Talk:Madhyamaka/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Shentong/Rangtong and prasangika/yogacara

Is it correct to identify yogacara with shentong, and prasangika with rangtong? These terms certainly aren't translations of one-another. My (limited) understanding is that shentong/rangtong is a question of view, as in how you "see", whereas yogacara/prasangika is concerned with philosphical reasoning. So my opinion is that it is possible to be a prasangika philosophically, and a shentongpa for the purposes of meditation practice.

I further understand that *all* important tibetan lamas profess adherence to the prasangika school of reasoning. If prasangika is to be construed as being in opposition to shentong view, then that would mean that there are no more shentongpas. Since this is counterfactual, I find myself somewhat confudledoo (madhyamaka thinking is supposed to lead to clarity, so I'm obviously doing it wrong!).

I haven't tried to fill-in the missing article on Rangtong, in the hope that someone who is philosophically opposed to Shentong view will help to clarify this question. --MrDemeanour 12:24, 18 September 2005 (UTC)

Well, from what I understand of the Shentong issue, it certainly is in no way cognate with yogacarya. However, the actual specific details of what shentong is, is much harder to understand. I am guessing, but I think they were asserting that there is one mode of emptiness - shentong - which merely meant 'empty of other' - ie empty of being something other than itself. This could be construed to indicate an essentially existing substrate similar to 'God', and is probably why the Jonangpas were accused of holding non-buddhist views. I may be completely mistaken, not being a scholar, and not being too familiar with this rather antique long-standing debate. (20040302 13:34, 18 September 2005 (UTC))

"Empty of something other than itself" - this is correct, and has indeed been construed in the way you say. I believe the accusations against the Jonangpas, however, were leveled for political reasons, and the doctrinal issue was a pretext. But this debate isn't "antique", and the shentong view is not just a historical footnote; the Rimay masters were shentongpas, as are many of their their contemporary lineal descendants. I'd like to add a cite from Jamgon Kongtrul to emphasize this; but I'm unable to check it (it's a second-hand citation). Kongtrul apparently says in Encyclopaedia of Knowledge that rangtong is for establishing certainty through listening, studying and reflecting; shentong is for meditation practice.

--MrDemeanour 16:07, 19 September 2005 (UTC)

Thank-you for your correction - I did not mean to demean the issue by calling it antique - though I see now that it is easier to read it that way than otherwise - I was merely saying that it has an old history. My understanding of Madhyamaka holds that, if I am right in my understanding of shentong, this would be objectionable to views held by Candrakirti and indeed Nagarjuna - both of whom tried pretty hard to deny any form of essence whatsoever. It is possible that the shentong/rangtong debate continues to have a political facet to it also, though I would feel that such areas are outside of the scope of a general presentation of Madhyamaka (ie this article). (20040302 17:01, 19 September 2005 (UTC))

Continuing this discussion, at the risk of repeating myself, I do not think it is correct to identify the Shentong/Rangtong division as being the same as the Prasangika/Yogacara division. Following MrDemeanour's statements that

1. The Rimay masters are shentongpas and
2. All Tibetan lamas profess adherence to the prasangika,

We have to either state that there is a contradiction, or that both Shentong and Rangtong views belong to those who claim to be Prasangikas. The Yogacarya school has plenty of distinguishing features: one of them is (from what I understand) that the Yogacarya assert that e.g. a table appears to be a different substantial entity from the eye consciousness apprehending it but is not - therefore in Yogacarya, a table is said to be empty of being a different entity from a valid consciousness. This mode of emptiness is (in my limited understanding) in direct contrast to the shentong position, if it is as above-stated: empty of being something other than itself.

With these thoughts in mind, and until someone cares to express a clear rationale for their union, I am removing the sentence Tibetan adherents of this school refer to it as the Shentong view, whereas Prasangika Madhyamaka is known as the Rangtong view.

Further to this, I am deeply intrigued as to how someone can actually be a Prasangika and express the shentong position of "empty of being something other than itself" - what does this position mean, in light of Candrakirti: "Atman" is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature, understanding that according to the Madhyamikas this 'intrinsic nature' exists solely as a cognitive obscuration - the root obscuration responsible for all suffering? What I am curious about is how one can derive an understanding of the essencelessness of a thing from meditating on the emptiness of being something other than itself? (20040302 13:46, 5 October 2005 (UTC))

Shentong/Rangtong not the same as Prasangika/Yogacara: I'm sure this is correct. Specifically, my understanding is that the terms Shentong and Rangtong are not translations of any Sanskrit terms, and the ideas behind them were Tibetan developments.

Could it be that the problem is the result of confounding a view with a system of reasoning? Prasangika and Yogacara are ways of establishing certainty. I don't think the "emptiness" that they each asserts is a different kind of emptiness.

Shentong and Rangtong are "views", i.e. ways of seeing, not of reasoning. Shentong view, in particular, can only be acquired as the result of being shown (pointing out). It's not a type of logic, nor is it the kind of thing that could be proved by some system of logic. And as far as I can understand, the Shentong view is pretty meaningless, outside the context of Rangtong insight. This is really difficult stuff to discourse about, I think; words definitely get in the way. but my understanding is that Shentong is really a sort of Rangtong-plus, and that the two are not really opposed to one-another, despite this being the way the story is usually presented. One would need to have acquired Rantong insight, for Shentong view to become accessible. That's why one might profess to be both a prasangika and a shentongpa. --MrDemeanour

Thanks for the comment - regarding shentong/rangtong - I am ignorant, and have offered the best I can without more research. However, I completely disagree about Prasangika and Yogacarya both as merely ways of establishing certainty (for a start the schools are both concerned with Prajnaparamita, not Pramana) secondly, for a Prasangika, the Yogacarya view is basically an essentialist view: The yogacarya assert the necessity of things like 'mind-basis-of-all' and other phenomena, whereas the Prasangika tend to avoid substance doctrine at all cost. (20040302)

Ringu Tulku about Shengtong/Rangtong: "Rangtong and Shentong

There has been a great deal of heated debate in Tibet between the exponents of Rangtong, (Wylie, Rang-stong) and Shentong, (Wylie, gZhen-stong) philosophies. The historic facts of these two philosophies are well known to the Tibetologists. This is what Kongtrul has to say about the two systems:

"Rangtong and Shentong

Madhyamika philosophies have no differences in realising as 'Shunyata', all phenomena that we experience on a relative level. They have no differences also, in reaching the meditative state where all extremes (ideas) completely dissolve. Their difference lies in the words they use to describe the Dharmata. Shentong describes the Dharmata, the mind of Buddha, as 'ultimately real'; while Rangtong philosophers fear that if it is described that way, people might understand it as the concept of 'soul' or 'Atma'. The Shentong philosopher believes that there is a more serious possibility of misunderstanding in describing the Enlightened State as 'unreal' and 'void'. Kongtrul finds the Rangtong way of presentation the best to dissolve concepts and the Shentong way the best to describe the experience."

Does this help?

Austerlitz -- 88.75.91.43 (talk) 20:28, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

quotation from *Ringu Tulku: The Rimé (Ris-med) movement of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great

Austerlitz -- 88.75.91.43 (talk) 20:31, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Prasangika Madhyamaka Paragraph

The Prasangika Madhyamaka paragraph is a misrepresentation of the school's views on every single issue.

1. Prasanga is not their sole avowed technique
2. The views of the Prasangika Madhyamaka are NOT held solely for the purpose of defeating all views.

There is no doubt at all that the PM have their own views, and that they do not solely use Prasanga. Tsongkhapa has written eloquently and at length on these specific issues - as the misrepresentation is a traditional one. In fairness, one could argue that some who claim to be PM themselves also state this - what Tsongkhapa does is to show that these two points are not representative of the views of Nagarjuna or Candrakirti. At some point I shall work on a revised paragraph that is more adequate. (20040302 17:31, 26 October 2005 (UTC))

Still no distinction between dependent designation and dependent origination

I have noticed that there is still no mention of the (M.Pra.) division of Pratītyasamutpāda into the two clases of dependent designation (eg Nagarjuna: 'nivṛtam abhidhātavyaṁ nivṛtte cittagocare') and dependent origination, here, on the Prasangika page, or on the Pratītyasamutpāda - let alone anywhere else.

I am not a scholar, and since the obsession with references from published books, I have lost some interest in being a wiki editor. However, the omission is large, especially as it is dependent designation which prevents the M.Pra view from establishing an essence in causality.

In fact, and it may just be my reading of them, these articles appear to me to be dumbing down the Madhyamaka view so much that it begins to sound like some sort of 'everything is interconnected' view, which doesn't even begin to present a view which assists in liberation. It's only one premise of a syllogism that begins to establish the view based on dependant origination:

everything is interconnected (OR dependent on causes/designation - therefore not independent)

interconnected things are essenceless (only independent things have essence)

therefore everything is essenceless

Also (relating the view to the afflictions)

(afflictive) grasping depends on a view that phenomena essentially exist

as everything is essenceless, any view that differs from that is false

therefore a view that phenomena essentially exist is afflictive (ignorance)

It is because of the purpose of the Madhyamaka view - to directly undermine the afflictions, that we can measure the success of our own understanding. If we have substantially eliminated grasping, afflictive attachment and aversion, then our view is successful.

As one of the masters [can't remember who or where] points out that syllogisms themselves are only of value if such rational methods are accepted by the student. This is important, as the disclosure of the Madhyamaka view can only be effective within the language of the audience itself (a necessary feature of reductio arguments in general). (20040302 (talk) 10:23, 10 June 2008 (UTC))

A red link is created based on the following....

http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=Madhyamaka+Yogacara&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=title&as_sauthors=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en --222.67.212.250 (talk) 10:14, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=Yogacara-Madhyamaka%20school&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=ws --222.67.212.250 (talk) 10:17, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Nihilism?

Can Eastern "nihilism" be explained in terms of Western solipsism? ThomHImself (talk) 05:36, 24 October 2010 (UTC)

Wow you read my mind. See my comment when I modified the third paragraph. I could not agree more with you it is bass ackwards...for now, the bold print below is what I put in...

FROM MAINSPACE: Mādhyamaka is a rejection of two extreme views, and therefore represents the "middle way" between eternalism—the view that something has an objective existence (i.e., its existence does not depend on external objects)—and what some Western interpreters translate as "nihilism". The term nihilism is used here in the sense from Indian philosophy, which differs from that used in Western philosophical nihilism. The sense used here denotes either an assertion that all things are intrinsically already destroyed or rendered nonexistent, or a denial of the existence of something that actually exists.User:Geofferybard|Bard गीता 01:37, 30 April 2011 (UTC)

IIRC, Within the context of Madhyamaka, the term 'nihilism' is a very literal translation of (Tib.) chad-lta-ba / sarvaśūnyatva (Skt.). The attribution is not solely one belonging to Madhaymaka or to even to Buddhism, but is widely used by ancient Indian philosophy. Moreover, the examination of the meaning of nihilism is debated and differentiated amongst all those traditions, even within the various schools of Madhyamaka. Tsongkhapa (who is only one Madhyamaka voice among many) states that the definition of "Nihilism" is shared between the Madhyamaka and the (Buddhist?) Essentialists as those who dispute/negate causality - and most specifically, Karma. There is a well-known apocryphal(?) story in Tibet that the progenitor of the nihilist view was an Indian academic who wanted to defend an incestuous relationship with his daughter, and he did not want to consider the consequences of his actions, so he developed a philosophy (nihilism) that was free from the concept of consequences to one's actions. So in brief, there is a general consensus among many Buddhists that a disbelief in Karma is enough to be considered as a nihilist. (From which we can deduce that Buddhism, even Madhyamaka Buddhism, is a religion in that it requires a belief (or at the very least a non-rejection) of Karma). Of course, the essentialist schools of Buddhism accuse the Madhyamaka of being nihilists, in that the essentialist view relates causality directly to essential existence. ( cf. Jinpa, p29; ISBN 0415406056 ). Even within the Gelug tradition, there are nuanced differences regarding the definition of nihilism that are collegiate, as well monastic (see some of the academic texts from Loseling vs. Gomang, for instance - I don't know of any translations, sorry); likewise other Madhyamaka schools that stretch from Europe over to Japan have their own definitions, and a scholarship tradition of nearly two thousand years discussing this issue. To conflate this vast range of differing views (vast even within Madhyamaka) with a relatively narrow examination from Western Philosophy (where nihilism plays a far less significant part) is, IMO, naive. 20040302 (talk) 14:04, 30 April 2011 (UTC)

"the distillation of all of Buddhism"

Mādhyamaka can be considered the distillation or bottom-line understanding of all of Buddhism. Although I may believe this to be the case, it doesn't mean anything, and quite clearly it is also not true, unless one wishes to argue that the Cittamatra, Vaibhashika, Svatrantika, (and many other) philosophical schools are non-Buddhist, which would be very hard. Moreover, especially the Cittamatra state that the 2nd turning of the wheel is not the final turning of the wheel, and that the final (distilled) word of Buddha is theirs. Although there are syncretists, there are also those who hold that these traditions and teachings are distinct.

The word 'Mādhyamaka' is just a word, here we are referring to the philosophical school as promoted by Nagarjuna (the opening statement of this article). Clearly there were Buddhists before Nagarjuna.

"All of Buddhism" is every Buddhist (lay and monastic), and every Buddhist culture, with all their own views, across the last 2,600 years. There are plenty of Buddhists who reject Mādhyamaka as being nihilist. To make such a large claim is pretty meaningless.

If it really must be kept, please provide it as a citation, from a text that makes the statement. Otherwise it's unsubstantiated. (20040302 (talk) 12:54, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

Gorampa/Geluk Polemic replacement

"One must be aware that the popular Gelugpa view of emptiness (emptiness equated to 'lacking intrinsic existence') is not universal to all Mādhyamaka interpretations. For example, Gorampa finds this view to be nihilistic. However all Mādhyamikas agree that to say an object is "empty" is synonymous with saying that thing is dependently originated. Furthermore all Mādhyamikas suggest that things appear as mere thoughtforms (conceptual constructs) designated upon causes and conditions, which of course also applies to the causes and conditions themselves and even the principle of causality itself." - This text was replaced with a citation from Buddhapālita for two reasons, first of all it's a good secondary source that substantiates the paragraph, and secondly the place of any distinct viewpoints according to variations of school should not be in the first few paragraphs of this article.

The "Gorampa" text appears at first glance to conflict with Buddhapālita's statement. Of course, Buddhapālita predates the Gelugpa (and even Tibetan Buddhism) by a few centuries, so if Gorampa did make that statement, then he is rejecting a view that was established way before the Gelugpa. Meanwhile, pointing out that the "Gelugpa view of emptiness is not universal to all Mādhyamaka interpretations" is merely a truism, and has no value. It is always the case that a distinct viewpoint is not universal, because otherwise it would not be distinct.

Moreover, the distinction between dependant designation and dependant arising is an important one, but it should have it's own well structured paragraph - and also the 'appearance as mere thoughtforms' neologism is highly likely to cause (rather than resolve) confusion.

My understanding (and I may be wrong) is that, in general, the Madhyamaka tradition denies the objective (essence-holding) self, as well as all other (objective / essence-holding) phenomena; the only self that exists is the one used to indicate the difference between 'me' and 'you' - a conventional, unphilosophical, nominal self. It is true that other traditions accuse the Madhyamaka of being nihilists, but that is because for them they believe that some form of essential existence is necessary in order for Karma to function, the role of which is fulfilled by (as I understand it) an instance of a subtle form of energy (somewhat similar to kinetic energy) which arises at the point of the karmic action and remains bound to the mental continuum until fruition. This karmic energy is itself a product of the karmic action - therefore, for the Madhyamaka, dependant arising demonstrates emptiness, and emptiness demonstrates dependant arising.

I suggest that the 'Gorampa' editor add the paragraph (with adequate, reliable sources) further down the article. (20040302 (talk) 13:02, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

I added the reference regarding Gorampa. You can read it on Google Books. It is extremely clear....written in plain english. Start reading from page 52. LhunGrub (talk) 14:48, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

It's not enough to say 'it can be found on google books' - you have to provide a reference for the copy that you are editing on wikipedia. Likewise, you have reverted the 'distillation' sentence without reference, and have totally ignored my suggestions. I am encouraged that you wish to participate in editing this page, but it's a team effort, and we must work as a team here. What you have been doing is called an 'edit war'. (20040302 (talk) 16:31, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

Moreover, the copy that added was way too highly placed for an article about the Mādhyamaka. It solely concerns some distinctions made between Tibetans. (20040302 (talk) 16:31, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

The reference is provided. It is you who is edit warring. The reference mentions "Gorampa accuses Tsongkhapa of holding a nihilistic interpretation of the Madhyamaka" and also "....Tsongkhapa also believes....true existence is to be negated."LhunGrub (talk) 16:43, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

Okay, first of all thank-you for discussing this rather than merely reverting. I am reading the text that you cite, but I cannot find any reference to your assertion. (That it is a distinguished view of Gelukpa that emptiness equates to 'lacking intrinsic existence') - Instead, what I read is that Gorampa's accusations of nihilism are puzzling, for his central thesis is that Tsonkhapa and his follower's do not go far enough in their negation - Likewise, your other summaries of the text do not tie in with your submission to the article. (20040302 (talk) 16:52, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

First off, I am not going to type out several pages of copyrighted text for you. There is no obligation for me to do so. You have no interest in reading the source or being reasonable. You engage in Boomerang behavior and Wikipedia:Don't_shoot_yourself_in_the_foot. Basically the Gelupas/Dgaldanpas concern "the need to repudiate true existence." I don't understand why you have such difficulty understanding basic english. LhunGrub (talk) 17:07, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

I have read the text, and I cannot find anything that agrees with the statement "The popular Gelugpa view of emptiness (emptiness equated to 'lacking intrinsic existence') is not universal to all Mādhyamaka interpretations." In fact I find the exact opposite. It seems to me that Gorampa is claiming that Tsonkhapa et al (the Gelukpa) are faulty because they grasp onto the true existence of emptiness, which would not be established by the mere absence of intrinsic existence. There's a very nice part at the end of page 53 which suggests that for the Gelukpa, Samsara is due to the mind improperly reifies things, whereas for Gorampa, Samsara is due to mental dichotomisation. One of the points mentioned in the text is the business of self-reflexive cognition, which has become particularly topical in recent years thanks to Mipham, with WIlliams writing a long article, and Jay Garfield responding with a valiant rebuff. (see "The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What’s at Stake in a Tibetan Debate?", by Jay Garfield - it's available online at http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/ReflexiveAwareness.pdf ) (20040302 (talk) 17:12, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

The source clearly says "For Gorampa, the truth of things comes to be negated not through the negation of true existence, but through the negation of all four extremes..." Why won't you focus on what all Madhyamakas agree on, which is how the article was structured before you ruined it. LhunGrub (talk) 17:21, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

Why do you refuse to focus on the commonalities of all Madhyamakas? The original lead mentions the attributes which all Madhyamakas share. We can agree to get rid of the "distillation" sentence. LhunGrub (talk) 17:24, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

I do note refuse to focus on the commonalities of all Madhyamaka - what I object to is the raising of a specific polemic in the third paragraph of the article, which gives way too much emphasis to a rather localised dispute. In truth, in relation to the entire sphere of history and culture for which the Madhyamaka pervades, do you seriously imagine that the objections made by Gorampa against Tsongkhapa are the most prominent? Whereas in my opinion, the distinction between chinese Madhyamaka (who, along the Ch'an tradition do not accept the texts of Chandrakirti, as I understand it) is probably far more important.

It's very easy for us who have some small knowledge of some of the Tibetan debates to forget the rest of the world; I'm not objecting to Gorampa's views being depicted on this article, I am objecting to his views being placed at the top of the article. (20040302 (talk) 19:25, 20 September 2011 (UTC))

Exactly! I am trying to counteract the Tibetan Gelugpa view which scholars have said has become predominant. Off the top of my head, I believe Dr. Napper talks about this. LhunGrub (talk) 22:40, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

---

Well, let's discuss what it is that you wish to add to the article. Your contribution is: One must be aware that the popular Gelugpa view of emptiness (emptiness equated to 'lacking intrinsic existence') is not universal to all Mādhyamaka interpretations. For example, Gorampa finds this view to be nihilistic. However all Mādhyamikas agree that to say an object is "empty" is synonymous with saying that thing is dependently originated. Furthermore all Mādhyamikas suggest that things appear as mere thoughtforms (conceptual constructs) designated upon causes and conditions, which of course also applies to the causes and conditions themselves and even the principle of causality itself.

It's clear that you feel that this paragraph has merit, and that it deserves to be placed high up in the article. Help me with the following (I want references).

1. "One must be aware"
   1. Why must one be aware of what you are about to say?
2. The popular Gelugpa view of emptiness (emptiness equated to 'lacking intrinsic existence')
   1. What is meant by "The popular Gelugpa view of emptiness" ? Who says it's popular, who says it's Gelukpa? WP:OR
   2. Where is a source that demonstrates that the Gelug view of emptiness is distinguished by equating emptiness to 'lacking intrinsic existence'? WP:OR Moreover, how do you respond to Buddhapālita's (Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti, P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2) statement which says, commenting on Nagārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. This is especially relevant here, as I am pretty sure that all Tibetan Madhyamikas recognise Buddhapālita as an authority, and yet this statement is uncontentiously paraphrased to "emptiness is the absence of essence". I consider that such a view is commen to all Madhyamikas who follow Buddhapālita, and that it is an error to assume that such a view is restricted to the Gelugpas only. Cabezón et al state that, yes, there are people such as Gorampa (and also Mipham, and many others) who dispute the hermeneutics of Tsongkhapa and followers, but Cabezón does not claim that the view of "emptiness as the absence of essence as being" a view held exclusively to the Gelug.WP:OR
3. I am pretty certain that Gorampa does not find "emptiness as the absence of essence" to be nihilistic. WP:OR
   1. My reading of Cabezón et al is that he considers certain features of Tsonkhapa's views to be nihilistic; e.g. he feels that Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna's Catuṣkoṭi are misinformed, but this isn't relevant to the paragraph you wrote. So, can we find a supporting cite which is easily paraphrased (i.e., does not involves synthesis) to Gorampa finds "emptiness as the absence of essence" to be nihilistic.
4. All Mādhyamikas agree that to say an object is "empty" is synonymous with saying that thing is dependently originated
   1. This needs a citation also, it's not enough to find a quote from the MMK, because you are making a claim that this view is shared by all Mādhyamikas, which looks like WP:OR
5. Furthermore all Mādhyamikas suggest that things appear as mere thoughtforms (conceptual constructs) designated upon causes and conditions, which of course also applies to the causes and conditions themselves and even the principle of causality itself.
   1. Once again, we need to find a cite that makes the general statement (that all Mādhyamikas assert that things appear as mere thoughtforms (conceptual constructs) designated upon causes and conditions - I am not sure if this claim can be made, but without a citation it's WP:OR.

Having read your text through line by line, it appears that there are two separate agendas which have been somewhat conflated. First of all, it appears that you wish to make it clear that Tsongkhapa's views are not the only views on the block. I agree with that sentiment, and I believe it has a place in the article. I don't think that it should be placed outside of the Tibetan section further down. The second agenda that I read is an attempt to assert what the distinguishing, common features of the Madhyamaka are. Likewise, I concur with the sentiment, but I feel that the delivery is weak without references. It seems clear that in light of the MMK, there are existing philosophical opponents that Nagarjuna identifies - and that first of all we should demonstrate how the Madhyamaka distinguishes itself from those groups.

I am aware that this article is weak, and that it has considerable overlap with the Prasangika page and several others. If you are able and willing to co-operate, it may be a very good project to bring all of these articles into some sort of robust form. However, I believe it will involves weeks or months of work and research, and that this article is a great place to start. (20040302 (talk) 09:37, 21 September 2011 (UTC))

Are you seriously asking "Where is a source that demonstrates that the Gelug view of emptiness is distinguished by equating emptiness to 'lacking intrinsic existence'?" You should be given disciplinary action. I already posted several sentences. Here is another one "Tsongkhapa maintained that emptiness.....was....the negation of inherent existence." I even asked a Tibetan Loppon, who speaks perfect english, about this. LhunGrub (talk) 14:50, 21 September 2011 (UTC)

I just added references that addressed all your concerns. You can confirm that the references say exactly what is stated in the lead. As far as I am concerned, the matter is closed. LhunGrub (talk) 20:24, 21 September 2011 (UTC)

Changes to lead reverted

I have some concerns regarding recent changes to the lead made by LhunGrub and have reverted them. [1]

One concern with the changes was that they did not have a reference. The article cannot be improved unless editors provide reliable sources for their changes. This is all the more important with major changes, including changes to the lead (which is intended to be a summary of the main ideas in the article).

Another concern was the quality of English. In my opinion, the changes did not improve the understandability of the article. Wikipedia allows for editors with various abilities to contribute. Some editors who have good knowledge of a subject do not speak English as fluently as others. Thus collaboration is important. The best way to initiate that process is through discussion and agreement on this page before making major changes. I hope this is clear and that we can initiate positive discussion here so as to improve the article. Sunray (talk) 07:08, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

The material I changed was all UNcited. Let us all be clear on that. I totally agree with you that my language here may be more confusing, but that is the trade-off for accuracy. LhunGrub (talk) 17:55, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

You are quite right that some of the information in the article is uncited. That is why it is unrated by the Buddhism Project and rated "Start-class" by the Philosophy Project (see top of article talk page). Like many editors, I am concerned with improving the article. One does that by either finding citations for material already in the article or adding new sourced material. How about looking for a cite for it?

I also agree with you that accuracy is important. However, WP policy says it has to be verifiable. If you have a citation, I am willing to work on with you to make it as understandable as possible. Sunray (talk) 20:35, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

Fixing the third paragraph of the lead

I've removed the third paragraph of the lead so that it can be worked on here. Here's what was in the article prior to changes made today by LhunGrub:

Mādhyamaka, through specific logical analyses, rejects extreme views and therefore represents the "middle way" between eternalism—the view that something has an objective existence (i.e., its existence does not depend on external objects)—and what some Western interpreters translate as "nihilism". The term nihilism is used here in the sense from Indian philosophy, which differs from that used in Western philosophical nihilism. The sense used here denotes either an assertion that all things are intrinsically already destroyed or rendered nonexistent, or a denial of the existence of something that actually exists.

LhunGrub has observed that the foregoing paragraph does not have a citation. He is concerned about its accuracy. The following are changes he wishes to make (changes in red: note, his addition is also un-sourced):

Through specific logical analyses Mādhyamaka shows that conceptual thought, by its very nature, is dichotomizing yet "reality" (or lack of it) is free from the extremes of eternalism and "nihilism". All views can be summarized into these two positions. Eternalism is the view that something has an objective existence apart from dependent origination. The term nihilism is used here in the sense from Indian philosophy, which differs from that used in Western philosophical nihilism. The sense used here denotes either an assertion that all things are intrinsically already destroyed or rendered nonexistent, or a denial of the existence of something that actually exists.

Apart from the need for a citation, I have the following comments on the proposed addition:

1. It may be too detailed for the lead, which is intended to be a summary of what is in the article.
2. It omits mention of the "middle way," which seems to me to be very common in definitions of Mādhyamaka.
3. Whatever its accuracy, it isn't as understandable as the original version.

My suggestion above was that we need a citation (preferably more than one). I think that should be the first task in fixing this. Sunray (talk) 21:23, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

Actually my revised phrasing is more understandable than "its existence does not depend on external objects." What the hell does that mean? LhunGrub (talk) 01:58, 29 September 2011 (UTC)

However well, or badly written, neither paragraph has a source, that is why I moved them both here. Sunray (talk) 04:45, 29 September 2011 (UTC)

Here's my proposed re-write of this paragraph, with a source:

Madhyamaka re-affirmes the doctrine of emptiness (i.e., the dependently originating nature of all things) which has been a central tenet of Buddhism from the earliest times. This is the "Middle Way," which avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism is the view that something has an objective existence apart from dependent origination. The term nihilism is used here in the sense from Indian philosophy, which differs from that used in Western philosophical nihilism. The sense here is the assertion that all things are intrinsically already destroyed or rendered nonexistent.

Reference

• Burton, David (Dharmachari Asanga). Is Madhyamaka Buddhism Really the Middle Way? Western Buddhist Review, Vol. 3. Retrieved on: 2011-09-30.

Since no one has commented on the above paragraph, which I posted four days ago, I will add it to the article. Sunray (talk) 06:54, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

My paragraph is heavily sourced with the same academic books already used all over wikipedia. You are just using a website. If you must have the phrase "Middle Way", put it in the very first sentence of the article. Thank you for your cooperation in advance. LhunGrub (talk) 22:52, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

That paragraph you added does not belong in the lead. It does not summarize anything in the article, nor does it express an important idea of Buddhism. In fact, it contradicts itself. I am disappointed that you did not chose to discuss the paragraph that I added, above. Editorial decisions are made by consensus. If you and I cannot agree, we will need to get other editors to comment. In the meantime, I am going to restore the paragraph that I added and we can discuss it further here. Sunray (talk) 03:23, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

I am disappointed that you delete a well sourced paragraph and reinsert something that only has one website as a reference and omits entirely the famous ultimate truth of Madhyamaka. Basic elements of Madhyamaka should be in the lead. LhunGrub (talk) 04:42, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

I am not objecting to the quality of your sources, I am objecting to the way that paragraph is written. For example:

• "Through specific logical analyses Mādhyamaka shows..." I don't believe that Williams used these words. It seems to me an awkward way of phrasing. How does a Buddhist tradition (i.e., Mādhyamaka) show something? Surely in individual, or a statement, shows something, not a tradition.
• "... conceptual thought, by its very nature, is dichotomizing." This is an important idea. Surely it needs further elaboration.
• "...yet "reality" (or lack of it)" Does Williams actually say this? What is a "lack of reality"?
• "... is free from the extremes of eternalism and "nihilism." This seems to express the idea of a "middle way," which is a term often used to describe Mādhyamaka. Why wouldn't we want to use that term (middle way) in the lead? Most sources do use it.
• "All views can be summarized into these two positions." Does this mean the positions of eternalism and nihilism? The previous statement is that "reality... is free from the extremes of eternalism and nihilism." Now you are saying that all views can be summarized into these two positions??? That seems contradictory. Do views not express a reality? This is unclear.
• As I mentioned, above the lead is intended to be an overview of the article. Where are these views discussed in the article? What is the important idea that is being expressed here? Is it perhaps the middle way? Then why not say that?

There are other minor (i.e., syntactical) errors in the passage (e.g., the use of "into" instead of "in"), however, while confusing, these are the least of the problem. Sunray (talk) 05:22, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

First off, it is forbidden to say exactly what the author has written. That violates the copyright policy of Wikipedia. But yes, everything I have written is substantiated by the sources I have cited. And I'm not against the phrase "Middle Way" at all. But do you realize the phrase "freedom from extremes" is just as famous in Madhyamaka? You don't seem too knowledgeable about Madhyamaka. So why are you even here?LhunGrub (talk) 05:49, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

What policy are you referring to that says that one cannot state exactly what an author has written? Fair use certainly allows that. It would save us both time if you could do that. If you cannot, then I will go to the library to check the source. This may take awhile.

ASK SUDOGHOST. EVEN A PASSING RESEMBLANCE TO THE CITED SOURCE, AND HE WILL DELETE......YES EVEN WHEN CITED.Thigle2 (talk) 19:42, 13 October 2011 (UTC)

As to your question about why I am here. I am here to ensure that articles are well-written. I have professional expertise as an editor and am familiar with Buddhism. I have edited Wikipedia for eight years. It is odd that someone who has had an account here for two months would think it relevant to question my expertise. Sunray (talk) 06:09, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

My paragraph reflects pretty well whats in the originial sources. You can confirm that. LhunGrub (talk) 06:16, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

You have not begun to address my concerns. The addition you just made, while better, does not address my concern about the "specific logical analyses" phrase. What scripture or author contributed these "specific logical analyses"? That is why I want to look at exactly what Williams says about this. Please treat this with some seriousness. This is an encyclopedia that millions of people rely on for information. Sunray (talk) 19:09, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

And what about my concerns? You use only one website as a ref. You lack mention of the ultimate truth. You don't even use the famous Madhyamaka maxim "freedom from extremes". Regarding the logical analyes, they are in book. The same basic logical analyses in every Madhyamaka book. You know like X cannot be the same as the aggregates because......X cannot be different than the aggregates because....X cannot be the same as one aggregate because...LhunGrub (talk) 19:16, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

With respect, you are a relatively new user here and do not yet seem to have a grasp on some of the policies and guidelines yet. I do have one source. It is a reliable source for a non-controversial subject. We do not weigh the number of sources by the pound. One source is fine for a paragraph. Now it may be that the source you like has something to add. But you do not respond to my request to quote it, so I am headed to the library (which will take some time). But that is not the only concern I have and I am getting tired of having to repeat this. You need to address the legitimate concerns I've raised. As I have said (several times now) the wording of the sentences you want to add is not clear. So please do not keep adding it. Sunray (talk) 20:20, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

The hypocrisy is dumbfounding. I had multiple sources for this "non-controverisal subject". What do you exactly want me to quote? The pages of logical analyses that Williams uses with the "X" variable? Like when he says "If X is the result of causes and conditions...." So basically you want me to type out an entire section of analyes that Madhyamakias use like Geshe Tashi does in chapter 6 in his book "Emptiness"? Why not just look at the tetralemma on Nagarjuna's Wikipedia page?LhunGrub (talk) 02:30, 6 October 2011 (UTC)

Please see Wikipedia:Ownership of articles. Tengu800 12:03, 6 October 2011 (UTC)

Major revert

The contributions made by 'lhundrub' (a sock puppet of thigle) have all been reverted. The main reason is that he has demonstrated little ability to comprehend academic text, which renders his cites meaningless. Likewise he is promoting a view which is not well established. This basic view is that (as can be derived above and by examining his assertions) emptiness is not always an emptiness of inherent existence. Unfortunately, and although he is adamant about this, his claims were not substantiated. (20040302 (talk) 07:04, 10 October 2011 (UTC))

I have a great understanding of academic texts. The problem is that its hard to speak to 'third generation Buddhists' and bullies that don't even understand that people are bundles of aggregates in Buddhism. Secondly, of course I established that emptiness is not always emptiness of inherent existence. One of my many of my quotes above "For Gorampa, the truth of things comes to be negated NOT through the negation of true existence, but through the negation of all four extremes..." Negation of true existence is only ONE of Nagarjuna's FOUR extremes. The other 3 extremes are both, neither and nihilism. This goes back to Nagarjuna in India. But you knew that right? Thigle2 (talk) 19:17, 13 October 2011 (UTC)

I'm fully aware of Catuṣkoṭi and it's use in Indian philosophy. Are you aware of who Buddhapalita was, and how seminal his works are in the Madhyamaka tradition? 20040302 (talk)

Causes and conditions.

No inherent existence apart from causes and conditions implies (at least grammatically) that there is some form of inherent existence there. I will look at that shortly. (20040302 (talk) 07:24, 10 October 2011 (UTC))

Cites for the article..

ISBN 0-415-20701-0 Buddhist Thought, Paul Williams

Although Buddhism has always held itself to be a "Middle Way", a Madhyamika considers a principle significance of this middle way to be an understanding of emptiness (Sunyata) as the middle between eternalism and annihilationism. This idea can be undoubtedly traced back to the identification of dependant origination as the middle between those who hold onto the eternal existence of an unchanging self and those who hold to annihilation at death. Therefore, for the Madhyamaka, emptiness is equated with dependant origination (MMK 24:18) (p140-141).

Even in your own quote the Gelugpa biased Paul Williams equates emptiness with dependent origination. Nagarjuna said "That which is dependent origination is explained to be emptiness." From Mulamadhyamakakarikas. Thigle2 (talk) 19:39, 13 October 2011 (UTC)

of course. I do not dispute that For the Madhyamaka, emptiness of inherent existence is equated with dependant origination 20040302 (talk) 23:09, 13 October 2011 (UTC)

[Removed more nonsense from Thigle3, a blocked sockpuppet of Thigle2 (also blocked as a sockpuppet of Thigle]

Hello

This page came to my attention when discussed recently on a Buddhist forum. I am also wondering why a Gelug translated text was picked over Nagarjuna's MMK 24:18. MMK 24:18 is the Madhyamaka equivalent of Christianity's John 3:16.

Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be emptiness. Jay L. Garfield, The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with a philosophical commentary (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 304ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 19:30, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

This is a "start" class article, which means it needs considerable work. I agree that the quote you give, above, should be included in the article. It wasn't clear which text you mean when you refer to a "Gelug translated text." Are you referring to the quote from Buddhapālita in the lead? If so. here's what I would suggest. Quotes are rarely given in the lead of an article. I note that there is no section on Nāgārjuna and also none on Buddhapālita. How about adding sections on each, including those quotes? Sunray (talk) 19:57, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

There used to be a decent explanation of Madhyamaka in the lead, which I see someone removed. See if the current page works for you. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 21:09, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

Your addition looks fine to me, although now there is no mention of Buddhapālita in the article. This should, perhaps, be addressed. Sunray (talk) 21:51, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

You can add the Buddhapālita article link right above Chandrakirti in the "See Also" section. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 21:58, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

You don't think that Buddhapālita merits more mention than that? Sunray (talk) 22:04, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

I just noticed that Buddhapālita is mentioned a couple of times already in the article, but you must search for "Buddhapalita" not "Buddhapālita". ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 22:09, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

Quite right, thanks. Sunray (talk) 17:58, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

Sorry to resurrect this, but how is the term "bundles" related to the Madhyamaka? (20040302 (talk) 11:29, 21 December 2011 (UTC))

If you look at a "table" for example, it is made of a bundle of parts i.e. legs, pieces of wood etc. This is an example I have seen frequently given in various books. The ancient term of "skandha" in Buddhism itself means bundle. Nagarjuna based his Madhyamaka off of Abhidharmic concepts. But things are actually bundles of bundles. For example people are a bundle of 5 skandhas. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 17:23, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

The difficulty is that if we introduce new words to an article, we have to show that they (a) belong to the technical language, or (b) are used by cited sources. I removed the word and the sentence works well without it, and loses none of it's meaning, so we can leave the article without it, IMO. (20040302 (talk) 18:40, 21 December 2011 (UTC))

The term bundle is used frequently as in here. And I quote "That is, dependent origination means that the dependently originated entity (and that is every entity) is not a real thing, but is simply a convenient label for complex bundles of interrelated phenomena." ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 18:52, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

I have once more reverted your change. We are discussing this, and no consensus has been reached. Please refrain from adding the term 'bundle' until we reach consensus on it. (20040302 (talk) 11:59, 22 December 2011 (UTC))

The google search didn't appear to highlight the term bundle very much for me. Okay, so Burton may use it, but that doesn't make it a commonly agreed upon term. Regardless, the problem that I have with the word 'bundle' is that it lends itself too strongly to affiliating Madhyamaka with Hume's Bundle theory. There may indeed be similarities, but the philosophies are distinct. Western academic approaches to Madhyamaka are historically filled with using W.Phil. terms - most especially Kant, for some unknown reason (see e.g. Wayman's translations). (20040302 (talk) 12:08, 22 December 2011 (UTC))

Ok firstly, I already explained earlier that the ancient term skandha itself means bundle. So that throws your Western philosophy argument completely out the window. Even your own source says bundle in the Madhyamaka section, among many other places in the book! ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 17:40, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Mistake regarding nihilism

I don't believe the definition of nihilism is quite correct. My understanding from what people have written about Madhyamaka and Nagarjuna's work specifically is that since nothing "arises" in the first place, there is nothing to "perish". So nihilism is automatically refuted by refuting existence. Its kind of a stupid logic, but it really is part of authentic Madhyamaka from Nagarjuna's time. I will make the change with source. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 05:47, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

erm, hang on. What are you on about? Nihilism isn't refuted in Madhyamaka, but Madhyamaka do not identify themselves as nihilists. Nihilism in classical Buddhism has specific meanings that cross philosophical boundaries. The most important meaning was that it was a denial of karma (efficacious causality). (20040302 (talk) 10:56, 21 December 2011 (UTC))

As mentioned above ISBN 0-415-20701-0 Buddhist Thought, Paul Williams Although Buddhism has always held itself to be a "Middle Way", a Madhyamika considers a principle significance of this middle way to be an understanding of emptiness (Sunyata) as the middle between eternalism and annihilationism. This idea can be undoubtedly traced back to the identification of dependant origination as the middle between those who hold onto the eternal existence of an unchanging self and those who hold to annihilation at death. Therefore, for the Madhyamaka, emptiness is equated with dependant origination. (MMK 24:18) (p140-141).

Sure you can use "annhilationism" instead of nonexistence. What you quoted is exactly what I said otherwise. There cannot be "annihilation at death", as you say, since nothing truly exists in the first place. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 17:53, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

I'm still not getting this, ProvMPEP. Let's be clear here - Nihilism refers to those views that some people hold which asserts that there is no causation whatsoever, and most especially there is no Karma, meaning that the world we experience is not merely like a dream, it's exactly the same as a dream, in that actions are not efficacious. The Madhyamikas do not refute Nihilism - to do so would imply that for Madhyamaka there cannot be such a view, which is clearly nonsensical, as there are plenty of Madhyamikas who do indeed refer to Nihilists. Madhyamikas DO refute the Nihilist view - and most importantly the view that actions are not efficacious, otherwise (as mentioned by Nagarjuna's accusers) the four noble truths would be abandoned.

Now, my understanding of "non-existence" is that it refers to those things which do not exist - there are plenty of things that do not exist, but of course the most important non-existent in Madhyamaka is inherence. But there are loads of uninteresting non-existents, such the classical "hare's horn".

The point that the article makes is not about avoiding the extremes of 'existence vs. non-existence', but about avoiding the extremes of inherent existence ('eternalism') and non-efficacious existence ('nihilism'). The contribution you made stated "This is the "Middle Way," which avoids the extremes of existence and nonexistence." - but that's not correct, in that existence and non-existence are not recognised as extremes, unless one is glossing such terms as being essential/inherent existence and inherent/essential non-existence, which, though is done a lot in the wisdom literature, must (IMO) be made explicit in an encyclopaedia article.

However, the text which states "This is the "Middle Way," which avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism." does not have that error, though one could argue strongly that the terms 'eternalism' and 'nihilism' also need to be glossed, and they are.

(20040302 (talk) 18:37, 21 December 2011 (UTC))

You are contradicting your own bold-face quote that you quoted to me. Lets us use the term "annhiliationism" just like your own source does. You can't possibly have an objection to that. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 19:03, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

By the way this is much ado about nothing. I was very close to using the term annhilationism, as you also prefer to. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 19:11, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

I'm not convinced yet that there's much difference between annhilationism and nihilism. How am I contradicting myself? There is a wild difference between existence qua existence and existence of an unchanging self. (20040302 (talk) 10:41, 22 December 2011 (UTC))

The problem that I had, (I thought that I'd made myself clear) is the use of the term 'existence' as a name for a view. The phrase "eternal existence" sounds too much like a type of existence, rather than a type of view. The point is that the Middle way avoids the extremes of views, not of modes of existence. It's true that the views concern modes of existence, but the views are not modes of existence themselves. It's a semiological issue for me. As for many readers, Madhyamaka is novel or obscure, it seems very relevant not to obscure it further by conflating view-holders with their tenets.

You and I do agree that this still needs more work. Let's collaborate. (20040302 (talk) 12:16, 22 December 2011 (UTC))

I actually don't agree that it needs more work. As long you put the word "bundles" back in, from when Sunray and I had Consensus on it, the article is fine. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 19:37, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Ok, well I am not convinced that nothing more than a word needs adding in. For me everything in the lead after the MMK quote needs to be totally rewritten. As I have expressed above, I am concerned with using loan words / loan phrases from (or appearing to be from) western philosophical schools, including both Hume and Kant. Likewise, I am unconvinced of the gloss that attempts to summarise the pith of the Madhyamaka.

"Thus (bundles of) causes and conditions are designated by mere conceptual labels" - So let me work this through... the phrase "bundles of causes and conditions" is what is meant by 'dependant origination', 'designated by mere conceptual labels' is what is meant by 'dependant designation'; then "...which applies to the causes and conditions themselves etc. etc.. I just don't get the emphasis, or direction of this. How is it contributing?

"Madhyamaka reaffirms the doctrine of emptiness (i.e., the dependently originating nature of all things) which has been a central tenet of Buddhism from the earliest times. " erm, well, isn't it only the Madhyamaka assert the identity of dependent origination and emptiness? (I can look this up but I'm I'll in bed right now) and the rest of it needs a cite, otherwise it's WP:OR.

"This is the "Middle Way," which avoids the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism." - why introduce new terms into what is meant to be an explanation in the first place? Then the remaining part of the lead on Madhyamaka is spent talking about the middle way which has it's own article.

Lastly, "All views can be summarized in these two positions." - what on earth does that mean, and where does it come from? If all views are wither eternalise or annihilationism, then what can be said of the Madhyamaka view, which avoids either view? Who says that?

I cannot see how you, who clearly are well-learned in Madhyamaka, could say that this article is complete... Well, if so, maybe you would like to start contributing on the dependent designation stub! 20040302 (talk) 21:20, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Stick to the cited sources and previous consensus. If the subject is above your head, that is not my problem sir or madam. I addressed your arguments previously, yet you keep repeating them. How is "bundle" a western "loan word", when it is a direct translation of skandha? This it the third time I am repeating myself. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 22:31, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

ProvisionalMPEP, if you are referring to skandha, then fine, let's use the nearly universal translated term: aggregate. Secondly, for the sake of keeping the peace, I shall leave the article as-is until we reach WP:CON. Right now, there is no consensus. It is up to interested parties to achieve it. The subject is far from being above my head, as should be quite obvious, and if my skin where thinner, I may have thought that you were being rude. I hope that you and I both share the intent of assisting in the development of an excellent Wikipedia article, so there is no need whatsoever to be antagonised. If you have read what I last wrote, the existing copy needs cites. For example, there is no cite against "All views can be summarized in these two positions". So, as you are defending the text, the onus is on you to provide a cite for that. Likewise, I suggest once more that we reassess the need to explain the middle way in the lead of this article, when it has a very thorough article of it's own .

Since you ask me about how 'bundle' is a western philosophical concept, let me point you to Bundle theory. I have absolutely no problem with using the term 'aggregate' on this article, 20040302 (talk) 22:47, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Yeah but things are bundles of bundles. Even your source says it. See my unaddressed comment above. And yes we did have consensus before you unilaterally took action. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 23:11, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Forgive me, but I have to be missing something here. I have made one cite in this section, which is from Dr. Williams. This bundles of bundles idea comes from.. Where? Read skandha, or just recollect the vast amount of literature in English. The translation of Skandha is aggregate. Why are you trying to fit Buddhism into a lead paragraph on this article? I don't have a source that says things are bundles of bundles. How can we begin to achieve consensus if you start to claim that 'bundle' is the English translation of skandha, when it just isn't? What is your agenda? 20040302 (talk) 23:12, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Yes I am talking about a different page of the same book. Its the same source. Click Here. This is the second time I am posting this link. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 23:37, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Also skandha does mean bundle, if you would please Click here.ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 23:37, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

This is where Williams is talking (see page 85) about the stages of purification, as found in Buddhaghosha's Visudhimagga, where one becomes aware of the composite nature of experience, being made of the aggregates, and nothing more. Buddhaghosha was a Theravadin. See Williams' index, and the remainder of the text, especially pp58-60, where Williams goes into a great deal of depth about skandha, which he uniformly translates as aggregate. As I understand it (and Theravadin doctrine is not a great strength of mine, so I am happy to be corrected) Buddhaghosha is talking about examining personhood as being nothing other than a bundle of aggregates. Whereas from a M-Pras. viewpoint, a person arises in dependence of causes and conditions, and likewise arises in dependence upon designation and, more generally, all existents arise in these two ways. Though it is true that the sevenfold analysis likewise examines composites, and the current Dalai Lama states a depenence upon composites as a third form of dependence, I am not convinced that this has any philosophical sense for the Madhyamikas, more than as a means of establishing the view, as the view of all products being composite is shared with other schools. I am unsure of just which Madhyamikas (it may be that Berger stands alone) concur with Candrakirti regarding dependent designation, but certainly it would be hard to argue that any Madhyamikas dispute dependant arising and it's identity with emptiness of essential/objective existence.

I digress. I reject bundle as a translation of skandha on the evidence presented to me so far. 20040302 (talk) 23:53, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Skandha does mean bundle, if you would please Click here. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 23:55, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

By the way, I did indeed use aggregate as a translation for skandha in the article, which I also prefer to use. So we agree! ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 00:07, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

incidentally, google results aren't conidered to be WP:RS. Moving on, you seem to be missing (avoiding? Unwilling to consider?) my points. First of all, 'bundle of aggregates' is derived from a Theravadin text, not a Madhyamika one. Secondly, it was referring to personhood, not all phenomena. Again,, as I understand it the dependence upon composites is not exclusive to Madhyamaka, so why would we want to highlight that? The other two dependencies- most centrally and undisputedly Pratītyasamutpāda , and Prajñaptir upādāya, are directly related to Madhyamaka. As I have said more than once, the verse explanation is unwieldy - maybe even incoherent. We are still far from any concensus 20040302 (talk) 00:10, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

Re. You last comment, I believe that we agree with mostly everything! 20040302 (talk) 00:12, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

First off it wasn't "google results". It was Google Books. If we agree with mostly everything, just leave it alone since Sunray and I had previous consensus. I'll remove the new sentence for now. I guess that takes care of everything. Thanks. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 00:18, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

lol, no it being google books doesn't make it any more WP:RS. Likewise the idea that an article may rest on past consensus may appeal to you, but it has no bearing here, the changes were made only days ago, and my contributions to the article go back over five years. However, I have reconsidered my argument against the third dependence, and I feel that my argument is weak, especially as Candrakirti authored the sevenfold reasoning. However, I think that it is vital for us not to conflate the three dependencies. Likewise, the dependence upon parts is not explicit in Nagarjuna's verse, which is a challenge. Likewise, although he may stand alone, certainly Berger questions Candrakirti's glossing of Prajñaptir upādāya as 'dependent designation. Since it is topical, we should consider including it, though to be honest, I think Berger may be in a minority of one here. 20040302 (talk) 00:30, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

When I said that I believe we agree about most things, it was in light of the evidence that we both believe it worthy to uncover the meaning of Madhyamaka. However, I ave made it clear enough that the explanation of the verse does not work as it stands. 20040302 (talk) 00:33, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

We disagree with you. And its cited. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 00:43, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

Are you stating that you are unwilling to collaborate with me in order to reach consensus for the article? Do you wish to bring in a third opinion? 20040302 (talk) 00:49, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

I read the consensus rules. It is clear we already had consensus before you took unilateral action. Everything is cited, except the last sentence in the lead. All you are trying to do is canvassing. ProvisionalMPEP (talk) 00:59, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

Citation is concerned with providing WP:RS - a part of WP:V, and may assist with consensus. Consensus is about the community of editors agreeing with what the article should say. Merely providing cites does not safeguard content. Merely achieving the agreement with another editor does not indicate consensus. Where do you want to go from here? Shall we invite sunray/other editors to chime in, or do you wish to resolve this with me? 20040302 (talk) 01:01, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

If this is the consensus being alluded to, then that is a very weak consensus (someone saying "that's fine" is not a consensus), and appears to have been referring to this broad edit and not this very specific thing that is being contested. Unless there is some other consensus that I am not seeing, there is no previous consensus in regards to this content specifically (especially in regards to the contested nature of it), and the very nature of this discussion shows that if there was a consensus which was relevant, there certainly is not one now. If this is not the case, and there is some other consensus elsewhere that is being referred to, please show a diff or location where this consensus might be found. Thank you. - SudoGhost 01:10, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

OMG, there's a huge amount to that edit which I missed. It looks like ProvisionalMPEP engineered a massive edit, much of which I contest. I wish I knew how to use WP diffs properly. ProvisionalMPEP, please now, work with me on this.20040302 (talk) 01:23, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

Eternalism/Nihilationism

These terms don't sit nicely for me. Eternalism sounds too much like something to do with permanence, but Candrakīrti says When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self, but we do not consider this to be the basis of the conception of "I" It is therefore astonishing that knowing this selflessness expunges and uproots the view of self. (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.140)

I have added the article for dependant designation. It surprises me that it did not yet exist.

Previous opening sentence

'''Madhyamaka''' ([[Sanskrit]]: मध्यमक, ''Madhyamaka'', {{zh|t=中觀派|p=Zhōngguān Pài}}; also known as ''Śunyavada'') refers primarily to a [[Mahayana|Mahāyāna]] [[Buddhism|Buddhist]] school of Buddhist philosophy<ref name="Buddhist Thought">[[Paul_Williams_(British_professor)|Williams, Paul]] (2000). ''Buddhist Thought'' Routledge, p140.</ref>

What was wrong with this?

According to the Mādhyamikas, all [[Dharma#Dharmas in Buddhist phenomenology|phenomena]] are [[shunyata|empty]] of "substance" or "essence" ({{lang-sa|svabhāva}}), meaning that they have no intrinsic, independent reality.

what was wrong with this? 20040302 (talk) 01:34, 23 December 2011 (UTC)

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