Talk:Miles Browning

old trivia section

This is the article's 'Trivia' section - it was removed in accordance with Avoid trivia sections in articles. I put it here so the sourced statements can be worked into the text. The 'urban myth' at the bottom needs to be sourced before it can be put into the article. KrakatoaKatie 02:59, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

• Browning was the maternal grandfather of American comedian, musician and actor Chevy Chase. done
• Browning's notorious affair in the summer of '42 proved to be a costly tactical miscalculation for the "man with a slide-rule brain" in more ways than one, as his lover's husband was a semi-pro boxer who did not stick to discussing theory upon catching them in flagrante delicto.
• A bit worse for wear, Browning took shore leave and married Jane Matthews in March 1943. (She was his fourth and last wife.) done
• Urban myth has it that after a night of especially hard drinking by Admiral Browning, USS Hornet (CV-12) nearly collided with a T2 tanker in port, coming so close that a sailor could jump from one deck to the other -- the only incident of drunken aircraft carrier driving known in the storied annals of the United States Navy.

I worked two of these into the article without too much trouble, although sources are needed. I'm not sure how to or if the last two should be worked into the article; the last one might be interesting to readers, but the former isn't encyclopedic, at least not to me. I'm interested in the opinions of others about this. KrakatoaKatie 03:21, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

E. J. King was not commander of the Indochina theater, he was Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Halsey was not "about to be promoted to Fleet Admiral" in 1942-43; he did not receive that promotion until December 1945, afte the war was over. In fact the rank was not created until December 1944. (I'm going to make those edits) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.107.248.220 (talk • contribs)

POV

I assume this was written by a relative give the fawning over him. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Purpleslog (talk • contribs) 02:56, August 24, 2007 (UTC).

Buell additions moved here for discussion

The proper page for this content is the talk page, which is why I've moved them here almost intact. It's inappropriate to add three large sections from one source with comments such as "these accounts were wrong, as we shall now see" and "so let it be written, so let it be done". First, the Manual of Style is an excellent guideline for article and section structure; I've taken these headings down two notches from major headings to minor headings for the purposes of this section. Second, our job is to cite, not analyze and take sides in the text. Here, on the talk page, we can take whichever side we want – but not in the article itself.

I agree that Browning's roles at Midway and Guadalcanal were magnified by Morison and some others. I've read several books that differ with Morison's conclusions, and I've participated in forum discussions about the reality of the situation vs. Morison's glorification of the battles. That said, Spruance's biography should not be used as the sole source for such a large chunk of text in the Browning article, especially since identical text was added (by the same editor) to the Spruance article.

Let's agree on the basics to add, if any, instead of this text. - KrakatoaKatie 00:14, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

Katie, my magazine article noted under Unused Resources should provide enough properly cited material to resolve these and many other problems with the article. ARems 98.169.179.8 (talk) 16:32, 24 October 2022 (UTC)

Midway: Background to Decision to Launch

Thomas Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Naval Institute Press 1987), pp. 494-5:

“ The reasoning behind Spruance's decision to launch at 0700 on June fourth has been inaccurately recorded in previous published works. Nearly all have stated that Spruance intended to close to 100 miles and launch at 0900, but that Browning convinced him to launch ‘early’ at 0700 in order to catch the enemy carriers recovering from their first strike. The source of this version has never been disclosed in any of the published work on Midway, and for that reason alone its credibility is questionable. [Emphasis in the original]. ”

It is clear that Spruance’s own accounts give his intention as wanting to hit the Japanese carriers “as early as possible” and that he made preparations to launch “when we got within striking distance.” (Buell says this “was generally regarded as 150 to 175 miles.”) Spruance also said in 1966 that “There was no argument or discussion about when to launch.” This is from the notes of a Spruance interview by Walter Lord, author of Incredible Victory, the first best-selling account. Buell corresponded with Lord about these notes, which also say (as quoted in Buell):

“ He wanted planes to go as soon as possible and told Browning to attend to it. Up to Browning to decide the exact time—that was his business—but Spruance all for anything he decided, as long as it was as soon as possible. The key to everything was surprise . . . to hit the Japs before they discovered the U. S. forces. This meant hit them the earliest possible moment we were within range. It became all the more important when we monitored the Jap call for a second strike. ”

Buell told Lord that, contrary to these notes, Lord’s book states that 0900 was Spruance’s “original inclination.” Lord responded “I didn’t mean to imply that Spruance ‘intended’ to launch at 0900 .. I was trying to connote something less strong than intention, or even taking any firm position on the matter.” Lord also responded that “as soon as Browning came up with 0700, he went right along with it” and that Spruance’s main point had been to torpedo the contentions of Morison, Tuleja, Forrestel, and others that there was argument or discussion between him and Browning.

Buell believes this does not do justice to Spruance’s desire for surprise. Buell also rejects a further comment of Lord’s as to a letter he had received from former staff officer Bromfield Nichol to the effect that Spruance had suggested delaying the launch until they’d run in closer and that Spruance “had the good judgment to take the advice of others” – rejecting Nichol’s account as “inconsistent with the overwhelming evidence.”

Spruance himself, in 1955, in one of the few statements he published on the battle, the Foreword to Midway: the Battle that Doomed Japan, a translation of works by Fuchida and Okumiya, refuses to take credit for choosing the exact time when an attack would do most damage, “flight decks full of aircraft, fueled, and ready to go.”

“ All that I can claim credit for, myself, is a very keen sense of the urgent need for surprise and the strong desire to hit the enemy carriers with our full strength as early as we could reach them. ”

Buell, p. 496:

“ In summary, it is clear that Spruance indeed intended to launch at the earliest possible moment. In that Spruance told Browning to ‘launch the attack’ shortly after 0600 (as reported by Oliver), it is not logical that Spruance would then decide to wait three hours (until 0900) and take the unacceptable risk of the Japanese hitting him first. [Oliver was Spruance’s flag lieutenant, whose account Buell says he verified in every respect] ”

Midway: Decision to Launch—A Prelude

When Spruance took over for the indisposed Halsey, Spruance inherited Halsey’s command staff, bringing only his own flag lieutenant, Robert J. Oliver. There was high excitement among this staff about what Spruance was like, which Oliver was only partly able to satisfy. One thing in particular mystified them, and Oliver too, for that matter:

“ Spruance carried a rolled-up twenty-inch-square maneuvering board [a printed form used for solving relative motion problems], fastened by a paper clip. He was never without it, and when he entered the flag shelter he would casually toss it upon the book rack. There it remained until he retrieved it upon leaving. No one asked him to explain his mysterious maneuvering board. ”

Buell adds only that “He would use it to make the most important decision of the Battle of Midway.” p, 142.

Midway: Decision to Launch

Spruance arrived at the “flag shelter” (the command post created by Halsey atop the Enterprise island) very early on 4 June, joining Browning, Buracker, Oliver, and the staff watch officer. They listened to the radio loudspeaker tuned to Midway search-plane frequency.

“ The men sat and waited. ”

At 0534 “Enemy carriers.”

At 0545 the same plane reported many enemy planes closing Midway from the northwest at 150 miles. Were they headed toward us? Towards Midway? How many of them were there? “The inconclusive reports had an unintended and malignant effect upon the staff officers, wrenching their nerves and intensifying their anxiety. Anticipating that the next message surely would locate the enemy, they could scarcely contain their impatience and excitement.”

At 0603 “the message burst through the loudspeaker”: two carriers and battleships making for Midway.

“ The effect was explosive. Browning, Buracker, and the staff watch officer lunged in a body toward the navigation chart, all grabbing for the single measuring dividers. For a moment it looked as if someone might get stabbed by the instrument’s sharp points.

Spruance, meanwhile, calmly rose from his seat, picked up his maneuvering board, and unrolled it. Oliver had wondered for days what it contained. To his astonishment, he saw it was blank, without a pencil mark upon it.

Spruance stood quietly behind his staff officers as they feverishly plotted the reported enemy position. When they finished, he asked that the contact report be read to him.

Someone read it.

Was it authenticated?

It was.

Then he asked for the ranges and bearing from Midway to both his force and to the enemy. These he plotted on his maneuvering board, allowing him to measure the distance from him to the enemy. Using his thumb and index finger as dividers, he estimated the distance was about 175 miles, within the maximum range of his torpedo planes.

He rolled up the maneuvering board and tossed it aside.

‘Launch the attack,’ he said.

”

Buell, 144-5.

The actual departure time of aircraft from Enterprise’s decks depended still on the distance each of the two opposing forces would cover, the direction of the wind and its velocity, the degree of accuracy of the reported position of the enemy, payload and fuel capacity, speed of manning the planes and starting them, time between first and last launch, combat radius, and “the time required to send the attack order by flashing light on the Hornet, also under Spruance’s command. Computing all this was Browning’s job, his considerable job. “But it had to be without delay. Spruance wanted his planes up and flying at the earliest possible moment.” Browning computed 0700; Spruance accepted. So let it be written, so let it be done.

Midway: Proceed to Target

Half an hour into the launch, only half completed.

The first-launched aircraft circled, burning fuel, waiting for others so that it would be a coordinated attack, bombers first, then torpedoes, all protected by fighters. At the same time, the distance to target lengthened due to the winds.

Here is Spruance’s second critical, vital decision. Proceed to target. Proceed with the bombers then aloft. Torpedo planes would follow when they could.

“ Spruance had consciously and deliberately abandoned his plan for a coordinated attack in order to get something headed toward the Japanese without further delay. ”

Buell, p. 147.

Not until an hour and six minutes after launch had begun did the last torpedo plane lift off Enterprise’s deck. Hornet, following Spruance’s orders, had launched and gone. A report that a Japanese scout plane had sighted them had come in, but Spruance was unaware of this until nine minutes later, according to Lundstrom, The First Team (Naval Institute Press 1984).

None of the key decisions had been made by Miles Browning.

agree with morison as a somewhat less than reliable source. 46.138.77.215 (talk) 11:17, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Range

Pls check the distances in the Midway section. The distances are stated in land miles and not nautical miles. A nautical miles over 200 metres longer than a land (statue) mile. --78.54.222.198 (talk) 00:09, 9 February 2009 (UTC)

Npov

Lead is praise not reflecting the article and historians have major disagreements over his role at Midway. Doug Weller talk 16:11, 29 September 2022 (UTC)

Heartily agree. See next entry. ARems 98.169.179.8 (talk) 21:19, 20 October 2022 (UTC)

Drachinfel You Tube Vid Clip "Spruance- Masterminding Midway to Taking Tarawa" states Browning was resonsible for failing to inform the pilots on the first (succesful) attack on the 3 Japanes carriers, where the US carriersa would be upon returning. This is what caused the loss of so many aircraft havbing to be ditched. 105.186.195.123 (talk) 17:27, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Unused Resource

Many points can be corrected or expanded upon by reference to my article about Browning in the April 2016 issue of Naval History Magazine titled Out of the Jaws of Victory- https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2016/april/out-jaws-victory Particularly significant, as Doug Weller correctly observed above, it is very doubtful if Browning deserves praise for his performance at Midway. Spruance refused a medal for Browning's performance which involved multiple serious errors that deserve mention - including a pilot revolt over assignment on what would have been a suicide mission had Browning not been overruled by Spruance. The article dissects the words of the citation and includes noted historian Craig Symonds opinion that such praise was unmerited. Many specific examples are given in the article underlining Browning's recklessness throughout his career, such as a hair-raising risk he took with his squadron to excel at the 1936 National Air Races. The article makes clear that Browning was not given command of the Hornet for merit, as might be assumed from the entry, but as a device by Navy leadership to force Halsey to give up someone they regarded a bad influence. This quote from King is worth including: "Browning was no damn good at all. He had no brains and no understanding." As it comes from King, expect no POV problem. Also, the article variously says he was married either three or four times. According to his last marriage license available at Ancestry, he was married four times. Found in Ancestry, and not mentioned in the article, was birth of a son in the mid-1930s. ARems 98.169.179.8 (talk) 21:16, 20 October 2022 (UTC)

Thanks. Doug Weller talk 15:12, 21 October 2022 (UTC)

Midway

As it stands, the section on Midway is seriously deficient. Most of the material involves the general situation during the battle. There is no recognition of the several serious errors committed by Browning that caused Spruance to deny an award; and for Symonds to state that the award, conferred at the insistence of Halsey who was not present during the battle, was unmerited. Much more than Browning's abrasive personality was involved. Also, it was circumstances of the unfolding battle that caused the defending Japanese aircraft to be out of position when the American dive bombers arrived, not the genius of Browning as indicated by the article wording. As already urged, use should be made here and elsewhere of the information in my magazine article about Browning, as cited above under Unused Resource. ARems 98.169.179.8 (talk) 00:14, 27 October 2022 (UTC)