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On the definition

As I mentioned above, I am not a fan of the current opening definition, which invokes impediment and constraint. These are terms typically used to characterise compatibilism, and so are not topic neutral, nor is the definition a standard one. The most common definition is modal: the ability to have done otherwise, or to choose between different possible actions. The problem is then to reconcile this with the 'necessity' of determinism. Compatibilism involves defining possibility and necessity, incompatibilism involves the view that these are strictly contradictory – no more than one alternative is possible under the strict reading of 'necessary'. Thus the medieval compatibilists argued that while God knows everything in advance, and even though he has pre-ordained everything, he has neither caused these things, nor made them necessary. Hobbes by contrast (as far as I know) accepted that the future is necessary, but redefined 'possible' – different courses of action are possible if there is no external constraint. And so on. Peter Damian (talk) 08:13, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

A rewrite, with references, is certainly possible.Rick Norwood (talk) 11:55, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

All of these definitions are really circular when closely examined. The folk concept is that an action is freely willed if it is caused by my choices and if my choices are not caused by anything. That isn't circular; unfortunately it is nonsense. Philosophical definitions can be characterized as efforts to convert the folk concept into something that isn't nonsense. But there isn't much unity in the approaches that various philosophers take to that problem. Looie496 (talk) 13:46, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

“The folk concept is that an action is freely willed if it is caused by my choices and if my choices are not caused by anything.” I don’t believe this is the folk concept. In any case, I don’t see how the proposed definition (free will = the possibility of acting otherwise) is circular. This does not involve the notion ‘cause’, but rather appeals to the notions of possibility and necessity. Peter Damian (talk) 16:14, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

On the 'unity' of definition, see the samples below. We should generally prefer the definition used by reliable sources. The problem with the current definition is that hard to locate it in reliable sources. Peter Damian (talk) 16:34, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree with that. I think we are going to be stuck summarizing a range of definitions, though. At least the situation is not quite as bad as for consciousness, where many authors refuse to define the term at all, claiming that everybody knows what it is. Looie496 (talk) 14:34, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

I'm all on board with using "ability"-type language (which you might note we already do), but I'm concerned with the language of "The problem is then to reconcile this with the 'necessity' of determinism." Only incompatibilists find there to be any problem of reconciliation there; by most compatibilist conceptions of free will determinism is trivially irrelevant, and other, entirely different things are of concern (depending on which different concept you're looking at); the only reason for a compatibilist to discuss determinism at all is to defend against incompatibilist insistence that it is a problem, which argument boils down to whose conception (or definition, if you will) of free will is the right one. As such, for the sake of neutrality, we have to make sure not to define free will in this article in a way that frames it somehow inherently contrasted with determinism. "Necessitation", broadly construed, might still be acceptable language to replace the "impediment" or "constraint" language, so long as it's clear that it's not intended to mean exclusively necessitation of the strict and universal deterministic type. For that reason I think it is important that we maintain a brief list of examples of things that different conceptions of free will say will must be free of, to make clear that beyond a very bare-bones common ground involving an ability (possibility) to do something freely (not necessarily otherwise), the very definition of free will is a matter of debate.

I don't think we should go the route of avoiding definition at all though, and we need to be especially wary of use-mention confusion, e.g. "free will" may be a term of art, but free will is not a term of art, or a term at all, and Wikipedia articles are generally supposed to be about topics, not terms. We need to say that free will is something, but what something we say has to be insubstantial enough that it doesn't step on any point of view's toes; we can then add a bit more substance with a short list of how different points of view would elaborate upon it, being clear all the while that this list is not exhaustive and all these elaborations are contentious. That's what the current lede, in its original form, was trying to do; say roughly that free will is the ability to will freely, but that what it needs to be free of is contentious and here are just some examples of answers to that (with "determinism" just one of those, albeit probably the first). I'm more than happy to tweak the exact language used to convey that kind of idea, if "constraint" or "impediment" sound biased toward compatibilism somehow, but I can't think of and haven't seen anything that improves upon that structurally. --Pfhorrest (talk) 18:27, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

Reductio ad absurdum? LoveMonkey 19:43, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

Is this supposed to be a response to me, or a misplaced response to someone else? I'm lost. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:40, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

Well can you post where science has empirically demonstrated determinism? Where they have modelled precisely any future event, correctly for example? Can Science validate determinism if so what experiments? Also wouldn't those experiments invalidate things like irreversibility? LoveMonkey 20:19, 19 May 2015 (UTC)

I'm still lost here. I didn't claim anything about science having proven determinism. It seems like you've having a different conversation than I am. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:28, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

As a definition of free will must not fall into circular reason it must not fall into Reductio ad absurdum let alone reductio ad infinitum. As I glean you are trying to express also too (editor Pfhorrest), as you pointed out the definition must be not given in connection to determinism. I posted a very short why to that. The why being because determinism does not show itself to be validatable by science as determinism can not be demonstrated it can not be empirically shown to exist anymore than a quark can. However people can believe in determinism as they can believe in randomness and indeterminism even though any single incident can not be scientifically proven to be random or determined, as an event can not be scientifically proven to be caused by a single cause, nor can any event be completely modeled to show all of its causes. As any given event (say a flag flowing in the wind) can be shown to have billions if not infinite things that influence that designated event. The only real illusion here is that the objective world can be modelled in its entirety as it is very much a matter of science that since not all things or concepts have a cause and or are caused per se there is no real science to speak of the objective world as deterministic (determinism is an opinion). This is of course something that is being neglected on a larger scale here because no one seems to even mention the proper way of dealing with this as an issue of epistemology. I will leave that alone and anyone interested in that can read people like William James or C. S. Pierce. As with such articles, it is always found impossible to validate any concept by reason alone.

I am here to point out the most neglected part of this and then I will leave this article alone. My point is those who argue that others ought to deny human freedom or rather that free will has something to do with freedom. That which is called free will and the ability to be free or act as they will. They should be more forthright and direct as common people understand that people whom argue against freedom of will or against any kind of freedom do so at the risk of making what ever discipline they represent a then discipline of authoritarianism (religion, legalistic, scientific, governmental). Freedom is a philosophical concept (it is a cornerstone to liberalism) I have as of yet to see freedom be proven scientifically or by reason alone. And I can say that I am motivated to respond here because this implied intuition of people (free will has something to do with personal freedom) is something either outright attacked, ignored or obfuscated. I do not expect any kind of response to the substance of this as I have tried here before and my concerns were deleted. I just hope that science and reason (law) and or medicine do not become organs of authoritarianism or repression because they can not by reason or science prove and or even explain that people can or should be able to act upon their own will or volition. LoveMonkey 15:13, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

I haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about. Peter Damian (talk) 18:14, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

@user:Pfhorrest I don’t understand why you are concerned with "The problem is then to reconcile this with the 'necessity' of determinism." Clearly it is a problem under the common definition of free will, i.e. the possibility of doing otherwise. The problem for the compatibilist is to define liberty in a way that doesn't conflict with necessity, so it's a problem (even if only a problem of definition).

" Only incompatibilists find there to be any problem of reconciliation there" No, compatibilists also find a problem using the common definition of freedom. They avoid the problem by redefining it ('freedom from impediment').

" which argument boils down to whose conception (or definition, if you will) of free will is the right one" yes this is correct, but by the same token you can't have the sort of neutral definition you want. The conflict is between the natural conception of free will (more than outcome is possible), and determinism (one of the outcomes is necessary, ergo only that one is possible).

The problem is that you seem to be taking "the common definition of free will" to be the incompatibilist one, which biases the article toward incompatibilism. (I would guess from that that you are yourself an incompatibilist, and probably always have been?) Within incompatibilism, libertarians and hard determinists argue over whether determinism is true and thus poses a problem for free will; the compatibilist (of any flavor) observes this debate and asks "why would there be a problem?" A compatibilist would not be thinking about the relationship between determinism and free will if incompatibilists hadn't brought it up first; but because incompatibilists are the ones who see a philosophical problem to be solved there, they framed the terms of the debate that they started, and everyone who doesn't see a problem at all gets lumped together as those-not-participating-in-that-debate. In turn spawning a second-order debate about whether there's any problem needing solving at all, which becomes a debate about definition; but to frame compatibilism entirely as a reaction to the incompatibilist debate, a reaction that proceeds by "re"defining things, privileges the incompatibilist definition as the "default" one, and frames compatibilism as some kind of clever wordplay to dodge the assumed-real issue. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:40, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

" so long as it's clear that it's not intended to mean exclusively necessitation of the strict and universal deterministic type." I don't understand this.

I mean that there are many different senses in which something might be "necessary", or conversely someone might be "free" to do something, and that at least some of these different senses correspond to different senses of the term "free will". Some things are logically necessary, and it would simply be incoherent to even think of them being otherwise, so nobody is free in any sense to make them otherwise. But amongst things that are not logically necessary, that are merely logically contingent, that are logically possible to be otherwise, some might still be metaphysically necessary, necessitated by the laws of nature and the initial state of the universe, even though it would be logically possible for them to be otherwise given a different past or different laws, so though such things are free one sense to be that way (it's logically possible for them), they are not free in another sense. It's freedom of that sort that the incompatibilist sense of "free will" is concerned with.

But even amongst things (if any) that are not necessary in that sense, they may be necessary in still other senses; if I'm chained to a wall in a cell, it's not possible for me to walk out of the building, even if it is the case that me being thus chained to the wall is not metaphysically necessitated and I could very well have avoided that predicament; it is not the laws of nature and the past state of the universe that have limited my freedom, but the chains and walls and bars, which could still be there even if the universe is non-deterministic. Classical compatibilists like Hobbes and Hume considered that the only kind of freedom that is relevant to free will, though today we could call that instead "freedom of action".

Even someone, in an indeterministic world, who is not chained up behind bars, might be in other senses necessitated, and not free, lacking possibilities to choose from. Something might be illegal, or otherwise prohibited with the threat of some kind of punishment or censure; doing that might not be possible in a legal or social sense, and doing otherwise might be, in the same kind of sense, "necessary". Today we'd usually call this political liberty and not conflate it with free will but I have a dim memory of some modern-era philosophy, perhaps Rousseau, considering that kind of freedom all that was necessary to freedom of will. But that dim memory aside, there's still other kinds of freedom, possibility, and necessity; perhaps we live in an indeterministic universe, and I am not in chains behind bars, and it is perfectly legal for me to do so, but it is not economically possible for me to take a flight on Virgin Galactic; I do not have that economic freedom, and I am economically necessitated to state on the Earth. I'm not aware of anyone who would conflate that kind of freedom with freedom of will, but it's an example of yet another sense besides the logical or metaphysical ones in which someone's actions might be necessitated.

Coming back around to actual compatibilist conceptions of free will though, we might live in an indeterministic universe, and I am not in chains behind bars, and it is legal for me to do so, and supposing I was able to afford to do so, I might still in yet another sense not be free to fly on Virgin Galactic; if perhaps I have a crippling fear of flight, and though with all of my best logical reasoning and deliberation I decide that I ought to fly on Virgin Galactic for some reason, I identify with that decision as my will, what I have chosen to do... despite that, I might still be unable to bring myself to actually do it, not because of determinism or chains or laws or money but because of some psychological compulsion. So in yet another sense, I might thus be not free, and my choice to stay on the ground necessitated. This is the sense of freedom that contemporary compatibilists like Frankfurt are concerned with.

The point is that every different kind of compatibilist has a different take on what would constitute a threat to free will, what sense of "free" the will needs to be, in what sense it needs to be not necessitated; the only thing they have in common is agreeing that that relevant thing to worry about is not the possibility that all our choices are causally determined; that the question of determinism could turn out either way, and it wouldn't matter, but something else would still matter.

And that I think the best way to give a neutral definition of free will in the article is to make clear that there is not consensus on what "matters" thus, and that determinism is only one (if a very notable one) of a number of different answers to the question of what is it important for the will to be free of. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:40, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

"free will is the ability to will freely, but that what it needs to be free of is contentious and here are just some examples of answers to that (with "determinism" just one of those, albeit probably the first" It's this idea of 'freedom from determinism' that I find difficulty in getting my head round. Can you find any source whatsoever that characterises it in this way. I understand 'freedom from impediment', because an impediment is a kind of obstacle. But freedom from a theory (given that 'determinism' is an 'ism', i.e. a theory or principle)? That's a bit weird. Anyway, it would be useful to understand where you got this from.

Peter Damian (talk) 21:28, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

Freedom from the theory in the sense that incompatibilists consider that if determinism were true, that would be a problem for free will; so the important kind of "freedom" to an incompatibilist is the freedom that comes from determinism being false. But, as above, there are other senses of freedom, possibility, and necessitation that we could talk about, and different kinds of compatibilists think that various of those other senses of the words are the more relevant ones, and it doesn't matter whether determinism is true or false; that it being false wouldn't grant any important kind of freedom, and it being true wouldn't take away any important kind of freedom. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:40, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] I also don't understand whether (on your view) a compatibilist thinks that free will is free from determinism, whatever that means? Does it mean free from being necessitated? But surely a compatibilist does believe a free action (by his/her definition of 'free') is necessitated. So how is it free from being necessitated? Peter Damian (talk) 21:35, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

I think you might be conflating "compatibilist" with "soft determinist", when the latter are a subset of the former. Soft determinists say that determinism is true (and thus that actions are necessitated in that sense), but that that's not a problem for free will because the important, relevant kind of necessitation/possibility is a different one. (On which different one, different soft determinists will disagree). A compatibilist just says the latter (that determinism being true or false is not important to whether or not we have free will), without necessarily being committed to the former. For instance (and my cards on the table here I guess), I'm a Frankfurtian-style compatibilist, and well-versed on modern physics enough to know that determinism is empirically false to the best evidence we have at hand. I just think that fact of indeterminism is not relevant to free will. Scientists could discover tomorrow that quantum indeterminism isn't real, that there actually are hidden variables after all and everything is deterministic at the bottom, and it wouldn't have any impact at all on my view of free will. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:40, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the detailed and considered reply.

"I would guess from that that you are yourself an incompatibilist". Not at all. The idea that different actions are possible, is perfectly compatible, to my mind, with the hypothesis that the world is entirely deterministic. Note my original scare quotes in "The problem is then to reconcile this with the 'necessity' of determinism." Why should determinism imply necessity?

But anyway. Now I have a bit better understanding of what your introduction means, but it took a while, and I regard myself as moderately competent in philosophy. So it needs to be a bit more coherent. The idea that free will is the ability to make choices "unimpeded by metaphysical constraints [list]" is bordering on incoherence. I know you want to provide a 'neutral' definition, but you have to bite the following bullet: philosophers mostly do not argue about matters of fact, but rather about definitions. From which it follows that they will mostly disagree about which definition is the right one. Ergo, a neutral definition is impossible. Start with the most commonly recognized one, or the one from which the problem starts, and work on from there.

Just because there will be disagreement on a fully fleshed-out definition does not mean that there is no bare-bones common ground that everyone would agree on, at the cost of it not saying very much. We have to at least minimally define the topic that the article is going to discuss, and we have to do so in a way that does not privilege any one of several contentious points of view. We can of course discuss the best way to do that, but I don't see how we can excuse not doing that, either by avoiding a definition at all, or by privileging a contentious one.

That said, I haven't objected to your suggestion by saying that it is contentious or biased, but just that if we roll with it we need to be wary of doing so in a way that does not introduce bias. More below... --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:28, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

Also, Wikipedia must be reliably sourced. In all of my reading on the subject of free will, the definition in the current version of the article I have never encountered. Can you provide any reliable sources for this definition? Note that it is not enough to deduce it from recognised sources. You need to find something as close to that as you can.

Turning to the 'common definition'. There is such a thing as the 'traditional definition'. I have some notes here, but consider particularly Inwagen: "almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act". Consider also the 'historically very well known' formulation ('could have acted otherwise'). James Miles talks about a 'widely taken' conception.

I don't object to something like that as such. As I said before, I don't think that there is a problem with modal language about ability, possibility, necessity, etc. "Could have acted otherwise" and the like sounds perfectly neutral to me. I only get wary if we start to suggest that [the potential truth of] determinism is necessarily a threat to the possibility of doing otherwise, or that it is the only threat to doing otherwise that is of concern, because there are notable sources (pick any compatibilist) that do not consider that a concern, and who variously consider a number of other different things of greater concern. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:28, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

You might complain that this 'biases the article toward incompatibilism', but (a) the possibility of doing otherwise is not logically inconsistent with determinism, as I pointed out (b) even if it does presuppose incompatibilism, you could begin "the traditional conception [ref] of free will is [possibility of alternative actions etc]. It has been widely held by many philosophers that this is incompatible with the hypothesis that the universe is determined [etc]. Other philosophers hold these are not incompatible, or that appropriately modified conceptions of free will and/or determinism not incompatible.

That sounds structurally alright to me, but add on a few examples of what those other philosophers are concerned about instead and it doesn't sound so dissimilar in structure from what we've already got, either. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:28, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the comments, I will look at the rest of the introduction this weekend. Peter Damian (talk) 18:14, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

This sets up the introduction nicely.

In summary, the opening definition needs to be (1) coherent and understandable by Wiki's target audience (which includes many people not at university), (2) adequately sourced. Peter Damian (talk) 18:48, 19 May 2015 (UTC)

Sample definitions

See below. The majority of these involve the modal concept (i.e. possibility or ability to act otherwise). But one of them invokes the causal notion.

• SEP (Free Will) the “capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives”.
• SEP (Foreknowledge and Free Will) "if you cannot do otherwise, you will not perform the act freely".
• Arguments for Incompatibilism "It is generally agreed that problems of free will are problems about our capacity or ability or power to perform certain kinds of actions"
• SEP fatalism "An action is free in the required sense if not causally determined and not predetermined by God".
• Catholic Encyclopedia (Free Will) "power of real choice, true ability to determine the course of his thoughts and volitions, to decide which motives shall prevail within his mind, to modify and mould his own character?"

Sample non-definitions

I just want to point out that the majority of tertiary sources emphatically do not define free will the way we try to. The lead sentence of SEP and IEP are notoriously evasive:

• “Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (SEP)
• Most of us are certain that we have free will, though what exactly this amounts to is much less certain. (IEP)

Note that the SEP does not say "free will is a capacity...", it says that "free will is a philosophical term of art". This difference is significant because it could be that this particular capacity has nothing to do with "willing" at all. In any case, these sources explicitly acknowledge the difficulties and lack of unity in defining free will. I want to raise the possibility that we should maybe also do something similar. Vesal (talk) 17:47, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree and see some other examples of avoiding a definition. However, the majority of RS do seem to attempt a definition, and the concepts of necessity and possibility (could have done otherwise) are central to the problem. Perhaps begin by pointing out the difficulty of defining free will, but that it is commonly defined as the ability to do otherwise. Peter Damian (talk) 18:06, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

Note also that Hume entitles his famous discussion in Part III sec. 1 of the Treatise "Of liberty and necessity". Much of the discussion is around the nature of necessity. Peter Damian (talk) 18:12, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

Some more points:

• The modal definition ties neatly with the notion of responsibility. "The defendant could not have avoided the accident". Therefore the defendant is not to blame.
• And isn't this the 'folk notion' of freedom of action? By contrast, the idea of a self-caused event is a philosophical one, and which would never have occurred to me had I not studied philosophy.
• If we cannot even define free will, if we cannot even say what it is, how can we say that it contradicts the idea of free will? For p and q to be contradictory, i.e. p iff ~q, we must be able to say what p and q are. That is a matter of logic.

Peter Damian (talk) 18:55, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

As I wrote earlier, this is a literature characterized by loose reasoning. If we try to impose logic on it, the result will be OR. Our job is to hold our noses and neutrally summarize the range of arguments that authorities have used, regardless of how illogical they may be. Looie496 (talk) 14:34, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

OK. I thought this was on the mark, by the way.

Physics/science etc

"First, physics has addressed the question whether nature is deterministic" - has it? Peter Damian (talk) 19:27, 21 May 2015 (UTC)

It's a central issue in quantum mechanics. Einstein famously said "God does not play dice with the universe" -- his way of objecting to the mainstream interpretation of quantum theory. The issue of Nature that came out today has a long feature story about ongoing efforts by physicists to decide whether the superficial indeterminism of quantum mechanics hides a deeper underlying determinism. There may be other types of determinism (e.g. religious) that yield a different story -- one might for example say that God plays dice but knows how each roll will come out -- but it is beyond doubt that modern physicists have spent a lot of time arguing about determinism. And earlier, before quantum mechanics was formulated, the deterministic nature of Newtonian physics was something every physicist knew about, going back to Laplace. Looie496 (talk) 22:05, 21 May 2015 (UTC)

I am wondering how relevant it is, given that the basic idea was proposed by Chrysippus, and given that Epicurus suggested that the atoms might randomly ‘swerve’ from time to time, in order to avoid the problem of determinism. It’s misleading to give the impression that this is in some sense addressed by modern science. Peter Damian (talk) 18:03, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

"researchers can now watch the brain's decision-making process at work" ? Rather, doesn't the researcher monitor brain activity while the subject makes a decision (or attempts to make a decision, if the experiment successfully proves that the subject does not have free will, and therefore cannot make a decision)? Peter Damian (talk) 19:33, 21 May 2015 (UTC)

Do philosophers attach that much baggage to the word "decision"? To computer programmers, a program basically makes a decision every time it executes a conditionally branching logic pathway (i.e., a command of the form "if a is true, then do x, otherwise do y".) Neuroscientists use the word in a similar way. Looie496 (talk) 22:05, 21 May 2015 (UTC)

Philosophers get a bit sniffy if you say things like that. No problem if used figuratively of course, but it's like saying the brain drives your car. It's the person, strictly speaking, that makes a decision. Peter Damian (talk) 17:48, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

Trimming the introduction

I have simplified the introduction somewhat. I don't think I removed any significant claim, and certainly didn't intend to. Feel free to revert. I haven't touched the opening paragraph. Peter Damian (talk) 18:41, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

Mind body problem

Free_will#The_mind-body_problem is a bit of a mess. The real meat is only in the final paragraph. Any ideas about trimming it down? Presumably the real stuff is in Mind body problem itself? Peter Damian (talk) 18:44, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

Related Afd

See Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Friedrich Nietzsche and free will Peter Damian (talk) 06:27, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

Addition of Dilemma of determinism

I reverted all the edits of Piotrniz (talk · contribs), who seems to have a close connection with the Dilemma of determinism article [1]. Peter Damian (talk) 06:11, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

That of itself is OK but this seems to be taking his appeal to another page. The addition was poor, more a colloquial reporting in style. At best a sentence might be called for ----Snowded ^TALK 06:16, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

• The article on Dilemma of determinism is not mine, it seems to have been written by somebody knowledgeable in philosophy or at least somebody who read a lot of books on the topic. I prefer another version thereof: [2]. Please note that both the Hume's passes and the James' lecture were precisely on this topic (analysing of human freedom in terms of necessity and chance and discussing the argument of whether there can be any freedom when using such dichotomy; such chance/necessity analysis was also done by Schopenhauer and the argument was used by many modern philosophers, see the archival article from my link). Piotrniz (talk) 06:18, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

• The present state of the description of Pereboom's views is a joke. The old article on the Dilemma of determinism explained it better:(quote from Pereboom) "As has often been pointed out, such random physical events are no more within our control than are causally determined physical events, and thus, we can no more be morally responsible for them than, in the indeterminist opinion, we can be for events that are causally determined." Yet the whole dichotomistic argument (i.e. the one basing on the analysis of the extent of determinism and lack of determinism, here aptly called randomness) is missing in this version of Free will, like nobody earlier in the history of philosophy pondered it! Whereas many great minds understood the dichotomy and drew anti-libertarian, "hard incompatibilist" conclusions therefrom, as is proved by the old article on DoD. That's why an edit like mine should be included. If you dislike mine, please suggest which words should be changed and what is the wording that you can accept. I guess an admin or even owner – who knows who exactly – sold this topic for cash so I am now more careful editing. Piotrniz (talk) 06:22, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
  • I suggest you are sockpuppet either of Brews, or of Cmsreview (talk · contribs). The style is identical, the usual mish mash of unconnected quotations.Peter Damian (talk) 06:31, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
    • No, sorry, I live in Poland (you can find my blog easily) and don't read books in English, especially little known ones. How could I have got to know them? If I saw them in a book store, I would buy translated ones. Piotr Nizynski Piotrniz (talk) 06:38, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
      • OK apologies but the resemblance is uncanny. Peter Damian (talk) 06:48, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
      • That said, there are accusations of persistent edit warring and socking here. Could you take any proposed edits to talk page please. Thanks Peter Damian (talk) 09:39, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

Draft

I am drafting in my user space here. Comments welcome on the talk page, but please do not make any changes to the draft itself, taking all suggestions to talk page. I will make any necessary changes to the draft. This is part of an experiment. Draft flagship articles outside of main space, under a 'main editor', then get the article professionally peer reviewed. When completed, the article goes into a separate stable version with a prominent banner inviting the reader to choose between the peer reviewed version and the 'unstable' one. Peter Damian (talk) 12:07, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

My friend Anthony Cole is designing a similar process for medical articles. At least poor philosophy articles won't kill anyone. Peter Damian (talk) 12:11, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

Draft

Free will is traditionally understood as the ability to choose between different possible courses of action. It is sometimes also understood as origination, the power of choosing after a gap in the causal chain, so that the choice is uncaused by any previous event, whether external or internal. It is closely linked to the concepts of responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgments which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice, persuasion, deliberation and prohibition, which are pointless unless different possible results follow from different courses of action.

The traditional metaphysical problem of free will is to explain how this conception of freedom is consistent with the deterministic nature of the universe. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with the existence of free will as traditionally conceived. In addition to the metaphysical problem of free will, there is a closely related ethical problem. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame. If there is no free will, there is no justification for rewarding or punishing anybody for any action. Very few people are willing to accept that conclusion, but there is no consensus on the correct answer. As far as we know, the problem was first suggested by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.E., but it is still the focus of philosophical debate.

There are many different positions on the problem, broadly divided into two types. Incompatibilists hold that free will is not compatible with determinism. The two main incompatibilist positions are metaphysical libertarianism, the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible; and hard determinism, the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible. Compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of how choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs determinism a false dilemma. Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what 'free will' or 'determinism' even mean, and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue.

References

I think that's good enough to form a starting point. I would favor starting the second paragraph with "The traditional metaphysical problem of free will is ...", and collapsing the paragraphs on compatibilism and incompatibilism into a single slightly shorter paragraph. I would also propose adding a paragraph along the following lines:

In addition to the metaphysical problem of free will, there is a closely related ethical problem. Traditionally, actions are classified as voluntary (freely willed) or involuntary; only voluntary actions are seen as deserving credit or blame. If (the reasoning goes) free will does not exist, then no actions are voluntary, and therefore there is no justification for rewarding or punishing anybody for any action. Very few people are willing to accept that conclusion. The problem is how to escape from it.

This could be referenced to Dennett or other sources. Looie496 (talk) 14:22, 24 May 2015 (UTC)

Yes I agree and it ties in with the mention of responsibility, guilt, persuasion etc in the first paragraph. Peter Damian (talk) 16:09, 24 May 2015 (UTC)

Actually Aristotle (On Interpretation c.9) says something like this. He refers to the 'awkward results' following from necessity: " There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow." Aquinas adds that if so, "counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain". Peter Damian (talk) 16:17, 24 May 2015 (UTC)

Done.Peter Damian (talk) 16:54, 24 May 2015 (UTC)

Origination

I have added a short explanation of 'origination' to the opening. Peter Damian (talk) 15:51, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

Suggested revisions

I've been away for the holiday weekend, sorry I couldn't comment on this earlier.

I'm mostly OK with it but I would make some changes to it:

• First sentence, "traditionally understood as" is a bit weaselly and I would just strike it. I can't think of any point of view that would say that "the ability to choose between different possible courses of action" as a definition is biased against them (though plenty would say it's not sufficient, but what they would add to make it "sufficient" would be contentious), so I think we're OK to just say "Free will is..." that, without weasel words.
• The second sentence, about origination, is only of concern to incompatibilists, and so I think belongs further down in the part of the lede discussing them specifically, rather than up front as the second sentence of the lede. (This is one of those things that one POV would call necessary for a sufficient definition, but which other POVs would consider biased).
• Rest of the first paragraph looks good.
• Second paragraph, first sentence, "The traditional metaphysical problem of free will..." puts too much weight toward incompatibilism, and I would rephrase it as something like "A traditional concern regarding free will...". Using the indefinite article instead of the definite article feels more inclusive of (unstated) other concerns, and calling it a "concern" rather than a "problem" leaves space for the view that there really isn't any problem there to be solved with regard to determinism vs free will (i.e. compatibilism).
• Same sentence, "…how this conception of freedom...". Which conception of freedom? We haven't specified a particular conception yet. Perhaps prefacing this sentence with the relocated origination sentence would make clear that we're talking about that conception of freedom specifically.
• Same sentence, "… is consistent with the deterministic nature of the universe" sounds like it's asserting that the universe is in fact deterministic, which is both biased against metaphysical libertarians and also contrary to contemporary scientific consensus. A better phrasing might be "…can be reconciled with the possibility that the universe is deterministic", or something more to that effect; to say that this conception of free will would conflict with determinism if it were true, without saying one way or another whether determinism is true.
• Next sentence, "… free will as traditionally conceived" is again privileging the incompatibilist conception of free will as somehow default or normal or traditional. Writing "…free will thus conceived" or "…this conception of free will" instead would fix that.
• Next two sentences ("…the ethical problem…") sound like they would fit more naturally segueing directly from the end of the previous paragraph, without the determinism stuff in between. If that's done, I don't think the first of these two sentences is needed at all. We'd just have "...which are pointless unless different possible results follow from different courses of action. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame. If there is no free will, there is no justification for rewarding or punishing anybody for any action." That would also make the entire first paragraph, beyond the definition, about what is at stake regarding free will, before going into the possible threats to its existence (like determinism), which I think would read more nicely.
• Last two sentences of the second paragraph: It's not clear what conclusion and what problem are being referenced there. A literal reading of the second-to-last sentence of that paragraph suggests that the "conclusion" is the conclusion that "if no free will, then no responsibility", but that does not seem to be as contentious a position as the sentence claims; that seems to be accepted by basically everyone. It seems to me that the conclusion intended to be referenced is "there is no free will, therefore nobody is responsible", but that conclusion hasn't been made in any of the preceding text, so why are we discussing it there? In contrast, it seems like the "problem" in the last sentence is the problem of "if the future is determined, then nobody has any free will" (and consequently nobody is responsible, deliberation is pointless, etc). If my understanding of the intent here thus stated is correct, then I would get rid of the second-to-last sentence of this paragraph entirely (or maybe move it, with the preceding sentence, to the end of the first paragraph, with some changes, to serve as new concluding remarks there), and leave the last sentence as part of the paragraph discussing incompatibilism, though maybe change "problem" to "concern" for consistency and the reasons stated earlier.
• Third paragraph, first sentence: again not clear which problem we're talking about here, and it's problematic to say "problem". It seems that the "problem" intended is the free will vs determinism problem that incompatibilists are concerned with, but if so then this is a bad introduction to the rest of this paragraph, as compatibilism is not a position on the problem of free will vs determinism, it is the position that there is no such problem in the first place.
• Third paragraph, second and third sentences: I would integrate these into the second paragraph (after the changes above), naming the preceding conception of free will ("incompatibilism") and the two positions in the debate surrounding the conception. That would make the second paragraph all about the incompatibilist conception of free will and the problems it's concerned with. Then a paragraph break before moving into discussing compatibilists positions that are not concerned with those problems.
• Rest of the third paragraph: pretty good as-is. I would add to the end of it some of the information that was lost from the previous lede though, namely the other kinds of things that different compatibilists are concerned about; possibly naming "classical compatibilism" and "contemporary compatibilism" in there too.
• Maybe a good idea to add back a brief mention of hard incompatibilism, which despite having multiple proponents discussed in the body of the article was replaced with a sentence (then made a footnote) claiming that it has no proponents. This would go at the end of the incompatibilist (second) paragraph.

Here is my revised draft here. I'm going to go ahead and be bold and make these edits in the article too since it's mostly just rearranging what's already there and some minor rewording:

Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action. It is closely linked to the concepts of responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgments which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice, persuasion, deliberation, and prohibition, which are pointless unless different possible results follow from different courses of action. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame; if there is no free will, there is no justification for rewarding or punishing anybody for any action. Very few people are willing to accept the conclusion that there is no free will and thus that reward, punishment, deliberation, and so on are pointless, but there are numerous different concerns about threats to the possibility of free will, varying by how exactly it is conceived, which is a matter of some debate.

Free will is sometimes understood to mean origination, the power to break the causal chain of events, so that one's choice is uncaused by any previous event, external or internal. The concern for this conception of free will is to reconcile the existence of free will thus conceived with the possibly deterministic nature of the universe. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with the existence of free will thus conceived. As far as we know, this problem was first suggested by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.E., but it is still a major focus of philosophical debate. This conception of free will is called incompatibilism, because it holds that free will is not compatible with determinism. The two main incompatibilist positions are metaphysical libertarianism, the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible; and hard determinism, the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible. There is still further the position of hard incompatibilism, which holds not only determinism but also its negation (indeterminism) to be incompatible with free will, and thus free will to be impossible whatever the case may be regarding determinism.

In contrast, compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of how choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs determinism a false dilemma. Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" even means, and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatiblists such as Thomas Hobbes and David Hume considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if, had one (counterfactually) wanted to do otherwise, one could have done otherwise, without impediment. (Even if, because of determinism, one could not have wanted to do otherwise). Contemporary compatibilists such as Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf instead identify free will as a psychological capacity, such as to have causally effective desires about what one desires and which of those desires are effective on one's actions, or to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason. (Again, regardless of whether those psychological processes are deterministic or not). And there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns, sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will.

References

On the addition

• No significant comments on the revisions to existing material, but the addition to compatibilism completely unbalances the introduction. (i) it introduces material not in the article itself (ii) it goes into detail that would be better provided in the relevant section (iii) it makes the introduction too long. Would you consider moving it to the relevant section? Also, it is too significant an addition to discuss coherently. I appreciate you have been away this week.
• We now have 100 words on compatibilism, 233 words on compatibilism. That strikes me as unbalanced, particularly with regard to the balance of the article itself (although we have yet to discuss that).

Either we make the introduction longer (which is already too long) or we trim the 'compatibilism' section close to its original size. Another point " The concern for this [originationist] conception of free will is to reconcile the existence of free will thus conceived with the possibly deterministic nature of the universe." But the same problem applies to the 'traditional' definition. If determinism implies that the future is necessary (not that it does), then we cannot choose between different possible courses of action, because only one is possible, at least reading 'possible' in its modal sense. (Which we don't have to). Peter Damian (talk) 20:50, 27 May 2015 (UTC) Peter Damian (talk) 20:44, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

Oh no, " This [origination] conception of free will is called incompatibilism". This is incorrect. Incompatiblism is simply the view that free will and determinism are not compatible. The view that (i) free will is the ability to choose between different (modally) possible courses of action and (ii) determinism implies that only one course of action is (modally) possible, is a form of incompatibilism, obviously so, but it does not invoke origination. Peter Damian (talk) 20:56, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

"Classical compatiblists such as Thomas Hobbes and David Hume considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if, had one (counterfactually) wanted to do otherwise, one could have done otherwise, without impediment. " Again, if the future is necessary, one could not have done otherwise. The question is, whether determinism implies necessity. If the past is necessary, and determinism is true, then the future is necessary. But is the past necessary? Or, is the sense in which alternatives are possible the same as the sense in which determinism might say that only one alternative is 'possible'? Peter Damian (talk) 21:10, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

What material does my addition introduce that is not in the article itself? We have sections on the classical Hobbesian type of view and the contemporary Frankfurtian type of view already.

I strongly disagree that the addition to compatibilism unbalances the introduction; it is rebalancing it to give more equal weight to the wide variety of viewpoints that are not focused just on free will vs determinism. If anything, I'd say that there is still too much discussion of determinism in the compatibilist paragraph; I'd be happy to strike the two parenthetical sentences in it which serve only to reemphasize "regardless of the truth of determinism" if you think that helps trim it down. Given that every other conception of free will gets lumped under the umbrella term "compatibilism", I don't think it's a problem to use more words to summarize that than it takes to summarize the one incompatibilist conception, but for the sake of compromise I'm fine with trimming it down to equal length by tightening it up some somehow. But what we had before was sorely lacking, and pretty much only mentioned compatibilism as a footnote in a lede that was otherwise entirely about incompatibilist concerns. If we're going to go into so much detail on the issue that incompatibilists are concerned with (determinism), we need to at least gloss over the things that different compatibilists consider of greater concern (e.g. the freedom of action Hobbes cares about, the psychological capacities that Frankfurt cares about).

I might maybe be amenable to moving both of the second and third paragraphs of the lede into their respective subsections, but not just the compatibilist one, leaving incompatibilism to hog the lede. I don't really think that would be a great idea though, as it would leave the lede too short, with just the one paragraph.

With regard to the relation between origination and incompatibilism, I don't see how you think those two can come apart. Incompatibilists consider free will to be possible only in the absence of a deterministic chain of cause and effect. (Free will requires non-determinism). Origination"ism", if you will, defines free will as precisely such a break from such a deterministic chain of cause and effect. (The will is free if and only if it is not causally determined). How can those be separated? Can you name an example of a non-originationist incompatibilist, or a compatibilist originationist?

Your last paragraph just seems to be arguing against the classical compatibilist viewpoint, which would just say that even if the future is necessary (given the past and the laws of nature), one could still have done otherwise in the only way that matters for freedom of will. I'm not an advocate of that point of view and it wouldn't be appropriate for us to argue about that here even if I was; the point is just that that's what those people thought, and the article ought to report that they thought as much. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:00, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

OK you have already trimmed the intro. My problem was that it mentioned Susan Wolf, who is not mentioned in the article.

But it still reads “This conception of free will [i.e. as origination] is called incompatibilism, because it holds that free will [conceived as origination] is not compatible with determinism.” This is completely wrong. Hints in square brackets. Peter Damian (talk) 07:31, 28 May 2015 (UTC)

Actually, thinking about it, it's not obviously wrong. But it's wrong. Incompatibilism implies, but is not the same as, free will. If we define free will =df contingency, and if we define determinism =df necessity = non-contingency, then free will = origination = contingency, as you suggest. But some philosophers have argued that determinism does not imply necessity. (For example, if we hold that the past is not necessary). But if determinism does not imply necessity, free will does not imply origination. Thus it is correct to say that this conception as origination implies incompatibilism, but not correct to say that it is called 'incompatibilism'.

I think it would also be correct to call origination 'the incompatibilist conception of free will'. But it's still not correct to say that origination = incompatibilism.

Although we could equally say that the conception of determinism as necessity is 'the incompatibilist conception of determinism', and that this conception of determinism is called 'incompatibilism'. Which would be obviously wrong. Peter Damian (talk) 19:25, 28 May 2015 (UTC)

Some of your comments sound very strange and I wonder if maybe you misspoke somehow, but I'm not sure how. Mostly "Incompatibilism implies, but is not the same as, free will". I'm not at all identifying incompatibilism as free will, so it seems strange for you to refute that as though I asserted it; and stranger still, incompatibilism implying free will doesn't seem to make any sense either. Hard determinism is a form of incompatibilism that explicitly denies free will. Incompatibilism is only a position about the relationship between free will and determinism, and doesn't necessarily say anything about whether free will exists or not.

That aside, I also did not intend to identify origination itself as incompatibilism, but rather, to identify the conception-of-free-will-equating-it-with-origination with incompatibilism; or as you say, "origination is the incompatibilist conception of free will"; or turned around, "incompatibilists conceive free will as meaning origination"; or more like the way I wrote in the article, the-position-that-conceives-of-free-will-as-meaning-origination is called incompatibilism. That's all I meant to say. Is that fine with you? Just need to change some words to make it more clear that that's what's meant? --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:53, 28 May 2015 (UTC)

"but I'm not sure how" – sorry, I meant "Incompatibilism implies, but is not the same as, the originationist concept of free will. But the article still says "This conception of free will is called incompatibilism". This is clearly not correct. Nor is "the-position-that-conceives-of-free-will-as-meaning-origination is called incompatibilism" above. Incompatibilism is simply the position that free will (as conceived by incompatibilism) is not compatible with determinism. It would be correct to say "This conception of free will is called the incompatibilist conception of free will".

On this edit, to "This view that conceives free will to be incompatible with determinism is called incompatibilism", it still doesn't work. What does 'this view' refer back to? Logically to the beginning of the para, which begins "Free will is sometimes understood to mean origination". It's simply wrong to say that origination is called "incompatibilism". It's called 'orgination', period, and incompatibilism is called 'incompatibilism'. Of course you have "that conceives free will to be incompatible with determinism" in apposition, but then you have the problem of what 'this view' refers back to, when the only subjects previously mentioned are origination and determinism.

At this stage, and seeing the article is coming under attack from other editors, which in my experience always happens when an article undergoes significant change, I am contemplating copying the article to my user space. Anyone would be free to comment on the talk page, but not to edit the draft. Peter Damian (talk) 11:54, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

The paragraph begins with stating the conception of free will as origination, but it then goes on to discusses how determinism might pose a problem for free will thusly conceived. "This view" is the view under discussion for that entire paragraph, the view that considers free will and determinism at odds. "Origination" is not a view; it is a thing that a view (namely incompatibilism) equates with free will. Nothing written there is or ever has been equating origination itself with incompatibilism; that would be as absurd as, say, equating free will itself with metaphysical libertarianism. It is only identifying the originationist concept of free will, and all related concerns about a possible conflict between free will and determinism, as falling under the umbrella of incompatibilism.

Then it's rather poor writing, sorry. Peter Damian (talk) 18:29, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

I am not happy with the suggestion that you somehow take total control over this article with your userspace draft allowing comments only. Remind yourself of WP:OWN. (I'm not following it closely but the "attack" and response to Piotrniz below seems a bit out of line too). --Pfhorrest (talk) 17:49, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

In no way am I taking control. This is a draft in user space. I will get it reviewed by a professional academic, then we can take it from there in a number of ways. The least invasive would be to leave the current article in the (poor) state it is, but as the default view, but allowing the reader to choose the peer reviewed article if they want. Peter Damian (talk) 18:29, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

Compatibilism

Having skimmed through the literature, I don't think the current article represents all the varieties of compatibilism.

1. 'Medieval' compatibilism. Having alternate possibilities open does not conflict with determinism, understood as either God's foreknowledge or God's pre-ordination, because determinism in this sense does not imply necessity of any of the possibilities, and thus does not imply the impossibility of all but one of the alternatives. Anselm and all those who followed him represent this position.
2. 'Traditional (i.e. early modern) compatibilism. Having alternate possibilities open does not conflict with determinism, because although determinism does imply necessity, the sense of 'possibility' here is not the sense which conflicts with 'necessity'. Possibility means simply freedom from external impediment or compulsion. Hobbes and Hume represent this position.
3. Semi-compatibilism. There are no alternate possibilities open, but but moral responsibility does not require that there are alternate possibilities. Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer have argued for this. The current article mentions Frankfurt and Fischer but does not draw their views out.

Peter Damian (talk) 09:53, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

History

Draft for the (currently missing) history section

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Antiquity

See also: Free will in antiquity

Epicurus built on the early atomism of Leucippus and Democritus

We do not know whether the problem of free will was explicitly raised before Aristotle, although Leucippus (5th century BCE) supposed that everything happens for a reason and by necessity.

In his logical work On Interpretation, Aristotle questions whether propositions about the future can be determinately true or false. If so, then someone may predict an event ten thousand years ago, and if the prediction was determinately true at that time, the prediction “will of necessity take place in the fullness of time” . As this kind of determinism does not appeal to causation, it is sometimes known as logical determinism. Aristotle worries that if there were no real alternatives, there would be no point in deliberation, or in 'taking trouble' (πραγματεύεσθαι), and resolves the problem by rejecting logical determinism, claiming it is not always possible state determinately (διελόντα) which of several alternatives must come about.

Later, Diodorus Cronus (died c. 284 BCE) formulated a similar argument now called the Master Argument. The precise argument has not come down to us, but a possible reconstruction is as follows. If a future event is not going to happen, then it was a truth in the past that it would not happen. Since every past truth is necessary, it was necessary in the past that it would not happen, and so it is impossible it will happen. But the impossible cannot follow from the possible, therefore if something will not be true, it will never be possible for it to be true .

Epicurus (341–270 BCE) built on the early atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, arguing that everything that happens is the result of atoms colliding, rebounding, and becoming entangled with one another, with no purpose or plan behind their motions. His theory differs from the earlier atomists in that he claims that atoms do not always follow straight lines but may occasionally show a "swerve" (Greek: παρέγκλισις parenklisis; Latin: clinamen). It is thought by some modern commentators, but not by all that he introduced the 'swerve' as a necessary condition of volition or free choice. Epicurus also argued that both necessity and randomness conflict with the ideas of praise and blame. “... necessity destroys responsibility and chance is inconstant; whereas our own actions are autonomous, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach”.

Good work. Rick Norwood (talk) 11:57, 9 June 2015 (UTC)

Scholasticism

See also: Free will in scholasticism

References

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Please explain M1, M2, P1, P2, ...

See first diagram with caption "Various definitions of free will that have been proposed (...)". There are no explanation. --Krauss (talk) 03:23, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

I may be missing something but those definitions are in the main body ----Snowded ^TALK 04:52, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

No, not there (!), please check by ^F the words M1, M2, P1, P2... We must supply abbrev. explanation in any encyclopedic content. Please explain it in the caption. --Krauss (talk) 11:16, 27 June 2015 (UTC)

If you feel the need then propose an amendment, issuing premptory commands to other editors is generally not a good way forward ----Snowded ^TALK 13:09, 27 June 2015 (UTC)

Your article is very unsolid

and it ignores the fact that serious arguments have been raised against free will by philosophers. The 2 main arguments are (1) Standard argument against free will (aka: Dilemma of determinism), but this article was quickly deleted by your admins in about a week, I even suspected bribery, and (2) Infinite regression; then there is also (3), which was also deleted, about the whole idea of "Moral order of the world", Divine commandments etc., because free will in religion guarantees that "human will and choices are compatible with an Omnipotent and Omniscient God that raises certain obligations and moral junctions for men." (So if one, correctly, identifies lack of necessity with a chance, there is still the question of why this matters and what implications may this have, for example in the religious realm. Only in this context it becomes clear that it might be about controlling the uncontrollable, the "higher powers.") This text was removed from Free will header (first sententences) in ca. early 2015, amongst other consequent (more or less explicit) reverts of my good faith edits.

Generally, every time something wise is said about the topic, which shows that the debate in true philosophy and amongst professors may be long over, your admins delete it (or e.g. a user deletes it, but then either I am excluded from Wikipedia for "edit warring" or an admin comes and locks the topic; still, eventually always it is an admin who comes and shows that he is against you and this is how the topic must be). A very dishonest way of housekeeping.

So, to sum up:

• The article on Dilemma of determinism was barefacedly deleted from Wikipedia, in spite of proofs of support for the name from several different Professors of Philosophy and creators of famous trends in philosophy.
• The infinite regression argument (the problem of willing the will itself) is, happily, currently still mentioned in the article Incompatibilism#Libertarianism. But the main page on Free will is silent on this. You could add something like "The article on Incompatibilism cites the argument from infinite regression against the self-determination of consciousness, which was raised in the 19th and 20th centuries." It is a powerful argument which shows that the conscious power ultimately is not controlled by consciousness, so it reduces to the non-conscious. It is suitable in particular for combining with the "late" Standard Argument. The closest thing to this which you have in the present page is Frankfurt's hierarchical mesh. I am really no genius or discoverer here. Willing the will appeared first in Hegel's books but he was no opponent of religion, the problem was later demonstrated as an infinite regression by Schopenhauer in his prize essay.
• The problem of the importance of free will for the very existence of moral commandments in the light of the (late) standard argument is, likewise, removed from the article; it was highlighted in this version (see first sentences: "For example, in the religious realm..."). So now one might say that the bigger problem is about something else, which can be easily refuted by rejecting Determinism, e.g. in "others make you" or "God made everything" (in the latter case even the Scholastics who believed in strict causality and determinism of everything would say that not everything follows directly from God and many choices are contingent, although there is general Providence in this world, so the argument can be refuted even on grounds of determinism – you cannot control everything by controlling the laws of nature, of causality, or whatever). Or maybe the bigger problem is whether "God made Nazis do evil" (the same reply is possible again; you need Determinism, even under Determinism you might be wrong; besides, there could be factions of e.g. Christianity, like the Jazidis, which deny that world was created by God – for instance, the devil created it, nobody created it – but lack of free will still poses a challenge to them). In fact, the biggest problem about free will in religion is to avoid fatalism in morality, i.e. the stance that life is shaped by higher forces – and so God would request the impossible (by definition) and thus the thing about the "moral order of the world" as defined by Nietzsche in The Antichrist (sect.26) would be a nonsense and a contradiction. (This is by the way another thing which people have successfully hidden from articles on Nietzsche, because there were sections about it; and even a dispute about deleting Nietzsche and free will was open, which almost succeeded.) In this aspect, with such accent, not only determinism can be the foe and modern Hard Incompatibilists can have a word to say on this (see the old article on the Dilemma), one important for religions too. Various religions raise external tasks for men, but without free will it's like willing that laws of nature are X and non-X at the same time, or like willing that one controls the uncontrollable, the thing that is completely beyond influence by definition. The problem about "Judgements" is still a completely other case (even a bandit-alike judgement could happen anyway, there are arguments against this which are not related to the free will problem) but here only the very justification of morality is discussed.

All these 3 important achievements of philosophy are now hidden. It thus looks like a consequent admin-supported trend towards removing all signs of truth of Hard Incompatibilism from your articles, so that there is no trace of why Free Will would be impossible by virtue of reason alone. What you at present say about Hard Incompatibilism is hard to understand at all (whereas the article on Standard argument against free will – which really explained this position in detail – is now nonexistent). 195.250.54.46 (talk) 01:25, 13 September 2015 (UTC)

Theological determinism taxonomy

I am attempting to understand this edit concerning the removal of the theological determinism taxonomy [3]; https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Free_will&oldid=656728002 ("but that diagram is odd best, sometimes they help but this is not a subject susceptible to simple categories").

Does anyone have any specific references concerning "theological compatibilism" which contradict the theological determinism taxonomy that has been removed from this article (but is still being referenced to in the text)?

Or are there any references which indicate that the thelogical compatibilism/incompatibilism categories are invalid?

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 02:39, 18 October 2015 (UTC)

Intro Incompatibilism Prelude

The prelude to incompatibilism is unnecessarily restrictive. The breaking the causal chain analogy may have some historical significance, but it assumes that a rigid causal chain exists (deterministic physical law). Most (modern) metaphysical libertarianism discusses influencing causality but not breaking physical law. The example chosen appears to be an artefact of 1. substance/interactionist dualism and 2. physical determinism.

Although there may be some more precise edits in the history, I suggest changing;

"Free will is sometimes understood to mean origination, the power to break the causal chain of events, so that one's choice is uncaused by any previous event, external or internal. The concern for this conception of free will is to reconcile the existence of free will thus conceived with the possibly deterministic nature of the universe. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with the existence of free will thus conceived."

To;

"Some conceive free will to be the capacity for an agent to make choices in which the outcome has not been determined by past events. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with the existence of such free will."

The theological image in the intro also appears somewhat arbitrary. The 4 position taxonomy was more helpful.

The Free will Talk archives are also difficult to locate (perhaps the table of contents needs to be updated).

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 04:10, 17 October 2015 (UTC)

I have identified the relevant edits (discussed; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Free_will/Archive_25#Draft_2).

1. incompatibilist free will (metaphysical libertarianism) does not imply origination (e.g. centred accounts)

disputed edits: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Free_will&oldid=664192751

(see also [4] for history)

2. origination does not imply breaking a causal chain of events (e.g. efforts of will, centred accounts)

disputed edits: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Free_will&oldid=663987205

(see also [5] / [6] for history)

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 00:42, 18 October 2015 (UTC)

I'm Ok with that change - braking a causal chain implies a causal chain exists so unnecessarily restricted .... ----Snowded ^TALK 06:56, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Aristotle incompatibilism reference

I added the following citation required tag to the Aristotle incompatibilism association. I am not claiming this is a false association, I am merely requesting a citation.

As far as we know, this problem was first suggested by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.E., but it is still a major focus of philosophical debate.

Reason: the Susanne Bobzien reference "Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?" appears to argue against this. See also Susanne Bobzien#Determinism and freedom and "Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy"; "...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them".

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 07:08, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Wikipedia free will criticism

Wikipedia seems to follow Vatican's esoteric guidelines which say roughly that "the populace should believe «free will is simple and there are no arguments against it»." Note what happened to the article Dilemma of determinism (and there is at present a Proposed Deletion discussion). I believe it's got something to do with politics (& money, because Wikipedia is private whereas it speaks in a very coordinated manner on this aspect). The Catholic church, unlike many Protestant churches (sola fide), lives from sins, wants that man be considered guilty and almost the whole religious life of a Catholic is about sinning, penance and absolution. Turrp (talk) 17:31, 25 October 2015 (UTC)

Speak for yourself ----Snowded ^TALK 19:42, 25 October 2015 (UTC)

Dilemma of determinism?

There used to be such high quality article on the topic, distinguished as a separate term and argument by many philosophers and scholars. There's an ongoing discussion as to whether delete it (with no good reason except "protection of some forms of religion") or no. See Dilemma of determinism, Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Dilemma of determinism (2nd nomination)#Dilemma of determinism. It deserves more vote but Snowded supported by admins insisted on not including the article in its natural categories (8-9 categories or so) so it's almost unattended voting and, as far as I know, people on Philosophy group such as Brewsohare were banned for incorrect edits and view, so it's rather very biased. At present, if the article be deleted, no rationalist arguments are mentioned in Free will which would undermine the term, even though such arguments exist and are independent from determinism/indeterminism. See Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Dilemma of determinism (2nd nomination)#Dilemma of determinism. 78.146.121.60 (talk) 09:59, 6 November 2015 (UTC)