Talk:McCollum memo
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A Comment on the Honesty of Wikipedia Editors
[edit]I would like to highlight the extremely apparent dishonesty of this edit. No doubt, many have made similar edits, but this one is clearly rubbish.
The editing user makes the claims that McCollum "did not advocate any military attack on Japan", despite the fact that McCollum wrote: "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better"; clearly indicating that McCollum was not only unafraid of or indifferent towards war with Japan, but desired war with Japan. He also ignores McCollum's statements on pg. 5 of the memo, "Japan must be diverted... the United States naval forces now in the Pacific are capable of so containing and harassing Japan" and that "it is to the interested of the United States to eliminate Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan."
The user also ignored, for example, Knox's statement that he "concur[s] in [McCollum's] courses of action" -- specifying, clearly, that it is McCollum's "courses of action" that are agreeable, not, for example, his synopsis of the British, U.S., Japanese, German, etc. positions. Instead, the user wrote: "It reached Captain Knox and vetoed any action, warning 'We should not precipitate anything in the Orient.'", which is clearly wrong. Knox stated very explicitly that he agreed with the courses of action.
And yet, there is more.
Further down in the article, he offers supposed rebuttals for each of the eight proposed actions. Not only is his information here (again) demonstrably false, it is unsubstantiated: he has apparently decided that it is not necessary to cite his sources.
Clearly this user has been dishonest in making this edit, and being familiar with this user, I know that this type of dishonest editing is SOP for him/her. Let us take care to prevent similar edits being made to this article and ones like it. TPaineTX (talk) 14:57, 5 December 2009 (UTC)
- I would like to highlight the extremely apparent dishonesty.
- "McCollum...desired war with Japan"? Really? Japan was at war with China. The only way for the U.S. to provide more direct aid, even so much as a blockade of Japanese ports, was for a state of war to exist between the U.S. & Japan. "'"If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war'"? Because public opinion (never mind Congress) would never support aggressive U.S. action. Winston & FDR were agreed (as noted above), the idea was to deter Japan. "8-step plan to thwart Japan's threatened aggression" Yeah, that was FDR's objective, esp since war with Japan (which is what resulted) in no way benefitted Britain, & he, Winston, Stark, Marshall, & McCollum all knew it. It backfired.
- "Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore. [This was never attempted]" Correct. It was too far from U.S. bases, & there was some concern in USN circles of becoming embroiled in British troubles. (Recall, isolationism was strong. It may be this very prospect was in Winston's mind when the offer was made.) There was also concern the U.S. might end up financing RN facilities, but getting no use from them.
- "Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-Shek. [This was done, but was underway before the memo.]" Correct. Also a reason for the frequently-repeated desire to have Japan commit "the first overt act", as already noted.
- "Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient. [One division was already there.]" Correct, as Blair says. By 12/41, there were more fleet boats in Manila than Hawaii.
- "Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. [This says keep the status quo.]" Also correct. Richardson advocated pulling the fleet back to the West Coast; FDR kept it in Hawaii, as a threat (read, "deterrent") to Japan. He could not know IJN/IJA internal politics would turn it into bait.
- "Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil." The Dutch proved sufficiently resistant to Japanese demands for the U.S. not to need to insist, in the event.
- "Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire." [This was done a year later, by the State Department not the Navy.]" Also correct. It was a stupid thing to do, but it was in keeping with the objective: deter Japan.
- And since I expect to be tarred with the same brush, since I can't cite p# for each, let me suggest TPaineTX consult Blair's Silent Victory, Peattie & Evans' Kaigun, Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin, & War Plan Orange. (There's also an analysis of the economic measures FDR set out, which I can't seem to find in my notes. :(( As usual, when I want it...) I daresay all the points of contention will be answered nicely. This is where I found it. Of course, where conspiracy theory is concerned, evidence rarely changes any minds. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:44, 5 December & 09:56, 6 December 2009 (UTC)
- Evidence rarely changes any minds, indeed. But whose minds?
- You claim "war with Japan... in no way benefited Britain, & he, Winston, Stark, Marshall, & McCollum all knew it. It backfired.", despite the fact that McCollum repeatedly states his main concern is the British (for as long as they can put up a fight, the U.S. is reasonably safe) and their ability to defend the Suez Canal if Japan goes unmolested. This is clearly his primary concern, and then he goes on to say that "[Should Japan declare war], so much the better", which has been been repeatedly cited. Do you not know what "so much the better" means? This link should help you make sense of the phrase. Here's another for good measure -- so much the better, right? The two links should suffice, one would hope.
- How about my explanation of Nimitz Jr.'s quote? Was that sufficient? Were you able to figure out that Nimitz didn't want to be in command of ships that were going to be blown up because he would've gotten blamed for it, but rather, he wanted to be on land, shuffling papers, disconnected completely from the blame that would come after the largely undefended, yet desired attack? Or are you going to make it very clear that you are being willfully ignorant? TPaineTX (talk) 23:22, 5 December 2009 (UTC)
- Yes, I expected you'd trot out the misreading of Nimitz's quote... The difference is, I've been reading in this area over 25yrs, so misreading one quote amounts to nothing. And the evidence isn't in one quote from McCollum, either. It's in the entirety. And in a memo McCollum prepared on the benefit to Germany. And on Winston Churchill's own words. (Or is he "dishonest", too? Or stupid, which you appear to think I am?) The connection between Japan attacking & the benefit to Britain you appear to be drawing ("their ability to defend the Suez Canal if Japan goes unmolested") is faulty. As Winston understood, Britain had to defend Singapore, Hong Kong, & Oz before Japan got anywhere near Suez; recall the events immediately following the start of the Pacific War. As a result, he wanted everything possible done to deter Japan, to prevent diversion of forces...including U.S. forces, which were then aiding RN against U-boats in the Atlantic. Recall, also, precisely those diversions occured after Japan attacked... Material went to U.S. armed forces, rather than Britain, as Winston knew it would. (We can safely conclude FDR did, too.) Indeed, the build-up of B-17s in P.I. went ahead, even while Britain was desperate for ASW a/c, since Winston doubtless believed the threat to Japan (deterrence, again) overweighed the benefit in the Atlantic. (He was wrong, but even brilliant people boob, occasionally. Or do you think you're perfect, too?) "Willful ignorance" has nothing to do with it. I've seen your so-called "evidence", & I'm not persuaded. Why don't you try answering the actual evidence, instead of trying to make out I'm too stupid to grasp McCollum's meaning. Oh, wait, that would require accepting I might be right. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:54, 6 December 2009 (UTC)
- "The connection between Japan attacking & the benefit to Britain you appear to be drawing ("their ability to defend the Suez Canal if Japan goes unmolested") is faulty."
- Faulty according to whom? To you? Is this article about you?
- It certainly was not faulty logic, according to McCollum, for that is what he wrote:
- "Could Japan be diverted or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean" (for this would mean a blockade on India, China, and British positions in North Africa/the Middle East, such as Iraq and the Suez Canal) "thus opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be diverted if the British and American blockade of Europe and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect."
- And that if "Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better", once again disproving your assertion that McCollum didn't want war. Clearly, in the eyes of McCollum, nothing "backfired".
- The McCollum Memo article should be about the McCollum memo, including its impact on pre-war policy, which would require text showing evidence that some of the pertinent government and military officials had indeed seen it. If you have any evidence (with proper citation) to the contrary, you are welcome to append it to the article, but any nonsense, such as assertions that run contrary to the text within the memo, comments that have nothing to do with the topic, and/or comments without citation, is going to be deleted or receive a NPOV tag. Again, this article is about the McCollum Memo, and if you refuse to admit it says because you don't like what it says, that is your own problem. You can either attempt to make a referenced rebuttal or leave. TPaineTX (talk) 12:13, 9 December 2009 (UTC)
- Would you like to actually read what I wrote? The connection is faulty, given Japan goes unmolested. You defend it with "Could Japan be diverted or neutralized", which is expressly contrary to the position I advanced. And McCollum knew the difference better than both of us. McCollum acknowledges an attack by Japan (i.e., war) risks neutralizing British seapower & putting Suez at risk. Which is why it's a moronic idea to encourage it. (Which is also why Winston is asking FDR to do whatever he can to deter Japan from it!) I'd also remind you (for all the good it will do) the U.S. supported China, & could not, under international law (nor, even moreso, Congressional opposition & isolationism) even so much as blockade Japan without an overt hostile act by Japan. You ignore this entire. And what the memo does say cannot be read in isolation, or in support of a preconceived position, both of which you appear to be doing. (Your suggestion "which would require text showing evidence that some of the pertinent government and military officials had indeed seen it" would seem to contradict your previous position, that it was a plan for war, adopted entire by FDR. Of course, inconsistency has never seemed to bother those attempting to prove a conspiracy exists.) Also, I see, as usual when the conspiracy theory is challenged, you fixate on one point & ignore everything else. Would you care to try & answer the others? (I imagine not.) Which leaves you in the position of making accusations of dishonesty, & offering no evidence for error, nor for it being "rubbish", let alone dishonesty; I suggest an apology to Rjensen is in order. (I don't expect one to be forthcoming.) As noted, I don't have the sources handy, & your inability even to read what I wrote disinclines me to go to more effort to persuade you. For those interested, the sources I mentioned do contain the pertinent facts. I invite the open-minded to look. I invite you to take off the blinders. If you can get past being insulting to anyone who disagrees with you. I doubt either is possible. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:18 & 17:30, 9 December 2009 (UTC) (P.S. I think the econ sanctions issue is raised in Barnhart's Japan Prepares for Total War, which deals with her efforts toward autarky.)
- I would like to provide better responses to your input, but unfortunately, I find you rather incoherent.
- McCollum does indeed state that an attack by Japan (on the British) would be unfortunate unless "Japan [could] be diverted or neutralized" (i.e. by the United States), in which case he views war with Japan as favorable (e.g. "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better."). Of course, Churchill also did not want, for Great Britain, war with Japan -- especially exclusively -- but it was McCollum's intention to make sure that Japan did not declare war on Britain without also declaring war on the United States. McCollum wanted the United States to be the matador's red cloth to Japan, diverting attention away from Britain, and indeed, he plainly stated that a declaration of war upon the US was desirable. That is very clear. TPaineTX (talk) 03:06, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
<--"I find you rather incoherent"? I invite you to ask for clarification, in that event. However, I don't even see an attempt to answer.
"he plainly stated that a declaration of war upon the US was desirable" Really? War with Japan was not a desirable outcome, and McCollum knew it. The proposition it was desirable, as you seem to be suggesting (& as you seem to believe McCollum is saying), is flat wrong. What was desirable, & what McCollum means, is something to provide an excuse to impose stronger measures on Japan (such as blockade, as noted), due to her incursions in China, & as a means to keep her away from Britain. Do you believe he doesn't know this is what FDR wants? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 16:08, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
- "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." - McCollum
- "Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war." - FDR
- All of your claims fly in the face of these statements by McCollum and FDR. Sorry, but you can only deny reality so much.
- It is interesting that you claim that the goal was the provocation of an event "to provide an excuse to impose stronger measures on Japan (such as blockade)", however. Do you not realize that a blockade is an act of war? And how exactly is the United States going to enforce a blockade on Japan? They'd have to sink most of Japan's Navy first... and shoot down many of its aircraft... and bomb its runways. Does that not sound to you like war? That sounds like war to me. Although it's taken considerable dialogue for you to exhibit comprehension of the memo, I am glad we're on the same page now.
- TPaineTX (talk) 18:14, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
- I will acknowledge enforcing a blockade requires this. Declaring one does none of these. It does, however, enable the U.S. to provide additional aid to China, which was the aim. Since you find me so "incoherent" (perhaps you'd care to actually read what I wrote, not what you thought it said?), perhaps you'd like to show me where I said "enforcing" a blockade was ever an objective? The declaration was a politcal act, with benefit under international law at the time (of which I am unaware, not being a specialist in international law of the 1930s).
- "willing to enter the war" Does not mean war is a good idea, just there's likely to be support for stronger measures against Japn, which was the objective. And a U.S. public more willing to go to war might in itself have been a deterrent to Japan, in FDR's mind. (That it wouldn't be in Japan was something he couldn't have known.)
- "Sorry, but you can only deny reality so much." War with Japan benefits German most, & McCollum knew it. So (doubtless) did FDR, presuming he read the memo McCollum wrote on the subject (never mind he'd have been told this by Stark, Marshall, & Churchill). And you still refuse to answer the other issues, yet again fixating on one point. (A different one, I see, as usual; change the subject when you can't win on the facts, as usual.) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 18:47 & 18:49, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
- You're simply making up excuses left and right for the words of McCollum and FDR. My quotes are from the actual memo and from Admiral Richardson. You're just going on and on with some rather crude and unconvincing apologetics, claiming things that contradict statements made by McCollum, FDR, Richardson, Kimmel, etc. -- you simply make stuff up. No citation, no logic, no nothing. You claim that what they really meant was that they wanted to be able to publicly declare a blockade, but not implement it, in order to send aid to China -- something that you admit was already "underway before the memo", so what would be the point of that? Nothing. It's rubbish. It's made-up nonsense. You ought to be ashamed of yourself, but I sincerely doubt that you are. TPaineTX (talk) 02:51, 12 December 2009 (UTC)
- "You're simply making up excuses left and right" Excuses? You are ignoring the fact the issue is broader & more complicated than one damn memo, no matter what it says. "It's made-up nonsense."? Then it's made up by Barnhart, who explains the rationale better than I can. And I notice you've managed to a) change the subject again & b) resort to insults again. And, as I said (but you conveniently choose to ignore), I don't have all the sources in front of me. I also notice you've made no real effort to answer the points raised. If anybody should be ashamed, it's you. Notice: declaration of blockade had political implications of benefit to China. (And, as noted, I don't have Barnhart in front of me, & my memory isn't eidetic {which you seem to presume it should be; is yours?}, so I can't quote the reasons from memory. I imagine you'll call that "made up" anyhow.)
- Let me ask for a point for point answer, then. (Here's hoping you bother to read these.)
- McCollum issues a memo stating the benefit of war with Japan will be to Germany. How, then, is it "so much the better" there be one?
- Churchill asks FDR to make a strong effort to deter Japan, in an effort to prevent another war. How, then, is it "so much the better" there be one?
- FDR initiates a buildup of forces in the Philippines, with the objective of deterring Japan. Do you deny it? (My guess: yes.)
- "Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient. [One division was already there.]" Correct, as Blair says. By 12/41, there were more fleet boats in Manila than Hawaii. Do you deny it? Or do you allege Blair is dishonest, too?
- "Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil." Do you deny the Dutch actually did refuse to capitulate to Japanese demands for oil before the war started?
- "Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire." [This was done a year later, by the State Department not the Navy.]" Do you deny this was done? Do you further deny it was a proximate cause of war? (I imagine you do deny it was a stupid thing to do, & that it was in keeping with the objective, i.e. deter Japan, because it's not in your favorite memo.)
- "Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-Shek. [This was done, but was underway before the memo.]" You call this dishonest, yet you've just finished saying, "aid to China..was already underway." So who's dishonest?
- "Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. [This says keep the status quo.]" Do you deny this happened? And if the "quotes from Richardson" suggest he wanted war, too, why, then was he not calling for the fleet to be moved to Manila? Rather, he wanted it in San Pedro or San Diego, hardly a location Japan was likely to attack or see as a threat; indeed, Japan expected it to be based there & expected to be able to attack it en route to the "decisive battle area". And if FDR really wanted war so badly, why wasn't he moving the fleet to Manila? Unlike Richardson, he could do it. And for damn sure Japan couldn't ignore the fleet based there. "Let Japan commit the first overt act"? With the fleet in Manila, that would've put the count in minutes until it happened. So why didn't "warmonger" FDR do it?
- And let me suggest, yet again, you consult Blair's Silent Victory, Peattie & Evans' Kaigun, Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin, White's War Plan Orange, & Barnhart's Japan Prepares for Total War. I daresay you'll find I'm right on all counts. (Of course, that would require you actually read something, & actually accept a POV contradictory to your own, which would require having an open mind.)
- How many of these points are you going to ignore as inconvenient? (All of them, again?) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:24, 12 December 2009 (UTC)
- Yep, ignored every one of them. Just goes to show the caliber of scholarship in support of this nutty fantasy. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 02:40, 17 June 2011 (UTC)
- "McCollum issues a memo stating the benefit of war with Japan will be to Germany." Πετάει ο γάιδαρος; Πετάει!! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:587:5C10:3200:5178:C0B2:DDC6:55CC (talk) 23:41, 13 February 2017 (UTC)
- You're simply making up excuses left and right for the words of McCollum and FDR. My quotes are from the actual memo and from Admiral Richardson. You're just going on and on with some rather crude and unconvincing apologetics, claiming things that contradict statements made by McCollum, FDR, Richardson, Kimmel, etc. -- you simply make stuff up. No citation, no logic, no nothing. You claim that what they really meant was that they wanted to be able to publicly declare a blockade, but not implement it, in order to send aid to China -- something that you admit was already "underway before the memo", so what would be the point of that? Nothing. It's rubbish. It's made-up nonsense. You ought to be ashamed of yourself, but I sincerely doubt that you are. TPaineTX (talk) 02:51, 12 December 2009 (UTC)
FDR could and did know that the fleet being at Pearl Harbor was risking an attack by the Japanese, Admiral O Richardson told him so (on the tredmill to Pearl Harbor) Montestruc (talk) 17:53, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
A deceitful book?
[edit]In the review "A deceitful book" by Rear Admiral Richard E. Young (which I downloaded a PDF of but now can't locate a link for...) calls in question the reliability of Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit. It misrepresents the position of McCollum, mistates the number of intercepts, misrepresents the meaning of radio silence, & makes unsubstantiated claims about FDR's having seen an important memo, just to name examples offhand. It is also contradicted in its thesis by one of Stinnett's own sources, as quoted in his own footnotes. This doesn't sound reliable to me. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 02:40, 17 June 2011 (UTC)
Young http://www.artbarninc.org/REY/Stinnett.pdf
is not a “reliable source” he asserts things he has no evidence let alone proof of.
It is physically impossible to prove FDR did not see the memo. Asserting he did not is bad scholarship and childish. Montestruc (talk) 14:53, 26 December 2017 (UTC)
Rear Admiral Young reviewed the book on Amazon, at https://www.amazon.com/review/R3CCECK90K142H — Preceding unsigned comment added by Saintonge235 (talk • contribs) 19:59, 24 October 2020 (UTC)
- We can't use Amazon reviews, customer or otherwise. They aren't reliably published, see WP:VERIFY. Doug Weller talk 16:21, 25 October 2020 (UTC)
WP:Japan Assessment Commentary
[edit]The article was assessed Start-class. The article suffers from a deficiency of references, as it relies too heavily on a single source. Article suffers from {{WP:NPOV|POV issues]]. Overall, the article seems less about the memo, and more about criticizing or exposing the deception in one work about the memo. Boneyard90 (talk) 11:42, 9 January 2013 (UTC)
Agree 100%, this article suffers from some editors with obnoxious bias to the point of cult of personality worship of FDR.
In the real world if a war happens some of the politicians are always at fault, usualy the ones who refuse to meet and try to negociate a way out of war are at fault. Montestruc (talk) 20:10, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
Article protected
[edit]This article has been protected from editing for three days to try to generate talk page discussion of the disputed content. Please follow the WP:BRD guideline. You may also wish to consider dispute resolution (WP:DR). Mark Arsten (talk) 22:59, 9 August 2013 (UTC)
Inclusion of entire text of McCollum memorandum
[edit]Should the entire text of the memorandum be included in the article? The answer is no. Binksternet, you referred to the page Wikipedia:NOTREPOSITORY, which is part of a Wikipedia policy page titled "What Wikipedia is not". Point #3 under the subheading "Wikipedia is not a mirror or a repository of links, images, or media files" states that Wikipedia shall not host the original unmodified text of source documents. Such materials are to be added to Wikisource, not here. This is a Wikipedia policy, not an editorial choice. There's a link to the McCollum Memo at the bottom of the article. Comments? -- Diannaa (talk) 01:08, 10 August 2013 (UTC)
- Quite correct. Policy has us discussing the memo, but not hosting the whole thing. We can certainly quote parts of it if the WP:SECONDARY sources point to those parts. The quotes that are currently in the article ought to be checked to see if they are directly discussed by secondary sources. Binksternet (talk) 03:43, 10 August 2013 (UTC)
RfC: Are these valid sources?
[edit]The last three sentences of the the first section seem to me to have unacceptable sources, especially the first one, which uses a review on Amazon.com. I have found the content of that review in other places online, but never in a trustworthy, published source. The second sentence I find uses a questionable source, but the biggest problem I find is that the sentence itself is unclear (perhaps the author could clarify it?). The third sentence seems to be a conflict of interest, as it is a person exonerating himself of something.
On top of all of this, these three sentences completely reverse what the entire section had been saying up to that point. Perhaps if some version of them is kept, they could be put in their own section? Shicoco (talk) 14:24, 27 September 2013 (UTC)
- ♠"Trustworthy, published source"? How is it that only arises when somebody wants to discredit an online ref? I originally found the Young PDF at Google Books or Google Scholar (can't recall which). Not reliable enough for you? If not, why not? It's common enough elsewhere.
- ♠I'm not clear why you think the second-last sentence is unclear: Stinnett says McCollum took a particular position; McCollum denies it. Who are we supposed to believe? And you call The Saturday Review of Literature "questionable"? Really? What do you want?
- ♠The third has got nothing to do with conflict of interest. What it has is McCollum's sworn testimony, which refutes Stinnett's claim; the source is one of the very Congressional inquiries Stinnett holds up as evidence of conspiracy. Again, what do you want?
- ♠"these three sentences completely reverse what the entire section had been saying" Indeed. Because what it had been saying is what Stinnett claims is true. These are offering the counter case. Balance, yes? You'd prefer only to hear Stinnett's side, perhaps?
- ♠By appearances, you're trying to gut the criticism of Stinnett's dubious & fictional claims. What, exactly, is the problem with the sources? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 05:24, 28 September 2013 (UTC)
- USN Rear Admiral Richard E. Young (retired) is one of the questioned sources. Young is a respected Denver resident, a recipient of the 2011 Outstanding Military Community Service award given by the governor of Colorado.[1][2] During his Navy service, Young was assigned the task of organizing the vessels celebrating the Statue of Liberty's 100th birthday in 1986.[3][4] Young co-wrote the paper "Customs or Coast Guard?" which was published in the U.S. Naval Institute journal Proceedings in August 1987. Young's very critical review of Stinnett's book first appeared in 2004. The Amazon website says it was uploaded on 3 January 2004 as a book review.[5] A slightly different copy of it can be found at American Diplomacy, dated 9 July 2004, hosted by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A greatly expanded PDF version containing extensive footnotes is hosted by the website of the now-defunct Art Barn in Vermont;[6] this updated review by Young contains a final footnote about how Stinnett "as of June 27, 2009," had not yet honored his promise to deposit his source materials at Stanford University. Thus we can surmise that Young updated the document at least by mid-2009. The footnotes clinch it for me; this later document is well-researched and very specific in its criticisms of Stinnett. Binksternet (talk) 06:22, 28 September 2013 (UTC)
- Thx for all that. Especially for the PDF; it's the one I've got, & the one I'm relying on for the cites. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 06:58, 28 September 2013 (UTC)
- I have changed my mind. While I agree that the information being presented by Richard E. Young is valuable (just not off Amazon), I have found that the biggest problem is that this info is off-topic and argumentative, rather than objective (you can write the arguments of others objectively). This article is about the McCollum Memo, not the credibility of the arguments in Day of Deceit. The article mentions Day of Deceit because it was due to this book that the McCollum Memo received a lot of attention. Whether or not that book is reliable or not does not matter, all that matters is that the McCollum Memo received a lot of attention when it was the target of a conspiracy theory. This page is not for the advancing of arguments.
- Trekphiler, I have reviewed other edits you made to Day of Deceit, and found this quote by you regarding Day of Deceit: "Because it's a fabrication masquerading as fact." This quote makes it clear that you are not concerned with being neutral, but rather advancing your own opinions. Your opinions may be correct, but the rules need to be followed.
- I am going to remove the off-topic material, including off-topic material that supports the Stinnett side, and I will remove RfC template, as the issue is no longer about sourcing (which I still think was a problem), but rather being off-topic. Shicoco (talk) 15:00, 28 September 2013 (UTC)
- ♠You're right, I'm not neutral on the subject, nor have I ever claimed to be. Your whitewash of Stinnett is rv'd. You want to make out like he is neutral, when he's neither neutral nor honest in his treatment of McCollum's memo. Readers without extensive knowledge of the subject deserve complete information, & that includes the deep flaws in Stinnett's position. If you intend to leave in claims for McCollum advocating war with Japan, per Stinnett, the other side must remain, also: that is simple NPOV treatment.
- ♠Make a note: my own biases do not govern what's on the page. I invite anybody not already involved in this to examine my edits & judge for themselves: are they in the interests of balanced treatment, or POV-pushing? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 02:30, 30 September 2013 (UTC)
It shoud be noted in all these claims of "refutation" of the intent of the McCollum memo by McCollum, that McCollum died in 1974, and the memo was not declassified till the 1990s. The EXISTENCE of the memo was not acknowledged by the US Government till the 1990s. McCollum's statements must be taken in light of the fact that the memo was very highly classified at the time the supposed "refutations" were made, and these "refutations" were more along the lines of McCollum stating that the Roosevelt Administration had no intent to provoke Japan. They do not state that the Roosevelt Administration was not willing to risk provoking Japan with policies that they knew the Japanese were likely to go to war over. Montestruc (talk) 14:22, 8 December 2016 (UTC)
Conrad Crane
[edit]It should be stated Conrad Crane, the US army representative and reviewer of "Day of Deceit" who thinks that McCollum's "overt act of war" was just an "offhand remark" works as the Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. He may be a US army historian, but he also gets paid by the US army. This highly important fact should be told to the reader, and not hidden or omitted. Stating Crane's position as "Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA" would present the reader with the necessary information. Pounamuknight (talk) 01:59, 28 February 2014 (UTC)
I agree, this is appropriate to add. Montestruc (talk) 18:22, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
Stinnett is not the subject of this article.
[edit]Putting attacks on the honesty or integrity of Stinnett is not really appropriate to this article. In the first place even though it was Stinnett that found the McCollum memo by a FOIA request, his "interpretation" of McCollum's intent in writing the memo is not properly a subject of this article either, and so NEITHER Stinnett's opinion, nor refutation of Stinnetts opinion belong in this article. The appropriate place for such would be in an article on Stinnett's book.
Furthermore, and lots of documetation back this up. The memo was classified till 1994, McCollum died in 1976, so McCollum could not legally refute jack about the memo. Any article he wrote for public consumption, or testimony given in congress prior to the memo being declassified could not involve a discussion of the memo or classified USN or White House policies regarding the Japanese.
The claim that McCollum writing in a public forum some 10+ years after the memo is in any way relivent to the memo is absurd. This is obvious bias on it's face. The memo clearly shows that in upper USN Intelligence circles they knew that the actions taken could result in war. To assert FDR did not know is ludicrous. Montestruc (talk) 18:19, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
- Anybody who is foundational to a topic is part of the historiography of that topic. Stinnett is inextricably linked to the topic. Stinnett's unfortunate book was a travesty of falsehood and manufactured conclusions. The "attack" on Stinnett by people who know the actual story is appropriate here because it relates to the historiography – the wrong narrative that Stinnett created about the memo to sell his book. Binksternet (talk) 22:01, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
Nonsense. It is irrational to "refute" a position that you do not allow to be presented. Stinnett's "interpretation" of McCollum's opinion is not presented in the article. If Stinnett's position is not clearly presented with proper references to book showing EXACTLY what Stinnett alleges, which is not in the article, then the so called refutation is a straw man, and just a biased opinion. Further it is not relevant to McCollum memo itself. You asserting Stinnett's opinion of McCollum's intent is relivent to the memo does not make it so.
Both of the references are to open literature of opinion, not fact.
What FDR thought about this issue is not really a matter of fact, just conjecture and inference. Stinnetts opinion on wh
Montestruc (talk) 23:30, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
So you admit you are trying to control the historical narrative. I infer from " actual story is appropriate here because it relates to the historiography – the wrong narrative that Stinnett created about the memo to sell his book." So rather than being an angry veteran who writes the book because he feels that FDR got a a lot of his buddies killed for no good reason, you take personal pot shots at him implying that he only did this to make a buck and that he is such an unethical person and journalist he would do that? Montestruc (talk) 23:42, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
Could we please agree that only psychotic persons are willfully evil and deliberately try to profit from from what you imply? Can we please agree that Stinnett was an angry vet, that he honestly belived what he said, that he made honest mistakes and may have engaged in hyperbole, but that your alligation that Stinnett was primarally motivated by profit is nonsense. Montestruc (talk) 23:52, 15 December 2016 (UTC)
Quote of Stinnett from day of Deceit.
“Lieutenant Commander McCollum’s five-page memorandum of October 1940 (hereafter referred to as the eight-action memo) put forward a startling plan—a plan intended to engineer a situation that would mobilize a reluctant America into joining Britain’s struggle against the German armed forces then overrunning Europe. Its eight actions called for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Dutch colonial outposts in the Pacific region.”
Excerpt From: Stinnett, Robert. “Day of Deceit.” FREE PRESS. iBooks. This material may be protected by copyright.
Check out this book on the iBooks Store: https://itun.es/us/iDkVw.l
I would agree that Stinnett is engaging in hyperbole, but the McCollum Memo article in wikipedia does not make clear what Stinnett states, McCollum was "planning".
The "refutation" does not make clear what position the article is refuting.
The "refutation" does not negate what McCollum actually said in the memo. But the existing wording implies that McCollum's memo was not advocating a plan that seriously risked war with Japan, which is emphatically not true. Montestruc (talk) 03:26, 16 December 2016 (UTC)
I would rather not go into what motives Stinnett attributes to McCollum at all, but if you insist on discussing it at all, you need to clearly document what Stinnett accused McCollum of. Montestruc (talk) 00:05, 20 December 2016 (UTC)
Fulfillment of the eight-action plan?
[edit]One important claim that is circling on the Internet is that all eight of the listed actions were implemented before the Pearl Harbor attack. If this claim is true, then it would be strong evidence of the influence of this memo. If the claim is not true, then it would be strong evidence of the memo's lack of influence. So I would love to see a section of the article that reports on the implementation of the eight actions or lack thereof. --ApostateAbe (talk) 19:13, 28 February 2018 (UTC)
- A section on its lack of implementation might be a good idea, except for the inability to demonstrate absence. How do you show a thing was not done? It's possible to show FDR never saw the memo; I'm not clear how you show he took none of the actions supposedly offered in it, except by the fact they weren't done. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 21:06, 28 February 2018 (UTC)
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