Talk:Big Wing

This article was obviously rated before the standards were strengthened. This is also one of the most lop-sided non-neutral POV articles in the entire aviation project.--Reedmalloy (talk) 19:16, 10 December 2011 (UTC)

It's more like an opinion piece than an article. It has no inline citations. It's an embarrassment. Richard75 (talk) 23:36, 7 August 2020 (UTC) From everything I've read and heard on the subject (from both sides) I think the current article reflects precisely the political battle between 11 Group and 12 Group leadership, tactics, squabbles and power struggle. The problem is, it really doesn't fit quite so well with the historical narrative where "The Few" were all pulling together (in quite the way would have liked to believe). After the war, Adolf Galland was pretty matey with Barder, but stated Park / Dowding tactics were the ones that confused / disillusioned the Luftwaffe (while 12 Group were dicking about doing their own thing) rather than concentrating on simply protecting 11 Group airfields. George "Grumpy" Unwin even attested to 11 Group's airfield devastation. The ones 12 Group were supposed to have been protecting. It clearly sucked having to play second fiddle to the stretched 11 Group.

Sir Hugh "Stuffy" Dowding and Balbo.

It is accepted knowledge that Sir Keith Park was following the opinions of Sir Hugh Dowding on the negation of the implementation of "Big Wing" tactics during the Battle of Britain! Sir Keith Park had been appointed over Leigh-Mallory as commander of 11 group for this reason, something Leigh-Mallory was never to forgive. To say that Sir Keith Park was solely responsible for not implementing "Big Wings" during The Battle of Britain is untrue. 81.148.30.228

The Battle of Britain, James Holland. p472-481 (extremely important and relevant to the fact that Park was following the Dowding system in rejecting the "Big Wings"!

Dowding and Park were right, and Leigh-Mallory and Bader were wrong, and Dowding should have fired them or removed them from command for insubordination and failing to follow orders at a time of great peril for the country.

The whole point of Fighter Command was the protection of Britain's means of war production from attack from the air, and by neglecting this important fact the latter two were putting at jeopardy Britain's means of continuing the war. At the time there was only one factory in Derby producing the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine (on which Fighter Command depended) and one factory in Enfield producing the Bren gun, most of the British Army's stocks of-which had been recently left behind at Dunkirk, as had almost the army's entire stocks of tanks and other vehicles.

... shooting German aircraft down after they had successfully bombed and destroyed Britain's means to fight back, e.g., the airfields, the factories producing munitions, etc., was too late. That was the difference between strategy, and tactics. Park understood this, and could see the big picture, as did Dowding; Leigh-Mallory and Bader didn't, and it appears, couldn't.

... Leigh-Mallory was to repeat this failing in 1944 at the time of the Battle for Caen when he complained about Montgomery 'failing to capture' ground for his (Leigh-Mallory's) 2nd TAF airfields, thus seeming to forget the fact that his aircraft were there mainly to support Montgomery's ground forces - not the other way round. Montgomery had deliberately avoided capturing the ground Leigh-Mallory wanted because Montgomery didn't need the additional air support the airfields would provide, and he didn't consider the loss of Allied lives that taking the ground would entail worthwhile. Nor did he at any time complain about the quality of the air support he was being provided with. On the contrary, he had nothing but praise for it, thus not supplying any justification Leigh-Mallory might have had for complaining in the first place.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.42 (talk) 13:49, 8 March 2019 (UTC)

Mallory and Park

Mallory was senior to Park and was put in charge of 12 Group because it was thought most likely to be the attack route for raids from Germany - this was before the invasion of Belgium/Holland and the fall of France allowed access to airfields much closer and to the south.

Once it became clear that 11 Group was to be central to the defence, Mallory desperately wanted to take over 11 Group, but of course by then it became clear that Park was fully in agreement with the aims of the Dowding System, and despite being junior to Mallory, was (luckily) left in place. 49.195.28.135 (talk) 02:39, 20 September 2016 (UTC)

References

Big Wing and RAF Fighter tactics.

The relatively inflexible fighter tactics of the RAF would have been an additional problem for the "Big Wing".

• It is rather difficult to keep a three plane "Vic" together in the chaos of battle, even in small formations.
• German fighter pilots used the more flexible, "finger four" formation, consisting of two groups of two, which ensured that there were fewer "lone planes".

The Big Wing Formation required more training and coordination than smaller, squadron-sized units. An issue, given the low numbers of flying hours of RAF fighter pilots.

Source: Battlefield Series 1, Episode 2: Battle of Britain.--95.222.186.244 (talk) 03:36, 8 January 2017 (UTC)

I always understood that the 'Big Wing' was a concept put forward and tested before the battle by Keith Park even if he didn't use that term, but in his evaluation it would not be effective for 11 Group, and that certainly initially 12 group would have been more helpful arriving earlier to help his overstretched group. Unfortunately I can't find the source for this at present. I will keep looking.

Adolf Galland comments

After WWII German Ace Adolf Galland comments regarding the Dowding v. Mallory's Big Wing tactic were pretty clear. He stated that one of the things that frustrated the German's campaign was the illusiveness of 11 group and the obvious organization of Park's jump tactic. He stated that the Luftwaffe would have been better able to deal with a mass of Spitfires at higher altitude. A 1970's tape recorded interview with George "Grumpy" Unwin 12 Group stated that most of his fellow pilots were scared to take their alternative Sunday off "in case they missed something" also stated they could not understand why the groups were not rotated to give No 11 group a rest. It's pretty obvious that there were far more grubby politics going on with "The Few" than the propaganda and popular historians care to let on. Sadly history books still love to regurgitate the Churchill (PR) narrative rather than the more grubby facts on the matter. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 109.152.28.224 (talk) 19:22, 13 February 2021 (UTC)

Not very balanced

Other commentators on this thread have, rightly, pointed out that this article is heavily biased. No account is taken of the fact that 12 Group assistance was often requested too late. The Duxford Wing did not waste time and fuel "forming up" as many claim or assume. The three Hurricane Squadrons were scrambled from Duxford and immediately set course on their given vector, lead by Bader. The two Spitfire squadrons from the satellite airfield at RAF Fowlmere were instructed to catch up. The main reason the Wing did not often successfully intercept was because of being called late and then not being properly vectored. At the very least, this article should acknowledge that there is an alternative to the generally accepted and inaccurate narrative that 12 Group failed. Also, this piece falls into the trap that Dowding was somehow sacked as AOC-in-C, Fighter Command. He was in fact already over normal retirement age and had twice been extended in post by his boss, Chief of Air Staff, ACM Sir Cyril Newall. The date he was to leave was made clear in a letter from Newall in July 1940 when he was further extended. That there were political machinations to discredit him, claiming he had not mounted an effective defence against night time bombing raids is undoubtedly true. But this was more a ploy by Sholto Douglas to ensure he was not further extended. The criticism of Park by Leigh-Mallory and Sholto Douglas, both of whom had the ear of senior Air Ministry personnel, had much more relevance in his being relieved as AOC 11 Group. Kenstan2 (talk) 05:11, 19 November 2024 (UTC)