Talk:Dual process theory

To the comment below (that says "I don't see the point of this entry") - I am a Professor of Cognitive Science and at least 40% of the university program that I teach in is about dual process theory. I suspect the same is true for many programs at other universities too. Therefore, having a dual process theory is relevant to many students. The comment below is absurd and obviously ignorant of current academic discussions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Prof. Dr. Brain Scientist (talk • contribs) 11:43, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

No offense, but I don't see the point of this entry... Do we need an entry for Three Process theories so we can mention Robert Sternberg? How about Four Process models so we can talk about the four food groups? This is more of a common phrase that appears in research than it is a bonafide psychological topic, isn't it? I mean, lots of things come in twos and threes. --Jcbutler 07:02, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

I made an attempt to expand on this a bit, and also added a reference section. --Jcbutler 20:28, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

Perhaps mention can be made of Groves and Thompson's theory they put forth in the article "Habituation: a dual-process theory" (1970) (article can be found at http://garfield.library.upenn.edu/classics1980/A1980KM40400001.pdf) -- BartNotelaers (talk) 14:14, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

I am going to be adding information about dual-process accounts of reasoning on this page within the next few days. Meltamming (talk) 02:13, 8 April 2012 (UTC)

Hello everyone, I am working on a project for my psychology class and I'm required to edit Wikipedia pages that I believe could use work. I was thinking of simply creating a table showing the similarities and differences between System 1 and System 2, to make it more clear. Although not a major change, I honestly believe a table will help new viewers better understand the processes and make the differences (between the systems) more noticeable. Please let me know of your thoughts! Thanks Sjordan1992 (talk) 23:14, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Hello everyone. Like some other people, I will be making some edits to this page for a psychology class. Here are 4 edits we will be making in the future. Let me know what you think of them.

Redesign Idea 1:

We plan to go into greater detail of the automatic and controlled processes that are involved in the the dual process theory. Bargh (1994) reconceptualized the notion of an automatic process by breaking down the term “automatic” into four components: awareness, intentionality, efficiency, and controllability. One way for a process to be labeled as automatic is for the person to be unaware of it. There are three ways in which a person may be unaware of a mental process: they can be unaware of the presence of the stimulus (subliminal), how the stimulus is categorized or interpreted (unaware of the activation of stereotype or trait constructs), or the effect the stimulus has on the person’s judgments or actions (misattribution). Another way for a mental process to be labeled as automatic is for it to be unintentional. Intentionality refers to the conscious “start up” of a process. An automatic process may begin without the personal consciously willing it to start. The third component of automaticity is efficiency. Efficiency refers to the amount of cognitive resources required for a process. An automatic process is efficient because it requires few resources. The fourth component is controllability, referring to the person’s conscious ability to stop a process. An automatic process is uncontrollable, meaning that the process will run until completion and the person will not be able to stop it. Bargh (1994) conceptualizes automaticity as a component view (any combination awareness, intention, efficiency, and control) as opposed to the historical concept of automaticity as an all-or-none dichotomy.

Redesign Idea 2:

We plan to include a section describing how the dual process theory contributes to stereotype use. The stereotyping dual process model involves using controlled processes when there is motivation and cognitive capacity to do so and automatic processes when there is no motivation or cognitive capacity to do so regardless of personal beliefs. We plan to use the three studies from Devine (1989) as evidence of the stereotyping dual process model. Study 1 tested for the knowledge of cultural stereotypes and found that participants high and low prejudice measures (according to the Modern Racism Scale) were equally knowledgeable of the cultural stereotypes of African Americans. Study 2 was interested in seeing whether people would use automatically activated stereotypes in their judgments regardless of prejudice level (personal belief). Participants were primed with stereotype relevant or non-relevant words and then asked to give hostility ratings of a target with an unspecified race who was performing ambiguously hostile behaviors. Regardless of prejudice level those who were primed with more stereotype relevant words gave higher hostile ratings to the target. Study 3 investigated whether people can control for stereotype use with their own personal beliefs. Participants were asked to do a thought listing of African Americans, and those participants who were low in prejudice thought with less stereotype consistent than those high in prejudice. These three studies taken together show that regardless of personal beliefs when individuals do not have the motivation or cognitive capacity to inhibit stereotype use then they will go on to use the stereotype in judgments of others, thereby using automatic processes in decision making. However, when people have the cognitive resources and motivation to inhibit stereotypes by using personal beliefs then the stereotype use will be inhibited.

Devine, P.G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1), 5-18.

Redesign Idea 3

We plan to further describe how dual process theory is involved in decision making. For most of the decisions we make, we are unaware of the true process for how we reached our conclusion, yet we consciously form a story that neatly outlines our thought process. These stories are formed by lay theories (personal beliefs about how some aspect of the world works) that result in misattributions, i.e., claiming the reason for a decision is due to a particular set of stimuli while those stimuli actually had no effect. Thus, decision making is an integration of both automatic and controlled processes. It is an automatic process when no conscious effort is made to come up with a solution to a problem, such as in the Maier (1931) study when a hint is given and participants suddenly come up with the solution without being consciously aware as to why or how they came up with the solution. It is a controlled process when a conscious decision is made by evaluating the situation and putting forth effort to come up with a solution. This can be seen in American participants in Knowles et al.’s (2001) study when they have to effortfully correct for situational moderators. Several studies support the notion that automatic processes underscore the choices we make. As reported by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), Maier (1931) conducted an experiment that required participants to tie two cords together that were hanging from the ceiling, just far enough apart that the participant could not reach both of the cords at the same time. After each solution the participant came up with, the experimenter asked them to come up with another way to solve the problem. Three of the possible solutions were easy for the participants to figure out, however one solution was significantly more difficult than the others. Subtly, Maier set one of the cords into motion. About 45 seconds after this hint most participants tied a weight to the end of one cord and created a pendulum, swinging it over to the other cord tying them together. In another version of this study, Maier physically tied a weight to the end of one of the cords, but this did not help the participants. Again, only after subtly setting the cord into motion did participants reach the final conclusion. In this second condition, after being asked how they came to the conclusion, many of the participants said that Maier tying the weight onto the cord helped them. In the first condition, participants said that it just came to them, or that it was the only thing left to do. The participant’s behavior was influenced by stimuli outside of their awareness (the process is therefore, at least partially, automatic). When they were asked to explain their behaviors they denied the influence of the unaware stimuli and made up a different explanation (misattribution). A study conducted by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) dealt with participants inability to recognize the effect that the position of a stimuli had on their evaluation of it. Participants either saw four different nightgowns or four identical pairs of nylon stockings and rated the quality of them. There was a significant left-to-right position effect; the rightmost object was consistently rated as being the best quality, by a ratio of almost four to one in the stocking condition. When asked why they made their choice, participants never mentioned the position as having any effect and most denied the possibility of it having an effect. Again, participants’ decisions were heavily influenced through automatic processes, and the conscious, controlled system rationalized it in a way that made more sense to the participant. In a study conducted by Knowles et al. (2001), East Asians and Americans were participants in an experiment testing how cognitive busyness affects dispositional inferences within different cultures. Cognitive busyness increased dispositionism among American participants but it did not for East Asian participants. This showed that East Asians have automatized the ability to correct dispositional inferences to situational. It also shows that in order for Americans to correct for dispositional inferences they have do so in a controlled process because they have to consciously and effortly make the decision to do so.

Redesign Idea 4:

There is evidence that emotion can lead to the increased use of stereotypes. For example, Bodenhausen, Kramer and Süsser (1994) found that individuals who had been induced to feel happy rendered more stereotypic judgments than did those in a neutral mood. Furthermore, Bodenhausen, Sheppard (1994) and Kramer found that the angry participants demonstrated roughly the same results as happy participants; angry subjects rendered more stereotypic judgments in a social perception task than did sad subjects, who did not differ from neutral mood subjects. Thus, people who are either happy or angry will rely on their automatic processes (stereotypes) more heavily than people in a neutral or sad mood, who will rely more on controlled processes. CKG327 (talk) 03:58, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Several points that need to be considered: 1) Attitude has more to do with bias, then which system is being used. Attributing prejudice to system 1, only reflects personal bias against system 1 thinking. 2) As Sloman, has noted, system 1 CAN and does deal with abstract concepts, though not best suited for it. 3) As the complexity of problems increase, it's elements spill over from Working memory to Long term memory, the role of the associative heuristic increases. While very simple problems activate the associative heuristic, medium complexity problems acitivate rule based thinking (with working memory limitations), and the more difficult problems activate both associative and rule-based thinking. 4) By most accounts,'System 1' thinking is for more characteristic of inductive thinking (involving probabilistic based assumptions), while 'System 2' is more characteristic of analytical thinking. I've deleted the section regarding system 2 exclusively allowing for hypothetical thought. That is the opinion of Johnathan Evans, is in contrast to the view of Daniel Kahneman and others, who has suggested System 1 allows for Hypothetical thought and creativity. There is no consensus as to what system accounts for hypothetical thought, or abstract thought. Sloman, has made it clear that abstract thought can occur in System 1. Also, according to Nira Liberman, co-author of Construal Level Theory, associative heuristic processes are, generally, temporally abstract.

Historical precedents

I am a professor and don't have time to edit this entry. However, the historical precedents seem to be false. Freud started Dual Process Theory. I've never heard of James in relation to DPT, so I did some research. After much google scholaring, I still found no mention of William James in relation to DPT. I think the text about James in this wiki entry is wrong and should be about Freud. Someone, please correct. Citation: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231948804_Freud's_dual_process_theory_and_the_place_of_the_a-rational — Preceding unsigned comment added by Prof. Dr. Brain Scientist (talk • contribs) 11:39, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

The first bases for dual process theory go at least all the way back to Plato with his Chariot Allegory where human reason is lickened to a chariot driven by a two horses: one horse is tamed, noble and reasoned and the other untamed and passionate. Indeed many philosophers have touched this subject thereafter. --Nikosgpet (talk) 01:35, 20 April 2021 (UTC)

I think it would be good to add some more historical background to the History section. In particular I think it would be informative to mention Thomas Aquinas' notions of ratio and intellectus. While his thought is generally categorised as philosophy as it is somewhat formalistic and predates the independent discipline of psychology, I think it is relevant and interesting. I cannot find any material online that relates those notions to dual process theories of psychology per se, so there is an "original research" problem here. There is also an axiological and theological element to Aquinas' thought which doesn't sit comfortably with modern psychology. Anyway, here are links to some pages I have found that cast light on the older theories, Aquinas but also Kant:

[1] [2] and less authoritatively: [3]

Theoh (talk) 23:27, 12 June 2014 (UTC)

Another historical influence is from Gestalt Psychology. Max Wertheimer distinguishes two types of problem-solving solutions: Type A are those that demonstrate insight and originality; whereas Type B involve the old rules being reapplied in an ineffective manner (Wertheimer, "Productive Thinking," 1945).141.238.29.8 (talk) 04:28, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

What about Hume's distinction between sensation and reason? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2604:2000:D119:9600:884:1531:E6E6:8A7B (talk) 00:42, 19 December 2017 (UTC)

Proposed Expansion and Additional Examples

To whom it may concern, A group of undergraduate psychology students and myself have been studying Dual Process Theory and believe this page needs some more information about specific applications. We propose the following changes. 1. Add a subheading of economic application of Dual Process Theory, including the example about economic decision making. Application to economic decision making is completely absent on the page and may provide a good example of how Dual Process Theory works. This would include information from Alos-Ferrer and Strack (2014) whose Multiple Selves Model helps explain economic choices made by individuals. 2. Add information about the intersection of the Dual Process Theory and terror management theory as proposed by Psyzczynski, Greenburg, and Solomonas (1999). This article outlines the way the brain deals with conscious and unconscious thoughts about death. 3. Expand the section about habituation to include information from Groves and Thompson (1970). The article currently mentions habituation but does not say that it involves both systems and does not talk about the specific steps that occur. Please let me know what you think. Any suggestions would be appreciated. --JeffreySzczecinski (talk) 11:45, 9 March 2015 (UTC)

Charachteristics of Systems 1 and 2

Magda Osman has argued that attempts to characterize the systems will fail, as there is overlap. Almost anything that can be said about System 1, can be said about System 2, and vice-versa. She believes there is also the risk of garnishing each system with personal bias. http://www.academia.edu/441716/An_Evaluation_of_Dual-Process_Theories_of_Reasoning

More distinction/less interchangeability between "system" and "process"?

I don't really know much about this subject, but it seems that the "systems" version is a "stronger" proposition than the "process" conceptualization, whereas the overall impression I have from this article is that it's all the same thing. Here's an example of the differences laid-out:

1. Dual-process and dual process and dual process and dual-system theories theories theories Dual-process theories:

• - posit two distinct mental processes that can generate a response to a problem,
• - posit one process that is fast, automatic, nonconscious, effortless, highly contextualized,
• - posit a second process that is slow, controlled, conscious, effortful and abstract,
• - claim that the fast process relies on heuristics or associations, and generates responses that are often biased,
• - claim that the slow process is rule-governed and analytic and generates normative responses,
• - were developed during the 1980s and 1990s in various areas of psychology (e.g. Wason & Evans 1975; Evans
• 1989; Kahneman & Tversky 1982; Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Chaiken 1980; Petty & Cacioppo 1986).

Dual-system theories (DSTs):

• - are more ambitious,
• - synthesize different dual-process distinctions,
• - attribute the fast and slow processes to two different multi-purpose mental systems (System 1 and System 2),
• - ascribe further features to the two systems, such as difference of evolutionary age, heritability, malleability,
• - are supported by evidence from (a) experimental manipulations, (b) neuroimaging, (c) studies of individual differences,
• - emerged in the late 1990s (e.g. Evans & Over 1996, Sloman 1996; Stanovich 1999, 2004).

Quoted from: http://herbertsimonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Frankish_Dual-systems_HSS_handout.pdf — Preceding unsigned comment added by 187.35.36.190 (talk) 23:09, 21 September 2016 (UTC)

Evolution subsection

The "evolution" subsection is currently found under the "evidence" section. This is odd, since no evidence is cited for the evolutionary claims, they are purely opinion and hypothesis. I suggest the "evolution" subsection be moved. 59.102.90.92 (talk) 11:02, 5 April 2018 (UTC)

Related to the issue above, the statement "System 2 is evolutionary recent and specific to humans." is unsupported on both accounts (and almost certainly false with regard to the assertion that it is specific to humans). The mind is the product of the brain, and with similar brain structures you will have similar minds. Animals with similar brains to us almost certainly have the same System 1 / System 2 as human do. TrustworthyPerson (talk) 18:14, 26 October 2018 (UTC)