Talk:Dialectic/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

external link

This page: http://www.vandruff.com/art_converse.html should be added somwhere.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 141.35.12.196 (talk • contribs) 08:54, 23 July 2004 (UTC).

Robert Pirsig

"Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance" contains, among other things, a critique of dialectic and the socratic method.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 203.10.231.231 (talk • contribs) 05:37, 22 August 2005 (UTC).

more like a vindication of the dialectic. not of simple logic and rationality- but that's not what the socratic method is about.  ;) --Heah (talk) 20:25, 22 August 2005 (UTC)

triads

I took out the reference, in the Marxist dialectics section, to "other schools of thought that use the triadic model", since they weren't identified and I couldn't figure out what the point of that section was. Jeremy J. Shapiro 17:43, 7 September 2005 (UTC)

i guess it was referring to fichte . . .  ;)--Heah (talk) 18:29, 7 September 2005 (UTC)

But I mean, they were presented as critiques of Marxian dialectics. I'm not aware of any modern Fichtean school that criticizes Marxism from that perspective. Or was I missing something? Jeremy J. Shapiro 20:01, 7 September 2005 (UTC)

Exposition needs revamping

The musicologist bit belongs in the body of the article IMO. There should be something clearer to explain dialectic up front. Pazouzou 00:24, 26 Sep 2004 (UTC)

What are your objections? It is a clear real world example that also illustrates the importance of the concept. Hyacinth 00:32, 27 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I think relational dialectics should be covered somewhere.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.183.187.47 (talk • contribs) 15:55, 20 September 2005 (UTC).

"sinister dialectic"

I just moved the following new paragraph to this Talk page, because I have no idea of what it means, and no examples were given: "In some political analysis, this sort of dialectic has taken on a more sinister meaning, whereby both sides in a conflict are either directly controlled or indirectly manipulated in order to control the change which results." Although it sounds like an interesting idea, I couldn't figure out what it means, whether it's reporting on some current useage of "dialectic" or is original research, etc. If the person who added it would give some examples, that would help. Jeremy J. Shapiro 04:21, 3 November 2005 (UTC)

Trichotomy

I think that this article is misleading as are most discussions of the concept of Dialectic because they portray dialectic as dinstinct from or in opposition with Classical Logic. Which is to say that Dialectic does not allow for an "actual contradiction" or violation of Identity and Law of Excluded Middle, rather it identifies contradictions in terms or argument, which are cause for revision of premise or conclusion. In this sense the Law of Identity is central - something and it's contradiction (i.e. A and ~A) cannot both be true. If it is realized that two statements which are seemingly opposite are either both true or both false it means that they do not have a genuine inverse truth relation. Dialectic is the study of trichotomies. It is the process of realizing this "seeming contradiction" and resolving it by resort to some other statement which has a genuine relation. It is stripped of its of glorified philosophy terminology - trial and error. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ikkyu~enwiki (talk • contribs) 07:35, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Rosa L wrote:

Well, Hegel fans often say things like the above, but the so-called 'Law of Identity' (unknown to Aristotle) has nothing to do with the 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.

The former, in its traditional (i.e., pre-Leibnizian) form concerns the alleged relation between and object and itself; the latter relates to the truth-functional implications that hold between a proposition and its negation. Since propositions cannot be treated as objects without destroying their logical form, the 'law of non-Contradiction' is not about objects.

[And if, per impossibile, a proposition could fail to be identical with itself, it would not be a proposition, and hence nothing could follow from it.]

Of course, Hegel had rather odd views about 'judgements' and 'propositions' themselves, but unless one is fluent in Martian, they make no sense. [On this see John Rosenthal 'The Myth of Dialectics' (Macmillan, 1998).] But even so, a judgement cannot be an object, nor yet the name of one, without destroying its logical form, too.

So, this part of 'dialectics' is based on seriously defective logic (and this is so whether or not it is true that Hegel accepted/rejected these alleged 'laws' of logic in the dialectical or the speculative part of his philosophy), as indeed are others.

All of which vindicates Bertrand Russell's claim that the worse a man's logic, the more interesting are the conclusions that are alleged to follow from it.

More details here and here. RL 29/08/06 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.106.14.196 (talk • contribs) 23:35, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Quote from Marx under Marxist Dialectic

I'm changing the first use of the word "ideal" to "Idea" — I think this was a (slightly confusing) typo. Please revert if I am mistaken, but post me a brief response why "ideal" is right (unless, of course, it is just that that is what Marx actually wrote; I can't check, as there is no citation.) Lewallen 18:18, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

I googled and found that that was indeed the correct quote, so I reverted... but it still doesn't make perfect sense to me. Lewallen 18:24, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

This is not "ideal" in the sense of a Platonic ideal, but simply an adjective derived from the noun idea. Forgive me if I'm just pointing out what you already know. Franklin Dmitryev 01:00, 8 June 2006 (UTC)

I think most modern writers would put 'conceptual' to avoid confusion, but Marx could conceivably have found such a confusion a fertile one, given his revolutionary, materialist perspective. Likewise. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 83.138.136.91 (talk) 16:35, 30 December 2006 (UTC).

khm, you must be forgetting that marx was german? are you giving yourself enough credits to criticize him? matt.

dialectic application to ecology

does the concept of 'niche contruction' (and the conflict with evolutionary theory/natural selection) arise from the application of dialectic thinking to ecology? That is, does the phrase 'not only does the environment cause changes in species, but species also cause changes in their environment' represent a dialectic argument? — Preceding unsigned comment added by CornColonel (talk • contribs) 14:27, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Given that Lewontin is one of the main people to popularize the niche concept, I'd say yes. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cellulator (talk • contribs) 16:01, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Proudhonian concept of dialetics, anyone?

Hi, last year I did a dissertation on the politics and philosophy of the 'Anarchist' writer, journalism and philosophy of P-J Proudhon. He had a slightly different concept of dialectics. His theory that there was always be thesis and anti-thesis, and that there could be no synthesis. So there would be uneasy relationship between the two opposing ideas until it was superseded by different, 'superior' or more appealing ideology/philsophy. I'm not too confident to write a new chapter on this on this subject. But if anyone else wants to write about it they are welcome to do so. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 62.6.163.65 (talk) 12:03, 4 March 2007 (UTC).

Proudhon therefore appears to present a concept of a non-synthesis. But surely that inevitably forms an antithesis to the thesis of a synthesis, resulting in...? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 83.138.136.90 (talk) 00:28, 8 March 2007 (UTC).

Aristotle

Some of the opening remarks seem to me to reflect the Aristotelian tradition. "It is one of the three original liberal arts or trivium (the other members are rhetoric and grammar) in Western culture. In ancient and medieval times, both rhetoric and dialectic were understood to aim at being persuasive (through dialogue). The aim of the dialectical method, often known as dialectic or dialectics, is to try to resolve the disagreement through rational discussion." One could perhaps either insert, "originating with Aristotle" or, I wondered whether they might be better moved to an Aristotle section, perhaps with his ideas on dialectics made more explicit and the opening summary remarks made into a summary of sections that follow? Andysoh 22:14, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

first line

I think this article is good but I'm not sure about the first line. Is there a source in classical philosophy (other than Fichte) where dialectic is posited as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis? If so, why not specify the earliest origins? Is it Aristotle?

Alternatively, I wonder if this description should say something like:

"In philosophy, dialectic (Greek: διαλεκτική) is commonly described as an exchange of propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses) resulting in a synthesis of the opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of the dialogue."

Dialectics is often attributed to the Ancient Ionian philosophical school, particularly Heraclitus as per the wikipedia entry. Perhaps some acknowledgement of this?

Socrates seems to have combined something of this school with the best of the old Sophist tradition (which some trace back to the ionian school anyway), from where the term dialectic may have originated.

Plato's development may have been to make dialectics more of a mystical type of enlightenment (in his republic, for instance).

Andysoh 00:50, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

More details, less rhetoric.

Many philosophers have offered critiques of dialectic, and it can even be said that hostility or receptivity to dialectics is one of the things that divides twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy from the so-called "continental" tradition, a divide that only a few contemporary philosophers (among them Richard Rorty) have ventured to bridge.

So what does the "Anglo-American philosophy" do - agree with dialectic or disagree? For that matter, what does one who disagree with dialectic believe? How does non-dilectic philosophy disagree with dialectic philosophy?

It's generally thought that whilst on the continent of Europe dialectics has entered the cultural as a legtimate part of thought and philosophy, it is generally misunderstood, disregarded, ridiculed or treated with great suspicion in the UK and the USA, and plays no discernable part in their culture with their strong mechanical positivist bias. Of course there are many notatble exceptions to this. Andysoh 00:58, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

Parts of this page sounds like it was dumped from someone's honors thesis - good, but a little unapproachable for someone without a good grounding in philosophy.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 128.104.114.136 (talk • contribs) 21:39, 15 May 2005 (UTC).

Pierre de la Ramée (Petrus Ramus)

We appear to have a big gap in the story of dialectic between Socrates (circa 470–399 BC) and Hegel (1770-1831) - but what of Pierre de la Ramée (aka Petrus Ramus, 1515–1572) and his once canonical (even in England) Dialectique (dates varying between English and French Wikipedias)? Does the development of dialectic really jump from one philosophical 'Herrenvolk ' to another, without the inspirational influence of a French revolutionary? BTW, I just noticed that the evidence of editor opposition to the orthodox, mainpage summary of dialectic as Socratic-Hegelian reads 'Kant... Ramus.' :D —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 83.138.189.76 (talk) 01:50, 30 December 2006 (UTC).

In addition, Hegel acredits Kant as being the first to revive ancient dialectics. I am not sure that "instead of regarding the contradictions into which dialectics leads as a sign of the sterility of the dialectical method, as Kant tended to do in his Critique of Pure Reason" is correct. I thought his four cosmological antimonies (etc) were a celebrated reintroduction and redefinition of dialectics along more classical greek lines.

And I think there was around the time of Pierre de la Ramée a strong influence of the neo-platonists; perhaps one find more than one or two attempts to retreive dialectics from the Aristotelian grasp.

The article on Pierre de la Ramée does not indicate this influence however, nor does it indicate what his dialectic might have consisted of. Andysoh 21:13, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

Much talk of ancient history, few examples of benefits

In all this deliberation on the precise provenance of the concepts, little has been done to demonstrate their day-to-day practical value, if any(?). :)

In relation to science, see the last section: Dialectical biology.

We could possibly make reference to http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/sn-cohenrs1.html, where there is a scan of a "Science and Nature" magazine sponsored discussion in the USA. Irving Adler (North Bennington, Vermont) makes by far the most useful points in my opinion. I think they have been shortened. There is much that is wrong with the editorial position of "Science and Nature" in relation to the dialectics of nature in my opinion, and that makes me hesitate.

Dialectics is (and always was, going right back to Anaxamander in 600BC Miletus in ancient Ionia in my opinion) a logic of revolution, or a logic given birth to by revolutionary times, and in relation to society its practical value extends to those who wish to understand revolutions, that is, sudden changes, upheavals, coming-into-beings and passings away.

In cosmology, see "phase change" and its significance in understanding the cosmos. Phase change is an example of quantity into quality or vice versa. One could say that an awareness of the possiblity of encountering dialectics of nature in the form of a phase change could help predict, or does help predict, developments in nature. cf, for example, Brian Greene, 'The fabric of the cosmos'.

So - day-to-day practical value? ... you might say, no, not to you and me, not every day, just some days - exceptional days. :)

Andysoh 00:54, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

I'm not sure dialectics hasn't got day-to-day practical value, which is perhaps what someone new to the subject most needs to know. In authoritarian behaviour, people tend to accept what they're told about things by anyone remotely suggestive of authority, and are trained/reared to view contradiction as perverse, disobedient, disloyal. But when one adopts dialectics as part and parcel of one's day-to-day examination of reality, it becomes a routinely liberating mind-tool. Thus, for example, instead of meekly accepting your authoritative-sounding conclusion to the effect that dialectics may lack day-to-day value, I simply, routinely, explore the antithesis, resulting in a quite revolutionary, if not necessarily original(?) conclusion.

I would also really want to place these observations near the commencement of the systems analysis entry, but a cursory glance at it seems to suggest that, as often happens, the Wiki entry (and possibly the subject itself) has been cornered and monopolised by established idées fixes, which the simple application of dialectics at once exposes.

N.b.,: What would happen were one to propose to a student of dialectics? ;|

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 212.100.250.225 (talk) 11:18, 26 March 2007 (UTC).

I agree, actually. Some people think in rigid categories, and are the worst at practical things, and are always taken by surprise when the thing in question turns out to be many sided, appoproximate, full of contradictions, subject to sudden change (such as snapping off...) So it is useful, but not mysterious, and possibly not so easily accessible as an idea to new people as when one discusses big things, like big science or revolutions.

I wonder whether the systems analysis people would violently object to a criticisms section, in which one could perhaps place something? The only problem is, without some good sources, (Wittgenstein's later stuff, or something really heavy like that - his critique of logic and embracing of a holistic approach is the first step on the rung of dialectics) they will just laugh like a drain - and who could blame them - they're not philosophers.

Now the logicians might be fair game, although I've been reading a few critiques suggesting that hegel and trotsky misrepresented logic. I suspect the critiques take an ahistorical approach, and that hegel and trotsky correctly represented the logic, as it existed in their time. But its just a suspicion at this stage. Andysoh 20:20, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

I finally did get around to criticising the Systems analysis article: see Why can't a subject be what it says?

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Rosa Lichtenstein wrote:

I do not know why you are repeating these hoary old falsehoods. I have taken them all apart at my site -- not one single dialectical idea works (where any sense can be made of them, that is).

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/

Rosa Lichtenstein 21:10, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

Sounds like a female problem to me. It's also quite offensive to accuse us of 'repeating hoary old falsehoods' when in fact we are simply paying homage to a simple, everyday mental process of lateral thinking in the contemplation of alternatives. Also, if you're still allowed your Wiki ID, you're not truly as radical/original as you pretend - radicals/originals are always banned, here - well our IDs, anyhow. Not that that really matters, as the truth is 'out there' - unpatentable, beyond copyright, anyway. I can't help thinking that your German/German-Jewish ID gives you an unfair advantage, also, with regard to the type of 'PC,' authoritarian policebots who run this joint.

article may contain original research or unverified claims?

Can anyone list the original research or unverified claims? J. D. Redding 14:12, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

original research

Here for OR. J. D. Redding

unverified claims

Here for UC. J. D. Redding

It was tagged (not by me, I hasten to add) on 2 January 2007 for lack of citations: "tagged for lack of sources". This suggests the tag should be "This article does not cite its sources" etc, and it would be great to have so direct references (author, book, page), then we could remove the tag.

The article starts off with classical philsophy, etc, and I'm sure all can be sourced, but I'd certainly be happier if someone had time to make the first paragraph to be more clear on which of the various interpretations of dialectics is being referenced, by original author if possible.

I did ask about this a bit further up on the talk page. It may be that the "tagger" (to coin a phrase), read the opening paragraphs and felt it was little a bit 'ad hoc', but could easily be squared up with some quotes and citations.

Andysoh 20:03, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

Could you please list individual statements that need citations? J. D. Redding 00:01, 13 May 2007 (UTC)

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Switched tag to need references instead of original research ... unless you can state individual lines of OR ... if no, then leave this tag.

If you want to keep the need sources tag, PLEASE list individual statements that need them. J. D. Redding 00

12, 13 May 2007 (UTC)

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Hi J D Redding, I'd be interested in references in the places indicated below (I personally don't like tagging an article itself)

In classical philosophy, dialectic (Greek: διαλεκτική) is an exchange of propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses) resulting in a synthesis of the opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of the dialogue.

Citation? By "classical" is this a reference to ancient Greek classical, Plato presumably? In particular, is this correct about the "Synthesis" here? Is this what modern scholoarship suggests, or is this a reference to the Fichte or post-Hegelian rendering of the dialectic? Or should we remove "sythesis" at this point, or say, "later interpreted as arriving at a synthesis (ref, etc)". If Plato, can you give the best Socratic dialogue for this? Plato also discusses the dialectic in his Republic but here is it not rendered differently?

It is one of the three original liberal arts collectively known as the trivium (the other members are rhetoric and grammar) in Western culture.

Originally Aristotle? Can you state which work?

In ancient and medieval times, both rhetoric and dialectic were understood to aim at being persuasive (through dialogue).

This again has its origins in Aristotle I think, although perhaps 'dialogue' is Plato, and are we also refering to the medieval scholastic traditions? Are there any references we could give?

The aim of the dialectical method, often known as dialectic or dialectics, is to try to resolve the disagreement through rational discussion.

According to whom? I think this might be Aristotle again. (Socrates, for instance, argues that he only shows what he doesn't know although this often seems disingenuous, perhaps though Plato's intervention. It would not be the Kant, Hegel or Marx tradition I think.)

(My own opinion is that there are two distinct renderings of "dialectics" in Socrates/Plato, and another distinct one in Aristotle, whilst the Ionian school supplies another which they both pick up on / build on from time to time.)

A bit further down we read:

(instead of regarding the contradictions into which dialectics leads as a sign of the sterility of the dialectical method, as Kant tended to do in his Critique of Pure Reason)

I'm not sure about this. Kant re-introduced the dialectical method because of the sterility of the existing philosophical schools, and to reflect the conflicts in philosophy (the four cosmological antimionies, etc.). I don't think this would reflect the general outloook of Kant Kant appears to see both of the dialectical propositions of each of the cosmological antimonies, for instance, as valid. This line might be better to simply read, that Hegel was building on the earlier work of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. Andysoh 00:12, 14 May 2007 (UTC)

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Great ... getting somewhere now ... put the fact tags in .. and I'll start looking for references for these ... J. D. Redding 00:16, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

Tag should now surely go. Any objections to unreferenced assertions remaining should be tagged at that place, or raised in this discussion page, rather than tag the entire article. Andysoh 17:56, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

Incidentally, whilst the person who inserted the reference to Heraclitus was adding an essential reference, I'm not sure that one could say "Since Heraclitus was the first person in the Western World to create a robust philosophical system" since I would have thought this would be attributed to Thales, and in writing, to Anaximander. This description appears in the wikipedia Heraclitus entry, without challenge in the talk page, so perhaps there is more scholarship to it that I haven't seen.

However, both provided elements that Heraclitus took further, and I would guess there is little doubt that Hegel and others regarded him as the father, or perhaps the originator of dialectics, which is a different matter, and should be kept.Andysoh 17:56, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

History of Classical Literature By Robert William Browne .... cites all these people ...

dialectics (dynamical theory) are terms that come up .... still have momre looking into it though ... J. D. Redding 20:10, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

I'll see if I can find any more refs for that ...

I also removed ref needed tag too ...

J. D. Redding 19:20, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

More unverified claims?

Please list more unverified claims. Otherwise, the tag should be removed. J. D. Redding 01:03, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

Thesis question from article page

The following student question was left on the article page:

I have a question!!!

In the first line, from the 'Engles explains..', where did Engels say this? There is no citation... It's really important and interesting issue for my thesis.

Please answer for it by sending email to me jinhyungjung@yahoo.com...

Thank you.

Reposted by maxrspct ping me 22:32, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Rosa L:

In response to the student above, Engels says this in Dialectics of Nature, page 223 (in my edition), or here (1/4 of the way down the page -- search with the word "Buddhists"): 1. Rosa Lichtenstein 15:34, 14 June 2007 (UTC)

Hegel and Engels' dialectics

Collapsed very long discussion:

Rosa wrote: Andysoh: "Now the logicians might be fair game, although I've been reading a few critiques suggesting that hegel and trotsky misrepresented logic. I suspect the critiques take an ahistorical approach, and that hegel and trotsky correctly represented the logic, as it existed in their time. But its just a suspicion at this stage." This is not open to doubt; Trotsky was advised as such by Burnham! And Hegel was a logial incompetent. Proof? I'll post it if you request it. Rosa Lichtenstein 20:35, 4 May 2007 (UTC) --- Hi Rosa, I've picked up the books now and am pretty satisfied that both Hegel and Trotsky did indeed criticise a major trend in logic. As you know, Trotsky critcises the law of identity. As you yourself point out, Aristotle did not specifically formulate the law of identity, which appears to have been attributed to him for hundreds of years, perhaps coalescing in the schools that arose after Plato was replaced by Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas's influence, possibly through assimilation of the work of Leibniz, but probably pre-dating him. Presumably someone can pinpoint an earliest text which contains the "Three laws of thought" attributed to Aristotle. This guy whose enjoyable article is linked to in the Law of identity article at [1] expresses the way the three laws were assumed - presumably he was taught the "three laws" at the university of Texas, even perhaps studied Aristotle, since he has the books. He also says that the other two laws, of contradictions and excluded middle are found in Aristotle, although of course he could have added only as a part of a complex system that formed Aristotle's outlook. It certainly appears to me that the law of identity is a crude reduction of Aristotle's approach, who knew too much of dialectics to make that mistake. Then of course Bertand Russell highlighted these same three laws in 1912 in his little primer, Problems of Logic - no doubt you discuss this somewhere, where he points out exactly what Hegel asks. Hegel, highly critical of the old scholastic schools, says, (in his Science of Logic) of these three laws, Why only take these three axioms as the basis of thought? and names others. Russell says, as you know, "These three laws are samples of self-evident logical principles, but are not really more fundamental or more self-evident than various other similar principles" as if to affirm with Hegel that there are others. And this indicates modern thinking - the so called "three laws of thought" are falling out of use. But I think therefore that both hegel and Trotsky's aim is straight for the period they were writing in and the targets they had in mind. I suppose its probable that Trotsky knew of Bertrand Russell. Trotsky makes clear he is attacking Aristotelian logic. The term Aristotelian logic may be a misnomer, but that's what the three laws were called, rightly or wrongly. I think his critique is basically correct, and I now feel more confident that he attacked a well known trend of thought - even as it was waning (in European thought), perhaps, vis Wittgenstein, Russell's own doubts, etc. I don't know, however, what Burnham said, or whether it was vey informative, but my guess is that he attempted to bury Trotsky's critique by references to lots of other logical constructions, etc., each of which suffer the same basic flaws of reductionism, positivism, etc. Andysoh 23:10, 4 May 2007 (UTC) Andy, thanks for those comments. I think much of what you say is correct, except Hegel and Trotsky's criticism of these 'laws' is lamentably poor -- and Hegel's is based on a level of syntactic sloppiness that beggars belief. The whole of the 'dialectic' flows out of these errors, which makes his entire Philosophy a joke. I dissect these in Essay Eight Part Two, note 67. Rosa Lichtenstein 15:25, 14 May 2007 (UTC) Hi Rosa, I enjoyed reading a few bits on your website, although I don't have time to read those long essays, (even the short versions, I'm afraid) I read quite a few pages of two or three of them. I can't make any comments, some disagreements I have, here, because that is going off subject. I guess here is not the place. In relation to this wiki article, I don't see how anyone can disagree with the criticism that Hegel lacks rigor, but I guess some Hegelians do. Whether or not its sloppy, it is mysticism, eclecticism. Marx's criticisms are clearly correct here, I think. I agree that constructing a dialectic around an argument against the so-called three 'laws of thought' is not going to be very persuasive today - your criticisms are well founded. But equally, for various reasons I think it would be misleading to see dialectics as a criticism of logic, whether Aristotelian, or modern or classical logic (not that I know of anyone who has attempted the latter.) But this means that I don't see dialectic flowing out of these errors, as you suggest, but rather having a quite independent origin. To me these errors misrepresent the nature of dialectics as an historical set or sets of concepts. I suppose a little like trying to make a science out of an art, but keeping in mind that there is the art of warfare, and the art of revolution, and that the best artists have a great deal of scientific technique behind their actions. It is not coincidental that I think the criticism of the failures of the Vienna School, etc from the later Wittgenstein and from within (expressed as "doubts") do have a bearing on how we perceive modern or classical formal logic itself, in its various formulations. But that is a philosophical question with rigours which must be observed of its own kind. Dialectics, I think, is most accessible if it is approached in its true historical development from the ancient Ionians (essential to understand Hegel in his own terms) and has a much less rigorous, much more impressionistic field of play. Even so, I was surprised that you questioned phase change as the modern equivalent of quantity into quality. I think the two should be seen as the same in any materialist dialectic. In reality, that is the origins of this concept - the phase change of water and probably metals, (the latter in the process of manufacture) observed by the ancient Ionians and seen as a qualitative change, picked up by Aristotle centuries later, and mentioned by Hegel briefly (quoting Aristotle) in his Science of Logic (without any great amount of mystifying), finally codified by Engels in a work he realised he should not publish, but which was published anyway after his death - so that Engels' short, unrevised chapter on the "three laws" of dialectics has since been ossified and mystified by self proclaimed dialectical materialists ever since. Nevertheless, there are some valuable observations in it. My understanding is if a metal (for example, but the same applies to chocolate) is sustained at a temperature that is above its "melting point" - say one degree above - it will melt (hence phase change). Until the melting point is reached, additional heat increases the temperature of the metal. After the melting point has been reached, additional heat induces the metal to melt, whilst its temperature stays the same, until it has melted. You seem to suggest this is not so - or are you suggesting that metals and other objects don't experience an immediate conversion of form, but take time to change? I think that would depend on our ability to supply heat to the entire metalic object. If a metal was plunged into the sun, I imagine the transformation would be pretty rapid. If dialectics attempts to depart from the known evidence of phase change, it should be dragged back. I don't think, for instance, the question of the rapidity of the phase change should be over-emphasised. There are various qualitative changes at work in a phase change, and the tempo of events will be different. For instance, I noticed your emphasis on time in relation to Stephen Jay Gould and punctuated equilibrium. I would argue that these things are relative, e.g. "rapid" speciation over anything from a few years to a few tens of thousands of years or so, followed by (and compared to) a few million years of stasis. I didn't mean to write at such length, my apologies. Andysoh 18:25, 15 May 2007 (UTC) Rosa Lichtenstein replied: Andy you are right, the errors I spoke of were not confined to Hegel; they in fact began (in the West) with Parmenides when he decided to do odd things with the verb "to be". This was compounded by the later 'doctrine of terms' in Aristotelian logic, which treated predicates as names, which in turn gave birth to the 'identity theory of predication' in the middle ages, which Hegel appropriated. Hegel merely added his own crass errors on top of that. So the dialectic springs from not just Hegel's errors, but from 2400 years of loopy logic. That alone invalidates it. [Details in Essays Three and Four at my site.] And I did not question phase change, as you say, merely whether it gives unambiguous support to Engels. The point about metal, glass, butter, plastic, rock, chocolate, etc., is that they undergo a non-nodal phase change (solid to liquid and vice versa), contrary to what Engels said. And I take your point about the sun (how plunging a metal into the sun would speed the whole process up), but the only way you can use that as a counter-example is because the nature and duration of a 'node' has been left entirely vague -- as well as the conditions under which this 'law' does or does not apply (i.e., it will appear to work under certain circumstances, but not others -- as your sun example illustrates). Since this area of dialectics is in fact a good example of Mickey Mouse science (with the nature of 'nodes', and that of 'quality' and 'quantity' left vague): the evidence is hackneyed, anecdotal, secondary, and specially-selected -- with disconfirming instances just ignored. Can you imagine a physicist leaving such things undefined? Or relying on such 'evidence'? He/she would be laughed out of the profession. But dialecticians are allowed to get away with this all the time. However, Engels says that it is impossible to alter the quality of an object without altering the quantity of matter and/or energy. This is demonstrably incorrect. Just to take one example; if you alter the geometry of certain molecules you obtain a stereoisomer with different qualities. Change in quality -- change in geometry, but the same amount of energy and/or matter. There are many more examples like this. Rosa Lichtenstein 15:07, 25 May 2007 (UTC) Hi Rosa, I'm sorry, I don't know what is meant by non-nodal phase change. Although I'm sure Engels was well aware that there were many faults to his unpublished Dialectics of Nature (otherwise he would have published it) I'm sure Engels was doing no more, in the chapter entitled "Dialectics", than setting out the science of the day. It might be worth noting in this article (if uncontroversial), that in his discussion of the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, we see the limitations of the science of the day. Science was just begining to formulate the idea of "energy" and had just made the great discovery that the temperature of a body could be expressed in the movement (or vibration) of its atoms, hence the emphasis on "motion (so-called energy)". The formulation here has certainly been overtaken by scientific advance, and I have no doubt that Engels' recognition that science was continuallly developing, contributed to his abandonning the manuscript. What seemed "impossible" one year became possible the next. Only a few years before Engels was writing to Marx about the new concept of molecules. But, in regards to Engels' aim, we should point out, he wishes to demystify "Hegel's mysterious prinicple" by equating it with phase change as understood by the science of his day, and showing it to be "quite rational but even rather obvious". It was not his intention to attempt to force nature into a fixed for ever formulation of the science of 1887 or whenever - that would be to return to Hegel. Another intersting thing, that might be noted in this article, is the link between quantum mechanics and the examples that Engels gives. After quoting Hegel's example of the phase change of water, Engels refers to "a definite minimum current strength is required to cause the platinum wire of an electric incandescent lamp to glow." Now this phenomenon (which comes under the study of the problem of 'black-body radiation') was most puzzling to the science of the day, and lead eventually to a formulation by Planck (1901) which led, via Einstein (1905), to quantum mechanics. What Einstein contributed (the photo electric effect) was that this is a discontinuity, a leap, just as Engels had identified it. You seem to be criticising those who take dialectics to be a kind of alternative to logic or science. I'm sure that's the way it has been often presented, especially in authodox Communist literature. But I still think this is a misunderstanding of dialectics by a rigid orthodoxy that grew up in the 1900s.Andysoh 21:20, 25 May 2007 (UTC) Rosa Lichtenstein wrote: Thankyou for you comments, but: Hi Rosa, I'm sorry, I don't know what is meant by non-nodal phase change. Well, you do, since I gave you several examples. Here is one again: as metals are heated, they change from solid to liquid very slowly, with no boundary between the two phases. Now, you can speed this up (as you noted), but the fact is that some processes in nature are non-nodal. Sure, science has developed since Engels's days, but he expressed his laws in a characteristically a priori manner: Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [I say 'characteristically' since all dialecticians do the same: i.e., they all impose their a priori schemas on to nature -- the whole of Essay Two at my site is devoted to substantiating that seemingly controversial claim.] And, despite the advances in science since his day, dialecticians the world over still make the same claims that Engels did. So, this 'theory' is not sensitive to contrary evidence. It is held onto as a dogma. I think your attempt to see Engels's hand in the development of quantum physics is fanciful, at best -- at least as far as foresight is concerned. Engels made so many incorrect claims about nature that by sheer luck one or two might seem to have been on the money. But, this is a highly selective way of looking at science, one shared by fundamentlist christians who view the bible in the same way that dialecticians view their holy books. They look only for confirmation, and ignore what they do not like. For example, and in this regard, quantum discontinuity might seem to validate the nodal aspect of change as underlined by Engels, but at the same time it falsifies his view of motion (which has to be continuous to generate his alleged 'contradiction'). So, when an electron, for example, moves between energy levels nodaly as you say, it is not in two places at once, and it is not in and not in one place at one and the same time. So, nodal change here means there is no 'contradiction'. Do dialecticians make a note of that? No, just like Christians, they cherry pick. And I think you are mistaken also in thinking I am criticising dialectics as an alternative to logic or science -- it isn't. It is far too confused to be an alternative to anything. So, if us Marxists needed a science (or a philosophy, or a logic), dialectics would not even make the reserve list of viable candidates. This is not to suggest that this is what happens in Marxism; quite the contrary. Far too many of our comrades treat this 'theory' a dogma, and cling onto to it for contingent psychological reasons. Rosa Lichtenstein 09:39, 26 May 2007 (UTC) Hi Rosa, Thanks for replying so quickly! I'm afraid you misunderstand me so completely I'm not sure we will get anywhere. I do apologise for being so opaque! I had no intention of suggesting Engels had any hand in the devlopment of quantum mechnics!! I said that the "phenomenon" that Engels mentioned "was most puzzling to the science of the day," and "lead eventually" to the formulation of quantum mechanics, not that Engels' mention of it did! The manuscript was not even published! What is interesting is only that Engels was keyed in to a particularly significant example. I didn't mean to imply that you were criticising dialectics as an alternative to logic and science, but that you were criticising dialectics on the assumption that dialectics itself sets out to be an alternative to logic and science. This may well be true of many who have written since Engels. But whilst your criticisms of the a priori approach of many today and in the last century are fine, with Engels you must make a few assumptions which I would challenege. I think you wrongly assume that formulations in Engels's Dialectics of Nature is something he would stand by as it stood when he abandonned the manuscript. I think this is wrong. Just imagine that you began a manuscript then abandonned as impossible to complete let alone revise correctly, as Engels did. Imagine your manusript then being published anyway, and people saying "Ah! But Rosa L was quite wrong to say XXX!" (and another set insisting that everything you wrote is true for all time irrespective of physical evidence to the contrary!) How annoying that would be!! Engels abandonned the manuscript because it was not possible to keep it up to date with the constantly changing science. Under subsequent revisions to get the various notes we criticise today into a form acceptable for publication, perhaps he would have removed many of the too rigid expressions, but he later wrote that the task was impossible. You also assume that subsequent marxists who have rigidly interpreted Engels' points as if they were a priori laws accurately reflect what Engels wanted: you assume he is intentionally laying down a priori laws, and this is wrong. He is giving contemporary examples in science, whcih have been overtaken, whilst the method remains. And I think that if one studies Engels' published material rather than manuscripts he abandonned, one gets quite a different picture. As for nodal and non-nodal changes, so far as I can see, phase changes are nodal by definition, if not temporaly, then in some other way. To take the example in question, in the case of metals, the temperature of a metal stops rising whilst heat is added until it fully melts. The node is the temperature point of melting. What the phase change is, is clearly going to be different in each substance - the only important point is that there is a discontinuity. In metals, before the melting point the addition of heat led to an addition of the temperature of the metal, and after the melting point, it does not, until the metal has turned into a liquid. there is a discontinuation of the one-to-one relationship between heat supplied and the temperature of the metal. Hence there is a phase change. You are of course aware that in dialectics the terms "contradictioni" "opposite" "negation", and so forth, as Fichte explained, have a special meaning, not in terms of logical opposites e.g. black and white, but as in terms of something very "other". You object that this is too vague to be a science, but I think it should not be compared in this way, and was not intended to be compared in this way by Marx and Engels, but on the contrary, to be put on a materialist basis, meaning, to reflect science, not surplant it. The fact that electrons behave nodally supports the view that phase change as a concept is correct, and since Hegel and Engels were doing no more than noting the science of phase change in their own language of "quantity into quality and vice versa" it validates dialectics against gradualism. You are, in my opinion, wrong to assume that Engels, for instance, attempted to set up a different law from that of the actually existing law of phase change. I think Engels saw the two as identical, except of course, that the most important result of this outlook, is that significant political change also happens nodally - not gradually in this case. E.g. the ruling class will not gradually give up their hold on society. This of course is the real significance and sphere of application of dialectics. I hope this clarifies things. Andysoh 16:48, 26 May 2007 (UTC) Rosa Lichtenstein wrote: You say this, Andy: I think you wrongly assume that formulations in Engels's Dialectics of Nature is something he would stand by as it stood when he abandonned the manuscript. I think this is wrong. But, I am not sure I suggested he would have stood by all he put into his notebooks; but subsequent Marxists (almost to a man/woman) have stood by this law (as you do, it seems). you assume he is intentionally laying down a priori laws, and this is wrong. He is giving contemporary examples in science, whcih have been overtaken, whilst the method remains. In fact, it is easy to demonstrate (indeed, I have posted a very long Essay at my site which does just this -- Essay Two) that not only did Engels do this, all subsequent dialecticians have done likewise, since this is the traditonal way of doing philosophy (and it is part of the Platonist tradition in science), and has been since Thales. Here is just one of many quotes (and not from Engels's notebooks, but from a published work) that shows this: "Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…." [Anti-Duhring, p.74.] There are many more like this from his published work, and countless thousands from other works on this 'theory' by later dialecticians -- all fall into apriorism at the drop of a hat. [I list hundreds of such quotes in the aforementioned Essay.] And I think that if one studies Engels' published material rather than manuscripts he abandonned, one gets quite a different picture. Not so, as the above shows. As for nodal and non-nodal changes, so far as I can see, phase changes are nodal by definition, if not temporaly, then in some other way. To take the example in question, in the case of metals, the temperature of a metal stops rising whilst heat is added until it fully melts. The node is the temperature point of melting. Bold emphasis added. Now, you see how easily even you slip into apriorism: facts about the world for you are true by "definition"! In this case, nature supplies us with a slow transition, but you re-configure it as a node! But, even you will admit that the melting of metal is not the same as that of say ice, or the phase change of boiling water. The latter two are nodal; the former can only be made so if you re-define it so. In that case, you would be manufacturing a truth about nature by reconfiguring a definition -- and how is that different from forcing this doctrine onto reality, and not reading it from the facts? Would you, for example, allow me to 're-define' a node in such a way that it excluded the vast majority of cases dialecticians quote? [A node has to be 0.000000000000001 yocto seconds long....] I think not. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yocto What the phase change is, is clearly going to be different in each substance - the only important point is that there is a discontinuity. This is a 'discontinuity' only if the meaning of that word has changed, too. [I think you are using it as if it were a synonym for "change" itself!!] there is a discontinuation of the one-to-one relationship between heat supplied and the temperature of the metal. Hence there is a phase change. Are you talking here about 'latent heat'? I do not question the fact that energy needs inputting into objects/processes, or that systems in nature vary in their capacity to take this energy up (at different stages in their phase cycles), but the qualitative change that Engels needs here is manifestly continuous, and non-nodal. We see metals growing ever softer as heat is fed in, and then gradually becoming liquid. A node can only be seen here subjectively, on an ad hoc basis --, or if the word is used to cover both rapid and slow change -- voiding it of any useful meaning. Now, if you insist on using this word for slow and rapid change, even then the 'node' for metals is qualitatively different from the node for, say, the formation of steam from water. So, we would have here a qualitative change (in the use of this word) caused by no input difference of energy and matter. And thus the same objection would reappear here! Moreover, if you use this one word to cover two entirely different types of qualitative change, why bother using it? That would be like using the word "murder" to cover all deaths. In that case, we would need other terms to distinguish the different kinds of "murder" there would be, and we'd be back at square one. And since subsequent Marxists have used this sort of 'nodal' change as an analogy for the transition between different modes of production (or state forms), then that might mean that there would be no need for a revolution, since the said transition from capitalism to socialism could be nice and smooth, like the melting of metal, plastic, glass, butter, and chocolate. Marxists need a node that is rapid ot of short duration. This slow one is no use. That takes care of this comment of yours (since your use of this word could mean that the transition to socialism might well be gradual): You are, in my opinion, wrong to assume that Engels, for instance, attempted to set up a different law from that of the actually existing law of phase change. I think Engels saw the two as identical, except of course, that the most important result of this outlook, is that significant political change also happens nodally - not gradually in this case. E.g. the ruling class will not gradually give up their hold on society. This of course is the real significance and sphere of application of dialectics. Which is just one more reason to reject this mystical theory. [And if truth is tested in practice, history has refuted dialectics!] So, there are good reasons for not following you in your attempt to blur a real distinction in nature with the use of one word to cover different types of change. You are of course aware that in dialectics the terms "contradictioni" "opposite" "negation", and so forth, as Fichte explained, have a special meaning, not in terms of logical opposites e.g. black and white, but as in terms of something very "other". You object that this is too vague to be a science, but I think it should not be compared in this way, and was not intended to be compared in this way by Marx and Engels, but on the contrary, to be put on a materialist basis, meaning, to reflect science, not surplant it. Yes, I have devoted a 20,000 word Essay at my site to pulling this Hegelian myth apart (or rather, myth put about by German Idealists). [And 'black' and 'white' are not logical opposites; I presunse you mean that the predicables "x is black" and "x is white " are? Well they aren't either! Even Aristotle was wise to that one!] Hegel's use of these terms is based on a series crass logical errors over the nature of the 'law of identity' (which dialecticians have not questioned since, but have meekly swallowed -- since, in my experienc, few of them know much logic (and even less, modern logic)), analysed fully at my site. These errors provided him with the rationale behind his belief in universality of 'contradictions', and thus the motive force of history and nature (as he saw it). Engels, knowing even less logic than Hegel, fell for this, gave it an alleged materialist flip (to put it back on its feet, etc.), and began forcing these bogus ideas onto nature and society. I suspect Marx too fell for this, but the evidence is less damning in his case. This means that the whole of the 'Marxist' dialectic is based on series of sub-Aristotelian logical blunders, whether it is used to depict nature or the class struggle. The fact that electrons behave nodally supports the view that phase change as a concept is correct, and since Hegel and Engels were doing no more than noting the science of phase change in their own language of "quantity into quality and vice versa" it validates dialectics against gradualism. I do not deny there are nodal changes in nature. But, since electrons are simple 'objects', they cannot change because of their 'internal contradictions'. I note you are only seeking 'validation' of dialectics, ignoring cases where it just does not work (or 're-defining' words to make things fit). This is not science it is dogmatics. Rosa Lichtenstein 15:09, 14 June 2007 (UTC) Hi Rosa, You are of course right that dialectics is not science. But, as I said before, I think you attempt to treat it as if believes that it is. And again, as I said before, certainly, Hegel beleived he could supplant science, and you are quite right, it is true of some of our contemporaries, who beleive they are following "dialectical materialism" which you mercilessly criticise. But Marx and Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, found that dialectics was a useful tool in understanding development and change, but not as a law imposed upon nature or society, but as a method to help uncover the threads of factual reality. But in my opinion you have not grasped the points I made above, for instance in relation to the historical discovery in science of "motion" contemporary with Engels and his subsequent use of the term, or my points in relation to phase change, (I really don't think you can deny nodal points in phase change unles you define nodal points only in terms of a time parameter, as I said before), and all I could do would be to reiterate those same points in reply to your points and that would waste your time and mine. I'm afraid I don't really feel you have grasped what real dialectics, as I understand it, is about, and I'm disappointed I failed to make it clear, but we must I suppose agree to disagree on this. It has been an interesting exchange, but I guess it would be pointless to sustain it any further. Andysoh 22:43, 14 June 2007 (UTC)

George Orwell

While I agree that doublethink is not a dialectic, I would argue that it is the absence of a dialectic - the elimination of the ability for people to think of things other than the mainstream. To me, 1984 was about breaking the historical cycle, leading to the stagnation and eventual death of society as we know it. For example, if in a country there were very weak exective powers and a strong parliament, then it might be very difficult to react quickly enough to situations where time is short. After such an event, people might change their government to have stronger exective powers (etc.). In 1984, there would be no reaction, no change, and no dialectic. So I would say that 1984 is actually about how crucial a dialectic is to a living society. --Ignignot 16:12, 21 November 2005 (UTC)

Orwell's 1984 shows what could be the result of a widespread controlled dialectic. This would be the desired end result such controllers presumably would seek. Problem, Reaction, Solution is the method used to bring about further control or other desired result that would in any other situation be completely unacceptable to the general population, e.g. loss of liberty, privacy invasion, war. --Shink X 19:07, 17 June 2007 (UTC)

HIndu and Buddhist Dialectics

Whoever has written about hindu and buddhist dialectics, seems to have a little knowledge about various forms of dialectics. Hindu and buddist persepctives are full of dialectics some of which are similar to synthetic(hegelian) and others are totally different. One needs to see closely how Nagarjuna and Shankara championed negative and synthetic dialectics so as to develop the notion of Shunyata and Brahman/Atman. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.7.248.130 (talk) 06:06, 4 October 2007 (UTC)

Re: (The Essence of Buddhism in its original form possesses a rational core, and most of the elements of dialectics were present in it, but they were present only in Theravāda Buddhism presently practiced in Thailand, Burma and Sri Lanka, similar to the early Greek philosophies. This represented the first faltering steps of dialectical philosophy). This is a gross miskate, and an attempt to subordinate Eastern logics under the Western/Greek logocentrism. There are more differences than similarities.

Buddhistic Dialectic

Apparently, the sub-entry just relates what Engels thought he understood of it. That is POV and should be marked as such. Engels is not an authority on the matter. -- ZZ 19:16, 15 June 2006 (UTC)

That's pretty pointless. ALL citations on controversial issues are POV, because obviously everybody has an opinion on nearly anything. The NPOV stance does not apply to citations, it applies to the Wikipedians. We should try to be objective, not the sources, so there is really nothing gained by indiscriminately tagging articles where both sides of an inconclusive argument are exhibited. --84.186.249.142 02:56, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree with the statement about the buddhist dialectic, but did Engel's really state such a thing? If so where? Somehow I'm skeptical. Is there an actual citation for this somewhere?

Regardless of whether Engles is an aithority on anything, the entire section fails utterly to convey the notion of dialectic in Buddhist training.

"Elements of dialectics are found in Buddhism, Engels explains. The Buddhist doctrine was argued in a highly consistent and logical way in the 2nd century by Nagarjuna, whose rationalism became the basis for the development of Buddhist logic. The logic of Buddhism was later developed by other notable thinkers such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti (between 500 and 700). This laid the basis for later idealist schools such as Madhyamaka, Vijnanavada, and Tantric Buddhism."

This entire paragraph is simply silly and wrong.

To begin, Nagarjuna is the founder of what we call Madhyamaka (English: Middle Way), which was extensively developed by the others referenced above, and by Chandrakirti who isn't even mentioned. The entire point of Madhyamaka is not to prove something, but to show that all conceptual explanations of reality fail because they fall into the trap of duality. Madhyamaka is a skillful means (Skt: upaya) to move the practioner beyond mental fabrications. In Tibet, and in Tibetan schools in the west, it is practiced as a form of debate. (In the Zen tradition, koans are a form of upaya.)The purpose of such activities is not philosophical games, but deep penetration into the false assumptions we all make about what is real, and to liberate our minds from making mistakes that cause suffering to ourselves and others. Without complete confidence that the purpose of discussion within a Buddhist context is to free our minds rather than to arive at a verbal "truth," one will not understand much.

I have seen a bumper sticker that reads, "You don't have to believe everything you think." This is so much more profound than the attempts to misunderstand Buddhism as some sort of rational philosophical school, that it should give one pause before saying more. If we could understand this, how many silly discussions and brutal wars could be avoided!

Somewhat as an aside, no Buddhist school has ever adopted a view which amounts to "idealism."

As a Trotskyist, my devotion to Engels and Marx is comparable to a cultist's dedication to his cult. However I am not yet fully blind and realize that Engels is indeed not an expert on Buddhism, thus if his opinion on Buddhist dialectics is the only thing that says that it existed. Then clearly there may not be such a thing as Buddhist dialectics in the first place. Although it does make some sense, that Buddhism is tied to dialectic thought. Have any Buddhists validated this claim perhaps? (Demigod Ron 04:21, 1 November 2007 (UTC))