Talk:Hylton v. United States

Hylton and Pollock

The Hylton case was essentially overruled by the 1895 Pollock case, in which the Court held that taxes on personal property are direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution and therefore require apportionment. I would like to edit this article explaining this principle. If anyone wishes to make a comment, please do so at your earliest convenience. Thanks. Fireatsea (talk) 00:06, 19 June 2015 (UTC)

You would need to find a reliable source that says that Pollock overruled Hylton. In Wikipedia, you cannot do your own analysis of that.

Since Hylton is still being cited by the U.S. Supreme Court as recently as two or three years ago, I don't know what you're going to find, if anything, in terms of reliable, previously published third party sources.

Further: The Court in Pollock did not rule that taxes on personal property are direct taxes (although such taxes might indeed be direct taxes).

What the Court ruled was that a tax on the INCOME from personal property (such as dividend income and interest income) were to be treated as direct taxes for purposes of the apportionment requirement. In other words, under Pollock, you had to look at the SOURCE of the income to determine whether the related income tax should be treated as a direct tax or not. And, as noted elsewhere, that holding in Pollock was overruled by the Sixteenth Amendment. Indeed, there is little if anything in the holdings in Pollock that is still valid constitutional law.

At any rate, as noted above, I would suggest that you look for reliable, previously published third party sources. Famspear (talk) 00:49, 19 June 2015 (UTC)

OK, I found a source and I have added the notation about Pollock overruling Hylton to the article, along with a footnote to the source. Famspear (talk) 04:08, 19 June 2015 (UTC)

OK. Unfortunately the section entitled "Opinion of the Court" still contains some superflous references to income taxes and the Sixteenth Amendment, neither of which has any relevance to taxes on personal property and will only cause confusion. It's late in the evening so I will propose some additional edits tomorrow, but in the meantime please let me know if you have any ideas for making this section a little more coherent and streamlined. Thanks. Fireatsea (talk) 05:52, 19 June 2015 (UTC)

I propose changing the section entitled "Opinion of the Court" as follows: "The Justices at the time, rather than issuing a single opinion of the Court, instead issued seriatim opinions, with each writing separately and reading his own analysis in turn. The Court's interpretation of the federal power to tax personal property lasted until overruled in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895), in which the Supreme Court held taxes on personal property to be direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution, therefore requiring apportionment. The Congressional Research Service lists the Hylton decision as having been overruled by the Pollock decision.[2]"

Further, I propose moving the paragraph about Alexander Hamilton's speech out of this section ("Opinion of the Court") and into the main summary section at the beginning of the article. Please let me know if you agree with these changes. Fireatsea (talk) 00:24, 20 June 2015 (UTC)

I will have to get back to you in a few days. In the mean time, I would point out that the rulings in Pollock were not on taxes on personal property. The rulings were on taxes on INCOMES from personal property. I will try to get back to this soon. Thanks! Famspear (talk) 02:50, 22 June 2015 (UTC)

I look forward to your comments as always. However, I must correct you regarding the Pollock ruling. Justice Fuller writes the following, "We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes." This is one of three separate conclusions laid out by Justice Fuller at the end of his very long opinion. I do not think this qualifies as obiter dictum because these remarks are absolutely necessary for reaching the decision in the case. It is not an incidental remark; in fact Justice Fuller himself refers to it as one of the Court's "conclusions." Anyway, I'm sure you have your own thoughts about this so I will await your reply. Fireatsea (talk) 01:03, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

More on this from the Brushaber decision: "[T]he Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution[.]" Fireatsea (talk) 01:08, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

No, you're not correcting me on Pollock. The fact that a particular conclusion is necessary for the result in the case does not make that conclusion part of the holding. In determining the difference between a holding (a ruling) and dicta, we look to see what the parties were actually litigating. The parties were not litigating a tax on property. They were litigating only a tax on INCOME from property.

Court opinions are full of statements about what the law is that are logically necessary to the result in the case -- but that does not make those statements "not be dicta." In short, what appears to be a "conclusion" -- even if labeled as such by the Court, is still not part of the holding of the court where the parties weren't fighting about that particular issue. Famspear (talk) 11:28, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

This is another way of saying that prior principles of existing law may be logically "necessary" to the rationale in a subsequent case -- and those prior principles may even be stated as "conclusions" of law in the subsequent case -- but that does not make those prior principles part of the holding of the subsequent case. If those kinds of principles were part of the holding in the subsequent case, then almost every statement about the law that a judge makes in his or her opinion would be part of the "holding" of that case.

The holding in a case relates not to "how" the case was decided, but instead to what the court actually decided about the parties' disagreements in that case. "What the court decided" is a narrower concept than what the court "concluded," and what the court decided is based on what the parties were actually disagreeing about. Famspear (talk) 12:00, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

I understand your logic and generally agree, but sometimes the Court makes rulings on issues beyond what the litigants are fighting about. For example, in Pollock, the Court invalidated statutory language imposing taxes on income from employments and professions, even though neither litigant complained about such taxes or even mentioned them. Furthermore, Justice Fuller intentionally created confusion because prior to Pollock, the existing interpretation (in Hylton) was that taxation of personal property is an indirect tax. Justice Fuller deliberately broke from precedent and stated that taxation of personal property is a direct tax. Regardless of whether you think his statement is mere dictum, the Congressional Research Service lists Hylton as being overruled by Pollock. Which is correct? Fireatsea (talk) 01:11, 24 June 2015 (UTC)

It's not "my logic." And it's not a question of what I "think." I'm explaining the Pollock case. Remember, the Court in Pollock did not rule that taxes on income from employments and professions were unconstitutional. The Court in Pollock did rule the entire statute unconstitutional, but the Court made NO RULING about the constitutional validity of taxes on incomes from employments and professions. Instead, the Court stated that the REASON it was ruling the entire statute unconstitutional was that the Congress could not have intended to tax only income from employments, etc., without also taxing income from property. The Court also specifically noted in passing that taxes on income from employments were NOT unconstitutional.

Regarding the Congressional Research Service, I'm the one who provided you with that material. We'll get to the question of Pollock overruling Hylton later. Famspear (talk) 03:20, 24 June 2015 (UTC)

Yes, in fact Justice Fuller went to great lengths to explain that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Court decided to invalidate sections of the statute that were plainly constitutional and not contended by the litigants in the case. This proves my point that sometimes the Court makes rulings on issues beyond what the litigants are fighting about. Fireatsea (talk) 01:33, 25 June 2015 (UTC)

No, you're still not getting it. By ruling the entire statute unconstitutional, the Court was not making a ruling on issues beyond what the litigants were fighting about. And, in this very case, the Court explained that the Court was NOT ruling on the constitutionality of an income tax on income from "employments". Famspear (talk) 14:20, 25 June 2015 (UTC)

Note: The concept works both ways. If a court upholds the constitutionality of a statute, the holding in the case does not constitute a ruling on each and every provision in the statute. The ruling covers only the specific issues that the parties were actually fighting about.

Courts make many, many statements about "what the law is" in court opinions. Many -- often most -- of the statements made in a given case are what we call obiter dicta, or words said "in passing." Dicta are not binding statements; they are not part of the holding or holdings in the case.

Similarly, with respect to a decision like that in Pollock where the court struck down an entire statute because of what is sometimes called a lack of "severability," the decision does not constitute a ruling on issues that the parties were not fighting about. Shortly after the Pollock decisions were handed down, the Congress could have enacted a new statute that taxed only incomes from employments. Let us suppose that this new statute had then been litigated and had gone all the way to the Supreme Court. If the party asserting that the statute was invalid tried to argue that the Court had made a ruling on the validity income taxes on income from employments in the Pollock case, the Supreme Court would have corrected that party and explained that the decision in Pollock was NOT a ruling on the validity of such taxes.

These concepts cannot be easily learned by reading one, or two, or ten, or even a hundred court opinions. It takes years reading literally thousands of court opinions to obtain a meaningful grasp of how the concepts of stare decisis and judicial precedent work in the American legal system. Famspear (talk) 14:42, 25 June 2015 (UTC)

PS: I keep saying "the decision" in Pollock, but as you know there were two separate opinions rendered by the Supreme Court in Pollock. Even in the text of one opinion, a court may render any number of holdings. Famspear (talk) 14:47, 25 June 2015 (UTC)

I agree with you that the Court did not make a ruling on the constitutionality of taxes on income from employments and professions. However, the Court did make a ruling on the severability of such taxes from other taxes in sections 27 to 37 of the act of 1894. To the best of my knowledge, neither litigant invoked the severability principle or contended that the entirety of sections 27 to 37 should be declared invalid. The Court did that on its own without any provocation from either side. How is this not a ruling on issues beyond what the litigants were fighting about? Fireatsea (talk) 01:04, 26 June 2015 (UTC)

One way of looking at that particular point is to recognize that the Court's determination of the lack of severability was merely an aspect of how the Court arrived at its conclusions, and not an aspect of what the Court decided about what the litigants were fighting about. Famspear (talk) 12:29, 26 June 2015 (UTC)

Please bear with me as I try to understand this; you’ve been very patient and I appreciate that. I am going to break down each event in chronological order. First, the Court came to a conclusion about what the litigants were actually fighting about, i.e. whether taxes on income from real estate and personal property were direct taxes. Having reached that conclusion, the Court recognized a new legal issue that was not put forth by either litigant, i.e. whether or not those particular taxing clauses (now known to be unconstitutional) could be severed from the other (constitutional) taxing clauses. On its own volition, the Court deliberated this new legal conundrum that did not exist prior to its first conclusion about the nature of taxes on income from real estate and personal property. After deliberation, the Court issued an additional ruling about the validity of the entirety of sections 27 to 37 of the act of 1894 (based on the principle of lack of severability). The validity of the entirety of sections 27 to 37 was not contended by the litigants in the case. Please let me know if you agree with this summation. Fireatsea (talk) 00:44, 27 June 2015 (UTC)

The Court's severability analysis is another aspect of how the Court arrived at its decisions. For purposes of the concept of stare decisis, the decisions in Pollock were that income taxes on dividends, interest and rent were to be treated as direct taxes and thus, because such taxes had not been apportioned under the 1894 statute, such taxes were unconstitutional.

If the Court's severability analysis were to be considered a "decision" (for purposes of the narrow concept of stare decisis), then every time a court performed a severability analysis in any case, subsequent courts and legal commentators would treat such an analysis as a holding in the case. You don't generally see that.

The term "decision" (for purposes of stare decisis) is a term narrowly referring to the detailed legal result following from a detailed set of facts. The decision (in this narrow sense) is what the court decided, not how the court decided and not why the court decided. The severability analysis the Court used in arriving at its Pollock decisions can be thought of as an explanation of how and why the Court came to its decision, and not as the decision itself. Famspear (talk) 11:10, 27 June 2015 (UTC)

OK, so you’re saying the Court’s statement about the validity of the entirety of sections 27 to 37 of the act of 1894 is not one of its “decisions”? Fireatsea (talk) 00:03, 30 June 2015 (UTC)

I am saying that the Court's "decision" (using that term in a broad sense) in Pollock to rule the entire statute unconstitutional (because of the lack of severability) would not be viewed by many legal scholars as one of the Court's decisions in the narrowest sense of that term for purposes of the doctrine of stare decisis. Famspear (talk) 00:46, 30 June 2015 (UTC)

PS: I still want to get back to you on Hylton and why some legal scholars view Pollock as having overruled Hylton. I haven't forgotten about that. Stay tuned. Famspear (talk) 00:54, 30 June 2015 (UTC)

I think we are really splitting hairs at this point. We could continue to go back and forth on this issue, but if you recall this discussion began when I stated one of the Court’s “decisions” was that taxes on personal property are direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution. You disagreed because you said the Court’s statement was obiter dictum. However, even the dissenting justices in Pollock accepted this as one of the Court’s “decisions.” Of course I realize that dissenting opinions are non-binding, but they do give us an insight into the justices’ understanding of the majority decision. For example, Justice Harlan wrote the following: “But the court, by its judgment just rendered, goes far in advance, not only of its former decisions, but of any decision heretofore rendered by an American court. Adhering to what was heretofore adjudged in these cases in respect of the taxation of income arising from real estate, it now adjudges, upon the same grounds on which it proceeds in reference to real estate and the income derived therefrom, that a tax 'on personal property,' or on the yield or income of personal property, or on capital in personalty held for the purpose of income, or ordinarily yielding income, and on the income therefrom, or on the income from 'invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds,' is a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, which cannot be imposed by congress unless it be apportioned among the states on the basis of population.”

“In its practical operation this decision withdraws from national taxation not only all incomes derived from real estate, but tangible personal property, 'invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds,' and the income that may be derived from such property. This results from the fact that, by the decision of the court, all such personal property and all incomes from real estate and personal property are placed beyond national taxation otherwise than by apportionment among the states on the basis simply of population. No such apportionment can possibly be made without doing gross injustice to the many for the benefit of the favored few in particular states. Any attempt upon the part of congress to apportion among the states, upon the basis simply of their population, taxation of personal property or of incomes, would tend to arouse such indignation among the freemen of America that it would never be repeated. When, therefore, this court adjudges, as it does now adjudge, that congress cannot impose a duty or tax upon personal property, or upon income arising either from rents of real estate or from personal property, including invested personal property, bonds, stocks, and investments of all kinds, except by apportioning the sum to be so raised among the states according to population, it practically decides that, without an amendment of the constitution,-two-thirds of both houses of congress and three- fourths of the states concurring,-such property and incomes can never be made to contribute to the support of the national government.”

“And it is now the law, as this day declared, that under the constitution, however urgent may be the needs of the government, however sorely the administration in power may be pressed to meet the moneyed obligations of the nation, congress cannot tax the personal property of the country, nor the income arising either from real estate or from invested personal property, except by a tax apportioned among the states, on the basis of their population, while it may compel the merchant, the artisan, the workman, the artist, the author, the lawyer, the physician, even the minister of the Gospel, no one of whom happens to own real estate, invested personal property, stocks, or bonds, to contribute directly from their respective earnings, gains, and profits, and under the rule of uniformity or equality, for the support of the government.”

“If anyone has questioned the correctness of that view of the decision rendered on the original hearing, it ought not again to be questioned, now that this court has included in the constitutional exemption from the rule of uniformity the personal property of the country and incomes derived from invested personal property.”

"But the serious aspect of the present decision is that, by a new interpretation of the constitution, it so ties the hands of the legislative branch of the government, that without an amendment of that instrument, or unless this court, at some future time, should return to the old theory of the constitution, congress cannot subject to taxation - however great the needs or pressing the necessities of the government - either the invested personal property of the country, bonds, stocks, and investments of all kinds, or the income arising from the renting of real estate or from the yield of personal property, except by the grossly unequal and unjust rule of apportionment among the states."

And then Justice Jackson had this to say:

"The decision of the court, holding the income tax law of August, 1894, void, is based upon the following propositions: First. That a tax upon real and personal property is a direct tax within the meaning of the constitution, and, as such, in order to be valid, must be apportioned among the several states according to their respective populations. Second. That the incomes derived or realized from such property are an inseparable incident thereof, and so far partake of the nature of the property out of which they arise as to stand upon the same footing as the property itself. From these premises the conclusion is reached that a tax on incomes arising from both real and personal property is a 'direct tax,' and subject to the same rule of apportionment as a tax laid directly on the property itself, and not being so imposed by the act of 1894, according to the rule of numbers, is unconstitutional and void. Third. That the invalidity of the tax on incomes from real and personal property being established, the remaining portions of the income tax law are also void, notwithstanding the fact that such remaining portions clearly come within the class of taxes designated as duties or excises, in respect to which the rule of apportionment has no application, but which are controlled and regulated by the rule of uniformity.

And from Justice White:

"The court, in its present opinion, considers that the constitution requires it to extend the former ruling yet further, and holds that the inclusion of revenue from personal property in an income subjected to taxation amounts to imposing a direct tax on the personal property, which is also void, unless apportioned. As a tax on income from real and personal property is declared to be unconstitutional, unless apportioned, because it is equivalent to a direct tax on such property, it follows that the decision now rendered holds, not only that the rule of apportionment must be applied to an income tax, but also that no tax, whether direct or indirect, on either real and personal property, or investments, can be levied, unless by apportionment. Everything said in the dissent from the previous decision applies to the ruling now announced, which, I think, aggravates and accentuates the court's departure from the settled construction of the constitution.”

"To destroy the fixed interpretation of the constitution, by which the rule of apportionment according to population is confined to direct taxes on real estate so as to make that rule include indirect taxes on real estate and taxes, whether direct or indirect, on invested personal property, stocks, bonds, etc., reads into the constitution the most flagrantly unjust, unequal, and wrongful system of taxation known to any civilized government."

"Hence, the decision now rendered, so far as taxing real and personal property and invested wealth is concerned, reduces the government of the United States to the paralyzed condition which existed under the Confederation, and to remove which the constitution of the United States was adopted.”

Obviously, based on these quotes, the dissenting justices interpreted the majority decision as "ruling" that taxes on personal property are direct taxes. As always, I look forward to your comments. Fireatsea (talk) 01:35, 30 June 2015 (UTC)

I haven't forgotten about our discussion here. I'm mostly tied up with other stuff, but I intend to get back to this! Yours, Famspear (talk) 14:07, 10 July 2015 (UTC)

Famspear, let me know when you are ready to resume this discussion. Fireatsea (talk) 22:58, 14 September 2015 (UTC)

Yes, I have skimmed the discussion and I'm thinking that the first choice would be to find a secondary source (such as a scholarly article) that says "the Court in Pollock ruled this" or "the Court in Pollock ruled that" -- but make clear that it is the secondary source that is making that claim, not Wikipedia itself. Also, the mere fact that I, as an editor, disagree with a particular source's conclusion about what the ruling(s) of the Pollock Court was/were is not determinative. As long as the source is reliable, etc., it could be used.

If you use the text of the dissent as the source -- as in "Justice [name], in his dissent, stated that the Court had ruled [fill in the blank]", that method might also work. It is possible that other editors might object to the use of the dissent in this way. But, I think that this approach might work as long as you make clear that it is the dissenting justice that is claiming that the Court ruled such and such a thing, and not Wikipedia itself.

One might even argue that using the text of a dissent to characterize what the Court ruled is an acceptable use of a secondary source, since the text of the dissent technically is not part of the text of the actual opinion of the Court. Again, another editor might or might not agree. Famspear (talk) 01:11, 15 September 2015 (UTC)

OK I propose the following initial edit: "The Court's interpretation of federal taxes on personal property as 'indirect taxes' lasted until the 1895 case of Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. Writing for the majority in Pollock, Justice Fuller explained, 'We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes.' The Congressional Research Service lists the Hylton decision as having been overruled by the Pollock decision." Fireatsea (talk) 01:54, 15 September 2015 (UTC)

Yes, that looks good. Famspear (talk) 16:45, 15 September 2015 (UTC)

Great, I made the change. But now I would like to remove the sentence about the 16th Amendment, because this amendment has no relevance to taxes on personal property and will only cause confusion in the article. Please let me know your thoughts. Fireatsea (talk) 22:12, 15 September 2015 (UTC)

The Sixteenth Amendment is relevant to taxes on personal property. Remember, in Pollock, the Court ruled that a tax on income from personal property (a tax on dividend income and interest income, for example) was to be treated as a tax on the property itself for purposes of the apportionment requirement. In other words, an income tax on dividend income and interest income was to be treated as a direct tax and was therefore required to be apportioned. Under Pollock, the source of the income had to be considered to determine whether apportionment was required. The Sixteenth Amendment overruled Pollock by removing the apportionment requirement for any income tax -- no matter what the source of the income is.

If you're going to delve into Pollock in an article on Hylton, then you should make clear that Pollock itself was subsequently overruled -- by the Sixteenth Amendment. Famspear (talk) 02:41, 16 September 2015 (UTC)

The Sixteenth Amendment did not change anything with regard to taxes on personal property. We know this because of Justice White's explanation in Brushaber: "[T]he Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution[.]" (emphasis added) Fireatsea (talk) 18:02, 16 September 2015 (UTC)

In American law, the term "personal property" often means property other than real estate, although the term can have other legal meanings. So, to be clear, let's be specific. When you say that the Amendment did not "change" anything with respect to "taxes on personal property", are you referring to (A) taxes on real estate by reason of its ownership (such as an ad valorem property tax), or (B) taxes on non-real estate by reason of its ownership (such as an ad valorem tax on equipment), or (C) taxes on dividend income, or (D) taxes on interest income, or (E) taxes on rent income from real estate, or (F) taxes on rent income from non-real estate? Are you referring to just one or two of these categories, or to all of these categories? Which specific categories of taxes (A, B, C, D, E, F) are you saying the Sixteenth Amendment did not "change"? Famspear (talk) 18:39, 16 September 2015 (UTC)

The Pollock decision differentiates between real estate and personal property (which simple logic dictates must be non-real estate), therefore I am referring to category B. Fireatsea (talk) 20:41, 16 September 2015 (UTC)

Famspear, let me know when you are ready to resume this discussion. Fireatsea (talk) 00:07, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

Thanks. Yes, I got diverted to the real world for awhile. Yes, I think your suggestion might work with this wording:

"The Hylton decision was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Pollock case [insert the applicable citation to the secondary source mentioned earlier], which in turn was overruled on other grounds by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment [insert a citation here as well, such as the citation to Bittker, etc.]."

If we use something like that language, we're making clear that Hylton has indeed been cited by a reliable secondary source as having been overruled, but we aren't leaving a false impression. We're making it clear that Pollock has also been overruled. The "on other grounds" language is pretty standard in legal citations where you want to make it clear that the cited case was later overruled -- but not overruled on the grounds that are relevant to the specific point you are discussing.

The Hylton conclusion -- that a tax on ownership of personal property (ownership of non real estate) was an indirect tax -- was rejected in Pollock. The Pollock Court concluded that such a tax was a direct tax, and then (moving to the actual issues litigated and decided in the case) held that a tax on income from personal property (and on income from real estate as well) should be treated as a direct tax for purposes of the apportionment requirement. The Sixteenth Amendment did not overturn the Pollock conclusion that a tax on ownership of personal property was a direct tax. The Sixteenth Amendment simply removed any requirement for apportionment in the case of any federal income tax -- regardless of the source of the income. This means that whether a federal income tax is deemed to be a "direct" tax or an "excise" (indirect tax), the tax is not required to be apportioned. Famspear (talk) 00:52, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

Something like this:

"The Hylton decision was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Pollock case [footnote: Senate Document # 108-17, 108th Congress, Second Session, "Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision," in The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, at page 2388, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, U.S. Gov't Printing Office (2004).], which in turn was overruled on other grounds by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment [footnote: William D. Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation, p. 2, Little, Brown and Company (3d ed. 1985); Calvin H. Johnson, "The Constitutional Meaning of 'Apportionment of Direct Taxes'", 80 Tax Notes 591 (Aug. 3, 1998); Sheldon D. Pollack, "Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894-1913," 66 Tax Lawyer 295, 323-324, Winter 2013 (Amer. Bar Ass'n).].

--with applicable coding to put in footnote form, of course. Famspear (talk) 01:03, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

My suggestion was to remove any reference to the Sixteenth Amendment because it might cause confusion, but I think it could work if it read something like this:

"In 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to modify certain portions of the Pollock decision relating to taxes on income from real estate and personal property, but the Amendment did not address taxes on personal property itself. Writing for the majority in the 1916 case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Chief Justice White explained, '[T]he Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution[.]'” Fireatsea (talk) 00:35, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

I would suggest wording it this way:

"In 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, overruling the Pollock decisions relating to taxes on income from real estate and personal property. The Amendment did not address taxes on personal property itself. Writing for the majority in the 1916 case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Chief Justice White explained, '[T]he Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution[.]'”

This makes clear that the Amendment did more than "modify" the decisions on taxes on income. The Amendment overruled those decisions. Famspear (talk) 01:14, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

Yes, that looks good. I will add it to the article with citation to Brushaber. Fireatsea (talk) 16:40, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

The first paragraph of this article is a bit awkward. I propose some minor changes as follows, let me know if you approve:

Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), is an early United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a yearly tax on carriages[1] did not violate the Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Clause 9 requirements for the apportioning of direct taxes. The Court concluded that the carriage tax was a form of indirect tax known as an excise (not requiring apportionment), instead of a direct tax requiring apportionment among the states by population. The Court noted that a tax on land was an example of a direct tax contemplated by the Constitution. Fireatsea (talk) 01:08, 30 September 2015 (UTC)

Looks OK to me. Famspear (talk) 01:34, 1 October 2015 (UTC)

In the section entitled "Opinion of the Court" there is a paragraph about Alexander Hamilton's oral argument. It doesn't really belong in this section, therefore I propose moving it to a new section entitled "Oral Arguments" or something to that effect. Let me know if this change is acceptable. Fireatsea (talk) 23:35, 5 November 2015 (UTC)

Yes, the material could be re-organized, in the order and in the headings. The three paragraphs are actually talking about three different things. How about this:

Oral argument

Alexander Hamilton argued before court on behalf of the government, claiming that the tax was a valid use of the power of Congress. Justice James Iredell wrote, two days after the event: "Mr. Hamilton spoke in our Court, attended by the most crowded audience I ever saw there, both Houses of Congress being almost deserted on the occasion. Though he was in very ill health, he spoke with astonishing ability, and in a most pleasing manner, and was listened to with the profoundest attention. His speech lasted about three hours."

Opinion of the Court

The Justices at the time, rather than issuing a single opinion of the Court, instead issued seriatim opinions, with each writing separately and reading his own analysis in turn. The Court's interpretation of federal taxes on personal property as "indirect taxes" lasted until the 1895 case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. Writing for the majority in Pollock, Chief Justice Fuller explained, "We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes." The Congressional Research Service lists the Hylton decision as having been overruled by the Pollock decision. Senate Document # 108-17, 108th Congress, Second Session, "Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision," in The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, at page 2388, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, U.S. Gov't Printing Office (2004).

Subsequent history

In 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, overruling the Pollock decisions relating to taxes on income from real estate and personal property. The Amendment did not address taxes on personal property itself. Writing for the majority in the 1916 case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Chief Justice White explained, "[T]he Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution[.]'”

What do you think? Famspear (talk) 01:57, 6 November 2015 (UTC)

Looks good to me, I think that makes a lot more sense. Fireatsea (talk) 22:28, 6 November 2015 (UTC)

OK, I made the change.... Famspear (talk) 23:42, 6 November 2015 (UTC)

The section entitled "Use as precedent" contains a lengthy quotation from Justice Chase's seriatim opinion. I propose moving that quote to the "Opinion of the Court" section. Fireatsea (talk) 19:29, 1 December 2015 (UTC)

In just glancing at the quotes (in the "Use as precedent" section, I'm thinking that perhaps the quotes don't really go very well in either the "opinion" section or the "use as precedent" section. The quotes don't go so well the "opinion" section, to the extent that putting them there could incorrectly imply that these were opinions of the Court as a whole (which apparently they were not). And, the quotes are probably not really part of the holding or holdings of the Court either, so they're not really judicial precedent. (Indeed, many of the statements of the law in many court opinions are not part of the actual holding or holdings of the case, but are instead non-binding dicta.) Maybe the quotes in the "Use as precedent" section should be moved to a new, completely separate section, with a different heading. I'll give this a second look, hopefully later today. Famspear (talk) 20:22, 1 December 2015 (UTC)

OK, how about a section entitled "Obiter Dicta" or "Comments of the Court"? Fireatsea (talk) 20:49, 3 December 2015 (UTC)

Yes, I agree that "Comments of the Court" should work, or perhaps "Other comments by the Court". Famspear (talk) 04:15, 4 December 2015 (UTC)

I added "Other comments by the Court" and moved Justice Chase's quotes into that section. Fireatsea (talk) 19:20, 4 December 2015 (UTC)

In order to flesh out the "Opinion of the Court" section, I propose the following additions:

Justice Chase wrote, “As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax…I am for affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court.” Justice Paterson wrote, “All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax.” And Justice Iredell wrote, “I am clearly of opinion this is not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, and therefore that the judgment ought to be affirmed.” Fireatsea (talk) 23:45, 4 December 2015 (UTC)

I would say it would work better in the "Other comments" section. Famspear (talk) 02:08, 14 December 2015 (UTC)

I disagree. The actual holding of the Court was an affirmation of the judgment of the Circuit Court and a simultaneous rejection of the plaintiff’s contention that the tax in question was direct. I think these quotes perfectly delineate the holding, and therefore they belong in the “Opinion of the Court” section rather than “Other comments by the Court.” As always I welcome your comments. Fireatsea (talk) 02:11, 15 December 2015 (UTC)

The problem is that the quotes you have provided are not the "Opinion of the Court." They are instead statements from separate opinions of various Justices. Generally, for an opinion to be considered an opinion of the Court itself, at least a majority of the justices have to have joined in that specific opinion. There is a difference between having a majority agree on a holding and a majority joining in a specific opinion.

The holding of the Court was indeed that the tax on carriages imposed by the Act of Congress of June 5, 1794 was constitutional as an indirect tax. THAT is the holding that a majority of the justices agreed on. However, each justice issued a separate opinion. So, essentially there was one holding and several separate opinions.

One way to approach this might be to go ahead and include the quotes you want to add in the section on "Opinion of the Court," but change the heading of that section to read something like "Separate opinions of the Court". Famspear (talk) 02:42, 15 December 2015 (UTC)

PS: I should have caught the problem with the heading "Opinion of the Court" a long time ago. I haven't had much time to focus on this article, lately, or even on Wikipedia lately, nearly as much as I used to do. Famspear (talk) 04:29, 15 December 2015 (UTC)

Yes, that is a very good distinction between the holding and the opinions. In order to be precise, perhaps the heading should be "Seriatim opinions of the Court." Fireatsea (talk) 20:13, 15 December 2015 (UTC)

Agreed. Famspear (talk) 21:03, 15 December 2015 (UTC)

OK I made the change to the section header and added the quotes. I also made a few grammatical changes to other sections, but did not materially change the content. Fireatsea (talk) 23:41, 15 December 2015 (UTC)

I propose moving the second paragraph of the "Seriatim opinions of the Court" section to the "Subsequent history" section. It would make more sense there. Fireatsea (talk) 02:27, 20 January 2016 (UTC)

I agree. Famspear (talk) 23:22, 20 January 2016 (UTC)

References

Hylton as a breach of case or controversy with background

Is is not worth giving some background on the case? I remember my constitutional interpretation professor making a big deal about Hamilton and Hylton essentially making this whole case up just to prove that the government could impose a tax on income.

https://books.google.com/books?id=DzcMCAAAQBAJ&lpg=PT116&ots=-WlrD_0q6E&dq=supreme%20court%20hylton%20case%20or%20controversy&pg=PT116#v=onepage&q=supreme%20court%20hylton%20case%20or%20controversy&f=false

Sorry I can't find a more broadly accessible source than this Google Books link. I'm reluctant to write this up myself as I'm no legal scholar and haven't done any writing for Wikipedia before. No sense of what the conventions are. Volfied (talk) 03:51, 20 November 2016 (UTC)

That is very interesting, I didn't know about the behind-the-scenes machinations of this case. I think it would be worthwhile to add this background to the article. Unfortunately I don't have much time to devote to Wikipedia but I'd be happy to review any new contributions before publishing. Fireatsea (talk) 18:24, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

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