Talk:Hawker Typhoon/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

bubble canopy?

I came to the Hawker Typhoon page by following a link from the P-51 Mustang page. I was interested there to learn that the Mustang had corrected a major problem by taking its "teardrop-shaped bubble canopies derived from the British Hawker Typhoon". However, the Typhoon page has a picture which does not at all show the canopy, and the article barely mentions the canopy, so I was left wondering about its origins, whether it was innovative or crucial, etc. Since the Mustang had such a storied career and because it outlived WWII, the Typhoon page could perhaps provide more of this story? if anybody knows it... ok, now I see more discussion of this in the P-47 Thunderbolt article, and it mentions that the Hawker Tempest also included this canopy. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.132.5.41 (talk) 14:05, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

This type of canopy is better shown on the Hawker Tempest page as the picture here does not show the bubble canopy in any detail - the bubble canopies on the later Typhoon and on the Tempest were identical.

The poor rearward view that most fighters possessed at the beginning of World War II was caused by an attempt at better streamlining on the designers part and due to a misconception, (in the RAF's case at least, but it also applied to most other air forces), that fighter aircraft were now so fast that dog fighting had become obsolete, and that aircraft would simply make high-speed attacking passes at each other, the pilots only needing to see straight-ahead and to the sides. This fallacy was disproved for the RAF during the Battle of Britain when it was discovered that a number of its pilots who had been shot down had been hit from behind and had not even been aware that they were being attacked until they were hit - presumably this also applied to Luftwaffe pilots, however, being over 'enemy' territory, fewer returned to complain about it.

The 1940 Miles M.20 with one-piece moulded bubble canopy

It was therefore concluded by the RAF that a good rearward view was still essential and the first aircraft with a proper all-round vision canopy (i.e. a moulded bubble one that slid backwards, sometimes also known as a 'teardrop' canopy) was actually the Miles M.20, designed at around this time (1940) - the Focke-Wulf 190 had a similar 'clear view' canopy design but it wasn't a true 'bubble' canopy as-such, having flat side panels, at least initially.

This bubble design of canopy came after the Typhoon and Tornado - which were basically the same aircraft but using different engines - were designed and so the early examples of these aircraft had canopies designed to the earlier, 'straight ahead', philosophy (these are sometimes referred-to as 'car-door' type canopies - the P-39 Airacobra and later P-63 Kingcobra had similar ones, in which entry is through a door hinged at the front in a similar manner to those on a car). This lack of rearward vision also applied to the P-47 Thunderbolt and the P-51 Mustang which were both designed at around the same time as the Miles M.20, i.e., 1940, but without the benefit of experience gained during the Battle of Britain, so they were designed to the earlier 'straight ahead' concept.

As a result of these conclusions as soon as it was practicable the Typhoon was given a new bubble canopy based on the one introduced in the M.20 (which possibly would not have been widely known in the US as it did not enter production) and it was the Typhoon's new canopy that attracted the attention of the US designers and which was adopted for their designs.

A canopy of this type was also designed for the Spitfire, however due to pressures on production (i.e., the down-time for re-tooling for the new, cut-down, rear fuselage being unacceptable) the introduction for the Spitfire was severely delayed. The Tempest was designed from the start with the new canopy, (however the prototype was a modified Typhoon and had the earlier car-door type!), as was the subsequent Fury and Sea Fury. Ian Dunster 10:27, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

The first bubble canopies appeared in response to the 1937 United States Army Air Corps Circular Proposal X-608 request for a high-altitude interceptor aircraft having "the tactical mission of interception and attack of hostile aircraft at high altitude". The Bell P-39 Airacobra and the Lockheed P-38 Lightning were designed to this requirement. Both designs featured bubble canopies but delays in the Lockheed experimental program allowed Bell to fly their prototype first April 6 1938. Binksternet (talk) 11:42, 17 November 2007 (UTC)

There's an official USAAF 1943 test report for the Hawker Tempest here which contrasts its 'bubble' (or "bulb" 'canopy' with the P-39 Airacobra's 'side door plus a hinged overhead section': (Section B - 'Factual Data', Para 3 'Flight Characteristics' - Sub-section a - 'Cockpit Layout'): U.S report on Tempest V Ian Dunster (talk) 21:12, 14 December 2007 (UTC)

The Westland Whirlwind flew before the P-38 and it has a similar framed canopy. So did the Gloster F.5/34. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.73 (talk) 09:33, 12 February 2019 (UTC)

Switch to Ground Attack

I hadn't noticed before that cites have been removed from this section - now restored. Statistics are usefulo, but too many are not needed in an encylopaedic article. As it is the effectiveness of the rockets is discussed in the relevant article on the RP3. ◆Min✪rhist✪rian◆MTalk 01:46, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

I think it is important that for every number of kills claimed that is in the article a verifiable source be used. And this is what I did for Goodwood and Mortain. I also added the overall numbers, as best as I could find, for the Normandy Campaign to put all the claimed kills in perspective.Part of the problem with air attacks is that they simply weren't that effective in ww2 using fighter bombers and unguided munitions against armoured or dug in targets! Much propaganda has been made regarding air attacks by all sides during and post war, likely to validate the cost of fighter bombers....but as I tried to show more recent research and even ground based analysis post battle during the war suggests that direct fighter bomber attacks accounted for between 3-7% of tanks; regardless of the nation. This is why I think the section on effectiveness should have something in more detail about: 1) the difficulty of hitting a pin point target with a plane and unguided munitions 2) the fact that many tanks had armoured tops which a 20-37mm cannon at a glancing angle (30-60 deg) strike angle would have difficulty penetrating 3) Aircraft munitions are limited, so as a weapons platform aircraft cannot 'last in the fight' as they quickly run out of bombs, rockets or cannon shells..heck the Ju87G only had what 12 37mm shells in its underwing pods! This means that aircraft cannot really sustain fire on an area like a ground based AT gun can! 4) Attacking a dug-in, fortified or AA defended spearhead is even more difficult as the AA fire restricts the lines of approach and reduces the time aircraft have over the target! A referenced discussion of the above is warranted for combat effectiveness.Tempsperdue (talk) 02:33, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Beware of making statements like: "The reason for the inflated regard of Typhoons and other fighter bombers as effective tank destroyers is a result of the myth perpetrated by exaggerated pilot kill claims." that are not backed up by authoritative and verifiable references. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 04:00, 8 July 2012 (UTC).

This is an article about the Hawker Typhoon, not a specialised opinion piece on the effectiveness of aerial GA during WW 2 - as Thomas notes there were two sides to the story; sure, the the Typhoon pilots overclaimed on the numbers of AFVs actually destroyed, but the effects of the GA sorties against "soft skins", open topped AP carriers and horse drawn vehicles used by the German armed forces was devastating, and was enough to halt the attack at Mortain with tanks and other AFVs being abandoned because of the attacks or because they ran out of fuel and ammunition. Fact is the Typhoon attacks were effective, as witnessed by all those who saw the battlefields afterwards. "A referenced discussion of the above is warranted for combat effectiveness." Not in an article such as this, because all that will happen is that it will become a long, tedious debate which will never end as other editors add their referenced opinions. One or two examples of AFV casualty figures v Typhoon claims is enough to make a point. ◆Min✪rhist✪rian◆MTalk 10:35, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Concentrating on Typhoon attacks against tanks alone could also be a case of undue focus. The Typhoon could, and was used to, attack most anything of benefit to the German war machine on the ground - ships, railway movements, airfield hangars... Losses of Typhoons would also have to take that into account before the aircraft/tank calculations were started. An interesting numerical experiment for a historian perhaps but not for this article. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:11, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

What I added: "The Typhoon has been credited with destroying dozens of the feared Tiger Is the Normandy campaign. However, only 13 Tiger tanks were destroyed by direct air attack during the entire campaign. Of the 13 Tigers lost by aircraft, it is estimated that seven were lost on 18 July 1944 due to high altitude bombing preceding Operation Goodwood - at most only six Tigers were destroyed by Typhoons or other fighter bombers in the entire Normandy campaign. [39] No more than 100 German tanks were verifiability lost due to hits by aircraft out of a total of approximately 1,500 German tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns lost during the Normandy campaign.[40] In contrast, the 2nd Tactical Air Force lost 829 aircraft and the 9th USAAF lost another 897 [41] out of an estimated total of 4,101 Allied aircraft of all types that were lost in support of the Normandy campaign and were involved in all mission types, not just anti-tank.[42]" -->Referenced Normandy campaign numbers that keep getting removed. It is specific to Typhoons, and puts the losses of the 2nd TA and 9th USAAF in perspective during Normandy; that is all. Nowhere have I suggested that the Typhoons were NOT used in interdiction or other mission types. All the later is clearly cited in the article, so why not add numbers on the losses of tanks vs. aircraft?Tempsperdue (talk) 14:38, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

In using terms like "estimated", "verifiably", "at most only" aren't exactly the standard for authoritative, verifiable reference sources. Instead, this seems more like making a WP:Point campaign. FWiW, if there are these undisputed sources, where were they before? Bzuk (talk) 16:59, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

You are quite correct, those words should not be in there...my badTempsperdue (talk) 18:29, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Jumping back a bit - no you did not say that Typhoons were only used against tanks - but you had put the "kills" of only one target next to the losses to all causes. The juxtaposition appears to be chosen to cause the reader to "compare and contrast" in a particular way. GraemeLeggett (talk) 21:04, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

I've changed the text by separating the two items by a blank line. But more importantly - I've tagged that what needs to be added to the aircraft losses during the Normandy campaign is the number of Typhoons (ie the focus of this article) lost. GraemeLeggett (talk) 21:11, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Hmmm...what was the make up of 2nd tactical during Normandy, they were made up from forces of Bomber command and fighter command...this shouldn't be too difficult to find, I don't have the references on hand.Tempsperdue (talk) 23:55, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Once again you are turning this article into a needlessly detailed critique of the Typhoon's effectiveness against tanks - the material about Tiger Is etc is not needed because the point, that the Typhoon did not destroy large numbers of tanks during two major battles, has been made already - by directly comparing numbers of tanks destroyed v numbers of Typhoons destroyed you are producing a skewed set of figures which bear no relationship to the Typhoon's overall effectiveness as a ground attack aircraft; think about it - how many tanks destroyed Typhoons? You have become fixated on the numbers of tanks destroyed at the expense of the overall impact of aerial operations against the German supply echelons, headquarters, troop concentrations etc; without embarking on long explanations and breakdowns of statistics such comparisons are meaningless and do not belong in this article - save it for more specialised websites or the article on the RP-3. Also, you mention 456 tanks but what does this mean? Were they all German? Were they abandoned, destroyed, out of fuel? Were they all tanks or a mix of tanks AFVs and APCs? Thirdly what was the Office of Research and Analysis in this particular (WW2) context? I have googled it under Office of Research and Analysis 2 TAF WW2 and still have no idea. ◆Min✪rhist✪rian◆MTalk 02:43, 9 July 2012 (UTC)

Personally I think it is important to have the overall numbers for tanks included especially vis-a-vis the Normandy Campaign because in the introductory paragraph and throughout the articles the suggestion is made that 'the typhoon was the best ground attack aircraft of the war'. We then give examples of all the things it destroyed, both claimed and verified: inclduing flak, aircraft, soft skinned vehicles, buildings, etc. But nowhere is there an example of its actual effectiveness vis-a-vis tanks. And it seems to me important to give lie to the fact that ww2 ground attack aircraft were 'good' against tanks,which IMO seems to be a common misnomer prevalent today. Perhaps because modern guided weapons ARE so effective! Anyhow I would include that little referenced paragraph summarising the typhoons effectiveness in Normandy vs. AFVS, but obviously I am arguing against the wind....you seem determined NOT to have anything in the article putting into question the Typhoons overall effectiveness against AFVs, other than particular references which counter exaggerated pilot claims.Tempsperdue (talk) 13:33, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

The statement in the introduction is that the Typhoon was one of the most successful ground attack aircraft (my emphasis). No mention of tanks. It has already been stated above that tanks were not the only target of the Typhoon. As WP:UNDUE says "strive to treat each aspect with a weight appropriate to its significance to the subject". To focus on only the performance against tanks seems to me to be inappropiate to the significance of that performance. GraemeLeggett (talk) 17:57, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

I think that it gives undue weight unless you also have figures and stuff on railway engines, rolling stock, bridges, soft vehicles, buildings or anything else that was a target of opportunity, better just to leave out the tank stuff. MilborneOne (talk) 20:14, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

The article did not make any claims - verified or otherwise - about how effective the Typhoon was against tanks because it is well known that making such claims in Wikipedia only leads to contention and debate, coupled with large scale and futile statistical analysis.

"Anyhow I would include that little referenced paragraph summarising the typhoons effectiveness in Normandy vs. AFVS, but obviously I am arguing against the wind..." Your "little paragraph starts off stating that "The Typhoon has been credited with destroying dozens of the feared Tiger Is" Can you explain this further, apart from quoting from Zetterling? Exactly where or from whom has it been claimed that the Typhoon destroyed "dozens" of Tiger Is? Can you find any reputable source on the Typhoon which has made such claims? Such a sweeping statement, even one which is referenced, can be argued over ad-nauseum.

As Graeme and Milbourne have stated you are putting WP:UNDUE weight on just one aspect of the Typhoon's role because it was also a fighter and it was effective against other targets - the fact that .

Here is an article on Ground-attack aircraft which gives more scope "...to give lie to the fact that ww2 ground attack aircraft were 'good' against tanks,which IMO seems to be a common misnomer prevalent today." ◆Min✪rhist✪rian◆MTalk 03:12, 11 July 2012 (UTC)

Look we can sit here at discuss at nauseaum about whether or not I put the emphasis on tanks or that Zetterling is insufficient a reference. The reality I find and hear quite often, and that which this article indirectly supports is that fighter-bombers or ground attack aircraft in ww2 were particularly good or effective. IMO this stems from the effectiveness of modern guided munitions, which didn't really exist in ww2. The Typhoon was no doubt one of the more effective and feared or well-liked fighter bombers, but I think some perspective is needed in the article. Do we have an evidence of the total amount of soft targets killed/destroyed by typhoons? When I propose to add a comparison of typhoons or aircraft vs. total AFV losses in Normandy to add perspective I get shot down. Yet the paragraphs on soft-target effectiveness and as morale booster remain without any opposing viewpoints. I have no issue with discussing the typhoons effectiveness against ALL targets, but I do think some perspective is needed, especially about overall effectiveness of fighter bombers against AFVs.Which I tried to supply. So fine remove the 'against tigers' quote if you don't trust the reference, but keep the overall planes vs. AFV losses aka this:" No more than 100 German tanks were verifiability lost due to hits by aircraft out of a total of approximately 1,500 German tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns lost during the Normandy campaign.[40] In contrast, the 2nd Tactical Air Force lost 829 aircraft and the 9th USAAF lost another 897 [41] out of an estimated total of 4,101 Allied aircraft of all types that were lost in support of the Normandy campaign and were involved in all mission types, not just anti-tank."! Tempsperdue (talk) 12:34, 19 July 2012 (UTC)

Morale

While following up some thoughts I had while editing the article I found this on google books. RPs are discussed from page 249 onwards though - as ever - some pages are tantalizingly not shown. Mentions morale boost for the British troops when a Typhoon strike goes in. GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:44, 11 July 2012 (UTC)

The physical destruction is irrelevant - just as the Civil Air Patrol crippled u-boat effectiveness by being there, the appearance of Typhoons pinned down German tanks. Hull down tanks are difficult to destroy (including by tanks and anti-tank guns), but if it stays put the heavies can pound on it, and if it moves, since its location is known, it won't survive long. That is if ammunition and fuel supplies are adequate but as they were largely destroyed by Typhoons, the tanks may as well have been destroyed as they just weren't going far.

Naval and ground forces always have an inflated belief in their ability to deal with aircraft and arguments suggesting a lack of effectiveness have put forward by them regularly (mostly by armchair generals and authors trying to make a repuation rewriting history) since the 1920s and haven't been valid for most of that time. This is nothing but more of the same and isn't even relevant to the Typhoon story.NiD.29 (talk) 03:55, 12 July 2012 (UTC)

As can be seen by the discussion above, and in the article, the idea that it was easy for fighter bombers, with unguided munitions, in ww2 to destroy armoured ground targets, especially moving ones, has been clearly shown as false. It was incredibly difficult for Typhoons and others to hit and then penetrate and destroy AFVs, hence the 4% kill rate vs. the claims. As to the claims that anti air crews exaggerated their kill claims, please provide some evidence/links. My understanding is that AA was effective, even if it merely acted as a deterrent to an air attack. As to morale, there is no doubt that air attacks adversely affected morale, but in the same vein the Germany army did learn to cope to a degree, moving at night, coordinating movements, etcTempsperdue (talk) 12:24, 19 July 2012 (UTC)

With a direct hit the 60lb RP would destroy any armoured fighting vehicle in the world at the time - a Typhoon or Tempest's eight RP load was reckoned to be equivalent to a cruiser's 6" gun broadside. One rocket hit on a Tiger or Panther would literally blow the vehicle to bits. This is why German tank crews were reported to have bailed out of their vehicles before being hit. This is more understandable when you realise that the Typhoons and Tempests were being used on the 'Cab Rank' system under a FAC, whereby the attack is maintained continuously with no break for the defender until he either surrenders, withdraws, or is destroyed. So we are talking of rocket attacks that might go on continuously all day with most, if not all, of the 2nd TAF's aircraft to draw on. Imagine being in a tank with rocket-firing Typhoon after rocket-firing Typhoon coming in at you all day, with only perhaps a quarter, or perhaps half a minute in between aircraft. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 19:46, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

BTW, the 'Cab Rank' system worked like this. The ground force would have an attached RAF ground controller in wireless communication with RAF operations and also with the pilot's VHF radios. Should he need to call on support from Typhoons or similar, he would radio in, and two Typhoons (or as many as he thought were needed) would immediately take off and fly to the requested target area, and on arrival, call the RAF ground controller on VHF voice radio for instructions, then following up by attacking the target with guns, rockets, or bombs. While the first two Typhoons were attacking the target, two more would be taking off, and proceeding to the area as backup, should the first two aircraft not succeed in destroying the target. Upon arrival, if needed, they also would be guided on to the target by the ground RAF officer, and the initial two aircraft would be on their way home to refuel and rearm. At the same time, a third set of two Typhoons would be taking off, and flying to the target area, again, if needed should the second two aircraft fail to destroy the allocated target. Eventually it would be the turn of the refuelled and rearmed first two aircraft again, and again if needed they would take off and again fly to the target area. The point of this was that the attack would continue as long as it was required, and in theory, the ground controller could call on the entire 2nd TAF if needed, as the Typhoons came on a 'cab rank' system, of 'first come, first served', any available Typhoon could be called upon by the ground controller and directed to attack the target. The Typhoons were based on the Advanced Landing Grounds so the flight time to and from the target areas was only measured in minutes. As soon as one set of aircraft ran out of ammunition, another fresh set arrived to take over from them. And so on.

This system was originated by Arthur 'Mary' Coningham in the Western Desert.

It's called a 'Cab Rank' system BTW, as it works like a taxi stand, where the cabs line up and the one at the head of the line gets the fare. The one with the fare leaves, and the others all move up one, and the new one at the front gets the next fare. Later the original cab returns, and goes to the back of the line, moving up until he is at the front of the line again. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 21:45, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Quote below referring to the Battle of the Falaise Gap:

"The chief credit in smashing the enemy's spearhead, however, must go to the rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force. The result of the strafing was that the enemy attack was effectively brought to a halt, and a threat was turned into a great victory." - Dwight D. Eisenhower

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.24.215.150 (talk) 07:40, 9 August 2014 (UTC)

The supposed 20:1 overclaim by Typhoon pilots attacking tanks, compared to the usual 2:1 or 3:1 in air-to-air combat, is odd. It does not seem very likely that pilots overclaimed that much, especially considering the unanimous view of German tank crews that when Typhoons appeared, the panzers' day was done. It is worth recalling that the post-battle assessments were made by army officers, who would be keen to show that the air force did nothing and the army did everything. It is also worth recalling that at Mortain, soldiers of the US 30th Division, cut off on Hill 314 with a spectacular panoramic view of the battlefield, saw the artillery and ground anti-tank guns continually re-killing German tanks that had already been knocked out. As soon as the wreck wasn't giving off smoke any more, it was considered 'live' and artillery and anti-tank fire would be called down on it. And this went on for days. The same wreck could be re-killed half a dozen times. And in the post-battle assessment, only a wreck that was found to have been hit solely by Typhoon rockets and by no other Allied ordnance of any kind at any time would be credited to the Typhoon pilot who had in fact killed the thing. It was presumably the same on the Goodwood battlefield earlier that summer. And at Goodwood large numbers of knocked-out German tanks were towed away for possible repair or to be cannibalised for spares, and none of those kills would figure in the army's post-battle assessment. Hence, perhaps, the illusory '20:1 overclaim'. The article probably should not give so much weight to such a flimsy argument. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:04, 18 August 2015 (UTC)

It is curious fact that the people attempting to minimise the effects of the rocket attacks seem to miss the fairly important point that if the rockets had been that inaccurate the RAF would probably not have bothered to use them in the first place.

There is plenty of gun-camera footage on YouTube showing 60lb RP's successfully hitting their targets, although the success or failure in this does seem to depend to a great extent on the skill of the pilot, many of the less skilled ones firing their rockets when still way out of range — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.30.162.162 (talk) 14:22, 13 September 2016 (UTC)

The actual post-Mortain report by ORS2 can be found by clicking the link here: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA951850

It is evident that ORS2's officers just wandered around the battlefield and made random observations, like opinion pollsters. These observations were not intended to be exhaustive or definitive. It is also evident that, according to ORS2's random survey, the number of enemy AFVs destroyed by the US Army in an entire week, compared to the number destroyed by Typhoons in a single afternoon, isn't very impressive. In regard to Panthers, they found 5 certainly destroyed by RPs (rocket projectiles -- they could not say whether these were RAF or US Ninth Air Force, though most RP strikes were RAF), none destroyed by cannon or machine guns, 1 destroyed by a bomb (again, could have been RAF or Ninth Air Force), 6 abandoned by crew (ORS2 believed abandonment was due to air attack), 4 destroyed by crew, 14 destroyed by US Army (artillery, bazookas or anti-tank rounds), 3 destroyed by unknown cause (too messed up to tell). That gives a total of 6 destroyed by air weapons, 6 abandoned presumably due to fear of air attack, 4 destroyed by crew, 14 by US Army ground weapons, 3 unknown. Since ORS2 attributed abandonment to air attack (German tank crews were only observed to bale out of undamaged vehicles for that reason), you've actually got 12 Panthers accounted for by air attack compared to 14 by ground weapons. Plus 4 'destroyed by crew' for whatever reason and 3 'unknown causes'. When you consider how much more time the US ground forces had to address the problem, with all the advantages of constant proximity, it's surprising that their tally was so little better than that of the air forces.

In regard to Panzer Mark IVs, there were 2 killed by RPs, 1 by bomb, 1 abandoned, 5 destroyed by US Army, 1 destroyed by unknown cause.

In regard to armoured troop carriers: 7 destroyed by RPs, 4 by aircraft cannon or machine guns, 1 abandoned, 3 destroyed by US Army.

In regard to armoured cars: 1 destroyed by RP, 5 by US Army.

In regard to armoured recovery vehicles: 1 destroyed by US Army. Khamba Tendal (talk) 19:53, 16 January 2018 (UTC)

Anthony Beevor, in Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 (Penguin, London, 2019, ISBN 978-0-670-91867-6), p.302, has this German account, from Cornelius Ryan's archive, of the fighting on 'the Island' south of Arnhem on 23 September 1944, when 43rd Wessex Division were attacking II SS Panzer Korps: '"We had four Tiger tanks and three Panther tanks," Horst Weber [Sturmmann, 21st Panzergrenadiers, 10th SS-Panzer Division 'Frundsberg'] recounted. "We were convinced that we would gain another victory here, that we would smash the enemy forces. But then Typhoons dropped these rockets on our tanks and shot all seven to bits. And we cried. We cried from sheer rage, that there could be such injustice, that the soldiers on one side should have everything and the soldiers on the other side should have nothing. We would see two black dots in the sky and that always meant rockets. Then the rockets would hit the tanks which would burn. The soldiers would come out all burnt and screaming with pain." ' So the Typhoons scored seven out of seven. Contemporary Allied and German accounts usually do suggest that the rocket-firing Typhoon was far more effective than recent interpretations of rather iffy after-action surveys allow. The Typhoon was feared by the Panzertruppen for a reason. Khamba Tendal (talk) 16:18, 27 August 2019 (UTC)