Talk:Ernest J. King/Archive 1

Archive 1

Untitled

Ernest King is one of those historical figures who is revered from a safe distance and disliked up close. He probably earned both.

Cranston Lamont 23:04, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Issues

Much of the commentary regarding his wartime decisions is inconsistent with published biographies (most notably Buell's biography which is regarded as definitive). When I can dig a copy out I will revisit. Paulmeisel 16:23, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

"Analysis"

This entire section needs to be deleted and reworked. Based on information in King's autobiography, Buell's biography of King, and Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-Boat War" almost this entire section is either wrong, or a collection of hearsay and catty diary entries of his antagonists.ElectricJoe 05:14, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Ref formatting

I replaced the "Ibid"s in the <ref> tags with a modified Harvard citation approach. Reasoning - if other editors insert citations into the text, "Ibid" may no longer be related to the appropriate reference source. — ERcheck (talk) 15:53, 30 December 2007 (UTC)

Date of Rank

The article for William Halsey has his date of rank for Lieutenant J.G. the same as Lieutenant but he underwent the same type of promotion as King. So, shouldn't one the articles be changed. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.140.56.241 (talk) 03:02, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Corrections

Okay, I have made some corrections in line with the suggestions above. Also corrected a number of errors of fact:

• King was not the most senior admiral in the US Navy; that distinction belongs to William D. Leahy No, Leahy was retired.....
• King did not favour the war in the Pacific over that in the Atlantic. He believed strongly in the Germany First strategy. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Hawkeye7 (talk • contribs) 04:45, 15 April 2007 (UTC).

I have corrected the ranks while at Annapolis. Currently rthe articles calls him a Naval Cadet and Later a Passed Midshipman. When an person enters the Academy become a Midshipman Fourth Class and reaches Midshipman First Class. So technically through the four years they all just Midshipment, but never naval cadets. Wikihonduras 16:04, 4 May 2007 (UTC)

What you say is correct but your change is wrong. The old rank of naval cadet was changed to midshipman while King was at Annapolis. Hawkeye7 21:39, 4 May 2007 (UTC)

"King was a strong believer in the Germany first strategy, and gave priority to the war in the Atlantic.". I've added a "citation needed" tag to this. There are several of King's decisions that contradict this assertion (and are referred to in the article), so a specific citation should be given. Folks at 137 18:03, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Will do. Will reconcile this with any decisions that apparently contradict this fact, as I find them.

Hawkeye7 22:26, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

King made decisions that may appear to contradict his stated "Germany First" policy, but he certainly didn't see it that way. While he agreed that Germany be defeated first, that should not mean totally ignoring the Japanese (which is what the British, and to a lesser extent, the US Army, would have preferred). King stated that "the Russians would do 9/10 of the job against Germany" and he was exactly correct; he also realized early on that we could fight a two-ocean war. Refer to Buell's book or Pogue's books on Marshall.Dukeford (talk) 00:21, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Ranks

Commodore was not a rank when King came along, so I deleted the "he was promoted directly to Rear Admiral" passage. Civilians tend to think Commodore is a rank, but it has, in fact, only rarely been an official rank in our Navy.

• Commodore has typically been a temporary wartime rank, used for captains to temporarily assume "flag duties" commanding groups of vessels.Paulmeisel 16:25, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

Naval officers below the rank of Rear Admiral who are in command of more than one ship (like a Captain commanding a destroyer squadron) are sometimes informally referred to as "Commodore". Cranston Lamont 00:32, 8 August 2007 (UTC)

I believe it is inaccurate to say that King was second in seniority only to Admiral Leahy in the Navy at the outbreak of WW II. Richard E. Byrd had been promoted to Rear Admiral after his Anartic polar flight in 1931 at the age of 43 (five years younger than King and 16 years Leahy's junior). This seniority actually represented something of a problem for the navy given Byrd's celebrity and political connections. He was, however, a very modest person, and never tried to pull rank to assert his perrogatives of command. user: Michael Maher 27 August 2007

By virtue of his position (CNO), Harold Stark was the "ranking" active-duty admiral on 07 Dec 1941. Thomas Hart was the "senior" four-star admiral at the time, with King second. Leahy retired in 1939. He returned to active duty in July, 1942. Richard Byrd wasn't on active duty, either, having retired in the early 1930's. When he came back on active duty during the war, he was still a rear admiral. Dukeford (talk) 19:57, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

A thought

The Anglophobia is mentioned, but no reason at all is provided as to why he may have had that sort of bias. This skirts the line between common knowledge and hearsay. We need a 'why', and a cite for it. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 24.22.22.101 (talk) 15:17, 26 March 2007 (UTC).

Agree. Although there is some evidence for antipathy towards Britain, as a Brit I'd like to know the causes. I've also asked elsewhere (Maritime warfare talk page). No response, so far. Folks at 137 18:03, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Been dragging the chain on this page. I will update it again soon, providing you with the requested citation. King's Anglophobia dated back at least to his experience in the UK with the Royal Navy during the Great War but may well have been there before, given the rivalry between the US and UK in that early part of the 20th century.

In the Second World War, while most of the big arguments were between Marshall and Brooke, King was the one who always suspected that the British were lax in their commitment to the alliance with the United States. In particular, he suspected that the British did not intend to launch a cross-channel attack in 1943; sought excuses not to carry out amphibious operations in southern Burma in 1943; intended to deploy a fleet to the Pacific without adequate logistical support and then charge this to the United States; and did not intend to continue a maximum war effort against Japan after the defeat of Germany.

Unfortunately, while I can cite instances of King's tendency to be suspicious of British motives and methods, just as I can cite instances where he was "rude and abrasive", but his motivation remains more elusive. It is impossible to state with certainty why people do what they do and I would argue that there is no place for it in this work. Instead, we normally just list possible reasons, aware that decisions are made when people take these rationalisations and combine them with their prejudices.

Hawkeye7 22:17, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Thanks. Points:

1. US/UK rivalry was, I believe, reflected in naval planning and wargames with Britain as an adversary.
2. In 1943, the logistics and surety of supply for a cross-channel invasion did not exist. Power of reason won this point. Burma, not sure, but it wasn't in a good state, militarily. Also amphibious craft were not available.
3. On the Pacific, the other view remains he was anti-Brit with rationalisation coming along later. But I doubt he was alone in this.

Good luck hauling the chain. Folks at 137 06:02, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

1. I had forgotten about Plan Red. It continued to be studied right up to the war; not because there was any threat from Britain, but simply because Britain was the only country capable of invading the US.
2. The point here is that King approached all these issues from a skeptical standpoint, and required convincing.
3. You're absolutely correct here but since we cannot be sure, the final article will say something like "King opposed this on the grounds that..." leaving the known fact open to both interpretations.

Hawkeye7 11:14, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

King's ambivalence towards the British was formed prior to WWI, when he was exposed to elements of the Royal Navy, and didn't appreciate their condescending attitude. This was amplified during WWI, when he served as a staff officer on the US Atlantic Fleet. King's feelings were not isolated - there was plenty of "Anglophobia" in the US Navy between the wars. I also concur with Hawkeye's comments. Dukeford (talk) 00:32, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

I have come into the possesion of some rarely-seen, first-hand documents from Walter Muir Whitehill (King's biographer) and Admiral Francis "Frog" Low, who worked for King 1939-1945, that address King's "Anglophobia". When I figure out how to present it, I'll post it.Dukeford (talk) 20:49, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Operation 3-41 (FDR's Attack on the German Navy before Pearl Harbor)

It seems like a big oversight not to mention Admiral King's role in operation plan 3-41 where US destroyers were secretly ordered to attack German subs MONTHS before Pearl harbor. http://216.230.103.132/navalhistory/Articles04/NHoconnorFeb-2.htm

If the isolationalist American public became aware of this policy, FDR's head would have been on a plate and Admiral King with him..... 96.226.60.117 (talk) 16:06, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

I'll certainly mention it. My overhaul of the article has only got up to WWII.

It was hardly secret though. After all, it was in the newspapers and FDR told the public on radio. There was a slow drift in the Atlantic from the "Neutrality Patrol" to "Short of War". King's orders had to be politically circumspect, leading to skippers having to figure out what the rules of engagement were when it came such things as co-operation with the British and Canadians, as in the Greer incident. Then there was also the sinking of Rueben James. By this point in 1941, as the article points out, the US public was increasingly in favour of US intervention in Europe. When it came, most Americans believed that the attack on Pearl Harbour had been orchestrated by Hitler. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:43, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

I don't think most Americans thought "neutrality patrols" involved initiating attacks against German subs. 96.226.60.117 (talk) 21:13, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

Reversion on Jan 17 re Gannon "bias"

I don't like blanket reverts but these appeared v POV. If, however, Gannon's work is demonstrably incorrect or invalid, then this needs discussion. In his defence, I know of no authority that has disputed his work. He did interview participants and view original documents in Europe and US. Folks at 137 (talk) 10:34, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

Give me a few days to read Gannon. It does not sound incorrect or at odds with Morison's scathing semi-official account, which is most likely what I will go with. The U-Boat offensive was foreseeable but the US Navy was unprepared, and it took too long to adapt. This seems like another one of those items where King is not so much personally at fault as he is standing in for the navy whose policies and values he embodied.

(inserted comment) Gannon quite specifically lays blame at King's feet, not for the resources available, but for how they were deployed. Given King's pro-active and aggressive command style, it's hard not to assume he could have over-ruled his subordinates, at will. Anyway, read Gannon and see what you think. For me, the power is that he's prepared to ignore the smoke-screens and judge on evidence. Folks at 137 (talk) 22:26, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

This is really annoying me: "He (along with Marshall[citation needed]) wanted no part of the perceived British agenda in reclaiming or maintaining any part of her pre-war colonial holdings, whether in the Pacific or the eastern Mediterranean[citation needed], preferring to broaden American hegemony in the region. Roosevelt, however, overruled him". The policy was actually Roosevelt's; but the text makes it look like King and Marshall were differing from him and that Roosevelt's was the one opposed to his own policies! —Preceding unsigned comment added by Hawkeye7 (talk • contribs) 21:31, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

Poor phrasing. FDR overruled King in respect of BPF deployment (according to Churchill). The more I read, the more it seems that there were deliberate US (FDR) efforts to displace UK economic and influence around the world, so I wouldn't blame (credit?) King for that. But from this side, there seemed to be a predisposition amongst some US military and political leaders against European interests. (Just because I'm paranoid, doesn't mean THEY're NOT out to get me !!!) Browsed a book in Foyle's yesterday that concentrated on differences between the WWII allies. Folks at 137 (talk) 22:18, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

On several occasions, Marshall voiced his objections to supporting British aims (read "empire preservation") in the Eastern Med. This is well-documented in Pogue's interviews. King's viewpoint mirrored Marshall's, and he stated as much in "Fleet Admiral King". I wrote the original text for this, but someone else inserted the bit about "American hegemony". That throws off the whole paragraph.Dukeford (talk) 00:11, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

The reference to Gannon's book "contradicting" Professor Love's statement should be removed. Actually, the reverse is technically correct, but the main issue here is that Gannon's viewpoint starts the section, and Love's "rebuttal" finishes it. There's no need to reiterate Gannon "contradicting" anything. The reader can make that decision. Dukeford (talk) 03:04, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Roosevelt's opposition to British Colonialism is fairly well established. Hawkeye7 (talk) 04:14, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Did Marshall actually use the expression "empire preservation" or is that an interpretation? I know that there was a general American resistance to allied Eastern Med activity, but I thought that was because they saw France as the direct route to Germany (and US agreement to Torch was based on UK agreement to Dragoon). I'm not sure that Churchill saw the eastern Med as an Empire issue once the Italians had quit. He had serious reservations about Stalin's intentions in eastern Europe, that FDR didn't share or had decided to relegate, hence later British intervention in Greece. British involvement in the Pacific was also an agreed strategy following German defeat or neutralisation.

I inserted the 'hegemony' bit (itself a POV word) largely as a counter-point to the 'empire' bits which sounded too POV on their own (the realpolitik was that the allies were jockeying for position as the war came to an end). This section is getting scrappy as bits are added to it - the "contradiction" note is a part of this. The structure needs to be addressed once all the points are gathered (see Hawkeye7's comments above). I suspect the Lowe v Gannon differences are not resolvable here but, as said, the various sourced opinions should be offered to the reader. Gannon's points are countered by the quotation, but not the substance of his argument. Anglophobia remains unproven (IMO more likely to be professional insularity, pride and self-sufficiency), but King did disregard British experience, information and offers of help (and his own naval intelligence) in the first weeks of 1942. And the consequences were dire. It's a counter-point to his achievements elsewhere. Folks at 137 (talk) 00:34, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

I cannot stress this strongly enough: Taking Gannon's work as the definitve word on the U.S. Navy's actions against the U-boats is like using (for example) Toland's "Infamy" as the last word on who was responsible for Pearl Harbor. Both books are entertaining and thought-provoking, but both are flawed and misleading - in many ways, seriously so. Ironically, Gannon also wrote a book on Pearl Harbor that attempts to absolve Admiral Kimmel, which is preposterous. Controversy sells, which seems to be Gannon's m.o..Dukeford (talk) 17:50, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't take anyone's, including Gannon's, work "as the definitve word" - that's an "Aunt Sally"! However, do his opinions have neither basis nor value? Has he misrepresented his references or has he misinterpreted them? Given that he's an established academic, it would be professional suicide to be caught out. As an interested amateur I have to rely on others' research and several of Gammon's arguments seem to be based on actuality. For example, Gannon states that 13 destroyers were in New York harbour awaiting convoy duty (AT-10) on the days that U-123 operated off Long Island: none sortied to harry the the sub. He names the warships. He argues (reasonably, surely?) that the despatch of a troop convoy in the circumstances was "reckless". Is this untrue, is his argument baseless? The need to escort convoys is often trotted out as a reason (there are several) for the poor USN response in the early days of Drumbeat - but the warships were available to be diverted from a "reckless" sailing. Please offer me a few book titles to balance my education.

Re BPF: are King's "real" objections (mentioned above) as stated by him? If so I'd like to include them in the BPF article, with references. Folks at 137 (talk) 21:19, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Gannon is very selective in what he uses to further his anti-King agenda. The AT-10 convoy is a case in point. Does he say why the destroyers in question weren't sortied, other than "awaiting convoy duty"? One must keep in mind that King was no longer the CINCLANT at the time (it was Ingersoll), and that the entire U.S. Navy was in considerable upheaval in the weeks after Pearl. Gannon chooses to ignore these facts (his view on the troop convoy as "reckless" sounds like POV). In addition, King generally let his commanders command, without interference. He would have left it up to Ingersoll (a very senior and well-regarded flag officer) to direct ship activities. Furthermore, Gannon ignores the fact that everyone in the Navy from King on down knew (and stated) right after Pearl that we would have a tough time with the U-boats until sufficient quantities of the proper escort craft were available. Pulling escorts from Fleet operations or from troop or Lend-Lease convoy duty was not considered a viable option - by anyone, including Roosevelt and Churchill. Another canard is the issue of Liberator aircraft for anti-sub patrols. How could King have deliberately disregarded (!) a direct order from the President, when the aircraft weren't his to deploy until the early part of 1943! "Professional suicide" isn't part of the equation, IMHO. That doesn't stop people from writing books. Clay Blair's book is much more balanced, as is the one I referenced with Love's comments. In fact, Robert Love has done considerable research into the Drumbeat affair; nearly all of it refutes Gannon. "The Chiefs of Naval Operations", Naval Institute Press, and Larrabee's "Commander in Chief" also present a more balanced POV.

King's objections to the British Fleet in the Pacific is documented in his autobio (the "political" aspect); in Buell's biograph (fleet support); Low's booklet on King (operating doctrine). There are other reasons scattered about that are attributed to King. I'll dig around for them.Dukeford (talk) 22:27, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Marshall's chief objection to Eastern Med operations was that they would detract or postpone the Allied invasion of France. King objected to them because he would have to commit resources that could be better utilized elsewhere. However, both were well aware of Churchill's politcal aims in this area, and they both resisted them. When Churchill advocated an Allied invasion of Rhodes, Marshall ended that idea by stating that "Not one American is going to die on that goddamed beach". King actually suspended naval operations in support of the British in Greece, stating that "The U.S. is not fighting a war in that area". This caused the British no end of consternation, and Leahy eventually convinced King to rescind the order. Nevertheless, the points had been made.Dukeford (talk) 20:17, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

This is recorded elsewhere. Some writers point out that intervention in SE Europe might have forestalled the subsequent Soviet takeovers and FDR placed too much weight on Stalin's goodwill; perhaps but IMO there wasn't the manpower to support it. "Allied invasion of Cyprus"? Is this a typo? Folks at 137 (talk) 21:19, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Sorry - it was Rhodes. The exact quote was "No American boy is going to die...etc." Pogue's "Interviews and Reminiscences". Dukeford (talk) 21:45, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

I think the reference to Convoy AT-10 should be removed entirely. By January 1942, King was no longer CICLANT; that responsibility had (or would shortly) passed to Royal Ingersoll. Therefore, King had little to do with the operational disposition of the Atlantic Fleet. This is just another one of Gannon's canards regarding King and the Battle of the Atlantic. --Dukeford (talk) 21:02, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

I have removed the reference to "Convoy AT-10" from the Drumbeat text, for the reasons cited above. Any references used in this article to Gannon's book pushes the tone of the article into an entirely biased anti-King POV. I have also edited certain passages of the "Drumbeat" section for clarity. I removed the part about blackouts not being necessary due to the number of available "targets". I had added that some time ago, but couldn't back it up with a reference. Also inserted "supposedly" to King's "anglophobic" decisions. He may indeed have been anglophobic to a degree (at the least, he certainly didn't trust Churchill or Brooke), but there is NO documented evidence (despite Gannon's assertions) that he made biased decisions that cost "thousands" of Allied lives because he didn't like the British or their suggestions. That is a MAJOR canard!! I also added the bit about Arnold not wanting the RAF in the Pacific. It's from his wartime diary book, and I'll provide the reference cite later.--Dukeford (talk) 18:13, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Order of the Bath

I removed the post nominal letters GCB, referring to his honorary status as Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, from the introduction of this article as Mr. King was not closely associated with the United Kingdom in the sense required by the Manual of Style for biographies. The full style guidelines for the use of post nominal letters can be viewed here: Wikipedia:Manual of Style (biographies)#Post-nominal_initials. TrufflesTheLamb (talk) 14:07, 8 June 2009 (UTC)

Say it ain't so

While I recognize the page is about King & not peripheral issues, I do wonder why, then, mention of McVay & Joe Rochefort is included, without any detail of the nature of the controversies in Q.... Do I understand this is to do with Rochefort's lack of decoration & being posted to command of a floating dock? Or, more broadly, to the intra-Navy politicking of the Redman brothers, which caused Rochefort to get the shaft? I remain unclear how this bears on Ernie King.

FWIW, King is fairly widely described as an anglophobe, tho I can't say I've seen anything to substantiate it. His decision on VLRs had to account for production & demand in PTO, too, & his position on convoy escort, IMO, had to take account of the lack of DDs (based on a faulty prewar theory they could be built after war started) & the possibility of German raids on U.S. bases. (Recall British missions at Zeebrugge & St. Nazaire.) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 16:56, 17 November 2009 (UTC)

The crux of the matter is that when it came to the British, King was not uncooperative, uncollegial or even unfriendly. It is simply that, in the words of Admiral Cunningham, "he doesn't trust us!" This partly arose from the long standing rivalry between the US and Royal Navies. In the First World War, this was of little import; in the Second it came to the fore due to a series of arguments over strategy.

As a rule, personal criticism of King of this nature is not really aimed at the man at all, but at the characteristics of King that were seen as a typical of, setting the tone for, or even a product of, the US Navy as a whole. Anglophobia is one; others might include careerism, empire building, maladministration, and an unwillingness to take outside advice.

I've been meaning to finish this article. I only got half way through. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:45, 17 November 2009 (UTC)

I think we're agreed. It seems to me there was a fair amount of mistrust of Brit objectives generally (recall Marshall & Brooke over TORCH, for instance), which (at least in part) stemmed from a misperception (IMO) of Brit strategy (historically, the Brits have preferred to nibble at the edges til continental enemies are exhausted, then march in with flags flying & declare victory), as well as very different WW1 experience (AFUS didn't suffer anything like Verdun even once). (Grigg {had to look for his name :( } makes the first point in 1943, Terraine the second in The Right of the Line.) If "anglophobia" is to be thrown around, let's have some evidence, first. And I do get the sense King wasn't heavily inclined to take advice from anybody, so being in a furriner's navy put you well down the list.

Which does still leave me wondering about Joe Rochefort. (I know, nag, nag, nag. ;p) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 06:38 & 06:42, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

Two photoes: Viktor Sergeevich Kurushin(1909-1941)---Ernest Joseph King (1898-1956): Two Photoes.

Viktor Sergeevich Kurushin(1909-1941)---Ernest Joseph King (1898-1956): Two photoes.

The Photo from Newsru.com with remarks Reuters (1) http://www.newsru.com/pict/big/1259969.html [1] and words on Russian: "Фото с линейного эсминосца, корабля, ЕБК "Принц Уэльский", сделанные во время конференции 14 августf 1941 года во время встречи Рузвельта и Черчилля." In my translation from Russian to English, shotly: "Photo, from HMS "Prince of Wales", 14th August 1941" --- Here is a photo, where might be Ernest Joseph King, sitting since on the time of the Chirh service here on the board of the NHS Prince Of Wales (Prince Wales)

(Another photo 2 - or as the photo 1 in this artickle about the some event, but Admiral Ernest Joseph King, USN, was standing up already, on the another day of the meeting of the Roosvelt and Cherchull, which was from the american military navy archive, to this article about the Admiral Ernest Joseph King

(2)

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h67000/h67209.jpg [2]

I remark photo (2) as a photo (A) as it is a chart about Ernest J. King here, for a politness.

• You do not need to vizit the Hisory Navy Military archive to look at this number A or Number 2 photo- I prefer to write a letter A, as it would be more polite here.

So, we have photoes, as about the some events, with the some people, some place, and one is photo A, and another is photo 1 here.

As it would more polite here, I had rename the Photo 1 to Photo B.

So, We had photos as Photo A and Photo B now, two photoes about the some event, on the some place, with the some people, the some time.

I will show all again, as it would more easy here< to start to understand about what I try to say.

We had here photo A - sorry it is not American-this is British resource, probably- http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h67000/h67209.jpg [3] whch is presented in this article as a photo C, or photo A, as it is as a Main, so, I remark photo C (which is a similar to photo A, as downladed from the military navy archive) Photo C http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Prince_of_Wales-5.jpg [[4]] - a rename this photo C, similar to photo A as The Photo I ("The Number One")

The some photo it is possible to look and in the Russian web-side http://www.calend.ru/event/3023/ [http://www.calend.ru/event/3023/ ] with a remark here on Russian "Франклин Рузвельт и Уинстон Черчилль на борту британского линкора «Принц Уэльский»" "Franklin Roosvelt and Winston Churhill are ont boad of the British lincorn HMS Prince of Wales

So, we may found names and surnames of people on this historical photo:

The original photo is here:

Photo #: NH 67209 Atlantic Charter Conference, 10-12 August 1941

Conference leaders during Church services on the after deck of HMS Prince of Wales, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) and Prime Minister Winston Churchill are seated in the foreground. Standing directly behind them are Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army; General Sir John Dill, British Army; Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN; and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, RN. At far left is Harry Hopkins, talking with W. Averell Harriman.

• Donation of Vice Admiral Harry Sanders, USN(Retired), 1969.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph. from page http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/uk/uksh-p/pow12.htm [5] -photo A and The Photo I, Photo 2, Photo B, The Photo C, the Photo D are the some, where Admiral Ernest J.King was standing.

and we have only the Photo 1 here, which I had mention as The First on this artickle "Viktor Sergeevich Kurushin(1909-1941)---Ernest Joseph King (1898-1956): Two photoes."

So, We had The First Photo and The Photo One here.

So, it was the explanation about the numbers of photoes onle

The First Photo is where Admiral Ernest Joseph King was sitting The Photo One is where a some undefinated person, whom may be, probable, be named as Admiral Ernest J. King, was sitting.

But I am тще sure about this, as this person, on this The First Photo (1) is looking like Viktor Sergeevich Kurushin (Виктор Сергеевич Курушин) (birth 1909, Saratov, Russia - was killed, died, burried at (30th June 1941 | 30th July 1941 | 2nd August 1941), by the diffrent archive paper from the Russian Military and other archves See Архивы России - погибшие и пропавшие без вести: http://www.obd-memorial.ru/ [6]

"Курушин Виктор Сергеевич" , 1909 -1941 His wife - "Курушина Нина Степановна" ("Nina Stepanovna Kurushina" or "Kurushiba Nina Stepenovna"), arcodng the Russian Archive.

I had not found the open resource in the Internet, to download the original photoes, which I had saw privatly. So, I may mention only my personal opinion, as I had a possibility to look at these photoes,

on the some photoes they both, Kurushin Viktor Stepanovich(1909-1941) and Ernest Joseph King (1898-1956) both had been looked liked as the some one person.

There were being plenty photo with was a similarity in their both look. But I had found one where it was defenetly diffrent people.

So, I decided: yes, it is a similatiry in their both look. But there are 2 diffrent personality and people, probably.

It was a mark... as it was a broken chess from a bomb explosive, so he was unlucky to be near with this explosive, damaging himself till the dieth.

Nina Stepanovna Kurushina, his widows, had a daughter from his, one from their 3 daughters, whom had survived. She had still 2 daugters. But she never had married again for another man, living the memory and the love, as about the best kind person and man, whom she will see for all her life.

She had died in her 77th years old, 25th May 1992, in Novosibirsk, Russia.

V.S.Kurushin, Kurushin V.S. had died on his 31-32 y.o.

Edward Joseph King had died on this 77th year of his life.

I would be glad to think, that Kurushin V.S. had not died at 1941, but still was alive It is so hard, if a life so short, as it was in the WWII time for plenty people.

I had founded The First Photo from the 14th August 1941 with the explanation of name of a people n the boad. Only the Photo Number One in the British Military Navy Arcive had saved their names and surnames, and still not for all.

So, this versia may have a point to be, through this.

Winderrainer (talk) 22:30, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Ernest Joseph King (1898-1956): Two photoes

Ernest Joseph King (1898-1956): Two photoes.

The Photo from Newsru.com with remarks Reuters (1) http://www.newsru.com/pict/big/1259969.html [7] and words on Russian: "Фото с линейного эсминосца, корабля, ЕБК "Принц Уэльский", сделанные во время конференции 14 август 1941 года во время встречи Рузвельта и Черчилля."

In my translation from Russian to English, shotly: "Photo, from HMS "Prince of Wales", made on 14th August 1941"

--- Here is a photo, where might be Ernest Joseph King, sitting since on the time of the Chirh service here on the board of the NHS Prince Of Wales (Prince Wales)

I have marked this photo (1) as The First Photo

(Another photo 2 - or as the photo 1 in this artickle about the some event, but Admiral Ernest Joseph King, USN, was standing up already, on the another day of the meeting of the Roosvelt and Cherchull, which was from the american military navy archive, to this article about the Admiral Ernest Joseph King

(2)

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h67000/h67209.jpg [8]

I remark photo (2) as a photo (A) and as The Photo Number One

The Photo Number One Photo #: NH 67209 Atlantic Charter Conference, 10-12 August 1941

Conference leaders during Church services on the after deck of HMS Prince of Wales, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) and Prime Minister Winston Churchill are seated in the foreground. Standing directly behind them are Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army; General Sir John Dill, British Army; Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN; and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, RN. At far left is Harry Hopkins, talking with W. Averell Harriman.

• Donation of Vice Admiral Harry Sanders, USN(Retired), 1969.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph. from page http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/uk/uksh-p/pow12.htm [9]

The some Photo Number One is here Photo C http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Prince_of_Wales-5.jpg [[10]] - a rename this photo C, similar to photo A as The Photo I ("The Number One")

The some photo it is possible to look and in the Russian web-side http://www.calend.ru/event/3023/ [http://www.calend.ru/event/3023/ ] with a remark here on Russian "Франклин Рузвельт и Уинстон Черчилль на борту британского линкора «Принц Уэльский»" "Franklin Roosvelt and Winston Churhill are ont boad of the British lincorn HMS Prince of Wales

So, we may found names and surnames of people on this historical photo:

The original photo is here:

Photo #: NH 67209 Atlantic Charter Conference, 10-12 August 1941

Conference leaders during Church services on the after deck of HMS Prince of Wales, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) and Prime Minister Winston Churchill are seated in the foreground. Standing directly behind them are Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army; General Sir John Dill, British Army; Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN; and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, RN. At far left is Harry Hopkins, talking with W. Averell Harriman.

• Donation of Vice Admiral Harry Sanders, USN(Retired), 1969.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph. from page http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/uk/uksh-p/pow12.htm [11] -photo A and The Photo I, Photo 2, Photo B, The Photo C, the Photo D are the some, where Admiral Ernest J.King was standing.

The First Photo is where the undefinated person, whom may be probably to be Admiral Ernest Joseph King was sitting The Photo One is where a some undefinated person, whom may be, probable, be named as Admiral Ernest J. King, was standing.

The question is :

is the person on the First Photo and The Photo Number One is the some, Admiral Ernest J. King, Ernest Joseph King?

Winderrainer (talk) 22:47, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

• Yes. Hawkeye7 (talk) 03:58, 12 April 2010 (UTC)

"...most even tempered man in the Navy" quote

According to Ronald Lewin's "The American Magic", ISBN 0 14 00.6471 0, page 121, paragraph 2, the quote is, "He is the most even-tempered man in the Navy. He is always in a rage." It is attributed to King's daughter! —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Antinice (talk • contribs) 06:34, 6 January 2007 (UTC). --Antinice 06:37, 6 January 2007 (UTC) Antinice

This saying is usually applied to General Bedell Smith. This seems to be a unique application of it to Admiral King. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.16.252.144 (talk) 22:01, 31 March 2009 (UTC)

Lewin's source was probably W. J. "Jasper" Holmes:

"Nearly twenty years before [i.e. around 1923], he was commander of the Submarine School at New London when I was a student there. Some of my fellow students dated one of his daughters and reported that she defended her father's strict discipline and exacting demands with the statement: 'He is the most even-tempered man in the Navy. He is always in a rage.'" (W. J. Holmes, "Double-Edged Secrets", page 142)

Wilfred Jay Holmes, "Double-Edged Secrets: U. S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II" (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis) Copyright 1979, ISBN 0-87021-162-5 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 136.160.250.253 (talk) 12:16, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

The Record on King versus the ASW war MUST be corrected in this article

Reference: Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-Boat War" volumes 1 and 2

1939 - As a member of the General Board, King advocates beginning construction of destroyer escorts (DEs); President Roosevelt refuses, instead approving a pet project to employ yachts and harbor craft and to build hundreds of PC and SC class submarine chasers after conflict begins. Only one yacht, one SC craft and two PC craft were involved in submarine sinkings while DEs became highly prevalent submarine killers.

late November 41 - As CinCLant and prior to U.S. entry into WW2 King proposes convoying ships between Norfolk, New York and Boston.

7 December 41 - US enters WW2, King is CinCLant; CNO is Admiral Stark.

18 December 41 - The Germans sortie to begin Operation Drumbeat.

20 December 41 - King, then CinCLant, detached and ordered to WDC.

23 December 41 - Allied "Arcadia" Conference, King in attendance. Conference establishes Allied priorities including the higher importance of troop convoys and certain special convoys to support the U.K. in the Middle East and North Atlantic cargo convoys over U.S. coastal convoys.

30 December 41 - King relieves Kimmel as CinC U.S. Fleet.

January 42 - Allies lose the ability to read German codes; simultaneously German intelligence breaks Allied Naval Cypher #3.

January 42 - King suspends delivery of PBYs to U.K. to make up heavy casualties in this type at Pearl Harbor.

early January 42 - Three battleships and seven DD ordered to Pacific, depleting available convoy escorts.

14 January 42 - King's Chief of the Bureau of Avionics, RAdm Towers requests 400 4-engine and 900 2-engine aircraft in the U.S. production schedule for ASW; USAAF chief Gen. Arnold refuses the request.

22 January 42 - King orders 1st Convoy Conference and establishes 10-escort East Coast coastal convoy cadre.

24 January 42 - King orders his CinCLant, VAdm Ingersol, to make LantFleet aircraft available to Eastern Sea Frontier commander RAdm Andrews and directs that Ingersol's ASW patrolling operations "should not unduly interfere with scheduled operations of Atlantic Fleet aircraft, especially those on convoy escort."

1 February 42 - GILBERTS/MARSHALLS CARRIER RAID

7 February 42 - The nucleus of the ASW Operational Research Group (ASWORG) is formed by King's CinCLant, VAdm Ingersol.

10 February 42 - Necessary escort for higher priority troop convoy AT-12 consumes DDs from East Coast escort cadre intended to escort coastal convoys.

12 February 42 - King demands a convoy plan from Eastern Sea Frontier, RAdm Andrews.

12 February 42 - "Channel Dash" by German heavy ships reinforces Allied perception of the need for a heavy covering force to prevent a sortie by German battleship Tirpitz, which consumes American DDs that could otherwise escort convoys.

17 February 42 - U.S. Navy lets contract for mass production of centimetric wavelength radar for ASW purposes, one of many British innovations readily adopted by the U.S.N..

18 Feburary 42 - Two U.S. DDs run aground, further depleting available escorts.

March 42 - King resumes delivery of PBYs to U.K. having made good the Pearl Harbor losses and immediate Pacific needs.

24 February 42 - CARRIER RAID ON WAKE ISLAND

27 February-1 March 42 - BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA and BATTLE OF SUNDA STRAIT

4 March 42 - CARRIER RAID ON MARCUS ISLAND

10 March 42 - CARRIER RAID ON LAE AND SALAMAUA

12 March 42 - King relieves Stark as C.N.O.; retains concurrent CinC U.S. Fleet role, thus ending divided responsibility at the top tier of the U.S. Naval hierarchy.

12 March 42 - One carrier and two light cruisers needed in the Pacific are escorted by four DDs, further depleting available escorts.

12 March 42 - The first of 24 U.K. ASW trawlers accepted by King arrives in NYC, late, in bad condition, requiring voyage repairs and unready for immediate use.

16 March 42 - President Roosevelt responds to Prime Minister Churchill's questioning on the ASW issues by pointing out that 1) the U.S. is propping up the Mid-Ocean Escort Force; 2) The Royal Canadian Navy's weakness in numbers has forced the U.S.N. to take up another 300 nm of the North Atlantic convoy route; 3) The U.S.N. will shortly be sending a task force to Scapa Flow because of the 12 February "Channel Dash;" 4) Britsh ASW trawlers that are just arriving require voyage repairs.

17 March 42 - One DD rammed by carrier, further depleting available escorts.

20 March 42 - King orders coastal convoys initiated "at once" even though "escort will for a time be meagre;" CinCLant Ingersol replies that already assigned higher priority tasks established at Allied Arcadia conference and due for execution in April will adversely impact convoy escort availability. So-called "Bucket Brigade" Convoys begin.

25 March 42 - In response to the 12 February "Channel Dash" one carrier, one battleship, two heavy cruisers and six DD dispatched to Scapa Flow to operate with Royal Navy, further depleting available escorts.

26 March 42 - USAAF Gen. Arnold finally surrenders operational control 1st Bomber Command to Eastern Sea Frontier for the purposes of ASW; Arnold still views this force as doing temporary duty that detracts from what he feels is its primary duty: training crews for strategic bombing.

late March 42 - King approves inter-locking convoy plan.

31-March to 18 April 42 - DOOLITTLE RAID

early April 42 - Nightly harboring of coastal merchant traffic commences.

9 April 42 - BATAAN FALLS

6-17 April 42 - A British and U.S. Intelligence information exchange agreement is finally concluded.

20 April 42 - CARRIER REINFORCEMENT OF MALTA FIGHTER COMMAND

20-26 April 42 - Visiting British Admiral Pound feels snubbed when King suddenly leaves during this period for a conference with Adm. Nimitz; said conference was necessary and set in motion the subsequent Battle of the Coral Sea.

22 April to 10 May 42 - CARRIER REINFORCEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE

1-17 May 42 - Convoy routes between Key West and Norfolk; Halifax and Boston; Halifax and the Caribbean; and Trinidad and Aruba commence operating.

4 May 42 - CARRIER RAID ON TULAGI

6 May 42 - FALL OF CORREGIDOR

7-8 May 42 - BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA

9 May 42 - SECOND CARRIER REINFORCEMENT OF MALTA FIGHTER COMMAND

mid-May 42 - U.S. Government obtains legal authority to order coastal blackouts resisted to this time by local municipal authorities.

20 May 42 - U.S. Secretary of War Stimson orders Gen. Arnold to realign 1st Bomber Command's mission to ASW over Arnold's objection.

24 May 42 - One carrier, one battleship, one escort carrier, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and six DD shifted to the Pacific, further depleting available escorts.

4-7 June 42 - BATTLE OF MIDWAY

21 June 42 - King memo in reply to Gen. Marshall's questioning on the ASW issue describes convoy as "the only way" to control the U-Boats and points out that the U.S. Army could help the situation by reducing unnecessary troop movements in the Western Hemisphere, reducing unscheduled sailings of Army controlled shipping and using established convoys. Quoting King after 4 March and no later than this date: "Escort is not just one way of handling the submarine menace it is the only way that gives any promise of success. The so-called hunting and patrol operations have time and again proved futile."

21-27 June 42 - Allied "Argonaut" Conference; a memo from Roosevelt to King makes mention of convoy routes already in place.

1-19 July 42 - SECOND CARRIER REINFORCEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE

August 42 - Drumbeat ends.

December 42 - Allies break 4-rotor Naval Enigma and regain access to German codes.

The above more than extinguishes the claims that King was unresponsive to the U-Boat threat; unwilling to accept British aid; unwilling to establish convoys; or overly focused on the Pacific during a period when his Asiatic Fleet was being hunted to destruction, his Pacific Fleet was conducting five raids and fighting two pivotal battles, and his Atlantic Fleet was conducting four reinforcement missions and escorting numerous troops convoys--without loss--and "Winston Special" convoys specifically at the behest of the British.

The charge that the US possessed adequate escorts and King misused them is patently false and also proven to be false in Blair's two-volume opus previously cited. At war's start the Atlantic Fleet possessed 92 destroyers, no destroyer escorts (proposed two years prior by King and refused by Roosevelt), and less than 10 patrol craft and submarine chasers (types advocated by Roosevelt in place of DEs; PCs alone consumed 40,000 men and sank only 2 submarines, SCs consume over 10,000 men and sank only one submarine, and requisitioned yachts sank only 1 submarine--claims that SCs, PCs and PFs sank 67 submarines are blatantly incorrect). SCs did not begin to launch in numbers until January 42; PCs did not begin to launch in numbers until March 42; both types required shake down cruises and training before being useful as escorts.

Of the 92 destroyers available at the war's outbreak:

An average of 14 were in yard hands for necessary repairs at any one time. Another 14 were tied up with troop convoys WS-12X and TC-19, as well as TF 19 at Scapa all in support of BRITAIN. Another 11 escorted 1 CV, 3 BB, and 2 CL urgently needed by the embattled Pacific Fleet which was endeavoring to keep open the supply line to two BRITISH Dominions (Australia and New Zealand) and protect those Dominions adequately to prevent said Dominions from demanding the withdrawal of their ground forces from the BRITISH Middle Eastern Army. Another 30 were assigned to North Atlantic Convoy duty in support of BRITAIN. Another 21 were providing escort to Atlantic fleet ships. This leaves exactly 2 destroyers available to escort coastal convoys at the outbreak of the war.

As rapidly as destroyers were commissioned they were added to the Atlantic fleet for convoy escort.

It should not be forgotten that President Roosevelt had previously transferred 50 destroyers to Britain, destroyers which constituted the U.S.N.'s reserve that would normally have been used to escort convoys. President Roosevelt made no special provision to replace these ships beyond that already provided by Congress's naval construction appropriations drafted by Representative Vinson, the fruits of which would join the fleet after hostilities broke out.

The British contributed to the delays in initiating an effective defense against convoys by squabbling over control of the ASW effort, squabbling over sharing intelligence information, and starving the RCAN of assets and training until late in 1941.

Various British (and American) writers have claimed there were 51 available destroyers for the US coastal convoys at the war's outbreak, and assertion that can only be arrived at by counting the 30 already assigned to the North Atlantic run, and the 21 assigned to protect the Atlantic Fleet's ships, assignments that made them patently UNavailable to protect coastal convoys.

Various British (and American) writers have claimed these supposedly missing 51 destroyers were siphoned off to the Pacific; the 11 destroyers actually sent to the Pacific are already accounted for and the desperate situation in the Pacific demanded their transfer.

Various British (and American) writers have claimed the USN resisted absorbing RN lessons learned on convoys, and therefor were slow to implement them. This is the reverse of the truth; the USN resistance to employing unescorted convoys was based on the negative experience of the RN with such convoys in the summer and fall of 1940.

Operation Drumbeat was launched by the sortie of five submarines on 18 December 1941, before King assumed either the CinCUSF or CNO roles. It was fully developed before King took over as CNO. It ended within five months of King assuming complete control of the USN. King implemented coastal convoys within 8 days of assuming the role of CNO. Drumbeat peaked in April, and the U-Boats effectiveness began to diminish within two months of King assuming the role of CNO.

In is not coincidental that King's institution of coastal convoys in March coincided with SC craft finally completing training and becoming available and Arnold being forced to surrender control of 1st Bomber Command to the ESF; and that the process accelerated as PC craft finally completed training and became available in May along with refitted British trawlers and Arnold was forced to finally realign 1st Bomber Command's mission to ASW. This was also the time the US Government obtained the legal right to force municipalities to extinguish coastal lighting. King fought many rounds with Arnold and Marshall to get the aircraft and aircraft production needed for effective ASW, things that Arnold consistently resisted. Final control of ASW aircraft by the Navy did not come until 1943, again through King's tireless efforts and over Arnold's objection.

Almost the entire image of King's character and policy in this article and others is derived from five quotations which are uniformly taken out of context and/or attributed to the wrong people. These include his daughter's humorous and hyperbolic observation of his temper; the remark attributed to Roosevelt but actually made by another person of King's shaving with a blowtorch; Stilwell's actually sympathetic remark about how much the ascerbic Alanbrooke goaded King which included Stilwell's wish that King had hit Alanbrooke; Eisenhower's petty diary quotation suggesting killing King would help the war effort; and King's own quotation about logistics after a conversation with Marshall which is generally misused to imply King knew nothing of logistics--in fact the Navy had studied logistics at the War College for decades and King's remark was a sarcastic observation to an aide after Marshall tactlessly lectured King on the issue.

British allegations of "Anglophobia" derive primarily from the fact that King saw right through their intention to grab everything they could from the Americans and their attempt to do as they pleased with that materiel. Although Marshall and Eisenhower also resisted these efforts to a degree, King was consistent in spotting where the British demanded more than they needed, left assets idle that were better employed elsewhere, or sought to pull the focus of the war off of American aims and onto their own. The two chief American aims were to invade the continent and Europe and come to grips with Nazi Germany first and foremost, and to defeat Japan in the Pacific. When King saw the British had no intention of going ahead with a cross-Channel invasion in either 1942 or 1943, he rightly discerned that assets earmarked and/or left idle for those purposes would be better employed elsewhere to meet U.S. aims. One cannot entirely blame the British for looking out for their own interests, but if we grant the British this courtesy, then we can in no way blame King for looking out for American interests.

Descriptions of meetings and conversations make clear that personalities such as Alanbrooke and Cunningham were every bit as stiff and standoffish with King as he was accused of being with them. Pound's dislike for King was founded entirely on his own personal pique when King quite clearly had more important things on his plate than entertaining a dignitary; the war in the Pacific and American interests there, and King's world-wide responsibilities did not stop for Pound's convenience. The attitude adopted toward King's view of the British is that denying the British anything at all constituted hatred of all things British and obstruction of the war effort, a position utterly and deliberately blind to the British manipulations in their own interest or to the fact the American and British interests in the war were not entirely identical. Signed Electic Joe.

Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-Boat War" should be an essential and extensively referenced part of this article. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.207.109.109 (talk) 08:25, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

well there was a lot of naval history King was in charge of -- S E Morison wrote 13 volumes on the topic, and there are good bios of King. Blair was a submariner himself and thought the war was all about subs. As for the article it is fully referenced to very good sourced, including 11 citations to King's own memoir--is that not enough? Historians highly recommend Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. (1995). -- he had better access to the records than did Blair. Rjensen (talk) 08:32, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

When the result is superficial and presents myth and legend in the face of readily available fact, then no, what is here is not enough, by definition.108.207.109.109 (talk) 15:29, 4 April 2012 (UTC) Signed, Electric Joe, 10:35 CDT, 4 April 2012 (the four tilde signature system seems to be non-functional).

The idea, I believe, is to present all sides of the issue; rightly or wrongly, there's no doubt that many authors have a problem with U.S Navy (i.e. King) activity against the U-Boat threat early in the war. However, detail of this type would certainly enhance the article on Drumbeat ("Second Happy Time")(hint, hint). Discarding the typical, well-worn King canards would benefit several Wiki articles, but this one is pretty neutral, IMO. Dukeford (talk) 20:47, 27 August 2012 (UTC)

Unclear half-sentence

Small thing. Could someone clarify the segment in brackets?

When General Marshall resisted this line of action (as well as who would command the operation),

Regards to all. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.150.157.244 (talk) 13:50, 9 April 2015 (UTC)

Not really sure what's unclear. Marshall didn't like the idea of a Guadalcanal invasion, not King's proposed choice of CO (presumably Nimitz rather than MacArthur, tho I can't say offhand). Anything else not clear? TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 03:20, 10 April 2015 (UTC)

Analysis

Recent changes to this section seem to be POV or require citations: in some cases, they take no account of earlier, referenced, additions. One instance is the tagging of the British Pacific Fleet as "politically-motivated": given the British assurances (given in 1942) of full involvement in the war against Japan once Germany was defeated, the British interests in the region and Australian discomfort at being submerged or sidelined by US pre-dominance, the British (more accurately British Empire, as the BPF was mullti-national) desire to be involved is understandable. One could also tag King's resistance as political. Another issue is the use of US Atlantic forces for troop convoy escort: there was only one at the time of "Drumbeat", it was delayable, and unused AS forces were moored while ships were being sunk (referenced to a US author). I suggest that we add info and citations to the analysis and then rework it. Folks at 137 (talk) 18:33, 15 January 2008 (UTC)

The page still needs substantial updating. I shall be reworking it, adding info and much-needed citations. I got sidetracked half way.

King's resistance to the BPF was not political but based on a naval assessment that the British Navy lacked the logistical infrastructure to operate in the Central Pacific. King foresaw that the British Pacific Fleet would require US Navy support, necessitating a withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet, and therefore not resulting in any net gain. The anglophobia of King and senior officers of the US Navy in general was certainly also a factor but it also has to be noted that he was right: the BPF did require US Navy support, although it attempted to comply with the CCS directive that it to be self-supporting. This is an issue that confronts coalition commanders to this day.

The Anglophobia of the nitwit seems to be marked stupidity and intransigence in the face of common sense. According to this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_KcQ9qYICo most of his victims were US sailors.

Weatherlawyer (talk) 22:22, 28 June 2015 (UTC)

The article sounded very odd to me as well when it claimed that the BPF a political measure was forced on Churchill by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The term "British" had a double meaning back then - it was understood in certain contexts to include Australian, Canadian and New Zealand. I may add words to this effect to the BPF article.

As for "Drumbeat", I think we agree on this one too. Troop shipping were not the issue. The problem was the shortage of escorts. In turn, this can be blamed on the US Navy (but not King) because of a pre-Pearl Harbour policy of building up a large, balanced fleet containing aircraft carriers, battleships etc rather than concentrating on escorts. This - and the ineffective effort - harkens back to the fact that the US Navy was as mentally unprepared for the U-Boats as it was materially.

Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:12, 15 January 2008 (UTC)

Good, good. I agree that King's practical reservations about BPF endurance were valid, at the outset. However, there was a real effort to build forward bases (eg MONABs) and a fleet train for the BPF. These points should be in this article and the detail in the BPF one. I think that King retained his opposition in principle to BPF involvement, as did his colleagues, which is why FDR overruled them (a political decision). The extent of actual US logistical support to the BPF should also be recorded.

There is at least one source, which I can obtain, that the British chiefs of staff threatened resignation if Churchill did not ok involvement in the Pacific. This was an issue at the overlap of the political and military spheres.

Yes, escorts were in short supply, but those that were available were not deployed properly and there was little sense of fighting spirit, which is strange given the preceding months' activities. Also King and his commanders failed to use what was available, finding out eventually that even inadequate sporting boats had a deterrent effect. Have look at Gannon's book, which needs to be contrasted with other, more generous sources.

Folks at 137 (talk) 21:59, 15 January 2008 (UTC)

The "politcal motivation" behind the use of the British Fleet in the Pacific is well-documented in both Brooke's and Cunningham's diaries. They state that the British General Staff forced the issue on Churchill. This was King's underlying objection, and he specifically refers to it in "Fleet Admiral King". The fleet train problem was a red herring. King also had objections to incorporating units of mixed nationality into the U.S. Fleet, due to differing tactical doctrine. This is mentioned in Admiral Low's short tretise on his relationship with King. Finally, King certainly felt that the British had no buisness interjecting themselves into an essentially American-run theater. The U.S. Navy had already pushed the Japanese all the way back to their home islands, and the British Fleet was not needed to bring about Japan's defeat.Dukeford (talk) 20:23, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

I have serious objections to using Gannon's book as the sole reference arbitrator of King's performance in the U-boat war. Perhaps some American historians are too sympathetic to King's image, but Gannon's book is overly biased in the other direction. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. Dukeford (talk) 23:59, 18 January 2008 (UTC)

The logistical effort required to support the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) was immense. I have updated the order of battle on the BPF page to include the fleet train, so readers can judge for themselves. I should also add some more words about it. Also, the US Navy had not "already pushed the Japanese all the way back to their home islands" when the decision was taken at Quebec in September 1944.

The minutes of the meeting imply a heated discussion:

"The COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then considered paragraph 2 of CCS 452/27 referring to the use of a British Empire task force in the South West Pacific.

"SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Prime Minister had offered the British Fleet for use in the main operations against Japan. By implication this paragraph accepted a naval force for the South West Pacific, and was therefore contrary to the intention he had expressed.

"ADMIRAL KING said that it was of course essential to have sufficient forces for the war against Japan. He was not, however, prepared to accept a British Fleet which he could not employ or support. In principle he wished to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific but it would be unacceptable for the British main fleet to be employed for political reasons in the Pacific and thus necessitate the withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet.

"SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded Admiral King that the Prime Minister had suggested that certain of the newer British capital ships be substituted for certain of the older US ships.

"SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that as he understood it the Prime Minister and President were in agreement that it was essential for British forces to take a leading part in the main operations against Japan.

"ADMIRAL KING said that it was not his recollection that the President had agreed to this. He would not accept that a view expressed by the Prime Minister should be regarded as a directive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

"SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Prime Minister felt it essential that it should be placed on the record that he wished the British Fleet to play a major role in operations against Japan.

"SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, as he remembered it, the offer was no sooner made than accepted by the president.

"ADMIRAL KING asked for specific British proposals."

Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:28, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Hawk, you are correct. The preceding was included in Buell's book. Too bad the conference meeting minutes were not taken verbatum. The actual language used would be interesting! Dukeford (talk) 20:56, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

What's happening with Drumbeat?

I read the article earlier and came up on this in the Drumbeat section:

"Admiral King stayed the course and the US Navy reasserted itself both in the “Battle of the Atlantic” and, with no help from the British, in a string of great victories in the Pacific. The bottom line is if FDR thought Admiral King was incompetent Admiral King would have been fired.[citation needed]"

Has anyone actually managed to find a cite for this? I think the above passage is wrong for three reasons:

1. This comment generally leads the reader to believe the British was of no help in the Pacific Theater of Operations. This is untrue. The US Navy were given Operational Command of the British Fleet in the Pacific. But the BFP did make engagements, and they were successful. What "great" victories are actually being referred to?

2. Why are "great victories in the Pacific" even mentioned in the Drumbeat section? Drumbeat was entirely an ATLANTIC operation. It had nothing at all to do with the Pacific.

3. "The bottom line" is, unless someone can find a source, I think the sentence talking about FDR firing King if he thought King was incompetent should be removed.

Those sentences just sound very fishy to me that's all. Maybe I'm just reading too much into them. Anyone have any comments? DarkLight753 (talk) 11:31, 16 September 2018 (UTC)

♠Read it again. It's not saying Drumbeat was in PTO, it's saying the victories were.

♠"What 'great' victories are actually being referred to?" Oh, I dunno, how about Coral Sea? Or Midway? Or maybe Guadalcanal? (Not really a USN op, I'll allow.) Or maybe Tarawa? Or Leyte Gulf? None of which involved the Brits at all, notice. The British involvement in PTO was pretty small, in the grand scheme of things.

♠As for FDR firing King, yes, he would (& should) have fired King if unhappy; in the event, he wasn't sufficiently, no matter how bad Paukenschlag got. (How bad it got wasn't solely King's fault.) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 06:55, 18 September 2018 (UTC)

Japan won the Battle of the Coral Sea. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.158.32.197 (talk) 15:06, 12 April 2020 (UTC)

• The section says there was no help from the British, and this is untrue; the carrier HMS Victorious went to the Pacific in 1942 when the USN was down to just one carrier. And while the battles cited did not involve British ships, Coral Sea, Guadalcanal and Leyte Gulf all had considerable involvement by Australian ships, on which some British personnel (one of them an admiral) served.
• The section would make a lot more sense in my opinion if it highlighted the King's successes in the Atlantic; as it is, a veteran of the Atlantic fleet might feel aggrieved.
• While I personally think the final sentence is true, you still need to find a source. (And how many incompetent admirals did FDR relieve?) Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:25, 18 September 2018 (UTC)