Talk:Mohammad Mosaddegh/Archive 1

This is an archive of past discussions about Mohammad Mosaddegh. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Underestimation of the difficulties of managing...

The lead section reads...

"In Iran and many countries, Mosaddeq is widely considered a hero of anti-imperialism and victim of imperialist greed, although many historians believe his downfall can be credited to his underestimation of the difficulties of managing Iran's oil industry and his loss of Shia clerical support because of his dependence on Iran's communist party."

I detect weasel. What does "underestimation of the difficulties of managing Iran's oil industry" mean exactly? Nothing in the main body supports the existence of this one particular paragraph as it currently stands, so I'm moving it here until the ambiguity is pressed out. smb (talk) 18:40, 16 February 2008 (UTC)

Well, that's a well addressed quote. If weasel apply here, please mention the exact part that is a weasel. Do you think if we change the "many" to "some" , the sentence would be correct?
"In Iran and many countries, Mosaddeq is widely considered a hero of anti-imperialism and victim of imperialist greed, although some historians believe his downfall can be credited to his underestimation of the difficulties of managing Iran's oil industry and his loss of Shia clerical support because of his dependence on Iran's communist party" --Alborz Fallah (talk) 23:05, 16 February 2008 (UTC)

That's only one part of the problem. Their opinion should be made explicit in the main body, providing it's notable. What do these historians say exactly - that Mosaddeq dug his own grave opposing U.S.-British policy and asserting national independence? Are they implying incompetence? The present wording is not sufficiently clear. Please summarise their work accurately and clearly so to avoid confusion. And instead of saying "...some historians..." perhaps naming each of them individually is better (both of them). Once that's done, something can be said of it in the lead section. smb (talk) 00:11, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

Why did you remove the whole paragraph? Is not

although many historians believe his downfall can be credited to ... his loss of Shia clerical support because of his dependence on Iran's communist party."

adressed in the main body? For example:

The withdrawal of support for Mossadeq by the powerful Shia clergy's has been regarded as having been motivated by their fear of the "chaos" of "a communist takeover."[23] Some argue that while many elements of Mossadeq's coalition abandoned him it was the loss of support from Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani and other clergy that was fatal to his cause, reflective of the dominance of the ulama in Iranian society and a portent of the Islamic Revolution to come. "The loss of the political clerics effectively cut Mossadeq's connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses which are crucial to any popular movement" in Iran.[24]

So I'm putting back the deleted sentences minus the difficulty of management part. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:43, 18 February 2008 (UTC)

Removing the oil passage doesn't solve the problem - are we now expected to believe there are historians who contend oil played no part? In addition, "downfall" (failure that results in a loss of position) is also prejudicial language. The logical implication is again one of mismanagement and incompetence. Mosaddegh was illegally forced out of office; he didn't simply fall from power. I can't attempt something better myself not being familiar with the work cited. smb (talk) 21:41, 18 February 2008 (UTC)

changed to a major factor in his overthrow --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:29, 18 February 2008 (UTC)

This doesn't address the main points above. smb (talk) 21:33, 22 February 2008 (UTC)

Understand too, that the people you cite are not historians in any objective sense. smb (talk) 21:43, 22 February 2008 (UTC)

Another edit war

Hi can we get a request for mediation and protection on this page for a while and can somebody step in between BoogaLouie and CreazySuit? Thanks, Erxnmedia (talk) 21:10, 22 February 2008 (UTC)

I agree with user CreazySuit: there's too much emphasis on what is a minority point of view. smb (talk) 21:27, 22 February 2008 (UTC)

Edits of the lead

Latest edit by AlexanderPar says in the edit summary "what Stephen Kinzer actually says"

Is this article Mohammed Mosaddeq or Mohammed Mosaddeq according to Stephen Kinzer? The lead is now, at the very least, inaccurately cited since none of the cites 8,9, and 10

Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.124
Review by Jonathan Schanzer of All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer (note this a review of Kinzer's book)
Mackay, Sandra, The Iranians, Plume (1997), p.203, 4

... agree with AlexanderPar's POVing: since the CIA and the British helped to undermine Mossadegh's government through bribery, and libel that Mossadegh was close to the communists, even though Mossadegh was as anti-Soviet as he was anti-British. --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:15, 23 February 2008 (UTC)

Disputed paragraph in lead

Is this:

In Iran and many countries, Mosaddeq is widely considered a hero of anti-imperialism and victim of imperialist greed,^[1] although many historians believe that a major factor in his overthrow was Mosaddeq's loss of Shia clerical support because of his dependence on Iran's communist party.^[2]^[3]^[4]

Did Mossadeq lose support of some Iranians after taking emergency powers?

I propose changing the paragraph to the following: In Iran and many countries, Mosaddeq is widely considered a hero of anti-imperialism and victim of imperialist greed,^[5] although a number of scholars and historians believe that a major factor in his overthrow was Mosaddeq's loss of support among Shia clerics and the traditional middle class as a result of their fear of a communist takeover.^[6]^[7]^[8]

Evidence

Because this is such a controversial subject I've gone to the trouble to type out text from several sources to answer the question:

Quoting Amin Saikal:
The British blockade of Iranian oil and that country's intervening actions for Mossadeq's downfall resulted in serious economic hardship and polarization of Iranians into pro- and anti-Mossadeq forces. The anti-Mossedeq forces were centered around the monarchy, which had the support of a large section of the armed forces. The situation worsened when, amid increasing unrest inside and outside the Majlis, Mossedeq attempted to take over the constitutional position of the Shah as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rule by emergency powers legitimized by a referendum and bypass the reponsiblity of the Majlis. He thus isolated himself from some of the close colleagues, including Seyyed Abol Qazem Kashani, the speaker of the Majlis, and laid himself open to criticism of dictatorial rule, inviting a direct confrontation between his government and conservative forces." (Saikal, Amin, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.43-4)

Quoting Ervand Abrahamian:
"The easy success of this coup can be explained by two factors, the widening gap between the traditional and middle classes within the National Front; and the increasing alienation of the whole officer corps from the civilian administration." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.273-4)

"... Mossadeq, confident that he had defeated the shah and thrown out the British, pressed ahead for fundamental social changes. When he gave the Ministries of Interior, Agriculture, and Transport to leaders of the secualr Iran party, the Ministry of Justice to Abu al'Ali Lufti, and anticlerical judge who had helped Reza Shah reorganize the judicial system, and the Ministry of Education to Dr. Mehdi Azar, a university professor from Azerbaijan sympathetic to the Tudeh party, Qonatabadi and other clerical leaders of the National Front expressed guarded fears for the future. When the minister of transport proposed to nationalize the bus companies of Tehran, Makki warned that such an act would open the way for the state to take over all small businesses, even groceries:

We would end up like the Soviet Union where the state owns everything and citizens nothing. Anyway, we all know that our bureacrats are incompetent businessmen.

When the minister of economics tried to reduce food prices by opening new bakeries, the bazaar guilds - encouraged by Kashani - protested that the government had no right to interfere with the free market. When the minister of communications recommended that the country's telephone companies be nationalized, Kashani solicited petitions from shareholders, and Haerzadeh proclaimed that `Islam protects private property and prohibits expropriations.` When Fatemi complained that the prohibition against the sale of alcohol reduced government tax revenues and increased the consumption of pure alcohol, [Shams al-Din] Qonatabadi [a preacher and leader of the Society of Muslim warriors, which was a member of the National Front] exclaimed,

I cannot believe my ears. Here is an assistant minister who considers himself a Muslim and represents a Muslim country proposing to legalize what the shari'a has clearly made illegal.

When Mossadeq's advisers proposed to enfranchize women on the grounds that the spirit of the constitution treated all citizens as equals, the `ulama, supported by theology students and guild elders, protested that `the religious laws undoubtedly limited the vote to men.` Kashani stressed that the government should prevent women from voting so that they would stay home and perform their true function - rearing children. ... One demonstrator was killed and ten were seriously wounded as theology students in Qum took to the streets to protest the proposal of extending the vote to women." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.275-6)

The conflict between the traditional and modern wings of the National Front reached a climax when Mossadeq asked Paliament from a 12-month extension of his emergency powers. Opposing the request, many of the clerical deputies left the National Front and formed their own Islamic Caucus (Franksium-i Islam). Kashani denounced the emergency powers as `dictatorial`; informed foreign journalists that true democracy in Iran needs a faithful implementation of the shari'a; and told Behbehani, the royalist ayatollah, that Mossadeq's `leftist advisers were endangering national security.` Qontatabadi claimed that the ministers of justice and education were replacing good Muslim employees with Kremlin-controlled atheists`; that he had always suspected the Iran party because of that party's alliance with the Tudeh in 1946; and that the `government's dictatorial methods were tranforming Iran into a vast prison.` Another clerical deputy suddenly discovered that Mossadeq's doctoral dissertation, written 35 years earlier in Switzerland, contained strong secular and anticlerical views. ..." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.276-7)

Quoting Vali Nasr:
Despite modernization in Iran in the 20th century, "One are where the ulama could still make their weight felt was the struggle against imperialism. Clerics supported both the nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1951 and the popular movement that it created. ... While many in the Shia ulama supported Mossadeq's goals, at the end of the day the most senior clerics backed the restoration of the monarchy because they badly feared chaos and a communist takeover." (Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2005), p.124)

Quoting Nikki Keddie:
"The coup could not have succeeded without significant internal disaffection or indifference, but without outside aid it would not have occurred." (Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p.140)

Quoting Sandra Mackay:
"The loss of the political clerics effectively cut Mossadeq's connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses which are crucial to any popular movement" in Iran. "It was Ayatollah Kashani who quietly inflicted Shiism's mortal wound on Muhammad Mossadegh." (Mackay, Sandra, The Iranians, Plume (1997), p.203,4)

Quoting Abbas Milani
"It was the clerical establishment’s animosity towards Mossadegh that laid the groundwork for his ouster. A broad swath of clerics--Islamists like Ayatollah Abolgasem Kashani, a mentor of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini--had initially supported Mossadegh. But, by late 1952, the clerics turned against him after he bucked their demands. The Ayatollah Kashani unsuccessfully pressed Mossadegh for the right to appoint key ministers. Another top cleric called on the prime minister to purge the civil service of Baha’is--a bane of Shia clergy. The clergy’s allegiance to Mossadegh weakened further as he allowed the communist Tudeh Party to gain ever more power, despite his own personal abhorrence of communism. Once Mossadegh squandered the allegiance of the clergy, the inevitability of his fate became increasingly clear. (He had also alienated the middle class, increasingly weary of ideological warfare; and the army had pleaded for his ouster.)"

"None of this is to defend America’s role in the coup. But it was hardly the only or even the decisive factor in his fall. ..." ("The Great Satan Myth, Everything you know about U.S. involvement in Iran is wrong" by Abbas Milani tnr.org, December 8, 2009

Did Mossadeq have the support of the communists? NO, certainly not at first.

To clear up this issue:

"As the the Tudeh gradually reemerged as a major force during 1951-1953, the party leadership was confronted with the inevitable question: whether of not to support the Mossadeq administration. Not surprisingly, the leaders where sharply divided." Older members of the Central Committee "favored an alliance" Newer members did not. "The debate was won by hard-liners."

The Society of Democratic Youth sponsored teachins to "expose the conspiracy between the shah and his prime minister." (October 1951) ... The Tudeh press constantly portrayed Mossadeq as a feudal landlord, a devious old-time politician, and a stooge of the United States..... In 1951-2 the Tudeh supported the National Front only during the July uprising, when the danger from the shah appeared imminent." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.323)

What was the association of Tudeh (communist party) and Mossadeq?

Mossadeq helping Tudeh "The election of Mossadeq helped the Tudeh even [more than the liberalization under Razmara] for the new prime minister accelerated the pace of liberalisation. Although he neither repealed the 1931 law nor formally lifted the 1949 ban, he believed that police controls violated civil liberties and the constitutional laws. He argued that the royalists smeared social refomers as communists in much the same way as the Qajars had labeled their opponents `heretical Babis`. And he realized that he needed all the public support he could get in order to oust the British from the oil industry and expel the shah from politics." (p.318-9)

Tudeh helped the Nationalization fight and become stronger as a result. Comment of Hussein Fateh, "the anticommunist leader of the defunct Comrade's party":

One must admit that the Tudeh was a major force participating in the struggle to nationalize the oil company.`... although diverse elements participated in the July uprising, the impartial observer must confess that the Tudeh played an important part - perhaps even the most important part. .... If in the rallies before March 1952 one-third of the demonstrators had been Tudeh and two-thirds had been National Front, after March 1952, the proportions were reversed. [Panjah Saleh-e Naft-i Iran (p.320)

"Arsanjani, writing on behalf of Qavam, argued that the Tudeh was the chief force defeating the Shah. And Kashani, the day after the riots, sent a public letter to the pro-Tudeh organizations thanking them for their invaluable contribution toward national victory." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.320)

If anyone has reason for us to believe this is not evidence that Mossdeq lost domestic support prior to the coup and that the Tudeh was not strengthened by the events supporanding the natoinalization, let us know because otherwise I'm going to put the revised paragraph in the lead. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:36, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Dispute over cause of coup

Examine the paragraph again. The second line has zero relevance to the first. It's really a non sequitur in need of a punctuation mark. I propose we break it up. smb (talk) 23:35, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

So we break it in two sentences and you have not problem with it? The sequitur is why he was overthrown. The first sentence implicitly gives imperialist greed as the reason for his overthrow, the secound sentence loss of domestic support.

New paragraph: In Iran and many countries, Mosaddeq is widely considered a hero of anti-imperialism and victim of imperialist greed.^[9] However a number of scholars and historians believe that a major factor in his overthrow was Mossadeq's loss of support among Shia clerics and the traditional middle class, brought on by Mossadeq's increasingly radical and secular policies and by their fear of a communist takeover.^[10]^[11]^[12] —Preceding unsigned comment added by BoogaLouie (talk • contribs) 02:21, 27 February 2008 (UTC)

"The sequitur is why he was overthrown." No, you have it backwards. Mossadegh was overthrown because he opposed foreign control of internal affairs. We shouldn't seek to soften the reality, by ignoring two years of American and British subversion. Please see User:CreazySuit's objection above and below. smb (talk) 17:59, 2 March 2008 (UTC)

Mossadegh did not lose domestic support prior to the coup, this is a minority view and nonsense advocated by the Iranian monarchists and people with similar agendas like Abrahamian and Nasr. The whole paragraph by BoogaLouie, gives undo weight to and puts undo emphasis on a minority apologist view advocated by those who wish to downplay the role of US and UK in the coup. It's well-documented that Shia clergy were provoked against Mossadegh by the CIA through media and other means, the CIA even bombed some Mullah's house and blamed it on Mossadegh. So to claim that the clergy and their supporters feared Mossadegh and were a major factor in his overthrow, without mentioning who had put those fears into their minds, and who had provoked them, is a dishonest assertion to say the least. The whole paragraph should be revised or removed from the lead, but I'll wait for others' input first. --CreazySuit (talk) 09:43, 2 March 2008 (UTC)

I agree. The 'some people consider Mossadegh a hero of anti-imperialism', however 'scholars and historians believe...' is misplaced, and gives undue weight to a minority viewpoint. smb (talk) 17:59, 2 March 2008 (UTC)

What evidence to you have that Abrahamian and Nasr have agendas ? What evidence do you have that this is a minority viewpoint? --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:01, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

Smb said it best, your paragraph gives undue weight to a minority viewpoint. You're essentially editorializing the article, synthesizing material to demonstrate the validity of your own POV conclusions by citing sources that when put together serve to advance your position. The whole paragraph should be revised or removed from the lead, but I'll wait for further input from other editors, before taking the initiative myself. --CreazySuit (talk) 07:07, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

You have the wikipedia jargon down pat. "... undue weight ... minority viewpoint ... editorializing ... synthesizing material ... POV conclusions ..." all you need now is some facts. I've given the judgements of some serious scholars that the coup involed more than CIA bribes, what evidence to you have this is a "minority viewpoint"? --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:22, 6 March 2008 (UTC)

You're editorializing, simple as that. You're cherry picking sources, synthesizing them and putting them together, to advance a nonconservative minority point of view on several articles. The paragraph in question has to be re-written or must go, it's contradictory with the mainstream scholarly accounts of the coup.--CreazySuit (talk) 09:02, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Sorry, you'll need facts not assertions. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:01, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

Did he just say "neoconservative"? Yes, he did. The universal title of leftist contempt has now been placed upon you. Now who is pushing POV? (I have NEVER heard ANYone call themselves a neoconservative. It is used as a generalized stereotype and a sign someone is about to package up all their anger at the right and hurl it squarely at one person, justified or not)I thought I'd step in and point that out, sorry. Batvette (talk) 20:54, 13 March 2008 (UTC)

More dispute over the Coup

"Realizing that the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats, Mossadeq stopped the voting as soon as 79 deputies - just enough to form a parliamentary quorum - had been elected." This is a false/loaded statment, do you have another source for this beside Avrahamian? Does Vali Nasr make a similar claim? --CreazySuit (talk) 21:01, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

No. I don't have another quote about this issue in the election. That and the fact that it is a controversial subject is why I preceded the statement with "According to Ervand Abrahamian ...". Abrahamian is a reputable scholar and his book Iran between two revolutions is a major work of Iranian history. He is also a lefty and generally sympathetic to Mossadeq's goals. You can't just assert that it is "false" because it makes Mossadeq look less than perfect. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:16, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

Actually, I can assert that it's false, so long I can refute it with another source. Remember, fringe views do not belong on Wikipedia, if there is any truth to that statement, then other scholars would have mentioned it, huge claims and liables need more than one source. Also, I disagree with you that "Abrahamian is a reputable scholar", he's a former Marxist, and a very political person. What I am saying is that he clearly has an agenda.--CreazySuit (talk) 21:38, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:BoogaLouie"

well if you have a source its not an assertion, but where are your sources? A fringe view is one denied by the mainstream. What evidence do you have that other historians deny there was any manipulation of the election by Mossadeq? What evidence do you have that Abrahamian was not a reputable scholar? Who has questioned his scholarship?

alonng with various Nationalist, Islamist, and socialist parties and groups What groups? The National Front was a coalition of such groups, were there more outside of it? If so, who were they? --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:54, 26 March 2008 (UTC)

For the time being, I didn't remove Abrahamian's false claim, until I'll dig up the exact details of the elections (Press reports, first-hand historical accounts etc) to refute Abrahamian's false claim, which should also discredit him as a source in general, just like his friend Amir Taheri. For now I am disputing the claim, but if there was any "manipulation of the election by Mossadeq" (this is a HUGE claim and liable by the way), it would have been reported by other scholars and sources. Extraordinary claims like election fraud, should be supported by more than one source. Abrahamian's claim is regarded as a fringe view unless reported and supported by several reputable sources. Also, National Front at that time was coalition a few liberal/nationalist parties like the Iran Party plus Kashani's Mojahaedin, it did not include all the Islamist or socialist groups, there were even nationalist groups who were not formally a part of National Front such as the Pan-Iranist Party, but were allied with NF nonetheless, Tudeh was not a part of NF either.--CreazySuit (talk) 05:12, 26 March 2008 (UTC)

There are plenty of unsourced statements in this article without a peep from other editors. Now I have sourced material to expand the article but since it points out that Mossadeq was human being with imperfections like anyone else, we have a lot of talk about "false claims" and discrediting a scholar "as a source in general, just like his friend Amir Taheri".

I'll ask you again, who says Abrahamian was not a reputable scholar? Who says his a fringe view?

I put it to you that "manipulation of the elections" in a society where elections are a relatively new phenonemum, and not a tradition of government, is not a huge claim but something that has happened and does happen all over the world - not that that makes it alright. Mossadeq's opinion was that the voters in the provinces were predominately illiterates who voted as the local aristocrats and notables told them to vote, and so should not have had the right to vote. He wanted to pass legislation preventing illiterates from voting but didn't have enough support.

Another question: Yes, "National Front at that time was coalition a few liberal/nationalist parties like the Iran Party plus Kashani's Mojahaedin." But wasn't Kashani's Mojahaedin an Islamist group? What other Islamist groups or socialist groups of any significance (that could draw a crowd in the street) were there active around 1951-53 that weren't in the NF? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:54, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

I am going to hold off expanding until I can add material from All the Shah's men --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:54, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

Please read Wikipedia:Verifiability#Exceptional_claims_require_exceptional_sources: "claims... which would significantly alter mainstream assumptions, especially in science, medicine, history, politics, and BLPs." This is a case of Abrahamian going against the mainstream assumption that Mossadegh was a democrat who held free and fair elections. If there was any truth to Abrahamian's exceptional claim of election fraud, it would have been mentioned by the other source who have extensively covered Mossadegh and the events of 1951-1953, at least a few of them. Don't you think that it's odd that such an important detail about the elections has apparently escaped the attention of every scholar and historian expect for Abrahamian who hadn't even been born yet? As for the anti-Shah groups who supported the protests and strikes, besides the pan-Iranists, the Fadayiaan Islam was another group that was not a part of NF, and had even tried to kill Dr. Fatami, but supported those particular protests/strikes nonetheless.--CreazySuit (talk) 23:34, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

Wikipedia has to be based on what reputable sources say. we can't just assert that someone is a fringe source and proclaim their statements "untrue". Do we know that no historians or writers besides Abrahamian have talked about irregularities in the vote?

How do we know there is a consensus that "Mossadegh was a democrat who held free and fair elections," and thus would never bend electoral rules? Says who? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:48, 5 April 2008 (UTC)

It is no secret that Mossaddeq used dictatorial tactics, and resorted to vote rigging. See, e.g. this book: (p. 65) http://www.amazon.com/Eternal-Iran-Continuity-Chaos-Middle/dp/1403962758/ref=si3_rdr_bb_product, which speaks of a "model of vote rigging" stating that Mossaddeq "was ruling as a dictator, contrary to the democratic image projected by his supporters in later years." It also points out the fact the vote in the famous referrendum held by Mossaddeq was not secret. If you don't believe this source, you can find similar statements in newspapers published in those days [1][2].Shervink (talk) 14:01, 7 April 2008 (UTC)

That's a minority view.The dominant view about Dr.Mossaddeq , neither in Iran nor out of Iran , is not as above.--Alborz Fallah (talk) 20:22, 7 April 2008 (UTC)

Well, that's not really a very well-presented argument you give here! Anyhow, wikipedia is not about "domination", as you put it. It's about sources, and when there are several reputable sources saying something then it's not a fringe view anymore. But it's high time that considering the sources presented, this article becomes at least slightly less pov. Shervink (talk) 21:49, 7 April 2008 (UTC)

Shervink makes a point I should have made. Mossadeq's referrendum used seperate ballot boxes for yes and no votes, i.e. it was not a secret ballot, i.e. it was less than democratic. Even Kinzer's All the Shah's Men points that out. This is not a fringe view. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:04, 8 April 2008 (UTC)

In fact, even the polling stations for yes and no votes were at different places! Shervink (talk) 07:30, 9 April 2008 (UTC)

The context of the events is important.Until that time no such "Standard western type ballot" was performed in Iran (and maybe not until now!) ... That means it is not correct to judge with present western standards about a previous middle eastern referendum.
And by "dominancy" , I mean "mainstream view" that is important in Wikipedia... --Alborz Fallah (talk) 10:40, 10 April 2008 (UTC)

It is not about "present" standards. As you can see in NY Times articles of that time, for example (links provided above), the methods were very much criticized back then as well. Moreover, as far as I know, having separate polling stations was by no means a common procedure, even in those times! Shervink (talk) 12:10, 10 April 2008 (UTC)

Not in those times in which place? As Pahlavi's and Islamic republic never performed standard elections many years after that ... Is there any such standard election in whole Iranian history?! --Alborz Fallah (talk) 19:01, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Are you seriously suggesting that having separate polling places or ballot boxes, election results that give 1300 no votes out of 2,043,300 votes, and which was criticized not just by historians but at the time it happened ... is simply an "alternative" way of holding elections? Just different from "present western standards"? It eliminates the secrecy of the secret ballot, a very basic element in any free election. And it would seem to be more trouble to have two polling places, so shortage of resources couldn't have been the issue. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:23, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Lead

I've tried to clean up the lead, editing out factoids about the assassination of his predicessor and how many times he was appointed as prime minister and adding bigger issues such as the fact that he was a major figure in modern Iranian history --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:46, 5 April 2008 (UTC)

Dispute over coup edits

To Crazysuit: Please do not revert sourced material

Iran had soviet oil concessions in the north that were not nationalized.
"taking advantage" of a situation does not imply anything sinister or devious. Politics is all about taking advantage of a situation. mossadegh had massive support he used it. He took advantage of it.
The National Front was a coalition of groups, nationalist, socialist oriented, islamist. The NF had supporters who were not members. I have not found any mention of other groups outside Tudeh that historians found worth mentioning involved in Iranian politics supporting mossadegh at that time. If you have, show us the source. --BoogaLouie (talk) 14:58, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Crazysuit has given as a source for the contention that the National Front had "various Nationalist, Islamist, and socialist parties and groups" worth mentioning in support of it the book. MOSSADEGH: The Years of Struggle and Opposition by Col. Gholamreza Nejati, p761

Problem: it's not available in English and only a available at a handful of libraries in the English speaking world. Thus it is not verifiable. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:38, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

"agenda ... minority apologist view", etc.

From editor CreazySuit:
Mossadegh did not lose domestic support prior to the coup, this is a minority view and nonsense advocated by the Iranian monarchists and people with similar agendas like Abrahamian and Nasr. The whole paragraph by BoogaLouie, gives undo weight to and puts undo emphasis on a minority apologist view advocated by those who wish to downplay the role of US and UK in the coup. It's well-documented that Shia clergy were provoked against Mossadegh by the CIA through media and other means, the CIA even bombed some Mullah's house and blamed it on Mossadegh.

So is Abrahamian an apologist pro-Shah, spouting nonsense, etc.?
Here's what Stephen Kinzer, of the CIA expose All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror has to say:
"A small but dedicated group of scholars has devoted considerable effort to uncovering the truth about events surrounding the 1953 coup. Most persistent among them is Mark J. Gasiorowski, who has become the group's unofficial dean. Other who have accompanied him on his mission of discovery include Erband Abrahamian, Fakhreddin Azimi, James A. Bill, ...." etc. (p.xi) --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:52, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Here's another endorcement: "Iran between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian (Princeton 1982), [is] by far the fullest and most professional treatment that we have of Iranian history from the turn of the century until 1978." Roy Mottahedeh , The Mantle of the Prophet : Religion and Politics in Iran, One World, Oxford, 1985, 2000, p.391)

I hope everyone, especially Creazysuit, will bear in mind it is possible for Mossadegh to have been a great man, an Iranian hero, a victim of foreign conspiracy, and at the same time to have made mistakes, to have done things that were less than democratic and less than wise. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:38, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

no matter how you decid to cut it, iran has not had a true national government since the time of the hakhamaneshid. neither the shah or mossadegh or the bastard mullahs have any sense of national pride. mossadegh wasnt elected by the people for the people of iran are divisable by too many different groups. in contrast mossadegh cant possibly have been a nationalist for all he cared for is rebellion against western imperialism. at least the shah tried to redeam national pride by collection money for the national product. he denounced all turkish mongolian arabic thought and followed through with aryan white thoughts so that he can gain power in the global field. his argument was were starters of the western thoughts, they created themselves based on what we achieved what happend to those ideas they use and are forgotton by us. the man began gaining power and raising prices on the imperialist and they had him killed and we all sit here calling mossadegh a nationalist. the opposers of the shah are nothing but turkish and mongolian savages that ate raw meat up untill 6 century. as muslim idiots glaze themselves in praying to a god thats interpreted himself in three different religions, the shah was on the verge of denouncing islam as the official religion and having the religios figures killed since they control all the savage turks and mongols that exist in the country sides of iran. for a someone so accredited as mossadegh you would think he would sit down and coexist with the shah but his views of islam had him thinking that socialism is the way..... capitalism wins, and no matter how you cut it nothings stronger then a mans greed. that was the downfall of all controllers of iran except for koroush e kabir and darush e bozorg —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.250.9.147 (talk) 04:18, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

Spelling: Mosaddeq, Mossadeq, Mossadegh, or Mosaddegh?

~~Google search survey:~~

40,700 for Mohammed Mosaddeq

86,000 for Mohammed Mossadeq

78,400 for Mohammed Mossadegh

2,010 for Mohammed Mosaddegh
21,800 for Mohammad Mosaddeq

157,000 for Mohammad Mossadeq

71,800 for Mohammad Mossadegh

4,950 for Mohammad Mosaddegh

Proposed name change

~~I propose changing the title of the article to Mohammed Mossadeq~~ --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:38, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

I'm not sure if I'm the best person to comment about it (I'm not good when it comes to liguistics), but let me say I'm surprised. As this is an Iranian person, I expected "Mohammad" to be used for his first name, not "Mohammed" (which is the way Arabs write this name in English). Then again, as there is a tashdid on the "d" of his family name, I expected "Mosaddeq" or its variants to be used more commonly.

I guess my predictions are wrong, because most of the tens of thousands of times his name was found by Google belong to texts written by non-Iranians who don't know the exact Persian pronounciation of his name.

A valid resolution to this debate could be to check how his name was spelled in his passport but I don't think there is access to it (easily).

Anyways, it appears that the proposal is based on good grounds, but I'm not sure if we should proceed with it. huji—TALK 17:17, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

~~After doing more google searches I hereby revise my title change to Mohammad Mossadeq~~ --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:20, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

I agree with almost all statements by Huji. In particular "Mohammed", as opposed to "Mohammad", is just utter nonsense as the name of an Iranian; no living being in Iran recognises "Mohammed" as name of a human being. As for "Mossadeq", Huji is absolutely right. I think for the time being we can rely on the spellings used by two of the top experts on Mosaddeq, namely Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne who use "Mohammad Mosaddeq". See here: [3]. I say 'for the time being', because it remains to be determined whether one has to use "q" or "gh". --BF 17:19, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

Through most of the article, his name is spelled "Mohammad," but in the title it is spelled "Mohammed." At the very least, this inconsistency should fixed. -- 24.147.190.194 (talk) 17:17, 31 May 2008 (UTC)

Proposed last name stay-the-same

I just noticed that the US Library of Congress also uses Mosaddeq, Mohammad, so I hereby withdraw my proposal to change the name of the article. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:16, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

Change from Mohammed to the proper Mohammad

The name of this article should be changed from the incorrect Mohammed to the proper Persian pronounciation Mohammad. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.96.118.214 (talk) 18:09, 13 February 2009 (UTC)

"... loss of support among Shia clerics and the traditional middle class"

From the lead:

Among many in Iran and abroad, Mosaddeq is known as a hero of Third World anti-imperialism, and victim of imperialist greed for Iran's oil.^[13] However a number of scholars and historians believe that alongside the plotting of the UK and US, a major factor in his overthrow was Mossadeq’s loss of support among Shia clerics and the traditional middle class,^{[dubious – discuss]}

I propose the "dubious" label be removed.

Evidence for loss of Mossadegh support among Iranians

Because this is such a controversial subject I've gone to the trouble to type out text from several sources to answer the question:

Quoting Amin Saikal:
The British blockade of Iranian oil and that country's intervening actions for Mossadeq's downfall resulted in serious economic hardship and polarization of Iranians into pro- and anti-Mossadeq forces. The anti-Mossedeq forces were centered around the monarchy, which had the support of a large section of the armed forces. The situation worsened when, amid increasing unrest inside and outside the Majlis, Mossedeq attempted to take over the constitutional position of the Shah as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rule by emergency powers legitimized by a referendum and bypass the reponsiblity of the Majlis. He thus isolated himself from some of the close colleagues, including Seyyed Abol Qazem Kashani, the speaker of the Majlis, and laid himself open to criticism of dictatorial rule, inviting a direct confrontation between his government and conservative forces." (Saikal, Amin, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.43-4)

Quoting Ervand Abrahamian:
"The easy success of this coup can be explained by two factors, the widening gap between the traditional and middle classes within the National Front; and the incraseing alienation of the whole officer corps from the civilian administration." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.273-4)