Talk:Ford Pinto/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

Intro order

I haven't weighed in on the language of the intro section. Given the current ~3 paragraph intro I think the fuel tank part should be the last paragraph. I'm also OK with basically arranging the article with the fuel tank stuff at the end. Basically discuss the car and sibling models first. This would include press reviews, SCCA etc. Once finished then move to the controversy section. I would suggest the intro should follow in the same order. To be fair, I do think that at this point the most significant thing about the Pinto is the fuel tank/safety controversy. I'm suggesting making it basically the second half of the Pinto article (in truth it could be a separate article) about the issue because I think the topic is too significant to mix between a discussion of the Pinto and Bobcat. For that same reason I think the controversy section should be the last paragraph, not the middle, of the intro. I also think that we should use terms like alleged or other words that indicate that many of the claims made against the Pinto regarding safety etc were not proven. Honestly we should treat MJ as an unreliable yet significant source in this article. Springee (talk) 20:48, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

The information in the lede should be provided in order of its notability. As you point out, the fuel tank controversy is more notable than other aspects. So why bury it in the lead?

We could probably make a spin-off article, but at this point, I don't think the Ford Pinto article as a whole is reaching or exceeding our article length limits. So I think we're fine.

You're probably right about the MJ article. I don't think we're currently using MJ to cite any information which isn't also contained in other, more reliable sources, right? NickCT (talk) 20:59, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

I agree that the "controvery" paragraph should follow the "Bobcat" paragraph. There is flexibility about the order built into lede guidelines. Putting the "controversy" after "Bobcat" not only puts the elements in chronological order, it moves from general information to specific, which is highly recommended for an introduction. Again, Mother Jones did not know then what we know now. It was making allegations.842U (talk)

@842U: - re "lede order" - It seems obvious to me that the more notable issue should appear higher in the lead. Would you like to poll other editors on this topic?

re "allegations" - I don't think we should use the word "allegations", unless we have reason to believe that some specific fact is in doubt. Is there any information we are pulling from Mother Jones that you think is in doubt? If so, could you point to the specific sentence? NickCT (talk) 21:33, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

Again, Mother Jones mis-characterized much of the data and the memorandum. They were writing an inflammatory piece. I'd be find with a group of editors reviewing the entire article.842U (talk) 21:36, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

Again, I think you're using a WSJ op-ed to support your "mis-characterization" statement. I agree MJ is a non-neutral source, but if we're going to point out stuff it got wrong, we shouldn't point to other non-neutral sources. NickCT (talk) 21:43, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

I think the MJ article gets singled out because, if I have my history right, it was the one that started the ball rolling. I read one article that said the feds didn't get involved until after the MJ article because it was causing a poop storm with people calling their Congressmen and demanding action. However, I think others such as the news broadcast on the story (forgot the network) further inflamed (:D) the public. I agree that MJ was going for impact rather than quality. Perhaps the others were as well. Maybe we should start the section with a statement noting something like "a series of (damaging?) allegations were made regarding...". That way it's clear that the material in the section is not what was later proven but what Ford was said to have done/not done. It certainly can be hard to pick the right langauge in a case like this. Springee (talk) 21:49, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

@Springee: - re "it was the one that started the ball rolling" - Yes. That's my interpretation too.

re "a series of (damaging?) allegations were made regarding..." - That's fine when talking about the MJ article. I'm opposed to using the word "allegation" next to anything that was later shown to be true though. Otherwise we'll confuse the reader. NickCT (talk) 21:55, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

NickTC, I understand the wish to put things in order of significance and generally agree. However, I think it's just a case of how we claim to be cutting up the topic. I would say the first two paragraphs are about the hardware (the automobile). I would group the Bobcat info into that hardware topic. This hardware had to come first (chronological) and without it the controversy can't happen thus it's more important. The second half of the article is the controversy. Thus I would see it as paragraph 1&2 are the hardware and 3 is the controversy. The first half of the article is hardware, the second half is controversy. Thus, and hopefully my intent is clear, both the article and intro are in chronological and significance order. It also just feels right to me. I get why you changed the order but I don't think it reads as well.

As for MJ references, I don't recall right now. I think in the past some non-controversial facts were cited to MJ. When I read over the current version of the article I wasn't checking and meant it as a general statement. It sounds like we are all in agreement in that regard.

As for "allegations", I'm not opposed to the word given that much of what MJ said was later proven to be wrong. However, I also understand it is a loaded word. What would be a good alternative? "Said" is perhaps OK but alleged really is, grammatically, the better choice. Perhaps WP:WEASEL can help.Springee (talk) 21:42, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

re "I'm not opposed to the word given that much of what MJ said was later proven to be wrong" - I keep hearing this repeated, but whenever I've asked to see the specific piece of information we're using which has been proven wrong, all I'm hearing are crickets.

re " I get why you changed the order but I don't think it reads as well. " - Ok. I guess I sorta see your point, but it really looks like we're trying bury important information by pushing it down in the lead. Ultimately I think this is going to be a pretty subjective question. Shall we do a simple straw poll? NickCT (talk) 21:51, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

There is quite a bit wrong in the article. I'm not sure how much was obviously wrong at the time and how much we might assign to deliberate bending of facts but one doesn't get far into the MJ article before realizing it isn't about the facts so much as the story. Look at the bullet points on the first page (response by bullet number) Warning, wall of text!:

2: Did Ford find in preproducion crash tests that the tank was ruptured extremely easily?

4: Ford waited 8 years. This is a bit misleading. Ford was caught out because they knew new safety regulations were going to be coming out. What they didn't want to do was spend a lot of money to make changes only to find that the new regulations made those changes instantly obsolete. This bullet also contains the claim about 500-900 deaths as of the time of the article. I'm not sure what records were available at the time but given that the total number was found to be grossly over estimated (note MJ actually reads as a statement of "already". Schwartz page 1029 clears this up. At the time of the recall shortly after the MJ article was released, the NHTSA said they were aware of only 38 examples of rear-end impacts which resulted in fuel leakage or fire. Those 38 resulted in 27 deaths. Schwartz noted that of that 27, the NHTSA didn't indicate how many would be saved by the safety features Ford later added and that many fire deaths are associated with very high energy rear impacts. I would say that counts as one example of at best sloppy reporting. At worst, deliberate overselling to create outrage.

5: Ford did wait a number of years before changing the car. However, as explained in Schwartz, Danley and Lee and Ermann, Ford didn't jump on modifying the car because it would take a few years to make some of the changes (auto production changes take more time than many might realize) and they knew that a new set of rules was just around the corner. So the MJ telling is grossly unfair to the company. Where the telling goes from unfair to a basic lie is in this same bullet, "Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner." This claim, which introduces the "memo" is simply not true. There is NO evidence that Ford used a human life calculation to decide what changes to make. Later in the article when MJ talks about the Memo they grossly mistate what it was actually about. It was NOT about rear impact performance. "This cost-benefit analysis argued that Ford should not make an $11-per-car improvement that would prevent 180 fiery deaths a year. (This minor change would have prevented gas tanks from breaking so easily both in rear-end collisions, like Sandra Gillespie's, and in rollover accidents, where the same thing tends to happen.)" Note the mention of roll overs? Well the memo was ONLY about roll overs and was based on a general response to regulators, not a specific car design (see Schwartz starting on page 1020). Danley noted of the memo, "This was NOT an analysis to determine the profitability for Ford, nor did the report include costs of litigation to Ford, or to any other manufacturer." Much of this is trying to create moral outrage in the readers. Lee and Ermann spend a great deal of time looking at what Ford knew and who in Ford knew it as a way to try to answer the question, what took them so long. One of their important points was that the number of actual fire deaths was not out of the ordinary so the company would have no reason to assume there was a significant problem. Danley dove into the issue that people saw the location of the gas tank and reasoned that it was clearly unsafe but such a conclusion ignores that the overall safety of the car is a composite of many different parts. His retrospective view certainly doesn't support the moral outrage MJ was attempting to incite. MJ claims that $5.08 per car could have saved a life (well $5.08* the number of pintos made). However, perhaps for $5.08 Ford could have improved some other part of the car and saved even more lives. Perhaps Ford already spent that $5.08 somewhere else and did save lives. I know that last bit is my OR but the point I'm making is MJ was clearly trying to make it look like it was obvious to spend the money but Ford didn't want to. Danley notes that it isn't simply to estimate the effectiveness of a safety feature before the car is in the wild. Thus what might seem like an obvious "fix" after the fact may not have looked like a problem before hand.

The article starts out describing a rubber-cloth fuel tank that could withstand impacts. What MJ was describing was a race car type fuel cell. The tanks are in fact very puncture resistant. They also degrade over time. MJ makes it sound like Ford had this perfect answer in their back pocket but chose not to use it because of cost. In fact, even today, decades later, those rubberized tanks are not used on street cars in part because they degrade over time.

MJ had a number of passages that really shouldn't pass the sniff test. In the quote below note that they mention Nixon (not a popular guy) and then imply the regulators were heartless. Lee and Ernmann would disagree here [quote from MJ]:

The Nixon Transportation Secretaries were the kind of regulatory officials big business dreams of. They understood and loved capitalism and thought like businessmen. Yet, best of all, they came into office uninformed on technical automotive matters. And you could talk "burn injuries" and "burn deaths" with these guys, and they didn't seem to envision children crying at funerals and people hiding in their homes with melted faces. Their minds appeared to have leapt right to the bottom line—more safety meant higher prices, higher prices meant lower sales and lower sales meant lower profits.

I would note that the MJ article seems to clearly want to indite anyone and everyone. Robert McNamera, certainly still unpopular due to his Vietnam involvement, was noted as a former Ford employee and it was implied that he was the origin of the government's use of "cost of life" calculations. MJ calls the NHTSA weak and suggests it is at the mercy of the car companies. That's a bit unfair since the agency was just 10 years old at the time and much of it's early existence was trying to come up with reliable, repeatable tests and measures. Today we take for granted that we have meaningful crash tests. At the time they didn't even know what they should test. MJ claims Ford was getting regulators to kill various regulations. In fact Ford, and the other car companies, were engaged in the usual back and ford negotiations that were part of the system (the act of Congress that created the agency said as much). It's also notable that the final laws were more stringent that Ford was suggesting and that had Ford made the safety improvements they had considered for the early Pintos they would have had to immediately upgrade the car again to meet the later standards.

Finally, we should be clear that MJ went deep off the advocacy end of things with this article. They held a press conference in DC (they are based in San Fransisco) with Nader and included clip out coupons that could be mailed to representatives demanding action against Ford. (Schwartz 1017). Springee (talk) 03:56, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

CRICKETS??????? I've told you the main faults in MJ. here's a longer version deindent for convenience

MJ 1

By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure could be as high as 900.

refutation Schwartz 27

MJ 2

Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.

No CBA was ever found for Pinto and rear end collisions (not saying it wasn't done)

MJ 3

The product objectives are clearly stated in the Pinto "green book." This is a thick, top-secret manual in green covers

Which MJ then contradicts by saying " The product objectives for the Pinto are repeated in an article by Ford executive F.G. Olsen published by the Society of Automotive Engineers." Highly unusual for a ford executive to print stuff from a TOP SECRET document, unless of course it isn't TOP SECRET at all. Maybe TOP SECRET is being used to make things more interesting.

MJ 4

To everyone's surprise, the 1977 Pinto recently passed a rear-end crash test in Phoenix, Arizona, for NHTSA. The agency was so convinced the Pinto would fail that it was the first car tested. Amazingly, it did not burst into flame.

Comment. I'm not amazed. it is not typical for a leaking gas tank to catch fire, whether in a crash test or anywhere else. It can certainly happen, but in the majority of cases I've seen gasoline pooling on the road, not burning.

MJ 5

Seventy or more people will burn to death in those cars every year for many years to come.

Schwartz 27 total

MJ 6

cost-valuing human life is not used by Ford alone. Ford was just the only company careless enough to let such an embarrassing calculation slip into public records.

Comment. Well, there'll be a whole damn lot more of these revealtions since it is standard practice mandated by NHTSA.

Greglocock (talk) 04:51, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

@Greglocock and Springee: - Guys. Lots of good thoughts here. I appreciate you've put a lot of thought into this. I would ask that we re-read my original query though; "I've asked to see the specific piece of information we're using which has been proven wrong," (bolding for emphasis). I didn't ask for information in the MJ article which has been proven wrong. You guys have pointed to a lot of questionable information in the MJ article, which we aren't reproducing in this WP article.

My position isn't that there weren't any problems with the MJ article. My position is that we're not reproducing any of that questionable content in this article.

Take for example the death stats Greg mentions. Those stats don't appear in this article, so why do we care?

So again, I'll ask; what information that we are providing in this WP article relies soley on facts presented in the MJ article?

I hate to say this, but there seems to be an obsession to bash the MJ article. Our job isn't to figure out the accuracy of the MJ article. Our job is to relate notable information about the controversy to readers. NickCT (talk) 10:03, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

We do have a section that talks about what MJ said in their article. If one wasn't familiar with the issues and read just that section they probably would not realize the facts of the article were questioned. As an example, the article says, "The magazine obtained a cost-benefit analysis that it said Ford had used to compare..." That is an attributed claim but there is no up front warning that the MJ claims are wrong/misrepresenting facts. Basically almost every MJ claim in that section was later proven to be false yet that link isn't really clear in the article. I'm hoping to get some time in the next few days to create some proposed edits. It's just a mater of free time. This is more fun but the other stuff is more important. Springee (talk) 14:56, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

@Springee: - I think we'd both agree that some of what MJ said was accurate and some was inaccurate. I also think we both agree that we shouldn't present inaccurate things MJ said without warning the reader. Do you currently think we are presenting inaccurate things MJ said without warning the reader? If so, what? I don't think you disagree with the cost-benefit thing, right? I mean, there was a cost-benefit analysis, right? So that part of the MJ article would appear to be true. NickCT (talk) 18:39, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

Actually I do think we should present the high impact, inaccurate things MJ said. The Pinto Madness article, gross inaccuracies in all was HIGHLY significant in forming the public understanding of the issue. To your cost benefit question, well I do agree that Ford did a cost benefit analysis that include a human life calculation (certainly the company did and still does hundreds of cost benefit calculations as part of their design process). However, MJ mislead their readers into thinking Ford did such a calculation as part of the Pinto's design process.

As an example consider the statement, "Tim hit Jim. Jim got a bloody nose". We really don't know much about Tim and Jim but we would reasonably assume Tim hit Jim and that resulted in a bloody nose. We also might assume Tim was trying to cause harm. But consider an extended version, "While playing Football on the Xbox Tim's player hit Jim's player. Jim tripped while leaving Tim's house and got a bloody nose". Well that totally changes things in the reader's mind. Yes, the original story is still "true" but it creates a very misleading impression. The MJ telling of the cost benefit analysis was at best a misleading presentation of facts. At worst it was a deliberate lie.

What I think the article should really do in this section is start with an into paragraph, not unlike the one we have now. Then perhaps follow a shortened presentation of events like Schwartz, Lee or Danley did. This section should start with a statement that it's presenting the "public perception" and can explain where that perception came from (MJ, 60 minutes etc). This can also include some of the time line as well as the history of the NHTSA initially saying no-recall and later Ford's "voluntary" recall. The later subsection can hit on which of the public perceptions were wrong (number of lives lost, memo, Ford's design motives etc). Springee (talk) 20:16, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

re "Actually I do think we should present the high impact, inaccurate things MJ said." - Again, if you reread what I wrote I don't think we're disagreeing here. " I also think we both agree that we shouldn't present inaccurate things MJ said without warning the reader." (bolding for emphasis).

re "MJ mislead their readers into thinking Ford did such a calculation as part of the Pinto's design process." - Maybe so. But we aren't saying in this WP article that the cost-benefit analysis was done as part of the design process, right? So why does it mater if MJ got it wrong? We're not, ourselves, misleading the reader. That's what important. As long as the information in our article is neutral and verifiable, why does it matter if MJ's wasn't?

re "low a shortened presentation of events like Schwartz, Lee or Danley did. This section should start with a statement " - Ok. Sounds interesting. Mock it up. Let's see it.

re "NHTSA initially saying no-recall and later Ford's "voluntary" recall" - Interesting to note that there are a number of sources which seem to qualify the word "voluntary" (e.g. 1, 2). I guess we should be careful how we use it.

re "The later subsection can hit on which of the public perceptions were wrong " - I think that's fine in concept. I was trying to do something similiar with the line starting "A comprehensive analysis looking at road fatalities between...". We could potentially expand on that. Let's see what you're thinking about. NickCT (talk) 20:42, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

There is a great deal of mistaken supposition here that Walter Olson's article in the Wall Journal was A) an Op-Ed piece and B) should be excluded because of this. There is no evidence of A) except for the supposition of an editor here, and there is no direction B) to exclude opinion from an article. Rather the opposite:

Wikipedia articles are required to present a neutral point of view. However, reliable sources are not required to be neutral, unbiased, or objective. Sometimes non-neutral sources are the best possible sources for supporting information about the different viewpoints held on a subject.

In other words, a neutral articled does not banish all opinion. It embraces different points of view. With this, I'd the article to reflect Mr. Olson's profound lack of confidence in the conclusions that were reached regarding the Ford Pinto's fuel safety.842U (talk) 00:05, 23 February 2016 (UTC)

Sorry I haven't had time to give the fuel tank section a good work over. I would like to but time is a issue these days. Anyway, I would suggest people take a look at this article [[1]]. We can debate how RS it is but happily it references other articles. I'm not sure the structure is right for our article but it starts with a statement summarizing the public understanding of the topic then goes into the details explaining the facts and the misconceptions. It also extensively uses other references which we can draw upon. As for the Olson work, I see no reason to view it as non-RS. Springee (talk) 02:02, 23 February 2016 (UTC)

Copyright problem removed

Prior content in this article duplicated one or more previously published sources. The material was copied from: http://uniquecarsandparts.com/car_info_ford_pinto_v6_wagon.htm). Copied or closely paraphrased material has been rewritten or removed and must not be restored, unless it is duly released under a compatible license. (For more information, please see "using copyrighted works from others" if you are not the copyright holder of this material, or "donating copyrighted materials" if you are.)

For legal reasons, we cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or published material; such additions will be deleted. Contributors may use copyrighted publications as a source of information, and, if allowed under fair use, may copy sentences and phrases, provided they are included in quotation marks and referenced properly. The material may also be rewritten, providing it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Therefore, such paraphrased portions must provide their source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously, and persistent violators will be blocked from editing. While we appreciate contributions, we must require all contributors to understand and comply with these policies. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 00:38, 5 March 2016 (UTC)

Who designed the Pinto

The article credits Lee Iacocca for the car. At the time of its design, he was in charge of the Ford Division -- clearly responsible for executive oversight, but too high up to be the real design, engineering, or product planning force. I am trying to research who else was involved. He clearly was the leading executive sponsor, however. Paulmeisel 02:48, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

Well, if you follow the link to the Grimshaw case, it was Justice Tamura who credited Iacocca. Of course, that could be incorrect, since there may be other evidence as to the management of the vehicle's design and production that didn't come into the trial for whatever reason (there are a lot of ways to exclude evidence). If you find a source with more detail than the Grimshaw case, be bold! --Coolcaesar 20:31, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

the link for the Grimshaw case is no longer active, but here is a good URL http://online.ceb.com/CalCases/CA3/119CA3d757.htm use it how you will, hope it helps... Shane198three@aim.com Email | AOL Instant Messenger Shane198three 06:10, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

My father worked on the Pinto as well as the Mustang. He always blamed Iacocca for the Pinto and thought he took too much credit for the Mustang. The Pinto was built based on his specification that it would cost $1000. Someone else says $2000, but that's probably what they sold it for originally. The Mustang was actually a lower profile project to redesign the Falcon. Of course, Iacocca did not want to take credit for the Pinto. My family had a Mustang and a Pinto. In the mid-70s they weren't that different, which Iacocca probably had something to do with also. Come to think of it those Chyrsler K-cars were junk heaps as well. The only people that bought them were true patriots. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.59.237.189 (talk) 21:16, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

My father, Robert Emil Eidschun (born 1938) designed the Pinto -- largely at our home in Livonia, Michigan, and I remember his doing it. I was very young the time but I remember his doing it in a studio that he built in the basement of our house. In addition, I have some of his original sketches to prove it, as well as his own personal photos of the clay models that were made based on his sketches. The various claims made by Bob Thomas and others for the design of the Pinto are misleading, as those folks were involved in managing the design process or had designed elements of the Pinto that were ultimately rejected. But Robert Eidschun's design was eventually chosen in its entirety. Perhaps I should post scans of his sketches and the photos he took of the clay models? - Robert Walter Eidschun —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.67.31.237 (talk) 12:26, 7 December 2010 (UTC)

Eidschun added as designer, sourced to Bloomberg Businessweek. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 14:49, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Summarization of characterization of design process by the appellate court

According to the California appellate court in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the Pinto was a "rush project," and while standard automotive industry practice was that "engineering studies precede the styling," in the case of the Pinto project "styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design to a greater degree than usual."

• Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 CA3d 757 (Cal. App. 1981) ("Ordinarily marketing surveys and preliminary engineering studies precede the styling of a new automobile line. Pinto, however, was a rush project, so that styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design to a greater degree than usual.").

The source highly reliable and extraordinarily neutral. The content is relevant to the design process as a whole. The design process is noteworthy for its record pace. We are asked to include all significant points of view WP:YESPOV. The claim is not in Wikipedia voice. The content is clearly attributed in-text for possible bias WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV. Hugh (talk) 00:23, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

The views of the appellate court are not those of engineering experts. The claim that the court is reliable or neutral in the way you are attempting to use the material is laughable. WP does not consider court opinions to be RS for things other than the opinion of the court. It is a significant point of view as it relates to the Pinto fire controversy and thus would potentially have a place in that section of the article. It would also be balanced by the historic record (Pinto's overall safety record was slightly better than similar cars and the rear impact fire performance was only slightly worse. All of the differences were in the range of statistical noise. Ford was not allowed to present this information in court and thus the appellate opinion was based on incomplete information. See Schwartz and Lee and Ermann for the supporting information and information that is critical of the lower court decision. The court opinion is clearly important to the discussion but it is NOT a reliable view. It does not have a place in the fact based portion of the article. Springee (talk) 00:34, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

Schwartz has a critically important statement that is highly relevant to instances when we wish to present appellate court findings as fact:

For reasons quite beyond the court's control, its opinion must be treated cautiously as a source of actual facts. Because the defendant was appealing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the court was under an obligation to view all the evidence in a way most favorable to the plaintiffs and essentially to ignore evidence in the record that might be favorable to the defendant. See id. at 773, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 388. In fact, Ford's basic position at trial-which the court's opinion at no point mentions-was that the approaching car (a Ford Galaxie) had not slowed down at all, and had struck the Gray car at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour. There was an enormous amount of evidence at trial supporting each of the parties' factual claims as to the Galaxie's closing speed. Had the jury accepted Ford's speed estimate, there would not have been much of an issue of crashworthiness: for the plaintiffs' position throughout trial was that even a state-of-the-art fuel system could not maintain integrity in a 50 mile-per hour collision.

The above is an example why we can not treat the appellate court finding of fact as a RS and for example we should avoid claims like the impact speed was 27 mph (a claim made my Nader's Auto Safety organization) vs the Ford claim of 50 mph. It is clear the impact speed is in dispute. Springee (talk) 04:18, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

I think the best thing to do is to survey other sources and see what they say. I'm fairly certain I've read about the issues with the Pinto's production history elsewhere (and given the attention to the car and especially the series of decisions that lead up to the lawsuit, I would expect really, really detailed studies of the history to exist), but I can't recall them off the top of my head. Some of the business-ethics studies have to go into it, though, since they'd want to discuss what decisions were made, what pressures were behind them, etc; so we could probably find something by searching those, letting us avoid relying so heavily on opinions of the court. --Aquillion (talk) 08:17, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your comment. Exactly right, the sense of the contended content in this thread was easily approximated using other reliable noteworthy sources. Thanks again for your engagement on this article. Hugh (talk) 16:51, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Not all recalls are encyclopedic...

HughD, I'm sorry you are not familiar with some of the discussions regarding automobile pages. Not all recalls are considered worth noting on the article page. For example, the one you just added [[2]] is not significant enough to make it to the page. Please show some sense of judgment when adding material. Springee (talk) 05:12, 7 March 2016 (UTC) HughD, since you are not using good judgment regarding which recalls are worth mention and you refuse to engaged in talk page discussions, please review this Automobile Project page proposal [[3]]. It makes it clear that the material you added is not encyclopedic. Springee (talk) 05:32, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

"you refuse to engaged in talk page discussions" Page contribution metrics are available, including talk page contribution metrics. Of course you are the leader in talk page verbosity, but your accusation on an article talk page regarding editor behavior is unfounded. Please forgive me if I do not match you wall for wall. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:14, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Yesterday's recall, one of the largest in automotive history, was not the first involving the Pinto - a car introduced in 1970 as a crossbreed of American and European technology that was designed to battle small imported autos. More than 2.5 million have been sold. Soon after the Pinto was introduced, 26,000 were recalled because accelerators were sticking. Later, 220,000 Pintos were recalled for modifications to prevent possible engine compartment fires.

• Jones, William H. (June 10, 1978). "Ford Recalls 1.5 Million Small Cars. Ford Recalls 1.5 Million Pintos, Bobcats, Pintos, Bolcats Face Alteration To Cut Fire Risk". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 4, 2016.

The recall you are concerned with is referenced to two highly reliable noteworthy sources, the Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune. Of course in the context of article on a particular automobile that was notable primarily for one of the largest and most notorious recalls in history, other, earlier recalls achieve noteworthiness. I'm sorry you do not feel it is due weight. Hugh (talk) 15:14, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

It is obvious you didn't read the Automotive project page discussion in question. From the project page discussion "This does not include single MSM articles mentioning them as they are announced. " So while the fire related recalls are important, and they are covered in great detail later in the article, the recall for a stuck throttle and carb problems are not. Just because the earlier recall was mentioned by an article at the time of the fuel tank recall controversy, does not make those early recalls significant 4 decades later. Also, please engage in more forthright talk page discussions. You are trying to use, and have been warned about, using slight of hand presentations of information in the past. Springee (talk) 16:07, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

The Washington Post is main stream media; the Washington Post source is from 1978; the Washington Post is not announcing the recalls of 1971 and 1972; it is exactly the exception the discussants at WP:Auto talk were careful to identify. Hugh (talk) 17:08, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Yes, and the view of the project page is that mentions at the time of the recall are not encyclopedic. Also, the mention in passing in an article that was actually about the fuel system recall. Just like the airbag recall you want to add, this is just not a historically notable aspect of the car. Springee (talk) 17:16, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

A single MSM source at the time of recall is not due weight; each of the two recalls 1971 and 1972 is sourced to multiple MSM sources, including national newspapers and an Associated Press report; and to contemporary sources and to later sources. And of course the context of this particular automobile, notable for the fastest development in history, obviously adds due weight to 2 recalls in the product's 1st 6 months; and of course notable for one of the largest recalls in history, and notorious for the delay in that recall, obviously adds additional weight to prior recalls. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:45, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Reviewers that put the car on a "worst" list

I condensed the list of "worst" lists that were mentioned in this section [[4]]. My condensed version is here [[5]]. The exact quotes from the sources are not particularly important given that none of the sources are automotive press. Forbes and Time are saying essentially the same thing. Business Week is offering an opinion on the styling of the car but I think it would be reasonable to say Business Week is not a notable opinion with regards to vehicle styling. What is significant is that the car made it to several "worst" lists, not the details of why. It is sloppy work to have each reference as a separate paragraph. There is certainly no reason for WP:PEACOCK material such as adding "Pulitzer-Prize winning" [[6]]. HughD, please consider your edits more carefully before adding. Speaking of that, please work on your edits in a sandbox then roll them out all at once. It's crazy that that you have added 150 edits (!) to the article in just 4 days [[7]]. Please take time to consider your edits, discuss them here then roll them out. I'm seeing the same disturbing pattern of ignoring the concerns of other editors here that resulted in sanctions against you on other topics. Springee (talk) 23:18, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

Again, I repeat myself, forgive me: please take your editor behavior concerns elsewhere WP:FOC, this is an article talk page where editors discuss content and sources and policy and guidelines. Very obviously, the sources do not say the same thing. Very obviously, the Time source is by a Pulitzer Prize winning automotive critic. Very obviously, Ford is a business and the Pinto is commercial product. Very obviously the Time, Forbes, and Bloomberg Businessweek sources are reliable and very obviously noteworthy and due weight. Very obviously the reasons why the subject of this article was included in the sources is highly noteworthy and due weight. Your contention that only the automotive press is eligible as a source for this article has no foundation in policy or guideline. Very obviously, a "reception" section may contain some content which you may feel is unflattering to the subject; I'm sorry you feel that way. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 01:41, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

I'm pleased that you understand that this is a page to discuss edits. The next step is for you to actually discuss your editing plans and discuss the concerns raised by other editors. It is PEACOCK to note "prize winning". Businessweek is not at all a qualified source for views on automotive style and design. Your claims of "very obviously" ring hollow because you haven't shown how a business news source would be a place that say, auto enthusiast or designers would turn for opinions on auto design. I can certainly find examples of car enthusiasts being dismissive of "auto design" articles from such sources. More often than not they are click bait articles. But let's move beyond that. We now have a long time editor of the page, myself, suggesting that perhaps this is not a reliable or reasonable source. I understand that you have basically never edited an automobile page in the past and probably followed me here for some reason. Regardless, it would be good to read what others have said and take those views into PROPER consideration. It is VERY clear that you haven't bothered to read much of the previous talk page discussion regarding the direction of the fuel tank fire controversy.

You claim that I've contented that only the automotive press is eligible as a source. That is a ridiculous claim that suggests you again haven't bothered to read what I have said. Certainly sources like Schwartz, Lee and Ermann etc are not automotive. However, when you are discussing how a car looks, drive, etc then automotive writers and press are the qualified sources. Your Time magazine article was, as you point out, written by a qualified writer and was also looking at these cars from a higher level POV (social and cultural impact). Businessweek was not. Springee (talk) 02:09, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

• HughD, please use honest edit justifications. This reversion [[8]] reason is dishonest. You reverted changes to another section (the review section) which were NOT section blanking. You also have not justified the "other lawsuit" section's existence in the article. At best it is given undue WEIGHT. At worst it is plain outside of the article SCOPE as it relates to airbags. Regardless, please restore the other edits as those changes were not in the scope of your reversion statements. Springee (talk) 03:30, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, please review WP:PEACOCK. You may disagree with me regarding the Businessweek as a RS (you have not attempted to justify that source) but you also restored obvious peacock language that you previously added. I've now had to remove it twice. If you don't start cooperating with other editors your editor behavior will have to be reviewed. Springee (talk) 17:30, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Of course you know who Dan Neil is, but he is hardly a household name. Please see WP:LINKSTYLE. This article is not so long that it cannot afford a very few words of explanation on the 1st introduction of a proper name. Please see WP:READERSFIRST. WP:PEACOCK is misapplied here. I know you are unimpressed with Pulitzers. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:58, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Article Lead

HughD, you are correct the lead is supposed to summarize the article. However, your recent edit to the lead contains errors. The NHTSA did not say the Pinto fuel "defect" resulted in fires. They don't use that sort of phrasing. They said "linked". Your edit claiming a causal relationship is simply wrong. Please show some care with such edits. Springee (talk) 02:16, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Please see article body and excerpt from source and source. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 21:45, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Pinto v. Mustang

The part about nobody investigating Mustangs for explosions and fires is actually wrong. 60 Minutes did an investigation of Mustangs in the early 2000s.

(dummy thread contribution for archiving unsigned thread) Hugh (talk) 16:26, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Gross vs. Net Horsepower

The article states that Net Horsepower is horsepower measured at the wheels. This is incorrect. Net horsepower is still measured at the flwyheel. Th difference is that net horsepower is measured with the engined fully dressed with accessories.

(dummy thread contribution for archiving unsigned thread) Hugh (talk) 16:26, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Keep material related to the fire controversy in a single section

This article has essentially two major topics. The first is the general discussion of the car which would be similar to other WP articles on cars. Material such as specifications, reviews, sales etc would go into that section. The safety controversy associated with the Pinto is the other major section. Discussions related to the car's engineering, safety etc which are related to the fuel tank fire controversy should be reserved for that section of the article. For example, a California appellate court's opinion on the engineering of the car based on only the testimony allowed into a lawsuit is NOT a reliable engineering opinion. Furthermore, such claims are contradicted by the historical record presented by Schwartz and others.

The controversy section, while increasing in length is actually dropping in quality due to a systematic removal of later sources which have pointed out significant errors in the early accounts and understanding of the Pinto's engineering and real world safety performance. We should not put those same questionable statements in other parts of the article. Springee (talk) 00:03, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, user Greglocock expressed concerns about editorial bias in your edits to the related Grimshaw article [[9]]. I think those same concerns apply here. Please consider your edits in context of talk page discussions that occurred before you joined this article. Those concerns, especially the ones related to the organizational structure of the fire controversy section and the removal of recent scholarly reviews of the case by Schwartz and others are still valid. Springee (talk) 00:10, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

No sources have been removed. This is an article talk page, other forums are available to you for your editor behavior concerns WP:FOC. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 00:26, 6 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, the material you moved is introductory. There is not talk page discussion, and certainly not one that you have participated in, that justified moving a high level general statement about the controversy to the retrospective section. Furthermore, if you followed the conversations that took place before you jointed this article, it was clear that we were not sure of the exact layout of the controversy section. A lead that states that there is a great deal of confusion and misinformation IS part of to the section lead. Springee (talk) 19:53, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

For most of us, the compromise arrived at above on this talk page 13 February was a turning point in making progress in the editing of this article:

There are really two stories here. 1) The controversy created by the Ford report. 2) The subsequent research suggesting the controversy may have been overblown. If we divide those two stories into two subsections I think it's going to be clearer for the reader. I also think this solution is going to let everyone insert the information they want in there.

We all understand very well you have a favorite source for this article, that you believe your favorite source takes precedent over all others, and requires coverage before all others. However, on Wikipedia a fundamental editorial practice is we strive to present the consensus on facts before we present opinions and commentary. I'm sorry the fine efforts of your colleagues of last month does not sit well with you. Hugh (talk) 20:06, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Hugh, I do not recall you being a party to that conversation. However, as I was adding to the lead of the section it is very reasonable to note the misinformation that exists as part of the lead. Take the lead of Schwartz's article, in the section paragraph of a 50 page article on the subject he states: "that several significant factual misconceptions surround the republic's understanding of the case. Given the cumulative force of these misconceptions, the case can be properly refereed to as "mythical." The quote I used was also from the opening section of a reviewed article on the subject. It makes a great deal of sense to start the section by warning the reader, as these scholars did, that much of the information regarding the fires, lawsuits, etc is muddled and often wrong. That is exactly why that material was put in the lead. I have it in the lead section of my own rework to the article that I was discussing, and working on off line, prior to your edits to this topic. So much of the general Pinto fire story has been shown to be wrong, or at least greatly confused that the only appropirate way to start the section is with such an into. What I had previously discussed was a section with a section lead, then a paragraph that could talk about the public perception of events followed by a section talking about the historic record. However, you have taken off with what were proposed sections. I don't think other editors have agreed those are the correct subsections but perhaps they can be made to work. That doesn't negate the need for a proper intro to the section which is what I attempted to add and you moved without discussion. Springee (talk) 20:20, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

By any objective measure, the sections in this article on the fuel system design, crash tests, lawsuits, prosecution, regulatory investigations, the cost-benefit analysis, and recalls are all in better shape than they have every been. Most of the content in these sections is sourced to multiple noteworthy reliable sources for the first time. We have been able to thoroughly document several thousand words of highly relevant encyclopedic content that is not in the least controversial: Ford was in hurry; Ford crash tested, cars ignited; Ford performed a cost-benefit analysis; Mother Jones published an article; the NHTSA investigated; Ford recalled; Ford was sued; Ford was indicted; and more. I know this content is very, very controversial in your view. When we find divergent points of view in reliable sources, we summarize them, in proportion; when we find consensus on objective facts and events in reliable sources, we don't diminish them by prefacing them with a minority view controversy. You are of course welcome to make your case for the due weight of inclusion of summarizations of the results of recent scholarship, but not at the expense of other, well-documented content. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 22:53, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Actually in terms of NPOV you have taken the article backwards and I suspect Greglocock would agree. I will grant you that you have cleaned up a number of citations and for that I thank you for that contribution. Now if you would please engage other editors on the talk page so we can agree rather that deal with an edit war.

Your claims about "not in the least controversial" illustrates that you really aren't well versed in the material. Even Becker, a scholarly source you introduced would agree that there is a great deal of misinformation. Let's just hit a few...

1. Ford was in [a] hurry: Well sources disagree here. In particular the 25 month claim seems to be one that has a life of it's own. Schwartz has the project starting in 1967 and first cars off the line in August of 1970. This is consistent with Rossow (a source I haven't added yet) who further specifies that design work began in June 1967 and the first car was produced August 10th, 1970. That's 38 months, yes, faster than the typical 43 of the time but by 5 months, not by 18 months as some sources have claimed. So the "rush" claim is already in dispute.

1. Ford crash tested, cars ignited: This is another area where there is a great deal of misunderstanding. Lee and Ermann discuss this in quite a bit of detail (as does Schwartz). Much of the reason why the industry was doing crash tests in the late 60s and early 70s is because they didn't have reliable, repeatable test methods at the time. They were as much attempting to establish the testing standards as testing the cars. A discussion of the various crash tests without explaining the uncertainty of the time can be misleading to the readers. The claims that cars ignited in the crash tests is VERY misleading. In NO case did a car catch fire during a crash test that was intended to test the crash worthiness of any car. Again, in the scholarly literature they talk about this. The crash tests that resulted in fire, the "secret crash tests", the ones that were discussed last February on the talk page (and likely before that) were tests that were designed to see what happens WHEN a car catches fire. They were setup to generate fire. So again you are wrong to claim no controversy.

1. Cost benefit analysis: To quote Schwartz, "To sum up, the Ford document has been assigned an operational significance that it never possessed" You have made edits that state, " The analysis compared the cost of repairs to the cost of settlements for burn deaths". That again is not true. The memo did not consider tort costs to the car industry. Yet again you have illustrated why my lead paragraph was relevant.

1. Mother Jones: Yes, they published an article. An incendiary article with MANY factual errors. It is significant that MJ got much of it's information from the Grimshaw plaintiff team. Talk about muddying the waters before trial (Danley). We can cite all the ways the media coverage got it wrong but to simply act like MJ published a fair and reliable article is crazy. Mother Jones and Nader's Center for Auto Safety acted in concernt to creat political pressure on the NHTSA to force the recall even though empirical data didn't support it.

1. Investigation and recall: Sorry you again aren't getting the whole picture. The first time around the NHTSA found that there wasn't sufficient evidence. The second time around they manufactured the evidence with a worst case crash test (Lee & Ermann). They were under political pressure and needed to come up with something to justify their action against Ford. Several scholars note that cars that did no better weren't subject to recall. The political pressure wasn't there.

1. Ford was sued: Again, there is quite a bit to discuss here. One of the interesting bits is that Ford didn't seem to take this case seriously enough the first time. When they lost they got hit with a flood of lawsuits. When they won in Indiana that flood stopped because by that time Ford had their defense strategy fixed. Most importantly Ford showed that despite MJ type "firetrap" claims the car's safety record was good for the class. There is also the mater of why the appeals court had to view the evidence against Ford in the most negative light.
2. Ford was indicted. I notice that you don't like to draw attention to the fact that they were also aquitted. Several of the sources I've working with explain why and also suggest that this was a really bad case. The verdict was clearly correct given the law and Ford's actions.

Sorry, the controversy is complex and the intro should indicate that. Furthermore the intro should make it clear that much of what is "popular knowledge" about the case is wrong. Springee (talk) 01:57, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

The article could benefit from more sourcing from peer reviewed academic journals. They are ample. Good idea. I think your problem is you seem to have stopped after you found two that share a point of view in the direction of revisionism and exoneration. Some of the proposed edits above in this thread are best I can tell a minority telling of events, almost pseudo-historical. We have policies and guidelines that deal with this situation. Is the Pinto more or less safe overall than other cars, or other cars in its class, or its closest competitors? If you have sources that say so, feel free to start a section somewhere. It doesn't alter events. Some stuff definitely happened. Hugh (talk) 05:58, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

[Comments below were nested in reply above - any editor may remove this note] Springee (talk) 12:50, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

If by "life of its own" you mean it is in multiple reliable sources, yes it does. Hugh (talk) 05:40, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

No cars caught fire in crash tests? Wow! Lots of rs is wrong, wrong, wrong. Hugh (talk) 05:40, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

You are obviously much impressed with Prof. Schwartz' telling of the Pinto story. Hugh (talk) 05:40, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Our article draws no content from Mother Jones. All our article does is note MJ's role in events. There is no controversy here. Hugh (talk) 05:40, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

NHTSA manufactured evidence? A govt conspiracy to defame the Pinto? Wow! Everything we know about the Pinto is wrong! Hugh (talk)

Our article says Ford was found not guilty. Hugh (talk) 05:40, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Our article does not have a section "popular knowledge." Please be specific about what content is wrong. Hugh (talk) 05:40, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

In reply to Hugh's points (please number them in the future) 1. Yes, as specifically mentioned by numerous scholarly sources there is a great deal of misinformation that gets retold and thus people assume it to be true. Because of that issue we should rely most heavily on the sources that really investigated the issues rather than ones that repeat what is "known".

2. The cars that caught fire in crash tests were cars that were rigged to catch fire. Please cite your reliable source that says otherwise. I can cite sources to support my statements. It helps that, unlike you, I have been reading about this topic for several years.

3. Schwartz is perhaps the most significant, reliable source on the subject. Sure MJ is significant but not reliable. I know you are a bit of a Chicago fan, perhaps you will take this source as reliable [10] "Gary was one of the preeminent torts scholars of his generation. Many of his articles are staples of the literature. (See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).) ". The article is also widely cited as reliable, even by Becker, a source you brought to the table.

4. Actually is does. Because we quote MJ without noting that the article has been criticized for poor accuracy and for being inflammatory you are creating a misleading story. You had a similar issue with the Grimshaw article. You wanted to use the appellate court's findings of fact as reliable fact [11] even though procedural rules made this a bad idea. Basically quoting/paraphrasing the source and then failing to note that it has been discredited is the same as treating it as reliable.

5. The NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to find a problem (See Rossow, section 2.7 "Recall" and Lee and Ermann page 41). MJ and the Grimshaw trial lawyers did in fact work together. Danley, footnote 12: "Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center. ... In an interview with Schwartz, Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the Mother Jones story." It shouldn't be surprising that a litigation team would use the press to generate bad publicity before a trial. The same thing occurred to Audi and GM (saddle tanks).

6. Our lead says Ford was indited, why not say "found not guilty?" Both are true but you picked the more damning language. Why put so much emphasis on the pretrial gory details (Becker talks about this) vs talking about the issues with the case and explaining that because Ford was able to show the real world performance of the car was sound the claims didn't stand. You noted the difference in budgets for the legal teams but you didn't note that public opinion was heavily against Ford because of the bad press coverage. Basically, you seem to want to include only the negative news and ignore the rest.

7. The "popular understanding" section was being discussed prior to your arrival. Unlike you, I was working on a set of changes off line that could be rolled out with just a few article edits. I hope you understand that 200+ edits in 5 days means you are doing something wrong! Anyway, since that section appears unlikely now, it makes sense to include discussions of misinformation in each subsection. Please note that I don't necessarily support your updated subsection headings. Springee (talk) 16:13, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Sorry, I now understand how important the integrity of your walls of text are to you. I will not intersperse comments in the context of your bullet points, even 7 item lists. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

• Replies such as the one above do not show good faith. Please retract such statements if you want to engage in discussions. Springee (talk) 21:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

1. ...we should rely most heavily on the sources that really investigated the issues rather than ones that repeat what is "known".

Let me guess, the real sources are Schwartz and Lee & Erdman? The truth is out there? Hugh (talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

2. The cars that caught fire in crash tests were cars that were rigged to catch fire.

Yikes. With that comment it is clear to me that this particular proposed editorial direction is more than I can deal with alone; kindly requesting de-lurking guys, you know how you are. Help! Of course all crash tests are "rigged" in the sense that they are all by definition simulations. If you believe the NHTSA was motivated by anything other than concern for public safety, that is an extraordinary claim that requires multiple extraordinarily strong noteworthy reliable sources, and even then may be undue weight here as a minority view. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

3. Gary was one of the preeminent torts scholars of his generation

The Mother Jones article was later awarded a Pulitzer Prize.

Schwartz said the Mother Jones (magazine) article won a Pulitzer Prize for their Pinto article. Would you support adding that to our article, sourced to Schwartz? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:27, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

4. ...we quote MJ without noting that the article has been criticized for poor accuracy and for being inflammatory

Please drop the stick and back away from Mother Jones (magazine). You seem obsessed with the Mother Jones (magazine) article. Our article does not quote from Mother Jones (magazine). Our article notes the key role of the article in events, and has a one sentence, neutral paraphrase summarization of the article, which seems to me due weight. You have largely succeeded in your crusade to exclude Mother Jones (magazine) as a source for content for this article. Uncontent with that, you are crusading to make sure our readers are aware that everything that everyone knows about the history of the Ford Pinto was polluted by Mother Jones (magazine) until a few courageous scholars like Schwartz set us right in the 1990s. Hugh (talk) 17:56, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

5. The NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to find a problem

Our article says merely that the NHTSA initiated an investigation, and made a determination. Our article makes no claims about the NHTSA motivations. If by political pressure you mean letters from the public, that is well document and due weight. However, if your theory of events is that the NHTSA was manipulated by Mother Jones (magazine) or lawyers or motivated by anything other than concern for public safety, that is an extraordinary claim that requires multiple extraordinarily strong noteworthy reliable sources, and even then may be undue weight here as a minority view. Again, forgive me for repeating myself, our project has policy and guideline regarding due weight of minority views. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:48, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

6. Body 1st, then lede. Thanks. Hugh (talk)

Limit the number of edits per day

HughD, when the article lock is lifted I would ask that you limit your edits per day. Currently you are average 40 per day. In just 5 days you have almost as many edits as the top page editor added over 8 years! This and your limited discussion and consensus building on the talk page may be [WP:DE]. Please use your sandbox for making a series of changes that can then be added to the article at one time. Please discussion what you see as good content and scope for the various sections on the talk page. Remember that others have a voice too. Springee (talk) 16:44, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

What is your basis in policy or guideline for this request? Why are you making it here? Once again, forgive me, I feel I must repeat myself, this is an article talk page, where members of our community discusses article content and sources and relevant policy and guideline. Please see WP:FOC. As you well know, other venues are available to you for your concerns regarding editor behavior. If you feel it is in the best interests of our project to take WP:BOLD away from me, kindly do it elsewhere. The record is clear, I have been extraordinarily patient with you on this talk page. Admittedly, I am a far distant second in terms of talk page contributions. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:09, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

If the pace of edits makes it too hard to consensus to emerge, another option is to place the article under full protection for a longer time such as one month. During the period of protection, edit requests could be used to make updates (after proper discussion). EdJohnston (talk) 17:39, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

I don't think that's necessary (especially since I expect it will slow down naturally.) I think that overall, while there are some areas of concern -- parts that might need elaboration, more coverage from other perspectives, etc -- the article is in a better state now than it was before HughD started editing. It's indisputable that the Pinto is most well-known for its safety issues, and the section on them (which previously relied on a small number of sources which we tended to just churn back and forth over ad-infinitum) was badly in need of expansion. It's gone from ~30 sources to ~90, most of which I think we can all agree are decent sources (even if there are a few being disputed back and forth above.) I would encourage HughD to be a bit more receptive to people who want to add other perspectives on various aspects on those (provided they're well-sourced), but ultimately the dispute over eg. exactly what the Ford Pinto memo was used for is not that high-profile relative to the overarching history of the car (look at the article as it is now -- the memo itself only gets three short sentences, and is just one point of many in a much longer timeline. We could add another sentence or two clarifying perspectives on it, but it wouldn't dramatically change the tone or structure of the article.) As I see it, most of the other recent disputes above, while they're hotly-contested, are actually relatively minor now -- things like exactly how we describe the Pinto's inclusion on so many worst-ever lists or whether to mention other recalls are, if you zoom out and look at the overarching history, not going to dramatically change the article much either way (this is why I've mostly avoided weighing in on them, because I don't think they're decisive and I suspect the article will end up fine either way, compared to what I felt were much more glaring issues I had with some versions of it in the past.) Most of the sources you object to are saying things that I suspect can be found from other sources, too; the Pinto's history is really well-documented from every angle at this point... as the fact that the number of sources for this article tripled in the past few days shows. --Aquillion (talk) 21:34, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

I agree HughD has helped the article in some ways. However, I actually think it is worse in terms of NPOV. But perhaps the best way to deal with that is to ask HughD to take a voluntary break (this is not a break that implies any wrong doing) and let others have a chance to make their changes. If Hugh still has more edits in mind then take another day or two to finish what he wants to do and THEN let others have the article for a bit. I'm perfectly happy to step back from editing for say a week to let HughD finish what he thinks should be done. I would ask that when he is finished he lets others do the same for a time. I do think there is a LOT of good material that has yet to make it into the article. Finally, I would ask that HughD put our editorial conflicts aside and engage in productive back and fort discussions on the talk page. I'm more than willing to do the same. Springee (talk) 22:27, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

The talk page is open, why not start now, propose some improvements? Instead of planning for the expiration of the edit lock, why don't you take this opportunity to showcase some of your preferred edits here on article talk? Show your colleagues what a modern neutral no-spin balanced well-referenced telling of the Ford Pinto story looks like when informed by the best recent scholarship. May I say, based on your prelude you insisted on inserting before the well-referenced, reliably sourced facts and events, and based on your comments above regarding "rigged" tests, political influence at the NHTSA, the invisible hand of Ralph Nader, and other comments, I have some concerns about what seems to be your editorial direction. Our community can work through it now or we can work through it later. On Wikipedia, short of a ban, you can't pick your collaborators, you sort of have to work with whoever shows up, sorry. Hugh (talk) 00:33, 9 March 2016 (UTC)

The above is a clear example of WP:Incivility. Please assume good faith. Springee (talk) 00:48, 9 March 2016 (UTC)

I'm sorry you feel it is not civil to invite you to share your ideas at article talk during this edit block. It is a sincere request. I sincerely want to see your ideas. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 01:10, 9 March 2016 (UTC)

Lee and Ermann material that relates to the recall and NHTSA

I'm going to copy some sections from this article for people to read. Please ask if you have questions.

Long quote from Lee and Ermann article

Technical Core Beliefs and Actions (1967-1973) To explain what employees in Ford's technical core subunits believed, when they believed it, and how corporate structures influenced them to communicate and act on their beliefs, we separate design from marketing stages. During the design stage ( 1967-1970), Ford technical core employees did not view their actions as taking calculated risks with consumers' lives. Even Harley Copp, the outspoken Ford safety whistle-blower, never asserted that informed Ford participants believed the car was unsafe. Furthermore, they were not thinking about potential lawsuits when making design decisions (Feaheny 1997; Gioia 1996). And they did not refuse to correct perceived problems because settling lawsuits would be cheaper (NHTSA C7-38; Strobel1980). Although technical core work groups were not informed by explicit cost-benefit analyses (we explain these analyses below), they did recognize that unavoidable cost and time constraints make safety trade-offs inevitable for all product designs (see Lowrance 1976). For the auto industry, with its long history of subordinating safety to styling (Eastman 1 984; Nader 1965), implicit safety compromises were particularly common. In the Pinto case, Lee Iacocca and others wanted to compete with foreign imports with a car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and cost less than $2,000 (Camps 1997; Dowie 1977; Strobel1980). Other car manufacturers were building cars under similar or more stringent guidelines (Davidson 1983 ). Commentators on the Pinto case (writing in a later era with different beliefs) assume that fuel tank leakage in rear end-crash tests must have alarmed both engineers and managers. They didn't, because the tests were not sufficiently convincing at the time (or even today). Crash tests during that era were novel procedures. Both the auto industry and NHTSA were more concerned with the reliability and validity of the tests than with safety data generated by a particular car's tests. Harold MacDonald, the engineer in charge of the Pinto's design, and every other engineer charged with interpreting crash-test data at the time-all of whom whistleblower Harley Copp considered "safety-conscious individuals" (Strobel 1980:183)-doubted that the tests accurately represented real-world conditions (Feaheny 1997). After all, they reasoned, a car slamming backwards into a wall at twenty to thirty miles per hour in a crash test is only a rough approximation of a real-world car-to-car crash. Results that seemed "troubling" (Schwartz 1991:1028) to later writers seemed less problematical at the time and were neutralized by participants' background assumptions about small cars and crashworthiness. NHTSA validated the engineers' skepticism by asking the auto industry to help develop reliable and cost-effective ways to approximate real-world conditions (Strobel1980). Thus, engineers in the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November, 1970 listed as its objective "To develop a test procedure to be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C7-38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T- 0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact at 35 miles per hour. Nothing in this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely be subjected to the extreme forces generated in a fixed-barrier test in real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA apparently agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixedbarrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test in its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988). Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72 ), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30 mile-per-hour crashes. But some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980). 3 Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument-that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it-is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until1977 (Strobel1980). And other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-theaxle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980). Additionally, after making a judgment that the Pinto was acceptably safe, most participants readily devalued subsequent competing definitions (Feaheny 1997). Lou Tubben, an engineer Nwith a genuine concern for safety" (Dowie 1977:23), did not press his concerns until1971-after the car's release. Frank Camps (1981, 1997), another concerned engineer, did not formally object to the Pinto's windshield and frontal-impact fuel tank design problems until1973, and never objected to rear-end fuel tank integrity. Tom Feaheny (1997) was worried about the lack of safety glass on all Ford models, and viewed the Pinto gas tank as a "nonissue" by comparison. In sum, the design stage was not characterized by an engineering consensus that the Pinto was Nunsafe." The value of crash tests was unclear. The Pinto's specific "problem" (e.g., frontal fuel tank integrity, safety glass) varied among those few engineers troubled by the car's safety performance. A "safe" placement of the gas tank was not identified, and the safety value of potential design changes was subject to disagreement. Additionally, engineers believed that the crash test performance of other small cars, particularly imports, was "terrible" (Feaheny 1997). Given this background and the host of other safety issues confronting engineers as a result of the recently passed MVSA, it is not surprising that many Pinto engineers and their family members (e.g., the chief systems engineer's wife) drove Pintos (Strobel1980). In the design stage (1967-1970), no company or government standard on rear-end fuel tank integrity existed to guide the engineers, but their actions were consistent with the takenfor- granted, industry-wide tradition of building lower levels of crashworthiness into small cars. This situation changed in the marketing stage (post 1970). Shortly after the 1971 model year Pintos were released, Ford adopted an internal20 mile-per-hour moving barrier standard for the 1973 model year-the only manufacturer to do so (Gioia 1996; Strobel 1994). The extant legal/regulatory environment reinforced engineers' beliefs that this standard was Nquite reasonable" since it was the "same one recommended at that time by the federal General Services Administration; the Canadian equivalent of the GSA; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA ... " and by NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would constrain future debates by certifying the Pinto as "safe" to Ford's subunit charged with evaluating potential recallable safety problems. Most Ford technical core personnel became less involved with Pinto safety during the marketing stage. One exception was Dennis Gioia, who began a new job in another part of Ford's technical core in the summer of 1972. A self-described Mchild of the '60s," Gioia ( 1992:379) hoped to change an industry he saw as insensitive to safety concerns. Within one year, this inexperienced recent MBA graduate was promoted to Field Recall Coordinator and charged with coordinating all active safety recall campaigns and identifying potential safety problems. Thus Ford had at least one individual in its technical core with the inclinations and authority, though little experience or organizational power, for taking a stand on the Pinto gas tank issue. When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use Mstandard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle in to Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His work group voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The work group was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually Gioia did become aware of, and concerned about, the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws-after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The work group conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996). In light of what they believed, work group members felt they would become the "laughing stock" of the company if they recommended a recall (Gioia 1996). But fear of ridicule did not motivate their vote. They doubted a recall's legitimacy, or its chances of approval. NHTSA's Role In The Landmark Narrative We now consider NHTSA's often contradictory contribution to the Pinto landmark narrative. Two issues are of primary importance: the selection of the Pinto for recall and NHTSA's use of cost-benefit analysis. NHTSA ultimately recalled the Pinto, but this outcome was far from predictable given the agency's record on the issue of fuel tank integrity. NHTSA's top administrator even testified on behalf of Ford in the Pinto's criminal trial (Strobel 1980). While NHTSA's actions appear Mrational" from a distance, like Ford's they were the product of compromise, conflicting organizational interests and routines, and environmental pressures and constraints. Before we examine NHTSA's actions concerning the Pinto, some background is necessary. Most accidents involve multiple factors contributing to the crash itself or the resulting death and injury. In detailed studies of specific accidents (see NHTSA C7-38), NHTSA employees made numerous recommendations for tougher standards regarding driver behavior (e.g., drunk driving laws), road safety (e.g., guardrails), and vehicle design (e.g., airbag standards). Outside parties (e.g., consumer groups, insurance companies, state government agencies) lobbied NHTSA to take action on particular problems. Therefore, deciding which problems to address was far from clear, given the blizzard of information and cross-pressures (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). Following two fuel tank burn deaths when a large truck rear-ended a Pinto in 1976, for instance, Pennsylvania's Bureau of Traffic Engineering pleaded with NHTSA for tougher truck braking standards, not auto fuel tank integrity standards. As early as 1968, the year of its creation, NHTSA had attempted to adopt a fuel tank integrity standard. The specifics of the standard were subject to much disagreement. In addition to dealing with industry claims that NHTSA's fuel tank integrity proposals would prove ineffective, NHTSA had to son through a fog of ambiguous data on vehicle fires. An Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study (NHTSA C7-38), for instance, reported that only 72 (out of a sample of 1,923) fires in 1973 resulted from collisions. Of these 72 fires, only 24 originated in the fuel tank-most began in the engine compartment and were caused by electrical shorts. Additionally, a number of factors affected the likelihood of vehicle fires, including make and age of the vehicle. The Pinto landmark narrative describes unique design features that purportedly made the Pinto less crashwonhy than other cars: for example, bolts on the differential housing and a fuel filler pipe that easily pulled out in collisions. Yet these same issues had been identified much earlier with other cars. For example, a 1970 NHTSA report (C7-38), along with a 1968 Society of Automotive Engineers report, found that pre-1967 Ford sedans exhibited "gross fuel spillage [in crash tests] arising out of the detachment of the filler spout" and tank punctures caused by a "poorly located track-bar bolt." NHTSA did not recall these cars to fix this acceptable risk. Forcing a "Voluntary" Recall In September, 1974, NHTSA crash-tested a number of vehicles, including the Pinto, Mto verify the [Department of Transportation's] rear-end moving barrier procedure ... " (NHTSA C7-38). Several cars, including the Pinto, exhibited significant fuel loss in 30 mile-per-hour tests. A 1969 Plymouth station wagon exhibited a Msteady flow of fuel." Like the Ford crash- test reports discussed above, NHTSA's report expressed neither shock nor concern, concluding only that "The tests indicated that the procedure would produce repeatable test results." None of the cars were subjected to follow-up studies or recall proceedings. 5 Also in 1974, Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety asked NHTSA to investigate Pinto fuel tank integrity. NHTSA beliefs and procedures were similar to Ford's: not enough evidence existed to warrant a full defect investigation (Graham I 991). The Pinto had no "recallable" problem, even though people were dying in Pinto fires. By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration. NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1 970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 1980- 81:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too." Selection of the Pinto Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, publics accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997). Ford's cost-benefit analysis, a normal product of an interorganizational network, also facilitated the selection of the Pinto for inordinate attention. The year Ford sent the Grush/Saunby document to NHTSA (thus making it available to outside audiences), General Motors conducted a similar cost-benefit analysis (Nader and Smith 1996). Like Grush/Saunby, this analysis used the government's $200,000 figure as the value of a human life. Unlike Grush/Saunby, which addressed static rollover for all cars and light trucks, the GM analysis looked specifically at rearend collisions on its own cars. These facts suggest that GM would have made a better target for Dowie's analysis, but the GM document did not enter the public record until 1988. Contingencies led to the identification of Ford as deviant, while other auto makers escaped scrutiny. By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action on the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues.

The above both discusses why it was reasonable that Ford's design team wouldn't have found the crash tests unacceptable. It also discusses how public pressure resulted in teh NHTSA creating a questionable test to ensure the Pinto would fail. The rigged test is an important detail. Yes, the car caught fire in a non-standard test but that was because the test was setup for that purpose. When people say the Pinto failed a crash test or caught fire during a crash test it would only be one where that was the intended outcome. Note that the standard crash test doesn't use gasoline hence no fire in the standard test.

While from a less reliable source, this article is well cited and worth a read. It's a much quicker read that Schwartz. [12] I would also suggest reading the one Greglocock added as both have a large number of citations to support what they say and both are offered as part of courses. Springee (talk) 04:20, 9 March 2016 (UTC)

Interesting. There's a lot of useful detail in that. I'm not keeping up with this article at the moment, it does not mean that I have lost interest, merely that I lack the time, and to be honest energy, to keep up with the 40 posts a day guy. However, tortoise and hare.. Greglocock (talk) 05:43, 9 March 2016 (UTC)

I agree with the fatigue bit. Springee (talk) 06:34, 9 March 2016 (UTC)