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I just significantly rewrote the introductory two paragraphs of the article. In the first, I put a bit more about the Enlightenment and also changed "philosopher and geographer" to "philosopher and scientist", mentioning a few of the areas of science to which he made contribution. His contributions to physics, astrophysics, and mathematics (nebular hypothesis, parity) surely outweigh any other scientific contributions. More importantly, the previous version of the second paragraph, giving an initial summary of Kant's philosophy, was deficient in two important ways. First, and most importantly, it defined Kant's transcendental idealism in terms of his doctrine of the ideality of space and time, of the forms of intuition, which for Kant was secondary to the activity of transcendental synthesis performed through the categories of the understanding, which is what the central piece of the Critique of Pure Reason, the transcendental deduction of the categories, is about. So I corrected that. Second, the previous version defined the center of Kant's philosophy and of his influence as being just his epistemology, and his moral philosophy was given short shrift. So I rewrote the paragraph to make both of them central. I'm summarizing this here for others who may work on this article in the future or may be already working on it. Jeremy J. Shapiro 07:57, 3 September 2005 (UTC)

  • Transcendental idealism is treated by Kant as identical to "critical idealism", a consideration for the apriori origins of our various representations in our faculties. These representations include those of metaphysical objects such as God, freedom and the Soul, and then of the objects of science and math. The first group have their origin merely in the thinking (Understanding) or reasoning faculty, without the possibility of being coterminously represented in the sensible faculty. Thus we can think God, freedom, and the Soul as things in themselves or noumenal objects, without being able to know them. The second group have their origins in the sensible faculty (mathematics) from which concepts are "constructed", and in the thinking plus sensible faculty (science) in which a concept thought through the Understanding is evidenced through the senses. Transcendental or critical philosophy tests the validity and reality of judgments, whether theoretical or moral or aesthetic, by exposing the faculties that are being employed in making them, and then showing whether the limitations of those faculties legitimate such judgments. Omar 19:40, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
Your comment reminds me that in the article on the Critique of Pure Reason, it needs to be made clear that when Kant talks about "intuition" he basically means "perception" and not "intuition" in the way that people use it in everyday language. I think that in general in these Kant (and probably some other philosophy articles) there needs to be a back and forth between the philosophers' original terminology and everyday language, so that people can understand what these things mean without being mystified, but preserving the original terms for the sake of accuracy. I certainly agree with you that "sensible forms" doesn't mean much in everyday language. And these things are SO complicated by translation problems. Jeremy J. Shapiro 08:49, 3 September 2005 (UTC)
  • The phraseology "sensible forms" seems so Platonic, and for Kant space and time were not concepts. Thus, you're right about the misinterpretation of "intuition". The terms could easily be misconstrued if not explained properly.Amerindianarts 08:54, 3 September 2005 (UTC)


A user just eliminated "positive" and "negative" because he thought of them as expressing POV, whereas in this context they are technical terms. I will try to rewrite to make that clearer. Jeremy J. Shapiro 18:40, 3 September 2005 (UTC)

So does it seem better now? Jeremy J. Shapiro 19:35, 3 September 2005 (UTC)
    • I think the element that tied Kant's constitutive element and the dynamic element together was the synthetic, especially the proposition that "Every event has a cause". Even if Kant himself were to believe this to be an absolute, however, it would defeat the entire purpose of his method. Thus, he was quite explicit later in the Critique of Pure Reason about proceeding on an "as if" basis. We cannot assert conclusively that God does or doesn't exist, but must proceed "as if" he does both morally and scientifically to be productive theoretically and remain within the limits of reason. This was the transcendental (empirical) aspect of his method and the fundamental basis of the hypothetical and disjunctive. It also defines the intentional aspect of his method and frankly the very narrow distinction between different types of faith ('religious' faith and the faith of scientific procedure in positing the hypothetical), if there is such a thing. While it is illogical to assert "God exists", it is even more illogical to assert "God does not exist" because this would be the demise of the dynamic (kind of a prerequisite to James' wager theory). This was Kant's solution to the antimonies. It is fundamental to his criticisms of Leibniz (monadology) and the Wolffian school. It is basically the argument one could make about the mathematical "point" (which Kant alludes to in the Four Syllogistic Figures). It is central to mathematics, but it doesn't exist. It has no extension but we treat it "as if" it does, especially in perception. Without it, that is, if we assert that it doesn't exist, we chance the demise of the ability (capacity) to posit any intended object at all. This needs to integrated into the article, I think.Amerindianarts 19:21, 3 September 2005 (UTC)
Yes, I agree that the "as if" is important. I think it should probably be in the discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason and the relationship between the "as if" aspect in Pure Reason but the non-"as if"ness in Practical Reason, i.e. the difference between moral certainy and the lack of theoretical certainty, as in Kant's quote "I have restricted knowledge to make room for faith". Jeremy J. Shapiro 19:35, 3 September 2005 (UTC)
      • One of the reasons people do not read Kant is that he was not good at writing paragraphs. 500 word paragraphs need to be the exception in any wikipedia article - not the standard. Excessive use of technical terms in the lead, especially without flagging them as such, also makes articles inaccessible to readers --JimWae 19:41, 2005 September 3 (UTC)
      • One can also live "as if" God does NOT exist - and still have a basis for morality. Kant broke ground there too. --JimWae 19:41, 2005 September 3 (UTC)
      • Your missing my point - I did not say that was Kant's point, just that he broke ground (nearby)--JimWae 19:54, 2005 September 3 (UTC)
      • Absolutely. My understanding of Kant is that the categorical imperative is an absolute, God can be a useful construct to help people live according to the categorical imperative, but its validity is not dependent on any beliefs about the existence of God. This is ultimately connected to why Kant's writings on religion were banned by the Prussian government. Jeremy J. Shapiro 18:25, 4 September 2005 (UTC)
    • The significance of Kant's work being banned simply shows the lack of understanding in the eighteenth-century contemporaneous powers that be. I think that I have also been misunderstood and should qualify that we are talking about an "idea" and the transcendental use as opposed to the use of the transcendent.Amerindianarts 23:05, 4 September 2005 (UTC)
    • If it's not Kant's point then it's POV and should be stated as such, if stated at allAmerindianarts 19:59, 3 September 2005 (UTC)
      • POV is permitted on Talk pages - I did not think anyone would jump to the conclusion that I was giving Kant's position. Nevertheless, his legacy includes citations by non-deists that he provides a basis for non-deistic morality--JimWae 20:04, 2005 September 3 (UTC)
  • I can accept that, but here on the talk page my concern is seeing that Kant's method is rendered descriptively and objectively in the article. Meaning, the talk page exists so that POV can be eliminated or reduced to a minimum. The best of all possible worlds.Amerindianarts 20:08, 3 September 2005 (UTC)

I just moved that longer paragraph from the introduction to a separate, concluding "impact" section and broke it into two paragraphs. Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:41, 3 September 2005 (UTC)

I don't like the stile of the article. The sentences are far too long. This is my example: "Immanuel Kant (April 22, 1724 – February 12, 1804) was a German philosopher and scientist (astrophysics, mathematics, geography, anthropology) from Prussia, generally regarded as one of Europe's most influential thinkers and the last major philosopher of the Enlightenment, which Kant himself defined, in his prize-winning essay What is Enlightenment?, as an age shaped by the motto, "Dare to know" and that involved thinking autonomously, free of the dictates of external authority." There is no reason to present simple facts in such a complicated way. Why don't you write: Immanuel Kant (April 22, 1724 – February 12, 1804) was a German philosopher and scientist (astrophysics, mathematics, geography, anthropology) from Prussia. He is generally regarded as one of Europe's most influential thinkers and the last major philosopher of the Enlightenment. In his prize-winning essay "What is Enlightenment?" Kant himself defined Enlightenment as an age shaped by the motto "Dare to know"....Kikl 12:30, 4 September 2005 (UTC)


Sounds fine to me. I will try to do this sort of rewriting over the course of the next week, and certainly don't mind if you or anyone else does it. Jeremy J. Shapiro 18:25, 4 September 2005 (UTC)
The task you are undertaking is not an enviable one. Kant is one of the most widely "read about" philosophers there is. There is a ton of secondary material and he is thus one of the most widely misunderstood thinkers as a result. Everybody seems to have an opinion about his work and this article will have much input as to how people think it should be. This is also a great tribute to Kant because of the emotions and ideas he seems to stir. I spent several years studying Kant as a student under a German prof. and a Middle Eastern prof. who knew French existentialism inside and out, and how they robbed Kant of his ideas. I also spent a few more years as and an assistant to the existentialist. The Critique of Pure Reason is my Bible. But I have no intentions of contributing directly to this article. I don't have the time or patience to argue the points, edit, and re-edit. Good luck.Amerindianarts 03:35, 5 September 2005 (UTC)
The discussion still needs to state some basic elements, i.e. keywords linking to other articles that will provide more information on Kant and philosophy. This means mentioning such things as Copernican revolution, trancendental idealism, even intuition, etc. If not, then the article is not going to be much of a guide for info and further research.Amerindianarts 21:57, 4 September 2005 (UTC)
I agree on all these points, and I can't commit do doing a full rewrite of the entire Kant article either now (because of work commitments) or by myself ever, because of the amount of competence involved, especially if it needed to account for all of the controversies in the interpretation of Kant. I think that might go beyond what Wikipedia should provide, that sounds more like a review article in a scholarly journal. Seems to me what needs to be figured out is how to walk the tightrope between giving the sort of oversimplifying summary of a typical encyclopedia, which sweeps the controversy and difficulty under the rug, and getting into an overly complex scholarly article that is beyond what people are looking for when they consult an encyclopedia. For example, I've been reading a rather good book on the Critique of Pure Reason by Arthur Collins called "Possible Experience", in which he argues quite convincingly that Kant was not an idealist but rather a realist, and that much Kant literature misinterprets him as an idealist because of assuming that he accepted basic premises of Descartes that in fact he didn't accept, i.e. that we only have access to our own inner consciousness. I don't think the Wikipedia Kant article could get into all the ins and outs of that. But it would probably be useful if it at least indicated that Kant's philosophy was quite controversial in the 18th century and is quite controversial now and that there are idealistic, realistic, phenomenological, existential, positivist, etc. readings of his central ideas. By the way, like you I studied under some different Kant scholars, in both the U.S. and in Germany, and because they came out of different intellectual traditions, they emphasized really different things in Kant and read him rather differently. I should add that as a relative newbie here, I don't yet have an understanding of what the consensus is of what an article on a major philosopher really should and shouldn't be like. I tend to edit when I notice that some existing article has some weakness, omission, or distortion, and that tends to then get me embroiled in trying to help make that article really good and really accurate. Jeremy J. Shapiro 08:08, 5 September 2005 (UTC)
  • The book sounds good because Kant was definitely not an idealist, which is one aspect of his philosophy that seems to be widely misunderstood. He is also mistaken as a representationalist or constructionist as well. "Transcendental" and "intuition" are other terms he uses that tend to misinform the uninformed also. I'm a newbie also, and I'm not sure what is expected, but I think my approach would be a descriptive intro page with keywords linked to back pages where the terms could be explained in a little more detail and the controversies brought to bear. If you try to present all the central issues with explanations then I'm sure you'll be writing 500+ word paragraphs. It is a tough undertaking. The section on the Critique was handled good, because it is an article in itself, as would his other major works. There is so much content to work with and consider that brief summation could appear very abstract and worthless. Conversely, it can get very wordy and appear long-winded (like me). The back pages may be difficult to identify also, but you can always use disambiguous pages and set-up potential pages that are meant for philosophy. Just another science that has its own vocabulary, and with Kant it can be a vocabulary within a vocabulary. Then again, you may not want to worry about links, but let the future reader/writers make their own, but that may lead to duplication and navigation problems. I looked over the intro, but I haven't read it. It appears fine. I will try to read it soon. As far as consensus, that is what the talk page is for (and the elimination of POV). This article was a real mess at one time, people wanting to include sections purporting Kant's atheism, racism, etc. It has also been subject to frequent vandalism. Kant has the capacity to incite emotion. A major mover. I'll read it with care soon and if you don't mind maybe suggest words that could be linked to wherever. I'll search Wiki and see what is out there and what is not. Analytic/synthetic, the beautiful and the sublime, transcendental/trancendent, categories. A lot of stuff. Some peculiar to philosophy but even more peculiar in Kant.Amerindianarts 09:54, 5 September 2005 (UTC)
PS. Like you I surf around to things of my interest and try to maintain a certain standard with minor edits. I have only made a couple of major contributions. No time. I have three websites to maintain and a couple of e-stores, plus I publish a daily newsletter and most of my time is spent doing research for it. My major contribs at Wiki are usually subjects related to current research. Amerindianarts 10:14, 5 September 2005 (UTC)
Passages that I have problems with:
  • 1) "The two interconnected foundations of what Kant called his "critical philosophy", of the "Copernican revolution" he claimed to have wrought in philosophy,"--I wonder about the "of" after "critical philosophy", this may be just grammatical preference. "or" might work better
  • 2) "This consisted of conceptual unification and integration carried out by the mind through concepts or the "categories of the understanding" operating on perceptions within space and time, which in turn are also mental structures"--. "mental Structures" gives the impression of idealism. Space and time were not concepts, but Intuitions. "Mental structures" gives the impression that they would disappear without the mind, in a Berkeleyian fashion. What do you think? Maybe the book you are reading will conjure a suggestion. Or, maybe to be safe, rephrase using "intuitions" and let the reader follow the link. The page on "intuition" has Kant's definition, and if need be a page "intuition (philosophy)" can always be created.
  • 3) The next sentence "Thus the objective order of nature and the causal necessity that operates within it are products of the mind in its interaction with what lies outside of mind (the "thing-in-itself")"--. The position of (thing-in-itself) at the end of the sentence seems to ignore the distinction between "appearances" and "things-in-themselves". The order and necessity that lies in the thing itself is unknowable. Appearances are products of the mind, but so are the conclusions we draw about the thing in itself. Appearances, I think, are also intended to be this side of the thing in itself which is outside the mind. Feel free to correct me, but this can be tricky because appearance and perception in Kant are not the same. I think this distinction, especially when I read the next sentence("The latter can never be known except through the forms that the mind imposes upon it."), relies on Kant's distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent. The transcendental logic (which has been described as Kant's term for general logic) is what we impose upon our representations (loosely appearances), but these representations are not simply mind pictures (otherwise he would rightly be a representationalist). When we impose this upon the thing itself it becomes transcendent, that is, we are imposing pure reason. I would have to think about possible suggestions.
  • 4)Last, I would put a comma after "activity" in the last sentence "and that philosophy involves self-critical activity irrevocably reshaped philosophy"
  • Feel Free to rebut

PS, I like this article's format (Jaakko Hintikka), but reducing Kant to this would be wishful thinking I'm afraid.Amerindianarts 12:16, 5 September 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for the great input Amerindian. However, I really don't like the expression "transcendental Idealism" for Kant's philosophy. The equivalent german article is called "transcendental philosophy". The term "idealistic" leads to great misconceptions of his philosophy. I propose to delete this term.

Sorry, transcendental idealism is Kant's own term. So we can't just take it out, but it would be good to explain it. Transcendental philosophy in German is used by some phenomenologists and other post-Kantian philosophers who are following up on some of Kant's ideas, but they aren't doing the same thing that Kant was doing in using the expression transcendental idealism. One of Husserl's main criticisms of Descartes and Kant was that they weren't transcendental enough. But you're right that Kant's use of transcendental idealism has contributed to confusion about his philosophy, and the Collins book I'm reading quotes Kant to the effect that Kant wished he hadn't used the expression precisely for this reason, i.e. that people took him to be an idealist. But since Kant uses it in conjunction with empirical realism, if we make that clear, then we can avoid confusing people. Jeremy J. Shapiro 03:45, 6 September 2005 (UTC)

realism is the viewpoint that accords to the objects of knowledge an existence that is independent of whether anyone is perceiving or thinking about them. Idealism is commonly considered to be the opposite of realism. Kant did not questioned the existence of independent objects. Hell No. Kant just said that one cannot perceive objects as they are; one can only perceive the appearance of objects. The "thing in itself" does "exist" according to Kant. The second edition of the critique includes a chapter called "Refutation of Idealism". Kant's main thesis is: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." 84.151.179.166 22:41, 5 September 2005 (UTC)

  • Empirical realism identifies the real with what appears, for what appears is a sensible content shaped by the categories, hence brought under the auspices of the unity of self consciousness. This is sufficient to establish the objective reality of what appears, and hence its reality persay.Omar 23:58, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
Nobody on this page is claiming that Kant was an idealist. I am not writing the article, but I agree with you. Transcendental philosophy is fine, but it is currently redirected to transcendental idealism, as if that helps the situation. Same with intuition. "Mental construct" overlooks that space is presupposed by the mind as an external intuition and not a result of experience. And yes, the thing in itself does exist, but we can't know it and any claims we make stating we do are transcendent. Where in the writings above do you read inferences that Kant doubted the existence of the thing in itself?Amerindianarts 02:41, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
To whomever it may concern on this page, I think the article at transcendence (philosophy) is confused.Amerindianarts 03:30, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
At your suggestion, I just checked it out and not only do I agree with you but it seems like it would be better to take it out and just put in a one-sentence stub, because it is a mishmash of unclarity. Jeremy J. Shapiro 03:45, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
The recent work, here, is a vast improvement to the article. I am glad that the fallacy that the CI is merely a version of the golden rule was changed, especially since Kant himself said quite clearly that it was not. Kant could not have cared less about how one would want to be treated by others or how others would want to be treated if a proposed action did not comport with reason and if one could not also will it as a universal law, notwithstanding whether one is perpetrator or victim. icut4u 03:55, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
LOL Removal is always a bold move, re: trancendence (philosophy). I think the decision to keep transcendental idealism is a sound one. I am also curious as to the date of the book you are reading. I never once had a prof who taught Kant as anything other than a Realist. In my first year I refered to Kant as an idealist and the reply was "Mensch! Dummkopf!" It's funny, now.Amerindianarts 04:09, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
I just did some editing on transcendence (philosophy). I don't even think what I did is that great, but it is at least more accurate than what's there before, and I don't have time to spend more time on it right now. I have a German book here called "Philosophie und Transzendence" that I've never read and which I'm sure would help, but I don't have time to read it now. Jeremy J. Shapiro 06:54, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
I finally read the intro and made some comments above. The thing that struck me about the transcendence (philosophy) page was that it seemed they had confused transcendent and transcendental, but I am a Kantian and never really explored Transcendence, so... I have been spending my time expanding the stub at Sublime. It corresponds to research I'm doing on the Zuni. If you read German there is a good, short, obscure article by Gerold Prauss entitled "Intentionalitat bei Kant". I have the article but can't remember the journal it was in. I don't know anyone else that has read it, so discussion has been a pipedream. You're in the UK??? No holiday on Monday?? Amerindianarts 08:15, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
I also read the transcendence (philosophy) . It appears fine. The only thing lacking may to distinguish between Kant's transcendental and transcendent. The only thing to really say about that is that Kant's concept of transcendent lacks the objectivity claimed by the phenomenologists. Kant's transcendent is Wittgenstein's transcendent. The only difference being that Witty didn't distinguish between transcendent and transcendental. Amerindianarts 09:42, 6 September 2005 (UTC)

The chapter entitled "impact" is truely brilliant. The explanation of Kant's "Copernican Revolution" is lucid and brief. Maybe Kant's impact on ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy should be added.

I changed the title of the "Impact" section to "Influence." "Impact" is a trendy word that has been borrowed from the Information Technology field and is now used by people who can't remember the difference between the noun "effect" and the adjective "affect."

Very cool section on Kant agnosticism!! Clear and well-written!! Jeremy J. Shapiro 14:55, 6 September 2005 (UTC)

Thanks. It goes to show that you can never really complete your own proof reading. Amerindianarts 17:15, 6 September 2005 (UTC)

Millenium?

An anonymous user changed the introductions "generally regarded as one of Europe's most influential thinkers" to "generally regarded as one of Europe's most influential thinkers of the second millenium. While I wouldn't fight about it, it seems to me that philosophers generally would regard Kant as one of the most influential philosophers of all time (along with Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, possibly Hegel and Nietzsche, and leaving the 20th century out of it). Does anyone see a reason to include "of the second millenium?" Jeremy J. Shapiro 00:06, 9 September 2005 (UTC)

I agree. "Second Millenium" limits his scope, but I wouldn't replace it "with all time". I would change it anyway because it was anonymous. Everybody has something to say about Kant and if they are going to say it, they should sign it.Amerindianarts 03:52, 9 September 2005 (UTC)
I changed it to "one of Western society's and modern Europe's most influential thinkers", but I'm not attached to this in the least. Don't hesitate to edit. Jeremy J. Shapiro 05:04, 9 September 2005 (UTC)
Good change. --goethean ॐ 17:54, 9 September 2005 (UTC)
I concur. Amerindianarts 00:35, 10 September 2005 (UTC)

Mendelssohn

The article refers to Mendelssohn. Which Mendelssohn is meant here? --Slashme 09:29, 28 November 2005 (UTC)

The reference is to Moses M. I've disambiguated the link. fi99ig 14:21, 28 November 2005 (UTC)

Additions to Intro

In the introductory article, we mention Kant's influence on subsequent movements: romanticism and german idealism. I thought it might be a good idea to also mention what came before: namely, the idea that Kant's philosophy serves as a bridge between Rationalism and Empiricism. This is how Kant himself viewed the matter, and it is the standard way of understanding his place in the history of philosophy. I would be happy to make the change, but, since I'm new here, I thought I would check first, as I don't wish to step on any toes. Please let me know if you are opposed to this addition. fi99ig 20:20, 18 September 2005 (UTC)

I support this. It seems to me that in a way the most instructive place to put this would be before the stuff on the Critique of Pure Reason, because of what you say, i.e. the Critique is his way of trying to synthesize and transcend rationalism and empiricism as they existed before him. In a way one can't fully understand the Critique and Kant's doctrines without that. So you could try some brief thing in the intro, but a somewhat more substantial part, e.g. a paragraph's worth, before the Critique would be very helpful to readers. Jeremy J. Shapiro 03:30, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
Sounds good. I'll try to do this in the next day or so, as my schedule permits... fi99ig 00:23, 21 September 2005 (UTC)
I added a section on Rationalism and Empiricism. It may appear long winded, especially with two introductory paragraphs, but this is basically my distrust of information that may be derived from linked articles. Proofreading by someone is appreciated, edit at will. If I disagree with your edits I will let you know. Also, I don't think that someone should have to scroll down past the intro to view the Table of Contents. Maybe this should be changed/rearranged. Amerindianarts 06:09, 21 September 2005 (UTC)
I appreciate the work that was put into the section on Rationalism and Empiricism, but the section seems rather out of place in a general encyclopedia article on Kant. It seems to me it would be more approriate to mention that Kant attempted to synthesize and transcend the divide of ratonalism and empiricism, and then let readers link up to rationalism and empiricism if they wish to find out what they are. The section might be more appropriate for the article on the Critique of Pure Reason, but even then I'm not so sure. If you have a problem with the linked articles on rationalism and empiricism wouldn't it be better to take up those issues in the discussion section for those article? Writing things about rationalism/empiricism in an article on Kant that don't hook up with those other articles seems kind of counterproductive. Wjwma 18:30, 21 September 2005 (UTC)
I agree with Wjwma. This seems like too much detail for this article. I've added a reference to empiricism and rationalism in the intro, with links. That might be enough for now. fi99ig 20:41, 21 September 2005 (UTC)
I've also made a few other edits in the Into: changed the link to Idealism to a link to German Idealism; changed the link to Romantic to Romanticism; corrected the reference to the Essay on Enlightenment as "prize-winning" (that was a different essay, I believe) fi99ig 20:59, 21 September 2005 (UTC)
The section was your suggestion fi99ig, sorry if I stepped on any toes. It has been removed. Amerindianarts 21:40, 21 September 2005 (UTC)
Hey, nothing personal, Amerindianarts -- I just thought it was a bit too much detail. fi99ig 21:52, 21 September 2005 (UTC)

On a related note, I'd like to offer a few more suggestions re: changes to the Kant page. In general, I think it's coming together very nicely, but I'm worried that it's too long and detailed in places. To this end, I suggest we consider the following:

(a) In the Introductory section, is it really necessary to list all of the sciences that Kant participated in? I worry that this creates the misleading impression that his scientific work is on par (in terms of its influence and significance) with his philosophy. That's surely not the case. He did not do any technical work in mathematics or physics; he taught Geography and wrote a few minor essays on the topic; I suppose he did have more influence in Anthropology, through Herder for instance, but I just don't see it being sufficiently important to warrant mention in the first paragraph of the article. I propose that we just call him a philosopher. If people still want to mention his other contributions, perhaps we could do so later in the article.

(b) In the "Biography" section there is a fairly detailed discussion of how and when Kant may have discovered Hume. Perhaps this is out of place in what should be a brief summary of his life. It might be enough to say, as we do later on, that Kant credited Hume with awakening him from his dogmatic slumber.

(c) The "biography" gives the impression that the Groundwork came after the 2nd Critique, when in fact, it came before it. It also suggests that the Groundwork shares the Prolegomena's analytic method, when, in fact, the third section is synthetic (see Kant's Preface, 4:392).

(d) As mentioned above, the section "Rationalism and Empiricism" seems overly detailed, and I suggest that we omit it (or perhaps move it over to the article on the Critique of Pure Reason, where the detail might be more appropriate).

(e) In "Kant's Moral Philosophy", there is almost as much detail in the examples of the first and second imperatives as there are in the original text of the Groundwork. Perhaps these could be moved over to the page on the Groundwork.

(f) The discussion of the Antinomies in "Kant and Agnosticism" again seems overly detailed, given how many other important topics from the Dialectic are not even mentioned. Also, the link with religious religious agnosticism feels a bit quick, to my mind. Perhaps it would be better to move this discussion over to the page on the Critique and replace it with a brief discussion of the Dialectic in general -- i.e., the idea that reason inevitably goes astray when it tries to extend its cognitions beyond the limits of possible experience. (This is already mentioned in the following section on Kant's "Influence", so perhaps we could use this material.)

(g) Do we need to mention the reference to Kant in a Matrix comic book? It's not clear to me what purpose it is serving, but perhaps it's just me that's missing the point... :)

(h) The bibliography seems overly long to me, although I like the introductory paragraph. Perhaps we could remove some of the more obscure items (referring the reader to something like the Cambridge Companion for a more complete list). We might also want to consider dividing it into several sections: useful collections of essays; important monographs on Kant; and works influenced by Kant.

OK, that's a lot of suggestions. I'll await feedback before proceeding with any of them. fi99ig 21:52, 21 September 2005 (UTC)

First, I made this comment earlier, but it didn't save, probably my oversight on the save button. The articles on Rationalism and Empiricism are sorely deficient. Rationalism makes little note of Kant, and the article on Empiricism is wrong, definitively. It must have been written by an empiricist because the entry on Kant is POV. It appears in the wording of the paragraph that Locke and Berkeley criticized Kant, so it gives the appearance of chronological error. Also, "innate ideas?", give me a break. Kant was not an innatist. This entry relies on dictionary definitions and is not philosophy.

Second, I first saw the entry on the Matrix comic, and rather than delete it added a comment stipulating how Kant is misread, or not read at all, in modern times. I should have deleted it, and I made a comment above, on this page instead, as to its non-content. It should not be in the article and should be deleted.

Third, I think the section on Agnosticism is too short and really doesn't provide the detail it needs in order to explicate his position. But it does provide enough material for a reader seeking the info needed for further research. Also the same on "Rationalism and Empiricism". The deficiency of the linking articles dictates detail.

Fourth, I agree the section on Morality should be its own page, but I don't know about limiting it to the page on Groundwork.

Fifth, the Biography may need a few changes, but I don't understand your concern with detail and space, and see most of your suggestions as to detail and space...destructive, and not constructive. The Bibliography is great.

Sixth, I had already deleted the section on Rationaism and Empiricism, but after viewing your overall take on the article I am reinserting it and leaving opinion to the rest of the editors.Amerindianarts 22:51, 21 September 2005 (UTC)

I certainly don't mean to be destructive. As I said, there's a lot of great stuff here. Let me try to clarify my intentions, and we can see if you still disagree with me. Mainly, I think we have to keep in mind that this is a summary article, not a full book. It's simply not feasible to go into the details of everything that is interesting in Kant's thought. The danger (and this is just my opinion, of course) is that in going into great detail on certain issues while completely ignoring others, the article will end up looking spotty and unbalanced. For instance, it seems odd to discuss the various Antinomies, without mentioning, say, the Paralogisms (which are just as interesting and influential). I thought we might bring more balance to the article by discussing the Dialectic in general, rather than focusing on one small section of it.
I think a similar point holds for the bibliography. It's true that there are a lot of great sources on it. But of course, it can't possibly be complete. That would be neither possible nor desirable. I take it that what we want is a list of some of the most helpful secondary work on Kant. But what's currently missing, I think, is a criterion for determining what makes the cut. For instance, we have Pippin's Idealism as Modernism, but we don't have his Kant book: Kant's Theory of Form. We have Allison's Kant's Transcendental Idealism, but not it's main competitor: Guyer's Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Etc. I really hope this doesn't come across as nit-picking. That's not how I mean it. My point, is that any selection we come up with will be arbitrary unless we agree upon some sort of criteria for selecting them. In the previous note, I mentioned a few categories that might guide our selection. I'm open to other ways of organizing it. (I also thought it might help the reader to divide up the list into these various categories, but I'm not wedded to the idea.)

I will go ahead and take out the Matrix reference. Hopefully we can have more discussion of the other issues. fi99ig 01:18, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

RE: Bibliography. I agree that the list is incomplete. If you feel something needs to be there, put it there. A good balance of sources should be a major objective.
I also agree that this is a summary article and should not be a full book, but it is far from being a full book. Let's assess who it is we are talking about here. In my opinion, the most monumental figure in modern philosophy and one the greatest thinkers history has seen. Not to mention the aspects of his philosophy, you have to consider his many influences. The questions he struggled with have been answered in the development of semantics, quantification logic, modal logic, just to name a couple. Almost any aspect of modern philosophy has to deal with Kant. Who is Sartre? Sartre is Kant reduced to the absurd, and it still makes sense! How can you post a summary of generalities and do service to his work? And what disservice is this to the reader? I have already mentioned the deficiencies in the links to Rationalism and Empiricism. Take a look. I don't think the summary you desire can be accomplished without relying on dictionary definitions and generalities that may tend to distort or misrepresent his views to the casual reader. It should be complete enough to provide information for further research for the serious reader. Some sections could be expanded, but haven't been because of the concerns you have mentioned. But to edit them down to be more general I think would be a mistake. I wish other editors would chime in. What are the objectives here? Assimilating an article in the Britannica? Or something that sets it apart from other summaries? Amerindianarts 01:47, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

The Popular culture and Matrix entry was reverted back with additions by an anonymous editor. I personally do not favor anonymous entries to this article, especially since there is a such collaborative effort on this page as to its content. Perhaps we need more feedback on this issue, that is, in regard to the Popular Culture entry. Amerindianarts 06:28, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

Don't revert edits just because they're anonymous. Wikipedia is the free encyclopedia that anyone can edit.
I have already mentioned the deficiencies in the links to Rationalism and Empiricism.
So improve those articles. That's why we have hyperlinks. --goethean ॐ 15:58, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
  • Amerindianarts, perhaps I can assuage some of your concerns regarding my proposals. I certainly don't mean to turn this article into a simplistic summary. I just think that we need to proceed more systematically. So, for instance, it would make more sense to have several paragraphs on the second half of the First Critique (i.e, the Dialectic), rather than focusing on a small part of it (i.e, the Antionomies). As it stands, we are leaving out the other parts and failing to explain how this small part fits into the larger whole. The same goes with the other topics I mentioned above. Keeping our focus on central issues does not have to mean dumbing down the text. (I admit that I may have given that impression by talking about removing excess detail, but I hope I've clarified my intentions.) fi99ig 17:12, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
  • Regarding the Matrix stuff, I have no problems with anonymous contributors. But if they want to keep this section in, they ought to defend its value here on the Talk page. Since no one has stepped forward to defend it, I'm going to go ahead and remove it again. I urge the anonymous contributor (or anyone else) to raise the issue here if he or she has a problem with this decision. fi99ig 17:12, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
One problem with the Popular Culture entries in this and some other Wikipedia articles is that one person's popular culture is another person's non-being or trivia, and it's not clear what the criteria are for counting as relevant or significant pop culture. For example, if one rock group in one part of the world in one song mentions something that may philosophically have some analogy to Kantian ideas, or uses the word "Kant" in a song, does that mean that they should be listed in the Kant article? In other words, it's not clear to me what the criteria of significance are for popular culture references in articles about philosophy or other things not directly related to popular culture. Or, to take another example, the Wikpedia article about diamonds doesn't have a popular culture reference to the Beatles song "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds." Should it? Is there any place on Wikipedia that discusses this issue? Jeremy J. Shapiro 16:47, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

--goethean I try to keep my editing to a minimum. Making changes usually entails defense at a talk page, and I just don't have the time. Also, I believe at the top of this page a signature is requested, as a courtesy. The same should also go for the article. If they came to the talk page and discussed it, and followed the requested courtesy, there wouldn't be a problem, would there?Amerindianarts 19:06, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

--fi99ig I don't understand, sorry. I thought you said it mentioned too much detail and now you seem to be thinking that it should be expanded?? The reason I choose the antinomies example is that philosophers consider it the classic statement of the agnostic position, and I did not see the need to present more "detail" by expanding the scope of the section by including more examples. The argument is for the agnostic position and Kant's formulation, I didn't see the need to include more. If you think it does, have at it. As far as the Rationalism and Empiricism section, if you feel the first two paragraphs need to be omitted, then omit them. If you want to omit the entire thing and rewrite, do it.Amerindianarts 19:06, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

  • --fi99igOn second thought, isn't there a separate page for the Critic?? Are you proposing new paragraphs on the main article? The section on Agnosticism was suggested by other editors. It states what it purports to state. Occam's Razor. Other users have found it OK (see above) and you seem to be the only one who has a problem with it. If you are looking to spread your wings, the lengthy section on Morality could stand a page of its own, or merged with the Groundwork. Amerindianarts 20:03, 22 September 2005 (UTC)


Jeremy J. Shapiro I agree. I don't know of a Wiki place that discusses it. I do fail to see the relevance of such entries to philosophy most of time. I wouldn't say they are never relevant, but in general they don't seem to be. Who knows? For some people the Matrix and comic books are philosophy. Amerindianarts 19:06, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

Actually, many articles have sections on "x in popular culture". These sections intend to show that x is still relevant to contemporary life. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, for example. I think that the Matrix material is appropriate but should be shortened and the writing improved. And I don't think that anonymous edits should be automatically reverted. --goethean ॐ 20:30, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
You're right. If it stays it should be rewritten. But the only way I really see to shorten it, it seems, would be to remove the comment on its significance, or relevance. Is this what you mean?? And anonymous entries shouldn't be automatically reverted, even though most of the time they do seem to appear without substance and entered by someone who doesn't want to lay claim to their entry. Amerindianarts 20:52, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
And I was not arguing that there should not be such references at all, only that without some sense of what are the minimal criteria for counting as "in popular culture", a) things of less than encyclopedic importance can easily start creeping in, and b) it can open up irresolvable debates about what counts as a genuine contribution to popular culture, c) it's not clear how central or peripheral the connection has to be, and d) it then opens up all kinds of questions about the interpretation of the idea. For example, the mere fact that some book or movie shows that the structure of space or time can be changed or is illusory or subjective doesn't make it Kantian, or an example of the influence of Kant, unless there's either an explicit reference to Kant or it's possible to trace a connection (e.g. it's known that the author of the book or movie was influenced by Kant). For example, one could make an argument that various works or movements of modern art or literature incorporate Kantian ideas -- but from the Wikipedia point of view, to do so here would count as Original Research, not the report of information. Furthermore, in the Matrix example cited, the idea that one could let go of our forms of space and time and restructure them is arguably not a Kantian idea at all, since for Kant they were ineluctable forms of our intuition and he says we can't make any sense out of the idea that people could have different ones. I write all this not so much out of concern with the Kant article specifically as for feeling the need for some guidelines about this "x in popular culture" business, which I see as relevant but complicated and confusing. Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:02, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
  • Yes, these are some very good points. The connection is an article "I Kant" in Matrix comics. It is very thin and the interpreters rendition strikes me as personal opinion. Poorly written, and to me interprets Kant in a Berkelian fashion, and space and time as a consequence of perception. You see this type of entry frequently in the films and actor biography articles and some give me the feeling I'm reading a gossip column. Amerindianarts 22:01, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
  • Coincidentally I had also been thinking about "gossip" in this connection, and it seems to me that at an intuitive level it would be a good thing to have in mind as part of the criteria of "x in popular culture", i.e. that it not be gossip. And this makes me realize that a lot of current popular culture is focussed around celebrity and celebrities. I still think that the best thing ever written about this is Daniel Boorstin's "The Image: a guide to pseudo-events in America", in which he wrote, around 1961, that current American culture is a culture of pseudo-events, i.e. of events, images, and information manufactured to be consumed, and that a celebrity is someone who is known for being known. I mention this just because it brings up the issue that a lot of contemporary popular culture IS gossip, i.e. there's not always a clear-cut distinction between culture, gossip, celebrity, and pseudo-events. Excuse me for just shooting my mouth off, don't know if that's appropriate in Wikipedia culture. Jeremy J. Shapiro 22:38, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
Entirely appropriate in this forum, and true now more than ever. Amerindianarts 00:52, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
I removed the section on Empiricism and Rationalism. My reasons are the ones I've already stated: If the role of that section is to correct the articles on Rationalism and Empiricism, then a much more productive approach is to actually go to those articles and correct them. Secondly, this section has much to much detail for an encyclopedia entry on Kant. It seems to me that discussing any particular section of the CPR in the Kant article is already giving too much detail. If you want to write about some particular sections of the CPR I encourage you to work on them in the article on the CPR, where such detail is appropriate.Wjwma 18:06, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
Who are you to make this decision? The section was suggested by other editors so I think you better have something better in mind for revert. That is what this page is for. Deleting perhaps the first two paragraphs would be sufficient.Amerindianarts 18:24, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
Who I am has nothing to do with it. Now as I recall you removed the section yourself after I first commented and then only reinserted it when you started to discuss it with another user. Secondly, other users have agreed that the section is too detailed for this article, so I am not just taking this upon myself. Finally, you posted an entry where you said: "If you want to omit the entire thing and rewrite it, do it." I took this to be permission on your part to remove the article. Since I don't think such a section is needed in this article (again I encourage you to work on the CPR article) I've rewritten the section as a blank.Wjwma 19:06, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

If that is what you think then why not move it too that section of the CPR rather than deleting it? I wrote it to answer a demand and I don't see anyone who suggested the section requesting its removal, or move. The suggestion was a section just prior to the CPR. I really think that Rationalism and Empiricism in Kant is much broader than solely the CPuR. Amerindianarts 20:04, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

I'm sorry that because of a huge workload this week I haven't even had a chance to read the controversial rationalism/empiricism section yet. But I wanted to mention briefly what I see as another important policy issue that this brings up for all of the philosopher articles, and maybe I should be writing this on the philosophy project page. I think that anyone who has studied philosophy knows that in reality most philosophy is either a response to or highly shaped by the philosophical history and context in which it occurs, to the point where one can't even understand a philosopher unless one understands something about the philosophical history/context to which he/she is responding. So an article that characterizes a philosopher by saying that he/she thought this or argued that or held a certain position, without explaining the context, is really not even accurately describing the philosopher. To say something about Hegel without saying something about Kant, or to say something about Aristotle without saying anything about Plato, is almost silly. So every good philosopher article ought to have something about that context == certainly more than just wikilinks to other, previous philosophers. But then the question is, how much? What should the general Wikipedia philosopher article norms be about how much of this history/context should be in an article? Because we can't recapitulate the whole history of philosophy in each article. So it almost seems to me that part of the norm for what a philospher article should look like should include something like the definition of a section on the immediate philosphical prehistory, and perhaps even a range of length for such a section, from x words to y words in length. That would the obviate getting into controversies about that for individual philosophers, and would produce a more uniform appearance for the philosopher articles. Just a thought Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:49, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

I was the original writer of the Popular Culture reference addition, which I defend in that I tried to make as informative and concise as possible and not sound like some bad edit someone just happened to throw it. But as I read your arguments and reasons I'm very much swayed to have the article remain as it is now, to be fair it was rather just like adding useless trivia loosely connected. I apologise for causing all this fuss... By the by, I wasn't the person who re-added it back again, I've only just found it was removed today. User: Zephirus 21:50, 26th September 2005 (GMT)

Perhaps it would be better if I had moved the section to the CPR page. Sorry if the delete seemed like overkill. My qualm about moving the section to the CPR article is that I'm not sure where to fit it in on that page. Also, in my opinion the CPR page has a number of sections that don't really cohere very well with eachother and seem like they were pasted in from somewhere, so I didn't want to add to the glut. In view of Jeremy J. Shapiro's sage suggestion let me propose a section entitled something like "Kant's Intellectual Background" for this page. Certainly rationalism and empiricism should be mentioned there, but lots of other things are important as well. I'm sure we all have something to learn from eachother about Kant's intellectual background. However, it seems to me to be essential to keep the discussion of whatever is mentioned short and uncontroversial. We don't want issues about what empiricism/rationalism are to pervade this page. Empiricism in twenty words or less. That kind of thing.Wjwma 23:04, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps you can enlighten us as to what was controversial? Actually, it was pretty much textbook stuff. Philosophy 101. So I would be interested in your feedback. Amerindianarts 21:44, 25 September 2005 (UTC)

Still waiting for a reply from Wjwma.Amerindianarts 02:28, 27 September 2005 (UTC)

Still waiting.Amerindianarts 23:54, 29 September 2005 (UTC)

User:Amerindianarts - some people don't use Wikipedia religiously, just be patient. Send a message on his talk page with a link here, it's much easier to find. Good luck. FranksValli 03:05, 30 September 2005 (UTC)

Or the comment has no foundation and a reply is not intended. Amerindianarts 19:52, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

Prize-winning

User:Fi99ig, why did you take out the description that Kant's "What is Enlightment" won a prize? These prizes were very important in the 18th century, they were a way of recognizing certain ideas as leading ideas of the day. The fact that Kant's essay won the prize (my memory tells me that it was from the Prussian Academy of Sciences, but I may be wrong) was a way of saying that his formulation of the idea of Enlightenment was, in a way, canonical for the period. Or should that be stated explicitly in the article? Because I think that's the point of it being described as "prize-winning". I think it was I who put that in, and that's certainly what I had in mind. Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:02, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

Jeremy, I agree about the importance of the prizes, but I suspect you're thinking of a different essay: Kant's "Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles..." (often referred to as the "Prize Essay"). "What is Enlightenment?" was published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. I don't believe it won a prize, but, if I'm mistaken, I apologize. fi99ig 00:03, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
I agree. "Inquiry..." was written in response to a question posed by the Berlin Academy, which was a contest of sorts, the question being posed to many philosophers. "Enlightenment" was written many years later independently for publication.Amerindianarts 01:22, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
Thanks for correction, sorry for mistake. It is actually many years since I occupied myself seriously with Kant, so some things have faded or become fuzzy in my mind. Someplace in my apt. I actually have the book containing not only Kant's but all of the other essays written in response to that question, so when I have a chance I will check it out and apprise myself of the complete story of the publication of that essay. If there's anything specially interesting, I'll report it to the rest of you. Jeremy J. Shapiro 02:12, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
When I first read the "prize winning" entry you made it didn't register with me either. I thought you were just being a little over enthusiastic and complimentary about a really great piece of literature. That you actually meant a prize didn't sink in and it didn't seem important enough to edit. That is my problem with editing other people's entries here at Wiki. If it is not a factual, grammatical, or blatant POV, I tend to ignore it. There is for anybody a little bit of ego in making a post, and my days of grading papers have long since past and I'm no longer in the mode for bursting bubbles. Good call on the part of Fi99ig. Amerindianarts 02:30, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of God's Existence

Biography section, third paragraph, the statement "Despite questioning this argument however, Kant in this piece defends a modified form of rational theology, which he subsequently rejected in his Critical work". Either POV or not providing enough detail. Take your pick. Probably copied from a seconary source. Amerindianarts 05:26, 24 September 2005 (UTC)

Rationalism and Empiricism

I removed this as original work. The reason I did so was after checking many reference sources (and not secondary works) I found that articles of this name rarely mention Kant. The decisive factor was his absense in this regard in article of the same name in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy' Thus, it was original work. It also indicates that any reference to Kant as forming a "bridge" between the two schools requires some justification, and if not, then reworded to reflect that Kant's doctrines simply contained elements of both schools.Amerindianarts 06:33, 24 September 2005 (UTC)

Respectively

I have a question about 69.234.22.129's deletion of "respectively" from the 2nd paragraph introduction. The user cites the following reason for doing so:

  • "implies TWO concepts in relation to two others(former to former, latter to latter)"

But I'm not exactly clear on what's wrong with the original sentence. It ran as follows:

  • "These [i.e., Kant's epistemology and moral philosophy] placed the active, rational human subject at the center of the cognitive and moral worlds respectively."

It seems to me that "respectively" is useful here, in that it makes it clear that the epistemology puts the subject at the center of the cognitive world, and the moral philosophy puts the subject at the center of the moral world. That sounds right to me. Perhaps 69.234.22.129 could clarify his or her reasons for deleting the term. fi99ig 20:53, 25 September 2005 (UTC)

That's exactly what I meant when I put in "respectively" in the first place. But now it looks OK to me either way (I guess because it's ultimately the same subject), so I don't know if it matters; I certainly will defer to others' views. Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:04, 25 September 2005 (UTC)

It appears that they may not have read the previous sentence, or wasn't following the stream of thought from sentence to sentence, or treated the sentences as separately. The deletion is non-sensical, but either way, the sentences still work.Amerindianarts 21:37, 25 September 2005 (UTC)

Reorganization of Biography section

Hi all - I hope I haven't done anything too drastic. Kant's page is VERY long - but I've began trying to organize it. I've started in the Biography section. Please change things as necessary, but I think it's at least a little more navigable.

Also, the "Early life" section may be broken up into too many subparts. Change this as necessary as well!

Hope this reorganization helps rather than detracts from the article.

FranksValli 02:38, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

After the above changes the section on the Critique, which was nothing more than a link to the the main article and is referred to in the bio, seemed superfluous, so I deleted it. I also re-positioned the 'tomb' section to the end of the article, which seems to be an appropriate place for it. Amerindianarts 04:04, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

Looks good! Hopefully we can get this huge article a bit cleaned up  :) FranksValli 04:08, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

The section on morals needs to be merged or moved. That would make the article an acceptable size. Amerindianarts 04:10, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

Explanation of reversion

User Mirra21 inserted the following phrase into the introduction: "(Transcendental meaning beyond the sense experience - Space and Time being forms of perception)". This makes the sentence it's in into an incomplete sentence, and this material is already covered later in the article as well as in the Critique of Pure Reason article, so I have removed it pending further discussion. Jeremy J. Shapiro 04:15, 22 October 2005 (UTC)

Space and time as "mental structures"

I commented some time ago (see above) that "mental structures" was misleading and ambiguous, and elicted no comments. So I made the change using Kant's terminology. Amerindianarts 02:58, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

  • However, "objectively real but transcendentally ideal" would need lots of unpacking & I do not see where that is explicitly done. Another approach is that it is a "fundamental intellectual framework" - one that we cannot choose not to have - that formats all our experience --JimWae 03:14, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • In refering to the transcendental ideality of our knowledge Kant says that it is "transcendentally ideal" but "empirically real." The first refers to the fact that I cannot know things in themselves (although I can think them). The second refers to the fact that I can only know what appears to me through the senses, and such appearance, insofar as it is made objectively determinate by the categories, has empirically real which is all that Kant demands of reality. Omar

How about "necessary elements of experience, not things that are experienced" or something along those lines? Snowspinner 03:23, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

Anything that removes the connotation that space and time are concepts. "Apriori intuitions" would also work, but would also require some "unpacking" as well. I would rather a reader take the initiative to do some unpacking as opposed to being mislead from the outset. Amerindianarts 03:30, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

I don't think "fundamental intellectual framework" removes the conceptual connotations. Space and time are presupposed by the mind and not products of the mind. Snowspinner is on the right track-"necessary elements of experience, but not concepts (or cognitions).Amerindianarts 03:36, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

I changed it again to "necessary elements of experience, but not concepts or cognitions". Comments are still welcome. I included "cognitions" because a cognition requires intuition plus concept. Since space and time are not concepts they cannot be cognized. What is cognized is the concepts of the understanding in their application within S & T. Amerindianarts 04:04, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

  • It's more like space & time are hard-wired - tho that's not a Kantian notion. Though not a "product of the mind", they could very well undergo historical development & refinement - as a growing child develops the notions & as physicists develop their understandings. I do not see any problem calling them concepts - but they are special concepts for which we have no alternative format. I think "constructs" would be more misleading than "concepts", because "constructs" suggests being consciously & voluntarily being built. "Presupposed" also suggests an element of choice --JimWae 04:10, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • Space and time, as with the categories, are "originally acquired forms". This means that they are neither innate nor empirically generated. They are not innate lest they be arbitrary forms: it is arbitrary to say that we are designed to achieve a particular kind of cognition. Think how arbitrary is the modern argument for "intelligent design" in this respect. They are not empirically generated, lest they lack the necessity and universality necessary for knowledge. Nonetheless, they are originally acquired: a necessary act of spontaneity is required to generate them. Kant refers, in this respect, to the "epigenesis" of such forms rather than their "preformation" (innatism) or "generatio aequivoca" (empiricism). How then are space and time acquired? An original act of reflection, by the Understanding through the mediation of the transcendental imagination "originally acquires" space and time through the effects of these spontaneous faculties on inner and outer sense. Think of space and time, in this respect, as the first effect of the Understanding on inner and outer sense. It is for this reason that they are called "given" apriori forms of intuition. They are given their form by the Understanding which has an effect on inner and outer sense: that effect is space and time. The reason they are not concepts is shown here: as the first original effect of this form, what is captured is merely the primal unity of space and time, a unity that is not conceptual, for nothing is subsumed under them; they are one with the totality of the spatial and temporal manifold which no concept can manage. What remains is for the categories to provide the rules whereby one can organize that manifold so as to form empirical concepts out of it.Omar 20:24, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
    • I would disagree that space and time, at least as Kant talks about them, change at all, actually. Kant's definition of both space and time is very precise, and different from the way that physicists or other people use the concepts, in that physicists are very clearly talking about an external thing called space (Which is in turn experienced through Kantian space). Snowspinner 04:19, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • "necessary elements of experience" requires unpacking in what way they are necessary - and also requires making it clear that they are not themselves experienced but rather structure experiences. I find similar issues with the concept of "number" --JimWae 04:13, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • space, time & number: parts of a systematic framework necessarily (ie there is no other option) structuring the experiences of any rational agent --JimWae 04:23, 25 October 2005 (UTC).
    • Kant is very explicit in the Transcendental Aesthetic-space and time are not concepts. Those are his words, not mine. I think you can also find him saying that they are the necessary elements of experience, and they are not cognitions (Logik). It is inevidable that some unpacking will have to be done, it is just a question of the amount of detail and space alotted.Amerindianarts 04:25, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • Space and time are "forms of intuition", and as such apriori forms are not concepts. Yet we generate spatial and temporal concepts on the basis of these apriori forms of intuition. Thus we "construct concepts" in mathematics by directly examining our intuitions of space and time and then finding, for those direct intuitions, representative concepts, and it is these spatial and temporal concepts that require categorical determination (eg. the mathematical categories).Omar 20:05, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
      • Yes, Kant is absolutely clear that an intuition is not a concept. Frankly, one way to consider translating it that's closest to English-language usage, both philosophical and everyday, is just "perception", since in English "intuition" has a whole lot of other associations. The German word "Anschauung" simply means "looking at". Most English-language discussion of the issues discussed by Kant fall under perception. Anyway, just a thought. And "necessary conditions for any possible experience" isn't right, because the pure concepts of the understanding are also necessary conditions for possible experience. For Kant it is precisely the combination of perception and concepts that is necessary for possible experience, neither alone will do it. That's the reason for his famous "concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." So it's the operation of the concepts of the understanding on a priori intuition or perception that makes experience possible. Jeremy J. Shapiro 04:59, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
      • I don't see anybody anywhere above stating that the pure concepts of the understanding are not also the necessary conditions for any possible experience, or that S & T are the only necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. All that is being stated is that space and time are not concepts or cognitions. What you say is true, but I don't see anybody stating anything to the contrary. Perhaps you can clarify more. Do you think the sentence implies that concepts are not a necessary part of experience? "concepts and cognitions" is meant to qualify "space and time", but if you feel that it is still ambiguous, it can be changed. One thing for certain, "mental structures" won't work. Amerindianarts 16:56, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

I also don't understand what you mean by "'necessary conditions for any possible experience' isn't right". Amerindianarts 17:22, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

Sorry for unclarity. I took user Snowspinner's comment above to assert that space and time are precisely equal to the necessary conditions for possible experience, and I meant only to indicate that they are part of the necessary conditions, but that those conditions include the categories. That's all. Sorry for any confusion I caused. Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:08, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • I don't mean to speak for Jeremy, but I believe his point was not that the phrase 'necessary conditions for any possible experience' is wrong, but rather that it is too general, in that it does not distinguish space and time as necessary conditions from the categories as necessary conditions. What would be wrong with referring to space and time simply as the forms of sensibility. If this requires further unpacking, we could say something like: 'that is, everything that is given to us in experience necessarily has a spatial and temporal form, a necessity that results from the particular nature of our capacity to be given objects.' --fi99ig 19:22, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • On Jeremy's proposed substitution of 'perception' for 'intuition': while I agree that this offers a better fit with contemporary English usage, I would suggest that departing from the standard translation (used in almost all the secondary literature and in both the Kemp Smith and Guyer/Wood translations of the Critique) would cause more trouble than it's worth--fi99ig 19:22, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • On the issue of space and time as concepts: I think the issue is more complicated than people are suggesting. Consider space, for example. Yes, Kant says that space is not an empirical concept (B38). He also says that it is not a discursive concept of the relations of things (B39). And he even says that the original representation of space is not a concept (B40). But on the other hand, he makes all three of these claims in a section of the Aesthetic entitled "On Space. Metaphysical exposition of this concept" (B37). And later on, in the Deduction, he refers repeatedly to the concepts of space and time (B117, B118, B120, B121, etc.) So, there's no easy answer to the question as to whether space and time are concepts. One might think that Kant is confused, or one might think that the distinction he is raising (between intuition and concept) is not as sharp as he initially presents it (i.e., that there turns out to be something necessarily conceptual about intuitions). I myself lean toward the latter view, but I'm not going to argue the point here. At any rate, I don't see why we need to settle the issue now, since we can effectively avoid it simply by referring to them as forms of sensibility. --fi99ig 19:22, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

I think you are confused by Kant's references at B117-B121. He is not referring to S & T as concepts. He is referring to the conception of Space and Time. Completely different. Amerindianarts 00:20, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Well, could you say a bit more? To be honest, I have a hard time seeing how they are completely different. Consider this quotation, from the top of B118: "Now we already have two sorts of concepts of an entirely different kind, [...] namely the concepts of space and time, as forms of sensibility, and the categories, as concepts of the understanding." Here, Kant seems to be directly identifying the concepts of space and time as the forms of sensibility. That is, the very forms that he just defended in the Aesthetic are now referred to as concepts.
Perhaps you can offer a different explanation of all of these later passages. But even if you do, you would still need to account for the fact that Kant, at B37, refers to the Metaphysical exposition of this concept" (i.e., space). And B40; and B46; and B48. The Aesthetic is full of references to space and time as concepts, even as Kant seems to be arguing against their being concepts. This is a live issue in the secondary literature, so I don't see how we can simply dismiss the puzzle out of hand. --fi99ig 00:51, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Who is dismissing anything? I thought you were the one who stated above that you didn't have time to argue the point? The Meiklejohn translation uses "conceptions". Kemp Smith uses "concepts", but his translation is notorious for errors and misreadings by not consistently translating the terms. His use of "concepts" is not in keeping with what Kant is trying state in this section. The section is crucial to the distinction between objective reality and transcendental ideality. If you read it carefully you will see that Kant is trying to show that cognition involves concepts of the understanding but there are no cognitions of S & T, we only conceptualize them as pure intuitions through the concepts, that is, we conceptualize about them. Later in B118 Kant refers to the bringing about of the whole body of cognition, but this does not involve S & T as concepts. Actually, this is really a moot point. The language I used is Kant's. It requires no more unpacking than any other suggestions that have been made, and it certainly requires less unpacking than "mental structures". I find your comments nothing more than contrariety, really. How is "forms of sensibility" more clear than the "necessary elements of experience", and a definitve "not concepts or cognitions". The objective here is to reinterate what Kant intended. Amerindianarts 05:20, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Question for Fi99ig: Since you have objected to every contribution I have made to this article, even after being approved and accepted by other editors, I have to ask: what did you find acceptable about "mental structures"? Amerindianarts 06:46, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Amerindianarts, I really don't understand why you're turning this into a personal issue. First of all, I never said that I found "mental structures" acceptable. I agree with you that this phrase doesn't work. Second, "forms of sensibility", "forms of intuition", etc. are Kant's language (see B58, B118, etc.) Third, Meiklejohn's "conceptions" and Kemp Smith's "concept" refers to the same German word: Begriff. I've checked the original German for the passages I mentioned above, and they all use Begriff, the regular German word for concept. So you can't blame Kemp Smith for the presence of this word. Or Guyer and Wood, whose translation I was using. Fourth, you continue to completely ignore the passages in the Aesthetic that refer to space and time as concepts. I'm willing to consider the arguments for your view, but how can I take it seriously when you ignore contrary evidence? Fifth, I confess I don't quite understand the reading you are giving of the passages in B118-B121. Where does Kant say that he is only conceptualizing about space and time? It seems to me that the passages in question refer directly to space and time as concepts. Could you provide some textual support for your reading?
Finally, regarding your proposed "necessary elements of experience," I certainly think this is an improvement over "mental structures". But I still have a few problems with it. First, "elements" could be misleading, as it might suggest that space and time are the matter of experience (as in the Greek elements), whereas Kant is quite clear that they are formal rather than material conditions of experience. Something like "formal conditions of experience" would be heading in the right direction. But it's still not sufficiently precise, as it fails to distinguish those formal conditions of experience that are specific to sensibility (space and time) from those that are formal conditions of experience from the side of thought (the categories). So, how about something like "formal conditions of sensibility"? --fi99ig 15:15, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

I really don't think I have made this a personal matter. I think you don't know what you mean. If you found "mental structures" unacceptable then why not say something rather than attacking perfectly good paragraphs straight from Phil 101? And rather than attacking the notion that S & T are not concepts, you should have been attacking the notion that they are not cognitions, which was obviously wrong (I made the changes this morning if you didn't notice). I tried to lead you there but you choose to harp on an element of Kant's philosophy that is accepted across the board by philosophers (contrariety?). Kant 101-S & T are not concepts, and Kant's reasons are complex. It needs to be explicitly stated. Kant 201-Any second year student of Kant should have raised an objection to "mental structures" and the generous unpacking it would require, as well as it is not NPOV. Now you are dismissed.Amerindianarts 15:55, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

I don't think it's unreasonable of me to think that your claim, "Since you have objected to every contribution I have made to this article" is making the matter personal. I also think your concluding remark: "Now you are dismissed" is undeserved, rude and innappropriate on this site. The same goes with "harping." When I have disagreed with you, I've never insulted you. And I'm pretty sure that I've always shown you the respect of taking your points seriously. That is, I haven't simply dismissed your view out of hand, but have offered arguments and textual evidence against it and in favor of a different reading. By contrast, you continue to ignore my points (like the repeated references by Kant to space and time as concepts in the Aesthetic). Instead, you simply appeal to the authority of "Kant 101" (whatever authority that might have) as ruling out my claim -- without offering any evidence against my view! I don't see how we are going to arrive at a consensus on this or any other issue if you fail to seriously consider my position.
Back to the issue at hand, I will repeat: it's a live issue in the secondary literature as to the status of space and time. That is, it is viewed as puzzling that Kant both refers to space and time as concepts and argues that they are not concepts -- often in the very same paragraph. This point is made for instance, in Daniel Warren's Kant and the Apriority of Space (Phil Review #107(2), fn22, pp. 219-20), arguably the most influential paper on the Aesthetic in the last twenty years. So, contrary to what you say, it is not the case that philosophers "across the board" deny that there is any issue concerning the conceptual status of space and time. Given that this is not a settled issue in Kant scholarship, I don't see why we should take a stand on the issue here. Thus my preference for "forms of sensibility," which remains neutral on this question. Is that so unreasonable?
I am happy to entertain further criticism of my position, but I hope you will at least show me the respect of addressing the reasons I have given in support of my view. --fi99ig 17:35, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

There is a certain amount of common knowledge about Kant. The concept issue is one and I think that it should be evidenced quite clearly in writings about Kant as well as his own writings, and I think that you should know this and demand for something else really does show a lack of understanding for his position. Sorry. "Forms of sensiblity" is Kant's own words as is what I (and Snowspinner) wrote. I think that "not concepts" and "necessary condition for experience" is fairly explicit and would require less unpacking that "forms of sensibilty". The article cited the concepts of the understanding but had not mentioned that S & T are not, which I think is required for clarity. Other than a misunderstanding of Kant about space and time as concepts you have not given any reason why what is currently written is not sufficient. Amerindianarts 19:23, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

I just want to say that it is such a pleasure to read serious philosophical discussions on these Talk pages, and since, to this observer, both Amerindianarts and fi99ig seem to be writing with genuine and benign intent about these issues and seem concerned to produce a good article rather than propagate some personal agenda of their own, I suggest that each assume good intent on the part of the other and stay within the boundaries of co-operative intellectual discussion rather than assume bad intent or personal attacks. Also, for a thinker as complex as Kant, about which there is a large literature and many different traditions of interpretation and we can't assume that we all know the same literature or are familiar with or situated within the same tradition, it's not surprising that things that will be taken for granted by one of us might seem highly outlandish or narrow to another. So we need to give each one another some benefit of the doubt about such things and work toward something that is both intellectually responsible AND understandable by a general reader who is not a philosopher. Jeremy J. Shapiro 18:56, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
Jeremy, I agree with you on this point. I certainly do not question the intentions of anyone on this page, and I believe that I have avoided any personal attacks. But I have to say that I find it exasperating that after repeatedly citing examples of Kant referring to space and time as concepts, and after pointing out an important example from the secondary literature that acknowledges this as a serious issue, Amerindianarts tells me that I "have not given any reason why what is currently written is not sufficient."
Amerindianarts, I am at a loss as to how to proceed from here, since you won't address the passages I've referred to and the points I've raised. But I at least want to address one potential misunderstanding. In your last comment, you refer to my "misunderstanding of Kant about space and time as concepts". I hope it's clear to you that I'm not defending the claim that space and time are concepts for Kant. If you look back at my previous comments, you'll see that I've never said that. What I have said is that their is an interpretive puzzle, for Kant both refers to space and time as concepts and denies that they are concepts -- often in the very same paragraph. I don't claim to have a solution to this puzzle. I find it very perplexing, personally. But I do think we should acknowledge the fact that it is a genuine puzzle, and not simply pretend that it doesn't exist.
If you do have a solution to this puzzle -- if you can explain why Kant sometimes refers to space and time as concepts -- please provide it. I would genuinely welcome an explanation that resolved my confusion on this point. But I hope you can understand how frustrating it is to have my concerns dismissed without any counterargument, simply by appeal to "Phil 101" and the "common understanding of Kant". --fi99ig 19:51, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
Let me point out a passage at B118 where Kant refers to the "conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories of the understanding". By stating "conceptions (concepts) of space and time as forms of sensibility" is he really referring to space and time as concepts? Or he is he referring to their concept (conception) as forms of sensibilityAmerindianarts 20:03, 26 October 2005 (UTC) I would like to know some sources Fi99ig might have for his position other than this section of the Critique, because I still think it is a misreading. Perhaps there is a secondary source ypu have that presents this serious issue. Amerindianarts 20:03, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
OK, let me see if I understand what you're saying here. Is it your suggestion that when Kant refers to concepts of space and time in the Deduction, he is referring to something different than the space and time that he has just defended in the Aesthetic? I.e., we can produce a concept of space and time, but these are not the same as the a priori forms of space and time discussed earlier? That's an interesting reading. But I don't think it will work as a solution to the puzzle at hand. The problem is that Kant goes on to directly identify the concepts of space and time with the space and time that he has defended in the Aesthetic. He does this at the top of B120: "We have above [i.e., in the Aesthetic] traced the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and explained and determined their a priori objective validity" (my emphasis). In other words, the Aesthetic is a deduction of the concepts of space and time. Furthermore, there are still the references to space or time as concepts that occur within the Aesthetic (the ones I mentioned earlier: B37, B40, B46, B48). For your account to be plausible, you would also need to explain these. All that said, I'm glad that we're now actualy engaging in philosophical discussion. --fi99ig 20:59, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

No, what I'm saying is that "forms of sensiblity" are the concepts. I think the passage is really explicit, "conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility". We conceive of space and time not as concepts themselves, but their conception as the forms of sensibility. I read this section as the "conception of space", and not space is a concept. We conceive of space conceptually as a form of sensibility. Later, at B125, where Kant refers to the two conditions of cognition, intuition and concept, you have to ask yourself, if space is a concept, then what is the corresponding intuition that makes cognition possible? "Concepts without intuitions are empty". The purpose of this section is to show that intersubjective knowledge can be objective and that we conceive of S & T and the concepts through objects. This is the reason that I prefer the Meiklejohn translation, because his rendition of Begriff as "conception" is more in keeping with the spirit of what Kant was trying to say. As for performing a side by side exegis of the texts, I'm a busy man and will have to get to it when I have the time, and get back to you. Like I said, Kant's reasons for S & T not being concepts is complex, and I'm not sure it is within my capacity as a writer to adequately explain it.Amerindianarts 22:02, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Fair enough. I think I have a better understanding of your view, at least of this passage. But I still think you're going to have a hard time accounting for the other passages that identify the Aesthetic as a deduction of the Begriffe of space and time. (It would be weird if Kant were saying that he has deduced our conception of space and time -- what he is deducing is something about space and time themselves, namely that they are formal conditions of being given objects in sensibility.) Anyway, given that there's some controversy on this issue, both here and in the secondary literature, it's probably best to take out the phrase "which are not concepts" until a full defense of the position is available. Do you agree? --fi99ig 23:04, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

No, I don't agree. I do not believe it to be not NPOV, and I believe that the consensus is that S & T are not concepts. Like I said, if S & T are concepts, then what is the accompanying intuition that yields cognition? Are you stating that apriori intuitions are also concepts? Amerindianarts 23:52, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

A, you can't have it both ways. It seems unreasonable to decline to address the passages that are problematic for your view, but still insist it be included in the article. And to repeat myself again, I'm not defending the claim that space and time are concepts. I'm just saying that there's an interpetive puzzle: that Kant says things suggesting both that they are and are not concepts. My own view is that this may have something to do with the distinction between concepts and intuitions is not as sharp as it first appears. Thus, space, as form of intuition, might have some of the features of a concept (generality) and some of the features of an intuition (immediacy). I also think this is what Kant is getting at when he says that "the same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment [i.e., concepts] also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition." (A79/B105) That is, intuitions are determined a priori with the unity of concepts and should not be thought of as something entirely non-conceptual that is added to concepts to produce cognition. But I'm certainly not insisting that all of this appear in the article. This is one way of reading Kant among many. All I want to do is to remove the phrase "which are not concepts". In doing so, we would be remaining neutral on this issue. --fi99ig 01:01, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

I don't have any problems with it the way it is. You do, and you cannot seem to answer the question (let me rephrase it) "how are judgements possible if space and time are concepts"? I really don't think you have presented a convincing argument other wise, and as much as I hate to resort to secondary sources for support, I am prepared to do so. What I am beginning to think is problematic is the inclusion of "forms of sensibility". The "forms" includes the relations of all sensations and leaving this unexplained leaves quite a bit to the imagination. I think that the choice is a long explanation, or just omit it. I don't think the content of the sentence will suffer one iota. I'm not asking to have it both ways. I'm fairly certain of my positions and sources that I will leave it as it is.Amerindianarts 02:59, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

W. H. Walsh, a well respected Kantian scholar, wrote an article on Kant for the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He writes "The ideas of space and time are intuitive rather than conceptual in character: moreover, they are "pure" intuitions insofar as the essential nature of their referents is known in advance of experience and not as a result of it". He continues in explaining the application of geometry to the physical world that "space is neither substance, nor accident, nor relations..". Here he not only excludes space from those entities which are concepts, but implies that because it is not a relation, which is essentailly the "form" in "forms of sensibility", that this conception requires considerable explanation, or unpacking. D. W. Hamlyn wrote an article for the same publication on Epistemology. In explaining how synthetic apriori mathematical judgements are possible in Kant, he states that "...it must be possible to make constructions in space, an idea which presupposes that we have an intuition of space. (Kant insists that this is an intuition, not a concept..)". It is the presupposition of these intuitions that makes objective conceptual knowledge possible. Regardless of what you think of this type of publication, both authors are scholars writing NPOV for a publication and not stating a thesis in need of publication in order to guarantee their tenure. I have a crate of articles from various philosophy journals specifically on Kant. I will dig them out and give you more fodder. I think I will trust these sources. Amerindianarts 04:34, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

I'm at a loss for words. I would genuinely like to work with you, Amerindianarts, to find some consensus and come up with a phrasing that we can both be happy with. But how can I do this if you repeatedly refuse to address the specific points that I raise? If you're that confident in your position, why won't you just spell out your reasons so that we can all figure it out together? And why do you think it sufficies if you personally are certain of your position. This is not your personal page -- this is supposed to be a collaborative effort. That means you have to show some willingness to consider other views and to defend your own. I just don't see how your unexplained certainty is at all relevant to deciding whether we keep the passage as it is.
Does anyone else want to weigh in on this issue? If everyone thinks I'm being unreasonable then I'll just drop the issue, but I really feel that I've been making an effort to defend my view, respond to criticism and consider the alternate position. --fi99ig 05:07, 27 October 2005 (UTC)
Amerindianarts, You ask me how judgments are possible if space and time are concepts. That's a very general question, but I will try to say something in response. A judgment is a representation of the unity of several other representations. This can be a relation of concepts or intuitions or even other judgments (as in conditionals). So, for instance, I can judge that all men are mortal. Here, I'm establishing a relation between the concepts 'men' and 'mortal'. Since judgments can have concepts as their content, it's not immediately clear to me how it's problematic to have judgments if space and time are concepts. Now I assume you have in mind a more specific problem regarding judgments. Please spell this out for me, and I will do my best to address your concerns. --fi99ig 05:07, 27 October 2005 (UTC)
This is a good question, perhaps fi99ig has some answer. Amerindianarts 07:53, 27 October 2005 (UTC)
JimWae, as I understand it, Kant thinks of concepts as being like a rule or criterion. It brings representations to the unity of a judgment. (This was an innovative development in the history of philosophy. It's also the basis for Frege's view of a concept as a logical function, a view that continues to hold sway in contemporary philosophy.) Given this definition of concept, it would be pretty crazy to say that space and time are concepts and not intuitions. Of course, I'm not saying that. Rather, I'm suggesting that space and time have a somewhat unique status. They have some of the features of intuitions (immediacy, singularity), and some of the features of concepts (generality). This becomes especially clear at the end of the B-deduction (section 26) and in the 3 Analogies, where we see that space and time are not fully independent of thought but are determined by the categories of the understanding. --fi99ig 14:01, 27 October 2005 (UTC)
  • I have a policy issue that I need some co-operative thought about before I can figure out how to involve myself in this discussion (I should add that I'm rather overwhelmed right now by my non-WP professional work and barely have time and mental space for the discussion right now, which I regret terribly). This is an issue I introduced way earlier on this Talk page and that I don't think we've really discussed directly as an issue. And that is, to what extent should the Wikipedia articles about major philosophers represent primarily the "standard", "textbook" view of these thinkers and their theories and to what extent should the WP articles represent the complexities and contradictions in their thought that the scholarly literature always (legitimately) focuses on? And that, in turn, is related directly to the question, How much of the standard, textbook view does one need to understand the complexities, subtleties, and contradictions or controversies? I can think of arguments on both sides. On the one hand, a "regular", "typical", "normal" reader without philosophical background probably just wants to get some basic ideas and information and may not even have the background for understanding the subtleties, complexities, and contradictions, which are more what one would expect to see in a review article in a scholarly journal, or perhaps in an encyclopedia of philosophy, rather than a general encyclopedia. On the other hand, the standard and textbook views always oversimplify the views of the philosopher and tend to present as "accepted" representations of their views ideas that are actually controversial or represent a particular philosophical tradition. It seems to me that resolving the current argument between Amerindianarts and fi99ig is in part dependent on what we think the correct Wikipedia policy about this, although such a policy would apply also to many other things in philosophy articles. The same thing applies to terminology questions. None of the Kantian terms and phrase, e.g. forms of sensibility, intuition, conditions of possible experience, etc. mean anything in ordinary language to an ordinary person. So, whichever ones we use, I think the key thing is how to explain them in a way that an ordinary person could grasp. Jeremy J. Shapiro 06:26, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

And I think that I am at a loss for words in regard to fi99ig's refusal to accept the sources that I presented. I really think this requires quite a bit of audacity and simply shows that fi99ig is not going to accept anything reasonably presented in defense or support. Sorry if this seems personal but I think I'm going to accept Walsh's take on this before I would take that of a student with what appears to be an inflated ego. I think Jim Wae 's question is a good one for fi99ig to perhaps explain. My question has still not been answered either. If space or time is a concept in a judgement, what is the corresponding intuition? According to Kant, mathematics and arithmetic are intuitive, and intersubjectivity, or objectivity, breaks down if they, or space, are concepts.Amerindianarts 07:53, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

As I've now said about ten times (I apologize, but this is really frustrating!), my claim is not that space and time are mere concepts. I've never said that! My suggestion is that they seem to share some of the features of both. This is suggested by Kant's arguments in section 26 of the Deduction and in the Analogies, and it explains his seemingly conflicting claims in the Aesthetic (which you still have not addressed). So, if space and time have some of the features of both concepts and intuitions, then it is no problem for them to play the role of intuition in a judgment. --fi99ig 14:08, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

PS to Jeremy, or anybody else. Thus far, fi99ig is the only source I can find stating otherwise than what is found in what I would consider authoritative sources, and is dependent upon his interpretation of the text. In any other article this would be considered a point of view and his position should be considered a non-NPOV.Amerindianarts 08:01, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Amerindianarts, the reason I did not respond to your sources last night is that we cross-posted our comments. I've only just now seen them. But it's ironic that you would accuse me of this after your past behavior. I am well aware that many Kant scholars think the distinction between concepts and intuitions is perfectly straightforward. This is the standard view, and it is well represented by the sources that Amerindianarts mentions above. I also think it's mistaken -- that the initially straightforward distinction turns out to be more complicated. I am not alone in thinking this. I've already cited Daniel Warren, a very important contemporary philosopher and Kant scholar. McDowell, who is an even more important contemporary philosopher, also holds a view like this, as do many others. I grant that it's not the standard view, but it is the view of a significant and, I think, growing minority. My own personal view is that this alternate understanding of the distinction has sufficient standing in contemporary Kant scholarship to make the phrase "which are not concepts" not NPOV. But if enough people think otherwise, then I will happily back down. I agree with Jeremy that this is not the place to explore the bleeding edge of Kant scholarship.
But I do want to raise a second point. In fact, I think this is the more important point. There is an issue about how we should make decisions regarding the Kant page. I feel that I have been treated incredibly unfairly by Amerindianarts. When he has made a claim, I have always tried to take it seriously, to address his concerns, to understand his position. Does anyone here think that he has treated me with the same respect? Has he responded to my claims? Has he acknowledged the sources I cited? No. He has repeatedly misrepresented my views, saying that I was defending the phrase "mental structures" when I said no such thing. He continues to sugges that I am claiming that space and time are concepts, even after I have repeatedly reminded him that my position is only that the relation between intuitions and concepts is more complicated than it first appears. And in the process he has continued to insult me personally: referring to my "harping"; my "inflated ego"; consescendingly announcing that "Now you are dismissed". Does anyone think this is an appropriate way to behave in a collaborative enterprise? I'll confess that I'm writing this partly out of personal frustration -- it's not pleasant being attacked in this manner. But I also think it's a poor way to arrive at a philosophical consensus. If we can reasonably discuss issues without attacking the people that offer different views, then the page would surely benefit from this. Perhaps other people could weigh in on this issue. Am I being too thin-skinned? --fi99ig 14:01, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

I think that your interpretation of the text is all you have brought in your defense and in my understanding of writing articles at wiki this is not sufficient (unless you are an expert, perhaps??). I have not found anything to support your interpretation. The closest thing I have found to your interpretation is Manley Thompson's notion of singular concepts in an article he wrote rebutting Hintikka on Kant's mathematical method and Parsons' singularity. If I seem offensive, well, that is because I am. I have little patience for opinion in the face of authority. I have encountered many a Kant expert in my day, but they were usually sophomores. Amerindianarts 18:46, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Note to JimWae. "What a concept is?" is only half of the question. The other half is "how do we construct concepts?". At B39-40 Kant mentions the concept (or conception, depending upon translation) of "spaces", and introduces the notion of "limitations". He is not saying that space is a concept, but is introducing a class notion of a set of particular spaces. Particulars are intuitions and there is only one space. So, if you wish to argue that space is a concept (in Kant), then you are arguing for a singular concept, but Kant explicitly states that it is a pure intuition. Amerindianarts 19:54, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Having had a few days to step back from the personal attacks, I will grant that Amerindianarts is correct on the main point: the standard readings of Kant do not draw attention to those passages in the Aesthetic and Deduction that refer to space and time as concepts. So, I concede the point. I was trying to consider these curious passages in terms of a larger issues regarding the necessary connection between sensibility and understanding. But I'm not sure how relevant these passages are to this issue, and, at any rate, this would not be the place to explore such a connection. I do think it would be interesting to try to figure out what Kant is saying in these curious passages (that is, I don't think it wise to simply ignore them), but that's a project for another day. In the meantime, I'm now fine with leaving in the phrase "which are not concepts". --fi99ig 19:38, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

This is the point that I was trying to make in raising the "policy issue" above, i.e. that if you scratch beneath the surface of any philosopher, there are contradictions and ambiguities. And, aside from the details of this specific case, it puts us in the position of having to decide whether to present some version of either the standard or most widely supported view of the philosopher or rather to get into any of either the ambiguities or the detailed scholarly literature and controversies. Seems to me that Wikipedia should be leaning in favor of the standard view, but that it would be even better if we could briefly summarize or point to important areas of controversy or different streams of interpretation -- I don't mean in relation to this passage but in general. But to do that also requires contributions from people who are really immersed in that literature or those controversies and can report on them in a reliable way. For myself, there are very few areas of anything where I feel that I can do that reliably. Jeremy J. Shapiro 20:35, 29 October 2005 (UTC)
Agreed. This will be especially important when we try to say more about the Deduction, where a thousand interpretive flowers have surely bloomed (my apologies to Feyerabend). --fi99ig 22:06, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

Changes to References and Further Reading

I've reorganized this section, and added a few items. I thought it would be useful to divide the list into a few categories, so as to guide the reader in an appropriate direction. With the same intention, I've added a short gloss on some of the works I'm more familiar with. (I thought of also incorporating the introductory comments into the list as glosses on those works, but I've left it as is for now. Perhaps we could discuss this.) I'll be the first to admit that it's tricky coming up with appropriate categories, so please let me know if you have a better way of doing it. Also, it would be good to have a few more introductory texts on Kant, but nothing's coming to mind at the moment. Any suggestions? If people are just generally against categorizing these references, we can always revert back to the old list. --fi99ig 20:20, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

I think that this categorization is an absolutely super contribution to this article, and my hat is off to you for doing something so valuable. It also will make it easier for the rest of us both to add works and to comment on ones we know about. This almost makes me think that we should have an informal understanding, in this and other such philosophy articles, that people shouldn't put in references without such comments, or that at least the goal should be to eventually have them put there, since for a beginner in a topic, a list of advanced philosophy books is not going to provide much helpful guidance. Anyway, thanks so much. Jeremy J. Shapiro 21:08, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
Thanks, Jeremy. It would probably be good to include some books on Kant's aesthetics, but this is an area I'm not very familiar with. I think there might be a collection of essays on this topic by Ted Cohen. Anyone know about this? --fi99ig 00:53, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
  • Ameriks, Karl. "Kant and the Objectivity of Taste". British Journal of Aesthetics, 23: 2-17 (1983)
  • Ameriks, Karl. "How to Save Kant's Deduction of Taste". Journal of Value Inquiry, 16: 295-302 (1982)
  • Schaper, Eva. Studies in Kant's Aesthetics. Edinburgh, 1979.
  • Crawford, Donald. Kant's Aesthetic Theory. Wisconsin, 1974.
  • McCloskey, Mary. Kant's Aesthetic. SUNY, 1987.
  • Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claim of Taste. Cambridge MA and London, 1979.
Thanks for the additions, A. I'ved added the books to the Reference section (I don't know if we're including articles or not -- perhaps something to discuss). If you want to add any one-line glosses on these works, that would be great. --fi99ig 21:13, 26 October 2005 (UTC)


Changes to Bio

I've largely rewritten the biography section. Although there was much that was very good in it, I felt that the emphases were sometimes in the wrong place: for instance, several minor works received more attention than the Critique of Pure Reason. I've tried to offer a balanced description of his life, but I'm sure I've failed in places. Please let me know if you have any concerns or if you would like to restore some of the previous material. It may be too detailed in places. Also, as I see it, there are still two particularly important items missing from the account I've given: first, Kant's dispute with Eberhard; and, second, the influence of Hume. Concerning the former, I wasn't sure how to fit it into the main account (and I was worried that it was getting a bit too long anyway). Concerning the second, I just couldn't figure out what to say. There doesn't seem to be much consensus in the secondary literature regarding how much influence Hume had on Kant (clearly it was significant) and when this influence had its effect. If anyone has a good way of incorporating these topics, please do so. Finally, there were several descriptions of particular works in the previous version that struck me as being useful, but not particularly biographical. Rather than simply delete them, I've moved them to the corresponding pages for those works. (One exception is the description that was given for "Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals", which is actually a description of a different work by Kant.) fi99ig 00:38, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Why did you remove Kant's Intro to Logic? Mistaken Subtlety is an addendum to that publication.Amerindianarts 04:13, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Well, I took it out because I couldn't find any record of it. The editors of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Kant refer to False Subtlety as an independently published treatise from 1762, perhaps intended as a means of promoting his lectures on logic (see Theoretical Philosophy 1755-70, pp. lvii-lviii). They do not mention any work called Intro to Logic from this time period. Kuehn's biography of Kant also treats False Subtlety as an independent work (see pp. 135-6). In fact, I haven't been able to find any record of a work called Intro to Logic Do you perhaps mean the so-called Jasche logic that was published based on his lecture notes right around the time of his death? But that was published 38 years later, so they would clearly be separate works. Of course, it's quite possible I've simply missed the reference to the work you have in mind. If you have it, please let me know. fi99ig 04:58, 7 November 2005 (UTC)
update: I think I may have found the source of the confusion. One of the earliest English translations of Kant's logical writings was a volume called Kant's Introduction to Logic and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety (translated by Abbott and reprinted many times). Perhaps this what you have in mind? But it's simply a translation of Kant's two published works in logic: the Jasche logic from 1800 and the much earlier False Subtlety from 1762. fi99ig 05:13, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

No. it is not the same as Jasche handbook from 1800. I have read both books. If you go to Steven Palmquist's 'extensive' bibliography at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/fne/bibl.html and navigate to 1762 you will see the entry for Abbott's translation of the Four Syllogisitic Figures and the notation of pages 79-95. Pages 3-77 are Kant's Intro to Logic and pages 78-79 are the beginning of the appendix as Of the Distinction Between Theoretical and Practical Knowledge with the Four Syllogistic Figures as an addendum. This is "A2". Navigate further to A2 and you will see the notation "A2:Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Kant's Introduction to Logic. London: Longmans, Green, 1885. Reprinted 1963 (London: Vision Press). Lectures on Logic and one minor work." I do not know why Palmquist ommited this from the "exhaustive bibliography". Perhaps these were published under another name or in a different work???? Or perhaps it was previously unpublished?? Do you know?? The work is an important resource for his pre-critical work. Amerindianarts 05:21, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

My mistake. It is Jasche's handbook printed as the intro to the introduction to the Hartmann translation of the Logic (1800)Amerindianarts 05:27, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

PS: What do you infer by the "so-called Jasche logic". It was authorized by Kant during his lifetime and supposedly Jasche is only responsible for possibly editing the first 30 pages or so. Amerindianarts 05:39, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

"so-called" just means "so-called". The German title of the work is not "Jäsche logic", but it's generally referred to in this way so as to distinguish it from other works based on Kant's lectures on logic. (On this point, see, e.g., the translator's introduction to the new Cambridge edition of Kant's lectures on logic, p. xix.) That said, it's incorrect that Jäsche was only responsible for the first 30 pages or so. He was responsible for compiling and editing the entire document based on Kant's lecture notes, and, although Kant did authorize the work, there is no evidence that he contributed to the compilation or even reviewed the final product (see pp. xvi-xviii of the above-mentioned edition). The translator concludes: "One cannot simply assume, then, that Jäsche's manual is a reliable statement of Kant's views." (xviii) (On the same page there are references to various other works that make the same point.) Of course, no one doubts that it roughly gets Kant's views on logic correctly, but it can't be viewed with quite the same authority as Kant's other published works. fi99ig 15:18, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

I think the translator's notes on the Hartmann-Schwartz edition disagrees with the reliability issue and how much it was edited by Jasche. Once again, it is a matter of preference in translation. The main body of the Logic does appear to be a synopsis of the Critiques with very little editing. Parts of the intro are questionable, but the latter pages reiterate the Anthropology. Amerindianarts 16:02, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Well, they might disagree on the reliability issue (to some extent), but they certainly don't disagree on the question of how much of it was edited by Jäsche. No one disagrees that Jäsche compiled and edited the entire document. Even Hartman, your preferred translator, points out that Jäsche compiled the text from Kant's marginal annotations and inserts in the textbook by Meiers that he used in his logic lectures, and that Jäsche inserted "some of Kant's formulations taken from his other works" (p. iii). Hartman never claims that Kant played any active role in turning these annotations into a book. Nor does anyone else, as far as I can tell. So, Jäsche is clearly the editor of the entire work. This means that there is no way of reliably knowing if Kant would have compiled his annotations in the same order. Nor is there any way of reliably knowing which annotations represent Kant's considered view and which were simply ideas he toyed with at some point in time. (In this respect, the work is more like the Opus Postumum, which was also compiled by someone other than Kant.) Of course, none of this is to say that the book is not quite useful in understanding Kant's thought. It certainly is. But, to repeat myself, it can't have quite the authorititave status of a work that Kant himself put together and supervised in bringing to print. This seems to be the standard view in the secondary literature on this topic. fi99ig 17:30, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

P iii is the preface to the Dover edition. The translator's notes and translator's introduction go into more detail. It has been a while since I have read the Hartmann intro, but I think he goes into a bit more detail. I really don't have time to go here since I haven't read the Cambridge edition and you seem pretty set in your ways. The point is that the only thing "incorrect" is viewing any one viewpoint as the last word on Kant.Amerindianarts 18:12, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Look, you can dispute my claims all you like. I really don't mind, so long as you argue for your position. But please keep the personal attacks to yourself. They're not helpful. And believe it or not, but I don't have a great deal at stake concerning Jäsche's role in the Logic. You made a series of claims that sounded wrong to me, so I looked up the information and commented on what I found. You said that False Subtlety "is an addendum" to a work called Intro to Logic", and this was wrong -- they're completely separate works. You said that "supposedly Jasche is only responsible for possibly editing the first 30 pages or so", and this was wrong -- he edited the entire work. You said that the translator's notes to the Hartmann-Schwartz edition disagreed regarding "how much it was edited by Jasche", and this too was mistaken -- they agreed that the entire work was compiled and edited by him. Don't get mad at me for pointing out these mistakes. Anyway, we've digressed from the main point. I take it you're fine with the deletion I made in the section on Kant's works. fi99ig 18:50, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Moving on, I would still welcome comments on my changes to the biography section. I'm sure there is much that could be improved upon. fi99ig 18:50, 7 November 2005 (UTC)

Getting a little testy, aren't we? I admitted above that I made a mistake on the entry. The main point here is that the bibliography is corrected. Perhaps I should clarify my position. Hartmann's contention is that Jasche did not misrepresent Kant. There may be, at the most, thirty pages of the introduction that is questionable. While Jasche compiled the entire document, which was authorized by Kant in his lifetime, the main body of the Logic could very well be verbatim Kant, and by "verbatim" I mean "just how much editing does verbatim entail?". If you have read the Critique of Pure Reason and the main body of Logic this should seem pretty obvious. It doesn't take rocket science to see it.Amerindianarts 17:27, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

Thing-in Itself

Small point: In the "Kant and his Philosophy" section it says "The latter, [the-thing-in-itself] can never be known except through the forms that the mind imposes upon it.". Isn't this kind of off the mark? In general Kant doesn't allow that we have knowledge of things in themselves. I'd like to remove that sentence. Any objections? Wjwma 00:15, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

Part of the problem, it seems to me, is that there is little consensus in the secondary literature regarding the status of the thing in itself. At some point we might want to just point out the two main readings. There's the two-world model, in which the thing in itself is a distinct entity from the appearance it "causes" (in some sense of cause); and then there's the two-aspect model, in which the thing in itself just is the appearance (but considered in abstraction from our cognitive and sensible contributions). Both readings have their strengths and weaknesses. Frankly, the topic strikes me as being a real minefield, and I'm not sure how we should approach it. Regarding this particular sentence, I don't have a strong opinion either way. I don't object to omitting it for the time being. fi99ig 05:08, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

I objected to this sentence when it was first entered (see above). I have no problem with its removal. Amerindianarts 17:28, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

  • The thing in itself, critically speaking, is a representation associated with the thinking faculty, the Understanding or Reason, but incapable of being represented by sensibility. Since knowledge requires thought plus sense content, we cannot know things in themselves. They remain objects of mere thought, what Kant calls "thought objects". Thus we can think such objects as underlying appearances without being able to make them appear, or hence to know them. It makes no sense though to attribute to them any kind of reality, theoretically speaking, since reality is one of the categories, and it can function cognitively only with respect to its schematization in possible experience. It is only in the moral domain that things in themselves acquire reality, although a purely practical reality, ie., the reality of moral freedom.Omar 20:50, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

Why is this guy in the category Philosophy of Sexuality?

I cannot find any menion of sex in the article.

I don't know. Maybe someone else has an answer. Amerindianarts 22:11, 8 November 2005 (UTC)
Well, the people who write on philosophy of sexuality do tend to mention Kant fairly frequently. For instance, in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a fairly reputable source), the article on Phil. of Sex. has a section on Kant (here: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L094SECT6#L094P8.31, although I think you need to be logged in to read it). But from the fact that this area of philosophy finds Kant important, it doesn't follow that the area is important to the study of Kant. After all, pretty much every area of philosophy refers to Kant at some point. My vote is to remove the link. fi99ig 22:29, 8 November 2005 (UTC)
  • A couple of things motivate talk of sex and Kant. First, its not clear how he reconciles sex with his understanding of the categorical imperative. One has to sex "from duty"?!! Second, he is known to have had his manservant wrap him up very carefully at bedtime so as to insure that he would not accidentally "touch himself" during sleep, a demonstration of his moral resolve to bring willfull control over every aspect of his own behavior. Kant does mention the sexual instinct in one of his shorter essays, the one on Conjectural Beginnings of Mankind, I believe. There he argues that we must not destroy the sexual instinct, but shape it to our moral will. Thus, it is possible to render the sexual instinct moral.Omar 14:06, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Criticisms?

Where are the many criticisms that have been leveled against Kant? I don't see them in Kantianism either. I just read the bit on him in Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy (Russell) and it's not light on Kant... AND it is one of the major sources of knowledge about philosophy there is; in fact it is probably the source of both the myths that appear here (late awakening and "you can set your watch by him"). Which by the way makes me wonder whether the assertion that he never went further from Konigsberg than a couple of miles is true, since it is not addressed here.

Also, Kant's view on duty is, to say the least disputed... where is the dispute here? Jules LT 22:48, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

I think the traditional response to this sort of thing is "get writing". Russell's HoWP is a fine book in its way, but it is not "one of the major sources of knowledge about philosophy", and in particular it's not a good guide to Kant - Russell disliked Kant and was dismissive of him and virtually all of the philosophers who followed him. Kantianism really needs merging with this article (and/or possibly the other articles dealing with specific works or aspects of Kant's philosophy). --  ajn (talk) 08:22, 9 November 2005 (UTC)
I'm not saying it's the most accurate source, I'm saying it's one of the most common, and because of that many misconceptions can come from reading it. I myself have little knowledge of Kant and I will therefore not "get writing" on this until I have spent a couple of months reading more about this from various sources, and I hope the article wont sit around waiting for me in the meantime. Jules LT 16:59, 9 November 2005 (UTC)
There is some material on criticism/contradiction on the bottom of this discussion page. Also, there is this:

The categorical imperative can be counterintuitive in that if you have a friend running away from a murderer, and she says that she's going to hide in your closet, the murderer comes in and asks where your friend is, do you tell the truth or lie? In accordance with the categorical imperative on lying all the time, it was seen to be disadvantageous to lie because if everyone lied, then no one would trust what others are saying. But this leads to telling the truth about the whereabouts of your friends and leading to her death. One way to counter this argument is to make the situations for the categorical imperative more specific to allow for situations in which you lie when friends are in danger to save their life. This has it's complications, namely treating the lie as a means and not an end and also the extent in which specification should lead to. We can keep getting more and more specific with the infinite situations out there and it leads to almost no help by using the categorical imperative. There might even be an lead to decision by intuition, but that also has problems.

Kantianism

OK, you have an article on Kant and an article on Kantianism which is defined there as "Kantian Philosophy" and you have a developed article on the Categorical Imperative. There's an awful lot of information that's duplicated and I suggest that the more precisely titled articles be developed with the information from here so the main "Kant" article can be made lighter and more easily readable. Jules LT 22:48, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

Personally, I would probably be against merging these two articles. That is, I think there is a place for an article on Kantianism distinct from an article on Kant. Where the latter focuses on the actual philosophy of Kant, the former can discuss roughly Kantian approaches to philosophy (approaches that might not be identical to Kant's own view.) To use an analogy, one can be a Platonist with regard to philosophy of mathematics (thinking, for instance, that numbers are metaphysical entities), without endorsing Plato's specific views on the nature of numbers. Terms like Kantian and Platonist are often used in this way -- to indicate an approach to philosophy that has an affinity with one great thinker or another. As I see it, the problem with the Kantianism article right now is that it doesn't sufficiently distance itself from Kant's actual views. (For instance, it begins by saying: "Kantianism is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant", where I would prefer something like: "Kantianism refers to philosophical views that share an affinity with the thought of Kant" -- that could use some cleaning up, but you get the idea.) It would be more interesting (to me, at least) if it explored the various ways people apply roughly Kantian solutions to philosophical problems. For instance, one could talk about recent Kantian approaches to ethics (Koorsgaard, Bok, etc.); McDowell's Kantian epistemology; and so on. Anyway, that's my suggestion. What do other people think? fi99ig 19:02, 9 November 2005 (UTC)

I agree that merging is not a good idea. We have already had plenty of discussion about the length of the current article, and user:Fi99ig is correct on the distinction between Kant and Kantianism. Merging the two articles is not a good mix. The same might also be said for the suggestion on "criticisms". There is just too much information. The concept of duty should probably be in an article on Kant's moral philosophy, which no one has yet to undertake. Russell's view on Kant? It belongs in the article on Russell, not in Kant. There are plenty of important viewpoints of various philosophers regarding Kant, and there isn't room here in this article. Russell is far from being the last word on Kant and there are as many opinions on Kant as there are secondary sources regarding Kant. Amerindianarts 03:07, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

I also do not agree with the recent change of the term "will" to "inclinations". "Inclinations and desires" is redundant, and that was not the purpose behind "will and desires". "Will" is an important concept in regard to practical judgement,the concept of duty, and grasping the idea (or rule) of the imperative. Amerindianarts 03:20, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

I am also having second thoughts about the deletion of the sentence "The latter can never be known except through the forms that the mind imposes upon it." When I agreed to its deletion I had something else in mind, but I see that "Thus the objective order of nature and the causal necessity that operates within it are products of the mind in its interaction with what lies outside of mind (the "thing-in-itself")" kind of leaves one hanging on for something more. Meaning, things-in-themselves as phenomenal are the non-spatial subjective representations which are the basis for intersubjective knowledge that the categories impose, and is the ground for what we "know". Kant held that space is subjective, or phenomenal, wherein in thought we arrange nonspatial things-in-themselves. If we hold that space and time are objectively real then the antinomies or contradictions are unavoidable. The proof that the objects of our knowledge are phenomena or appearances is that if the world were one of things-in-themselves, then a priori knowledge of it would be impossible. This does not mean that they are private objects, at least insofar as they are spatial. The world we know in everyday and scientific experience is common to many observers, and if not independent of consciousness as such, it is independent of particular consciousnesses. Parts of it are known only to particular experiences-my inner experience for example-but that does not effect the general point of spatial and temporal intensiveness. The characteristics in question are not merely subjective, they are objective, that is, valid for all men, but only in relation to phenomena, not to things-in-themselves. Kant's criterion of objectivity is the criterion of intersubjectivity-validity for all men. From the point of view of the critical philosophy something may be objective in this sense without being a feature of something independent of the mind. This is the essense of the synthetic a priori. Thus, the sentence "Thus the objective order of nature and the causal necessity that operates within it are products of the mind in its interaction with what lies outside of mind (the "thing-in-itself")" by itself is only half the story. I think the whole story is what Jeremy intended when he wrote it. I'm not saying the sentence should necessarily be re-inserted as it was. Maybe clarified. But the current edition cannot stand on its own. Amerindianarts 03:37, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

just got back from a wikibreak, it will take me a while to catch up with the discussion. Jeremy J. Shapiro 15:17, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

Era

An anonymous user changed the statement that in his Enlightenment essay Kant defined the Enlightenment to read that he defined "the era of the Enlightenment." I changed it back because it seems to me that the era of the Enlightenment consists of all of the surrounding political, cultural, and social stuff, and that Kant is not really defining that in his essay. But perhaps my reaction is distorted. Jeremy J. Shapiro 15:17, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

I agree, Jeremy. I was about to change it back myself. fi99ig 15:42, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

Comments on recent changes

I'd like to start a discussion on some of the recent changes to the Kant page. Some of them are quite good, in my opinion. I especially appreciate whoever cleaned up some of the sloppier passages from my recent attempt at a biography. But I do have a few concerns about some of the other changes. To be clear, I don't have strong opinions on these issues, but I think they're worth talking about. fi99ig 19:46, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

  • (1) Philosophers influenced by Kant

I know it's kind of vague to say "almost everyone who came after him", but I still wonder if this might be better than trying to list them all. After all, pretty much everyone after Kant is heavily influenced by him, so it seems that we might be faced with the dilemma of either (i) just listing all the major philosophers of the last 200 hundred years (which hardly seems helpful; or (ii) choosing a few philosophers to list (which runs the risk of looking arbitrary). As it stands, we seem to be going with option (ii). We have some German Idealists, Wittgenstein and then a series of continental philosophers. No neo-Kantians, no analytic philosophers (other than Wittgenstein), etc. Now, if the consensus ends up being that a list is valuable, I would be happy to fill in a few of the gaps that I'm more familiar with. But I fear that we are quickly going to end up with a situation that resembles (i). So, I would like to throw out the suggestion that we at least consider going back to "almost everyone who came after him". What do people think? fi99ig 19:46, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

    • It is important to emphasize the nature of the influence. It is essentially the "critical" approach that influenced those who followed: they began to ask after the origins of claims, if not in our faculties, then in a variety of spheres of discourse. Hegel--in historically mediated categories; Wittgenstein--in logic, or later in ordinary discourse; Heidegger--in the various ways in which Dasein seeks escape from his Being towards Death; Foucault--in hidden spheres of power; Bourdieu--in sociological prejudices for scholastic reasoning, etc.,.Omar 14:15, 25 January 2006 (UTC)
  • (2) Kant as a scientist

We open the page by referring to Kant as a philosopher and scientist and then list his various scientific contributions. While I don't think this is wrong per se, I worry that we may be over emphasizing his role as scientist (especially in the intro) and thus creating a misleading impression of Kant's accomplishments. All of us would surely agree that his scientific achievements are of minor importance compared to his work in philosophy. Perhaps it's worth discussing the particular disciplines listed.

(a) astrophysics

Kant made several hypotheses that turned out to be correct, and he is deserving of credit for these, but I don't believe he was an active contributor to the field. He certainly didn't have the background to do any technical work in astrophysics. Of course, he did claim that his system provided an adequate foundation for Newtonian physics, but this is more a philosophical than a scientific accomplishment. Or so it seems to me.

(b) mathematics

I don't believe that Kant did any original work in mathematics. In fact, he was a notoriously poor at arithmetic, according to Kuehn's biography. Of course, Kant had an enormous influence on the study of the foundations of mathematics, but that's a topic that normally falls under philosophy, rather than mathematics. (It's my impression that mathematicians have little interest in these debates.)

(c) geography

Kant wrote a few minor works on the topic and was somewhat ahead of his time in teaching course on the subject, but, again, I don't have the impression that he did any important work in the field. (Please correct me if I'm wrong -- I'll be the first to admit that this is an area of Kant that I have little background in.)

(d) anthropology

this is probably the area where Kant's importance is clearest, through both his own work and his direct influence on Herder. But I still have the impression that it pales in significance to his philosophical work.

Looking over this list, I can't help thinking that we might be better off removing the reference to Kant as a scientist from the introduction. My preference would probably be to remove it altogether, or perhaps to mention it somewhere in the biography section. But I don't feel strongly about this, and I'm open to being convinced otherwise. If you feel strongly about keeping the passage in the introduction, perhaps you could tell us why it's important here on the talk page. fi99ig 19:46, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

My revert of the recent changes was predominately in respect to the reference of innate ideas and intuitions in Kant, which is blatantly incorrect, and definitely not a neutral point of view, but a view of the British empiricists and the later dialectical materialists. Innatists would reject Kant's doctrine as containing innate anything, and view it as a doctrine of rationalistic principles. As for the rest of the changes I have no strong feelings, however; I would like to add that:
As for the reference to Kant as a scientist, Kant considered himself a scientist (doesn't theoretics count?). While in contemporary terms his writings on the sciences may not be important, they were more so at the time he wrote them. It is a matter of importance between the then and the now and terminology pertinent to the times we are referring to. The term "scientist" is "vague" only in regard to modern usage. His contributions to math and logic are more in regard to the questions he asked rather than any solutions, e.g. the antinomies and the subsequent development of quantification and modal logic, which do concern mathematicians (our symbolic logic classes at the university were 90% mathematicians and 10% philosophers).
I agree that listing individual philosophers is cumbersome and probably could be too lengthy, but don't you think "almost everyone who came after him" is a little to colloquial for an article on a philosopher? It stinks.
I agree that the bio section could be rid of some of the links, etc.Amerindianarts 02:57, 23 November 2005 (UTC)
I was fine with removing the reference to innate ideas. And, yes, I agree with you that "almost everyone who came after him" is kind of clumsy. Does anyone have a better way of putting it? On the other point, if Kant thought of himself as a scientist, then I suppose including it is not so bad. I still worry a bit about getting the emphasis right, but maybe we could just rephrase the opening sentences to make it perfectly clear that his most significant work was in philosophy. fi99ig 03:53, 23 November 2005 (UTC)

Sounds good to me. This article was at one time in pretty bad shape and Jeremy did a good job of cleaning it up. The biblio and bio are also good. I think we need to be diligent in seeing that it doesn't return to that previous state. I think that Jeremy's edit of a list of major names is a reasonable compromise. The alternative is the clumsy reference, or trying to give a detailed list, which is unpractical. Kant's influences are immeasurable, so we need to agree on a limit to the amount of info that can be provided and be diligent in overseeing any further changes. We can't tell it all, so we must leave some initiative to the reader.Amerindianarts 04:14, 23 November 2005 (UTC)

  • Where is Rawls? I think the template should be changed so that the Influenced section will not even appear, if so desired. With many philosophers (Descartes & Hume also come to mind), even the articles section can scarcely contain an account of those influenced. --JimWae 04:58, 23 November 2005 (UTC)
I don't know what to do about this influence question in general. I agree with JimWae that some of the major philosophers (e.g. Plato, Descartes, Kant) have influenced just about everyone who came after them, and some philosophers were influenced by many philosophers. And I don't know what the criterion is as to where in general we should be drawing the line. I just looked at the Hegel article and see that someone has insert under "influenced" some contemporary Hegel scholars whom I don't think are generally considered major philosophers in their own right, and I looked at the Descartes article and see that it fails to mention Husserl under the influenced. For one thing, we should probably define the criterion for "Influenced" to specify that the person has to be someone generally recognized as a "major philosopher". Does that imply the need for a list of official major philosophers? I hope not, although in fact most philosophers probably operate with one. Anyway, I'm at a loss as to how to deal with this. Another alternative would be to define influenced to mean something like influenced in the immediately following generations. What I mean by that is that I think in the reverse direction I think it's accepted that thinkers are mainly influenced by their immediate context and immediately preceding philosophical situation, so that, for example, even though Kant and Hegel refer to Plato, Hegel refers to Heraclitus, Heidegger has written about Anaximander, and so on, it would more generally be said that Kant was influenced by Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume, Hegel by Kant, Heidegger by Husserl, and so on, in other words influences extend backwards only recently, even though in a way they extend forwards infinitely. Anyway, I'm just thinking out loud, don't have an immediate solution. Jeremy J. Shapiro 13:02, 23 November 2005 (UTC)
The generational aspect may be a solution to consider. More detail can be provided in sub-articles on Kant's philosophy. For example, Lord Shaftesbury, John Addison, and Edmund Burke are the direct influences of Kant's aesthetics (the sublime) but are minor figures really. Kant's influences in aesthetics is more predominate in German theorist Max Dessoir than in either Schelling, Schiller, of Hegel, but there is also a gap of a few generations between Dessoir and Kant. Same can be said of some major figures, e.g. Sartre. Kant's influence on Sartre is profound, but limited in scope (ontology, intentionality, consciousness, transcendence), and probably belongs in a sub-article somewhere. Amerindianarts 06:17, 24 November 2005 (UTC)
Sometimes it's enough to simply ask: Which of the most influencial philosophers of the 20th century referred to philosophers of their past. Did Wittgenstein refer to Hegel ? Did he refer to Kant ? Did John L. Mackie refer to either Hegel or Kant ? Did Popper refer to either of them ? Did Einstein have any preferances towards one of them ? Now, if we have an answer to questions like this, then we gain a better understanding of the real meaning of philosophers like Hegel and Kant. (In my opinion: Kant was a philosopher, Hegel was a writer.) Hans Rosenthal (ROHA) (hans.rosenthal AT t-online.de -- replace AT by @ ) (27112005)

Vandalism

This article seems to be the object of much vandalism lately. Especially User 82.41.96.14 . Can this user be blocked? It is obvious that their fun and games are of a juvenile mentality.Amerindianarts 23:09, 29 November 2005 (UTC)

Deletions by User:12.159.135.17 from Immanuel Kant#Example of the first formulation:

The following text was deleted by User:12.159.135.17, and I agree with the deletion, as it is too much elaboration for this page. However the infomation is valuable and should probably be moved into a sub-Kant page. Here is the text that was removed - please place this somewhere else! Thanks!

There are two types of contradiction that Kant thinks may arise with impermissible maxims. The first type he calls "contradictions in conception." Kant uses the example of a false promise to illustrate this. His imagined agent has the maxim: "I am going to lie so that someone will lend me money, because I am in need." Kant argues that universalizing this maxim would lead to a contradiction — that is, if everyone were to follow this maxim, and were to lie whenever in need, promises would mean nothing. So it would be contradictory or irrational in the possible world to make a false promise to secure money, since your promise would simply be laughed at. Thus, acting on such a maxim in the real world is impermissible, which means we have a duty not to make false promises just to satisfy our needs. Incidentally, Kant believed that any maxim involving lying would lead to a contradiction, leading to his commitment to the view that we have a perfect (i.e. inviolable) duty not to lie.

The second type of contradiction Kant calls "contradictions in will," which arise when a universalized maxim would contradict something the agent would have to will as a rational being. Kant's example involves a self-reliant person who thinks everybody should mind their own business, and thus acts on the maxim: "Don't help others." In the imagined world where this is universalized, Kant thinks that this would necessarily contradict something any rational agent must will, namely that if one is in great need and could easily be helped by another, as a rational being he would have to will that the other person help him — but this universalized maxim contradicts that, thus leading to a contradiction in will, and showing that the policy, "Don't help others" is impermissible.

--FranksValli 19:42, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

I agree with the deletion, and that it is valuable and belongs elsewhere. Amerindianarts 21:03, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

Is the alternative spelling for Immanuel Kant (Emmanuel Kant) widely used? I do not recall seeing it being spelled with an "E". Otherwise, alternative spellings for names is not useful. What do you think?Amerindianarts 16:08, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Tonight I finally went and looked this up in the Manfred Kuehn biography of Kant, which I believe is considered authoritative, and here's what it says: "On April 22 of this year Immanuel Kant was born om Koenigsberg. The Old Prussian Almanac associated the name "Emanuel" with this date. Accordingly, he was baptized "Emanuel". He would later change it to "Immanuel", thinking that this was a more faithful rendition of the original Hebrew. "Emanuel" or "Immanuel" means "God is with him." Kant thought that it was a most appropriate name, and he was uncommonly proud of it, commenting on its meaning even in his old age. It is perhaps meaningful that he found it necessary critically to evaluate and correct the very name given to him, but it is noteworthy that the literal meaning of his name provided him with comfort and confidence throughout his life." He then goes on to refer to him as Emanuel in the whole section of the book that discusses his youth. But then when he's older he just refers to him as Kant, so I can't see if he pinpoints the exact year when Kant changed his name from "Emanuel" to "Immanuel". So I suppose that it might be worth saying in the article, "baptized as 'Emanuel', or something like that, but not describe it as an alternative spelling or name, because Kant himself apparently never used "Emanuel" once he changed it to "Immanuel". Jeremy J. Shapiro 05:20, 17 December 2005 (UTC)
I agree that it might be worth mentioning somewhere, perhaps in the biography section. I also support its deletion from the opening paragraph, as it surely isn't significant enough to warrant such a prominent mention. For what it's worth, there do seem to be some works in the English secondary literature that refer to him as Emmanuel (as revealed by searching Amazon.com), but they're a distinct and vanishing minority. fi99ig 05:31, 17 December 2005 (UTC)
I agree: in the bio but not the introduction. Jeremy J. Shapiro 05:54, 17 December 2005 (UTC)
Ok. I thought I had a book by Blakely on Emmanuel Kant, but can't find it to verify. Library catalogs I checked referenced Emmanuel but with no works listed and redirected to Immanuel. I did find several alternative spellings, including Immanuil Kant and 'Imanu'el Kant. Does anyone want to make the change? Feel free. Amerindianarts 10:33, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

philosophy speak

Since this is, I think, a general encyclopedia for the general public and not specifically a philosophy one for philosophers, I was wondering if we could simplify some of the language in some of these articles. Kant is already hard enough to understand, for some of us anyway, so why compound the situation with unnecessarily difficult language? Just a question/suggestion, --Jim 00:16, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

It's really not that simple. If you think that Kant is difficult then you can imagine what would be entailed by translating his terminolgy and ideas to everyone's satisfaction. I think the current article has tried to preserve his terminolgy, and not everyone will agree on what he meant by certain terms. You could spin several paragraphs attempting to explain a term and not everyone will agree that it is a neutral point of view. Amerindianarts 00:58, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

categorical imperative

Why does this article go into detail about the categorical imperative? Why not leave that to the categorical imperative article? If people want to know more about it all they have to do is click the link.--Jim 01:06, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Good point. It has been discussed before. It will take a consensus to get it done. Amerindianarts 01:24, 19 December 2005 (UTC)
After reading the section on the categorical imperative I have to agree that the section probably does go into more detail than needed, to the degree that it either needs more detail to explain the points that have been left open, or it needs to be reduced, serving as a link to the main article. For example, the sentence "and is not based on contingent facts about the world (e.g., what would make us happy)" is rather open ended. That the question of our own happiness is not the end of ends is Kant's point of criticism of the Nichomachean ethics, but he also states in the Critique of Pure Reason that we should ask not "are we happy", but "are we worthy of our happiness?" as the question of questions. What seems to be undermined here is the importance of the will, duty, and the sacrifice of personal happiness for the community of man. They are mentioned haphazardly, but it is not a neat little bundle of informative joy. This is just a suggestion to someone who may want to undertake the task. I have neither the time or patience to argue for the change or make to it. Amerindianarts 19:23, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Minor Edits Needed

The quote appearing as an epitaph on Kant's gravestone also appears lower down under a Quotes section. It seems that this isn't necessary in an already lengthy article. I am still rather new so I will leave it to another to change if they fell it is unnecessary. (Not willing to screw up everything) Chaoscrowley 03:53, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Kant's Influence

I've removed the references to critics of Kant that were recently added at the end of this section, as they are off topic. As I see it, the references to Peikoff and Rand do not belong anywhere in the article, for the Objectivists are generally (and rightly, in my opinion) not taken seriously in the Philosophical community. If anyone wants to keep the reference to Quine, perhaps we could start a new section on Kant's critics. If so, it might be better to refer more generally to the naturalist trend in recent philosophy, as Quine's criticisms of Kant are grounded in his naturalism. Just a thought. fi99ig 03:57, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

It's a correct edit. A section on his critics might be a good idea, but some will argue that the article is already too lengthy. Amerindianarts 12:42, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

Kant the greatest

I am concerned about "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential thinker of modern Europe". Was he really the greatest? Who says that? You? Me? When did they say it? It sounds to me like weasel words and something to be addressed. I am tempted to remove "greatest and" but would like to see the views of others. Eiler7 11:07, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

"Was he really the greatest?" Be honest. I think you should realize that is not the context. The statement is "often considered one of the greatest", which is comparative and places him in a group of thinkers to which he rightly belongs. You have taken it out of context and used it as an absolutive. I see nothing saying he "is the greatest". Your complaint has no logical foundation nor does the weasel word apply. Thumbs down to your suggestion.Amerindianarts 14:10, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

While I do think there's a substantial consensus re: Kant's status as one of the greatest philosophers, it does appear that this wording violates the policy on weasel words, as indicated in Eiler7's link. That is, instead of providing evidence that Kant is one of the greatest philosophers, we weasel out by attributing it to some anonymous collective who "often" claim this. I think we should probably rewrite this sentence somehow. Any thoughts? fi99ig 16:27, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

It doesn't surprise me that you would disagree. Eiler7 created a class with a single member. In that event you could question the wording. But the sentence creates a class which would be "great and influential thinkers of modern Europe". Is there such a class? If so, does Kant belong to it?? It is not as if Kant is being included in a class of "the greatest and most influential thinkers in history", or "the greatest and most influential thinkers in philosophy". The class was created specifically. What is the complement of the class? All "non-great and non-influential thinkers of modern Europe"?? Does Kant belong to this class?? You both seem to be questioning the conjunction of "greatest" and "most influential". I don't see the problem. The two terms are compatible conjunctively even if greatness and influence is viewed negatively by some, e.g. Heidegger and Neitzche. Eiler7's original request did not have any logical foundation. The class title and Kant's inclusion does not violate NPOV and the motivation for change is simply personal preference, which does violate NPOV. The sentence is also quantified by the term "often". It is not an absolutive. It does not state that he was the greatest or that there is a universal consensus that he even belongs to the class. But in all probability, and this is what is stated and shouldn't be too problematic in regard to verifiability, Kant is considered a such. This does not violate NPOV. Amerindianarts 17:00, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

Sigh. Here we go again. Where did I say I was questioning the conjunction of 'greatest' and 'most influential', as you claim? And how does anything I say imply that? Read what I said. And read the link to wikipedia's policy on 'weasel words'. Whether or not the claim "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential thinker of modern Europe" is correct (and I do think it's correct, for what it's worth), its use of "often considered" seems clearly to violate Wikipedia's policy on 'weasel words'. That's all I'm saying. We should find a way of rewriting the sentence that is consistent with Wikipedia policy. fi99ig 17:34, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
Eiler7 was questioning the presence of the term "greatest". Your statements do not dispute this or make any reference to the statement being quantified by "often considered". Your statements question inclusion into a class with "greatness" as a descriptive term. So why don't you, objectively, "read" what you wrote. I'm not drawing any conclusions other than what you inferred. My point is, that the capacity for a thinker to elicit conversation, controversy, make a place for themselves in history, etc., is a signature of greatness, distinct from influence and whether that influence is construed as positive or negative. As a term in a class title, it is descriptive. I would prefer to wait for comments from the original author, Jhapiro. Perhaps the term "greatness" could be replaced with, e.g. the term "controversial", although in light of your most recent objection this would not be acceptable for the same reasons. Amerindianarts 18:42, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
Are you blind? In my original claim I went out of my way to specifically clarify how the sentence in question violates the Wikipedia policy on weasel words, and I stated explicitly that what makes the sentence an example of weaseling out is the use of the word "often". Did you read this? Whether or not Eiler7 did a good job of explaining how the sentence violates the weasel words policy, even a brief glance at the link he provides would make the problem clear. And the fact that I agree with someone that a sentence is problematic does not mean that I agree with him in every respect as to how it is problematic -- especially when I immediately go on to cite a different reason for thinking it so.
Now, could we get beyond the tiresome hair-splitting and actually discuss the problem at hand? How can we formulate this sentence in a manner that is consistent with Wikipedia policy on 'weasel words' like 'often'? If you don't think there's a problem, I would welcome an explanation as to how the phrasing is consistent with Wikipedia policy as set out in the above link. fi99ig 19:19, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
Like I said, I'll wait for the author's feedback. I have faith in his judgment to adhere to Wiki policy. Maybe he has suggestions. I don't have any.
The Wiki rules are good rules of thumb to keep people within a certain guideline, but if considered hard and fast, nothing would be written. And I'm not splitting hairs. I think the original complaint is splitting hairs. In an article on mathematics I might say "one times one equals one". This is true except in the Fibonocci sequence. So, do I restate by writing that "people often consider one times one to be one"? Which is NPOV? Who is splitting hairs? How about "most people consider Euclidean geometry as an accurate means for measuring physical reality"? Do I rewrite the sentence as "Euclidean geometry is an accurate means of measuring physical reality." (do I need to elaborate on the problem with this?) I hate to seem pedantic, but it is a good device for countering hair-splitters. BTW, I should wear my glasses but I'm not blind. Perhaps you have a blinding faith in your capacity for clarity?Amerindianarts 19:48, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
Do you really think there's no significant difference between the factual examples you give and the evaluative claim that Kant is one of the greatest philosophers? I think the latter claim is true, but I recognize that it is open to dispute in a manner that straightforwardly factual claims are not. (I don't meant to say that it's always a simple matter to distinguish factual and value claims, but pretty much everyone agrees that there is some such distinction. I hope you'll be willing to grant that much.) Indeed, there are major contemporary philosophers who don't think much of Kant as a philosopher. I think they're wrong, but to show that would involve a lengthy discussion of the values and goals of philosophy, claims that are themselves up for dispute.
It is because the claim about Kant's greatness is an evaluative claim that the appeal to weasel phrases like 'often considered' is considered problematic. Look at the examples in the link provided -- most of them involve evaluative claims of precisely this sort. No one here is saying that all claims lead to this sort of problem, so I'm afraid I don't see how your examples are relevant.
Finally, as to the 'blinding faith in my clarity', you said that my original statement did not "...make any reference to the statement being quantified by 'often considered'". I then pointed out the sentence where I did exactly what you claimed I didn't do. I'm not sure how I could have been any clearer. fi99ig 20:23, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
"Euclidean geometry is an accurate measure of physical reality" can be considered evaluative also. It is generally considered by most people as true and the statement is an incorrect judgment (error), but because it does work in close proximity while failing in the universe as a whole it is also an evaluation. At what point does it stop working? It works, but when? The error factor has evaluative overtones. The fact that it works and doesn't work becomes an issue as to when it is an error or evaluation. The problem is viewing things in term of black and white. Nothing works that way. According to your interpretation Kant shouldn't even be considered in the class "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential philosophers of modern Europe", or "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential German thinkers", or "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential thinkers at the conclusion of the Enlightenment". This is because of the either/or interpretation of the Wiki rule. Under this interpretation I do not see how the content can be maintained in a rewrite, and you may as well remove the sentence altogether. Amerindianarts 20:50, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
Also, can we get past whether or not you think that "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential thinker of modern Europe". You think he is, fine. So do I. But It is irrelevant to the task at hand.Amerindianarts 20:54, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
I also misspoke. "Euclidean geometry is an accurate measure of physical reality" is not really an erroneous judgment. It is a judgment that could result in error. You may find that controversial and that's fine, but it is questionable whether the proposition is either true or false, and in that sense it can be evaluative. Amerindianarts 21:05, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
I confess that I'm not finding the Euclidean example very helpful, as it brings in all sorts of extra issues. I also have no idea why you think I'm committed either to the fact/value distinction being black and white or to not even considering Kant in the class "Kant is often considered one of the greatest and most influential philosophers of modern Europe". To believe that one can make a distinction (as I do) does not imply that the distinction is black and white (as you claim I believe despite my never saying anything of the sort). Moreover, I explicitly acknowledged that it is not always easy to make the distinction.
But anyway, here's a proposal. Why don't we simply drop the terms 'often' and 'greatest'. I trust that we can all agree that 'greatest' is farther on the evaluative side of the spectrum than 'most influential', and thus more prone to the charge of being a weasel term. (One sign that this is so: it's my sense that people are much more likely to dispute his greatness than his influence.) So, how about the following? "Kant was one of the most influential thinkers of modern Europe and the last major philosopher of the Enlightenment." Sound good? fi99ig 23:48, 14 January 2006 (UTC)
I can't tell if the lack of further discussion on this issue signals acceptance of my proposed wording. I'll wait another day or so before making the change. fi99ig 05:35, 18 January 2006 (UTC)
Calling Kant one of the greatest phlosophers is not a violation of the weasel word policy. It is an accepted academic opinion, and does not need to be cited. That would be like citing the opinion "Evolution was one of the most significan paradigm shifts in modern history." The policy on weasel words is in effect not to fill the encyclopedia with unnecessary citations, but to keep people from inserting their own unfounded opinions by pretending to cite a source. "People say Kant was rude" would be an innappropriate use of weasel words. Either way, I think influential should replace "greatest," because it is more descriptive. Shaggorama 11:11, 18 January 2006 (UTC)
If we call Kant one of the greatest, we encourage people to take a positive view of things like the categorical imperative. I imagine that serious philosophers have already documented the flaws in that imperative. Also, according to the Critique page Kant said Newtonian physics is a priori knowledge which is also highly questionable in my mind. So, calling Kant on of the greatest is misleading to the wikipedia audience. "most influential" does not have this problem although I wonder whether it is true as well. I am by no means an expert in this field but I suspect that modern analytic philosophers reject much of what Kant said. If this is so, and I hope there is someone out there with more information on this, can it really be appropriate to talk about "Kant's most powerful and revolutionary effect on philosophy"? It would be interesting to hear about other people's views. Eiler7 13:29, 21 January 2006 (UTC)

Well Newton is generally considered to be one of the greatest scientists of all times, although Newtonian physics turned out to be wrong and has been replaced by quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity. This does not diminish Newtons claim to greatness and fame. Kant definitely had a revolutionary effect on philosophy just as Newton had a revolutionary effect on physics. You may easily find out by searching for philosophy articles related to Kant. You will find many more articles dealing with Kant than any other philospher. Kikl 21:35, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

I have just checked the Newton page and found that, even though Newton's importance is acknowledged, so is the theory of relativity. So, if the categorical imperative has been replaced in a similar fashion, I think it would be good to note this. Otherwise the label great encourages more weight to be attached to it than may be warranted. Eiler7 11:01, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

Why don't you add a criticims section to the Kant page or the "categorical imperative" page? I think you should be more modest in your judgement of Kant. I suggest that you start reading the corresponding articles published by the encyclopedia britannica before editing this page.Kikl 13:03, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Hmmm... I think many philosophers would say that the Categorical Imperative is still influential, and Kant is certainly a great figure in the history of philosophy. I will copy across the criticisms section from the Deontological Ethics page (and perhaps delete some of it from there if it seems to have found a better home here). WhiteC 15:28, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

The criticism section should be improved. I quote: "The deduction that the entire human race has a duty to die is entirely consistent with the Categorical Imperative provided that the deducer agrees that he himself, or she herself, has a duty to die too". According to this sentence the deduction of a duty presupposes the existence of a duty (personel duty). This is a circular argument. Please redraft this section. Kikl 09:51, 31 January 2006 (UTC)

Kant as a geographer

Taking note of the points above, I just wanted to give the topic another airing. I was lectured by Nick Jardine at Cambridge in history of science and philosophy; when talking of Kant, one of his favourite asides was that his contributions in geography were far more significant than those in philosophy. There was a slight tongue-in-cheek wickedness to this aside, to be sure, but I suspect there was more than a grain of truth in the importance he attached to this aspect of Kant's work. If it is worth noting, perhaps a geographer with the relevant knowledge could add a section - I'm sure it would be right to add it at the end of the article, rather than at the beginning.

Jonathan Hollow 84.9.102.198 17:38, 19 January 2006 (UTC)

Well, It sounds like a pretty stupid joke to me. I don't think Kant made any contributions to geography, since he never travelled further away than a few miles from his hometown of Koenigsberg. Mr. Jardine probably expected you to know this. Furthermore, it's quite an embarrassing remark for a professor teaching history of philosophy. He should know better. Kikl 21:19, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

Doesn't quite seem like such an embarrassing remark, seeing as how Erich Adickes published works on Kant's lectures on geography, and geographer Richard Hartshorne apparently cited published lectures that Kant gave on physical geography. The full authenticity of the lectures seems to be in question, though. And works of both men are long out of print, as far as I can tell (used copies might be available). Additionally, I've little idea if there are any scholars currently working on the issue. Perhaps an Adickes or Hartshorne expert might know? Jonnyrice 06:15, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

trying to find a home for criticisms of Kant's ethics

The last section in Deontological ethics, "Specific criticsms of Kant's ethics"... It has recently been suggested (by user Kikl) that it doesn't really belong in that article. Earlier I moved it there because somebody said it didn't really belong in Categorical imperative either. I feel that much of it contains valid criticisms of Kant's ethics (although I am not an expert), and that these criticisms should be put somewhere... but nobody wants it. Any positive suggestions on where it should go... this page would seem to be the a plausible candidate, since there aren't any criticsm sections here yet. WhiteC 07:41, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

It's a good idea to include a criticism section to the Kant page. I don't object. Kikl 07:51, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

OK, after some disagreement, a home has been found for it at Categorical imperative, where it has been somewhat improved. I removed the content from this page. WhiteC 19:57, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

New pictures available

The following images have been uploaded to Commons and can be used in this or other Kant pages!

Kant mixing mustard, Drawing by Friedrich Hagermann, 1801
Kant and Friends at Table, Painting by Emil Doerstling, c. 1900

FranksValli 00:17, 5 February 2006 (UTC)

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