Talk:Heavy fighter/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Fighter Armament Limits in Early WWII

Sorry for another long post here by talk page standards, but there is an important issue to present on the strategic thinking and the particular specs and numbers of the world militaries on fighter armaments leading into and early in WWII. These limits around the world are very similar between fighters that are declared as purpose designed “lightweights” in some nations, and other aircraft that might be called “just fighters” in other nations, but which lead to them all being similar in configuration, weight, performance, and cost. Strategically, it results in them all being the same concept, which often then and now are referred to as “lightweight” fighters.

In the United States there was a strict weight limit imposed on armament loads by explicit regulation. This armament weight limit (500 lbs for guns and ammo) and single engine only requirement imposed by regulation on the American fighter developments of the late 1930’s seem to have effectively forced ALL new fighter/pursuit developments to be lightweight fighters. It is described in the P-38 book by Warren Bodie on page 14, but the rationale behind it is not given there. To get around this weight limit is why Ben Kelsey (fighter projects lead officer) and his colleagues in the USAAC invented the term “interceptor” in the proposals that led to the P-38 and P-39. I have searched and been so far unable to find the exact text of this regulation, who wrote it, and what its explained rationale was. If anyone has more extensive referencing on this it would be appreciated if they would point it out.

The gun limits of this weight limit are revealed by a little arithmetic, and they are easily shown to be very similar to the deliberate “lightweight fighter” designs of other nations.

The U.S. Browning 30 machine gun (also used by England with the British 0.303) weighed about 31 lbs. The 30.06 round weighs 0.96 oz, with linking (15%) 1.1 oz/round = 0.069 lb/round. Per gun weight with 500 rounds then 31 + 500(0.069) = 66 lbs. Allowing 20% for aircraft supporting structure imposes 13 lbs more weight per gun, so about 80 lbs per gun. The 500 lb limit in an all 30 cal weapons suite would be 6 guns.

The American Browning 50 cal MG is ~65 lbs. One round ~ 4.2oz, with linking (15%) ~ 4.83oz per round = 0.302lb/round. 800 rounds/min = 13.33 rounds/sec. 380 rounds => 28.5 sec of fire. One MG + 380 rounds (P-51 inner guns) ~ 65 + 380(0.301) = 180 lbs. Allowing 20% more weight for mounting structure is 36 lbs, so about 216 lbs per gun. The 500 lb weapon weight limit with more generous ammo loads means two 50 cals, with the ability to go a little more than the 380 rounds used in the P-51. One MG + 235 rounds (P-40) ~ 65 + 235(0.301 lbs) = 136 lbs. Add 20% more for structure (27lbs), and total per gun weight is 163 lbs. This lighter ammo load could allow three 50 cals, one in each wing and one centered and firing through the prop.

A mixed armament of two 50 cals (235 rounds) and two 30 cals (500 rounds) would weigh about 486 lbs, coming in just under the 500 lb limit. This is in fact the armament load used in the P-40B and in some C models. It was a smart armament load, with the heavier 50’s firing through the prop and the lighter 30’s close inboard in the wings, to minimize the angular inertia of this total weight and allow faster initiation of turn. Fighter project officer Ben Kelsey (Bodie, p. 14) describes the 500 lb weight limit as only allowing one 50 and one 30, but that seems be an error (it could only be true if the spec includes structural weight to carry the guns, which I am not sure of, and then if my estimated 20% weight bump for structure is way off). And, that armament load of two 50’s and two 30’s was approved for the P-40 in the late 1930’s when the 500 lb limit was in effect.

In the Battle of Britain, the chief German fighter was the Bf 109E with either four 30 cal MG’s or two 30 cal MG’s and two 20mm cannons. The Bf 109F that came just after mostly went with two 30 cal MG’s (prop arc mounted) and one improved high velocity 20mm cannon firing through the prop shaft. 20 mm high velocity (2600 to 2800 feet per second) weapons of that era weighed about 100 lbs, with the ammo weight being about 65 lbs per 100 rounds. With efficient structure, about 200lbs per cannon and 120 lbs per gun (they used 1000 rounds per MG). So, a one cannon and two MG armament on what its designers considered a lightweight fighter was about 440 lbs, very similar in weight to the American design specs of the time.

The Spitfire and Hurricane featured eight 30 cal MG’s, with the Spitfire featuring 350 rounds per gun. That would an approximate all up weight of about 530 lbs, again very close to the American spec. But, we note that the P-40 load of two 50’s and two 30’s threw about a 30% greater weight of fire for about 90% the weapon system weight, with more rounds per gun.

In Japan on the Zero they went with two 20mm cannon and two 30 cal MG’s. But, they used a relatively low velocity (2000 fps) and lightweight cannon that only weighed 51 lbs and carried only 60 rounds per cannon. With structure, that’s about 110 lbs per cannon. Their 30 cal MG’s carried 500 rounds, about 80 lbs per MG. So, that weapons load is about 380 lbs.

The German, Japanese, and Russian fighter designers specifically considered their design task as developing lightweight fighters. The U.S. regulations in effect seem to have forced their designers to only develop lightweight fighters leading into WWII, which may be the genesis of these lightweight fighters being considered as “just fighters”. I have yet to find direct designer or specifier statements on the lightweight fighter concept by WWII English designers and specifiers, but they did end up designing fighters that were fundamentally similar in configuration, performance, weight, cost, and weapons load. The American restriction to fighters with single engines and no more than 500 lbs of armament had the same result. Strategically, it seems they were all on the light fighter bandwagon, no matter what semantics were used or not used. PhaseAcer (talk) 21:59, 26 January 2020 (UTC)

A few quick thoughts. Engine power is the initial limit on speed vs armament capacity. The British had decided to switch to 20mm cannon in the 1930s jumping past 0.5, hence the specification that led to the Whirlwind. Eight 0.303 guns in the wing of a Hurricane or Spitfire was about the physical limit, though 12-gun Hurricanes flew. The US wanted to move to cannon but never got reliable guns produced. The 0.50 Browning was heavier and slower firing than similar Soviet and Japanese designs. Cannon are also more effective than HMGs due to to explosive ammunition, and MGs are more effective if you up the numbers of incendiary rounds in the mix. GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:04, 27 January 2020 (UTC)

I realize the guns are a pretty detailed subject. To get better data I have a copy of the seemingly well regarded book "Flying Guns of WWII" on order (about $50). The first book in this 3 book series, "Flying Guns of WW1" (which covers to 1932) is available as a free pdf download from "gen.lib.rus.ec". It seems like about 1/3 of the older titles are scanned in there. The user interface is old and primitive, but it saves buying some books. You search, click on a title, click again on that title at the top of the next page, and then click "Get". At that point it gives no indication that it is doing anything. Wait a minute or two, and it will pop up a window asking if you want to save or open in Adobe. I always select open in Adobe. It then just sits there giving you no indication of action, but it is working on the download. Usually 5 to 15 minutes later, the Adobe pdf file will pop up.

The first point of the above posting was to see if someone has a reference on that 500 lbs of loaded weapons American regulation, who wrote it and why. But, the second point was really to show that the fighters going into WWII were very consistent in their weapons weight, all around 400 to 500 lbs, all around 10% to 12% of their empty weight. This is simply part of the fact that they are also consistent in configuration. The "standard" fighter form emerged as an efficient (lightweight), monocoque single engine single seat monoplane, retractable gear, with variable pitch prop, more commonly with inline V-12 as that allowed about 5% higher speed compared to a radial, and with water/alcohol injection coming in right at the end of the war for temporary use. Binkster is correct that the configuration is "standard", but it is also "lightweight" according to many of the designers of the era, and also according to the strategic definition of "lightweight" today. At any point on the drag curve, these are the practical lightweights. Any fighter much lighter than these at a similar point on the drag curve, such as the emergency very light interceptors, is sacrificing some combination of load factors, weapons, and pilot protection. Physics forces it to be that way, and the designers understand the physics.

What is sometimes missed, with negative combat results, is the necessary weapons and features specification needed to be a highly efficient fighting aircraft, and to make best use of budget, and thus to have a numbers advantage. Specify too heavy of a weapons load, and the fighter has to become twin engined. Then it loses the surprise advantage (much easier to see), only delivers half the aircraft for the same budget, has lower range on the same fuel fraction, and has heavy engines out on moment arms that slow its agility. It's a lot better to have half the weapons load and be on the six o'clock position doing the shooting, than to have twice the weapons with a small fighter on your tail who with a few extra bursts from his lighter weapons load can still easily bring you down. That is the most important point on the subject, so should be emphasized in the light and heavy fighter articles. PhaseAcer (talk) 16:46, 27 January 2020 (UTC)

"gen.lib.rus.ec". is Library Genesis - copyright status of sources via that is questionable. You'll excuse me if I don't avail myself of the suggestion to use it.GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:02, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

A thought that may help in your investigations - the limit on amount of armament carried might have been an attempt to limit the size of aircraft. The British imposed an arbitrary 100ft wingspan limit on the specification that led to the Short Stirling in order to keep overall aircraft size down. GraemeLeggett (talk) 16:59, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

Here you are again evaluating various factors yourself in ways that the authors don't, another violation of WP:No original research. You imply here that author Warren Bodie said anything about a light fighter mentality. Nope, not at all. He was referring to a mentality that was straight from the Bomber Mafia: lots of big bombers for America, huge emphasis on big bombers. Anything that wasn't big bombers was of secondary importance or worse.

The light fighter debate started in 1952.[1] Anything you wish to write about the light/heavy debate must stem from the 1952 debate. Everything before that is simply aircraft designers doing what they do best, which is of course optimizing for a few selected factors such as speed, mass, armament, backward compatibility, economy, etc. Binksternet (talk) 01:36, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

Binkster, thanks for the 1952 reference. But, I have to note again that calculation and interpretation are fine on the TALK page. I am not proposing to put anything in the articles that is not directly referenced. And, later analysis of earlier situations by later literature based on greater knowledge is also fine according to policy.

I have just finished reading "Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter" by its chief designer Jiro Horikoshi. He describes all the advantages of lightweight fighers with respect to the Zero, except the detection range as a function of size. He specifically points to the Zero lightweight design as crucial for best use of resources in resource starved Japan, and that it provided better quality via superior maneuverability (a modern lightweight fighter position). The Bf 109 design team understanding was the same. The P-51 design team was also the same, as given by direct statements by chief designer Ed Schmued and their very deliberate attempts to further reduce the P-51 weight. The USAAC directly approved and funded this effort (Hap Arnold). Same thing with the Bearcat. Bubble canopies and surprise training shows their understanding of the surprise issue in general. The emergency fighter programs for very lightweight fighters also shows understanding of the issue. It is all there with the single exception of visual detection range as a function of size, which MAY not have have been scientifically studied until the 1960's (I am still looking for earlier references).

It may be that good lightweight understanding before WWII within the USAAC was the REASON for the 500 lb weapons and ammo weight limit. Whether clearly understood or not, that limit FORCES nothing but fighters with almost identical armament loads to other purpose designed lightweight fighters, with the result that American designs also end up being lightweight fighters. I am trying to find how that regulation came into being so that can be brought out. I am not misinterpreting Bodie and Kelsey either. Kelsey tells Bodie in interviews that they dreamed up the "interceptor" designation just to get around the 500lb weapon weight limit for fighters (he wanted 1000 lbs--a real heavy fighter proponent). His statement that this weight limited armament to a single 30 and a single 50 (page 14) is what prompted me to go get the weight numbers and add them up. Even when I add 20% weight overhead for mounting structure, I find the 500 lb weight limit allows for two 50's and two 30's. I am now wondering if the one 50 and one 30 claim made by Kelsey was just part of his campaign to get approval for those "interceptor" proposals and get the P-38 funded. The only way it is possible for that one 30, one 50 claim to be true is if the 500 lbs is not just weapons, ammo, and direct structure, but also general weight growth throughout the aircraft to carry the weapons (more engine power to carry the load, more structure for high g maneuvering with the load, more structure for more fuel, more wing, heavier landing gear, etc). I doubt that is the case, as is not directly or easily specified, whereas weight of guns and ammo is easy to express. We also have the data point that early P-40's, presumbly subject to that regulation, in fact were sometimes armed with two 50's and two 30's that with 20% overhead come in just under 500 lbs.

I have never understood the allergic reaction to the term "lightweight fighter", but you certainly seem to exemplify that reaction to a very simple term. You won't even provide your own interpretation of the term, so that we can understand what you mean. It is not a vampire that needs to be staked through the heart--it just means getting in the ballpark of the most efficient fighter design for the mainstream air to air mission. I realize it is not the very best term, but since it is the term adopted by the military and industry, why get all worked up over it? You understand that as Wikipedia editors we are supposed to weight the issues appropriately. There is no issue more weighty in fighter history and design than the fact that the literature and the combat record report that efficient single engine "lightweights" usually excel "heavy" twin engine fighters for most missions for half the price. If you were limited to telling Wikipedia readers the single most important fact about fighter planes, that is the fact. So, instead of obscuring that fact by all kinds of strenuous gymnastic arguments and semantic objections, we should just be coming right out with it. It is the simple truth, it is vitally important, it is interesting, and it is what the literature says. Why fight such a "blue sky obvious" truth that is backed by a truckload of literature? PhaseAcer (talk) 05:06, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

You are misinterpreting the source. Jiro Horikoshi was not making a "light fighter" aircraft. The Zero was light because he was optimizing for range, speed, maneuverability, armament and economy in a Navy carrier fighter. Yes, of course those factors are crucially important to the post-1952 debate about light versus heavy fighters, but the debate did not start in the 1930s in Japan. Anybody from any country who was optimizing for those factors during WWII was doing so because it was smart business, not because there was a debate between the light guys and the heavy guys. Binksternet (talk) 14:45, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

For the purpose of reporting light and heavy issues both now as well as modern histortical interpretation, it would not matter just how much WWII debate between light and heavy there was. But in fact, there was huge debate before and during WWII--there have always been lightweight proponents and heavyweight proponents. Bf 109 vs Bf 110 (Goring called his promotion of the Bf 110 his biggest mistake), Zero vs. J1N1 Irving, Mustang vs. P-38 (big issue with giant impact on the ETO air war), Spitfire vs. Beaufighter (from the Wikipedia Spitfire article: "As a result of the delays in getting the Spitfire into full production, the Air Ministry put forward a plan that its production be stopped after the initial order for 310, after which Supermarine would build Bristol Beaufighters."). Not everybody called them light and heavy either then or now, but it makes no difference in modern practical and strategic interpretation if they are called that, or efficient singles and heavily armed twins, or just fighters and heavy fighters, or small and large, or little gun kites and big gun flying carpets. Terms change over time and are colloquially used differently even in the same era--nobody considers themselves obligated to use precise and complete terms at any time. Therefore, we should not let the exact terms get in the way of a fundamentally sound presentation on what is a critically important military issue. PhaseAcer (talk) 18:10, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

No, there was no "huge debate" in the 1930s or 1940s, not anywhere in the world. The Germans decided to emphasize larger fighters because it seemed like a good idea to some of the decision makers, less so to others who argued against it but didn't win their argument. It wasn't a Huge Debate. Nor was it a "huge debate" when the P-51 started taking the most of the jobs away from the P-38 in the ETO. The P-38 was suffering from low pilot morale and various technical problems such as poor avgas formulations, so it was with pleasure that squadrons and wings replaced it with the P-51. Nobody was debating that change. So please stop putting your own spin on historical settings, it's wrong and it's not going to work here. Binksternet (talk) 02:24, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

It might help for you to review pages 69-80 of "The Development of the P-51 Mustang Long-Range Escort Fighter". Here several memoes on this struggle between USAAF generals are reprinted. USAAF Material Command commanding general Oliver Echols was a staunch opponent of the P-51, favoring the P-38 and P-47 (p. 80). He and others did not grasp the significant results of the Battle of Britain where the bomber most certainly did not get through enough, and where the heavy Bf 110 was shot to pieces by the English light fighters. From https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-nazi-germanys-destroyer-bomber-bf-110-bomber-failed-miserably-67927, "The Luftwaffe began the Battle of Britain with 237 Bf 110s—and lost 223." Also, "The arrival of the Mustang also announced the bankruptcy of the heavy World War II fighter. American aircraft design genius (and in the Mustang's case, a British engine) created a fighter with speed, maneuverability and range. It lacked the armament of a Bf 110, but so what? A Mustang was much more likely to be blazing away at a Bf 110's tail rather than the other way around." I've mentioned earlier about the light fighters lighter armament not being much of a handicap when they far more often are the ones able to get in position to do the shooting. That is Zero designer Jiro Horikoshi's argument also. It seems the only job in WWII where the heavy fighter handicaps were outweighed by its heavy firepower and its ability to carry the short range air to air radar of the time benefits was as a night fighter acting against bombers flying straight and level. That is because that is the only scenario where it could attain a suprise advantage and not be out-maneuvered.

I am replying on this point only because you keep bringing up this issue of how well the issues were understood in WWII. The literature shows the issues were understood pretty well, and what little was not understood actually does not matter much to the presentation of heavy and light fighter relative virtues. The combat record matters a LOT, but you have blocked presentation of the combat record. The fighter effectiveness criteria matters a LOT, but that is not presented here either. The definition of light and heavy and their relative costs matter a LOT, but you will not say what your interpretation of those are. Lightweight and heavyweight in the modern era is HUGE, and that also is not covered. Instead you continue to focus on the trivial issue just how perfectly the issues were understood and argued within WWII. In the larger scope of this article and given what the references show, that has little more relevance at this point than General Echol's favorite color. PhaseAcer (talk) 18:35, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

You keep trying to synthesize your favorite conclusion by bringing together different facts from different sources to prove your point. That's not going to happen. As well, you continually read more into the sources than they say.

The above-linked story by nationalinterest.org doesn't mention a "huge debate" about the German heavy fighter concept. Instead, it talks about how the concept didn't work as expected for the Germans. The author limits his scope to British and German heavy fighters, not mentioning the American P-38. So we don't know whether he considers the P-38 a heavy fighter at all, and we cannot include the P-38 in his statement about "the bankruptcy of the heavy World War II fighter."

A few memos from Echols is not a "huge debate" about light versus heavy fighters. Binksternet (talk) 19:25, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

In the Battle of Britain, Germany lost 94% of the Bf 110 force that it considered the elite of its fighter force and that it committed its best pilots to, while the Bf 109 traded about equally. Do you think there was not some debate in Germany after that war losing debacle?

You need to be more fair about who you acuse of synthesizing. I am the guy who is bringing over 40 references, and puts nothing in the articles without strict referencing. You are the guy who had 3 references in this article for years, one devoted to the Bf 110, one general survey book on aircraft from 1919 to 1945, and one a 1932 newspaper article. With zero jet age references you went along with the false statements saying that the term "heavy fighter" was no longer in use, and that light vs heavy no longer mattered, in complete defiance of the mountain of literature on this subject of critical current importance. Where did those amazingly false statements come from unless they were synthesized out of thin air? Where was your criticism and "That's not going to happen" then? Where were your declarations of idiotic claims then? If you want a good article here, you need to start going with the references and not with that kind of imaginary presentation. PhaseAcer (talk) 20:48, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

Whatever amount of light v. heavy debate happening in Germany in 1940 should be solidly referenced, not imagined or supposed.

I make no apology for the poor state of this article, which never received my full attention. I made some small changes over the years, nothing big, because I saw that the biggest problem was intractable, that the sources conflict with each other. My recent involvement stems from me following you here, because you had been disrupting related articles. I wanted to prevent further violations of WP:NOR, especially WP:SYNTH. Binksternet (talk) 23:59, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

Binkster, bringing a large set of references to make clear a crucial semantic term is not disruption, even if you disagree with the references. When that makes a change in the status quo of an article, that is not disruption. When you reject a large set of references based on nothing but your opinion, and delete those references and material based on them without even discussion, that is disruption.

When you say the sources are conflicted and that is why you allow giant errors to stand for years, you must mean all the dozens of sources that were not called out here, since this article only had 3 sources and none from the modern era. Once a larger set of reliable sources is gathered (getting there now), reference conflict can be a problem, but it is not irreconciable. As an experienced editor, you are perfectly aware that our goal is to find the majority view and present it, along with any significant minority views. When there is dispute in the references, we report the dispute instead of engaging in the dispute. Nothing there is irreconciliable, because all we have to do is report the references. That is all I ask of you--allow the references to be reported. PhaseAcer (talk) 04:23, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

You have persistently fought for misinterpretations of sources and synthesis of sources. Frankly, I don't trust your assessment of sources to be neutral. You always spin the content to match your worldview. Me? I just go with what I've read for decades in the literature, stuff that is mainstream, unchallenged, and fully disconnected from the activism of the light fighter debate. Binksternet (talk) 04:58, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

"Activist" military concepts: Automatic weapons in 1900, planes in 1910, tanks in 1930, monoplanes in 1935, aircraft carriers and Blitzkreig in 1939, nuclear powered naval vessels and air to air refueling in 1950, small jet fighters and snipers in 1965, assymmetric warfare in 1970, and drone combat aircraft in 2000. If you "disconnect" from what you call activism, then you are prejudicing the sources and often ignoring reality. PhaseAcer (talk) 21:49, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

Activists are useful. I consider myself an activist for certain causes. But activist writings about history are dubious because they want to reshape historiography to make their present-day point. Binksternet (talk) 22:00, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

Looking at the Spitfire article going by the dates, when someone made that suggestion, the Beaufighter was a sketch on a pad (detailed work started in late 38) for a quick conversion from a bomber as an interim, ie temporary infill, aircraft until sufficient Whirlwinds (smaller, lighter, but still twin engineed and cannon armed design) were brought into service. It hadn't even received the Beaufighter name. At that time Nuffield's Castle Bromwich 'shadow factory' for mass production was coming online so it may be the line was directed at Supermarine's own factory. But that line is uncited, or at least lacks specific cite. GraemeLeggett (talk) 21:13, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

OK Graeme, but the depth of the procurement fighting over light and heavy in WWII is a minor issue here (I am only replying to Binkster on that minor point). The major issue is that over the history of air combat, so long as "little shooters" are aerodynamically competitive designs, they usually outperform "big shooters" for most missions, and do so for about half the price. It does not get more simple and important than the fact that winning wars is better than losing wars. PhaseAcer (talk) 21:53, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

With the complexity of British procurement covering 1936-1945 there is nothing about selection/continuation of aircraft for service that can't be explained by MAP/Air Board asking "Does it fly?" "Have the problems been sorted out yet?" "Can it be made?", "Should [certain aircraft manufacturer] prioritize on something else." (as an example of the latter, once jet fighters became a possibility, any work by Gloster on any other aircraft design no matter how promising was dropped). The back and forth between manufacturers and 'the customer' in development of British fighters alone easily fills a book [2] GraemeLeggett (talk) 12:32, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

I'm sure you are right about that. The pilots are carefully selected, and then extensively trained to be able to perform at the limit of human ability. But, it often seems the people making the top level decisions on procurement are quite limited in their understanding of the issues. In the Boyd biographies, it is pointed out that the senior Air Force generals simply assumed that the F-16 as a lightweight fighter would have inferior range to the F-15, and they would be able to reject its procurement on that basis. They had apparently never heard of the Breguet range equation, and it was a complete shock to them that the F-16 had longer range. General Hap Arnold, commanding general of the USAAF in WWII, at first resisted use of the P-51, preferring the P-38 despite the lesson of the Battle of Brittain about how helpless the Bf 110 was against English light fighters. He later adopted it to the point that he has a full page portrait of himself in the P-51 Pilot Manual, and personally wrote the introduction praising the aircraft. If you would like that manual, it is available for download from "gen.lib.rus.ec". PhaseAcer (talk) 16:58, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

Bf110s had different effectiveness when left to operate independent of the German bombers compared to when told to stay in close escort with them, losing speed advantage and reacting rather than initiating the attack? And there was no range anxiety compared to the Bf109s. You can add in that British fighters were GCI onto the Luftwaffe's finest so not a 'fair fight' nor comparison. GraemeLeggett (talk) 23:00, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

In the Battle of France, Hurricanes were credited with 119 Bf 110's, whereas Bf 110's were credited with 30 Hurricanes, a dominant 4:1 kill ratio for the Hurricanes. This is from "Hurricane 1 vs. Bf 110", by Tony Holmes. I assume the Spits did a little better per plane, but I don't have reliable numbers. Reports that the Bf 110 had high kill ratios are almost certainly taking their night fighter performance into account. From "Spitfire vs. Bf 109E, Battle of Britain", also Tony Holmes, the reported ratio of the Bf 109E over the Spitfire and Hurricane combined is 1.2 to 1. From http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_bf_109E.html, the reported Bf 109E superiority was 1.47 to 1, despite them also suffering the degradation of close support and the English radar vector advantage.

On Bf 110 vs Bf 109 effectiveness in the Battle of Britain, consider this. From https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-nazi-germanys-destroyer-bomber-bf-110-bomber-failed-miserably-67927, "The Luftwaffe began the Battle of Britain with 237 Bf 110s—and lost 223." That is a 94% loss rate--I don't have a reliable report on the kills they achieved in the process of being driven to extinction as a day fighter. The Bf 109 enjoyed a positive exchange ratio with the English figthers and lost only about 50% to 55% of their numbers during the Battle of Britain (if the references are accurate). Considering their lower relative losses and lower cost, the Bf 109 was a far better investment of resources. That is the basic light vs heavy argument in a nutshell.

From that same article, "The arrival of the Mustang also announced the bankruptcy of the heavy World War II fighter. American aircraft design genius (and in the Mustang's case, a British engine) created a fighter with speed, maneuverability and range. It lacked the armament of a Bf 110, but so what? A Mustang was much more likely to be blazing away at a Bf 110's tail rather than the other way around." Far better to be the shooter than the shootee, even with lighter armament. PhaseAcer (talk) 21:33, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

From May to September 1940 Luftwaffe losses (from all causes) were at ~60% or worse for single engine fighters (57%), twin engine fighters, dive bombers, "long range recce" and bombers; the whole of the Luftwaffe was running short in terms of pilots and replacement aircraft, of which the Bf110 was the most extreme case. During the Battle of Britain the 'British' lost over a 1000 fighters of all types yet the Fighter Command strength was around 800 (with 600 serviceable) at start of July - by that measure, as a whole, RAF fighters suffered a 100+% loss rate. And yet still won the battle. GraemeLeggett (talk) 12:47, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

OK, thanks for the extra numbers. But, what can we draw from them?

1. England won the Battle of Britain because it (a) held its own in the single engine vs single engine fighter battle, (b) had strong positive kill ratio against the twice as expensive Bf 110, (c) had strong positive kill record against 3X as expensive German bombers that did not have strong defensive armament, (d) could continue high volume, efficient, single engine fighter production in the 90% of the nation not covered by the Bf 109 range without drop tanks, (d) accepted fighter pilots from other nations who fought well for England, and (e) recovered half her fighter pilots who were shot down to fight again. Between these last two points they were thus able to staff the cockpits of the continuous stream of newly built replacement fighters.

2. Efficient, single engine, "lightweight" fighters did a far better job and represent a far better strategic value in this era for the day fighter role. With what seems to be a statistically ~4X better exchange rate, at half the cost they are an 8X better return on financial and material investment than was the Bf 110. This was crucial to England winning. If England had placed her bet on only twin engine fighters for the higher weapons load, and if Germany had equipped the Bf 109 with drop tanks (the Zero had them in 1939), she could not have won this air battle despite her radar advantage. PhaseAcer (talk) 17:11, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

Given this clear example, it is a stunning error that the USAAC leadership for the next three years favored the P-38 and P-47 over the P-51, right up until almost having to stop the day bombing campaign against Germany. Hap Arnold later admitted that. PhaseAcer (talk) 17:11, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

Whirlwinds were faster and heavier hitting than Spitfires, climbed well, had all round visibility from the bubble canopy and forward. Had they had reliable engines with altitude performance they might well have proved equal or better. The Gloster F.9/37 had speed too. And 'UK', 'British Commonwealth', 'Britain'... But not "England". And I say that as an East Anglian. GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:19, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

The Whirlwind was a nice concept for a twin--on the light end of the twin range and single seat. But, even better developed, it would have still suffered from the inevitable loss of agility of having its engine weight out on moment arms instead of on the axis of roll. And, as a twin it would have inevitably suffered higher cost and lower sortie rate. On its consumption of resources during the Battle of Britain when resources were so critical, from the Wiki article, "Building a Whirlwind consumed three times as much alloy as a Spitfire." PhaseAcer (talk) 21:16, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

Suggested Editing Plan

Summary

In posting some planning information here, I am assuming that the editors actually desire a sound presentation that addresses the more important issues in a top down way. For example, why are there such things as light and heavy fighters? How has that played out historically, and why does it matter today? By answering those questions, someone who reads several of these related articles is coming away with a correct understanding of the big picture. That happens to be what I appreciate in any article I read—hopefully, I am not in the minority in taking that view here.

This article has recently been undergoing editing, but bringing it to a level that answers those basic questions would still take some work. As correct presentation is a project among a large set of editors that needs to be coordinated across multiple articles, getting some agreement on how to go about the project is essential to success. Agreement and focus will allow efficient editing and sound presentation. Lacking such agreement, getting past the contentiousness of the light and heavy fighter topic will make it hard to the point of near impossible to accurately present it. The contention is such that, for example, bringing references on whether a certain aircraft is light or heavy can lead to accusations of “disrupting” an article. We then just end up spinning our wheels with a very low rate of progress.

We can do much better, and technically it is a simple issue. So, if we can agree to a few summarized points from the literature, and then simply report the references, we can make a unified presentation that is compliant with the literature and tells the truth on a topic of high historical and current significance across this article and the related Wikipedia articles.

On the contention over presentation of efficient single engine WWII fighters as “lightweight fighters”, that is what the literature that addresses the issue reports them as, including by many of their own designers. There is still no literature to dispute that. So, I have to disagree with Binkster that reporting them that way is “idiotic”. However, it is true that a great deal of literature does not address them that way (which is also true of modern fighters), and instead refers to them as “single engine fighters”. I see no problem in compromising on this point and simply reporting that both terms are used in the literature. The key strategic point is that lightweights/singles are about half the cost of heavies/twins, while usually performing as well or better per plane. The reason they achieve better combat results for less budget is that in general they are more compliant to the fighter effectiveness criteria. That has held from WWII through 4th generation. PhaseAcer (talk) 06:11, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

Your plan requires entire shelves of WWII references to be ignored because they don't talk about heavy vs light fighter issues. Your plan requires the cherry-picking of a very few sources that paste a modern viewpoint on top of things that happened in the past. I don't think we can say with finality anything about this issue in WWII except that the German and British militaries both invested in heavy fighters as a concept. Everything beyond that is a violation of WP:WEIGHT (irony acknowledged) as the literature NOT talking about light vs heavy in WWII is so much larger. Binksternet (talk) 23:47, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

Strategy of Presentation

A key point is that the terms “lightweight fighter” and “heavy fighter” are really just the military and literature terms that have evolved for “small and efficient fighters” and “larger and better equipped fighters”. If that can be accepted, we can put most of the arguing behind us. But so far, most attempts to present the light/heavy issue devolve into arguments over classification, and the resulting default position that has evolved over a period of years is to avoid the argument by not addressing the issue. For example, to this very day the only article that has been allowed to present the fighter effectiveness criteria of surprise, numbers, maneuverability, and weapons effectiveness has been the light fighter article. Light and heavy are fighter configuration choices, and to talk about them in a meaningful way (beyond just reporting raw data) requires using the fighter effectiveness criteria.

A large part of the argument also seem to come from the feeling that only two classes are insufficient. But, that is what the literature presents. This has occurred because fighter aircraft design has always revolved around the available engines. Though there are large and small engines that confuse the issue by allowing a heavy single or a light twin, for the most part the design issue has been whether to use a standard sized single engine (light), or two such engines (heavy), with allowance made for variation within the two main classes to provide for more detailed description.

Therefore, in keeping with the literature, it is proposed now that the over 40 references given above and over 20 others located since be used to finally bring this and related articles up to date. This could be accomplished by first generating a common definition of light and heavy to be used in both the light and heavy fighter articles, presenting the fighter effectiveness criteria to explain why those classes exist, bringing this article up to date with the literature from WWII to now, and adding a summary of the issue to the main fighter aircraft article with pointers to these two articles. With those three articles synchronized, the consensus editor position may then flow out to the individual fighter articles, as appropriate.

Key historical points from the literature in the struggle of light vs heavy are reviewed below, followed by more detailed editing suggestions. PhaseAcer (talk) 06:11, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

WWII

The only place in WWII where heavyweight advantages outweighed their disadvantages appears to be night fighters. The combat record shows this as the only application where they could bring their heavy weapons to bear and still maintain the advantages of surprise and maneuverability, and where their mostly bomber victims were more expensive and thus a greater resource loss than they were. German heavyweights in particular ran up an outstanding combat record in this specialized application.

In daytime action the heavies were more often the prey of competitive lightweights than vice versa, or on the losing side of a resource trade. For example, Hurricanes and Spitfires were very lightly armed compared to the Bf 110, but they swept the Bf 110 from the skies early in WWII, and forced it into the role of night fighter. The higher performing heavy P-38 could trade about equally with German lightweights, but that was a major resource loss since German single engine fighters that were half the cost. This was then rendered even worse by the fact that mostly lightweight German fighters were achieving about a 2:1 kill ratio over heavy American bombers, which is a resource trade of about 1 to 10 favoring Germany. This terrible war losing resource trade was only corrected by finally removing the P-38 from front line air to air combat in the ETO, and replacing it with the P-51.

The domination of the heavy P-38 over the very light Zero in day combat is a case of a slower and by then obsolete fighter being overcome with energy tactics. The P-51 could have done that mission better, for half the price, if it had not been tied up winning the day fighter air war over Europe. PhaseAcer (talk) 06:11, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

References

Your chuckhawks.com reference says nothing about light fighters or heavy fighters. It's very difficult for me to understand why you so frequently insert your own personal analysis laid over the sources.

A nation that is rich in resources is not very concerned about what you call a "major resource loss". Military decision makers in the US were not as focused on economy as you think they were during WWII. The US was so resource rich that they spent two billion dollars on the Manhattan Project, more than all of the US fighters added together. There was plenty of room in the budget for larger and more complex fighters. Binksternet (talk) 23:47, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

Jet Age

The first major semi-modern contest of heavy vs light jets was Vietnam. Early in the war the heavy F-4 and F-105 suffered a mauling at the hands of the newly formed North Vietnamese air force flying lightweight MiG-17’s and MiG-21’s. Over various sources, the F-4 Phantom shot down 54 to 66 MiG-21s, while 37 to 104 MiG-21’s were shot down in return. The U.S. admits to losing 17 F-105’s in air to air combat, and claims 27 MiG-17’s in return (the F-105 apparently scored no MiG-21 kills). Other sources report the U.S. lost up to about 48 F-105’s in air to air. The subsonic but small, maneuverable, and hard to see MiG-17 was very competitive with the F-105, and shot down many F-4’s as well. However, exactly how many American fighters were lost in air to air is somewhat obscured by the heavy losses to ground fire and SAM’s.

With specialized training and tactics, the U.S. did better late in the war. The total kill ratio favored the United States by 2.5 to 1, and more like 5 to 1 on MiG CAP missions. However, in a resource trading sense the U.S. still lost that fight.

The Israeli use of the F-4E (the improved maneuverability and cannon armed version), from 1969 forward, led to a reported 166 kills and a lopsided Israeli kill ratio, mostly over lightweight MiG’s. Israeli F-4E’s scored 85-5 in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 (17 to 1). However, from the Wiki Dassault Mirage III article, Israel also claims 246 air to air kills by the Mirage and derivative Nesher in the Yom Kippur War, against only 5 air to air losses (49 to 1). Another reference for the Mirage/Nesher record in Israeli service reported 398 total kills over a period of years by the lightweight Mirage and Nesher, against 25 losses (16 to 1). The Mirage was certainly preferred by the Israeli pilots for air to air work, who called the F-4 the “B-4” due to its size and weight. Two statements by Israeli Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Mordechai Hod are also pertinent. First, they found the F-4 radar to be essentially useless (more modern radar is far superior, but on-board fighters still has a slow scan rate and limited field of view). Second, he said they could have swapped aircraft with their opponents and still enjoyed the same results. In his opinion, the dominant Israeli victories were much more due to careful pilot selection and training, and combat tactics, than the particular aircraft. In summary, with outstanding pilots and tactics, Israel did great with the heavy F-4, but did as well or better with the lightweight Mirage. Of the two, only the lower cost Mirage could be afforded in the numbers necessary to come out on top in the Arab-Israeli wars.

In the more modern era, there were two key results of the Vietnam War in U.S. fighter thinking. One was emphasizing air to air combat ability in the F-15 (a maneuverable light heavy), as well as a furious light vs heavy fight that culminated in the procurement of the F-16. Secondly, it also led to the United States developing an effective AWAC’s aircraft with the E-3 Sentry, to largely eliminate the element of surprise in airspace that can be covered by AWAC’s.. With AWAC’s coverage, the surprise advantage of small enemy fighters is greatly reduced. Since deployment of the E-3, the United States has only lost one fighter in air to air combat (an F-18 on the first day of the Gulf War).

In the truly modern age, since BVR became reliable around 1980, the only place that heavies have seemed to maintain an advantage is when a modern air force does not have ground radar or AWAC’s long range radar coverage of the battle space, and needs its fighters to have the longest possible radar range to try to make up for that lack. This is exemplified by the Israeli use of the F-15 from 1979 forward. The combat record of the F-15 is indeed spectacular, but then again so is the record of the F-16 against the same generally outdated competition that was not radar and BVR equipped. With similar pilot quality, it is the F-16 that edges out the F-15 in modern trials against each other and competent opponents, including BVR (the F-16 radar is not quite as good, but it also is a much smaller radar target), at half the cost per plane.

Israel has used both the F-15 and F-16 extensively in air to air (even though most F-16 missions are flown air to ground). The Israeli F-15 record is 50-0, and their F-16 record is 47-0.

In U.S. service the F-15 has scored 40-0. Not using the F-16 for the air to air role, the U.S. has only scored 6-0 with the F-16. In this era the United States has held a massive BVR, AWAC’s, and SEAD advantage to prevent being surprised in the air. This total system of air combat has been a large part of this outstanding record.

Pakistan, which employs the F-16 for both air to air and air to ground, has scored 10-0 with it, including against Soviet pilots posted to Afghanistan. PhaseAcer (talk) 06:11, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

References

Specific Editing Suggestions

My suggestions for editing in the light and heavy fighter articles using the now well-developed body of references are as follows:

1. Summarize the fighter effectiveness criteria. This is the key tool to understanding fighter aircraft combat performance.

2. Get a common ‘’definition’’ of light and heavy into both the light fighter and heavy fighter articles. There is not a simple and authoritative military, industry, and literature definition that is universally accepted and then repeated in secondary sources. The only simple formal definition I am aware of after hundreds of hours of literature review over the last 4 years is that given by Stevenson in “The Pentagon Paradox”, bottom of page 21, which is “The term lightweight fighter means a fighter that is significantly lighter than its contemporaries.” Obviously, that is an incomplete definition that breaks down if contemporaries are also lightweight, and it lacks a corresponding definition for heavy fighters.

But, there is a great deal of literature that uses two other methods to define light and heavy fighters. The first is ‘’by example’’, of which we have dozens of references. The second method is by reference to the ‘’fighter effectiveness criteria’’. In that definition lightweights emphasize the first 3 of the 4 elements of the fighter effectiveness criteria, which are surprise (small and hard to see), numbers (small and thus low cost), and maneuverability (small and thus agile). It comes down to meaning a small fighter that can still carry the necessary weapons and have the necessary performance. The heavy fighters emphasize the 4th element of the criteria, which is weapons systems effectiveness, which heavy fighter proponents emphasize as the amount and power of weapons per plane. The literature authors clearly think this combination of examples and particular point effectiveness criteria compliance is all the definition needed.

Between these many statements, we may offer a summarized definition that lightweights are generally highly efficient single engine fighters, and heavyweights are generally more strongly armed twins (yes, it has to be carefully worded and referenced to avoid the accusation of synthesis). Another result, given by many examples that have been important to the point of swinging major phases of major wars, is that lightweights are generally around half the cost per plane. That simple statement carries enormous practical weight when it comes to winning wars.

3. Using this definition commonly in both the light and heavy fighter articles, review the historical examples from WWII to the present. So far Binkster has taken the position that WWII fighters simply cannot be “lightweights” as they are viewed today, as in his opinion description did not become adequately formalized until about 1950 in the case of light vs heavy jet fighter options that were under consideration in the United States. This contention led to Lockheed developing the lightweight F-104, beginning in 1952. Contemporaneously, light jet fighters were under consideration in Britain by Teddy Petter at English Electric, which soon led to the Folland Midge and Gnat. Also at this exact same time the French government was issuing its proposal for a lightweight fighter, which led to the highly successful Mirage family of fighters.

There are two problems with the objection that the debate did not begin until around 1950 and that this locks out considering efficient WWII single engine fighters as lightweight fighters. First, other earlier WWII examples can be shown in a large stack of references, with zero counter-references. The only direct statement missing from the WWII era for strategic lightweight definition via the fighter effectiveness criteria is small size for low visibility enhancing the element of surprise (a concept that may not have been clearly stated until the 1960’s). And, the designers of heavy WWII twins developed them specifically for carrying heavier weapons loads. So, they certainly were “light” and “heavy” in the modern strategic sense. Second, these WWII fighters are interpreted this way by modern literature that analyzes the topic of light and heavy fighters. Modern literature is not only acceptable for interpretation of past events, it is encouraged by Wikipedia policy in technical areas. The only objection that can be raised is that there is much literature that does not discuss the issue at all.

Following Wikipedia policy on neutrality, what we can do is note Binkster’s position that many references do use the term “single engine fighters” to refer to what the literature that directly addresses the issue calls lightweight fighters. I see no problem in simply describing this term usage in the articles. When both terms are explained, the situation is quite clear.

4. Show the relevant combat record as given in the literature from WWII to now. It is interesting material that generally proves out theory, despite complicating factors. Direct light vs. heavy confrontation occurred in: A. The Battle of Britain between British lightweights and the German Bf 110 (light decisively winning), B. Between the P-38 and German light fighters in the ETO (around equal in numbers, but a decisive lightweight win in terms of resource trade), C. Between P-38 and the by then obsolete Zero in the Pacific (P-38 using superior speed and diving energy based attacks for decisive victory), D. In Vietnam between supersonic F-105 and supersonic F-4 vs obsolete subsonic MiG-17 and supersonic MiG-21 (a 2.5 to 1 advantage for the U.S. in total numbers, but still a resource win for North Vietnamese lightweights). E. Between F-4 and lightweight MiG’s in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, a dominant victory for the F-4 that was far different than the Vietnam results. This is largely attributable to a larger difference in pilot skill between Israeli and Arab pilots than between U.S. and North Vietnamese pilots. F. Between Gen 4 F-15 and Gen 2-3 MiG-21 in the Middle East (a very dominant heavy F-15 victory, aided by the F-15 radar and BVR missiles, and in U.S. combat by AWAC’s radar support, that the MiG-21 did not have the advantage of).

5. Offer a brief description of the American Lightweight Fighter Program leading to the F-16 and F-18 as a counter to the F-14, F-15, and other heavy fighter options. The issue of light vs. heavy in modern times has been ignored in this article, while it has been one of the most important and hotly contested military procurement issues for decades. Also, this program led to the clear modern definition of lightweights being efficient single engine fighters of about half the cost of heavyweights, which has since been picked up and endorsed in a large set of modern secondary literature.

6. We should offer what information we can on heavy vs. light in the stealth age. So far stealth is only featured on heavy fighters (F-22, F-35, and J-20). The apparent belief is that a larger weapons load (the weapons must be internally carried, hence even a heavyweight’s weapons load is modest), and perhaps higher power AESA radar for range and electronic warfare purposes, outweighs the reduction in radar and visual profile and greater numbers that a smaller stealth fighter could provide.

The United States has proven what battle space information superiority can do with EWAC’s, greatly reducing the ability of enemy fighters to win by surprise. A major part of the stealth concept and AESA radars are to prevent a more sophisticated enemy equipped with EWAC’s, ground radar, and fighter radar from also eliminating surprise advantage in return. Stealth reduces radar detection range by about 75%. It is getting easier for opponents to also have EWAC’s ability, as such systems are “downsizing” from large aircraft like the 707 based Boeing E-3 Sentry to what could be considered lightweight EWAC’s, with AESA radar that is far more powerful than that in a fighter aircraft carried on lower cost business jet platforms. Several such systems are available on the open market, such as the Israeli IAI EL/W-2085 and the Swedish Saab Globaleye. PhaseAcer (talk) 06:11, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

References

There will never be a "common definition" of light fighter or heavy fighter. You keep trying to define one truth when there are many viewpoints out there. The best we can do for the reader is to touch down at various places and times when the issue arose. One example is the US in 1952 when the light fighter guys started to get organized against another big, complicated proposal from Lockheed.

The P-38 and the lighter P-39 were both designed to meet the same specification of carrying a thousand pounds of armament, which puts a crimp in your idea that heavy fighters are always designed to hold more armament. Either the P-38 is not a heavy fighter (my stance, backed by many sources) or the mass of the armament is not a defining characteristic (not my stance at all.)

Careful wording is not the way to avoid "accusations of synthesis." If you want to avoid accusations of synthesis then don't violate our policy of WP:SYNTH – don't combine different thoughts from different sources to arrive at a novel conclusion. Binksternet (talk) 23:47, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

Binkster, there is nothing stopping us from giving the full range of definition, as given in the literature. This may be summarized as:

1. Lightweights in WWII are efficient single engine fighters, according to both many of their own designers and according to modern literature. Literature is available colloquially describing all the major fighters of this class as lightweights. Authoritative modern literature is available describing these fighters as lightweights both by example and by reference to the fighter effectiveness criteria.

2. Heavyweights in WWII are defined by example as mostly twin standard engine fighters, with a few big single R2800 engined fighters coming in at the low end of that range (P-47, Hellcat, Corsair).

3. Modern lightweights are efficient mostly standard single engine jets described by a ton of examples in the literature, and by the fighter effectiveness criteria. A few small engine twins fit this class also (F-5, F-18A, MiG-29).

4. Modern heavies are described in the literature as standard engine twins and the largest of singles (F-104, F-35). However, given that stealth is leaning to quite large fighters, the time may come when the F-35 is regarded as lightweight among stealth fighters.

What's so hard about that? The problem here is not a lack of references (we have over 60 now). The literature is available in volume, and "lightweight" and "heavy" are not hard concepts. They are actually very simple concepts that have applied from WWII to now. It is just a matter of:

1. Being willing to accept the literature instead of an opinion based presentation,

2. Being willing to present the well referenced fighter effectiveness criteria, and

3. Being willing to present the well referenced combat record of light vs heavy that has resulted.

Here is some pertinent history for you on the P-39, since you attach a lot of significance to specifications of the time. Bell proposed a navalized version of the P-39 to the U.S. Navy in response to a January 1938 Navy spec for a LIGHTWEIGHT fighter. This resulted in the XFL-1 AiraBonita protoypte. It did not have the 37mm cannon and was thus 10% lighter than the P-39. This was the same Navy spec that led to the F4F Wildcat as a lightweight fighter (heavier than the Zero, but still a lightweight). The P-39 is still a lightweight also--it's just one loaded down with 900 lbs of weapons and ammo (most heavily armed 37mm cannon plus four 0.50 cal MG's version) instead of the more typical 500 lbs for a fighter of its size. That's the same thing as the Bf 109 strapping on two 30mm cannons to go after bombers. Still lightweights, just not high performing lightweights when overloaded and upgunned that way. Again, very simple. PhaseAcer (talk) 03:35, 8 February 2020 (UTC)

The mass of literature on WWII will never support the claim that the P-47, Hellcat and Corsair were considered part of the heavy fighter class. And nobody every called the P-39 a light fighter. It was a standard fighter of the day.

Obviously it would be great to avoid opinion-based presentations on Wikipedia, but most of what you've suggested here is a synthesis of your impressions of a few activist sources combined with raw stats. Your analysis/opinion gets in the way. Binksternet (talk) 03:41, 8 February 2020 (UTC)

Here is another reference: "P-39 AiraCobra", Bert Kinsey, 1999, page 8: "The XFL-1 AiraBonita was a relatively small, lightweight fighter...". It is a direct derivative of the P-39, basically the P-39 with the 37mm cannon removed and in taildragger form. It was designed in response to a spec for a lightweight fighter. Again, a very simple situation--no analysis required.

No more than a few of the nearly 70 sources I am approaching now could be described as activist sources. And, under policy activist sources can be perfectly valid sources anyway. I am offering an editing plan that will make a sensible, complete, and coordinated presentation of light and heavy here, and in the lightweight article, and in the main fighter article, all based on a large stack of references. It includes a sensible definition of light and heavy based on references, where confusion on this important strategic issue that has existed here and in the related articles will finally be removed. You have not offered any definition, or any references, or any plan, to correct the poor state of this article. The status quo here has been very incomplete, and in some cases simply wrong, on some major issues. I know you are uncomfortable with change, but the references show it is time to make a change to a more accurate and complete presentation. PhaseAcer (talk) 05:22, 8 February 2020 (UTC)

"Uncomfortable with change" LOL. Don't patronize me. I am contributing here for the sole purpose of disallowing a rewriting of history to conform to a later viewpoint. Revisionist history can be valuable but it can also be overdone, and in this case you are trying to force historic fighter types into your world view. I have not even bothered to list the many sources describing WWII fighters as normal/regular/standard fighters because they are legion; they vastly outnumber your few activist sources. Yes, biased sources can be used on Wikipedia but WP:WEIGHT always applies. Your viewpoint is a minor viewpoint, not the defining mainstream view. Binksternet (talk) 03:07, 10 February 2020 (UTC)

Binkster, I have been waiting for over a month for you to deliver ANY of these references you keep mentioning. I've done a lot of reading in this area myself, and I only see two classes of references. These are the ones that don't mention the weight or classification issue at all (which seem to be the only possibility you can be referring to), and those that do. Those that don't mention it would not seem to be strong references on the subject, though I have no objection to describing what they do say. That would normally be along the lines of "single engine fighters", "smaller and more maneuverable fighters", etc. But, to claim that omission of the term "lightweight" means "not lightweight" is simply not a valid statement. For example, an article on the Honda Civic that describes it as a "car" or "small car" does not mean it is not also a compact car, which is the term the auto literature normally uses in North America when a more formal classification statement is needed.

Among the references that do mention and discuss weight/size classification (which is the SUBJECT of this article), the term "lightweight" comes up a lot in older literature, and even more in newer literature, to mean efficient single engine WWII fighters. I don't know why you have such prejudice against using that term, but it is the term that the literature has evolved into as the majority view for classifying efficient single engine fighters from WWII to now. And, under policy, majority views and all significant minority views are supposed to be presented.

Blocking what the literature that addresses the subject reports will be a neutrality violation. I have held off on adding more article material from this very large and still growing body of references to give you time to review the literature I have presented and compromise on your inflexible position that you will delete any material you disagree with, no matter how well referenced. But if you refuse to accept the references and continue to delete well references material, then arbitration to settle what is valid referenced material and what is opinion and inapplicable references will be fine by me. PhaseAcer (talk) 05:32, 10 February 2020 (UTC)