Talk:James J. Saxon

Controversies

[..] "Another overlooked aspect of Kennedy's attempt to reform American society involves money. Kennedy apparently reasoned that by returning to the constitution, which states that only Congress shall coin and regulate money, the soaring national debt could be reduced by not paying interest to the bankers of the Federal Reserve System, who print paper money then loan it to the government at interest. He moved in this area on June 4, 1963, by signing Executive Order 11,110 which called for the issuance of $4,292,893,815 in United States Notes through the U.S. Treasury rather than the traditional Federal Reserve System. That same day, Kennedy signed a bill changing the backing of one and two dollar bills from silver to gold, adding strength to the weakened U.S. currency.

Kennedy's comptroller of the currency, James J. Saxon, had been at odds with the powerful Federal Reserve Board for some time, encouraging broader investment and lending powers for banks that were not part of the Federal Reserve system. Saxon also had decided that non-Reserve banks could underwrite state and local general obligation bonds, again weakening the dominant Federal Reserve banks.

A number of "Kennedy bills" were indeed issued - the author has a five dollar bill in his possession with the heading "United States Note" - but were quickly withdrawn after Kennedy's death. According to information from the Library of the Comptroller of the Currency, Executive Order 11,110 remains in effect today, although successive administrations beginning with that of President Lyndon Johnson apparently have simply ignored it and instead returned to the practice of paying interest on Federal Reserve notes. Today we continue to use Federal Reserve Notes, and the deficit is at an all-time high." - Quotes from Jim Marrs 1990 book 'Crossfire'Nunamiut (talk) 01:42, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

Contemporary comments on his work

in 1963 Time Magazine Wrote:

[..]By far the sharpest battle in U.S. banking has been fired up by handsome James J. Saxon, 49, who as Comptroller of the Currency supervises the 4,500 nationally chartered banks. "The commercial banking system needs rescuing," says Saxon grandly—and he has set out on what he considers a rescue mission by permitting national banks to branch out more freely than state banks, which are regulated by state banking commissions. By liberalizing branching policies, he aims to break the hold that many small-town and suburban bankers have on their areas. Critical state bankers charge that Saxon's expansion plans would cause many of them to fail under the pressure of big-banking competition. They also fear that many state banks may have to seek national charters in self-defense, thus destroying the U.S.'s "dual system" of banking.

No Friend at Chase Manhattan. Last week the annual meeting of the American Bankers Association in Washington heard the strongest anti-Saxon attack ever made by a big, prestigious banker. Said David Rockefeller, president of Manhattan's state-chartered Chase Manhattan Bank: "I believe the Comptroller would be well advised to show greater restraint in exercising the immense power he now possesses. It would be a dubious honor for him to go down in history as the man who undermined the dual banking system."

Like many state bankers, Rockefeller has a particular reason to be upset. Saxon has permitted Manhattan's First National City Bank to open 26 branches in fast-growing suburbs, while Rockefeller's competing Chase has so far been limited by New York State to only eight branches. Beyond that, Saxon wants to permit national banks to offer longer and bigger mortgage loans and to extend their limits on other loans. This is all the more controversial because some federal officials are worried that bankers are already taking on many bad credit risks.

No Help from Bobby. Saxon has been colliding with strong forces ever since 1961, when he came to Washington from a job as counsel to Chicago's First National Bank. He has quarreled with Bobby Kennedy about the Justice Department's attempts to block bank mergers, with the Federal Reserve Board about whether banks should be allowed to underwrite state and municipal revenue bonds, and with the Securities and Exchange Commission over whether bank stocks should be regulated by the SEC. Last spring, after Saxon asked regional banking supervisors to drum up support for him among the national bankers, he came within a digit of being sacked by President Kennedy.

James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States

Webster Groves Trust Company, Appellant, v. James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, and West Side National Bank, a National Banking Association, Appellees United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit. - 370 F.2d 381 December 14, 1966

Appellant, Webster Groves Trust Company, and others sued James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, and the West Side National Bank, seeking to enjoin the operation of the newly chartered West Side National Bank and to compel Saxon to grant a formal adversary hearing before finally passing upon the Bank's charter application. The Honorable Roy W. Harper, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, denied relief and awarded judgment in favor of the defendants in an opinion reported at 249 F.Supp. 557. We affirm. 2

Plaintiffs below were eight commercial banking houses (seven state banks and one national bank) doing business in suburban St. Louis County, Missouri, within approximately a four-mile radius of the newly established place of business of defendant West Side National Bank. 3

On July 31, 1964, defendant West Side National Bank filed an application for a charter as a national bank with Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to the statutes and regulations controlling such applications. See 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. and 12 C.F.R. § 4.1 et seq. Pursuant to these regulations, the Comptroller caused a field investigation to be made of the applicant and the surrounding circumstances. In accordance with the established practice, the agent-examiners of Saxon called upon the competitors of the applicant bank, informed them of West Side's application and ascertained their reaction to the application.

The case of First Nat. Bank of Capitol Hill v. Murray, 212 F. 140, 142 (8 Cir. 1914) is cited for the proposition that the Comptroller has absolute discretion in granting a bank charter and his actions are not subject to judicial review. The Court therein said:

"Extensive powers of control and visitation have been confided to the Comptroller of the Currency, and his acts within the law are not subject to review by the courts." (Emphasis added.)

refrence http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/370/381/235015/ Nunamiut (talk) 01:42, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

refrences

http://vlex.com/vid/groves-saxon-comptroller-currency-side-36720312 Nunamiut (talk) 01:43, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

chartering 369 new national banks during 1963 and 1964

Saxon defended his controversial record of chartering 369 new national banks during 1963 and 1964, insisting that such expansion was essential to keep up with the expanding economy and to generate competition among lenders. Like many bankers, he blamed bank takeovers by unsavory characters on a loophole in federal law (since closed) that left federal officials in the dark about changes in bank ownership. Mindful of congressional cries that gangsters may still be buying up banks to sanitize their hot money, Joseph W. Barr, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., announced that he has set up a unit to help the Justice Department weed out criminals in banking.

Riskier Items. The McClellan hearings are the more embarrassing to bankers because they come just when a debate is heating up over whether U.S. banks have overextended credit. Squeezed between rising interest costs paid to depositors and stable rates on loans to business, banks are shunting more and more money into such high-yielding but riskier items as mortgages and consumer loans; they are also, some critics charge, lowering standards for borrowers. Installment credit extended by commercial banks has more than doubled since 1956, rose another 11% last year to $24 billion.

Most bankers still do not think that that is too much, but the number of critics is growing. Arthur L. Nash, senior loan executive of Manhattan's Brown Brothers Harriman, fears that "the stage may be set for trouble" because of careless lending, and H. Frederick Hagemann Jr., president of Boston's State Street Bank, worries because "banks are more highly loaned than at any time since the '20s." Says Ransom Cook, president of San Francisco's Wells Fargo Bank: "The proper criticism now is that banks aren't conservative enough." If Senator McClellan's current probe does nudge bankers in that direction, some bankers feel, it may even be worth the embarrassment. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Nunamiut (talk • contribs) 02:35, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

transparency

When former Comptroller James J. Saxon took office in November 1961, he found in existence methods of handling applications for new banks, branches, and mergers that had not been changed for decades. Almost every piece of paper pertaining to an application was considered secret, and virtually no public announcements of any kind emanated from the Office. In the preceding ninety-eigth-year history of the Office, there had never been a public hearing or a written opinion published on an application. Anything that smacked of controvercy was considered bad for the banking "image". "In fairness to all of Saxons distinguished predecessors in office", - it was at the time, that: "these methods are the traditionally accepted ones for a bank supervisory agency. They obviously could not have survived as long as they did without the approval of industry affected, of the courts, and of Congress." —Preceding unsigned comment added by Nunamiut (talk • contribs) 02:54, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

further reading

Kennedy's comptroller of the currency, James J. Saxon, grew increasingly at odds with the powerful Federal Reserve Board by encouraging broader investment and lending powers for non-Fed banks. Saxon also decided that such banks could underwrite state and local obligation bonds, further weakening the dominant Federal Reserve banks. In June 1963 Kennedy took the ultimate step against the Fed by autho-rizing the issuance of more than $4 billion in "United States Notes" through the U.S. Treasury, not the Federal Reserve. "Kennedy apparently reasoned that by returning to the Constitution, which states that only Congress shall coin and regulate money, the soaring national debt could be reduced by not paying interest to the bankers of the Federal Reserve System, who print paper money then loan it to the government at interest," noted one conspiracy author. In his attempt to level the economic playing field, Kennedy took a wide variety of actions, all of which deepened the animosity of Wall Street. As documented by author Gibson, these included:

—offering tax proposals to redirect the foreign investments of U.S. companies
—making distinctions in tax reform between productive and non-productive investment
—eliminating the tax privileges of U.S-based global investment companies
—cracking down on foreign tax havens
—supporting proposals to eliminate tax privileges for the wealthy
—proposing increased taxes for large oil and mineral companies
—revising the investment tax credit
—making a proposal to expand the powers of the president to deal with recession

Kennedy's economic policies and proposals were publicly attacked by Fortune magazine editor Charles J. V. Murphy, New York governor Nelson Rockefeller, David Rockefeller, and the editors of the Wall Street Journal. Kennedy's own Treasury Secretary, CFR member Dou-glas Dillon, voiced agreement with David Rockefeller in his opposition to the president's policies in 1962, and by 1965 had joined Rockefeller in creating a formal group to promote the war in Vietnam.Nunamiut (talk) 04:34, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

References

I've added the refimprove tag to this article. There are no in-line citations, and substantially all of the basic bio information was lifted verbatim (or with minimal changes) from the referenced occ.treas.gov site.

The referenced course case looks like it includes quotes from the case - that should be linked. Likewise, many of the views of Saxon that aren't mentioned in the treas.gov link need references to keep them in the article.

Finally, the HelpWithMyBank.gov link goes to a dead page.

Looks like a potentially interesting article! I realize it's pretty new, I'll see if I can help with some of the cites. Ravensfire2002 (talk) 03:06, 14 May 2009 (UTC)

Okay - found a link to the court case. Kinda laughing at it, as I'm from the area where this case happened (St. Louis). Hmmm, so am I right that this case is important because it covered that the Comptroller did not have to conduct a formal hearing on the granting of a bank charter before granting that charter? When saying that a case is important, the section should state up front why it's important. Ravensfire2002 (talk) 03:34, 14 May 2009 (UTC)

I agree. It was the case that constituted the regional/national? banks at the time against the creation/ establishing of new ones, which was Saxon's main practical contribution in that field and the most widely noted one. It figures in most of the articles on him and seems to be the one that got him into the limelight/searchlight of the media. I havent figured out how to phrase it yet to make it clear and consise and easy to spot the actual corresponding facts in the reference material, but you go ahead. Also, on a sidenote its interesting that John F. Kennedy also chose John Kenneth Galbraith as one of his close(st) advisors, since Galbraith was a pupil of and knew John Maynard Keynes, and, perhaps even more significantly, Galbraith was the chief of price-controls during the war, in effect the one man who made sure that the entire economy would work for the entire nation during the period of the greatest efforts and great economic production.. Nunamiut (talk) 20:35, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

"the Office of Price Administration itself - through its Consumer Division - mobilized the public on behalf of these guidelines, reducing the likelihood of "cheating" by those who would seek higher wages or prices. The result was that wages and prices were kept in check, and the U.S. enjoyed rapid growth and price stability through the war.Although little appreciated at the time, the actual power Galbraith wielded in this position was so great that he joked later that the rest of his career had been downhill."