Talk:Enabling Act of 1933/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Absence of KPD and SPD delegates during the Reichstag's Enabling Act vote

I have not yet been able to determine what legal basis the Nazis had (if any) to ensure the absence during the Enabling Act vote of the 81 KPD and 26 SPD Reichstag delegates. In the roll call, 15 of the Social Democrats are simply listed as absent, while 11 of them are listed as krank (sick).

Nevertheless, Joachim Fest in his book Hitler makes the observation that the absence made no difference in the final tally. This had not dawned on me until I read it and subsequently did the math myself.

Article 76 of the Weimar Constitution dictated that constitutional amendments require the affirmative vote of not less than two thirds of the delegates at a session where not less two thirds of all delegates are present. With this in mind, let's do the math:

Actual voting:

• The total number of Reichstag delegates (excluding the Communists) was listed at 566.

• In the actual voting, 441 Ja votes were cast vs. 94 Nein. The total number of votes cast was thus 535.

Hypothetical voting:

• Were one to restore the 81 missing KPD members, the total number of delegates would be 647.

• Assume that all 81 Communists and all 26 "missing" or "sick" Social Democrats would have voted Nein. This would not change the Ja votes from 441, but the 94 Nein tally would rise from 94 to 201. The total number of votes cast would rise from 535 to 642.

• The 642 members casting votes under the hypothetical scenario clearly exceeds the two thirds of the 647 total number of seated delegates.

• The 441 Ja votes is 13 votes more than the minimum of 428 that constitutes the constitutionally-required two thirds of the 642 votes that would have been cast in this hypothetical scenario.

So the revokation of the Communist members' mandate and the absence of the SPD members would not have prevented the Enabling Act from becoming law. — JonRoma 05:19, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

You can see it as a fail-safe arrangement:

1. Arrange the Yes votes of the Zentrum
2. Arrange the absence of KPD and part of the SPD

Only if both measures fail (or fail to be accepted as valid), the EA would fail.

Pjacobi 09:29, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Thanks, Jon, for doing the maths. I'd like to add one more point:

I read that the original requirement for a "constitution-changing" bill was that 2/3 of MPs were present and that 2/3 of these had to vote in the affirmative. The SPD tried to hinder the vote by staying away from the session and thus making parliament fail the quorum by one man. In reaction to this the procedure was changed (or maybe only threatened?) to the requirement of 2/3 of all MPs (present or not) having to vote in the affirmative. This thwarted the SPD plan and made them attend the session.

In any case, the arrest of KPD and SPD deputies had no direct bearing on the outcome of the vote, though indirectly it did spread fear into those considering whether to vote for the EA or not. Str1977 09:54, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

• 1b One reference to Kaas caught my eye recently in this run-around. . It was at possibly-POV pains to point out that the Kaas visit to the coalition Vice-Chancellor Papen on 6 March, came entirely off his, Kaas',own bat, and without the knowledge of the other Zentrum leaders.
• 2b I remind editors of the fact that Klemperer characterises these two figures as being the most crucial in the ascent of Hitler through the passing of the Enabling Act, and therefore take it that the date 6 March is highly relevant to the entire. A constitutionally-assuming-apologetic can paint events as innocent, when NPOV-accounting of the Tribunal's findings demands a more jaundiced and even handed NPOV enquiry. Now, I brought this up many months ago, and an apologetic was fed me to the point where I let it drop. It would drop except for the Klemperer source, and the Mowrer source.
• 3b As to the math, Str1977 and I went thru this with a tooth-comb, too. I quoted Father Gumpel, the Postulator for the Beatification of Pius XII, who quoted Prof. Joachim Fest, who said the numbers would have made no difference anywayas per above JonRoma. You guys however confirm the dispute I made of that at the time. The question is not whether the EAct would have passed without the absent deputies, but whether the combination of constitutionally allowed parties combining against the EAct could have prevented it. Add the Zentrum bloc of 92 to the 201 as Pjacobi has written. Un-constitutional arrest cannot be ignored and at the very least demanded a consideration of the house. Was it given?
• 4b we cannot yet say that there was any practicable way for the Zentrum to have acted and called for a full constitutional sitting to be delayed until appearance of the absent Deputies. I refer to the house in Article 37 as at Holocaust talk Archive 9( WP-wrong-ly-archived , I will have to return there if Arbcom allows).
• 5b I consider it disingenuous on WP that the cruciallly-internally-contradicting-Zentrum-agreement vote is lumped in casually as all other parties voted, which I have seen. The Zentrum agreed the assent on the final basis of the negotiated letter of guarantee, and Kaas may or may not, as source alone can specify, have had backing to have assented without it. This is a prime question, and Str1977 was able to find documents before. These showed that Kaas advocated no plan himself at the 11.30 AM Zentrum meeting .
• 6b I hate to be a bore but the sourceing may not be at an end yet. I believe that NPOV requires fullest report and truest characterisation as the fact remains that without the mysterious because-against-the letter/Zentrum-internal-agreement Kaas vote, the totalitarian state would not have been formalised with this the appearance of legality. I suggest that these last words are as far as any legal description can be taken given the Tribunals attitude.
• 7b What is most remarkable in the Yale Avalon documentation from these, is the skip that occurs prior to the opening of Justice Birkett's rendition . It is as if there is a missing page, as the preceding era speaks of the instituting of the NSDAP program, and then skips to thus the NSDAP achieved power'. I believe there may be a whole page of whatever conclusions reached, and which were a) either excised at the tribunal, or b)left out by Yale. Why this discrepancy should exist is odd and may contribute to the difficulties that such as Shirer onwards have had. The pre-Nazi historians and commentators such as Mowrer and Arthur Rosenberg were unable to report the crucial events, and the post-war historians with this above, were in no better position to clarify. Or, c) It may be that the very unchandged program was ,together with the documents proving will to subvert the parliament, considered so over-helmingly clear as to require no additional comment.
• 8b Kaas skipped it, and the inclusion that he was somehow removed from any vatican intermediaryship by Hitler Govt. pressure, seems to me to be imbalanced given the historical comment there is. I consider that the internal contradiction of the Kaas vote makes this on-topic in sevral Articles.
• 9b In short the principal out-standing question as to constitutional legality remain to be sourced . Did the house sit as a house to ratify the arrests? Did it consider the procedural change, or need to, and is that sufficient contradiction of the implied assumption emanating from the Tribunal? It is the same problem as was wrongly archived at Holocaust (which you responsible WPedians should note), to do with WP language: Seizure /or accession; legality /or appearance of legality;Constitutional /or un-Constitutional.

EffK 11:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Suppression of other Parties etc

Hitler pulling out of coalition with other parties, after 30 Jan, I am at a loss to understand. Hitler called the Election to receive a firmer mandate, to pressure other parties such as particularly the Centre , with whom bargaining had been long negotiated. He called elections to drive towards the EAct. No one states that he was from before the Fire planning to rig the Reichstag as he did, and at the Tribunal Goering suggests all the Fire measures were brought forward too soon. I have to disagree therefore with this description but I approve of JonRoma re-writing re :Arrests.

I have to note that ... following the EAct... other parties were suppressed or banned. I think we know a little more about the Centre Party than that. We know it was effectively suppressed by violent action, but we also know it was politically suppressed, and that the news of its choice to dissolve, or at any rate the date of this, emanates from the vatican via the British Ambassador-do we not? . This may be a quirk of telefonic fate, perhaps Kaas had been told by fone, etc. I do not think the rolling events can be allowed to pass proper notice as the Centre was so crucial. Kaas must be remarked for what he is , a friend and sub-ordinate to Pacelli, and therefore his involvement with Hitler is not limited to his action on 6 or 23 or to the working committees before and after . Most history points to a quid pro quo between the Reichskonkordat and the auto-dissolution, 6b , with all the reasons for that and results of that.In fact the 15 cabinet was notthe first, but appears was the first to list the EAct /centre subversion as priority. Some of this is off-Article, but by no means all. Suppression by itself does nothing to clarify the political alliances nor their evolution. I believe I have sourced enough to warrant a normal full treatment of the involvement of the RC Church, which is still absent. There is no mention even of the Hitler 'u-turn' pro Holy See Speech reference, no mention of the long-standing choice of the Pope for Hitler empowerment . I am sure JonRoma, that you will understand and that your ability to source will confirm or accept this. The only text that appears to be little known is the Mowrer reference of 1932, and certainly K v Klemperer exemplifies abundantly clear linkage between these forces made also by even the most standard histories . I would therefore hope that you can put a section into this where it is relevant detailing the entire connection and showing its position in the overrall . Other-wise links towards the unfinished scandal and H Pope should exist. EffK 10:27, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

This article is unreadable as the author has tried to use lots of unnecessary big words. Please do something about it! —Preceding unsigned comment added by StudentSteve (talk • contribs) 04:49, 21 January 2006

Are you saying that the article Enabling Act is unreadable, or that the above talk page post is unreadable? If it is the article, please state which paragraphs need cleaning up. If it is the above talk page post, then refactoring of other people's talk page posts is generally disapproved of, but they can always be ignored. Robert McClenon 16:07, 21 January 2006 (UTC)

I'm saying the article about the enabling act is unreadable because of the way it is written. The opening line "in order to obtain the power they sought" could be replaced with a simpler "in order to gain political power". The author uses of big words makes it impossible to word. —Preceding unsigned comment added by StudentSteve (talk • contribs) 00:35, 24 January 2006

StudentSteve, could you please remember to sign your posts? Thank you for improving the wording. Robert McClenon 12:20, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

Translation Issues

I see some issues with the english translation of the act. Where does it come from ? Is it authoritative in any way, or can/should we try to improve it ? First, the Title. "Enabling Act" is somewhat descriptive, but "Authorization Act" is probably closer to the German text, IMO. The subtitle is more obviously wrong: "Not" is not correctly translated to "need". I suggest "distress" - as in "Law to Remedy the Distress of the People and the Reich". I also suggest to capitalize as I wrote, since the other capitalization incorrectly differs between Volk and Reich - a distinction one would not have made in German, and certainly not at that time. If nobody objects, I'll make those changes. Wefa 17:05, 22 January 2006 (UTC) BTW - one thing that puzzles me - why is "Reich" not translated to "Empire" but everything else is ? Wefa 17:05, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

Wefa:

As you are undoubtedly aware, translation is an inexact science. As such, no translation can truly be considered authoritative or perfect; even an "official" translation (by the government itself, for example) might be slanted to give foreigners a different impression than would be given to people reading/hearing in the native language.

As far as the suggestions you make are concerned:

• Whether or not "authorization" is a better word than "enabling", the law has become nearly universally known through history in English as the "Enabling Act", so Wikipedia should follow that usage.
• Your observation about Not is correct and I will change.
• The word Reich is one that translates poorly between German and English; the word has shades of meaning that do not equate directly to an English equivalent. And in 1933, Germany didn't have an emperor, so can it really be called an "empire"? Someone has suggested that Reich be translated to realm, but my justification for using the German word is that it has become fairly well known in English.

One of the reasons I like putting side-by-side German/English versions of speeches, laws, etc. in Wikipedia is that it fosters discussions such as the one we're having. Further, anyone who has good German skills can examine the original and compare the shades of meaning it conveys as compared with the by-definition-imperfect translations. Regards. — JonRoma 20:06, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

I must second Jon, yes, Reich as a noun translates as realm or as Kingdom (but without any mentioning of a king) or Empire (without any mentioning of an Emperor). But that doesn't work when used in a compound as in "Reichsregierung". This would be Imperial government if it refers to an Empire, but Germany in 1933 was neither ruled by an Emperor nor an Empire because of its power (as the British Empire). Someone suggested "Federal" as Reichs... in the Weimar Republic (officially called "Deutches Reich") had the same meaning as Bundes... has in the Federal Republic. Another possibility would be "national" (as opposed to state) but I am not sure about this either. Probably it is the best alternative to ommit it when it's not utterly necessary. (In "Volk und Reich" I would opt for "people and state", if a translation is asked for). Str1977 20:44, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

Textual Issues Section:Passing of EAct

• I illegal but clearly illegal. therefore a valid reference should be interposed at both junctures I mention. let us accept it for what it all was, an intended hitlerian specific attempt to gain the appearance of legality. I have to repeat this valid point over and over at every place these novel un-sourced interpretations are permitted.

I think this should be dropped from the wording entirely, except maybe with a reference to the "legal strategy". S.

• Devised the Act I think is in error-rescuscitated I think is what it was. it was a long drafted template wasn't it?

Not to my knowledge. It had its precursor in earlier EAs but this one was different in some respects. Probably they used the text of the earlier EA and made the changes they thought necessary. S.

• Hitler reckoned is I think in error. He negotiated in common purpose(the Conspiracy of nurember) with these forces.

• Named chancellor as a result of the said conspiracy of forces is accurate. otherwise it is NPOV to the point of being simplistic. appointed as Str1977 would say, technically, if you desire one word broader.

Hitler was appointed Chancellor - you need mention the intrigue everytime this comes up, but only when the intrigue is actually relevant. S.

• Centrist parties is wrong. the co-alition was with ultra nationalist discredited right-wing business. discredited by corruption. hardly centrist. str1977 can inform us as to the remaining large of important 'centrist' Parties, as he has brought them up himself before. I must say they don't seem to hit my textual horizon with any noticeable force...

This passage can only refer to talks with Kaas. Kaas hoped Hitler would form a coalition involving the Centre as well. After the NS-DNVP coalition was formed, Kaas still hoped for inclusion as the coalition lacked a majority in parliament. Hitler first used the conservatives as an excuse to deny Kaas' request (except for offering him the postal ministry) and then used the failure of these talks to convince Hindenburg of calling for new elections (as supposedly the Centre and not Hitler had shipwrecked the talks). S.

• Habeas Corpus is I think a blind alley. I remember source which stated that what happened in fact, was that Hindenberg in his worried dotage( surrounded by young jackals, it is said by Wheeler-Bennett) forgot to append, as was regularly the done manner, the separate normal proviso against the loss of habeas corpus. Whether AH and Papen switched the papers on Hindenberg's desk or something , we may ask. W-B asks about Hindenberg's own good faith to hos presidential vow. At any rate we return to the nub of the entire: the Hitler triumph of appearance over legality, which still affects even this apparently completely free text here. Put in un-constitutionally neutralising their hitherto sovereign rights to represent the German people in the Reichstag.

Habeas Corpus anyway is not an exact way of putting it, as it is a legal provison of English Common law, and not of German law, which puts it differently. The Fire Decree suspended the catalogue of basic rights. And that effected the practice of the police et al. S.

• Not enough to gain absolute power suggests that it was a given that he expected it. he desired openly, like some modern extremist movements, to rot democracy from within, but at this stage he had no expectation of achieving 2/3 by an election, as this suggests. he certainly however expected that the rolling conspiracy, which started with the banker schroder and the magnates, would eventually succeee. but that is not the same thing.

The Nazis failed to gain an absolute majority without the DNVP and hence could not gain absolute power the parliamentary way. Had the NS gained 50% there would have been no Enabling Act (at least not in that form) but merely a Nazi-majority winking through all of Hitler's initiatives. S.

• Kaas and the negotiation- the text is not apparently aware of the separation of guarantees and negotiations. the over-whelming persuasive guarantee which swung the vote was the constitutional Guarantee (never delivered), as stated confirmed and negotiated by Kaas alone, but not as dependance of the earlier placation of catholic union -civil servant/educational interests. They were settled and apart. and negotiated by the party Ladership with kaas openly in a Hitler/Kaas chaired working committee of 20-22 March.

Kaas negotiated with Hitler and his representatives for guarantees, which he received in an oral form through the representatives and later through Hitler's speech, but never in writing. S.

• 'Holy see is what everyone remembers as being mentioned and signalled, not the Centre in thjis presentation, who knew they were likely finished, as Str1977 confirmed. If we can't go as far as Shirer text, we're about 70 years out of date(he arrived in Germany just after this). It would be apposite to include the later Kaas approbation made of AH , after he was ensconced in the vatican in April, of what a fine noble idealist the fellow Hitler was, and he knew bwecause he met him many times before the negotiations. It is noted that Kaas was prevailed upon to make this statement, by the vatican (ie Pacelli-no?)

There's no evidence for any Holy See involvement in the Enabling Act. S.

• Notably silent-Bruning had accepted the consensus fot the 11.30 am 23 march Centre caucus.

He yielded the party line and voted for the EA, but his silence during the debate was noted by foreign (French) observers. After all, he was the former Chancellor and foreign minister.

• Reign by decree.If this emanates from old text of mine, it is not hard enough, by any means, as the decree reign had been normal in the 4 Presidential Dictatorships preceding the 23 March act. ... to rule by the power of its own legislative decree.

Presidential dictatorship might be technically true but it blurs the line. And it was (apart from frequent dissolution of the Reichtstag) in line with the provisions of the Constituion. S.

Apart from this I very much commend Jon Roma , again, for attempting to balance the situation as we see it. if this can be useful to him , and to the Wikipedia, I will look at the remaining paragraph. If not, maybe not.EffK 00:53, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

I've been researching a great deal of material on this subject and hope to come back to the article at some point. One issue I've been pondering is whether this article and some of its companions ought to be restructured. I am beginning to think that, by covering each event separately, the facts are being presented discontiguously and to some extent are duplicated. I'm wondering if the answer to this would be a main article Nazi seizure of power or such that would cover the entire timeline from late 1932 into late 1933. A lot of the context and detail could then be put in one place, and the individual articles (Reichstag Fire Decree, Enabling Act, and so forth) would only present the specifics and state the significance of these events. The whole context could then be in the "main" article, so readers could better see them as a flow of events. Naturally one could not do an article on the seizure of power without mention of the Enabling Act (and so forth), but maybe the Enabling Act page should just be the details (such as the text of the act in German and English). There are arguments both for and against this approach, and I'm not entirely convinced one way or the other myself, but I thought it might be worth some discussion.

Regarding "largely legal", we know that Hitler had no scruples about breaking the law when it benefited him. But he knew that he had to give everything a "legal enough" appearance so as not to offend the law-abiding populace and, more important, the Army. This is one of the cardinal lessons Hitler learned from the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. The exclusion of the Communist deputies from the Enabling Act vote is still shrouded in some mystery — my sources do not provide a clear-cut explanation of how this exclusion was done. However illegal this may have been, how many in Germany would have objected to the Communists being locked up, other than the Communists themselves? Even without the "Red Scare" propaganda barrage after the Reichstag fire, it does not strike me that the command structure of the Reichswehr would have objected to suppressing the Communists; after all, the military had been in the business of suppressing leftist uprisings (legally or otherwise) almost since the moment the Republic was proclaimed in 1918. The point that Hitler had realized is that his assumption of power didn't need to be scrupulously legal; it just had to be legal enough to be palatable to the masses and inoffensive to the nation's power structure.

Another interesting tidbit I have run across is that it wasn't the Nazis who first devised the Enabling Act, but they seized on the opportunities it presented with record speed.

— JonRoma 06:31, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree with Jon's idea and actually have attempted that before. Time constraints didn't allow to do that. There is an article called Hitler's rise to power already in existence.

Regarding the "legal" - after the failed Putsch Hitler subscribed to a strategy of legality - play by the letter of the rules (though not by the spirit) until you have gained power and then change the rules or forget about them alltogether - both things happend in the Third Reich, hence its dual nature.

But the point EffK is making about legality is another one, I think: he wants to prove that at some point down the line in early 1933 Hitler broke the law, thereby making his government illegal and hence in no position to negotiate and ratify the concordat, which therefore was never legally concluded and therefore could be done away with today. That's his reasoning not mine and I have spend some energy in pointing out the holes in this reasoning. But to no avail. The issue is irrelevant for our article here.

And I agree with you on the Communists - one must never forget that the KPD was no less authoritiarian than the Nazi Party and that it wanted to do away with democracy no less. That doesn't justify murdering Communists, but it makes the reaction towards the anti-Communist measures understandible.

As for your "tidbit" - the 1933 EA wasn't the first of its kind - there was one in 1923 (or 24) to enable the Stresemann administration to restore order. But that didn't go as far as Hitler's EA with a sanction of "deviation from the constitution". And there was not "RT Fire Decree" in 1923.

Str1977 11:10, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Str1977 wrote:

As for your "tidbit" - the 1933 EA wasn't the first of its kind - there was one in 1923 (or 24) to enable the Stresemann administration to restore order. But that didn't go as far as Hitler's EA with a sanction of "deviation from the constitution". And there was not "RT Fire Decree" in 1923.

Am already aware that there were other enabling acts, along with dozens of invocations of Article 48 beginning as early as 1920. As it turns out, my "tidbit" should have referred to the Reichstag Fire Decree instead of the Enabling Act. (Sorry for that erroneous context.) Anyway, a quote on this subject:

For years it was believed that this decree was part of the diabolic master plan long nurtured in Hitler's brain. Recently, however, it became apparent that the decree was suggested not by a National Socialist but by a frightened Nationalist official in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. Naturally enough, Hitler quickly accepted the suggestion, made in fear of Communism, and adapted it to his own purposes. The matter was put on the cabinet agenda for [February 28]. It appears that both Hitler and Ludwig Grauert, the man who initially proposed the decree, had at first considered it nothing more than a defensive measure against possible Communist insurgency. However, as the decree was being drafted by the Reich Minister of the Interior, the Nazi Frick, it became apparent that this measure could be used to strengthen the authority of the national government with relation to the powers of the state regimes. And, from the Nazi point of view, it was an excellent time for such a decree; many of the leaders at the state level had been protesting vigorously some of the more openly high-handed aspects of Nazi rule during Hitler's first month in office.

• Mitchell, Otis C. (1983). Hitler Over Germany: The Establishment of the Nazi Dictatorship (1918-1934). Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

Now this assumes the Nazis didn't actually "help" van der Lubbe start the Reichstag fire and therefore were as surprised by it as everyone else, but if it is true, it's a sign of Hitler's spontaneous nature and that he and his party were masterful at seizing the opportunity presented them. — JonRoma 08:02, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

Dear Jon, you are right. As far as I can remember the RT Fire Decree (FD) wasn't waiting in a drawer for the oppurtune moment. In fact, several government people made various suggestion how to react to the fire. This is one piece of evidence against the "one big Nazi plot" theory. Somewhere I posted the three theories around - the main argument against the "lone arson" theory is a study that Lubbe alone could not have caused the fire all alone (but I don't know when the study was made - after the war or in 1933 - if the latter is correct, it also could have been intented to give credence to the "Communist plot" accusation). The spontaneous origin of the RTFD is consistent with the third (newest) theory which has Göring and others implicated, while Hitler wasn't in the know. The funny scene of Hitler falling over a cable while being interviewed on the scene of the crime also doesn't suggest that he knew - or he was a very, very, very tricksy actor. Str1977 23:24, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

One Main Article?

JonRoma raises the question of whether there should be one main article, and whether the large number of separate articles are partly duplicative. I agree that there is considerable duplication. Some of the articles are POV forks. There should be an overall article. However, it would be too long if it included all of the details on all of the aspects of the Nazi accession. It appears that the article on Hitler's rise to power was created within the past week by Cberlet and could be used as a structure to point to the other articles. Robert McClenon 12:34, 25 January 2006 (UTC)