Talk:Infiltration tactics

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Category:Maneuver tactics vs. Category:Maneuver tactics

Category:Maneuver tactics is itself a category within Category:Maneuver tactics. — Robert Greer (talk) 22:45, 10 March 2009 (UTC)[reply]

This is classed, probably incorrectly with Category:Espionage_techniques. Move to remove? Kortoso (talk) 19:59, 12 December 2016 (UTC)[reply]

Removed it. 108.34.151.191 (talk) 10:52, 23 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Before WW1

The originator of these tactics was the Union General Emory Upton, and they were first used at the battle of Spotsylvania Court House. Upton later taught tactics at West Point (1870 - 1875), and was the author of The Military Policy of the United States from 1775, which in turn inspired the Root Reforms of the US Army in the early 20th century. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.219.194.86 (talk) 15:39, 26 August 2011 (UTC)[reply]

This is very questionable for any number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that no Civil War vintage artillery was capable of firing a creeping barrage. Upton's tactics showed thoughtfulness and foresight but could not seriously be considered to represent the package of tactics used by people like Brusilov et al. It has a lot more in common with Sun Tzu. Flanker235 (talk) 04:19, 19 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Hurricane bombardment section

Just a note that this section is under construction. Currently, it lacks sources, emphasizes German use too much over British use.

I created this section at first thinking it would be pretty small, but it grew quickly. It might deserve its own article.

All are invited to improve in the meantime. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 21:08, 3 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Shell shock?

Keith-264, I'm curious on why a link to Shell shock was removed as part of this edit? The edit is certainly an improvement overall, but (a minor point) I thought that the link to Shell shock was good to keep. Is there a specific issue I'm missing? --A D Monroe III^(talk) 01:59, 4 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hello AD, I changed it because long slow bombardments were not intended to induce shell shock. To an extent they were necessary because the means to aim so many guns were inadequate; lots of guns had to wait their turn for information from artillery-observation aircraft. Accuracy was necessary so frequent pauses were used to check for effect; sometimes being dependent on artillery-reconnaissance aircraft to photograph the results, which wasn't always possible due to weather. The effect of a long slow bombardment was to destroy field fortifications, wire and exhaust the defenders, cut them off from the rear to prevent supplies and reinforcements from arriving, stop wounded being evacuated and physically tire the defenders from concussion. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 09:23, 4 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I'll accept that, but just add a couple of minor comments to explain why I had Shell shock in.

Hurricane bombardments were the exception, yet shell shock was common; apparently shell shock was induced by any significant bombardment, fast or slow.

It's true that bombardments didn't specifically intend to induce "shell shock" per se, as that was very poorly understood at the time. But there was talk of long bombardments "weakening their morale" and similar phrases. That apparently can be linked to the more specific effect of shell shock.

But, there's no specific source linking the two directly, only indirectly (thus my "apparently" emphases). I used a link to Shell shock to concisely summarize all the above, even though that's a bit of SYNTH. My thinking was that without something like that in there, long bombardments sound totally wasteful and stupid. I was trying to give the supporters of such bombardments some credit, which I must assume was justified, somehow.

Overall, though, SYNTH is SYNTH. Maybe I'll find a source that allows me to put it back, some day, but we'll leave it out for now. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 17:02, 17 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Assessment after rewriting

(I've separated this from the above since it's not about shell shock, and is more important than just that one part of one edit. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 16:32, 17 November 2017 (UTC))[reply]

Hello again, I've done a quick CE, revert as desired. I wonder if your sources are sufficient? Their emphasis on German ingenuity is OK but there is a counter view that it can be part of the UberGerman thesis and obscures the parallel developments in all the contending armies. An example is the slow bombardment - the British had too few guns for a hurricane bombardment between Neuve Chapelle and mid 1918 so however useful the tactic, the means for it were lacking. The Allies also had no need to make a virtue out of necessity, they could afford to swamp the Germans with firepower because (eventually) they had the guns and ammunition, a prodigious feat of manufacturing that the German war economy couldn't emulate. It might be better to describe each army's evolution of methods separately rather than in the context of German tactical change. I'd avoid the term enemy too since this can be construed as OR. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 18:03, 13 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for this valuable input. The TL;DR summary of my full response just below: I've updated the article some, and will continue looking for sources.

Here's my overly-detailed responses to these points:

1. On getting sources for "counter view" (anti-"UberGerman"): I haven't found any good ones. The most clear and emphatic is Krause, Early Trench Tactics in the French Army: the Second Battle of Artois, May–June 1915, but I found this really quite poor. Despite Krause's deserved good reputation, his promotion of Laffargue's The Attack in Trench Warfare Impressions and Reflections as being equivalent to German infiltration tactics is flawed in on all its points. Krause calls Laffargue an "artilleryman" though he was an infantry officer. Krause says Laffargue's primary contribution was about artillery, when Laffargue's mentions of artillery focus on its failures (the limited effect of French 75s on trenches, problems of communicating new targets to the artillery, inability to identify all targets before the attack), without giving any solutions that would be practical at that time. (Laffargue asks for more "aerial torpedoes", very dense smoke, bombing by aircraft, and mobile direct-fire medium artillery -- none of which were yet available to the effect he requires.) Krause attributes Laffargue's promoting a "much more cautious" approach, though Laffargue states emphatically that attacks "cannot be nibbled at" (the exact opposite of the French "nibbling" tactics they later adopted), and that the attack must be "unlimited" because he fully expects "infantry units disappear in the furnace of fire like handfuls of straw". Worse, though, is that on Laffargue being influential on French doctrine, Krause admits that historians are still "unsure", yet still proposes this as evidence of French tactical evolution, without any actual evidence. I can't cite something that admits it has no evidence. I've followed other sources on French WWI infiltration tactics that seem more reliable; these support the more modest French claims I have in the article.

2. On overstating "hurricane bombardment". I tend to agree that sources seem to make much more of this than documented effects would support, but they're the sources I have. I haven't found any sources with evidence that hurricane bombardments weren't that effective in general, only one that admit for special circumstance limited effectiveness for some particular battles. I have noted that hurricane bombardment isn't necessarily critical for successful infiltration tactics, and left it at that. I'll keep an eye out for more contrary sources in the future, however.

3. On describing each country individually, I fully agree, and have done that.

4. On avoiding the term "enemy" as OR, I'm a little confused. How is using "enemy" in a military article OR? Most sources make heavy use of it. Regardless, I've gone ahead and removed most of that, usually changing to "opponent". Hopefully that addresses the issue even if I don't fully understand it.

Thanks again. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 18:27, 8 December 2017 (UTC)[reply]

missed the point?

Is this article really about infiltration? Everything described is commando tactics or raids. Infiltration is clandestine, invisible, non noticed, non confrontive. Infiltration is recon or sabotage, not assault.

I suggest to move this article to a better suited title or delete it as dublette to existing articles on the subjects. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.113.121.148 (talk) 17:59, 14 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

As stated in the article lede (in its last paragraph), this article has nothing to do with clandestine operations. "Infiltration tactics", by that name (AKA "Hutier tactics"), is a distinct and well-known military assault tactic developed in WWI-WWII, and the basis of blitzkrieg. All this is stated in detail within the article. If there are sourced references to "infiltration tactics" being primarily some non-combat thing, please cite them here so we can avoid others' missing the point of this subject. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 20:39, 12 February 2019 (UTC)[reply]