Talk:Eingreif division

Definition

I took

During the First World War, the German army differentiated clearly between counterattack (Gegenangriff) and counterstroke (Gegenstoss). The difference was largely to do with timings. A Gegenangriff implied a formal, deliberate attack with full preparatory artillery fire. A Gegenstoss was launched automatically, triggered by the moment when the enemy broke into the defensive position. The principal task of an Eingreif division was to conduct automatically triggered Gegenstoss engagements. The operation would have been planned and rehearsed in advance. The formation would have launched necessary manoeuvres in addition to the defensive effort by the formation in situ.

out as it didn't seem accurate according to Wynne, Samuels (who seems to have paraphrased Wynne) or Balck.Keith-264 (talk) 19:19, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

In which respect?--Labattblueboy (talk) 19:42, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

They all write that Eingreif were counter-attack divisions first and foremost and part of the response to the materialschlacht that Germany couldn't match after their experience on the Somme; Lossberg also regarded penetration to the second line as the time for the deployment of the Eingreif divisions, on receipt of a code-word from the commander of the Stellungsdivision and that their intervention wasn't necessarily a stereotyped ('automatically triggered') manoeuvre; he didn't approve of the idea of defenders being allowed to retreat - he wanted them to move sideways or forward only as he felt that if they withdrew they'd get in the way of counter-attacking reinforcements - hence the stress on unyielding forward defence is his orders to 4th Army at Ypres. The use of Eingreifs in other operations was one of the things that evolved at 3rd Ypres as both sides tried to anticipate developments by the opposition - eg spoiling attacks and artillery strafes became more prominent German tactics after Menin Road and the withdrawal from the outpost line at the first sign of an attack (contra Lossberg) came in after Broodseinde. I think Sheldon's* exposition lacks some important detail.Keith-264 (talk) 19:58, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

Added link to Lupfer pdf.Keith-264 (talk) 07:51, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

• Actually that bit came from Zabecki and a bit of Lupfer. Sorry.Keith-264 (talk) 12:10, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

References and Citations

I added a few more but then found that defining Eingreif didn't make enough sense except as part of a description of the other parts of the defensive system adopted in 1917. I put back the bit about construction of field defences and tried to use wording which showed that these defensive ideas changed as circumstances changed.Keith-264 (talk) 12:09, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

The lead of the article functions as a general summary. Information must be located elsewhere in the article before it is placed in the lead. Given Eingreif divisions where employed on areas of the western front that were to be held in static, not elastic, I don't feel it correct to state they were only employed on deep breakthroughs.--Labattblueboy (talk) 16:01, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

Naturally I defer to you on the matter of form since I'm a beginner on such matters. It depends on what you mean by deep, hence me using 'break-in' rather than break-through. I meant deep in the sense of the deeper defensive zones of the 'front position' relative to the linear defences of 1914-1916, not being held back for defence against against a breakthrough. That's why I felt that Eingreif needed to be defined relative to the rest of the system and of the stellungsdivisions holding most of the fortified zones. There's also the variation in theory and practice to be considered - the Eingeifs were too far back at Verdun and Arras and at Ypres until Broodseinde were much closer - often with the first regiment adjacent to the reserve regiment of the front-line division.

The Principles related the purpose of the defense entirely to the enemy and did not mention retention of terrain as the basic objective. The principles for achieving the objective were:

• . The defender must not surrender the initiative to the attacker.
• . The defense must rely on firepower, not large numbers of troops.
• . The defender must not hold ground at all costs (a controversial principle).
• . The defender must consider depth for all construction and positions. Lupfer and pp. 12-16.Keith-264 (talk) 16:41, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

The application of the concept over time is what I believe is the most useful. Once we have a well flowing evolution section we can summarize the content into the lead. Often too much concentration placed on the lead when it is frankly the element that is best left till last, particularly when a document is evolving. I haven't come across anything that states when Eingeifs started to appear, at least informally. The evolution section right now read moreso as the evolution of German defensive strategy that then evolution of Eingreif divisions.

Principles can only explain how Eingeifs were employed for period of time. Previous we have rigid, then the alternate principles put forward by Lossberg & Beyer, then the fluid changed in Ypres without even covering German defence in 1918 and how Eingeif fit into that. --Labattblueboy (talk) 17:04, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

Thanks; actually I've let this page sidetrack me from a short piece on the genesis of 3rd Ypres about which Ive been procrastinating. ;O)Keith-264 (talk) 17:17, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

The evolution section right now read moreso as the evolution of German defensive strategy that then evolution of Eingreif divisions.

That's my point, Eingreif divisions were part of the system of defence in depth. Building a deeper three-zone area and placing the Eingreifs at the back of it was part of the same thing. Can we really describe the Eingreifs adequately if we ignore the environment in which they were to operate? There's already quite a bit of material on the Passchendaele page about Lossberg's dispositions in Flanders, perhaps some of it should move here? If so Eingreif might become a sub-heading for a larger page about the whole thing or perhaps this is going too far for what you intended this page for?Keith-264 (talk) 19:05, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

Wynne rough chronology

p. 84. Jan 15, Loss posted to Operations Section OHL at Mezieres as Tappen's deputy (at main OHL at Pless). Staff there uneasy about Falky's rigid defence of a line as Entente material superiority would increase and could allow better attack methods. p. 85. French document captured 10 May describing a defence in depth. Lossberg doubted the ability of troops to use this method. p. 90. 25 Sep 15 French offensive broke through front line but checked on reverse slope of Py valley despite heavy German losses. p. 92. Lossberg sent to 3rd army as CoS and cancelled a withdrawal from the reserve line. It was to be held and the 3,000m long south slope, overlooked from the north side of the valley used for artillery observers and counter-attack forces. 93. Artillery defence held the line in September then infantry built up into a depth with series of positions behind the reserve line in October from which they could counter-attack French penetrations. Ch 6. Somme positions on forward slopes and packed with infantry by commanders reluctant to risk the ack for losing ground. Lossberg managed to use the Py valley system of reverse-slope defences as positions on forward slope were lost and infantry losses deterred commanders from rigid defence.

p. 128. "On 28 August while the Somme campaign was still at its height.... There may be seen at this time the formation of an echelon of reserves such as Colonel von Lossberg had organised for the Champagne battles the previous autumn. By degrees he was able with the extra divisions, freed from Verdun, to form a first line of relief divisions (Ablösungs-divisionen), ten to fifteen miles back, ready to relieve the front divisions whenever necessary."

p. 184. (Week before Nivelle Offensive of 16 April) "To avoid further confusion as to the purpose of the reserve divisions they were from now onwards to drop the name Ablösungs-divisionen, which merely meant relief-divisions, and to be called Eingreif-divisionen."

It looks like a defence-in-depth was improvised on the Somme from the troops available and then supplemented by a line of replacement divisions once reserves came from Verdun.. Keith-264 (talk) 19:05, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

Freeman. J, A Planned Massacre?

British Intelligence Analysis and the German Army at the Battle of Broodseinde, 4 October 1917 (2011) p. 21

The German Army had been utilising two defensive tactics up to this point. One was holding their frontline line regiments in staggered lines behind the front. This "defence-in-depth" policy would repel an advance by utilising many defensive lines to wear it down.7 The second tactic was to use Eingrief or "interlocking" divisions to enter the front quickly from the reserve lines and counter-attack after the British divisions were clear of their own artillery cover. They would then press this advantage under the cover of their own guns and rout the attackers.8 7 = 7. For an introduction to these defensive measures see Nigel Cave, Polygon Wood Ypres (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999), pp. 95-6. 8 = 8. Ibid; Jack Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), pp. xi-xii.Keith-264 (talk) 23:12, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Gegenstoss

I think this is wrong, the front-holding division did this and the Eingreif joined in if necessary - so they were not used on the Gheluvelt plateau on 31 July, because the local divisions contained the British attack. Further north the Eingreifs were sent to engage the British on the XIX Corps front below Gravenstafel.Keith-264 (talk) 14:56, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

Could change "conduct" to participate.--Labattblueboy (talk) 15:08, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

I think that we need a litle more on the ground-holding division holding battalions back for instant counter-attacks and the link with the Eingreif division which moved up progressively as the battalions of the front division counter-attacked.Keith-264 (talk) 17:34, 4 October 2012 (UTC)

Added material on context

Added material for context in which Eingreif divisions developed and their results. 1918 still to do. Keith-264 (talk) 19:19, 19 May 2016 (UTC)

The article still has many deficiencies, more description of the organisation, training and equipment an Eingreif division compared to a Stellungsdivision, short narratives on the effect of Eingreif divisions at Arras, Nivelle, Messines and 1918 and a decent conclusion are needed. Some diagrammatic and/or pictorial representation also if possible.Keith-264 (talk) 07:40, 21 May 2016 (UTC)

Added a sketch of post-Flanders practice as a place-holder.Keith-264 (talk) 09:23, 21 May 2016 (UTC)

There's still too much context and not enough on the nature of the E divisions but this reflects the sources, which treat the E divisions as part of a system. Keith-264 (talk) 10:24, 21 May 2016 (UTC)

As above, there doesn't seem to be an alternative to gleaning details from sources not specifically about E divisions. Keith-264 (talk) 09:04, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

Class rating

Potential conflict of interest: the class section in the banner hadn't been amended to C when the article was reviewed, so took it on myself to do it. Keith-264 (talk) 10:24, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

Added more gleanings on specialisation and its discontents.Keith-264 (talk) 14:23, 23 July 2017 (UTC)