Talk:Mind–body problem/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

1st commentary

For a discussion of one of ontology's most important and notoriously difficult questions, this article is distressingly short. Unfortunately I'm not qualified to do this subject justice, but I do think it needs beefing up.

It is very short, and doesn't even mention any of the modern debate such as Kim's pairing problem. I think that until it is updated it should be pointed out that the article lacks a lot of information on the issue. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.145.187.185 (talk) 21:17, 6 March 2011 (UTC)

Couldn't this article be merged with Dualism (philosophy of mind)? Fledgeaaron (talk) 15:45, 14 December 2007 (UTC)

Merge with Philosophy of Mind?

This article has about as much content in it as the sub-section "the mind body problem" in the philosophy of mind article. The problem really isn't all that complex (in so far as the question itself is pretty straight forward - mind, body, are they connected?), and the answer is deeply tied in with the philosophy of mind, so much so that having its own page just to state the question doesn't seem necessary, and it's own page to discuss possible answers would make it indistinguishable from the philosophy of mind article. 63.139.220.200 (talk) 16:36, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

In summary it is all rubbish thus far and will be one day explained in simple pathways and not in conflicting parables and esoteric nonsensicalism. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.43.25.215 (talk) 00:10, 1 May 2009 (UTC)

Agreed. Merge. 1Z (talk) 08:34, 20 August 2009 (UTC) It doesn't make any sense to merge. The topic is important on its own and there are many sources that can be used to expand the article.--Sum (talk) 09:19, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

What is there to the mind-body problem that is not already in the philosophy of mind. If there were no MBP, there would be no PoM. 1Z (talk) 03:36, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Materialism useful for computer science!?

This article basically says that materialism is a useful approach for computer science. I'm only an undergrad computer science student, but I must say, that's gonna need better support than just the fact that some random person wrote a book about it! I could just as easily claim that a supernaturalistic approach is useful for computer science because it's a useful model for understanding admin powers. (i.e. they're Godlike) --Nerd42 (talk) 20:38, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Why title change?

Why was this changed from dichotomy to problem? I would have fought the change. Anyone else? BashBrannigan (talk) 22:11, 4 November 2010 (UTC)

Today is the first time I've looked at the article, but my suspicion is that it was change to indicate that this is a contentious issue. Saying that there is a mind-body "dichotomy" implies that there is a separation, but the whole point of the article is to present the fact that there is no consensus on whether such a separation really exists. For my own part, I don't think "problem" is a good name, but I do think it's better than "dichotomy." Carychan (talk) 08:09, 9 December 2010 (UTC)

I don't know about elsewhere, but it is taught in philosophy courses as the "mind-body problem," not dichotomy, as it is a question into the problem of how the mind and body interact. -- Charles Stover 19:03, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

A complicated issue to explain and to understand why Xqbot did it

To summarize:

• problem vs dichotomy, at the previous section: Why title change?.
• Dualism (philosophy of mind) : To merge or not to merge with it ?
• Philosophy of mind, Template:Philosophy of mind with: Portal · Category · Task Force · Discussion

Now, I've to explain it, to you .. ( and we have to understand why Xqbot did this ) :

two kinds of hyphen & sustitution by Xqbot, 23:06, 20 February 2010

Comparing the edition by User:Snalwibma, 11:05, 2 April 2009
with next one, of 23:06, 20 February 2010 (edit) (undo) Xqbot ::::::::::::::::: m (Robot: Fixing double redirect to Mind–body dichotomy)
It really was a nearly invisible change of one char for another, that looks like the same char. It's the character (hyphen) between Mind and body at these (next) two links.
I mean, that here there are two kinds of hyphens ( the 1st is longer than the 2nd one; I've checked it at a word-processing prgrm with large/big letters/characters ).

• Mind–body dichotomy versus
• Mind-body dichotomy

Click here and you can see the change made by User:Xqbot.

• If you haven't understood to myself. (I repeat, again) I mean that this two chars ( – ) versus ( - ) are different. If you want you may check this afirmation of mine.
  And the main subject/problem is this: Why User:Xqbot changed Mind-body dichotomy to Mind–body dichotomy ?. --PLA y Grande Covián (talk) 04:41, 30 December 2010 (UTC)

I see, too ( ...and, I know the cause it's the same again: hyphens ) :

Failure

current text fails to convey the degree to which Cartesian duality is considered a primitive error of language, judgment, and sophistication. The very usage

Dualism is the theory that mind and body are two distinct substances, and monism is the theory that mind and body are, in reality, just one substance.

pholgisticates, substantiating the duality. Dualism and Monism are not theories. They are metaphysical notions/preconceptions. A general overhaul of the article to reflect the contemporary intellectual niveau is called for here. 72.228.177.92 (talk) 14:36, 20 December 2011 (UTC)

Advices on information arrangement

Information on this page seems quite disorganized. The list of relevant topics, works, and people on the right side does not make it clearer. For instance, Baruch Spinoza is on the list, but the whole article does not indicate why he is on that list, what is his role in the Mind-body problem.

Secondly, like it has been addressed above, this article provides insufficient information. For example, there are five aspects including Monism, Dualism, Psychophysical parallelism, double aspectism, and epiphenomenalism rather than just Monism and Dualism.

Lastly, the Mind-body problem is one of the most important questions in Psychology. Instead of relating to philosophy, it should be more prone to the field of psychology. It needs at least to be linked to the article "History of psychology". Ywan11 (talk) 07:59, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

I thoroughly agree with what appears to be a major theme of this talk page in that this article is lacking a lot of useful information. Including the five aspects listed by Ywan11 above would be an excellent improvement. Since the three main versions of monism are so distinct, it is important to break those out separately as the article already does. I gave an effort toward improving the article by elaborating on these three different forms of monism. Here's my edit:

More specifically, physicalists maintain that mental experience is the illusory consequence of complex brain activity and so everything is contained within the physical realm, whereas idealists maintain that observation of all things physical is the illusory consequence of mental activity (as happens in a dream) and so everything is contained within the mental realm. Neutral monists take the view that mind and matter are both illusory, and are reducible to a third, neutral substance.

Well that got reverted today by BashBrannigan with the stated reason being:

"Reverting because not sourced and because use of the term "illusory" is a distortion of the position."

I saw nothing controversial in what I had added. Certainly any statement can be debated (especially among philosophers) but a primary utility of this encyclopedia is to communicate basic concepts. To delete useful information because someone out there might challenge it is a disservice to the general public that is looking for the basic understanding. And if anything I added was indeed a distortion, then I see it to be far more productive to make a correction to that instead of wiping it all out. If the word "illusory" is really a sticking point, then lets find a better word. As for wanting a source, consider this section on Physicalism. The entire section has no source cited. Yet I see it to be a very useful addition to the article.--Tdadamemd (talk) 11:23, 17 July 2012 (UTC)

Instead of "illusory", I will suggest the term "derivative" as being more broadly acceptable. Here is the proposed change:

More specifically, physicalists maintain that mental experience is derivative, such as arising from complex brain activity, and so everything is contained within the physical realm, whereas idealists maintain that observation of all things physical is derivative of mental activity (similar to a dream) and so everything is contained within the mental realm. Neutral monists take the view that mind and matter are both derivative, and are reducible to a third, neutral substance.

As for wanting references, here is one. And here is another reference, with this one saying that one realm is "a species" of the other.--Tdadamemd (talk) 21:40, 18 July 2012 (UTC)

Philosophy of Mind is a much better article on the mind-body problem... In terms of the physical realm and the mental realm... absent a third realm... the dichotomy of Cartesian substance dualism derives from I know not what?—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 14:52, 19 July 2012 (UTC)

pre-Aristotelian philosophers

The short third paragraph refers to "pre-Aristotelian philosophers" and provides footnotes to two essays, one by Young and one by Robinson. Although Robinson describes Aristotle's positions, I find the only mention of any pre-Aristotelian philosophers is Young's single phrase "invoking pre-Aristotelian, i.e., atomic, concepts", and in fact, Young does not really go into Aristotle, but emphasizes Descartes.

Therefore I have removed pre- in this discussion and moved the Young footnote to refer to Descartes Brews ohare (talk) 15:57, 2 October 2012 (UTC)

The entire thing is a paraphrase of Young and, obviously, there's a difference between "pre" and not-"pre" Aristotelian philosophers. Apparently, you're dropping the "pre", as well as Young, based on your own WP:OR. Once again, the changes have been reverted. Please stop edit warring to push your OR.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:40, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

My explanation above is complete and accurate. Young was not dropped, but made a citation for Descartes, and the citation was filled in by myself to refer to the actual book where it appears instead of being only a url to Young's web site which leaves the wrong impression that this source is not reputable. You have removed this useful bibliographic material in your reversion.

I am upset that you think I am pushing OR. So far as I can see there is no evidence of OR on my part. I simply changed pre-Aristotelian to Aristotelian, because there is no discussion of earlier work on the mind-body problem in either Robinson or Young. Brews ohare (talk) 13:55, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

Distinguished dualists of the past

The following introduction has been removed for lack of relevance, OR and POV. Please see WP:LEAD. Relevant new material goes in the body of the article.

The dualist standpoint has a distinguished past, including Descartes, Kant, Popper, Bohr and others. A general term for these various views is epistemological pluralism, of which one branch is interactive dualism, the view that although there are two realms, the mind and the body, they interact while preserving some mutual autonomy. The most extreme view is that of Bohr, which holds that the two realms are different, incompatible views of reality, both of which are valid but different descriptions in what he terms a complementary relationship, an analogy to his work on complementarity. The effect of observation of mental states upon the states being observed has been noticed by other writers as well.

References

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:17, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

Bohr

p. 457 ff: "This page left intentionally blank". Part V, "SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE", begins on p. 458, (for 117 pages).

Selection from p. 34, (Nature, April 1, 1933, p. 457): On one hand, the wonderful features which are constantly revealed in physiological investigations and differ so strikingly from what is known of inorganic matter, have led many biologists to doubt that a real understanding of the nature of life is possible on a purely physical basis. On the other hand, this view, often known as vitalism, scarcely finds its proper expression in the old supposition that a peculiar vital force, quite unknown to physics, governs all organic life.

Northoff

No page given for the "rather extended discussion".

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:31, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: The paragraph introduces some aspects of dualism, which otherwise is missing entirely from the introduction. As such the paragraph establishes a NPOV which the introduction otherwise lacks because apart from mentioning the possibility of dualism, it dwells upon monism.

You have objected to the references provided to dualist exposition, in particular to Northoff as providing no page number. This book extensively discusses the mind-body problem as its title Philosophy of the Brain suggests, so restricting reference to a particular page is unwarranted. If you would like a quote, here is Northoff suggesting a dualist position putting the brain and the mind in separation:

""Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective. In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective. The Third-Person Perspective focuses on other persons and thus on the neuronal states of others' brain while excluding the own brain. In contrast, the First-Person Perspective could potentially provide epistemic access to own brain...However, the First-Person Perspective provides access only to the own mental states but not to the own brain and its neuronal states." Georg Northoff, Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem, p. 5

Likewise, the article by Nobel Prize winner Niels Bohr, contains this passage relevant to his view that complementarity is introduced by the disturbance of the observed by the act of observation, making mind and brain mutually exclusive descriptions:

""For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will is to be considered as a feature of conscious life which corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity."...

"...On the contrary, the recognition of the limitation of mechanical concepts in atomic physics would rather seem suited to conciliate the apparently contrasting viewpoints of physiology and psychology. Indeed, the necessity of considering the interaction between the measuring instruments and the object under investigation in atomic mechanics exhibits a close analogy to the peculiar difficulties in psychological analysis arising from the fact that the mental content is invariably altered when the attention is concentrated on any special feature of it." -Niels Bohr: Light and Life pp. 457 ff

I fail to see anything untoward in presenting these important views in the introduction. Their omission curtails the presentation of dualism unnecessarily, and this material should be reinstated. Brews ohare (talk) 14:18, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

Plato's views

The description of the soul in this section appears contradictory to, or at least a great oversimplification of that topic as described by Lorentz. In any event, this discussion fails to connect with other views of the body-mind problem. Brews ohare (talk) 19:45, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

A proposal for the sub-section on Dualism

Dualism emphasizes the difference between mind and matter and says the mind is not only not the same thing as the brain, but may not be wholly a product of the brain. The dualist standpoint has a distinguished past, including Descartes, Kant, Popper, Bohr and others. A general term for these various views is epistemological pluralism, of which one branch is interactive dualism, the view that although there are two realms, the mind and the body, they interact while preserving some mutual autonomy. The most extreme view is that of Bohr, which holds that the two realms are different, incompatible views of reality, both of which are valid but different descriptions in what he terms a complementary relationship, an analogy to his work on complementarity:

"...On the contrary, the recognition of the limitation of mechanical concepts in atomic physics would rather seem suited to conciliate the apparently contrasting viewpoints of physiology and psychology. Indeed, the necessity of considering the interaction between the measuring instruments and the object under investigation in atomic mechanics exhibits a close analogy to the peculiar difficulties in psychological analysis arising from the fact that the mental content is invariably altered when the attention is concentrated on any special feature of it." -Niels Bohr: Light and Life pp. 457 ff

The effect of observation of mental states upon the states being observed has been noticed by other writers as well:

"Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective. In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective. The Third-Person Perspective focuses on other persons and thus on the neuronal states of others' brain while excluding the own brain. In contrast, the First-Person Perspective could potentially provide epistemic access to own brain...However, the First-Person Perspective provides access only to the own mental states but not to the own brain and its neuronal states." -Georg Northoff, Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem, p. 5

These observations are echoed by experimentalists studying brain function:

"...it is important to be clear about exactly what experience one wants one's subjects to introspect. Of course, explaining to subjects exactly what the experimenter wants them to experience can bring its own problems–...instructions to attend to a particular internally generated experience can easily alter both the timing and he content of that experience and even whether or not it is consciously experienced at all." -Susan Pockett, The neuroscience of movement

Plato, Kant, Popper and Duhem have drawn attention to a third realm to be considered: what might be called the world of forms, an ideal realm accessible to the mind but not to experiment, for example, mathematics. Popper calls this the "third world", and Duhem calls it "economy of thought", suggesting it is an expression of how humans grasp complexity:

"Such condensing of a multitude of laws into a small number of principles affords enormous relief to the human mind, which might not be able without such an artifice to store up the new wealth it acquires daily" -Pierre Duhem The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory

References

More could be said. Any suggestions about this?

In addition, another section on the Libet experiments and their successors and their interpretation, and the notions of emergence and their attempts to bridge the gap between mind and body should be discussed. Brews ohare (talk) 20:26, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

What is the mind-body problem?

Unless I'm missing it, the article doesn't actually address what the mind-body problem *is*, outside of the single sentence, "The problem arises because of the fact that mental phenomena appear to be qualitatively and substantially different from the physical bodies on which they appear to depend." It mostly just defines dualism and monism. It heavily needs more emphasis on the mind-body problem itself. "They're made of different substances." So what? That in itself is a statement and not necessarily a problem. The problem arises when questioning how the two "substances" supposedly interact, and the article does not really cover that at all. -- Charles Stover 03:31, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

The article is pointless, it should redirect to philosophy of mind. 1Z (talk) 03:34, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

I disagree. This topic in particular took up a large amount of the Philosophy course I took. Sub-categories deserve their own articles, especially when they are large and important, like this one. There are many things to discuss in "philosophy of mind." The mind-body problem is a very specific topic that has a lot of content in and of itself. -- Charles Stover 19:01, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Or a redirect to dualism (philosophy of mind) instead, since the mind-body problem presupposes dualism and is discussed at length in that article. This article is basically a dicdef for a synonym. ˉˉ^anetode╦╩ 20:39, 27 February 2011 (UTC)

Charles: Unlike many other articles such as Reality and Ethics, Mind-body problem does not use the leading sentence to define the subject of the article. It would be very simple to make the lead sentence something like: "The mind-body problem is the question of the relation between the mind and the body." That would be a major advance over the present leading sentence "The mind-body problem is a philosophical problem arising in the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of mind." This present leading sentence suffers from defining a particular problem as belonging to the class of philosophy problems, which fails to distinguish the mind-body problem from thousands of others, and also is incorrect, too restrictive, because the mind-body problem also is a scientific problem studied in everything from neuroscience to behavioral psychology. Brews ohare (talk) 12:30, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

The mind body problem: lead sentence

I have made the lead sentence:

"The mind-body problem refers to the relation between conscious mental activity such as judgment, volition, and emotion and the underlying physical plant that supports this activity, consisting primarily of the brain (seen as a complex of neurons, synapses and their dynamic interactions), but also involving various sensors throughout the body, most notably the eye, ear, mouth, and nose."

It seems to me that this is preferable to what was there earlier, namely:

"The mind-body problem is a philosophical problem arising in the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of mind."

My reason for this preference is that saying a particular problem (the mind-body problem) is an example of a philosophical problem does not appear to me to be illuminating. In addition, the mind-body problem is not restricted to philosophy, but is discussed by scientists as well, for example, neurologists. Brews ohare (talk) 15:47, 2 October 2012 (UTC)

It does not "seem preferable" to me, it introduces a major POV problem, as I indicated in my edit summary. Typically one does specify in the lead that it's a philosophical problem as opposed to some other kind of problem. It's unclear what you mean by "restricted to philosophy", as if that has no relevance to science, but it's certainly not a neurology article.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:36, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: the sentence "The mind-body problem is a philosophical problem arising in the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of mind." is not only meaningless, telling us nothing about what this particular problem is about, but it also incorrectly restricts the scope of the problem by limiting it to a philosophical issue when it also is a scientific issue. It is disingenuous to say philosophy has "relevance to science"; the two fields are distinct and their methodologies differ.

What is needed as a leading sentence is an actual definition of the mind-body problem. The proposed language:

"The mind-body problem refers to the relation between conscious mental activity such as judgment, volition, and emotion and the underlying physical plant that supports this activity, consisting primarily of the brain (seen as a complex of neurons, synapses and their dynamic interactions), but also involving various sensors throughout the body, most notably the eye, ear, mouth, and nose."

may not be ideal, but some version of definition is highly appropriate.

Other articles that do define their topics with their leading sentence are:

• "Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior."
• "In philosophy, reality is the state of things as they actually exist, rather than as they may appear or might be imagined."

The proposed leading sentence doesn't presuppose a particular stance on the relation between mind and body and does not violate the goal of a NPOV. It allows that mind and body are the same or different. I don't think anyone would suggest that mind e.g. volition and judgment does not exist, nor that body e.g. brain does not exist. If either is nonexistent, there is no mind-body problem. It is their relationship that is at question. Perhaps you have more to say on this matter? Brews ohare (talk) 13:41, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

BTW, I'd add here that because the mind-body problem is approached both from a philosophical viewpoint and from a scientific viewpoint, the definition adopted should be compatible with both disciplines, and not emphasize one over the other. Brews ohare (talk) 14:36, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

Meaningless? Brews ohare, ignoring NPOV in favor of your incompetently scientistic OR is not an option.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 21:01, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: I fail to see how changing the lead sentence constitutes "incompetently scieintistic OR". Perhaps a simple alternative like

"The mind-body problem is the question of the relation between mind and body."

would suit you? It has the advantage of (i) being specific about what problem this is, and (ii) not restricting the problem to philosophy, which is too narrow as this problem also is of interest to various sciences, notably neuroscience. Brews ohare (talk) 12:37, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

Background section

At the moment the article singles out Plato for discussion. That seems arbitrary. One might propose a Background section that treats some other thinkers. For example, consider the following as a sketch of such a section:

----------------------------

Background

The following is a very brief accounting of some contributions to the mind-body problem. Links are provided to find more detail.

Plato

See also: Plato and Theory of forms

Plato(429–347 B.C.E.) argued that, as the body is from the material world, the soul is from the world of ideas and is thus immortal. He believed the soul was temporarily united with the body and would only be separated at death, when it would return to the world of Forms. Since the soul does not exist in time and space, as the body does, it can access universal truths.

For Plato, ideas (or Forms) are the true reality, and are experienced by the soul. The body is for Plato empty in that it can not access the abstract reality of the world; it can only experience shadows. This is determined by Plato's essentially rationalistic epistemology.

Aristotle

Main article: Aristotle

For Aristotle(384–322 BC) mind is a faculty of the soul. Regarding the soul, he said:

“It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. For even if one and being are spoken of in several ways, what is properly so spoken of is the actuality” (De Anima ii 1, 412b6–9)

In sum, Aristotle saw the relation between soul and body as uncomplicated, in the same way that it is uncomplicated that a cubical shape is a property of a toy building block. The soul is a property exhibited by the body, one among many. Moreover, Aristotle proposed that when the body perishes, so does the soul, just as the shape of a building block disappears with destruction of the block.

Descartes

Main article: René Descartes

A famous statement of Descartes(1596–1650) is "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am):

"I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (Med. 2, AT 7:25)

His posited relation between mind and body is called Descartian dualism. He held that mind was distinct from matter, but could influence matter. Just how this causal relationship was exerted remains a contentious issue for all dualists, even today.

Kant

Main article: Immanuel Kant

For Kant(1724–1804) beyond mind and matter there exists a world of a priori forms, analogous to Plato's forms, some of which, space and time being examples, are pre-programmed in the brain.

Huxley

Main article: Thomas Huxley

For Huxley(1825-1895) the conscious mind was a by-product of the brain that has no influence upon the brain, a so-called epiphenomenon.

Bohr

Main article: Niels Bohr

For Bohr(1885–1962) mind and body are complementary descriptions, that is, both are valid but disjoint. His views were arrived at as an analogy to complementarity in quantum mechanics. Observation of a mental state by necessity disturbs the state observed, changing it. Therefore, the observation of a mental state is an introspective act that escapes the customary detached view of an uninvolved observer. The best that can be done is to observe neurological activity that is correlated with a mental state, but establishing causality in either direction is impossible in principle.

Popper

Main article: Karl Popper

For Popper (1902-1994) introduced three aspects of the mind-body problem: the worlds of mind, matter, and of the creations of the mind, such as mathematics. In his view, the third-world creations of the mind could be interpreted by the second-world mind and used to affect the first-world of matter. An example might be radio, an example of the interpretation of the third-world (Maxwell's electromagnetic theory) by the second-world mind to suggest modifications of the external first world.

Summary

It can be seen that there are some close parallels between these various thinkers, with differences in emphasis. There is agreement that there are phenomena that we call mind, and there is a neurological system or body that includes the brain. There obviously also are abstractions used by the mind that range from the intuitive notions of time and space to more complex creations like mathematics, that can be related to the world of matter sometimes, but not necessarily. It remains an unanswered quest of science and philosophy to relate these features of our experience.

----------------------------

Perhaps separate headers are not necessary for each thinker. And certainly the summaries can be improved. The question is whether something like this should be added, or whether the subsection on Plato should be treated differently. Brews ohare (talk) 14:41, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

Reorganization

To clarify the structure of this article, I've introduced headers to separate its sections. I have moved all the discussion of Monism into its own section, and likewise Dualism. This reorganization underlines the paucity of the treatment of Dualism.

I also have introduced the least controversial lead sentence that I can think of that actually defines the mind-body problem.

By breaking up the article with headers, it becomes clear that this article barely scratches the surface, with many topics omitted and many too briefly explored.

I hope that some discussion will ensue, rather than wholesale reversion of what is not a change of content, but just its arrangement. Brews ohare (talk) 16:47, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

Machine Elf: In this reversion, you undid all the headers in this version of Mind-body problem, which were introduced to break the article into subsections. You made the in-line comment "rv per objections on talk". However, I cannot find your discussion of these headers on this Talk page.

The only talk page addition you made is here (Revision as of 20:32, 3 October 2012), which addresses only the leading sentence:

"The mind-body problem is the scientific and philosophical problem of relating the mind to the body."

and characterizes this definition as "incompetently scientistic OR". That is all you have said, not really helpful, nor correct.

Your previous Talk page addition made here (Revision as of 02:31, 3 October 2012) predates the reorganization described on this Talk page, and is an old complaint that you could not find the relevance of sources cited in a proposed section on Dualism, a separate matter, later fixed, and one that does not come up here as that entire discussion has been dropped from the version being discussed now.

Nowhere have you suggested why your recent reversion was made, or what objections you have to breaking the material in Mind-body problem into sub-sections with the appropriate headers.

Perhaps you intended to discuss these matters, but forgot to save your comments? Brews ohare (talk) 00:30, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

FYI, as mentioned above, the only changes in the version under discussion are rearrangements of pre-existing text, with the exception of the first two sentences. I do not subscribe to this text, which I think is poor, but I wanted to avoid any controversy over content. Brews ohare (talk) 00:50, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

Brews ohare, you categorized the changes in question. That you don't understand is consistent with your argument that the lead is "meaningless". You appear to be effusively engaged in a POV dispute at Talk:Free will, which is spilling over here: 12:43, 4 October 2012 (→‎See also)—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 20:05, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: There is no way that a reorganization of the content of Mind-body problem into sections with their own headers has any relation to any discussion about the content of what was rearranged (all pre-existing), either here or elsewhere. Brews ohare (talk) 13:48, 5 October 2012 (UTC)

Bohr's views on causality

MachineElf: I won't quarrel with your revisions of the section Free will#Causality with the exception of the deletion of all reference to Bohr. With the in-line comment Bohr wasn't even remotely speaking to the mind-body problem, the following material was deleted from the article:

Bohr questioned the everyday ideas of causality:

"...any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description." -Neils Bohr: The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature

Bohr considered these reservations might apply in trying to explain the connection between mental and physical events in terms of observation altering what is observed:

"...On the contrary, the recognition of the limitation of mechanical concepts in atomic physics would rather seem suited to conciliate the apparently contrasting viewpoints of physiology and psychology. Indeed, the necessity of considering the interaction between the measuring instruments and the object under investigation in atomic mechanics exhibits a close analogy to the peculiar difficulties in psychological analysis arising from the fact that the mental content is invariably altered when the attention is concentrated on any special feature of it." –Niels Bohr, Light and Life

References

I find your reason Bohr wasn't even remotely speaking to the mind-body problem at variance with these quotations from Bohr. The first quotation refers to the notion of complementarity and makes the point that "any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description", that is, that normal ideas of cause and effect are vitiated by the disturbance of the observed by the observation. The second quote applies this observation to the mind-body problem, making the "analogy to the peculiar difficulties in psychological analysis arising from the fact that the mental content is invariably altered when the attention is concentrated on any special feature of it". Bohr's remarks intend to "conciliate the apparently contrasting viewpoints of physiology and psychology" (that is, body and mind).

My impression is that you have misread the quotations provided inasmuch as they contradict your conclusion that Bohr wasn't even remotely speaking to the mind-body problem. The full sources make Bohr's relevance even clearer. Brews ohare (talk) 14:02, 6 October 2012 (UTC) See also this summary. Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

Brews ohare, I haven't edited the Free will article, this the article on the Mind-body problem. If the "CZ" article you recently created is any indication, you don't know what that is. Also, the last 500 edits to the "CZ" Free will article are almost entirely yours. I think your WP:TENDENTIOUS editing and incompetence (or willingness to misrepresent numerous sources) in combination with this sort of self-serving promotion is a serious issue:

• User:Brews ohare 12:51, 6 October 2012 (Undid revision 516259218 by Machine Elf 1735 (talk) This material originated on CZ and that has to be acknowledged regardless of who put it there)

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 14:20, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: I understand you wish to escalate our discussion to the level of an administrative issue, which is hardly necessary. You have adopted the gist of my Mind-body problem#Causality section which indicates we are capable of some progress. Vague accusations of incompetence and misrepresentation of sources with absolutely no backing are poor substitutes for discussion. I have no qualms about my contributions to CZ, although I fail to see what that has to do with this WP article, which discussion stands on its own merits.

You have responded in no way to my suggestion here that Bohr's views be presented. Brews ohare (talk) 14:40, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

Why repeat myself? It's not my problem if you want to pretend I didn't read it.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 16:56, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

To repeat what you have said: "Bohr wasn't even remotely speaking to the mind-body problem", which remark is clearly wide of the mark and contradictory of what Bohr himself has said on this matter. Brews ohare (talk) 17:25, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

Quit lying. Bohr wasn't even remote speaking to the mind-body problem in the section you quoted on the page cited. Later he very briefly alludes to a strictly materialist, yet somehow non-eliminativist, psychophysical parallelism. However, that was explicitly tangential, so much so that he wasn't even concerned to elaborate on how the observer effect "analogy" might actually address it. Perhaps that's why you don't provide the relevant quote and page number.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 08:31, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

Goldenberg quote

This quote from Goldenberg introduced with the observation that it directly addresses the topic of this article (which is neither Causality nor Free will is concerned with "providing a bridge across the mind-body cleavage". Although quite an extensive quote, it contains nothing substantial about this bridge, which further reading of the article shows is argued to be the study of apraxia, that is, the defective control of motor actions. The quote does not identify this thesis and certainly does nothing to support it.

I suggest that the quote be removed or replaced with another quote and further explanation that actually contributes some understanding to the subject of mind-body interactions. Brews ohare (talk) 14:38, 9 October 2012 (UTC)

The quote has no introduction and my edit summary said: "replace WP:OR with a quote that directly addresses the topic of this article (which is neither Causality nor Free will)". Chapter 7 of the source you provided is describing a hot topic in cognitive science: "Proponents of this approach have expressed the hope that it will ultimately dissolve the Cartesian divide between the immaterial mind and the material existence of human beings... A topic that seems particularly promising for providing a bridge across the mind-body cleavage is the study of bodily actions, which are neither reflexive reactions to external stimuli nor indications of mental states..." and following a detailed description... "Immitation, communicative gesturing, and tool use are examples of these kinds of actions."

You claim that's not substantial and Chapter 7, "How the Mind Moves the Body: Lessons From Apraxia" is, in fact, just about the study of apraxia? Apparently your further reading didn't include the next paragraph: "In this chapter, I argue that the concept of apraxia has been developed with the explicit aim to bridge the border separating the immaterial mind from the material body and that the desire to bridge this cleavage continues to shape modern accounts of apraxia."–Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 12:06, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: You mistake my meaning. I did not say this chapter was irrelevant, but that the quotation provided did not convey useful information, or even present the thesis of the author. You might notice the word apraxia doesn't even show up in the quotation, only in the title identifying where the quotation came from. The reader should be able to get the drift from the presentation in the article without reading the chapter for themselves. They should not be obliged to "read the next paragraph". Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

I didn't claim you said "this chapter was irrelevant", but don't let that stop you from repeating yourself ad nauseum...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:42, 11 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: Can you direct your attention and comments to the point here which is that the quotation is inadequate to convey the gist of the author's position? Brews ohare (talk) 16:23, 12 October 2012 (UTC)

I think the author's intro would be far better than fixating on some otiose detail of apraxia, but you can always try.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:21, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

Need for a segue

The section on causality begins with a couple of sentences introducing the topic of mind-body interactions. It then describes at some length Descartes' ideas about how the mind influences the brain via the pineal gland. At that point it jumps to a discussion of Aristotle's formulation of four types of causality.

To me, this jump into ancient views of causality appears unrelated to the discussion of mind-body interaction, and requires a segue that suggests we need to digress for a moment. Such a segue has been attempted twice and both attempts reversed by MachineElf.

• The first attempt was a simple sentence:

"Some suggest that a broader notion of causality applies to the mind-body problem, recommending a return to earlier notions. For example, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), proposed ..."

This rather simple segue was reverted with the in-line statement WP:SYN & WP:UNDUE, despite the fact that the entire reason for introducing Avicenna in the first place is the subsequent quote from Northoff that applies Avicenna to the mind-body problem.

On revisiting this proposal, I believe a better wording would be as follows:

"Some suggest that a broader notion of causality applies to the mind-body problem, recommending a return to earlier notions. Such notions were described by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), who proposed ..."

• The second attempt at a segue included a quotation, intended to motivate the subsequent digression upon types of causality:

What is "mental causation"? Some suggest that the everyday concept of causation is inadequate for its description:

"The nonconcious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones."¹

— Roy F Baumeister et al., Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation

Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), proposed...

References

1. Roy F Baumeister, Matthew T Galliot, Dianne M Tice (2008). "Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation". In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh, Peter M. Gollwitzer, eds (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Human Action (Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 489. ISBN 0195309987. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

This attempted segue was reverted with the on-line edit WP:SYN don't inject an anachronistic seguy / the misleading quote wasn't spread across 18 pages, ff was just sloppy & rude / don't beg the question by rhetorically asking the reader and failing to disclose an expected answer

I cannot pretend to understand this in-line comment. First, the segue is not WP:SYN as I understand that guideline. Second, I do not understand how this remark is "sloppy & rude". Third, the segue does not "beg the question", it introduces the question of types of causality.

Two straightforward attempts at a segue have been removed without any proposal for a substitute. They have been removed with in-line comments that are (to me) confusing and misplaced. Can't we come up with an acceptable segue? Brews ohare (talk) 15:47, 9 October 2012 (UTC)

Your first "attempt", LOL, "a simple sentence", vague and misleading... why would I revert that on the basis of WP:SYN and WP:UNDUE "despite the fact" that the entire section was just background for what you wanted Northoff to say at the end? Well, Northoff isn't talking about Avicenna, and Avicenna is neither suggesting "that a broader notion of causality applies to the mind-body problem" nor "recommending a return to earlier notions". So replacing "For example" with "Such notions were described by" is an improvement, but instead of bloating the awkward section once again, why not just drop Avicenna, put that material under Aristotle and create a chronologically appropriate Northoff section with the rest of the Causality material?

Nonetheless, you're carrying on about your "second attempt" being "deleted" and you're dumbfounded by every reason I gave in my edit summary. The truth is, once again, you were incapable of honestly reporting what you wrote: you've changed the page number and omitted the ff. Indeed, there's no use pretending... it's obvious you've been lying: no doubt you also understand perfectly well that your source is talking about free will, not "mental causation". That's not a "type of causality" according to your so-called "earlier notions", so it "introduces the question" in the wrong place: you're merely trying to foreshadow the conclusion of your causality narrative.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 15:12, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: Again you wish to inject personalities into this discussion accusing me of "lying" "pretending", being "incapable of honesty" and so on, and spending no time trying to understand the purpose of the segue. Where does all this attitude of yours come from?

The point of the segue is this: it leads the reader from the discussion of ideas about how mind might influence matter, and a particular example of Descartes' use of the pineal gland, to a discussion of types of causality as outlined by Avicenna that seems to have little to do with the topic of mind-brain interaction. The reason for introducing the Avicenna digression is simply that Northoff and some others as well (Bohr, Freeman, Kelso in particular) have suggested that everyday ideas of causality do not apply to the mind-brain interaction. So a few other ideas about causality are worth discussing. Hence the digression from mind-body interaction to look at Avicenna's discussion of types of causality.

I don't know why this simple matter gets you so frothed that you have to resort to character assassination. Why not simply address the issue: what should the segue be? Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

I didn't call you a liar, that would be a personal attack... I accused you of lying. I've never accused you of 'being "incapable of honesty" and so on', but you quote me as having said that. In short Brews ohare, you're lying. Surely it would have behooved you not to do so in this instance. You have no way of knowing how much time I devoted to "trying to understand the purpose of the segue". You provided an explicit characterization of your purpose: I've read it, I've responded, and I've made a counter suggestion. That remark about "all this attitude of [mine]" is not your first ad hominem, but no thank you, I do not wish to inject personalities into this discussion.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:42, 11 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: Your distinction between saying "It's obvious you've been lying" and a personal attack on myself is cute. You seemed to have some difficulty tracking down my citation referring to multiple pages, so I narrowed it down to a specific page, which seems to have annoyed you, leading to your claim about me that "you were incapable of honestly reporting what you wrote". Putting inflammatory characterizations of myself aside, perhaps you might refresh my mind as to your "counter suggestion" for a segue, which I have not identified? Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 12 October 2012 (UTC)

Brews ohare: You didn't address me in your distinctive fashion... you didn't address me at all: you reported me in the third person. You fixed the main thing I had complained about but you made no attempt to bring that to my attention, or anyone else. That so-called "attempted segue" is not what I had commented on and reverted. And to top it off, more lies: "I cannot pretend to understand this in-line comment." Indeed, the reader would not have been able to understand it either after your alteration. Knock off the mock excuses.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:49, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

Circular causality

The discussion of "circular causality" was rewritten without Talk-page discussion in a series of revisions by MachineElf. It now reads as follows:

---------------------------

Biologist, theoretical neuroscientist and philosopher, Walter J. Freeman, suggests that explaining mind-body interaction in terms of "circular causation" is more relevant than linear causation:

Through my readings in physics and philosophy, I learned the concept of circular causality, which invokes hierarchical interactions of immense numbers of semiautonomous elements such as neurons, which form nonlinear systems. These exchanges lead to the formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the pattern of activity of the contributing individuals...Circular causality departs so strongly from the classical tenets of necessity, invariance, and precise temporal order that the only reason to call it that is to satisfy the human habitual need for causes. The most subtle shift is the disappearance of agency, which is equivalent to loss of Aristotle's efficient cause...The very strong appeal of agency to explain events may come from the subjective experience of cause and effect that develops early in human life, before the acquisition of language...the question I raise here is whether brains share this property with other material objects in the world. The answer I propose is that assignment of cause and effect to one's self and to others having self-awareness is entirely appropriate, but that investing insensate objects with causation is comparable to investing them with teleology and soul. The further question is: Does it matter whether or not causality is assigned to objects? The answer is "Very much." Several examples are given of scientific errors attributed to thinking in terms of linear causality. The most important, with wide ramifications, is the assumption of universal determinacy, by which the causes of human behavior are limited to environmental and genetic factors, and the causal power of self-determination is excluded from scientific consideration.

— Walter J. Freeman, "Consciousness, intentionality and causality" in Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?

---------------------------

This discussion depends entirely upon the views of Freeman, expressed in very broad terms, and other sources with more complete explanations were deleted. For example, the distinction from "linear feedback" theory is described as follows::

But add a few more parts interlaced together and very quickly it becomes impossible to treat the system in terms of feedback circuits. In such complex systems, ... the concept of feedback is inadequate.[...] there is no reference state with which feedback can be compared and no place where comparison operations are performed [...] An order parameter is created by the correlation between the parts, but in turn influences the behavior of the parts. This is what we mean by circular causality

— JA Scott Kelso, Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior

See J. A. Scott Kelso (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior. MIT Press. pp. 9, 16. ISBN 0262611317.

Besides indicating that the notion of "circular causality" has wider support, Kelso's explanation details the nature of this form of "causality". The use of this term from the field of complex feedback systems (a generalization from analysis of lasers) is the "slaving principle", detailed as follows:

Note we are dealing here with circular causality. On the one hand the order parameter enslaves the atoms, but on the other hand it is itself generated by the joint action of the atoms...Over the past years, it has been shown that these concepts apply to a large number of quite different physical, chemical and biological systems.

— Hermann Haken, Information and Self-Organization: A Macroscopic Approach to Complex Systems

See Hermann Haken (2006). Information and Self-Organization: A Macroscopic Approach to Complex Systems (3rd ed ed.). Springer. pp. 25–26. ISBN 3540330216. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)

These added remarks are helpful in explaining what the concept of "circular causality" means, and bring it into clear focus as not mere idle speculation, but a phenomenon actually observed and with a theoretical basis in some fields of knowledge, biology included. IMO, this added description is warranted here, especially for those readers that may wish to pursue this interesting approach. Brews ohare (talk) 17:27, 12 October 2012 (UTC)

I added enough context to "clarify" your first one... but the rest were name dropping and sentence fragments. Looks like you fixed those, thanks.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:00, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

Pertinence of Bohr's views

In this edit MachineElf removed a discussion of Bohr's views with the in-line comment Bohr: rm for reasons given So far as I can see, the only reason given is an in-line editing comment concerning a different entry removed with the in-line remark Bohr wasn't even remotely speaking to the mind-body problem. As pointed out earlier, Bohr was concerned to "conciliate the apparently contrasting viewpoints of physiology and psychology". By "physiology" he refers to the body and by "psychiatry" he refers to the mind. His view is that these two approaches use complementary descriptions, each valid in its way, but mutually incompatible. That view is based upon an analogy with Bohr's famous work in quantum theory that showed for instance, that certain particle properties could be measured or others, but not both, rendering these properties complementary. The basis for that situation is that the measurement of one property changes the value of the other, and Bohr felt that was true in the mind-body case as well: observation of the mind interfered with observation of the brain and vice versa.

This view, like those of Kant and others, is not established, but it is very different from other views and so deserves mention, more particularly inasmuch as Bohr is a very well-regarded thinker, notable for his many extremely sophisticated discussions with Einstein over just this principle.

That observation of a mental state interferes with the state being observed is a commonplace observation by those in neuroscience today. Just one example: "...it is important to be clear about exactly what experience one wants one's subjects to introspect. Of course, explaining to subjects exactly what the experimenter wants them to experience can bring its own problems–...instructions to attend to a particular internally generated experience can easily alter both the timing and he content of that experience and even whether or not it is consciously experienced at all." Susan Pockett, The neuroscience of movement Susan Pockett (2009). “The neuroscience of movement”, Susan Pockett, WP Banks, Shaun Gallagher, eds: Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. MIT Press, p. 19. ISBN 0262512572.

It is just wrong to deny mention of this view on the erroneous basis that Bohr did not discuss the mind-body problem He obviously did, and at some length in the cited sources. Brews ohare (talk) 00:15, 9 October 2012 (UTC)

LOL, I'm sure we'd all love to see the discussions with Einstein about the mind-body problem to which Bohr owes his notoriety. I don't know what mean about not being "established" but an obscure remark, even if it's "very different from other views", (too vague to tell), "deserves mention" where? on your blog? Frankly, if you'd quit lying about your one WP:PRIMARY source, I wouldn't mind a brief mention without the WP:OR about what he believes and WP:CB about observing mental states: "The best that can be done is to observe neurological activity that is correlated with a mental state, but establishing causality in either direction is impossible in principle."

Hey, props for "observation of the mind interfered with observation of the brain and vice versa", that really is hilarious! I love it but Susan Pockett is saying something completely sensible about introspection, it's not an example of: "That observation of a mental state interferes with the state being observed is a commonplace observation by those in neuroscience today." Whatever that's supposed to mean... no one can read your mind but it would help if we could read your writing.

In any case, quit lying about not giving you any reasons and spamming the talk page with Bohr sections so no one sees them (Talk:Mind–body problem#Distinguished dualists of the past). Oh, and nice how you omit the "fails WP:V" from your report of the reason I gave in an "inline comment", just like you omit your WP:OR from your report of what I deleted in the link you gave.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 10:37, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: If you think there is some OR in the presentation in the article, pleas point it out. IMO there is nothing OR there whatsoever. I did not suggest Bohr discussed the mind-body problem with Einstein, although that might have happened sometime somewhere; I just don't know. I simply wished to point out that Bohr was a deep thinker, and not to be scoffed at. The Susan Pockett observation is of motor control experiments that have, as a part, reports from subjects about their own mental states. She cautions that these reports are influenced by the instructions given to the subjects - if they are told what to look for, what they are consciously aware of depends upon what they were told to look for. The intention to observe some facet affects what is observed. However, that is all an aside to the presentation of Bohr's position, intended to help you, and has nothing to do with what is said in the article.

It is hardly helpful for you to say I am lying and spamming. That language and your entire tone is abusive, detracts from your image as a WP contributor, and adds nothing to your objections, which remain no more than your own imaginings about what has been said, and have nothing to do with what has been proposed about Bohr in the article. Brews ohare (talk) 14:17, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

BTW, attempting to justify reverts by simply listing a bunch of WP policies and guidelines like WP:OR, WP:V and so forth with no you did with the in-line edit WP:V WP:UNDUE WP:OR WP:NPOV WP:TENDENTIOUS without specific indication of what text exactly these flags attach to, nor why they apply, is misuse of these policies and guidelines, using them as pejorative adjectives instead of useful aids to improving contributions. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

Stop the lies and personal attacks (that my objections are "supported only by blather violating WP:Civility without specifics of any kind").[1] Regarding your edit summary: "MachineElf: Ever hear of WP:Civility?",[2] Lying about another editor and their actions is a violation of WP:CIVILITY. It's is a perfectly legitimate description of your edits to this talk page, not an excuse for personal attacks and incivility.

Bohr is not being "scoffed at", Brews ohare. Strange that you keep using the encumbered term "observation" for the Susan Pockett quote itself... Anyway, she's not leading some sort of vision quest: everyone knows that introspection depends on what you're thinking about. The influence/suggestibility that she mentions isn't an example of what Bohr was notable for discussing with Einstein; and it's a poor example of the psychological analogy he mentions in your actual source. I have to laugh at the audacity of dubbing it "the presentation of Bohr's position", (which explains "the presentation in the article"). Be as evasive as you want... I didn't ask for any help: WP:BURDEN. Those aren't insults, they're simply reminders that my objections are based in policy and guidelines. You simply reverted again, it goes without saying my objections haven't changed so stop pretending you don't know what I'm talking about.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 09:34, 12 October 2012 (UTC)

a careful presentation

MachineElf: I see you have again removed the statement of Bohr's position. You say my justification for its inclusion is "evasive". So I will provide you with a careful presentation, which you may critique in detail instead of being distracted by peripheral matters.

Why should Bohr's position be included? Bohr's work was deeply involved with the idea of causality, and he extended his successful approach in physics by analogy to the mind-body interaction.

• In support of these remarks, first let us look at Bohr's statement about causality in general, and his conclusion that the interference between observation and what is observed makes everyday notions of causality inapplicable:

"...any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description."

— Niels Bohr, The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature

See Neils Bohr. "The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature; Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.". The Information Philosopher, dedicated to the new information philosophy. Robert O. Doyle, publisher. Retrieved 2012-09-14.

I don't think there is any doubt that this statement throws doubt upon the usual concept of "causality", do you? Bohr's original work dealt at an atomic and sub-atomic level, where this failure of causality in turn leads to mutually incompatible descriptions, the phenomenon of complementarity. One can choose one description or another, but cannot use them both simultaneously. To digress upon this point, the WP article on complementarity summarizes as follows:

Physicists F.A.M. Frescura and Basil Hiley have summarized the reasons for the introduction of the principle of complementarity in physics as follows:

“In the traditional view, it is assumed that there exists a reality in space-time and that this reality is a given thing, all of whose aspects can be viewed or articulated at any given moment. Bohr was the first to point out that quantum mechanics called this traditional outlook into question. To him the ‘indivisibility of the quantum of action’, which was his way of describing the uncertainty principle, implied that not all aspects of a system can be viewed simultaneously. By using one particular piece of apparatus only certain features could be made manifest at the expense of others, while with a different piece of apparatus another complementary aspect could be made manifest in such a way that the original set became non-manifest, that is, the original attributes were no longer well defined. For Bohr, this was an indication that the principle of complementarity, a principle that he had previously known to appear extensively in other intellectual disciplines but which did not appear in classical physics, should be adopted as a universal principle.”

See F. A. M. Frescura, B. J. Hiley: Algebras, quantum theory and pre-space, published in Revista Brasileira de Fisica, Volume Especial, Julho 1984, Os 70 anos de Mario Schonberg, pp. 49-86, p. 2

• Next, let's look at Bohr's views regarding the mind-body problem. The above-quoted authors suggest Bohr viewed complementarity as "known to appear extensively in other intellectual disciplines". However, Bohr's work applied at the atomic and sub-atomic levels so it could be raised that these considerations are not applicable to the mind-body problem, which is the subject of this Wikipedia article. Bohr himself recognized this reservation explicitly, and claimed only an analogy for its application to the mind-body problem:

"In discussing the applicability of purely physical ideas to living organisms we have, of course, treated life just as any other phenomenon of the material world. I need hardly emphasize, however, that this attitude, which is characteristic of biological research, involves no disregard of the psychological aspect of life. On the contrary, the recognition of the limitation of mechanical concepts in atomic physics would rather seem suited to conciliate the apparently contrasting viewpoints of physiology and psychology. Indeed, the necessity of considering the interaction between the measuring instruments and the object under investigation in atomic mechanics exhibits a close analogy to the peculiar difficulties in psychological analysis arising from the fact that the mental content is invariably altered when the attention is concentrated on any special feature of it."

— Niels Bohr, Light and Life

See Niels Bohr (April 1, 1933). "Light and Life". Nature: p. 457 ff. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help) Full text on line at us.archive.org.

It is worth noting that this discussion by Bohr is very extensive, and this quotation is only a facet of his presentation. Although this quotation indicates Bohr's position that complementarity applies to the mind-body problem, a more complete reading of Light and Life fills in many particulars of his opinions. Bohr describes the use of the term "purpose" as an example of a phenomenon inaccessible to mechanics because of complementarity:

"I shall not enter further into such purely terminological points but only add that the essence of the analogy being considered is the obvious exclusiveness between such typical aspects of life as the self-preservation and the self-generation of individuals, on the one hand, and the subdivision necessary for any physical analysis on the other hand. Owing to this essential feature of complementarity, the concept of purpose, which is foreign to mechanical analysis, finds a certain field of application in biology."

— Niels Bohr, Light and Life

Bohr commented explicitly upon the relation between conscious will and atomic events in the brain, and the inability to explain consciousness based upon atomic concepts:

For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will is to be considered as a feature of conscious life which corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.

— Niels Bohr, Light and Life

MachineElf, the above remarks provide a basis for a useful discussion of the relevance of Bohr's views to the article Mind-body problem. Needless to say, the discussion is about the relevance of his views to this article on mind-body problem, not the validity of his views. Perhaps you might detail your objections to inclusion of Bohr's views based upon the above presentation and any other writings by Bohr that seem pertinent. Brews ohare (talk) 16:08, 12 October 2012 (UTC)

imaginary blather

Physics?! I'd have thought "his successful approach" was a circumlocution for complementarity (Bohr doesn't say it once in your new source... but that didn't stop you from using "mind-body interaction" and besides, I've got to admit... it's abundantly clear that, in fact, the rules really don't apply to you. But don't be hypocritical and whinge about "the validity of his views"...

Like I said, he briefly alluded to the analogy in your old source... WP:IDHT There's also a relevant paragraph in your new one. He sure does punch up the woo in there: the quantum mind-body problem article is at your mercy. Blush, that's in WP:WikiProject Physics...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:26, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

A "detailed critique"... dream on. Again you're evading my "blather" by insisting on starting from scratch. I have no objections to a brief mention that doesn't give it WP:UNDUE weight or misrepresent Bohr's position but I will point out that whatever justification you believe is somehow self-evident, it's not, and it is not one based on policy and guidelines... Like I said at Talk:Mind–body problem#Bohr's views on causality, consider focusing on the relevant quotes and use only verifiable claims from a WP:SECONDARY source, for example:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024529
In this paper, we discuss the application of Niels Bohr's Principle of Complementarity to fields other than physics, including psychology. However, Bohr has never attempted to show in sufficient detail how this could be done.

— Nathan Brody and Paul Oppenheim, Application of Bohr's Principle of Complementarity to the Mind-Body Problem in The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 66, No. 4 (Feb. 27, 1969).

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bohr

Extended content

Niels Bohr (1885-1962) Among all the major scientists of the twentieth century, Niels Bohr may have most wanted to be considered a philosopher. Bohr thought that his concept of complementarity, developed in the same weeks as Werner Heisenberg was formulating his uncertainty principle, could explain many great philosophical issues. Complementarity in the form of wave-particle duality lies at the core of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Over the years, Bohr suggested complementarity could illuminate the mind/body problem, it might provide for the difference between organic and inorganic matter, and it could underlie other classic dualisms like subject/object, reason versus passion, and even volition versus causality. Like any educated person of his time, Bohr knew of Kant's phenomemal/noumenal dualism. He often spoke as if the goal of complementarity was to reconcile opposites. He likened it to the eastern yin and yang, and his grave is marked with the yin/yang symbol. Bohr was often criticized for suggesting that both A and Not-A could be the case. This was the characteristic sign of Hegel's dialectical materialism. Had Bohr absorbed some Hegelian thinking? Another Hegelian trait was to speak indirectly and obscurely of the most important matters, and this was Bohr's way, to the chagrin of many of his disciples. They hoped for clarity and but got mostly fuzzy thinking when Bohr stepped outside of quantum mechanics... Free Choice in Quantum Mechanics "Free choice" is an important term in the debates about quantum mechanics and physical reality. It was introduced by Niels Bohr in his response to Albert Einstein's famous challenge to the "completeness" of quantum mechanics. Einstein, with his Princeton colleagues Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, claimed that their EPR experiment requires the addition of further parameters or "hidden variables" to restore a deterministic picture of the "elements of reality." In classical physics, such elements of reality include simultaneous values for the position and momentum of elementary particles like electrons. In quantum mechanics, Bohr and Werner Heisenberg claimed that such properties could not be said to exist precisely before an experimenter decides to make a measurement. This "freedom of choice" of the experimenter includes the freedom of which specific property to measure for. If the position is measured accurately, the (complementary conjugate and non-commuting variable) momentum is necessarily indeterminate. For many years, Heisenberg and Bohr described the reason for this as "uncertainty," as in Heisenberg's famous "uncertainty principle." Uncertainty was initially believed to be an epistemological problem caused by the measuring apparatus "disturbing" a particle in the act of measurement... Bohr abandoned this "disturbance" explanation after Einstein's EPR challenge, [adopting] a fundamental "indeterminacy" that is ontological...

— "Niels Bohr" article in Information Philosopher

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/qt-uncertainty#boh

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In spite of the fact that Heisenberg's and Bohr's views on quantum mechanics are often lumped together as (part of) ‘the Copenhagen interpretation’, there is considerable difference between their views on the uncertainty relations. From wave-particle duality to complementarity Long before the development of modern quantum mechanics, Bohr had been particularly concerned with the problem of particle-wave duality, i.e. the problem that experimental evidence on the behaviour of both light and matter seemed to demand a wave picture in some cases, and a particle picture in others. Yet these pictures are mutually exclusive... His long struggle with wave-particle duality had prepared him for a radical step when the dispute between matrix and wave mechanics broke out in 1926-27. For the main contestants, Heisenberg and Schrödinger, the issue at stake was which view could claim to provide a single coherent and universal framework for the description of the observational data. The choice was, essentially between a description in terms of continuously evolving waves, or else one of particles undergoing discontinuous quantum jumps. By contrast, Bohr insisted that elements from both views were equally valid and equally needed for an exhaustive description of the data. His way out of the contradiction was to renounce the idea that the pictures refer, in a literal one-to-one correspondence, to physical reality. Instead, the applicability of these pictures was to become dependent on the experimental context. This is the gist of the viewpoint he called ‘complementarity’. Bohr first conceived the general outline of his complementarity argument in early 1927, during a skiing holiday in Norway, at the same time when Heisenberg wrote his uncertainty paper. When he returned to Copenhagen and found Heisenberg's manuscript, they got into an intense discussion. On the one hand, Bohr was quite enthusiastic about Heisenberg's ideas which seemed to fit wonderfully with his own thinking. Indeed, in his subsequent work, Bohr always presented the uncertainty relations as the symbolic expression of his complementarity viewpoint. On the other hand, he criticized Heisenberg severely for his suggestion that these relations were due to discontinuous changes occurring during a measurement process. Rather, Bohr argued, their proper derivation should start from the indispensability of both particle and wave concepts. He pointed out that the uncertainties in the experiment did not exclusively arise from the discontinuities but also from the fact that in the experiment we need to take into account both the particle theory and the wave theory. It is not so much the unknown disturbance which renders the momentum of the electron uncertain but rather the fact that the position and the momentum of the electron cannot be simultaneously defined in this experiment. (See the "Addition in Proof" to Heisenberg's paper.) We shall not go too deeply into the matter of Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics since we are mostly interested in Bohr's view on the uncertainty principle. For a more detailed discussion of Bohr's philosophy of quantum physics we refer to Scheibe (1973), Folse (1985), Honner (1987) and Murdoch (1987). It may be useful, however, to sketch some of the main points. Central in Bohr's considerations is the language we use in physics. No matter how abstract and subtle the concepts of modern physics may be, they are essentially an extension of our ordinary language and a means to communicate the results of our experiments. These results, obtained under well-defined experimental circumstances, are what Bohr calls the "phenomena". A phenomenon is "the comprehension of the effects observed under given experimental conditions" (Bohr 1939, p. 24), it is the resultant of a physical object, a measuring apparatus and the interaction between them in a concrete experimental situation. The essential difference between classical and quantum physics is that in quantum physics the interaction between the object and the apparatus cannot be made arbitrarily small; the interaction must at least comprise one quantum. This is expressed by Bohr's quantum postulate: [… the] essence [of the formulation of the quantum theory] may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity or rather individuality, completely foreign to classical theories and symbolized by Planck's quantum of action. (Bohr, 1928, p. 580) A phenomenon, therefore, is an indivisible whole and the result of a measurement cannot be considered as an autonomous manifestation of the object itself independently of the measurement context. The quantum postulate forces upon us a new way of describing physical phenomena: In this situation, we are faced with the necessity of a radical revision of the foundation for the description and explanation of physical phenomena. Here, it must above all be recognized that, however far quantum effects transcend the scope of classical physical analysis, the account of the experimental arrangement and the record of the observations must always be expressed in common language supplemented with the terminology of classical physics. (Bohr, 1948, p. 313) This is what Scheibe (1973) has called the "buffer postulate" because it prevents the quantum from penetrating into the classical description: A phenomenon must always be described in classical terms; Planck's constant does not occur in this description. Together, the two postulates induce the following reasoning. In every phenomenon the interaction between the object and the apparatus comprises at least one quantum. But the description of the phenomenon must use classical notions in which the quantum of action does not occur. Hence, the interaction cannot be analysed in this description. On the other hand, the classical character of the description allows to speak in terms of the object itself. Instead of saying: ‘the interaction between a particle and a photographic plate has resulted in a black spot in a certain place on the plate’, we are allowed to forgo mentioning the apparatus and say: ‘the particle has been found in this place’. The experimental context, rather than changing or disturbing pre-existing properties of the object, defines what can meaningfully be said about the object. Because the interaction between object and apparatus is left out in our description of the phenomenon, we do not get the whole picture. Yet, any attempt to extend our description by performing the measurement of a different observable quantity of the object, or indeed, on the measurement apparatus, produces a new phenomenon and we are again confronted with the same situation. Because of the unanalyzable interaction in both measurements, the two descriptions cannot, generally, be united into a single picture. They are what Bohr calls complementary descriptions: [the quantum of action]...forces us to adopt a new mode of description designated as complementary in the sense that any given application of classical concepts precludes the simultaneous use of other classical concepts which in a different connection are equally necessary for the elucidation of the phenomena. (Bohr, 1929, p. 10) The most important example of complementary descriptions is provided by the measurements of the position and momentum of an object. If one wants to measure the position of the object relative to a given spatial frame of reference, the measuring instrument must be rigidly fixed to the bodies which define the frame of reference. But this implies the impossibility of investigating the exchange of momentum between the object and the instrument and we are cut off from obtaining any information about the momentum of the object. If, on the other hand, one wants to measure the momentum of an object the measuring instrument must be able to move relative to the spatial reference frame. Bohr here assumes that a momentum measurement involves the registration of the recoil of some movable part of the instrument and the use of the law of momentum conservation. The looseness of the part of the instrument with which the object interacts entails that the instrument cannot serve to accurately determine the position of the object. Since a measuring instrument cannot be rigidly fixed to the spatial reference frame and, at the same time, be movable relative to it, the experiments which serve to precisely determine the position and the momentum of an object are mutually exclusive. Of course, in itself, this is not at all typical for quantum mechanics. But, because the interaction between object and instrument during the measurement can neither be neglected nor determined the two measurements cannot be combined. This means that in the description of the object one must choose between the assignment of a precise position or of a precise momentum. Similar considerations hold with respect to the measurement of time and energy. Just as the spatial coordinate system must be fixed by means of solid bodies so must the time coordinate be fixed by means of unperturbable, synchronised clocks. But it is precisely this requirement which prevents one from taking into account of the exchange of energy with the instrument if this is to serve its purpose. Conversely, any conclusion about the object based on the conservation of energy prevents following its development in time. The conclusion is that in quantum mechanics we are confronted with a complementarity between two descriptions which are united in the classical mode of description: the space-time description (or coordination) of a process and the description based on the applicability of the dynamical conservation laws. The quantum forces us to give up the classical mode of description (also called the ‘causal’ mode of description by Bohr[4]): it is impossible to form a classical picture of what is going on when radiation interacts with matter as, e.g., in the Compton effect. [4] Note that this usage of the term ‘causal’ by Bohr differs from his usage of that term in earlier texts, where it refers only to the applicability of dynamical conservation laws, and not to the union of a space-time description with these conservation laws. Thus, in (Bohr, 1928), he characterized complementarity as a relation between space-time description and causality. Any arrangement suited to study the exchange of energy and momentum between the electron and the photon must involve a latitude in the space-time description sufficient for the definition of wave-number and frequency which enter in the relation [E = h? and p = hs]. Conversely, any attempt of locating the collision between the photon and the electron more accurately would, on account of the unavoidable interaction with the fixed scales and clocks defining the space-time reference frame, exclude all closer account as regards the balance of momentum and energy. (Bohr, 1949, p. 210) A causal description of the process cannot be attained; we have to content ourselves with complementary descriptions. "The viewpoint of complementarity may be regarded", according to Bohr, "as a rational generalization of the very ideal of causality". In addition to complementary descriptions Bohr also talks about complementary phenomena and complementary quantities. Position and momentum, as well as time and energy, are complementary quantities.[5] [5] Note, that while Bohr started from the duality between the particle and wave pictures, which are mutually exclusive also in classical physics, he later considered as complementary two descriptions which in the classical theory are united. We have seen that Bohr's approach to quantum theory puts heavy emphasis on the language used to communicate experimental observations, which, in his opinion, must always remain classical. By comparison, he seemed to put little value on arguments starting from the mathematical formalism of quantum theory. This informal approach is typical of all of Bohr's discussions on the meaning of quantum mechanics. One might say that for Bohr the conceptual clarification of the situation has primary importance while the formalism is only a symbolic representation of this situation. This is remarkable since, finally, it is the formalism which needs to be interpreted. This neglect of the formalism is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to get a clear understanding of Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics and why it has aroused so much controversy. We close this section by citing from an article of 1948 to show how Bohr conceived the role of the formalism of quantum mechanics: The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character, as regards information obtainable under experimental conditions described in classical terms and specified by means of parameters entering into the algebraic or differential equations of which the matrices or the wave-functions, respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is indicated already by the use of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even derived real functions like densities and currents are only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of individual events observable under well-defined experimental conditions. (Bohr, 1948, p. 314) These equations determine, according to Bohr: "the highest possible accuracy in the definition of the energy and momentum of the individuals associated with the wave field" (Bohr 1928, p. 571). He noted, "This circumstance may be regarded as a simple symbolic expression of the complementary nature of the space-time description and the claims of causality" (ibid).[See footnote 4 for Bohr's usage of the term ‘causality’] We note a few points about Bohr's view on the uncertainty relations. First of all, Bohr does not refer to discontinuous changes in the relevant quantities during the measurement process. Rather, he emphasizes the possibility of defining these quantities. This view is markedly different from Heisenberg's. A draft version of the Como lecture is even more explicit on the difference between Bohr and Heisenberg: These reciprocal uncertainty relations were given in a recent paper of Heisenberg as the expression of the statistical element which, due to the feature of discontinuity implied in the quantum postulate, characterizes any interpretation of observations by means of classical concepts. It must be remembered, however, that the uncertainty in question is not simply a consequence of a discontinuous change of energy and momentum say during an interaction between radiation and material particles employed in measuring the space-time coordinates of the individuals. According to the above considerations the question is rather that of the impossibility of defining rigourously such a change when the space-time coordination of the individuals is also considered. (Bohr, 1985 p. 93) Indeed, Bohr not only rejected Heisenberg's argument that these relations are due to discontinuous disturbances implied by the act of measuring, but also his view that the measurement process creates a definite result: The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are confronted in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as regard all questions of terminology. Speaking, as it is often done of disturbing a phenomenon by observation, or even of creating physical attributes to objects by measuring processes is liable to be confusing, since all such sentences imply a departure from conventions of basic language which even though it can be practical for the sake of brevity, can never be unambiguous. (Bohr, 1939, p. 24) Nor did he approve of an epistemological formulation or one in terms of experimental inaccuracies: […] a sentence like "we cannot know both the momentum and the position of an atomic object" raises at once questions as to the physical reality of two such attributes of the object, which can be answered only by referring to the mutual exclusive conditions for an unambiguous use of space-time concepts, on the one hand, and dynamical conservation laws on the other hand. (Bohr, 1948, p. 315; also Bohr 1949, p. 211) It would in particular not be out of place in this connection to warn against a misunderstanding likely to arise when one tries to express the content of Heisenberg's well-known indeterminacy relation by such a statement as ‘the position and momentum of a particle cannot simultaneously be measured with arbitrary accuracy’. According to such a formulation it would appear as though we had to do with some arbitrary renunciation of the measurement of either the one or the other of two well-defined attributes of the object, which would not preclude the possibility of a future theory taking both attributes into account on the lines of the classical physics. (Bohr 1937, p. 292) Instead, Bohr always stressed that the uncertainty relations are first and foremost an expression of complementarity. This may seem odd since complementarity is a dichotomic relation between two types of description whereas the uncertainty relations allow for intermediate situations between two extremes. They "express" the dichotomy in the sense that if we take the energy and momentum to be perfectly well-defined, symbolically ΔE = Δp = 0, the postion and time variables are completely undefined, Δx = Δt = ∞, and vice versa. But they also allow intermediate situations in which the mentioned uncertainties are all non-zero and finite. This more positive aspect of the uncertainty relation is mentioned in the Como lecture: At the same time, however, the general character of this relation makes it possible to a certain extent to reconcile the conservation laws with the space-time coordination of observations, the idea of a coincidence of well-defined events in space-time points being replaced by that of unsharply defined individuals within space-time regions. (Bohr 1928, p. 571) However, Bohr never followed up on this suggestion that we might be able to strike a compromise between the two mutually exclusive modes of description in terms of unsharply defined quantities. Indeed, an attempt to do so, would take the formalism of quantum theory more seriously than the concepts of classical language, and this step Bohr refused to take. Instead, in his later writings he would be content with stating that the uncertainty relations simply defy an unambiguous interpretation in classical terms: These so-called indeterminacy relations explicitly bear out the limitation of causal analysis, but it is important to recognize that no unambiguous interpretation of such a relation can be given in words suited to describe a situation in which physical attributes are objectified in a classical way. (Bohr, 1948, p.315) It must here be remembered that even in the indeterminacy relation [?q ?p ˜ h] we are dealing with an implication of the formalism which defies unambiguous expression in words suited to describe classical pictures. Thus a sentence like "we cannot know both the momentum and the position of an atomic object" raises at once questions as to the physical reality of two such attributes of the object, which can be answered only by referring to the conditions for an unambiguous use of space-time concepts, on the one hand, and dynamical conservation laws on the other hand. (Bohr, 1949, p. 211) Finally, on a more formal level, we note that Bohr's derivation does not rely on the commutation relations (1) and (5), but on Fourier analysis. These two approaches are equivalent as far as the relationship between position and momentum is concerned, but this is not so for time and energy since most physical systems do not have a time operator. Indeed, in his discussion with Einstein (Bohr, 1949), Bohr considered time as a simple classical variable. This even holds for his famous discussion of the ‘clock-in-the-box’ thought-experiment where the time, as defined by the clock in the box, is treated from the point of view of classical general relativity. Thus, in an approach based on commutation relations, the position-momentum and time-energy uncertainty relations are not on equal footing, which is contrary to Bohr's approach in terms of Fourier analysis (Hilgevoord 1996 and 1998). The Minimal Interpretation In the previous two sections we have seen how both Heisenberg and Bohr attributed a far-reaching status to the uncertainty relations. They both argued that these relations place fundamental limits on the applicability of the usual classical concepts. Moreover, they both believed that these limitations were inevitable and forced upon us. However, we have also seen that they reached such conclusions by starting from radical and controversial assumptions. This entails, of course, that their radical conclusions remain unconvincing for those who reject these assumptions. Indeed, the operationalist-positivist viewpoint adopted by these authors has long since lost its appeal among philosophers of physics. So the question may be asked what alternative views of the uncertainty relations are still viable. Of course, this problem is intimately connected with that of the interpretation of the wave function, and hence of quantum mechanics as a whole. Since there is no consensus about the latter, one cannot expect consensus about the interpretation of the uncertainty relations either. Here we only describe a point of view, which we call the ‘minimal interpretation’, that seems to be shared by both the adherents of the Copenhagen interpretation and of other views. In quantum mechanics a system is supposed to be described by its quantum state, also called its state vector. Given the state vector, one can derive probability distributions for all the physical quantities pertaining to the system such as its position, momentum, angular momentum, energy, etc. The operational meaning of these probability distributions is that they correspond to the distribution of the values obtained for these quantities in a long series of repetitions of the measurement. More precisely, one imagines a great number of copies of the system under consideration, all prepared in the same way. On each copy the momentum, say, is measured. Generally, the outcomes of these measurements differ and a distribution of outcomes is obtained. The theoretical momentum distribution derived from the quantum state is supposed to coincide with the hypothetical distribution of outcomes obtained in an infinite series of repetitions of the momentum measurement. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for all the other physical quantities pertaining to the system. Note that no simultaneous measurements of two or more quantities are required in defining the operational meaning of the probability distributions. Uncertainty relations can be considered as statements about the spreads of the probability distributions of the several physical quantities arising from the same state. For example, the uncertainty relation between the position and momentum of a system may be understood as the statement that the position and momentum distributions cannot both be arbitrarily narrow -- in some sense of the word "narrow" -- in any quantum state. Inequality (9) is an example of such a relation in which the standard deviation is employed as a measure of spread. From this characterization of uncertainty relations follows that a more detailed interpretation of the quantum state than the one given in the previous paragraph is not required to study uncertainty relations as such. In particular, a further ontological or linguistic interpretation of the notion of uncertainty, as limits on the applicability of our concepts given by Heisenberg or Bohr, need not be supposed. Indeed, this minimal interpretation leaves open whether it makes sense to attribute precise values of position and momentum to an individual system. Some interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g. those of Heisenberg and Bohr, deny this; while others, e.g. the interpretation of de Broglie and Bohm insist that each individual system has a definite position and momentum (see the entry on Bohmian mechanics). The only requirement is that, as an empirical fact, it is not possible to prepare pure ensembles in which all systems have the same values for these quantities, or ensembles in which the spreads are smaller than allowed by quantum theory. Although interpretations of quantum mechanics, in which each system has a definite value for its position and momentum are still viable, this is not to say that they are without strange features of their own; they do not imply a return to classical physics. We end with a few remarks on this minimal interpretation. First, it may be noted that the minimal interpretation of the uncertainty relations is little more than filling in the empirical meaning of inequality (9), or an inequality in terms of other measures of width, as obtained from the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. As such, this view shares many of the limitations we have noted above about this inequality. Indeed, it is not straightforward to relate the spread in a statistical distribution of measurement results with the inaccuracy of this measurement, such as, e.g. the resolving power of a microscope. Moreover, the minimal interpretation does not address the question whether one can make simultaneous accurate measurements of position and momentum. As a matter of fact, one can show that the standard formalism of quantum mechanics does not allow such simultaneous measurements. But this is not a consequence of relation (9). If one feels that statements about inaccuracy of measurement, or the possibility of simultaneous measurements, belong to any satisfactory formulation of the uncertainty principle, the minimal interpretation may thus be too minimal.

— Jan Hilgevoord and Jos Uffink, "The Uncertainty Principle" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:12, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: Thank you for an actual engagement about presentation instead of waving about of WP:OR. I see that you have done some research on Bohr's views. You may notice that without exception the works you have quoted are assessments of Bohr's position. In the section Historical background, there is no attempt at assessment of any of the mentioned individuals from Plato to Searle. The object is to provide a statement of position, not an evaluation. I believe the text you have provided here would be most useful in a WP article on Bohr's views, which is missing on WP. These evaluations are separate from stating Bohr's views as simply Bohr's views.

I would like to take you up on your statement:

"I have no objections to a brief mention that doesn't give it WP:UNDUE weight or misrepresent Bohr's position."

Perhaps you would care to engage by stating what you believe to be Bohr's position? IMO his position is that mind and body are complementary descriptions, which means simply that one can describe something like intention (as a wild example, pick your own) either in terms of some neurological occurrence or, alternatively, as some subjective state, but the two descriptions of intention are separate, in a relation of complementarity. Moreover, it is impossible in principle to say intention in the subjective sense "causes" intention in the neurological sense, or vice versa. How does that sound? Brews ohare (talk) 16:35, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

A different example from intention might be emotion, although Bohr talks directly about will and not about emotion. Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 14 October 2012 (UTC)

Don't flatter yourself, tl;dr. "You may notice that without exception the works you have quoted are assessments of Bohr's position." LOL, WP:SECONDARY sources, like I said... It's not true that the Historical background section uses only WP:PRIMARY sources, (as if it should).

OTOH, by "evaluation" you might be intimating that the sources I suggested are only concerned with whether or not Bohr's theories are true (in a realist sense)... Obviously, that's wrong too (in a WP:CB sense). I was hoping it actually mattered to you whether or not you were misrepresenting Bohr's position... but I doubt very much you'll be "taking me up on my offer" seeing as:

1. you're clearly unwilling go beyond your own personal assessment of quotes, taken in isolation;
2. you won't acknowledge that Bohr never clearly expressed "a position" regarding the mind-body problem; and...
3. you remain oblivious to the fact that he abandoned certain early views and reversed himself on others relating to complementarity.

"How does that sound?" It sounds like exactly the same WP:OR you've been pushing ad nauseum.

Engage: "Bohr has never attempted to show in sufficient detail how this could be done."

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:00, 15 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: You appear to want to discuss the line "Bohr has never attempted to show in sufficient detail how this could be done." which appears in N Brody, P Oppenheim (February 27, 1969). "Application of Bohr's principle of complementarity to the mind-body problem". The Journal of Philosophy. LXVI: 97 ff. The sentence following this line is "We sympathize with Bohr's endeavor, and we believe that, quite apart from teh validity of the principle of complementarity in physics, such an extension to fields other than physics is justified. ... we shall define a relation of complementarity in psychology that is structurally homologous to a relation of complementarity in physics."

The fragment of this work you have quoted exactly seems to suggest the authors are griping about Bohr's view, but in fact they build upon it. What is your intent in bringing up this paper? Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 15 October 2012 (UTC)

BTW, a follow-on article available on line is Siegwart Lindenberg, Paul Oppenheim (1974). "Generalization of complementarity" (PDF). Synthese. 28 (2): 117–139. doi:10.1007/BF00485231.— Preceding unsigned comment added by Brews ohare (talk • contribs) 16:05, 15 October 2012

LOL, that's Brody's position, not Bohr's.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:53, 15 October 2012 (UTC)

MachineElf: I simply asked "What is your intent in bringing up this paper?" I didn't suggest it was Bohr's position. Brews ohare (talk) 20:35, 15 October 2012 (UTC)

No, you didn't simply ask that:

1. you claimed that "[I] appear to want to discuss the line...";
2. as you do habitually, you needlessly obscured the specific page number with "ff", despite WP:MOS and my own objections;
3. Then you gave the sentence that followed as well as part of a later one on that same page;
4. Then you claimed "The fragment of this work [I] have quoted exactly seems to suggest the authors are griping about Bohr's view, but in fact they build upon it..."

Only then, for reasons that are unclear (since if you have to ask, you clearly had no basis for speculating about my intent), you ask "What is [my] intent in bringing up this paper?" Needless to say, I didn't bring up the "paper", I brought up the line supporting my claim that Bohr's brief allusions were far too vague to misrepresent as if he taken a clear "position" on the mind-body problem (much less your own interpretation thereof). Obviously, Bohr seemed to believe an enigmatic connection between the enigmas was somehow implied... although Brody's inspiration, he nonetheless admits that Bohr "never" explained himself in this regard... Not that you should, but if you didn't want to present Brody's theory, you had no reason to bring it up... I certainly didn't.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 21:47, 15 October 2012 (UTC)

BTW, the 1974 follow-on says the general definition of complementarity was "implicitly presupposed" in the 1969 paper but, lacking a formal generalization, it is often applied willy-nilly:

The extension of complementarity from physics to other fields pre-supposes a general definition of this concept.³ This definition has been implicitly presupposed in the application of complementarity to psychology by Brody and Oppenheim (1969), but Bohr's principle is often applied on an ad hoc basis in a variety of fields, without even an implicit general definition. Thus, without a formal generalization, 'complementarity' can serve as a convenient tool of bridging any contradictory theories or approaches without detailed analysis and without consideration to what kinds of problems the principle can or cannot solve.

[3]: Similarly, in biology, with reference to the correspondence (homology) of, say, a human's arm and a bird's wing, a general definition of the concept of 'Bauplan' is presupposed under which the Bauplan of humans and of birds are subsumed. See Woodger (1945, p. 109). See also Rescher and Oppenheim (1955, p. 90ff.).

Had Bohr ever done so himself, there would have been no need for this paper, the express purpose of which is to "give an explicit general definition of complementarity, compatible with Bohr's understanding of his principle and, as far as possible, free of technicalities." You could cite Lindenberg and Oppenheim's opinion that their attempt is compatible with Bohr's understanding... but in Wikipedia's voice, you cannot present your own generalization as such, even though you firmly believe it's compatible with (or identical to) Bohr's position.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:48, 15 October 2012 (UTC)