that conscious proximal intentions to flex are part of the causal chain leading to the flexings of Libet's subjects?..." (p. 334).

Since I haven't thought carefully about this page, I leave it to others to vet or implement this suggestion. -- Health Researcher (talk) 19:05, 17 June 2010 (UTC)

Useful offering. I fit Mele's criticisms (and some more I found from him at bigthink.com) into the article. I also added some abstracts, little summaries at the beginning of each study in case someone doesn't want to read the whole thing yet. Ooo and pictures. I added pictures.

-Tesseract2 (talk) 04:53, 18 June 2010 (UTC)

It seems that Mele is playing semantics, and it strikes me as sophistry. Lighting a fuse is quite obviously part of the causal chain of the explosion, it is not parallel to the causal chain, since the explosion would not otherwise happen. But there is no evidence that the conscious awareness of making a decision is part of the causal chain for making the decision, as opposed to being truly parallel, and after, the subconscious decision-making process. Furthermore, even if it were in the same causal chain as the subconscious decision-making process, that would still make it a valid assertion that it is not *the* cause, nor even a primary cause (which most people naturally assume, since it often *feels* like our decisions are caused primarily by a conscious decision making process, even if it is influenced by conditions).

Finally, none of this neuroscience is necessary to understand that free will is logically impossible. Either things happen due to conditions, or they are purely random, or some mix of the two. I have yet to see any definition of free will that accords with the common understanding of it as some kind of metaphysical process which is beyond the workings of logic, physics, etc.

Joelrosenblum (talk) 03:45, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

New Implications section

This material inappropriately expresses a point of view, and lacks sources. Unless the ideas can be attributed to specific published sources, I'm going to feel compelled to remove it. Sorry to be so blunt, but it can't stand as is. Looie496 (talk) 04:18, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

I agree with Looie here. The new section isn't WP:NPOV and needs to be verifiable. I'm going to remove it for now, but Tesseract, you know how to revert me when you've had a chance to make it neutral and verifiable. There is some stuff that might be useful for this section, like the Greene and Cohen articles referenced on the main Free will page, as they seem to be serious about morality and the judicial system if we take determinism seriously. But, we have to be careful here that this article doesn't simply recapitulate the whole free will page. Edhubbard (talk) 11:53, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

I suppose I agree, maybe the information was not necessary. I will settle for adding a simple link to Moral responsibility in the lead. -Tesseract2 (talk) 15:08, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

Criticism section

Hi, I'm new here so I thought about asking before making any changes to the article. I read about a study conducted by Jeff Miller and Judy Treven in 2009 which states that the RP in Libet's experimients doesn't necessarily represent a decison to move, but that it's merely a sign that the brain is paying attention. They modified the classical Libet experiment by playing an audio tone before letting the volunteers decide whether to tap a key or not, and what they found out was that there was the same RP signal in both cases (whether they tapped the key or not). They also made a second experiment with volunteers choosing which hand to tap the key, and found no correlation in brain signals before tapping (left vs right) and the chosen hand. Here's a link to the study [1] and to the newsarticle describing it [2]. For Criticism about other experiments I found this [3] which might be relevant. Should these findings be mentioned in the article? If so, could someone add them in a way that suits the format, I'm not sure of my ability to put them in encyclopedic fashion. Cheers. --84.251.222.22 (talk) 17:01, 29 November 2010 (UTC)

Welcome to wikipedia - that's a great, relevant start. I must encourage you to try your best to summarize these articles you have found, maybe in the Overview section (often just getting the information up is a good start). Remember, you can't break wikipedia - and there's a lot of cool stuff to learn about the editing process.

-Tesseract2 (talk) 21:14, 29 November 2010 (UTC)

Allright, done. --84.251.222.22 (talk) 14:57, 30 November 2010 (UTC)

Great!

I really felt this was a great and informative article. Based on what i read in it, it is biased, but I don't know in what way! ;) TimL (talk) 09:52, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

Yeah it's interesting stuff about an important topic, and with more views (average 700/day) we're getting more great input. Justin Bieber (40 000 views/day), here we come.-Tesseract2 (talk) 12:33, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

It was really facinating to read the article first time, and seeing how biased it was for the absence of free will was actually the motivation for me to edit it. But well, what can you expect when the main contributor identifies himself as a hard determinist :). --84.251.222.22 (talk) 15:13, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

Seems biased

The part about the forward model and efferent copies seems too strongly worded. Just because the experience of consciousness is delayed doesn't mean you aren't willfully making a decision. The feeling of it simply comes after a period of time (and a very short period of time). Also, the fact that consciousness is a "poor narrator" of what happens in the brain is very biased and need not be worded so strongly. Obviously I can't consciously control my heart beat, etc., but this doesn't mean that the feeling of consciousness doesn't reflect most of the processing that happens in the brain when it comes to "rational" activities. There should be a distinction between the experience of consciousness (qualia) that obviously comes a short amount of time after the brain processing, and the actual thought processes in the brain. There's subconscious actions like breathing, or reflexes like pulling your hand away from fire, and then there's actions that require you to pay conscious attention like learning how to ride a bike the first time, solving some very difficult mathematical problem, etc. Simply put, the experience we get of consciousness causing certain things could simply come immediately after you actually process that decision, "in the brain", or "in the chemicals of the brain", so to speak. So imagine doing the same activities I mentioned above (math problem), but simply without the experience of it. Too much emphasis is being made on the experience of consciousness, which obviously follows the brain processing. If saying the brain processing comes first is all we need to say free will doesn't exist, then this article, as well as all of these experiments, are completely pointless, since it's obvious to anyone that the processing comes first and then the experience comes afterward. Therefore, there are activities which don't require you to think too much about what is going on, and can be done easily (like certain subconscious decisions), and then there are those decisions which truly need a different kind of brain processing. A kind of brain processing which is associated with mental activity of a more important nature. Also, check this out [4] . It could be relevant. And this [5] is definitely relevant. I really fail to see how if the experience is separate from the decision, consciousness must have no input. From what I've read so far, consciousness is still not really understood completely in terms of neuroscience. So how can anyone even consider making such a statement? It's assumption and should be treated as such. For now, it's nothing else (and I'm not talking about the article when I say this thing, I'm talking about other people who draw conclusions from research). Why are there no alternative explanations given to this "efferent copies" model? It could be over-applied [6] The fact that the main editor of this article openly identifies as a hard determinist doesn't do much to help it would seem. Again, the experience of consciousness is different from the conscious processing that the mind does. Can anyone really doubt that there is a difference between using your mind to write an essay, or other complex problem-solving, vs. tapping some finger in a situation where you are really only given two choices anyway (tap now or don't tap --- not only that, you are expected to do so eventually, so obviously there will be a build up of anticipation, this will influence the results). Besides, if everything is completely determined (by processes outside of my control), then my thinking is determined (by processes outside of my control), which means rationality isn't really rational at all, it's at the mercy of forces outside of my control, so only through pure luck can I figure out the truth about something (see the Argument from Reason by C.S. Lewis, for example). This is relevant [7] . Also, why are the positions that criticize this research so poorly described (I don't have Mele's book, if someone has it, why don't you describe what he says?) compared to the descriptions of these "free will experiments". I'm not even 100% these experiments are totally appropriate for free will. Especially, according to what definition of free will. There's so much to discuss and all of these extreme conclusions given (especially that efferent copies model) seem unjustified from any point of view that isn't biased. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 07:32, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

I've done some more search and (though it comes from some religious source, I trust because it simply makes use of other secular scientific resources, so there is no threat of bias, assuming the scientific sources themselves have no bias) I've found this [8] which could have a lot to add. This article keeps stressing how nothing is settled yet, etc. But 80-90% of all the information is in favor of a lack of free will. Well if you still claim nothing is settled, then you better give a more balanced argument both in favor and against free will. If in a court of law only one side had all the arguments, would people still say "nothing's settled yet"? No, they wouldn't. So an experienced editor should do something about it using some of the sources I gave. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 16:23, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

I also disagree with the strong language here: "Directly stimulating the pre-SMA causes volunteers to report a feeling of intention, and sufficient stimulation of that same area causes physical movement.[30] This suggests that awareness of an intention to move may literally be the “sensation” of the body’s early movement, but certainly not the cause." CERTAINLY not the cause? Why not? Why can't it be that the decision of moving or not moving is resolved in the SMA area, and if you decide to go forward with it, that brain region will continue to activate further? More contradictions by whoever wrote this article. "May" literally be the sensation, and then words like "certainly". Which is it? I disagree with this biased interpretation. Why can't there be a decision-making process in the SMA area where people decide on whether or not they move, and then if they decide to go along with it (the intention which offers this choice of to more or not move), there is more activation/brain processing in the SMA leading up to the action? This is unbelievably biased. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 16:32, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

And definitely mention the fact that the Forward Model of MOTOR Control is just that at present time. It should be restricted to MOTOR control. And perhaps not even all types of motor control. Who knows? Regardless, I gave a source that says the model may be over-applied. Applying a model for motor control to all other free will actions seems like over-kill. That's even assuming that the forward model of motor control means no free will. I don't think it does (see my argument of conscious intention processing and conscious FEELING/EXPERIENCE of intention processing --- it could literally be so complex that the intent and the FEELING of intent are two separate things, yet both are done consciously with the brain paying close attention to the situation, as opposed to an automatic reflex-type movement.). 99.255.50.214 (talk) 16:38, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

And what I mean by the brain paying close attention to the situation is that obviously there are various parts of the brain which serve different functions. Some parts of the brain are used in conscious processing, and in turn those parts are sub-divided into what that conscious processing is devoted to (moral issues, learning, problem-solving, etc.). Then there are parts that deal with aspects of behavior that are automatic (e.g., a reflex). So you are faced with a novel situation that requires problem-solving. The brain consciously (since it's new, it can't just rely on some subconscious processing based off of memory --- to some extent I guess it's like when you learn to play an instrument, you pay more attention at first to learn than later on when you know it "by heart", so to speak, it's not a perfect example but it will have to do) is aware of the situation and all of the facts involved, it analyze the situation, finds out various possible ways in which to react, then further analyzes the consequences to those possible reactions, then decides which option to choose, or whether to do anything at all (something like a cost-benefit analysis). Since the situation is novel, and you are reacting to it in an appropriate and efficient way, it is obvious that the part of the brain that processed the decision was taking into consideration all the various new information, just like we feel we do in our mind. And that's where the so-called "efferent copies" (if they are to apply to this situation) may come in handy, so as to give the conscious FEELING of thinking, shortly after the conscious thinking (brain processing). So there. That way the mind works exactly as we feel it does, with awareness and everything, because obviously the brain processing required in a novel situation HAS to be aware of all or at least a significant amount of the factors involved before you make a decision, and then the FEELING of awareness comes shortly after that. Therefore, the "conscious narrator" is an accurate representation of how the part of the brain involved in thinking in a given situation actually operates, with awareness of the factors involved and everything, it's just that the feeling of consciousness is separate from actual consciousness. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 20:29, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

I think there are things here that at least deserve discussion, but I can't respond to 20-some distinct points all at once. Do you think you could pick out one issue that especially demands change, as a starting point? Looie496 (talk) 20:22, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

I too think that this article is biased against free will, the issue is complicated and there are researchers who believe in free will as there are those who do not. I made some changes to the article months ago to make it a little more unbiased, but when I read it today it seems like not much has changed. Rather than showing both sides in equal light, right after a short introduction comes a giant Patrick Haggard quote which basically says "Science has proven you have no free will". For some reason Haggard seems to wield this dualistic view of human mind where conscious decisions and thoughts should be somewhat different from the "readouts of brain activity" for free will to exist, not to mention that people should have the superhuman ability of reporting their "intention to move" not a millisecond later than they actually have it. Also, Haggard is not a neutral authority on these issues, although I don't have anything against a giant quote at the beginning, I think that it should be something more ambiguous and neutral about the neuroscience of free will. The side of debunking free will has much more space committed to it than the side that defends free will, for example the study that reports the Libet experiment replicated at the size of a single neuron is mentioned about half a dozen times in the article despite of the authors not mentioning any importance for it in the free will debate, and not being that notable within the scientific community, gathering 4 citations total according to Google Scholar. The points which make a case for the existence of free will usually have some side note that attempt to trash them, and cases against free will are portrayed as more scientific and mainstream among researchers than they actually are. Although the appeal to counter-intuitive and revolutionizing theories is strong, we should still approach this issue with caution and portray it in neutral light, rather than pseudo-neutral way of first calling it controversial and then giving the image of science supporting the case against free will. The fact of the matter is that there is no scientific consensus about the question of free will, and this should be the common thread through the article while at the same time portraying studies against and for the existence of free will. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.195.193.122 (talk) 20:50, 15 September 2011 (UTC)

Efferent copies

I dislike the strong language used in the section for efferent copies. The other parts seem pretty much fine, at least with regard to the neutrality for the most part. But that part is too strongly worded. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 20:28, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

I sort of realized that there was so much talk of inner speech - and it really all belonged on the inner speech page. Tell me what you think of what is left in the "Other related phenomena" section.

OR we can discuss your next suggestion; I am very interested in working through all your input (but for my health, I have to echo Looie's comment that I need them one at a time lol).-Tesseract²(talk) 22:37, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

Hello Tessarect2. I'm glad I caught you before I was about to go out for the night. I just want to say I have nothing against you, I know I mentioned the fact that you are a hard determinist, but I'm not saying that will automatically lead to bias ON YOUR BEHALF. Rather, my main concern with bias is perhaps how the different researchers interpret some of the findings, because they too are human so they'll have opinions. Then their opinions might be voiced in this article. But, I too struggle sometimes with being completely objective so if you ever did do anything biased I do understand. I would criticize the article just as much if it ignored all of the research so far and only focused on the pro-free will side, because I mainly want to use this to figure out some of the findings, and exactly HOW to interpret it. So again, please don't take anything personally, because I am fine with disagreement between editors (I don't call myself an editor, though, haven't been one for a long long time, I've forgotten a lot of the rules and everything). I simply want there to be more of a balance if indeed nothing is definitive regarding the research, that is all. I hope you understand and don't take things personally. However, like I said, I don't have the time to review the article at the moment, but I will in a matter of hours and I'll post my reply here. Thank you, to both you, and Looie496. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 22:49, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

I don't really notice any difference between what it used to be and what it is now. I've given my opinion above and I would rather not repeat myself because I would simply be stating the same things, which would be of no help to anyone. It also seems to me like this whole article is more or less devoted (unintentionally) to either proving or disproving epiphenomenalism (ASSUMING that epiphenomenalism means no free will, which, again, is up for debate I believe). The reply I gave would fit under reductive physicalism I believe, not 100% sure though. I basically claim that even though the feeling of action/intent is different from the actual action/intent, that doesn't mean that our brains weren't aware of exactly what was going on in a given situation when they made a decision. So instead of saying our "minds", or our "consciousness" caused something, give all the attributes of "consciousness" (since it's supposed to be a narrator, as this article claims is possible) to the area of the brain responsible for processing decisions, including AWARENESS, and the ability to go ahead or cancel an action. Then "consciousness" reflects what's going on in the brain. But when you say "unconscious processing", it almost automatically makes it look like you (meaning your brain) have no choice, when that might not necessarily be the case. I look at it like this, as long as the part of the brain that makes the decision doesn't do it almost completely randomly, and does take into account what's going on and makes informed decisions, AND has the ability to make a choice out of several options, it's not really a problem. If consciousness is a narrator, then that means what we perceive in consciousness is a somewhat accurate reflection of how the brain decides whether or not to make a decision. Simply put, reduce "conscious action" to the brain, and separate it from the generated "feeling" of conscious action which is needed for our day to day experience of life. This way, the issue is no longer whether or not consciousness (or rather, the experience of consciousness) has any ability to make decisions, but whether the part of the brain that made the decision was AWARE, was INFORMED, and HAD THE ABILITY TO CHOOSE ONE OPTION OUT OF MULTIPLE ONES (it wasn't "forced" to make the choice that it did). In short, the attributes of what we call consciousness are transferred to the brain --- since it's supposedly a narration anyway. This might also tie in with the so-called "problem of mental causation". Perhaps the fact that if the elimination of free will in a manner which would fit in with certain interpretations of these experiments does happen, it pretty much leads to epiphenomenalism. There are refutations of epiphenomenalism given here [9], and on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [10] (and probably Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), I can't cite any books because I'm a student at the moment and can't afford to waste money on anything but necessities. I don't mean to bring philosophy into this, but I know Wikipedia doesn't allow users' opinions as valid so as to be included as part of an article. Since it seems like there's few in neuroscience other than perhaps Klemm that really seem to care enough to refute certain conclusions, I can only rely on philosophers and some of the links I gave above. Something has to be done to show both sides of the argument. I think the same information can fit into more than one paradigm without contradicting scientific facts in this case because neuroscience is not yet complete, and thus consciousness studies are not yet complete either. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 06:41, 23 August 2011 (UTC)

<<So I just want there to be equal attention given to both sides of the argument, let the article take some form of a dialectical format.>> Use some of the arguments I've given above, some of the links, etc. Re-word certain words which give the impression that things are decided, when they are not, not yet at least. Offer the third option perhaps, what I've described above, where the issue is no longer whether or not consciousness as we know it has any power, but whether or not the part of the brain that made the decision has the ability to choose differently, etc. Because if consciousness is a narrator, then it should be a fairly accurate reflection of what is going on within the brain when decisions are being made. And thus, it means that the brain may go through the same process of deciding to go along or cancel an action just as we feel it in our consciousness, and just as we feel our consciousness can easily change decisions, so too perhaps the brain can as well. Basically, the brain itself is conscious of what is going on and what it chooses to do, more or less. If consciousness is a good narrator, that is. The way we humans behave would suggest this is at least somewhat plausible, given how we don't act in a totally mechanical manner, at least most of the time. There is room for flexibility, etc. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 07:08, 23 August 2011 (UTC)

As far as this discussion goes, I greatly appreciate your tone, and I have not taken any offense.

Regrettably, I may not personally have the time to do the work you suggest. I am already planning on discussing more about the cited study (on the main page) by Fried et al, and what it tells us about the SMA.

I recommend you write in well-sourced comments where you think they may be relevant - and I could copyedit. Otherwise we (or just I?) would need bullet points of the ideas you want brought in. Either way, please be sure that your sources meet Wikipedia's policies on Verifiability, or they may not last.

As for your discussion about narration and epiphenomenalism, you will again need to forgive me: I find it difficult to sort through your ideas the way your present them. Let me be concise: do you believe the article claims to challenge human choice? It does not, and I at least made some minor edits to make that more clear. Humans certainly choose - and some of the options do bubble to the surface of consciousness (e.g. "I want juice...wait, no, I want chocolate milk..."). As I see it, the literature puts consciousness in a position to observe these choices, albeit with imperfect accuracy. I am not sure what this means for "epiphenomenalism". I will say that the idea would be that the conscious thoughts we experience themselves influence more unconscious processing. Am I speaking to your critiques at all??

-Tesseract²(talk) 04:14, 24 August 2011 (UTC)

No offense to you or anyone else, but I am not going to make bullet points (for now, at least). I am glad to hear that you are not offended. But I too am busy and such, so the simple fact that I was here the past couple of days is even a surprise to myself, as I usually don't have time for these kinds of things. With that said, I am sort of just happy to have put out the information out here. As more research gets done and neuroscience continues to mature I have no doubt this article will become more important, and no doubt many will have disagreements. I'm happy to have posted some ideas here as to what can possibly be changed. Perhaps this will help future editors. Perhaps I'll come back some time in the future and continue this. I apologize if this makes you feel like I'm ignoring the conversation, but for now, I've said all I can say. I don't really have the energy to get into detailed discussions. As you can tell by my messages, they are not overly neat or organized, I just write what comes to my head. So I hope this information I put here will help any other editors in the future perhaps. Or, if I come back, it will allow me to build upon this. I don't think this article challenges human choice per se, but even if it did, if that's what the sources say, that's what they say, and there's nothing you can do about it. Most people who come to this article however are looking for introductions on this topic, so they may not be well-versed in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of free will. I mean, let's face it, the philosophy of mind you adopt is likely to interpret the scientific data in different ways. There's another suggestion to you, since you are the main editor here. Perhaps put more emphasis on the fact that different philosophies of mind will interpret things differently. It's already mentioned, but I think it should be highlighted more because it truly does make a huge difference, a different paradigm will use the data differently. My other suggestion would be to attempt to balance out the pro free will interpretations and the anti free will interpretations a little bit more. Especially for the FMMC section. I guess that's all I can say. I'm happy to have contributed information, and perhaps this will inspire future editors in one way or another. But for now, I am going to take a break from this discussion. Oh and the reason why I mentioned epiphenomenalism is because, basically, if consciousness is merely a narrator, it has no power to cause behavior (see the problem of mental causation here: [11]). While this doesn't mean the brain isn't in a sense aware of what it's doing and has the ability to choose, I can see why some would think this means free will is challenged, under certain ways of interpreting the information, of course. Thanks for your time and for this discussion. I hope you succeed in making this article even better and perhaps one day we'll be seeing it featured on the front page. 99.255.50.214 (talk) 04:36, 24 August 2011 (UTC)

Better coverage

I plan on including quotes from an article on the Nature news website.[http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/full/477023a.html Kerri Smith (2011). Nature news website, "Neuroscience vs philosophy: Taking aim at free will." The nature podcast also had an interview with Al Mele that I might reference. He makes a compelling case that philosophers have many other ways to salvage ideas of free will. This should balance the article more.

I'll cover those ressources here when I have time (unless, as always, anyone else wants to do the first draft).-Tesseract²(talk) 12:43, 16 September 2011 (UTC)

Consequences of this research?

What does all this mean, e.g. with regards to habits such as nose picking and lighting cigarettes? Too late to cancel the action when one becomes aware of it? Should we make lighting cigarettes a slower process? Matches instead of lighters, tobacco and paper instead of finished cigarettes? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.59.246.34 (talk) 10:42, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

I will be editing the article today and tomorrow. I hope the additions will answer those interesting questions.-Tesseract²(talk) 20:36, 20 December 2011 (UTC)

"Scientists missing the point"

I'm kind of unhappy about that section title. As a scientist who works in this area (although pretty peripherally), it comes across to me as a bit offensive, even though I'm not really sure what it is supposed to mean. Looie496 (talk) 18:08, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

You make a very good point. I've changed the heading. Not saying that the new title is perfect, but it's more neutral and an improvement over the previous one. MartinPoulter (talk) 20:18, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

Wasn't as focused on the title; didn't mean to offend. Consider myself a scientist. Love the new header though :) -Tesseract²(talk) 17:23, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

Rename article

I believe "Neuroscientific evidence against free will" far more accurately describes the intention (and content) of this article. Indigochild 09:22, 21 January 2012 (UTC)

I must disagree. If we wanted to name the article based on the conclusions it may lean towards, we could perhaps call it "Scientists have more evidence against magical free will, but that's not how many philosophers use free will anyway." But even still, the article's name is better off staying general, the way it is.-Tesseract²(talk) 16:06, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

Keep We don't call Climate science "evidence the world is warming".--Harizotoh9 (talk) 16:24, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

Free will in "instant action" processes vs Free will in "deep thoughts" processes

The first thing that struck me is that this article is titled "Neuroscience of free will" full stop... whereas it's totally devoted to results of scientific researches about "how does the human brain functions between the initial spark of decision making (to press on a simple button, for example), and the exact time to which the individual "consciously" presses the said button".

So... where in WP could be edited the immense field of neurophysiological careful examination of the process of "deep thought decision-making", if not in an article titled "Neurosciences of free will" ???

If I was to take St Exupery's Le Petit Prince view, I would say : "It doesn't require years of high level scientific researches to conclude that human beings' acts are, 90% of the time, decided through unconscious or preconscious processes" ! !

Dozens of paragraphs, in this article, deliberate on how many tenths of second lay between the impulse seen on an IRMs' screen, and the actual gesture of an individual's finger.

They noticed delays ranging somewhere between 0.6 and 2.8 seconds...

But what about somebody typing on a laptop's keyboard at 120 words per minute (which, unfortunately, isn't my case) ?

By sheer evidence, no one can pretend that the typist would decide first in his brain, consciously thinking : "well.. I will strike the "i" key, then the "s" one" etc.., and only after such a conscious decision would have been taken, does the brain signal (spending the amount of time noted by the cited scientists) finds its way to his finger, and is the key finally pressed !

Everybody can see that his hands run faster than his "conscious" thoughts...

The same process is at work in wording out "automatically" what we intend to say to other people —be it in our native language or even in later-acquired tongues, provided that they have attained the "fluency" level...

Common people have known for years that such "decisions" are made unconsciously inside our brain, and that we don't even master these processes.

On the other hand, what I would like to know, is : where —if not in this article— can be inserted the state-of-being researches about "deep-thought" decision-making ? Those who necessitate some time of reflexion...

I.e. : situations where you have to decide if you will orientate your university cursus towards paleo-anthropology or paleo-zoology... (or, for a more trivial example, if you'll spend your next holiday in the countryside or along a seashore !). As one can see, these are not matters of just instantly deciding when to press a button...

Maybe there should be two articles : this one, more accurately retitled "Neuroscience of free will in instant action processes", and another one (to be created ?) entitled "Neuroscience of free will in deep thoughts processes"...

What people involved in regularly editing this article, think about this ?

--Mezzkal (talk) 17:57, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

It might be easier to understand what you mean if you could point to some of the research you have in mind. To the best of my knowledge, neuroscientists who claim to study free will usually work on the sorts of problems described in this article. Looie496 (talk) 23:28, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

I'm just some IP guy but I fully empathize with Mezzkal and second his opinions for the very most part. I was rather disappointed with the scope of this article, actually shaking my head at the sheer uselessness of the information presented over and over aswell as the crude conclusions arrived at by some of these scientists. I will admit the head-shaking did not necessarily result from free-will.

It should be clear that there is some "processing delay" in the part of our consciousness we're aware of (and that is running most of the time we're conscious). In the self-experiments I undertook it generally took me an estimated 150ms to even formulate the thought-of-the-stimulus-to-act upon feeling a-random-stimulus-to-act; I could have acted well before that and sometimes my finger twichted, but then acting on this occurance in turn takes even more time! The movement might well be finished by that point or have been aborted. There's little science in it; you can feel it.

It just means movement is quicker than proper, clear, aware thinking - there are evolutionary reasons for it. Those scientists should look into tics because those are more closely related to the contents of this article than free will. 79.223.165.231 (talk) 06:08, 3 February 2013 (UTC)

The neuroscientists or more often philosophers and psychologists who claim to study freewill may not be the one's to look at certainly in so far as how the brain makes decisions. The culture of neuroscience looks to dicourage speculation about areas such as free will. However there is a significant body of neuroscience research on the brain's decision making/evaluation of sensory inputs. See particularly, (1.) Edmund Rolls, 'Memory, Attention and Decision Making' and 'Emotion Explained' plus numerous papers (2.) David Zald & Scott Rauch 'The Orbitofrontal Cortex' (3.)Leonard Kosiol & Deborah Budding 'Subcortical Structures and Cognition (4.) Jan Lauwereyns 'The Anatomy of Bias' (5.) Chapters by Rogier Mars et al and Jeffrey Cockburn et al both in 'Neural Basis of Motivational and Cognitive Control. What most of these have in common is that they describe decision related processing upstream of Libet's readiness potentials in the motor cortex. Persephone19 (talk) 12:19, 6 February 2013 (UTC)

The lead is not the place to fix "bias"

The lead paragraphs should not introduce significant views that are not covered in the remainder of the article. The exclusive treatment of Schwarz, and the picture in the lead paragraph, clearly violate this principle. I agree that maybe some treatment of "slow processes", as they were called above, would be useful, and Schwarz may even be a good example of that view, but it should be moved somewhere into the article body. (I also removed something about quantum physics, which is not discussed in the article, but that has no place in this article anyway.) Vesal (talk) 18:24, 13 July 2012 (UTC)

Bias? Balance? Lacking Schwarz, Baumeister etc. Datafile28 (talk) 07:24, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

Tolerant environments, non-justification and free will.

Most psychologists appear to believe that free will is an illusion and after-justification, but metastudies by Kurt Fischer, Christina Hinton and others at "Mind, Brain and Education" have linked the prevalence of extreme recoveries after brain damage (that are unexplainable by established neurological and psychological theories) to unusually tolerant social environments. This can be explained by the model that social pressure to justify one's actions leads to justifications that paralyze an underlying ability of practically unlimited self-correction. This is explained in greater detail on the pages "Moderating the free will debate" and "Brain" on Pure science Wiki, a wiki devoted to the scientific method unaffected by academic prestige. 94.191.162.74 (talk) 09:44, 8 January 2013 (UTC)Martin J Sallberg

That's a fairly interesting position. Taking it a bit further (too far?): our aware consciousness can be as much of a limiting factor as it can be a source of insight.

A lot of learned behaviour influences our minds, for good (like moderation) or ill (like shame). The complexity of the matter goes well beyond the scope of my understanding (props to anyone who can handle an issue of this scale).

The theory also lends credence to the philosophies of transcendentalism, which have been around for a good while and garned little bad press. 79.223.165.231 (talk) 06:26, 3 February 2013 (UTC)

Recent studies show that conscious will can influence perfromance of work. In an academic exercise, students told that their performance was predetermined by a prior test did less well than students who thought conscious effort could make a difference. Further studies show that exercise of conscious depletes energy, but its efficacy can be restored by intake of energy, so arguably not just an illusion. Some of this recent work needs to at least be acknowledged in any balanced article. Persephone19 (talk) 19:22, 10 February 2013 (UTC)

Reward circuit

Lacks balance without brains reward circuit and decision making. Datafile28 (talk) 16:07, 17 January 2013 (UTC)

"The Unconscious Actions / the Rationale" section

I flagged the section "The rationale" , as it is basically unreadable; this is due to an enormous overuse of parenthesis and even brackets. If you are editing an encyclopedia article and find yourself using brackets (because you're already using parenthesis [because your sentence structure doesn't properly express the idea}), stop what you're doing and start over. Explain things in whatever order seems reasonable to you, but surely subjecting people to parenthetical phrases within parenthesis is not the right way to format an encyclopedia article. I'll look at cleaning up the section myself, but it's really a mess... I'll need help, at least.

Thanks!

Oh, here's an example of exactly what I'm talking about:

Take one volunteer, for instance. The graph shows the times at which tones (not 'tones', unsuppressed responses to tones) occurred when the volunteer moved. He or she showed many tones (not tones, unsuppressed responses to tones) on average up until 1.8 seconds before movement onset, but a significant decrease in tones (not tones, unsuppressed responses to tones) immediately after that time.

If someone can please tell me how these few sentences can possibly have any meaning at all, I'd be very impressed. There's so much self-contradiction here that it's basically word salad. Please help fix this.

Spiral5800 (talk) 12:11, 12 February 2013 (UTC)

These are basically editorial comments on the article that have been inserted into the article rather than placed on the talk page where they belong. That happens pretty frequently, unfortunately. Looie496 (talk) 16:21, 12 February 2013 (UTC)

Spiral has a valid point though. Unfortunately, I cannot help. Lova Falk talk 11:06, 13 February 2013 (UTC)

I quite agree with you Spiral, I am going to correct at least one problem, the "tone (not tone, unsuppressed response to tone)" one... wich as I understand it should be replaced either by, indeed, "unsuppressed response to tone", or maybe "tone event" as indicated in the legend of the graph. Marcool04 (talk) 23:21, 11 March 2013 (UTC)

Some tips

Good morning. I write here to suggest some things about this page. Before starting, I would to apologize for my bad english (I am Italian). I explain my opinions in form of list.

1. The word "magical" that appears in the introduction shoulb be removed. Just yesterday, I tried to remove the word in question, but my modification has been nullified with the motivation that "it is well-sourced". However, I think that we should remove this word for this reasons:

a. I read the relative sources, but I don't find the words "magic" or "magical" in no one. In one of this source, was mentioned a book of Daniel Dennett, but it is not specified if Dennett, in this book, defines "magical" the cartesian free will. However, even if it is so, I think that this definition is the POV of Dennett for two reasons.

First, just because Dennett has called "magical" the cartesian free will, does not imply that cartesian free will is universally called by philosopher "magical": this way of defining cartesian free will may be a provocation. Dennett is not new in this things. For example, in "Darwin's dangerous idea" (p.93 in italian edition), he defines "hooks hanging to sky" the opinons different to his POV. I don't think that, because Dennett uses this expression to define this philosophical currents, we should go on the relative page and write in the introdution that they are "hooks hanging to sky". We can write this in paragraphs as "Criticism", or we can write this specifyng that this expression is used by criticals, but we should not write this in an impartial introduction.

Second, if we accept the criterion that every appellative or definition can be considered valid and NPOV only because an important author use this appellative, we should accept, for example, POV appellatives that should not be displayed on an encyclopedia, like the bad appellative of Afrikaans: "Tanned". In reality, "Tanned" is a POV (that I don't like) of the author, not a NPOV: we should not insert this definitions of Afrikaans in an impartial introduction. In the case in question, Dennett is a criticist of cartesian view of mind. I don't think that we accept as impartial an appellative that comes from a critical thinker. Gianfranco Basti, theologian and artificial-neural-network researcher defines "crazy" the determinism, but we must don't write on the relative page (or in this page) that determinism is "crazy" only because this appellative is well-sourced.

b. I never find in any philosphical peer-reviewd journal or in any philosophical tomo expressions like "cartesian free will is magical", neither that another name of cartesian free will is "magical free will". We don't define in the relative page the cartesian free will "magical" and there is not in any enciclopedy of philosophy a page called "magical free will" referring to cartesian free will. This, for me, confirms that "magical" is an arbitrary appellative.

c. I think that we should use an appropriate language, namely a scientific and philosophical language. The word "magical" does not appear to be a technical term suitable for this type of article and, moreover, its semantic appears vague (we all know the meaning of the term "magic", but, personally, I don't understand what is a "magical" current philosophical).

For this reasons, I don't think that we should use the word "magical" like an impartial appellative of cartesian free will. I propose to remove that from the introduction, that would be impartial.

2. The POV of libertarian thinker is totally absent (a part the POV of Miller&Travena, that is puntually refuted a few lines below). The only criticism to this experiments comes from supporters of deterministic free will. Despite this, there are many thinkers that criticize the setting (or the relative conclusions) of this experiments. I can cite "Tiempo, conciencia y libertad: consideraciones en torno a los experimentos de B. Libet y colaboradores", published on "Acta philosophica" in 2008 by J. I. Murillo and J. M. Giménez-Amaya. Or I can cite "Free will, perceived time and neural correlates of conscious human decisions", of italian neuroscientist Filippo Tempia, published on "The STOQ Project Research Series". And what about studies, like this, that confirms, for the autors, the causation role of conscioussness?

What i am saying is that the critics are not only deterministic: there are many thinkers who are not determinist. If we really want that this page is NPOV, in my opinion, we should insert the POV of libertarians free will.

3. I don't understand the images with captions. For example, why is there an image of a monk? However, this question is not very important. It would be if captions contain phrases apodictic and POV, but I don't think that this is the case.

4. In this article, it is discussed only the question of causation role of consioussness. However, neuroscience can bring a better clarification not only about the causation role, but also about functioning of brain and decision making. There are many studies that are investigating the possibility of prediction about a mechanical analysis of decision making (for example, Soon et. al 2008). This studies have a big impact with philosophical world. Despite this, this studies are only mentioned very roughly.

I am not a neuroscientist, but I think that it's a sin if we don't report this ensemble of studies.

I newly apologize for my bad english. --Anakynus (talk) 07:51, 21 February 2013 (UTC)

In the latter part you seem to be saying that this article fails to discuss a swathe of modern neuroscience relative to the topic. This is to say that I fully agree with this as a criticism. Persephone19 (talk) 20:23, 26 February 2013 (UTC)

Section "The Libet experiment", why is the pronoun feminin?

I am dubious as to the use of the feminin in the following part of "The Libet experiment" section :
To determine when the subject felt the intention to move, he asked her to watch the second hand of a clock and report its position when she felt that she had felt the conscious will to move.
Did Libet originally perform the experiment only on one woman? Didn't that affect it's validity? Shouldn't that be rather "he" in conformity with the general practice of using the masculin when gender is indiscriminate? Thanks for any input on this. Regards Marcool04 (talk) 21:01, 11 March 2013 (UTC)

Libet had multiple subjects and I've never read that all were female -- but if the gender is changed, the sentence needs to be rewritten to avoid ambiguity. Looie496 (talk) 21:52, 11 March 2013 (UTC)

I've always read the experiment to involve a number of subjects, so presumably it should read 'asked them to watch'.Persephone19 (talk) 23:00, 12 March 2013 (UTC)

Would you care to make the change yourself Persephone19, otherwise I'm happy to do it myself. Marcool04 (talk) 23:54, 12 March 2013 (UTC)

I have changed that bit to the plural form, which is also more in accord with the rest of the text. Persephone19 (talk) 18:25, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Decision making

Anakynus raised the question of the lackof coverage of the neuroscience of decision making back on February 21. Perhaps we should return to that issue.Persephone19 (talk) 16:05, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

I know a good bit about that topic, but I can't see that it matters much for this article. The only thing that matters for this article, as far as I can see, is that at a brain-circuitry level decision-making is a mechanical process. Going into the details can only serve to obscure the philosophical issues that are really at the heart of the matter. Looie496 (talk) 16:12, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

The title of the article 'Neuroscience of freewill' would suggest that it demonstrates how neuroscience throws light on, or explains freewill, or perhaps more liklely the impossibility of freewill. If it's a mechanism in the sense of an unconscious machine, the relevant suggested brain processing should be described. There's an abundance of recent research in this area, but I doesn't get a look in. Philosophy is all very well, but the ariticle's not entitled 'Philosophy of freewill', and in any case in the modern world philosphy is usually more to do with interpretating the significance of science. Persephone19 (talk) 14:33, 23 June 2013 (UTC)

My problem here is that I have a POV that I hold so strongly that it is impossible for me to write on this topic without it coming through. I'm convinced that the concept of free will is essentially and irreversibly dualistic, and that it is impossible to understand the bearing of neuroscience on it without understanding that fact. But that's at most a minority view in the field. The more widely held views seem so totally wrong to me that I can't bear to write them down without criticizing them. Looie496 (talk) 16:17, 23 June 2013 (UTC)

We all hold POVs. The main consideration is whether there is evidence underpinning them. I agree that free will is almost certainly a dualistic idea, and there is zero evidence for dualism. There is much evidence, however, for a lack of free will in the actions of humans and many other animals. The opening of this article claims that there is controversy and lack of agreement about the content. I would disagree. There is considerable unity about the absence of free will. See the forthcoming book We Are Our Brains by D F Swaab, in particular, Chapter 18, but none of its contents supports either dualism or free will. I assume what you are saying is that dualism is nonsense, so free will doesn't need considering. Yet it underpins the laws of most countries, regarding accountability for actions and consequent punishment. This is where the real controversy and lack of agreement lies, yet it hardly gets a mention. 51kwad (talk) 16:27, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

How thoughts give rise to action, paper by Zschorlich VR, Köhling R.

this article http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/neuroskeptic/2014/03/15/power-conscious-intention

outlining a paper

url=http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24386291

That claims intentions shape the action chosen or as it says

"Shows evidence for conscious motor intention in motor preparation prior to movement execution." would seem appropriate here. — Preceding unsigned comment added by SimonW11 (talk • contribs) 15:28, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

Not 'free will', just reflective awareness

Most of the findings mentioned in the entry is about reflective awareness of actions, not about free will, of which the author(s) has/have no faintest idea. 78.49.238.100 (talk) Wojciech Żełaniec — Preceding undated comment added 18:34, 8 April 2014 (UTC)

Needs a section on Scientific criticisms of the interpretation of the results

There is not a section on Scientific Criticisms and the free will interpretation of the results. This biases the article heavily. i.e. the arguments against the main conclusion of the paper needs its own section and then expanded upon and documented. The 1985 results are obviously outdated and newer results need to be added that are critical as it is science also. There is also no discussion of how biofeedback is deterministic. What I am getting at is Science is self-critical and there needs to be a section on these criticisms. It appears as a major weakness. JEMead (talk) 09:23, 12 July 2014 (UTC)

Naive About Interpreting Neuroscience Experiments . .??

My apologies in case this is mentioned somewhere here, but interpretation of the experiments by Libet, Soon et al, etc, is naive, not paying due attention do action planning or programming:

We humans are able to pre-program our actions (while animals are thought to act on stored programs handed down to them through their genetic endowment). All day and every day we plan before we act. This is not a false introspection, but an inner sense (I. Kant) by which to watch our own perceptive decisions. (Do I hear a thunder storm or is that a truck rumbling by the building?)

Such programming or planning action would show up prior to a final decision to act for recording by the experimenter. By early signals (fMRI or EEG) from pre-frontal areas like Brodman Area 10 (BA10), such pre-programming appears to have confused researchers, seemingly unaware that these orbito-frontal (or fronto-polar) gyri are our human neural Ego centers, as has been understood ever since an unfortunate accident destroyed these areas in the brain of Phineas Gage, robbing him of his personality, his Ego.

The TMS study by Ammon and Gandevia in frontal areas presumably had affected BA10, offering an excellent hint. Magnetic TS cut off Ego for experimental subjects in mid-experiment, with an effect of a temporary mini-lobotomy. Of course, if you lobotomize your subject, you shouldn't expect any rational account of voluntary action.

In Libet, etc, the prior brain activity reflects pre-planning action, not a final decision to move. In Soon et al (2008), BA10 activity 7 sec prior to report of voluntary decision to move is a case in point. Formulations in their published work may indicate that they were somewhat reluctant to see their work as a confirmation of Libet. hgwb (talk) 02:14, 21 July 2014 (UTC)

There are counterarguments to the argument you are giving. But what is more important is that anything that goes into a Wikipedia article needs to be derived from a reputable published source. So it isn't sufficient for your argument to be correct -- you need to be able to point to a place where that argument appears in print. (I personally agree with you that that the standard interpretation is naive, although my reasons are different from yours.) Looie496 (talk) 14:19, 21 July 2014 (UTC)

Wikipedia Governor-Editors: It should be possible to prove that the preceding entry, seemingly dated 12 July and signed by JEMead, did not exist when I initially started the present entry, entitled "Naive About Interpreting Neuroscience Experiments . .??" The preceding entry [& I am not referring to the above comment by Looie496], by being falsely dated (I claim) at 12 July, a few days prior to the initial 21 July date of the present entry, and by its title referring to interpretation which makes it similar to the title of the present entry, amounts to an intimation that my entry and its title is a follow-on. Please remove the preceding entry with its false date of 12 July. hgwb (talk) 04:10, 13 October 2014 (UTC)

'Free will' is not a scientific concept

Neuroscience has examined brain activity during decision making, but does not pretend to address the issue of free will, which is a metaphysical concept closely aligned to discussion of reductionism. Rather, what is done is to observe brain activity correlated to decision making, and an argument that (for instance) the observation of brain activity prior to conscious awareness indicates the lack of free will, is just murky thinking based upon murky definitions, not science. Although some scientists (maybe quite a few) believe that one day all mental activity will be related to synaptic activity:

"...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells.."

— Eric R. Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind

none of these reductionists claim that this objective has been reached. Philosophers and some scientists believe the establishment of such correlations between brain activity and decision making is only that, correlation, and logically speaking is disjoint from the subject of free will. There are also many scientists and even more philosophers who believe a causal reduction will never occur:

"It is not possible to resolve which of the subjective or physical universes ultimately contains the other."

— Alec Rogers, Cognitive Set Theory, p.85

"I argue that the bond between the mind and the brain is a deep mystery. Moreover, it is an ultimate mystery, a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel. Consciousness indubitably exists, and is connected to the brain in some intelligible way, but the nature of this connection necessarily eludes us."

— Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds In A Material World, p. 5

"The separateness of physical science, and its claim to completeness, has to end in the long run. And that poses the question: To what extent will the reductive form that is so central to contemporary physical science survive this transformation? If physics and chemistry cannot fully account for life and consciousness, how will their immense body of truth be combined with other elements in an expanded conception of the natural order that can accommodate these things?"

— Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, p. 8

This being the situation, the title of this article "Neuroscience of free will" implicitly asserts that a "science" of "free will" exists, which is incorrect, and even its possibility is controversial. Brews ohare (talk) 15:16, 10 March 2015 (UTC)

A better article title might be "Neuroscience and free will". Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 10 March 2015 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but I don't find those objections persuasive. "Neuroscience of free will" may be slightly misleading, but "Neuroscience and free will" is worse, as it does not imply any interaction between the two things. Looie496 (talk) 18:37, 10 March 2015 (UTC)

Looie: I am unsure of your meaning in saying you don't find the quotes persuasive. Do you mean that you don't find they make the point that neuroscience and free will are separate or do you mean that you don't agree with these authors? Of course, the latter position doesn't matter, as WP reports published work, not WP editors' thoughts. The first alternative, that these quotes are not persuasive that "free will" is a metaphysical, not a scientific concept, I don't understand. Maybe, if that is your view, you could elaborate? Brews ohare (talk) 02:07, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

I didn't say that I don't find the quotes persuasive, I said that I don't find your objections persuasive. None of the quotes deals directly with the phrase "neuroscience of free will". The application of the quotes to that phrase comes from you, and I don't find it persuasive. Looie496 (talk) 15:36, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

I think a scientific study bearing upon free will requires a specification of this concept that is contained within the reach of experimental observation, and the quotes indicate that cannot be done apart from a reductionist viewpoint supportable only using metaphysical, not scientific, arguments. Brews ohare (talk) 03:37, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

That's not a valid argument. Any given scientific study requires the terminology it uses to be operationalized, but there is no rule that requires the same operational definition to be used by every paper that uses a given term. Otherwise fields such as the "neuroscience of emotion" would be impossible. Looie496 (talk) 15:36, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

Looie: I think you have only half my point, the part that says that somehow the idea of free will has to be related to experiments for science to address it. The other part is that to fit "free will" into the scientific framework, one has to assume that the scientific framework can encompass the concept. To the degree that the concept is metaphysical, that cannot be done. As an example, dualism escapes a scientific formulation, and that is the spirit in which I understand the quotations above. Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

No, you don't have to assume that the scientific framework can encompass the concept. You only have to assume that the scientific framework can shed light on the concept -- a much weaker criterion. Looie496 (talk) 16:44, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

That is an interesting concept. An example close to what you want to say is the observation that drugs that change dopamine levels affect addictive behavior (all of which is observable). If we now accept the addict's declared intent to quit as an expression of their 'free will', their failure to follow through indicates that they did not have free will after all (as a consequence of an impaired dopamine system, we say, according to the theory relating their dopamine levels to addiction). The challenge is then whether they ordinarily have free will, but it was limited in this case by drugs, or if perhaps they never had free will in the first place (which may be why they fell into the trap of addiction despite knowing the risk). Or, what if the science isn't about free will at all, but about addiction? (After all, the theory doesn't need or use the term 'free will'. So where does this theory connect to the notion of 'free will'?) There is no resolution to these issues available today (and never will be, IMO) that doesn't go outside science to involve a metaphysical analysis of 'free will'. Brews ohare (talk) 19:58, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

You're basically inventing your own rules here. The general rule is to permit a substantial degree of looseness in usage of common language terms such as "free will", "consciousness", "emotion", etc. You may prefer to use them in a more rigorous way, but the consequence will be that it is impossible to use them at all. Most scientists don't prefer that approach. Looie496 (talk) 23:17, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

I'd agree that there exist common language meanings for terms, but scientific theory is very careful to use specific definitions. You can't predict a celestial event with "loose" meanings, even though, for example, an "eclipse" has a loose meaning. However, we can agree to drop the subject if you accept the changes I have made to the Intro. Brews ohare (talk)

Here is a discussion that may fit together both of our points of view. Brews ohare (talk) 03:36, 12 March 2015 (UTC)

Any single research paper must define the things that it measures precisely and operationally. But that rule doesn't apply to broader works such as textbooks or collections or encyclopedia articles. A volume on "Geology of Vulcanism" might contain two dozen papers, each of which defines a volcano in a slightly different way. This might be viewed as undesirable, but it is a common feature of the way science works. Looie496 (talk) 15:10, 12 March 2015 (UTC)

I don't think a discussion of vocabulary is my interest here. My concern is the reductionist point of view, that science (in principle) governs all phenomena including free will. There are issues beyond the reach of science (including free will), that are not experimentally accessible. It is true historically, however, that metaphysical claims often have overreached and science has brought more focus to philosophical discussions. Neurophilosophy aims to meld the two without conflating them in hopes of some synergy. Brews ohare (talk) 16:03, 12 March 2015 (UTC)

A better background for this topic is the WP article on Neurophilosophy. I have reworded the intro to reflect this connection. Brews ohare (talk) 12:52, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

Remove the "prospection" part at the end

Can somebody explain why there is a final section of "prospection?" It seems like a non-sequitur to me. Prospection (i.e. planning) is quite obviously a human behavior, and it has nothing to do with the question of free will, nor does it invalidate or call into question any of the preceding experimental conclusions. Joelrosenblum (talk) 04:29, 11 March 2015 (UTC)

The brain-computer duel experiment

The following new research article looks relevant to this page:

Press release URL: http://www.charite.de/en/service/press_reports/artikel/detail/the_brain_computer_duel_do_we_have_free_will/

Journal Reference: Matthias Schultze-Kraft, Daniel Birman, Marco Rusconi, Carsten Allefeld, Kai Görgen, Sven Dähne, Benjamin Blankertz and John-Dylan Haynes. Point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements. PNAS, December 2015 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1513569112.

But I cannot judge whether its relevance is major or minor. Can someone please look at it? Professor Tournesol (talk) 01:41, 16 January 2016 (UTC)

Manipulation of choice - inaccurate?

In this section it states: "However, further attempts to replicate such results have failed[74] and later Jeffrey Gray states in his book Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem, that tests looking for the influence of electromagnetic fields on brain function have been universally negative in their result.[75]"

However, this recent study seems to replicate the effect in question:

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn_a_00848#.VvMhwCtEHrc "Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation of the Motor Cortex Biases Action Choice in a Perceptual Decision Task" Amir-Homayoun Javadi, Angeliki Beyko, Vincent Walsh, and Ryota Kanai, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

59.191.208.189 (talk) 23:20, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

I have added a little info about this study and the corresponding reference. Thanks for pointing this out! Themidget17 (talk) 21:25, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

Looks to me like this can be nominated to GA Suggestion

Just wondering if anybody else has the same view. Themidget17 (talk) 02:46, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

Controversial subjects should remain limited to description of experiments & what researchers say; No over-stressing

I see an irregular pattern on these articles were objectivity is not clear. They overemphasize some statements by putting them and associated, supporting ones along the course of the article. The reader gets double portion of some research and some point of view, even when something was clearly stated. This seems to happen in emotionally-charged subjects, like God, free-will, ethics, death penalty, etc. It's a subtle way of preparing the ready to accept some opinion as truth without letting the reader aware there is no consensus yet. If no consensus has been achieved, the article should stress this with same strength. Please, Remain objective. — Preceding unsigned comment added by MLearry (talk • contribs) 07:36, 15 July 2016 (UTC)

This is awful. Start again?

I study this stuff academically, and use the wikipedia page regularly as it's got an impressive selection of evidence and is regularly updated. But it's become completely unmanageable. The page doubles back on itself, returns to arguments have finished above, references particular studies in incredible detail and others not at all. There is so much here, that i fear you would be better of simply starting again? Anyone up for the challenge?

I don't have the time to start myself right now, but will return over the next few months whenever I can, to at least attempt an unbiased, comprehensive introduction. Lewisly (talk) 12:46, 21 December 2016 (UTC)

I agree. I think the main body of the page should be organized by topic instead of by study (with possible exception of the original Libet experiment). For instance, the "Disputed Relevance..." section includes Adina Roskies' five areas in which neuroscience can inform free will. A variation of this would be a good starting place. I intend to do this soon. The content that is currently there is good, so I'd suggest moving it to the bottom under a separate "In-depth article review" section so we don't lose the hard work that people have put into the page. Jgavenas (talk) 01:17, 21 February 2019 (UTC)

Relation to Self-agency

What is the relationship between this page and Self-agency? Should they be merged? Is that a sub-topic of this page? Is that page a biased presentation of one perspective on the neuroscience of free will? I'm not familiar enough with this area to say, but wanted to draw the attention of other editors to these questions. Daask (talk) 17:20, 5 February 2020 (UTC)

Article assessment

I have assessed the article as "B". If there is any issue, it would be that it now may be too technical to be understood by someone not familiar with neuroscience.--WriterArtistDC (talk) 16:47, 25 July 2020 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 8 January 2020 and 25 April 2020. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Kelseystrauss.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 05:10, 17 January 2022 (UTC)