Talk:Enaction (philosophy)/Archive 2
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Some things in the intro that need fixing
The present introductory paragraph reads as follows:
- Enaction as a theory argues that cognition depends on the physical activity of the cognsier; there is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features. The origins of this view are traced to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through our opportunities to enact with that world. The theory sees an essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall the view is that we are embedded and embodied in an environment that we enact, and in which we are to a degree embedded and extended. It is one of a series of non-Cartesian theories of the mind which in various ways hold that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, and the environment[1]
- [1] Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
I'd like to discuss a few points about it.
- cognseir - probably cognizer
- "The origins of this view are traced to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit."
- → The origins of the view that "there is no separation between action and perception" is not traceable to Kant. In fact, Kant epitomizes a view contrary to enaction, namely the view that mind is pre-programmed with categories with which it interprets the world, space and time among them, and uses these categories to organize perceptions. In contrast, the view of enaction is that categories are not pre-programmed but arrived upon and invented during interaction with the world.
- → In any event, this line of thought does not belong in the introduction but in a subsection on historical beginnings.
- "The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through our opportunities to enact with that world."
- → The embedding of the observer is not a result of 'opportunities to enact'. The embedding refers to sensorimotor capacities at the motor-learning level, and possibly cultural tools (books, art, science) at a higher level. Opportunity does not embed us, the nature of our embedding dictates our opportunities, the ways available to interact.
- "since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes."
- → a non-sequitur, IMO. In any event it is not 'evaluation' that is intrinsic in the enactive view, but the selection of how we act and the blow-back, the 'interaction', that is intrinsic to our cognition. Enaction is explicitly opposed to the idea of the world 'out there', evaluated by the world 'in here'.
- "It is one of a series of non-Cartesian theories of the mind which in various ways hold that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, and the environment"
- → the description of enaction as one among many 'non-Cartesian theories' seems a bit unhelpful as it defines enaction in terms of what it isn't, and uses very technical jargon unfamiliar to many readers to describe what enaction isn't. It seems a bit of a waste of time to bone up on 'Cartesian theory' just so we know where not to look for enaction. The subsequent explanation of what enaction is, namely one of a series of theories blah-blah-blah is a repetition of what already has been said, but introduces the notion that enaction is about 'consciousness', which it is not. It is about cognition.
There is a lack of sourcing here also, which is not made up for by more careful sourcing in the body of the article. Brews ohare (talk) 19:05, 15 April 2014 (UTC)
- I wonder why you think other editors are incapable of reading the introduction, repeating it here just clutters up the talk page. The text there came from Tony's reference. Most of your points you make seem to challenge that reference with your own opinion. The substantial point related to non-cartesian, that could be referenced to Reynolds if you have concern and a dab link would be easy. ----Snowded TALK 05:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- Too much original research and synthesis in hose changes Brews and your edit summary is misleading, the objections are only your. When I get a chance this evening I will make some changes to remove the OR. Ill try and preserve what I can but you are again writing a personal view and misusing some of those sources----Snowded TALK 15:39, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- Snowded: Your comments are invention. I've rewritten the introduction and included some sources to make clear that "my own opinions" have nothing to do with it. However, the sources show pretty clearly that this article should be moved to Enactive cognition because a good deal of the discussion of it in the literature is about ways to verify its concepts by experimental observation and simulation, which is not the domain of philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 15:44, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- The real irony Brews is that you are using Cartesian language, string together partially understood sources. I'm happy to look at moving/deleting but you need to engage in the discussions about what a new article should be. You also need to be more consistent on the delet Koon discussion on this article. The one thing I can promise you is that you will not be allowed to simply write this material yourself.----Snowded TALK 15:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- Snowded: Glad for help in presenting sources more clearly, if that is your goal. Bellicose comments on what you will 'allow' seem egoistic. Comment about Kooning discussion unintelligible. Brews ohare (talk) 17:37, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- I am not being bellicose Brews, that you interpret it that way is disappointing. Your rent changes show zero evidence of paying attention to what I and several other editors have been saying to you. I was sorely tempted to simply revert but I will spend time this evening working through this 'delet Koon' was iPad fingers should have read 'deletion'. You are being inconsistent ----Snowded TALK 17:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- I am glad your assertions as to what you will personally 'allow' were entirely misinterpreted as being bellicose. I still have no idea where 'Koon' arises? Maybe you mean Kant? If so, I have suggested that a background subsection be written where various philosophical schools can be related to enaction, including Kant and Descartes. In such a subsection some prologue can be included to bring the uniformed reader up to speed about these authors. The introduction of undefined technical jargon in the Intro is disconcerting to the non-cognoscenti. Brews ohare (talk) 18:40, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- In case you meant the article deletion discussion, I updated my view on that page. Brews ohare (talk) 18:55, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- I am not being bellicose Brews, that you interpret it that way is disappointing. Your rent changes show zero evidence of paying attention to what I and several other editors have been saying to you. I was sorely tempted to simply revert but I will spend time this evening working through this 'delet Koon' was iPad fingers should have read 'deletion'. You are being inconsistent ----Snowded TALK 17:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- Snowded: Glad for help in presenting sources more clearly, if that is your goal. Bellicose comments on what you will 'allow' seem egoistic. Comment about Kooning discussion unintelligible. Brews ohare (talk) 17:37, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- The real irony Brews is that you are using Cartesian language, string together partially understood sources. I'm happy to look at moving/deleting but you need to engage in the discussions about what a new article should be. You also need to be more consistent on the delet Koon discussion on this article. The one thing I can promise you is that you will not be allowed to simply write this material yourself.----Snowded TALK 15:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
- Snowded: Your comments are invention. I've rewritten the introduction and included some sources to make clear that "my own opinions" have nothing to do with it. However, the sources show pretty clearly that this article should be moved to Enactive cognition because a good deal of the discussion of it in the literature is about ways to verify its concepts by experimental observation and simulation, which is not the domain of philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 15:44, 16 April 2014 (UTC)
I Added a picture
And I really think the intro is too long now, although we don't want to lose the important points in the work of Stapleton and Ward. Guidance says it should be concise, and 1-4 paragraphs. At the moment it is neither. I will try to deal with that, by brief mention in the intro then fuller text back in the main article. While taking account of others' views, of course. TonyClarke (talk) 03:02, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
- I was sorely tempted too revert to the summary by Stapleton and Ward but I have done my best to make the lede into an acceptable length using his material as much as possible. If it simply gets reinserted I think I will revert the version you 'liked' via a tag ----Snowded TALK 11:33, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
Proposed subsection
A subsection explaining the E′s might be useful here to put enaction in context. Here is a possible approach, somewhat along what Tony proposed and Snowded removed:
The E′s of cognition
As mentioned above, enaction is sometimes taken as one of the E′s describing cognition.1, 2. The E′s refer to Enactive, Embodied, Embedded, and Extended. This section outlines briefly what these terms mean, as described by Rowlands,1 and by Stapleton and Ward.2
Enactive
This aspect is the subject of this article. Broadly speaking 'enactive' means that cognition depends upon the activity of the cognitive agent, but beyond that, it opposes what is sometimes called a 'computationalist' or 'representationalist' picture of this interaction in which the agent receives information from the environment, represents it internally and processes it, and then arrives by 'computation' or 'deduction' at a course of action. Instead, the enactive view of the interaction is that the agent already is 'attuned' to its environment, which tuning filters both the input from the environment and the probing of the environment. One aspect of this interaction is the anticipation of the agent as to what might be the result of a particular probing action, and the design of that probing action to test that expectation.
Embedded
The cognitive agent is not engaged in a simple information exchange with the environment, a sort of detached input-output between largely autonomous systems, but is to some degree inseparable from aspects of its environment to which it is closely coupled. This coupling may limit or channel or structure the interactions available within the agent-environment interaction.
Embodied
The cognitive agent interacts with the environment through 'apparatus' peculiar to the form of the agent, for example the senses. Various aspects of the agent's embodiment influence this interaction, for example, the eye processes visible light to present a modified signal to the brain, and the spinal cord encodes certain instructions that produce a muscular response to some forms of stimulation.
Extended
The cognitive agent is not limited in its interaction to its embodied capacities, but can invent and enlist the aid of external 'tools' that extend its presence into the environment.
Affected
Not a descriptor beginning with the letter 'E', but indicating that there are some motivating factors pushing the cognitive agent to engage in the cognitive process, to adopt an evaluative stance. Our 'affective state' decides what the agent actually will undertake.
- [1] Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
- [2] Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525.
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has generic name (help) On-line version here.
Comments
- This proposal surely can be improved upon, but would something along these lines be useful? Please offer alternative formulations. Brews ohare (talk) 04:46, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
- That needs another article of which this is a development as proposed, its coat racking and diversionary. You need to engage in the discussion about a new article and agree a name. That would be evidence of a willingness to engage. I personally think we would be better with one article on the Es including this material until it expands to the point where it splits. ----Snowded TALK 11:32, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
- → Snowded: I suggested the article title be widened to more easily incorporate non-philosophical topics such as psychology and robotics. I also have presented three or four extensive sourced presentations of material suitable for this renamed article. You simply hold your nose, and say nothing about content. So, I guess I have demonstrated a "willingness to engage'. Your response has been to repeatedly refer to the chimera of some distant future discussion in which you will play an active role. Brews ohare (talk) 15:40, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded's reversion of intro
In a string of 7 edits, Snowded removed most of this Introduction:
- Enaction as a theory argues that cognition depends on interaction between the cognitive agent and its environment;[S 1] action and perception are directly connected, and "only a creature with certain features – for example, eyes, hands, legs, and skills – can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities".[S 2] The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create through our capacities to enact with that world.[S 3] Perception, however, is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features: for example, "your brain is tuned to certain potentialities".[S 3] This 'tuning' is not a sensorimotor limitation upon what the agent can perceive, but a 'guess' about what the sensed particularities 'mean'; "there belongs to every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to the sides 'also meant' – not yet perceived, but only anticipated."[S 4]
- The term enaction was introduced by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch,[S 5] and further developed by Thompson and others,[S 6] to place emphasis upon the idea that experience of the world is a result of mutual interaction between the sensorimotor capacities of the organism and its environment.[S 2] "Sense-making is an inherently active idea. Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world.[S 7]
- In a 2012 article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception.[S 8] They place enaction as one part of a wider context for cognition as being enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended.[S 1][S 8] For convenience, these aspects are sometimes named the E′s, and are parts of several theories of mind which, in various ways, hold that cognition is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, their environment, and their interactions. According to Rowlands, for the theory of enaction to succeed, it must establish a "parity [between internal and external processes] with respect to certain abstract, general features of cognition that will be identified by the mark of the cognitive."[S 9]
- The theory sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.[S 10]
- The initial emphasis of enaction upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal",[S 7][S 11] but has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions.[S 7] "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with ts environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."[S 12]
- Sources
- ^ a b Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
- ^ a b
Robert A Wilson, Lucia Foglia (July 25, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Embodied Cognition: §2.2 Enactive cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition).
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has generic name (help) - ^ a b Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 70 ff. ISBN 0262014556. Rowlands attributes this idea to D M MacKay (1967). "Ways of looking at perception". In W Watthen-Dunn (ed.). Models for the perception of speech and visual form (Proceedings of a symposium). MIT Press. pp. 25 ff.
- ^
Cited by Rowlands: Edmund Husserl (1999). "§19 Actuality and potentiality of intentional life". (Reprint of 1950 Martinus Nijhoff ed.). Kluwer Academic. p. 44. ISBN 978-9024700684.
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(help) or see Edmund Husserl (1999). Donn Welton (ed.). The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology. Indiana University Press. p. 108. ISBN 978-0253212733. - ^
Francisco J Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch (1992). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press. p. 9. ISBN 978-0262261234.
We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Evan Thompson (2010). "Chapter 1: The enactive approach". Mind in life:Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind (PDF). Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674057517.
- ^ a b c
Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. pp. 33 ff. ISBN 978-0262526012.
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has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ a b
Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525.
{{cite book}}
:|editor=
has generic name (help) On-line version here. - ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 90. ISBN 0262014556.
- ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 79. ISBN 0262014556.
- ^ Andy Clark, Josefa Toribio (1994). "Doing without representing" (PDF). Synthese. 101: 401–434.
- ^ Marieke Rohde (2010). "§3.1 The scientist as observing subject". Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press. pp. 30 ff. ISBN 978-9078677239.
Snowded provided one-line edit summaries for his actions:
- That looks very much like OR and its not for the lede anyway, possible main body but not in that form
- Not of direct relevance
- You need a third party not a primary source to make that statement
and so on. In sum, a series of non-specific vague assertions based upon his own ideas and without any sourced support. His talk-page reference to his actions is:
- I have done my best to make the lede into an acceptable length using his material as much as possible. If it simply gets reinserted I think I will revert the version you 'liked' via a tag.
TonyClarke suggested this introduction was too long.
I propose a discussion as to what material in this reverted introduction might be retained in the lede, and how the remainder might be incorporated in the body of the article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
Comments
- To begin this discussion, below is a list of the omitted points that should appear somewhere in the article.
- 1. The 'tuning' idea, as expressed by Rowlands citing Husserl
- 2. The background of the 'enaction' terminology begun by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (the reference everyone uses for this attribution) and further elaborated upon in the second paragraph.
- 3. A discussion of the Stapleton-Ward "E′s are good" paper, the third paragraph.
- 4. A clear presentation of the role of motivation or affect, as in the fourth paragraph
- 5. The view of the critics that the sensorimotor aspects are 'cognitively marginal', in particular Andy Clark and DiPaolo as described in the last paragraph.
- 6. The extension of enactivism to high-level thought processes as outlined by Rohde, including the activities of science. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
- Why, oh why, oh why do you feel the need to reproduce material that any editor can find with a single click? As I have said elsewhere its deeply patronising to other editors and wastes space on the talk page. It can also intimidate other editors from getting involved when they look at the amount of material they have to engage with.
- On the substantive issue, a lot of what you propose above (where relevant to the subject) is better treated on the Enaction article, reproducing it here is a content fork at best. Per comments below, better to see if the philosophy section of the Enaction article can sustain enough material in its own right to justify an article before further work is done here. ----Snowded TALK 10:58, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Tony has expressed interest in pursuing the philosophy aspects, and you also keep mentioning them although you haven't been forthcoming. On the other hand, Enactivism has plenty to deal with that is not philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 12:34, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- So pursue it in the section on Enactivism. At the moment you are just replicating material ----Snowded TALK 12:48, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- I'm unable to understand your recommendation. However, to this point there has been no replication of material in Enactivism, just a transfer of text proposed for Enaction (philosophy) but reverted by you. This material was proposed here before Enactivism was identified as the more general article, but it fits into Enactivism better. Brews ohare (talk) 14:05, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- So pursue it in the section on Enactivism. At the moment you are just replicating material ----Snowded TALK 12:48, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Tony has expressed interest in pursuing the philosophy aspects, and you also keep mentioning them although you haven't been forthcoming. On the other hand, Enactivism has plenty to deal with that is not philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 12:34, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
Philosophy topics
As this article is about philosophy, several points could be raised. An incomplete list follows:
1. Husserl: "there belongs to every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to the sides 'also meant' – not yet perceived, but only anticipated." cited by Rowlands; discussed by Thompson as noted by Keith Pearson.
2. Descarte: Maligned as a matter of course by Enactavists as somehow the exemplar of the division of mind from body.
3. Kant: Also maligned as somehow following Descarte's lead, but actually more complicated than that.
4. Alva Noë: Review found here
5. Hutto & Myin: Review found here
Brews ohare (talk) 01:10, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- But Brews, aren't those the sources you're co-suggesting at Talk:Enactivism?—Machine Elf 1735 01:36, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Enaction (philosophy) is where philosophy is to be handled in depth; the other article only mentions philosophy and leaves the heavy lifting here. Brews ohare (talk) 04:45, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Why would the other article only mention philosophy and leave the "heavy lifting" here? Let's imagine some "future" version of a main Enactivism article that has so much philosophy coverage that you'll want to hive it off here... Can you explain why you wouldn't want this to be a redirect until that actually takes place?—Machine Elf 1735 06:53, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- There is enough material for two articles if anyone is allowed to present it. Brews ohare (talk) 12:32, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Why would the other article only mention philosophy and leave the "heavy lifting" here? Let's imagine some "future" version of a main Enactivism article that has so much philosophy coverage that you'll want to hive it off here... Can you explain why you wouldn't want this to be a redirect until that actually takes place?—Machine Elf 1735 06:53, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Enaction (philosophy) is where philosophy is to be handled in depth; the other article only mentions philosophy and leaves the heavy lifting here. Brews ohare (talk) 04:45, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- So you want to segregate all the philosophical material into a different article or just some portion of it?—Machine Elf 1735 15:28, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
This discussion of 'what might be' is just too hypothetical given the unwillingness of all concerned to do anything but yatter. Brews ohare (talk) 17:32, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
As things stand right now, the philosophical aspects reviewed by Stapleton & Ward and by Rowlands have been deleted by Snowded, and what is left is 90% psychology of perception, which is mostly scientific guesswork, not philosophy, and doesn't belong here. Brews ohare (talk) 17:54, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- If you're done with the hypothetical yatter and the merge is complete then why not redirect at this time?—Machine Elf 1735 17:57, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- How about re-instating the Stapleton-Warde material and Rowlands references to Husserl? Brews ohare (talk) 18:01, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- Where at Brews? Enactivism? Enaction? Extended cognition? This is a WP:POVFORK, not an article. Please incorporate any material into the appropriate article.—Machine Elf 1735 18:41, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
- How about re-instating the Stapleton-Warde material and Rowlands references to Husserl? Brews ohare (talk) 18:01, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
Subject
The subject of this article is ENACTION it is not about the whole range of Es and other material that relate to post-Cartesian approaches. If we want to make it a more general article then lets agree to do that and change the name. I'm more that open to that as I think such an article is needed. However to date I don't see much engagement in discussing what that article would be called (I made suggestions). Pending such an agreement and move; to insert material that is not about ENACTION not on, hence my reversion. We are not here to write extended essays around a subject, but to create entries in an encyclopaedia.
FURTHER, Brews proposal to make that extension (above section) was rejected by another editor so to proceed without agreement is not being bold it is being disruptive ----Snowded TALK 00:29, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- So far as I can see, the only rejection is from you. You have said a few times that you'd like an article on the Es, but so far I do not have a road map from you, and every attempt to do that ends up in the ditch. Do you want it in Enaction? Do you think the Es are pure philosophy, or a fuzzy mixture with psychology? Let's get your ideas out here in the open. Brews ohare (talk) 01:02, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Machine Elf's comment is clear Brews, as is your latest rejection at the OR notice board. You either don't understand or you choose to ignore what are pretty direct comments. You chose not to participate when I raised the question of a new article so don't be surprised if your requests for me to repeat them for your benefit fall on deaf ears. Otherwise as I have tried to explain before, the boundaries between Philosophy and the cognitive sciences (I would avoid simply saying psychology) are very blurred at the moment, in fact there is considerable overlap including several people working in both fields. ----Snowded TALK 01:08, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- No substantive guidance as to where you want to go here. Brews ohare (talk) 05:13, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Machine Elf's comment is clear Brews, as is your latest rejection at the OR notice board. You either don't understand or you choose to ignore what are pretty direct comments. You chose not to participate when I raised the question of a new article so don't be surprised if your requests for me to repeat them for your benefit fall on deaf ears. Otherwise as I have tried to explain before, the boundaries between Philosophy and the cognitive sciences (I would avoid simply saying psychology) are very blurred at the moment, in fact there is considerable overlap including several people working in both fields. ----Snowded TALK 01:08, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Snowded I totally support your suggestion for a name change that would solve the WP:POVFORK problem by changing the topic to an overview of the Es of cognition: Enactive, Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Envatted, etc., but the only names I can think of would be something like Es (cognition)? Anything better? Does anyone know if it's a play on the German word for Id (or X)?—Machine Elf 1735 08:52, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Well it might help to work out the subjects first. I am in North America (ironically working on the implications of some of this stuff in safety, scaling development, engagement and the like. But that means I am away from my books until the end of the month. Brews seems to think that everyone here is retired and has infinite time available and that searching on line versions of books is sufficient, something I find appalling to be honest. I've started a list below, how about adding with minimal commentary? I've listed any where I know there are philosophers working on the subject. I suggest people add to the list then comment ----Snowded TALK 13:19, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- You don't have a name for a new topic in mind yet? Can we please focus more tightly on the immediacy of that need because of the active AfD?—Machine Elf 1735 17:00, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Well if pushed then I think its post-cartesian approaches to cognition and consciousness but that is a bit wordy. Choosing either cognition or consciousness would mean taking a particular slang. Post-cartesian theories of cognition might work however.----Snowded TALK 00:26, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Brews, how about Post-cartesian theories of cognition?—Machine Elf 1735 01:20, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
Well, one has to start somewhere. Rowlands would suggest Non-Cartesian theories of cognition emphasizing logical distinctions rather than an era in time. Here are some quotes:
- (p. 2) "I am going to refer to cognitive science in its traditional form as Cartesian cognitive science." and earlier: "Cognitive science, in its traditional form, is based upon the idea that mental processes - specifically cognitive processes - are abstract 'programs' realized in the hardware' of the brain (an analogy with computers guided much of the early work on cognitive science). The principal tasks of cognitive science are, accordingly, to identify the programs (cognitive psychology) and work out how these programs are implemented in the brain (cognitive neuroscience)."
- This seems to suggest the issue is an aspect of science, rather than philosophy.
- (p. 3) "What unites these differing faces of Cartesian cognitive science is an unquestioned - indeed seemingly banal - assumption: whatever else is true of meant processes,...they are processes that occur inside the head of the thinking organism. It is this unquestioned assumption that makes Cognitive science Cartesian."
- (p. 7) "The primary role of philosophy is not to provide new empirical evidence for non-Cartesian cognitive science, but to place this science on a solid conceptual footing...
- (p. 8) The new way of thinking about the mind is sometimes characterized as the claim that the mind, or even the self, is outside the head. Now that, at least on one way of thinking...would be a truly crazy claim. Happily, no version of non-Cartesian cognitive science commits us to this."
- This remark immediately rules out my own idea of what is the case as crazy, and so persuades me that Rowlands and I are not at all on the same page.
- (p. 2) "I am going to refer to cognitive science in its traditional form as Cartesian cognitive science." and earlier: "Cognitive science, in its traditional form, is based upon the idea that mental processes - specifically cognitive processes - are abstract 'programs' realized in the hardware' of the brain (an analogy with computers guided much of the early work on cognitive science). The principal tasks of cognitive science are, accordingly, to identify the programs (cognitive psychology) and work out how these programs are implemented in the brain (cognitive neuroscience)."
It seems that the philosophical subject is putting 'cognitive science' on the right footing, but without regard to empirical evidence. I find this framing of the matter indigestible, and a strong dose of "philosophers can help set up scientific theories better than the people trying to do the science", which I find to be pure hutzpah. My own view is that the philosophical subject transcends science altogether and relegates science to a small corner of the Universe where it works very well, but is inherently limited to questions that do not include many important philosophical questions. So I object to a title that sounds like science for a philosophy article. What do you think? Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Brews, are you suggesting Non-Cartesian theories of cognition?—Machine Elf 1735 16:23, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- How about Philosophies of cognition?? It is a recognized subject. Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Already covered by Philosophy of Mind.—Machine Elf 1735 16:54, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Great! Maybe all that is needed is some addition or revision of that article and we can get back to business writing here? Can we fit the Es into Philosophy of mind? Brews ohare (talk) 17:11, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Here is an attempt to do this. Brews ohare (talk) 17:33, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Snowded will not accept any attempt to put the Es in Philosophy of mind. We'll see his next step in the grand design one day, I guess. Brews ohare (talk) 03:20, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- Already covered by Philosophy of Mind.—Machine Elf 1735 16:54, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- How about Philosophies of cognition?? It is a recognized subject. Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Already has done Brews. It is a featured article after all, so it would be better to get consensus first on a more elaborate contribution.—Machine Elf 1735 04:30, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- I see Snowded relented and included one sentence about the Es under the sub-subtopic of cognitive science. So much for philosophy, eh? I guess that extremely minor mention means that we still need an article with a more useful discussion of the E′s. Brews ohare (talk) 05:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- You were dumping material again Brews. The briefest reading of the article and the tinniest bit of respect for the subject would have told you that the most that was justified was a sentence. It is a high level summary article, not an elaboration. Now try and engage, although your recent abuse of another editor Masem here does not bode well. This is going to end up at ANI again if you don't show some evidence of learning ----Snowded TALK 10:49, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
Potential list of subjects needing summarised a new article
- Exaptation & co-evolution of the brain (encompasses embodiment)
- Embedded (Clark on Scaffolding)
- Enacted (per above but one of the more controversial)
- Extended into the environment
- Continued evolution of the brain in a social setting post birth
- Epigenetics, cultural/social responses impact on biology
- Complex adaptive systems (Juarrero on the philosophical problem of intention)
- Freeman's stuff on how brains make up their minds (A philosopher, doctor and neuroscientists)
- Cognitive archeology, tools can determine or trigger development of abstract capability
- In aesthetics the role of art in enabling languages based on abstraction (links to Heidegger)
- The Churchlands in many manifestations
- Any number of people on free will
- The rehabilitation of Deluze's ideas on affordance by De Landa (impacts on identity)
- Fractality and scaling issues in social and cognitive processes (may be too new)
comments
- We have a developing fusion at the moment of Philosophy of the Mind, Cognitive neuroscience, the biological end of anthropology and to a lesser extent psychology. So this not going to be easy so its important to agree a broad approach before people rush off and write articles making work for others. Maybe a new project? ----Snowded TALK 13:19, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- You left out cultural psychology and neurophilosophy. This listing could become something useful if (i) it were more closely related to existing articles, (ii) linked actual sources (iii) indicated a beginning point.
- Considering the moribund state of the philosophy participation on WP, and our present inability to decide upon citing a seminal reference without extended, unpleasant exchanges, how is this massive rewrite of WP to occur? Brews ohare (talk) 15:19, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- As I understand you, these points are to be incorporated in one massive review or overview article, which necessarily will link to dozens of other articles for the main development. At a minimum that means shelving the deletion discussion of Enaction (philosophy) and directing attention to this new project.
- As I also understand you, you are unavailable to participate in this exercise because you want to be next to your library before starting. In the meantime (a month or two I gather), you will occupy yourself with reverting all efforts to compose this new overview with one-line edit summaries that are of no use at all in modifying content.
- So is it your opinion we should all find something else to do until you signal that you are back at home with time to spare and your library? Brews ohare (talk) 15:41, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- A suggestion for beginning could be to identify existing WP articles that are to be overviewed in the master article, and then an overview of their content be prepared. Gaps and lack of currency could be filled in later as they become apparent. Brews ohare (talk) 15:39, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Another suggestion is to use this outline as a starting point. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
- Brews, if I ever suspected that you really find it difficult to work with other editors then the above comments would confirm the suspicion. I've studied the subject enough to produce the above list without text books and it only takes a little good will to produce an simple outline of an article or articles and then look at existing material to match it. I know enough to engage in that without access to my library. I'm reverting material from you which is original research or coatracks, that will carry on regardless of when I have access to my books. Now try, just try to work with other editors; you know it makes sense. If you want to be helpful then identify all the related wikipedia articles Great idea, do it.----Snowded TALK 00:22, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- We don't yet have a title for this overview article. It includes free will, the E′s, mental development, epigenetics, adaptive systems, cognitive archeology, art and language, and so on. It is a bunch of beads, but without a string to thread them on. Brews ohare (talk) 14:41, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Post-cartesian theories of the Mind might work and is supported by sources. ----Snowded TALK 10:19, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- As already pointed out, post Cartesian suggests a time period, while non Cartesian (Rowlands' term) represents a difference in subject. Brews ohare (talk) 13:47, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- Apologies I missed that being distracted by your discourse on science and philosophy. I'm open to 'non' although I think the sense of time could be valuable ----Snowded TALK 14:16, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- As already pointed out, post Cartesian suggests a time period, while non Cartesian (Rowlands' term) represents a difference in subject. Brews ohare (talk) 13:47, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- Post-cartesian theories of the Mind might work and is supported by sources. ----Snowded TALK 10:19, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- We don't yet have a title for this overview article. It includes free will, the E′s, mental development, epigenetics, adaptive systems, cognitive archeology, art and language, and so on. It is a bunch of beads, but without a string to thread them on. Brews ohare (talk) 14:41, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- Brews, if I ever suspected that you really find it difficult to work with other editors then the above comments would confirm the suspicion. I've studied the subject enough to produce the above list without text books and it only takes a little good will to produce an simple outline of an article or articles and then look at existing material to match it. I know enough to engage in that without access to my library. I'm reverting material from you which is original research or coatracks, that will carry on regardless of when I have access to my books. Now try, just try to work with other editors; you know it makes sense. If you want to be helpful then identify all the related wikipedia articles Great idea, do it.----Snowded TALK 00:22, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
Fractality? exaptation? All of this is wildly off beam, and I suspect whipped up by editors who don't have a philosophical background. My position is that enaction is an important philosophical concept, arising from a range of interdisciplinary studies (started by Varela Rosch and Thomson), and this article needs much work to inform our readers accurately. But the tenor of this article's talk page sadly means that it is likely that my remarks will be ignored, so I will leave it there and go on editing the page as I think others should focus on also. TonyClarke (talk) 22:38, 21 April 2014 (UTC)
- It is an important subject, but it is one of a family of concepts. Fractality I agree with you, on exaptation it is one of the new ones, but if you look at exaptation of the cerebellum to enable grammar you will find it is now being considered. I made it clear in producing that list that some were new and the idea was to get a sense of the range. I have a degree in Philosophy by the way and work with several authors in this field (all of which is verifiable). The solution to issues on the talk page atmosphere is to contribute constructively, which probably means avoiding speculation as to the knowledge of other editors :-) ----Snowded TALK 01:42, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- Tony, go for it. Snowded has a grand vision of his own, but it will prove too big a mouthful. In the meantime, "petit a petit, l'oiseau fiat son nit." , or maybe "a grand journey begins with a single step." Brews ohare (talk) 03:26, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- And the most important step is to pay attention to what you are being told at the OR notice board and try and work with other editors. ----Snowded TALK 03:42, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
De-emphasis on sensorimotor activity
In this edit Snowded removed the following:
- The initial emphasis of enaction upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal",[Rf 1][Rf 2][Rf 3] but has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions.[Rf 1] "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with ts environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."[Rf 4]
- References
- ^ a b
Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. p. 43. ISBN 978-0262526012.
{{cite book}}
:|editor=
has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Andy Clark, Josefa Toribio (1994). "Doing without representing" (PDF). Synthese. 101: 401–434.
- ^ Andy Clark (March 2006). "Vision as Dance? Three Challenges for Sensorimotor Contingency Theory" (PDF). Psyche. 12 (1).
- ^ Marieke Rohde (2010). "§3.1 The scientist as observing subject". Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press. pp. 30 ff. ISBN 978-9078677239.
Showded made no Talk page analysis of this action, but did supply the one-line edit summary That looks very much like OR and its not for the lede anyway, possible main body but not in that form. That comment suggests some form of this material belongs in the body of the article, but not in the lede.
It is certainly the case that the position described has notable adherents and should be mentioned. Maybe a subsection with this material is order? Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- I think my problem is that you are putting together three authors to make a point and we really need a source which does that integration and which establishes the significance for the subject overall. ----Snowded TALK 14:50, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- I think my problem is your armchair criticism with no participation. Brews ohare (talk) 15:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- For the 'cognitively marginal' description, see Di Paolo, Marieke Rohde, and Hanne De Jaegher; page 34: " Our enactive-like ideas could well account for complex skills such as mastering sensorimotor contingencies in visual perception (O’Regan and Noë 2001), or becoming an expert car driver (Dreyfus 2002), but — important though these skills are — they remain cognitively marginal (Clark and Toribio 1994) and fall short of explaining performances such as preparing for a mathematics final or designing a house." Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- Brews, I am not participating in the way you want me to, but your approach to editing is not getting support so I will live with that. Your quote really validates my point, even the authors are speculating so it fails a significance test without a secondary source. You are stringing together sources and that as you well know breaks the OR rules. Yes you disagree with them, but resolution of your policy issues is not for the talk pages of an article.----Snowded TALK 16:35, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- I am 'stringing together sources' that agree the sensorimotor aspects of cognition are a minor part of cognition, and the enactive approach has to go further if it is to be a player in cognitive science. Call these sources speculative if you like. Their assessment is not debatable, only how to address the issue.
- And no thanks for the paternalistic comments. No substitute for a substantive contribution to fix the morass you have created here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- If you want to resort to personal attacks feel free Brews. The simple fact remains is that you are not getting support for your views on how wikipedia should be edited. If repeating a lesson you will not learn is paternalistic then so be it. Yes the enactive approach has to go further, when it does, and only then, do we report it here. In the meantime a lot of us will carry on working with the ideas of enaction and embodiment in the real world and that is exciting, some of it is or will be published but it still will not belong here until after it gets secondary citation. That is what an encyclopaedia is about----Snowded TALK 17:06, 22 April 2014 (UTC) ----Snowded TALK 17:06, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- What on Earth does any of this have to do with anything? Brews ohare (talk) 17:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- And the fact that you ask that question illustrates the problem. I am never sure if you just don't get it, or if you choose not to. Whatever too many editors have wasted too much time explaining it to you ----Snowded TALK 17:17, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- What on Earth does any of this have to do with anything? Brews ohare (talk) 17:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- If you want to resort to personal attacks feel free Brews. The simple fact remains is that you are not getting support for your views on how wikipedia should be edited. If repeating a lesson you will not learn is paternalistic then so be it. Yes the enactive approach has to go further, when it does, and only then, do we report it here. In the meantime a lot of us will carry on working with the ideas of enaction and embodiment in the real world and that is exciting, some of it is or will be published but it still will not belong here until after it gets secondary citation. That is what an encyclopaedia is about----Snowded TALK 17:06, 22 April 2014 (UTC) ----Snowded TALK 17:06, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
POV fork, notability, etc.
MachineElf, Not sure what's going on so I'll express my understanding of the situation, ask some questions, and see what you think.
- I looked at WP:POVFORK and this article doesn't seem to fit the term pov fork because this doesn't seem to be the case where contributors disagreed about the content of another article and this one was then created. For example, Brews ohare didn't even work on the article Enactivism before he created this article. It may not have been right to create this article, but the term POV fork doesn't seem to fit the situation.
- The philosophy subject Enaction seems notable as indicated by the number of references. I think the issue you have with this article is something else. In that regard, could you describe your understanding of the relationship between the articles Enaction, Enactivism, Enaction (philosophy)? --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:07, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- One problem is that it is difficult to separate the philosophical aspects of enaction from all the other aspects. Before this article was created everything Varela based was in one place and the danger here is that we end up replicating material and/or creating a coatrack. I think we would be better to create a good article at Enaction with a solid philosophy section, then a wider article under Philosophy of Mind, which in turn references Enactivism. Maybe in a few months time it would justify its own article but its not clear at the moment. We need a disambiguation with Enaction or another merge. Calling this article Enaction (Philosophy) rather than Enactivism (Philosophy) has just added to the confusion. ----Snowded TALK 19:14, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- What's the difference between the topic of the article Enactivism and the topic of the article Enaction? (Please note I'm not asking about this article Enaction (philosophy).) --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:52, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- One is really focused on Varela which is the starting point for a lot of of the subsequent thinking. Good case for a merge however ----Snowded TALK 23:46, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- What's the difference between the topic of the article Enactivism and the topic of the article Enaction? (Please note I'm not asking about this article Enaction (philosophy).) --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:52, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- Hi Bob, are you saying Brews conducted a valid WP:CFORK because he failed to engage at the appropriate existing articles? (His disagreement stems from trying to add the material at Talk:Hard problem of consciousness and Talk:Mind-body problem). Appending "philosophy" to the WP:TITLE parenthetically is for disambiguation purposes only. If you want an article with this title you need to find secondary sources who are not discussing Enaction or Enactivism but something different. Please see the new topic discussion above (possibly Non-Cartesian theories of cognition).—Machine Elf 1735 20:11, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
- To answer your question, no I'm not saying anything about CFORKS, just POV forks.
- Regarding the two articles Enaction (not Enaction (philosophy)) and Enactivism that you mentioned, are they about the same topic? --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:12, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- Bob: It appears that the articles enaction and enactivism have some commonality. The Enaction article appears to take a stance coming from interface design, while Enactivism seems to originate in psychological ideas about perception like the sense of depth. One of these articles has a subsection on 'enaction in the theory of mind' . It seems they use different sources. I don't think they should be merged, because they seem to be traveling in different directions. As for the myriad of WP articles overlapping in this area (See the category listings in the various articles) we have a real cacophony here.
- The split-off of the philosophical aspects of enactivism into enaction (philosophy) was a miss-step of mine due to being unaware of enactivism. However, enactivism is the bigger subject, and philosophy is probably the least interesting part of it. Given the complete apathy of the philosophy group and the wonderful collaborative atmosphere between those few who take any interest, it would be a good thing to leave enaction (philosophy) in place where it can atrophy in decadent squalor, and possibly let a more productive set of editors work on enactivism :-). Brews ohare (talk) 01:47, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- So just to get this right (i) you set up the article as a 'miss-step', (ii) have realised this you PRODed it (iii) when it was set up for deletion (the right approach not a PROD) you opposed the deletion and finally (iv) you feel the focus should move elsewhere but you are not supporting deletion? ----Snowded TALK 02:21, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- It does look like some serious organizing is needed. I think a way to start is to clarify what the other two articles Enaction and Enactivism are about. Especially, to clarify what the difference between them is. Personally, I would find it difficult to work on an article if I didn't know what the topic of the article was and whether my contributions were better suited for another article. So that's why I would want the topic of the article clarified as much as possible. --Bob K31416 (talk) 02:53, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- Agree, best would be to merge all three using existing content, then see what we need to change? happy to review or take a punt at it over the weekend. A little wiped out with travel and client work for the rest of this week----Snowded TALK 02:57, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- No, I think the clarification indicated in my last message is needed before considering any major changes like that. --Bob K31416 (talk) 05:04, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- Agree, best would be to merge all three using existing content, then see what we need to change? happy to review or take a punt at it over the weekend. A little wiped out with travel and client work for the rest of this week----Snowded TALK 02:57, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
- Thank you Brews, I appreciate your candor.—Machine Elf 1735 04:20, 23 April 2014 (UTC)