Talk:Battle of Waterloo/Archive 13

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A few comments on the article

Drawing of wounded from the battle, by Charles Bell

I have translated this article into Wikipedia in Norwegian Bokmål/Riksmål and I have a few comments that may improve it.

First, this section seems to repeat what has been said above it:

D'Erlon's men ascended the slope and advanced on the sunken road, Chemin d'Ohain, that ran from behind La Haye Sainte and continued east. It was lined on both sides by thick hedges, with Bylandt's brigade just across the road while the British brigades had been lying down some 100 yards back from the road, Pack's to Bylandt's left and Kempt's to Bylandt's right. Kempt's 1,900 men were engaged by Bourgeois' brigade of 1,900 men of Quiot's division. In the center, Donzelot's division had pushed back the Bylandt. On the right of the French advance was Marcognet's division lead by Grenier's brigade consisting of the 45e Régiment de Ligne and followed by the 25e Régiment de Ligne, somewhat less than 2,000 men, and behind them, Nogue's brigade of the 21e and 45e regiments. Opposing them on the other side of the road was Pack's 9th Brigade consisting of three Scottish regiments: the Royal Scots, the 42nd Black Watch, the 92nd Gordons and the 44th Foot totaling something over 2,000 men. A very even fight between British and French infantry was about to occur.

Second, not much about the wounded and dead, I organized that into a separate section and also added a drawing by Charles Bell.

Third, I added a section covering the various myths and such about the battle, that it never was fought at Waterloo, that Wellington's army (even without Blücher's men) had more German soldiers that British, so one might say it was more of a German victory, etc. Ulflarsen (talk) 17:44, 15 June 2015 (UTC)

Bylandt's brigade in part was still in line with Picton's brigades when the close quarters fighting started.... Bijlandt himself receiving a bayonet would in his thigh.68.235.53.15 (talk) 02:01, 16 September 2016 (UTC)

In regards to one can you be more specific by providing two snippets of two or three sentences above the paragraph and from the paragraph you have provided which you think are repeats?

in regards to the second this article is very large. I suggest that you write a detailed article and then add a sentence to this article (summary style).

As to the third, don't go there! This is a very well known argument and it depends on how you divvy up the numbers and is by and large a stale argument. Just as one example did the Gurkha's participation in the Falklands War mean that Nepal was one of the victors of the war? The KLG was integrated into the British Army, the Hanoverian's were from a country in a personal union with the British and in part officered by Britons. The other German forces present in the Allied army were either closely tied to the British or to the Dutch. This should come as no surprise as other German formations not closely tied to the British or the Dutch can be found in other Seventh Coalition armies and corps (See Military mobilisation during the Hundred Days German Corps (North German Federal Army) IV Corps (Bavarian Army in the Austro-German Army (Army of the Upper Rhine)).

Two recent articles that discuss this:

• Brendan Simms, 30 October 2014 What the Battle of Waterloo teaches us about Europe today, NewStatesman
• Richard Norton-Taylor, 9 June 2015 Waterloo: A German victory? The Guardian blog.

Simms states that:

The claim that Waterloo was a “German victory” was first made by the Prussian historian Julius Pflugk-Hartung before and during the First World War. He argued that the campaign was “a victory of Germanic strength over French rascality, in particular a success of the German people”.

This was elaborated on by Peter Hofschröer in a series of important but controversial works....

We can in fact say that Waterloo was a “European” rather than a “British” or “German” victory. Thirty-six per cent of the troops in Wellington’s army were British (that is English, Irish, Welsh or Scottish), 10 per cent were King’s German Legion, 10 per cent were Nassauers, 8 per cent were Brunswickers, 17 per cent were Hanoverian regular army, 13 per cent were Dutch and 6 per cent “Belgian” (Walloons and Flemings). In the recent words of the D-Day veteran and former British chief of the defence staff Field Marshal Lord Bramall, Waterloo was truly “the first Nato operation”.

I recently came across this:

In military terms, the last word on Waterloo should, perhaps be left to Napoleon himself, since they indicate a radically different perspective from that which he had expressed the Soult and Reille at breakfast. During his flight to Paris his old friend Count Flahaut asked whether he was surprised by the outcome of the battle. 'No,' replied the Emperor, with a shrug. 'it has been the same thing since Crécy.'

— Bryan Perrett

• Perrett, Bryan (11 October 2012). The Changing Face Of Battle. Orion. p. 276. ISBN 978-1-78022-525-8.

-- PBS (talk) 10:58, 16 June 2015 (UTC)

Waterloo as the 'first NATO operation' is a fantastic stretch. Europe was always shifting alliances and coalitions in their endless wars amongst themselves/tribes for thousands of years... 02:01, 16 September 2016 (UTC)68.235.53.15 (talk). The Roman army

Hougoumont 'Eventually they were relieved by the 71st Foot, a British infantry regiment. Adam's brigade was further reinforced' I couldn't find a previous mention of Adam in the article, so think that this has to be clarified Labocetta (talk) 16:42, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

Reply to PBS: As for my first point I found it and changed it after I translated the text in total from this article, the text that it overlap with is before the part I copied here.

Regarding your comment about the second: I agree the article is long, but as long as the introduction is good I do not think it is a problem that we have long articles, provided there is a basis for it. I guess most people read the introduction and that's it, the rest is either for the one with special interest, or the one that jump to some section. I did this in the article in Norwegian Bokmål/Riksmål (added a section about wounded/dead) but is is only a suggestion, I will not translate that back to English.

Regarding the third: The main "players" were Napoleon, Wellington and Blücher, and everyone with some knowledge of military systems know that "the big guys" run the game. In that respect is is right that we view the victory as British, with German assistance. But, it is very clear that the bulk of the soldiers were German, the articles you point to also state that, and numerous other sources, like John Keegan in The Face of Battle and recently Tim Clayton in Waterloo. When it comes to Hanover, that was a personal union, and as a Norwegian I know a bit about that as we were united with Sweden in such an arrangement from 1814 to 1905. That personal union did not change the nature of the two nations, they were still Swedish and Norwegian.

So I think this road is indeed needed, that is to mention that the British, even without Blücher, was a minority within Wellington's force, because most people think it's not that way. This does not change the fact that Wellington was the "organizer of Napoleon's defeat" and that Blücher was his main supporter in that, so to say. Anyway, I think this is as far as I will venture on this topic. I mainly contribute to Wikipedia in the Norwegian version in Bokmål/Riksmål and I only posted the comment here as I found out while translating. And for the record, I am a pure amateur in this, I have no background in the field and had to read up on it. Ulflarsen (talk) 20:02, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

The article states "Decisive Coalition victory" and the number of troop from each of states that contributed to the allied army are listed as are the total number of Prussians in the battle box, there is nothing in the article that states it was a British or German victory (this fits with guidance in WP:ASSERT or "let the facts speak for themselves"). -- PBS (talk) 23:42, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

I agree that we should use words like "Coalition Victory", but I am not so confident of the phrase "Anglo-allied army". I would like to change this label to "Coalition army", since the Anglo's in that formation made up only 36% of the total. This correction can be implemented quickly and easily, and will make the article more accurate and less Anglocentric. Any objections? Wdford (talk) 15:43, 31 July 2015 (UTC)

Yes, your views are not relevant when English-language sources overwhelmingly use the term "Anglo-allied". The English-language Wikipedia has to follow the precedent of usage in English-language sources. Also your view is not accurate. Wellington's army was not the same as the Prussian army, and the Austrians and Russians were also part of the Coalition, but their forces were not present. Therefore Wellington's army was no more a "Coalition army" than Bluecher's was. Wellington's army was an army of those states within the coalition that had agreed to place their forces under his control. Bluecher's army had initially incorporated troops from Saxony, but it has never been called a "Coalition army". Urselius (talk) 19:59, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Calling Waterloo a "German victory" is akin to describing the First World War One as an "American victory". Certainly,the Prussians were the freshest and most powerful players remaining on the field, but their late arrival and relatively low casualty figures illustrate clearly that the bulk of the efoort had taken place elsewhere. Moreover, if the campaign is considered as a whole, it is hard to overlook the fact that both Ligny and Wavre were significant defeats which were only prevented from becoming disasters by the existence of the other allied armies. All in all, it's best not to rewrite history; they generally got it right at the time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.199.236.86 (talk) 20:31, 4 February 2016 (UTC)

If this is what you learned at school, then it’s clearly important that history be corrected urgently.

It is widely accepted that Wellington was going down fast, and he himself admitted that that he would not have survived much longer without Prussian support. Proper generals don’t measure their “effort” in terms of how many of their own men they managed to sacrifice – that is a largely British phenomenon. In terms of actual results, the Prussians rescued Wellington at Waterloo, and without them he was doomed, British jingoism notwithstanding.

Ligny was not a "significant defeat", it was an orderly withdrawal in the face of a dominant enemy. There was no other "allied army" involved to help them, and in fact the whole Ligny reversal was due to Wellington promising to send Allied support and then failing to do so. The Prussians withdrew in good order and were battle-ready again within hours – very far from a disaster.

Wavre wasn’t even a defeat as such – the Prussian objective was to divert a chunk of the French army away from Waterloo and to keep them from intervening – all of which they accomplished with total success despite being heavily outnumbered. The French (and English) happily trumpeted a Prussian defeat at Wavre, but in reality Thielmann only yielded the field when he knew that the objectives had been achieved and that no further benefit would be gained by incurring further casualties. The French found out as well a few minutes later, and promptly yielded the field in turn, so to describe Wavre as a significant defeat bordering on disaster is utter BS.

Secondly, it is a fact that England would have lost WW1 had the USA not intervened when they did on the Allied side. Similarly, Britain likes to claim that they won WW2, although Britain’s role was largely to start the war, and then to get kicked up and down for two years until Hitler grew complacent and declared war on Russia and the USA, who then defeated him. There is a lot of pro-British propaganda in encyclopedias masquerading as "history", including on Wikipedia, and therefore "history" needs to be corrected where necessary. Wdford (talk) 10:48, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

You seem to be unaware that Wellington would not have made a stand at Waterloo if the Prussians had not made the commitment to send at least one corps to his aid. No Prussians, no Battle of Waterloo! Ligny was a defeat for the Prussians, not as extensive as Napoleon thought, but still a defeat. When you are defending a position and that position is overrun, it is a defeat. That your commander-in-chief is knocked off his horse and ridden over by a cavalry charge just underlines that you have suffered a defeat. My grandfather, a British soldier, was gassed on the Western Front - he survived but died prematurely due to his lungs never fully recovering. Be very careful when you denigrate the sacrifices of others. The French had many more troops on the ground in WWI than the British, and the American contingent was smaller by far than either of the preceding, and fought for a very short time. Had the fighting continued for longer the American contribution might have been decisive, but as the Germans folded after their last-gasp offensive the Americans were useful, but not essential for the Allied victory. You also seem unaware that Hitler offered Britain very good terms for a ceasefire and peace in 1940. In Hitler's view Germany and Britain were "twin Germanic powers", and if Britain had given Germany a free hand in Europe, Germany would have been content to support the continuation and even aggrandisement of the British overseas empire and sea-power. That Britain took the heroic view that standing alone against Hitler's Germany was preferable is the reason that the West is relatively free today. Urselius (talk) 19:20, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

I am well aware that Wellington would not have made a stand at Waterloo if the Prussians had not made the commitment to help him – a singular point in favor of the importance of the Prussian role, yes? Similarly, Blucher would not have committed to the battle at Ligny were it not for Wellington’s promise of support – a point you seem to over-look. The difference was that Wellington failed to meet his commitment at Ligny, whereas Blucher retreated from Ligny along a supporting route, and then force-marched his army in impossible conditions to rescue Wellington, despite Wellington letting him down earlier.

My forefathers participated in both World Wars, and while some of them came home physically or psychologically disabled, some of them never came home at all. Britain was not the only country to make sacrifices.

Obviously the French had many more troops on the ground in WWI than the British – the war was fought in France not Britain. The American contingent only arrived late in the war, because it wasn’t their war to begin with, but by the end of the war they numbered about 2 million men. The American Expeditionary Forces were actually a key asset at the Second Battle of the Marne, which broke the hitherto-successful German Spring Offensive and permitted the Allied Hundred Days Offensive that ultimately led to the end of the war.

Hitler regarded Britain as a "Germanic power" partly because the Anglo-Saxons were originally Germanic people, and partly because every English monarch since George I had a German spouse – George VI was allowed to marry a British spouse only because he wasn’t supposed to ever be king. Hitler never wanted war with England – his strategy was to dominate Europe, not England. This extended to letting the British Army off the hook at Dunkirk when he could have crushed them easily.

Britain did not take a "heroic view" to protect global freedom – that is blatant British propaganda. Churchill wanted a war with Germany to protect Britain’s interests as a global power. We can see the true extent of Britain’s commitment to global freedom in the way they followed in America’s wake across the Pacific campaign, re-imposing British imperial oppression on their former colonies as soon as America had liberated them from Japanese imperial oppression. We can see the true extent of Britain’s commitment to global freedom in the way Churchill signed Eastern Europe away to Soviet slavery in the Percentages agreement. We can see the true extent of Britain’s commitment to global freedom in the way Britain participated in carving up the Middle East after the war, including invading Egypt to steal the Suez Canal, and in the way Britain fought to hold on to colonies in the Malayan Emergency up to 1957 and Hong Kong up to 1997. The West is free today because America and the USSR defeated Germany in WW2, and because America then defeated the USSR in the Cold War. The world is relatively free today despite Britain, not thanks to Britain. Wdford (talk) 17:30, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

You have an odd take on history, were you frightened by a Union Jack at an impressionable age? Urselius (talk) 18:59, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Interesting - a diversion away from facts toward an ad hominem attack. When you have a minute, please check out [1] Wdford (talk) 12:51, 8 February 2016 (UTC)

Flippancy, yes, but hardly an ad hominem attack. I resorted to flippancy because historical facts seem to have no impact upon you. For whatever reason, you seem to have an anti-British axe to grind, and this appears to be the driving force behind your proposed edits to this article. Your last distortion of fact just left me incredulous. If Britain had taken up Hitler's offer of peace in 1940, which all evidence points to having been genuine, a number of things would have happened, or not happened. A neutral or German-aligned Britain would have allowed Hitler a free hand to concentrate all his forces against the USSR. I doubt that the USA would ever have declared war on Germany. Any Japanese aggression would have not been against British possessions in the Far East (as Germany would have objected) and the Pacific War would have been an entirely Japan versus the USA affair. The world would have been a far different place today. Urselius (talk) 14:05, 8 February 2016 (UTC)

I have no axe to grind generally, but I am opposed to the profusion of propaganda that infests so-called "history". Britain just happens to be a major culprit in that process – probably because many historians are/were British, and because history is written by the victors - and by their junior allies. I believe Churchill even got a Nobel Prize for Literature, for his semi-fictional opus on "history as he thought it ought to have been".

As regards this particular article, English children are seemingly still taught that Britain won the Battle of Waterloo and thus saved the world from French conquest and oppression. Firstly this is patently false – if anybody beat Napoleon at Waterloo it was the Prussians. And had the Prussians not been there to back him up, Wellington would have stayed out of Napoleon's way completely until the Prussians or the Russians or the Austrians arrived to help him, and that war might have ended very differently indeed. Second, while Britain was supposedly "saving" people from French conquest and oppression, they were themselves busy conquering and oppressing everything they could get their hands on – often in direct competition with France. The war against Napoleon - like the war against Hitler - was about British self-interest, and had nothing to do with protecting freedom.

A bit off topic, but since it has come up - if Britain had taken up Hitler's offer of peace in 1940, Hitler would have invaded Iraq etc eventually to secure an oil supply. Britain would have declared war on Germany eventually, to hold on to its vital colonies, which is why Churchill wanted war earlier rather than later. Hitler may or may not have attacked the USSR at some point, but if it happened without Britain and the USA in the war already and able to build up the USSR, Germany would probably have driven the under-equipped Soviets back beyond the Urals, and then stopped. We might at least have been spared the Cold War, which I’m sure the people of Eastern Europe would have appreciated, although living under Hitler would not have been ideal either. Japan was always going to have a war – like Britain they were an island of traders with limited natural resources of their own, so like Britain they needed to conquer an empire of colonies to be able to loot the natural resources they needed. However Britain had already stolen all the good colonies in Asia, so a Japanese war with Britain was inevitable. They attacked the USA first – partly because they would need to grab the Philippines eventually, which was basically an American colony, and largely because the USA was already helping Britain against Germany and they feared the USA would help Britain against them too. Without a war in Europe, the Pacific campaign would probably have gone much as it did, although with different timing, and with no Pearl Harbor attack, and initially at least it would have focused on Britain and the other European colonial powers then present is Asia - most of whom were already under Hitler's occupation and unable to protect their colonies anyway. The USA might have chosen to stay out of it, in line with their preferred neutrality stance, but odds are they would have bumped heads eventually as well. Germany had no influence over Japanese foreign policy. However they did have many common enemies, and they would probably have welcomed each other’s attacks on the common enemies at opposite ends of the planet. For Japan to drag Britain into a war at the other end of the world just as Hitler was taking aim at Iraq, would have suited Hitler just fine. Wdford (talk) 11:39, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

Can I suggest that all this speculative discussion, fascinating as it may be, might take place somewhere other than the talk page for this Wikipedia article? Except insofar as it relates to any proposed changes to this article. W. P. Uzer (talk) 11:57, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I have nothing more to say to you on this matter, but I will oppose any edits you make which push your particular agenda. I have checked your talk page and much of it seems to consist of strategies designed to win edit wars. I have better things to do, like actually writing quality content backed by relevant references. Urselius (talk) 11:59, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

My "agenda" is only to improve neutrality in these articles, and that includes removing blatant propaganda where it still persists. While you are busy with writing quality content, please do also take note of [2] as well. Wdford (talk) 12:25, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

Every few years somebody comes along to wikipedia who has only just read Hofschroer, and imagines him to be the last word and the final authority on the battle of Waterloo.

The problems with Hofschroer's various claims are as follows:

- he fails to justify the term "German" which was at the time mainly a geographical expression. He considers as German anyone who spoke German, which in 1815 included people in eastern France, southern Denmark, eastern Poland and most of Austria. Most of these Germans either weren't represented or were on the French side;

- he asserts that Waterloo is perceived as a British victory but does not cite a single source that says this;

- he doesn't set out a basis for measuring relative contributions to the outcome, other than distance marched (without noting that the direction of most German marching was away from the enemy, in retreat) and headcount. "Germans" lost every battle they fought alone in the Hundred Days, however, and won only when Wellington was present; Wellington won all his battles. This argues that Wellington's was the decisive presence. If headcount determined victory, we would have to conclude that all Rommel's victories in 1941-1942 were Italian victories;

- at Waterloo Wellington's 67,000 defeated 59,000 French including almost all its elite units. Blucher defeated just 10,000 French with 50,000 men and Thielmann was himself defeated by Grouchy. If it's all about headcount, it looks like a Wellington win again on the basis that his was the army that defeated the most French.

I would urge you to read more than one book on this subject or at least to treat Hofschroer's claims with the appropriate neutrality. He's not the consensus and he isn't really respectable. Tirailleur (talk) 13:36, 17 June 2016 (UTC)

My calculations of French opposition to Blucher's attack of 50,000 men at Waterloo is more telling and factual; Lobau's 6th corps around 9000 troops including gunners - the Young Guard 8 battalions around 4000 troops - 2 Old Guard battalions add 1,000 soldiers. Several light cavalty brigades another 2000 troopers. Let's also add a brigade of Durette's division - another 4000 soldiers. - total of 20k committed French troops. Indirectly Napoleon held back his Old Guard as a strategic reserve upon seeing his right flank ready to collapse. Thus close to 30% of Napoleon's force drawn away from Wellington's battle-line to face Blucher's attack. 68.235.53.15 (talk) 02:01, 16 September 2016 (UTC)

WP:NOTAFORUM

" ... invading Egypt to steal the Suez Canal ..." - actually the Suez Canal was French and British property which they had paid for, as was a strip of land on either side of the canal. This was then stolen by Nasser's government when they nationalised it without compensation to the French and British owners. In other words it was theft on the part of the Egyptian Government. And Nasser's government itself was the result of an illegal coup d' etat. Considering how much the British stole from other countries, and how readily they resorted to genocide in the process, the assertion that Britain was entitled to invade Egypt and bombard civilians goes beyond laughable all the way to obscene. When will Britain pay compensation for all the atrocities of the colonial period? Wdford (talk) 16:28, 22 June 2016 (UTC) Exactly...... What hogwash for anyone to really believe a huge important territory inherently central to one nation is really sellable and ethically owned by a foreign bullying power. And also the nationals reclaiming such should be accused of 'theft'?68.235.53.15 (talk) 02:01, 16 September 2016 (UTC) BTW, Hitler's invasion of Poland was also illegal under International Law, which is why France and Britain voluntarily went to war with Nazi Germany in 1939. Neither the USSR nor the US did any such thing, instead they either joined Hitler in carving up Poland on the one hand - until they themselves were invaded, or waited until they were attacked by Japan on the other. Two rather salient facts that are noticeably absent in some 'Mickey Mouse' histories originating from those two countries. France and Britain did not go to war with Germany over Poland - that was just their excuse. Sort of like the "weapons of mass destruction" excuse that was used to invade Iraq. The real reason was to put a halt to the rise in German power, as Germany was their most serious competitor in Europe. Britain did nothing to protect Poland from the USSR after the fall of Hitler, and in fact Churchill engaged with Stalin in the Percentages Agreement, which sold eastern Europe into Soviet slavery for forty years. The USSR and the USA stayed out of the war until they were themselves attacked - not because of feelings about Poland, but because they were not war-mongers like Churchill, and they knew that a global war would kill tens of millions of people. Wdford (talk) 16:28, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

In fact the Soviets entered the war shortly after their odd-Nazi allies attacked Poland to start off WW2 - re: the 1939 Nazi-Soviet /Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Russians swooped into eastern Poland a month later if I recall; Nazis and Soviets having made their secret arrangements together to carve up Eastern Europe as buffer zones between them.The USA was heavily supporting the British Empire with vast equipment/ war material needs - yet secretly prepared for a British collapse too. USSR and USA were indeed war-mongers - both had their far-reaching empires- the Soviets particularly moving on Finland with much fury. The USA readying for war with the Japanese in the Pacific. Stalin didn't care about killing millions of people; his tally of murders likely stretched beyond 20 million. My claim is all Empires are inherently criminal and evil no matter the nation evolved from; they all invade and destroy cultural independence of any resistance; and the leaders all make up lies and slanders for invading a non-threatening nation merely for ulterior motives based on greed or to deny a rival empire's stake on a region.Britain's war with Napoleon was their mastermind plan to expand their own world domination empire goals - and within 100 years of Waterloo the British Empire incorporated around 25% of the world's territory - they were not invited to colonize, but marched in with gunboat diplomacy and brown besses and martini-henry rifles in every aggressive intrusion.68.235.53.15 (talk) 02:01, 16 September 2016 (UTC)

... and Blucher's contribution to Waterloo may well have been crucial. But the point people often miss is that either way, Wellington (and the British) wasn't going to go away if the battle had been lost - or not fought at all - due to Blucher's absence. You see, if Blucher had not been able to make a contribution, then knowing this, Wellington would have done something different.

Of course Wellington would have avoided fighting Napoleon on his own - without the Prussians engaging half the French army and finally breaking the French flank, Wellington would have been shredded by Napoleon and he knew it. Without the support of the rest of the coalition, Wellington would have kept retreating all the way to Ostend, and then back to England - much like the British Army did in 1940. Similarly, Blucher would not have engaged at Ligny had he not been promised serious British support, but he trusted Wellington and engaged anyway - and Wellington left him dangling. Nice. Kudos to Blucher for upholding the agreement even after his ally had shafted him. Wdford (talk) 16:28, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

I rather suspect that it is much more easy to fulfil a commitment to converge forces when a French army is nipping at the heels of your rearguard, than it is when a French army is between you and your ally. Hofschroer, shows the same greater regard for axe grinding than facts. The general who trails the flank of his army by marching across the front of Marshal Ney is a general who suffers a crushing defeat. Urselius (talk) 16:46, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

Blucher's ineptitude came close to blowing the whole campaign several times. He fought at Ligny with only 60% of his army, a pro-French Corps having mutinied (they didn't get the memo about Germans, clearly) and been sent home and another failing to turn up in time because the vaunted Prussian staff had no idea where it actually was. On ground he chose (that Wellington and Napoleon both thought a gift to the French) Blucher was then thrashed by inferior numbers because the three Corps of his army were unable to support one another. On the 18th he sent the most distant Corps to Wellington's aid rather than the nearest, so they rocked up 3 hours late and in the wrong place. Instead of reinforcing Wellington directly, he allowed 30,000 men to be drawn into street fighting and to be repeatedly thrown back by a third of their numnber. When Prussians finally did go to reinforce the main action, they attacked the Allies instead of the French. The Prussians were, in short, completely owned by the French on every occasion they met them in 1815 unless Wellington was on the field. In 1806 to 1814, and indeed even in 1813-14, it was the same story; to beat French armies of 15-year-old conscripts with no cavalry, the Prussians needed either a more effective ally (usually the Russians), or superior numbers, but ideally both, and even then they still lost 17 out of 27 major engagements.Tirailleur (talk) 17:57, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

What utter tripe. The French armies may have included teenagers, as did all armies of the day, but they were not made up solely of teenagers. In the years before Elba the Prussians were largely under “Allied” command, and were fighting mainly against elite armies commanded by Napoleon himself, while Wellington’s Peninsular Campaign was prosecuted against weaker units under minor generals. Wellington, as usual, relied heavily on non-British allies, and much of the fighting of the Peninsular Campaign was eventually carried out by Spanish units after they changed sides. Wellington, as usual, took the credit.

At Ligny Blucher arrayed his forces over a long front on the understanding that a British Corps would be arriving in support, and by the time Wellington bothered to tell him that the British units were no longer coming as promised, the battle was already lost. Their lines were broken by concentrated attacks on weak points, where the French effectively outnumbered the Prussians – basic doctrine for all armies. About half the Prussian army were militia, who were not trained to stand like cannon-fodder before a powerful attack, and so the Prussians disengaged and retreated in good order, with effective rearguards. The Prussians could and did continue the campaign without a break, which is hardly indicative of a thrashing - so your objectivity here is a bit suspect. Mutinies happen when coalitions are formed by aristocrats without the support of their populations, especially when most of the soldiers had grown up under French rule and had been French soldiers themselves until quite recently. These were not the only allies to let the Prussians down that day.

I don’t know which Corps you think was mislaid, but I suspect this never happened in reality either. If you are perhaps referring to Bulow being absent at Ligny, he was deliberately held in reserve, and he acted accordingly after the battle which allowed the Prussians to regroup faster than Napoleon had anticipated – the fact which won the battle at Waterloo.

Blucher sent the most distant Corps (Bulow) to lead the drive to rescue Wellington, precisely because as the reserve Corps they were fully intact and thus the strongest. They marched through impossible road conditions to reach Wellington that day, including beating off French cavalry attacks, because Blucher did not want to let Wellington down the way Wellington had let him down at Ligny. They only arrived “in the wrong place” if you are a British general wanting more allies to use as cannon-fodder – in actual fact Wellington had been informed in advance that the Prussian intention was to attack on Napoleon’s flank rather than to join Wellington’s existing line. Blucher kept Wellington informed throughout – unlike the way in which Wellington had left Blucher in the dark at Ligny until it was too late. They only arrived “late” if you are a British general praying that “night or the Prussians must come”. In reality their well-planned flank attack diverted much of Napoleon’s reserves, and thus played a major role in ensuring the survival of the British army, so the attack wasn’t really in the wrong place at all, was it?

The street-fighting was essential and unavoidable, because they were fighting over a town – it’s hard to avoid street-fighting when you are trying to capture streets. There were not 30,000 Prussians at Plancenoit until after Pirch arrived, and then the Prussians took the village convincingly and held it. The friendly-fire incident happened because the Nassauers wore uniforms very much like the French, as I’m sure you were well aware. This wasn’t the first Prussian contact – Bulow had been in the battle a long time already before this incident happened.

All in all, your willingness to disregard the facts in order to preserve your POV is not really helpful here. Perhaps you should actually read the articles at some point? Wdford (talk) 19:23, 23 June 2016 (UTC)

Wellington to Ney, "Sorry old chap, I'd love to oblige with a battle, but I have a prior arrangement with Herr Bluecher". Ney in reply, "Ah, disappointing, but I understand, I will just sit my army down here and let you go past". You, Wdford, are the one blinded to reality by bias. Urselius (talk) 19:54, 23 June 2016 (UTC)

Oh please, don't be pathetic. Wellington met with Blucher in person at Brye on the morning of June 16, and so clearly it was not necessary to fight his way through Ney to get there. He then rode from that meeting directly to Quatre Bras, which is only about 6 miles away. Blucher already knew the night before that Bulow wasn't going to reach Ligny in time, and so he asked Wellington for reinforcements. Wellington only had two Corps available, and the rest of his army were not close enough to participate in either battle. The Dutch Corps was already engaged at Quatre Bras by that time, and Wellington had by then already sent serious reinforcements to Quatre Bras, because a lot of them arrived there before he did. Wellington therefore already knew that he didn't have a full Corps left to support Blucher, and he should have told Blucher the truth rather than make promises he knew he couldn't keep. Blucher would then have planned accordingly, and would probably have arrayed differently at Ligny, if he engaged at all. Instead Wellington promised Blucher a full Corps in support, then rode away and never delivered anything at all. Wdford (talk) 22:24, 23 June 2016 (UTC)

There was no Dutch Corps, you are factually as well as interpretatively wrong. The Anglo-allied army was integrated at the corps level, in some instances at the divisional level also. You also credit Wellington with supernatural prescience. At the time he was speaking to Bluecher (incidentally his name should be spelt thus, unless an umlauted 'U' is employed) Wellington could have had no idea of the size of the French force beginning to deploy at Quatre Bras. Also, had Wellington not held Ney at Quatre Bras, and he was only just able to do this by funnelling reinforcements into the fight as they arrived in piecemeal fashion, Ney could have swung around on the rear of Bluecher's position and the Prussian army would have been utterly destroyed, not merely defeated. Urselius (talk) 20:22, 25 June 2016 (UTC)

Urselius: you are wasting your time. Wdford is a 16 year old American anglophobe of Irish ancestry who has infinite time, has read one book about Waterloo that he has not understood properly, and is furious about Wellington's victory (and Haig's, and every other British victory). The author of the book he rlies on is Peter Hofschroer, who is on trial at this moment accused of making 36,000 indecent images of children: http://www.yorkpress.co.uk/news/14597557.Peter_Hofschroer_trial__He_made_life_hell__says_his_brother/

He is the kind of would-be editor who ultimately discredits wikipedia and is the reason why anyone who relies on it in a serious debate makes themselves appear foolish. It really isn't worth it.Tirailleur (talk) 11:06, 6 July 2016 (UTC)

Point taken. I was aware of the previous, vexatious, civil proceedings; anyone claiming to be a historian who resorts to litigation over informed criticism is making themselves an academic laughing stock. I'm glad that I never bought any of his books! Urselius (talk) 19:54, 6 July 2016 (UTC)

We are being trolled and as I have stated at the bottom on the thread I've better things to do. It is obvious he doesn't understand the terrain, movement times for units, or anything else I'd consider as a minimum from a Military Historian. Tirronan (talk) 21:08, 6 July 2016 (UTC)

Indeed, although we should note that Hofschroer, who appears to be the only author our troll has read, has just been convicted of 16 counts relating to his downloading 36,000 pornographic images of children aged 6 to 14. Following the verdict and sentence, we now learn that "Hofschroer claimed he was the victim of conspiracies involving his family, police, public servants, a civil judge and other leading figures...he has been sectioned under mental health legislation in the past...Judge Tony Briggs QC described his defence, in which he tried to blame many other people including his own family for the illegal images, as “quite outrageous”...Hofschroer was arrested at York Magistrates Court...when he arrived to start a private prosecution alleging kidnap and other crimes against three of his relatives, whom he had harassed them through the civil courts...Leeds County Court had declared Hofschroer a “vexatious litigant” because of the many cases he started, and banned him from bringing civil cases for two years...Hofschroer has been made subject to a High Court injunction preventing him from making slanderous or libellous comments about named police employees and has been barred from using a respected national website which gives details about elected people because he was continually posting potentially libellous comments on it. He was also ordered to pay at least £10,000 in libel damages, plus costs to a military historian over comments he had made." (http://www.yorkpress.co.uk/news/14612062.Historian_who_had_36_000_indecent_photos___videos_gets_two_and_a_half_years/) So that is the historian upon whose judgement the claims about "German" victory and Wellington's supposed bad faith are based. He doesn't seem like a useful source to me because he is, frankly, completely loopy.Tirailleur (talk) 08:54, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

As far back as 2008 most people in the know had concluded that he was both mendacious and underhanded - he contacted the employers of people he had had disagreements with on public forums, making accusations, additional to bringing vexatious civil cases over historical analyses that did not match his own - it couldn't have happened to a nicer man. Urselius (talk) 12:54, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

I see that the Dutch are now “Anglo-allied” again, after they did the main business of breaking Ney's momentum at Quatre Bras. It’s interesting to note that it was Dutch commanders directing Dutch troops who saved the day at Quatre Bras, by disregarding Wellington’s dithering. Had the Dutch obeyed Wellington’s eventual orders, Ney would have taken Quatre Bras without a fight. Yet again, Wellington was saved from a serious judgement error by his allies. It was the same Dutch allies who repelled the last charge of the Guard in the center at Waterloo (under General Chassé), before Zieten broke the French line and ended the battle.

I don’t credit Wellington with supernatural prescience - in fact I don’t even credit Wellington with normal prescience. Was Quatre Bras even worth fighting over at such a level as to leave Blucher exposed in front of the main French force at Ligny? Holding Quatre Bras served no purpose in preventing Ney from attacking Blucher’s flank – d’Erlon had no difficulty in making that march (twice) without any hindrance at all from Wellington, and Blucher only survived Wellington’s mistake because Ney called d’Erlon back against Napoleon’s wishes. Wellington would have been more useful in protecting Blucher’s flank if he had deployed his forces where Blucher planned for them to be – close in on the right flank, which Napoleon rightly perceived to be the weak point, and mutually supporting the various Prussian positions. You cannot protect a flank from a mobile army at six miles remove, and the French were known as a mobile army.

Quatre Bras was evidently worth nothing in protecting Brussels, as Wellington abandoned the crossroads the next morning without hesitation, rather than face d’Erlon in the daylight.

In fact Quatre Bras was only a British victory if you draw the line at nightfall on 16 June. Once again it was a case of “night or the Prussians must come”, and this time Wellington was saved by the nightfall. Starting the following morning Wellington was driven from the area and was driven all the way back to Waterloo, suffering casualties all the way. Wellington took more casualties at Quatre Bras than the French, which is amazing considering he was defending from cover while the French were operating in the open. He yielded the field once it finally dawned on him that Quatre Bras was not worth anything – much as Thielmann did at Wavre once Napoleon was routed at Waterloo. However Quatre Bras was counted by the British historians as a victory, and Wavre was apparently a defeat. The only difference – apart from that one battle involved some British people – was that Wellington withdrew at dawn, while Thielmann had to engage for a few more hours the next day until news arrived from Waterloo that his job was done and that no further casualties were justified.

If we are indulging in “what if” speculation, consider also that “IF” d'Erlon had stayed at Quatre Bras on 16 June then Wellington would have been crushed before sunset, Napoleon would have won the war right there, and Brexit would have happened 200 years earlier than it did. Furthermore “IF” it hadn’t rained hard during Wellington’ retreat from Quatre Bras, Napoleon would have crushed him on the road to Waterloo. Unless you are crediting Wellington with being able to control the weather then, in addition to being blessed with honorable allies, we should ascribe much of his apparent success to dumb luck.

Apart from random speculation, if we stick to what really happened, Wellington committed to provide support and then failed to do so, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of his allies, and almost causing a catastrophe. However when he in turn found himself in an identical situation at Waterloo a few days later, having committed to battle on the assumption of heavy support from his allies, Blucher marched his army hard over impassable terrain and rescued him. By not supporting Blucher at Ligny, Wellington exposed his own army at Quatre Bras to severe peril as well, and he survived at Quatre Bras only because d’Erlon went walkabout on the 16th, and because night fell before d’Erlon arrived back at Quatre Bras, and because Napoleon unaccountably declined to pursue the advantage immediately on the 17th (perhaps the French had been more severely mauled at Ligny than British historians report) and because serious rain on the 17th hindered French attacks on his retreating forces.

However “IF” Blucher had enjoyed the use of an extra corps at Ligny, as promised by Wellington a few hours earlier that very morning, then the threat posed by Ney would have been negated on the slopes of Ligny, and Napoleon’s resurgence would have been ended at Ligny rather than at Waterloo. One wonders “IF” Wellington deliberately postponed Napoleon’s defeat because he would not been able to claim much of the laurels for himself if Napoleon had crashed at Ligny?

Wdford (talk) 12:19, 27 June 2016 (UTC)

WP:NOTAFORUM

... Oh, and another BTW - the largest part of the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II was not in the Pacific as the earlier poster may have been led to believe, but was actually in Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. In these countries they suffered losses greater than everywhere else combined. These losses were inflicted by the British and Indian armies under Bill Slim. The largest part of the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II was in China. The army in Burma, Malaya, and Singapore was mostly an occupation garrison, as the British had already been crushed and humiliated. Slim was a good commander - certainly far better than the grossly-overrated Montgomery - but the battles in Burma in 1944/45 were irrelevant to the outcome of the war, as Japan was effectively already defeated by American and Chinese advances, blockades and bombings - in which Britain was unable to play any discernible role - and was concentrating on the survival of their home islands. This was similar to the Russian "liberation" of Manchuria after the atom bombs - inflicting massive casualties, but making no contribution to the outcome of the war, and aimed purely at seizing territory not liberating the locals. The bulk of the Japanese casualties in Burma were caused by starvation, disease and exhaustion - largely due to the effective American submarine blockade and the Chinese land blockade across their supply lines. Relatively few of their casualties were caused by the Indian Army (and very very few by the British Army), and those that engaged in battles were effectively unarmed due to severe lack of artillery, armor, air support and ammunition. It was typical of Churchill to claim a mighty victory with crushing casualties, when in actual fact most of the Japanese soldiers had already died long before the British got within shooting distance. The British were concentrating on recovering their colonies (stolen by them from the indigenous populations centuries earlier without any compensation), and on restoring the myth that the British Army was still a force to be reckoned with. But happily it was all in vain - once the Asian populations had seen the Great White Generals kneeling in the mud at the feet of Asian victors, the Empire was on borrowed time - and so it proved. Wdford (talk) 16:28, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.74 (talk) 11:00, 18 June 2016 (UTC)

Two web sites

• Hofschroer and the controversy about Zieten's Dispatch (2008)
• NOTES TO PART 8 notes 20, 21, 25, 37, 49, 51, 60

Bernard Cornwell comments on this incident, at some length but one sentence is particularly telling "He is accused of deliberately ignoring the Prussian messages, but why he should do that is also a mystery".

It is a mystery, because if he had known for certain where Napoleon was then combining his forces with the Blücher's would have meant certain victory. Allowing Napoleon to cleave them apart would mean the destruction of both armies.`Wellington had no motive to allow the armies to be attacked piecemeal given the abilities of the man who command the enemy army it would be far too risky as a premeditated. I think that the truth was revelled in Wellington's famous comment at about 1:30 on the morning of the 16th of June: "Napoleon has humbugged me, by God; he has gained twenty-four hours' march on me. … I have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras; but we shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight him there" (passing his thumb-nail over the position of Waterloo).

• Cornwell, Bernard (23 February 2015). Waterloo: The History of Four Days, Three Armies and Three Battles. Lulu.com. pp. offset 44–46. ISBN 978-1-312-92522-9.
• For the quote: Archibald Forbes Camps, Quarters, and Casual Places,(Project Gutenberg). In the chapter The inner history of the Waterloo Campaign cites the Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury'

-- PBS (talk) 22:19, 27 June 2016 (UTC)

Good quote, but I'm thinking we are talking about two different things. Cornwell seems to be referring to the controversy about when did Zieten send to Brussels the report that Napoleon had started the war, and if Wellington received it before or after he went dancing. I am referring to the fact that Wellington subsequently met with Blucher the following morning, when the fighting over Quatre Bras was already on the go, and promised support at Ligny.

The qualification "unless I am attacked" makes no sense, as Wellington and Blucher already knew there was fighting underway at Quatre Bras. Blucher's deployment of his troops indicated that he was expecting more units to arrive on the right flank (nearest to Wellington), and Blucher already knew by the previous evening that Bulow wasn't going to arrive in time, so he clearly had the impression that Wellington would be sending the extra units he needed for this particular plan.

If Wellington already knew he couldn't stop the French at Quatre Bras, as seems likely from this quote, then why did he engage there at all? It wasn't to protect Blucher's flank, as this action wouldn't have achieved that goal, and his units would have a done a much better job of this if they were actually deployed on Blucher's flank, rather than six miles away. Furthermore it is evident that the crossroads wasn't critical to the French, as d'Erlon made the trip across to Ligny anyway with a full Corps, and made it all the back again just after nightfall.

I think the truth is that Wellington - who had seemingly never actually faced Napoleon before on a battlefield - was worried about being beaten, and he was keeping one eye on the escape route back to Ostend just in case. Wellington's previous experience of what Napoleon himself could do was limited to Napoleon sweeping through Spain in 1808 and the British evacuating into the sea - much like at Dunkirk in 1940. Whereas Blucher was committed wholeheartedly to defeating Napoleon once and for all, it seems Wellington always had one eye on the Brexit. ;) Wdford (talk) 16:12, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

Cornwell goes into that issues in some detail (link to 4 pages). At the time Wellington and Blücher met, the French under Marshal Ney had yet to try to capture the crossroads in force. Wellington had no way to know how many men Ney had and if they would advance towards Quatre Bras in any force. However for him not to qualify his statement with a warning that he might not be able to come would have been odd. It seems reasonable to argue just like the previous issue what was his motive to try to fool the Prussians? If he could have attacked Napoleon's left wing at Ligny (as Blücher did two days later at Waterloo) why would he not have done it? Cornwell writes:

And we must also ask what possible advantage could accrue to the Duke by concealing the news. The usual answer that it left Blücher exposed, thus giving Wellington time to retreat. It makes no sense. If the Duke was so frightened of confronting the French why not begin the retreat as soon as he hears the news? To ask the question is to realise its stupidity. And what does the Duke gain if Blücher is defeated? The whole campaign was predicated on an alliance, on the knowledge that neither Wellington nor Blücher could defeat the Emperor alone, and that they must therefore combine their armies.

There is an analysis in the article section Quatre Bras to Waterloo § Advances by Napoleon and Ney about the morning of the 17th (the day between Ligny and Waterloo):

Hence it is evident that Ney's opinion, that a victory at Ligny ought to be followed up by a combined attack upon Wellington, perfectly coincided with Napoleon's views. The military historian William Siborne states that while Ney was thus justified in remaining inactive during the early part of the day, the fact of Napoleon's not moving directly upon Genappe with the morning's dawn, and his excessive delay in breaking up his bivouac at Ligny, are inexplicable. A glorious opportunity had presented itself for the attainment of his original design of defeating both Armies in detail, but which was completely lost by a most extraordinary and fatal want of energy and vigour in seizing upon the advantages which the victory of Ligny had placed within his reach.

There is more analysis in the article section Ligny through Wavre to Waterloo § Napoleon's errors at this time This is also Hofschröer's view who writes in Waterloo 1815: Wavre, Plancenoit and the Race to Paris:

By now [midday on 17th] Napoleon had already all but lost Waterloo, although it was too early for him to realise (page 14).

Wellington was very very lucky that his army was not destroyed by Ney holding it in position and Napoleon attacking his left flank. With the defiled of Genappe behind him Wellington could not have retreated that way. Again the alleged motive for duplicity does not IMHO stand up to analysis. Its a matter of Occam's Razor as to which account of the meeting at the windmill in Brye is more likely to be correct. -- PBS (talk) 19:13, 30 June 2016 (UTC)

I've realised since I wrote the above that I have made similar points before (in the next section). Sorry for repeating myself! One more detail: To aid Blücher, Wellington had to have uncontested control of the Nivelle-Namur road if all arms were to move from Quatre Bras, because although cavalry and infantry could march off road, artillery and supply wagons could not, and make any hast at all over six miles. To be effective Wellington, like Blücher two days later, would have had to make an all arms attack (as Cornwell describes it the Scissors-paper-stone of Napolionic warfare). -- PBS (talk) 19:41, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

Yes, I see now that Cornwell is very gentle and apologetic with Wellington’s performance. Again, it makes no sense that Wellington had to hold Quatre Bras so urgently that it was worth him abandoning Blucher to achieve it. The whole point of holding Quatre Bras – if we can believe the apologists – was to secure the road so that he could move units along it to support Blucher. However in order to hold Quatre Bras, he had to abandon Blucher. That is akin to saying that I saw your house was on fire, and I could have come around immediately to successfully help you save your house, and I promised you that I would come to help you, but then instead I spent the day shopping for a carload of fire-extinguishers, in the process leaving your house to burn to the ground, after which I abandoned all the fire-extinguishers it took me all day to obtain, and ran away. If I may paraphrase Cornwell – "To offer the explanation is to realise its stupidity."

We note that Wellington had the use of the road long enough to move 24,000 men to Quatre Bras – he could as easily have gathered them all at Ligny instead, and got the job done on day one. We know that Wellington had no idea of Ney’s forces, but in that case surely his safest option was then to group with Blucher and face together whatever the French may have brought along, rather than facing a potentially overwhelming force all alone at Quatre Bras, with no ridge to hide behind and nobody coming to rescue him? We note also that d’Erlon had no difficulty in moving a full Corps across that distance without the use of the road – twice in one day. Wellington’s excuse – and that of his apologists – seems terribly weak to a neutral observer.

Secondly, the question of motives. Was there any plausible motive for the Prussians to deploy as though they had an extra corps on hand, if Wellington had actually warned them that he wasn’t going to make it? They exposed themselves to a serious defeat and possible annihilation as a result – would they really have made such a ridiculous decision? We know that Wellington contradicted himself repeatedly on the subject in the years that followed, whereas Blucher and Gneisenau were constant always. Blucher and Gneisenau were both competent and experienced commanders, with a lot to lose - including their own lives. Is it really possible that, with so much at stake, they failed to properly understand Wellington clearly and just guessed at what he was promising them? Or did Wellington perhaps spend the meeting assuring them of his support, and then mumbled a throw-away line to the contrary over his shoulder as he rode off?

On the other hand, did Wellington have a serious motive to leave Blucher in the lurch? Well just a few months earlier the British delegation to the Congress of Vienna – which included Wellington – had signed a "secret treaty" with Austria AND FRANCE to oppose the ambitions of Prussia and Russia. Wellington was part of that intrigue. When Wellington met with Blucher at Brye, he was certainly aware of the future impacts of his current actions. If Prussia destroyed the mighty Napoleon at Ligny, with only a minor Anglo-Dutch participation, then Prussia would be in a very strong position at the future peace-conferences. However if the Prussian army was shattered at Ligny and then the weakened Napoleon was later defeated by a "British-led" Anglo-Dutch army with a smallish participation by some humbled Prussian survivors, then the British interest would be much better served. Wellington wanted two corps of support from Blucher at Waterloo, he already knew Bulow was out of the Ligny battle and would remain intact, and he could safely assume that Blucher could "take a licking" and still be able to muster one corps worth of effective units out of the wreckage of the three corps that were involved at Ligny. Then he would win a victory that would Save Europe (and burnish his own reputation in the process). The Prussians had no incentive at all to act on wrong assumptions and expose themselves to catastrophic defeat, whereas Wellington had powerful political and personal motives to "accidently" leave his "ally" to face Napoleon with a weakened flank. If we are to use Occam’s Razor here, then it strongly suggests that Wellington set Blucher up on purpose.

Wellington was indeed very very lucky that his army was not destroyed by Ney at Quatre Bras – or by Napoleon at Waterloo. He survived at Quatre Bras only because the Dutch disobeyed his dithering instructions, the French commanders had miscommunications re d’Erlon, night fell before d’Erlon could return and get into the fight, and Wellington ran away the next morning before Ney got around to deploying his overwhelming force. Wellington survived at Waterloo only because Napoleon was inexplicably slow to commence his attack, and because Blucher force-marched his army a long way over poor terrain to rescue Wellington as he crouched behind a ridge praying for deliverance. Then Wellington claimed the credit, spent decades fudging what actually happened and became Prime Minister. What an amazingly lucky chap! Wdford (talk) 15:04, 3 July 2016 (UTC)

A few comments here if I may. Wellington was given ample warning that the French were coming and in force. He chose to believe that his intelligence was in fact superior to that available to the Prussians. The Prussians were absolutely convinced that the Armee du Nord was on the way and where it was going. This was shared with Wellington. It was not a case of malice on Wellington's part. Look folks with all the cards on the table the US and UK went into Normandy ABSOLUTELY convinced they had all the answers to armored warfare well learned. This with fucking Tiger tanks in their possession. So the US Army went into Europe equipped with M4 tanks and a tank destroyer strategy that didn't work. OK the point being that Wellington was far from the 1st commander to make a bad decision on information choices. Unfortunately he wasn't the last. Hence the I've been Humbugged comment from Wellington. It is beyond dispute that his forces were far to dispersed to rapidly assemble and react to a deployed French army. He made a error of judgement pure and simple and he admitted as much at the time. As for deceiving the Prussians, I disagree. I believe that at the time he believed that he could retrieve the situation. Napoleon was not the sort that allowed one to retrieve any mistake. Go ask the Russians about that at Borodino.

This brings me to the road net at the area of operations. The Dyle river bisected the two areas of battle. The single best path between the two areas was the Old Roman Road. That road was the 1st thing interdicted by the French army. Moving corps worth of troops in any sort of time demanded that road be used. The other "roads" across the Dyle at that time leading to the British areas varied between bad to abysmal. French messengers running the route between Wavre and Waterloo were taking 6 hours because the only reasonable path was between Quatra Bra and Ligny. Mind you that was a messenger and a horse not an army. Once the French were there in force that path was closed to the Allies period. That said it would not have been obvious to Wellington until later in the day. This also explains why later Napoleon sealed his fate when he sent Grouchy to Wavre. There was no path across the Dyle not already held by the Prussians. That interdiction thing again and it played no favorites. Marching to the sound of the guns is just great as long as YOU HAVE AN UNBLOCKED PATH. Wellington wasn't the only one trying to cover mistakes made in the past. Poor Grouchy paid the price for Napoleon's vanity.

As for the Prussians at Ligny. Of the armies at the operational level the Prussian Army out performed the other two armies in the field by quite a bit. That isn't my opinion, it is the opinion of every major war college in major armies today. The execution however was not perfect. Bulow commanding the 4th Corps got his deployment orders in time to arrive at Ligny in time for the battle. Had he done so the Prussians would not have been moved that day. Instead he decided to get thick headed over what he perceived as a slight to his honor and didn't move until it was too late. Further, positional mistakes were made. The Prussian left was too heavily defended when the marshy grounds would have hampered any offensive moved on that flank. Two Corps were intermixed confusing the command picture for their commanders. Half of 2nd corps should have held the Prussian left the rest of the 2nd Corps the Center. The 3rd Corps should have held the Prussian Right while the 1st Corps should have been held as a ready reserve. The Prussian Army had enough to see to itself had it been moved on time and deployed properly. Tirronan (talk) 16:47, 3 July 2016 (UTC)

@Wdford

1. From the time Wellington returned to Quatre Bras from his meeting at the windmill in Brye, the battle was fought with the French attaching under Ney, with Wellington plugging the gaps with newly arrived forces ("Just in Time" delivery). It was only towards dusk that he finally had a numerical superiority to field against Ney. If Wellington had not held Quatre Bras and had been forced to retreat what then would Ney have done? He would almost certainly have pursued Wellington towards Brussels as he was ordered to do, but he may also have sent a contingent to aid Napoleon, and even if he had not, he would not have called D'Erlon back to his side. So Wellington holding Quatre Bras stopped Ney aiding Napoleon, just as Ney's strong attack stopped Wellington going to the aid of Blücher.
2. On the morning of the 17th it is not Ney who could have destroyed Wellington, it was Ney pinning Wellington's front to Quatre Bras so that Napoleon could destroy Wellington's army with a very strong flank attack.
3. Personally I don't think you have a good grasp of Regency politics if you think the Polish-Saxon crisis was a driving force in British politics once Napoleon had landed. Do you know of one reliable source that has made the argument that Wellington wanted to see the Prussians destroyed because of political machinations over the Polish-Saxon crisis?

-- PBS (talk) 17:59, 3 July 2016 (UTC)

There was considerable friction between the British contingent and the Prussian/Russian contingent at the Congress of Vienna. However keep in mind that British contingent was off afield from the British PM's position on several matters so much so that a quiet note was sent to the Prussian/Russian contingent from said office stating such. It expressed itself in the placement of Northern Princedom military contingents placements either to Wellington's Allied/Anglo forces or to the North German Corps under Kleist. Several factors being that some of the little principalities feared annexation by Prussian (rightly so), A British Army in desperate need of troops, and the normal Prussian budget concerns (always verging on bankruptcy). It even effected the Treaty of Ghent (Prussia/Russia how do you explain denying us annexation when you are trying to do the same thing in North America?). That said and political posturing aside, it was Wellington that secured loans to provide for the Prussian Army that was on the verge of logistics collapse. Nor am I aware of any comment on either side desirous of dissolution of other army. Gneisenau assumed that the British betrayed a promise of support is known. But both sides were dependent on the other for support and that was obvious throughout their communications. I have seen nothing to support Wellington's desire for the destruction of the Prussian Army. If such had taken place I rather doubt that we'd be talking about the Allied Victory at Waterloo. Tirronan (talk) 18:55, 3 July 2016 (UTC)

Wellington may have had a poor grasp of the situation to begin with, but when he met with Blucher at Brye he could see the French assembling. By then it was clear that a major battle would take place at Ligny. He was also already aware that the Dutch had been confronted by the French at Quatre Bras. He could no longer plead ignorance on either count. He then promised to support Blucher at Ligny, and instead he sent all he had to Quatre Bras and left Blucher in the lurch.

The assertion about the importance of the road is flimsy – d’Erlon managed to move a corps across that distance twice in one day without need of the road. Also, if the French really wanted to cut that road, they didn’t need to fight a huge static battle over Quatre Bras – they could have blocked the road at any undefended point along its 6 mile length. My points above stand – there was nothing to be gained from defending Quatre Bras – it didn’t defend Brussels, it didn’t defend Blucher and it was in fact a poor defensive position. Why then did Wellington defend it with all hands for a day – while leaving his critical ally exposed – and then abandon it the next morning? If he wasn’t malicious, then he was brain-dead – too much partying perhaps? I take the point about the road to Wavre, but that is not what we are discussing here.

Bulow did NOT get “thick headed” over his orders, his corps was already on the move and to change the deployment of so many units in mid-stream would have lead to chaos, so he allowed the units to arrive at their original destination and to regroup. Bulow had not been told that a battle was brewing, so he did the right thing under the circumstances. It’s interesting here that when Wellington ignores crucial intel from his allies he is merely “humbugged”, but when Bulow does not have the full picture and makes the correct decision under the circumstances he is “thick-headed”. Is that bias I smell?

Both Blucher and Wellington were aware of Bulow’s position at the time Wellington made his promises at Brye. If Wellington had been more competent/honest with Blucher at Brye, Blucher may well have deployed differently. I’m sure Blucher and his officers inspected the ground before the deployment, and they would have depleted the left flank if they really believed it to be impassable. They decided instead to reinforce it, and thus probably for good reason. Their right flank was left under-supported because they were expecting Wellington’s troops, and the right flank was the closest to Wellington’s over-night positions.

If Wellington had not held Quatre Bras and had retreated toward Brussels it would have ended in disaster for him, but if Wellington had instead concentrated at Ligny as he originally promised, then Ney could have pursued him there and found him supported by the Prussians. There was a nice ridge at Ligny for Wellington to hide behind, so they could have held the French easily until nightfall, and with the rest of the Allies approaching the next day, along with Bulow, they would have had Napoleon in a pickle on day 2.

On the morning of the 17th Ney did not need reinforcements to destroy Wellington, with d’Erlon returned and rested he had more than enough strength to get the job done.

Diplomacy is a long game. The coalition knew Napoleon was the most immediate threat, and obviously moved to act against him, but they all had the long view in mind. The Congress of Vienna continued while the Hundred Days was underway, and they were not all sitting around waiting for news from Belgium. The Allied leaders did the same at the Tehran Conference in 1943 – focus on the immediate objectives, but with a longer view toward the post-war situation as well. The British army did the same in the Pacific toward the end – scurrying around recapturing their colonies while the other Allies were still fighting the enemy and preparing for the final invasion. The Russians did the same at the Warsaw Uprising. Wellington was part of the intrigue at the Congress, he was part of the negotiations with Talleyrand to oppose the Prussians, and he believed he needed only two corps of Prussians to beat Napoleon. He was confident that at least that many Prussian units would survive the battle at Ligny, and so was quite happy to leave Blucher in the lurch. Wellington thought he only needed Prussian cannon-fodder, he didn’t need confident and determined Prussian Field Marshals. Wdford (talk) 14:05, 5 July 2016 (UTC)

In order "Wellington may have had a poor grasp of the situation to begin with, but when he met with Blucher at Brye he could see the French assembling." The Prussians had a full 24 hours on Wellington in the movement of their troops and still barely got assembled in time. Wellington (without the full staff system both other armies employed) got moving fairly well but still nothing was going to make up for the time he lost.

"The assertion about the importance of the road is flimsy – d’Erlon managed to move a corps across that distance twice in one day without need of the road." He was on the Old Roman Road the best in the area. That was the road running between Quatra Bras and Ligny. The other roads over the Dyle were poor to single mud tracks at the time. Do you have one single clue what you are talking about?

Bulow did NOT get “thick headed” over his orders, his corps was already on the move." This is your OPINION since every history I've read says otherwise. Assertions without fact mean NOTHING here. If you have RS sources disputing that then fine but I rather doubt that you do.

"If Wellington had not held Quatre Bras and had retreated toward Brussels it would have ended in disaster for him" What the hell has this got to do with the article? Had Napoleon pressed the Prussians hard after the defeat he would have won. Had he taken Grouchy with him he would have been much better off at Waterloo. If Wellington had not left 30,000 troops at Mons he would have been much better off. Had Bulow arrived on time The Prussians would have been on the field at Ligny on day 2. I maintain as does Von Clausewitz, if the Prussians deployed and reinforced more reluctantly the Prussians should have held on anyway. We do not deal in "what if" in an historical article. The only interest to the article would be where the commanders made mistakes and they all did.

I've got better things to do with my time and so should you. If you have specific areas where we should make changes in the article and you have RS sources hell I am all for it. As for who is right or wrong between two countries that have changed beyond all recognition since... There isn't a Prussia anymore... The United Kingdom isn't a world spanning empire anymore. In short why in the fuck would I care or our readers care? That is more interesting in a forum. Tirronan (talk) 15:56, 5 July 2016 (UTC)

In order: Wellington knew at Brye that he couldn’t assemble in time to support Blucher, but yet he made the promise anyway. Siborne says that: "The [Duke] having expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive, rode back to Quatre Bras."(The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 By William Siborne; pg 135, at [3]) That goes a bit beyond "made a mistake".

Re d’Erlon: I doubt he was using the Old Roman Road running between Quatre Bras and Ligny – that was the road that Wellington was supposed to be defending by holding Quatre Bras – is it not? The maps show that he crossed an Old Roman Road along his way (the road to Luttich – see [4], but that he was crossing over it not travelling along it. Either way, half of Ney’s army moved across to Ligny with ease, and then moved back again – so defending the "vital" position at Quatre Bras with all available resources clearly served no purpose in protecting Blucher from Nye. Another "mistake"?

Re Bulow: Siborne describes Bulow’s non-arrival as being due to "mischance", and he is actually quite supportive of Bulow's decision-making. (The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 By William Siborne; pgs 112 – 114, at [5]) Clausewitz attributes it to "accident and faulty arrangements in the communication of orders and intelligence". (On War, Volume 2; By Carl von Clausewitz, J. J. Graham; pg 84 at [6]) Creasy attributes it to "some error in the transmission of orders". (The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo; By Edward Shepherd Creasy; pg 336, at [7]) Which RS sources say Bulow was being “thick-headed” please?

We note the abusive language and ad hominem attacks. Far from ideal for editors of an encyclopaedia. Wdford (talk) 19:45, 7 July 2016 (UTC)

Are 'we' a collective, or a ruling monarch? Urselius (talk) 07:31, 8 July 2016 (UTC)

"We" refers to all the readers who have read or who will in future read the abusive language and ad hominem attacks above. Wdford (talk) 11:52, 9 July 2016 (UTC)

Wdford your wrote above "d’Erlon: I doubt he was using the Old Roman Road running between Quatre Bras and Ligny". I am adding three maps from wikicommons into a gallery below. The first shows the battle fields and the terrain including the rivers that Tirronan mentions. The second shows the position of the Comte d’Erlon's I Corps. The third is a map of the dispositions at the start of the campaign (I have included it as it gives a good overview of the theatre as well as the distances men had to march to get to the conflict). Note particularly the road that comes out of Charleroi and forks north of the town. One road to Gosselies and on to Brussels, the other to Fleurus. Ney lead the left wing of the French army up the road to Brussels while Napoleon pressed up the Fleurus road. The Roman Road was a link from Ney's reserve area to Napoleon's left wing. Because the French forces were debouching from the defile, caused by crossing the Sambre at Charleroi, they were quite close together. The Coalition forces because they were on the top of this triangle/cone had far greater distances to travel.

• 
  (1) Terrain
• 
  (2) The old Roman road and d’Erlon Corps at 17:30 on 16 June
• 
  (3) Initial dispositions.

The most detailed maps of this area at this time (although almost 40 years old) is:

• "80, 81, 97, 98", Kabinetskaart der Oostenrijkse Nederlanden et het Prinsbisdom Luik, Kaart van Ferraris, 1777

copies of this map were used by the armies during the campaign.-- PBS (talk) 18:33, 9 July 2016 (UTC)

The town shown just to the north-west of d'Erlon Corps shown on the second map in its position at 17:30 is called Villers Peruin on the Ferraris map, and can be located on about half way down the extreme left side of map section 97 "Gembloux". This will allow interested parties to see the detail of the terrain (woods, streams, banks and so forth), as the maps I provided on this page are not detailed enough to show this. Unfortunately to see Quatre Bras it is necessary to look at the next map "80 Seneffe", but it is fairly easy to locate once one has found Villers Peruin (it is in the top right corner of map section 80). -- PBS (talk) 19:07, 10 July 2016 (UTC)

Wonderful Maps PBS.

Wdford, here are some realities that you simply must grasp to have an intelligent conversation on these subject at this period of time.

1. The time to assemble a dispersed formation is typically a couple of hours in and of itself.
2. The speed of infantry formations is between .5 and 1 KM per hour dependent on road and size of the units.
3. The speed of Cavalry formations is 1 to 1.5 KM per hour.
4. The larger the formation or collection of formations running down a single road the slower the force will move.
5. The speed of communications is the speed of a messenger on a horse. That horse will not be running either.
6. Given example: Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo to Grouchy at the battle of Wavre 6 hours over good roads one way.

If my replies seem rude so be it but you have to know what you are actually stating as applies to the battle you are referring. You didn't know the road network when you not once but twice implied I didn't know what I was talking about. Further, you act as if the commanders had radios instead of painfully piecing a picture together from messages hours apart.

In answer into your replies, Bulow's thick headed, IE deliberate obtuseness, you will find in Peter's book on the subject volume 1 as per the reference. There is a reason we put them in there. The road net you have before you now. So before you continue arguing learn something OK?Tirronan (talk) 16:10, 10 July 2016 (UTC)

Thank you PBS for the maps - I have seen some of them before, but I appreciate the effort.

I realize that the French lines of communication were shorter on the day, but that is exactly my point - there is seemingly no value to defending Quatre Bras at all. Despite all the waffle above about the speed of formations, reality tells us that in fact D'Erlon made the trip across to Ligny quite easily twice in less than a day, and thus Ney could have followed the same route with the other half of his army if Napoleon had so ordered. Wellington himself rode between Quarte Bras and Ligny twice that day, and seemingly did so in about an hour each time. Since the French could have moved their left wing to Ligny quite easily and without any need of the Quatre Bras road, why then did Wellington pin himself down at Quatre Bras for the whole day, when he had agreed with Blucher to fight at Ligny? mmmmm.

I see now that another editor is making a case that Wellington was struggling with his communications because he didn't have radios. Seemingly the same lenience is not to be shown to Gneisenau and Bulow, who are maligned by some editors for their failure to communicate promptly and effectively over long distances. More bias perhaps?

On the subject of Bulow's alleged "thick-headedness", I have noted many leading historians who attribute the late arrival of IV Corps to miscommunication (caused by the lack of radios, presumably). The matter is dealt with in Wikipedia here [8], where all the references are to Siborne - who as I have already mentioned sees no fault in Bulow's actions. Does the reference to "Peter's book" perhaps refer to Peter Hofschröer - the author who accuses Wellington of malice aforethought, and whom some editors here have spent some effort slandering above? If so, it is interesting that in this matter Hofschröer is apparently to be considered a more reliable source than Siborne and Clausewitz etc, whereas in his criticisms of Wellington he is maligned as "loopy" - more bias, perhaps? Wdford (talk) 13:27, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

Rather than bias it is called informed criticism. If a historian makes a claim based on sources, and those sources prove to not support the claim, then it is bias or worse (see the message/Pflugk-Harttung controversy: [9] and elsewhere). If in a period of lucidity a historian makes a claim based on sources, and these sources back up his claim, then the assertions can be trusted, whatever the veracity of the historian elsewhere. Urselius (talk) 14:10, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

Hofschroer is a delusional liar, fantasist and now a convicted criminal. He serially misrepresents his sources, notably re the Ziethen letter. When forensically demolished by such as Greg Pedlow or John Hussey, he flies into a rage and resorts to litigation and slander. We don't yet know what other misrepresentations and falsehoods there are in his work, but given his astonishing mendacity it is likely there are many more. The most obvious falsehood is the main premise of his Waterloo books - he asserts that existing accounts of the campaign overstate the British contribution, but never in 18 years has he cited even one British source that does so. He posts favourable reviews of his own books on Amazon and hostile reviews of the works of those who disagree with him (Amazon chucked him off and deleted his "reviews"). He was found by a court to have harassed police officers (http://www.yorkpress.co.uk/news/11807294.Police_taking_civil_action_against_three_men_claimed_to_be_conducting__a_campaign_of_personal_harassment_/; http://www.brettwilson.co.uk/wordpress/ipcc-caseworkers-obtain-interim-harassment-injunctions-after-internet-campaign-of-abuse/), including calling a female officer "a ‘pervert’, ‘criminal’ and ‘rogue’" and accusing her of "covering up for child abusers, of lacking any sense of decency, morality or integrity and of being a known, habitual liar". The full judgement against him can be found here http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2014/3404.html. The judge observed that Hofschroer's claims were "plainly calculated to cause alarm and distress...They are properly to be described as utterly oppressive, and as...campaigns of personal vilification."

Hofschroer escaped an injunction only because his paedophilia had already landed him in jail. His defence of that paedophilia in the witness box was that "he was the victim of a conspiracy between a fellow military historian [Hussey] who won defamatory damages in a court case against him, the judge in that case and a Duke; and that he had evidence of senior people linked to North Yorkshire Police engaging in al fresco sex with Jimmy Savile on the North York Moors". He said all this under oath FFS, but of course - again! - his "evidence" was never produced. In Hofschroer's judgment, however, that was a good, credible defence of his actions.

The whole affair is an object lesson to all wikipedia editors, not just Wdford, to consider the limitations, impartiality, agenda and general acceptance of a source before relying on it. If a source appears to be a conspiracist crank it should be handled with care. It should be clear to the most ardent Hofschroer fanboi that given how staggeringly poor his judgment is, his analysis and assertions on frankly any subject are profoundly untrustworthy.

He remains, however, the source of choice for those who want to belittle the British contribution to 1815 (winning it, basically). I wonder why.Tirailleur (talk) 15:24, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

So from this latest diatribe, we can perhaps distil a few important points:

1. Hofschroer is apparently a delusional liar when he says negative things about British officers, but he is a “lucid” source when he says negative things about the Prussian officer who did the most to rescue Wellington at Waterloo, even when he is contradicted on this by the likes of Siborne and Clausewitz;
2. Wellington can be excused for ignoring all the intelligence given to him by his allies because he was at a nice party and he didn’t have radios, but Bulow must be excoriated for correctly acting on the limited intelligence given to him by his commander because he failed to properly develop his psychic powers;
3. Britain actually won the Battle of Waterloo after all, even though every credible historian notes that:

• Less than half the Allied army was actually British;
• Wellington agreed with Blucher to confront Napoleon at Ligny, but he then failed to send Blucher the promised support, because he was so busy at Quatre Bras keeping the road open so that he could send Blucher the promised support, that he was unable to send Blucher the promised support;
• Wellington took more casualties at Quatre Bras than the French, despite being the defender, and he "held the field" only because darkness fell just as D’Erlon was arriving back;
• When the sun rose again to allow the French to resume the battle, Wellington discovered that the Prussians were no longer keeping Napoleon away from him – he then abandoned his Quatre Bras position and ran for it;
• Wellington only gave battle at Waterloo because Blucher promised to rescue him, otherwise he would have kept running;
• At Waterloo Wellington spent the whole afternoon hiding behind a ridge, waiting for the Prussians to rescue him as promised, and sending Blucher “frequent and pressing” (Siborne pg 493) communications calling “anxiously” for that promised support;
• Bulow force-marched across impassable terrain to hit Napoleon in the flank, and forced Napoleon to split his forces, including Lobau's Corps and half the Guard units;
• Wellington’s “shattered line” (Siborne pg 510) was crumbling when Zieten arrived, and when Zieten obeyed his orders to support Bulow instead of the man who ignored his intel and then left him dangling at Ligny, the senior Prussian officer Muffling had to persuade Zieten to rescue Wellington instead;
• Zieten then broke through the French flank at the apex and his cavalry streamed through the field behind the Guard, effectively cutting them off (Chesney, pgs 186-188; Uffindell and Corum, pgs 232 – 234);
• Half of the elite French Guard were engaged in holding off Bulow on the right flank. When the remaining half of the Guard marched up the hill in two columns to deliver the knock-out blow, half of that half (the Grenadiers) were actually repulsed by the Dutch (per Field), and then the other half of half (i.e. three battalions of the Chasseurs) confronted the English;
• With Zieten driving D’Erlon’s Corps across the field and the Grenadier Guard column already in retreat before the Dutch counter-attack, the British finally managed to repel three battalions of the Chasseurs all by themselves;
• In British minds, this constitutes “winning it, basically”.

All of the above is reported consistently by the consensus of all the reliable sources, except that I have polished off the flowery language and the layer of British Spin which some authors have slathered on to make their great hero look a little less average. Wdford (talk) 18:32, 13 July 2016 (UTC)

Just out of complete curiosity because I am totally confused. Do you have some goal to your endless blogging Wdford? If there is a point would you just make it?Tirronan (talk) 19:54, 13 July 2016 (UTC)

I suspect that the minds that created the 1st Duke of Wellington: Field Marshal of the Austrian Army, Field Marshal of the Army of the Netherlands, Marshal-General of the Portuguese Army, Field Marshal of the Prussian Army, Field Marshal of the Russian Army and, Captain-General of the Spanish Army, were not British. The ruling elites of all these countries seem to have considered that Wellington had achieved something both notable and praiseworthy. Who are you to disagree? Urselius (talk) 07:45, 14 July 2016 (UTC)

My goal is exactly as I have previously stated it to be on this very page – I strive to uphold the Wikipedia policy on neutrality by identifying and correcting instances of bias and propaganda. This extends from blatant lies, such as “Waterloo was a British victory”, to strategic omissions such as neglecting to mention that the British line was busy crumbling when Zieten’s Prussians arrived to rescue them, to the kind of spin that describes Dutch and Hannoverian units as such when they are faltering but creates the impression that they are all British when those units do something useful, down to the careful cherry-picking of sources – such as when Hofschroer is considered to be hopelessly unreliable when speaking negatively about British officers, but then he is nonetheless considered a reliable source when speaking negatively of Prussian officers (even when the real reliable sources all contradict him on this). Many aspects of many articles are not neutral at all, and more work is required to bring them in line with wikipolicy.

Secondly, commanders being awarded honorary titles or decorations by foreign “ruling elites” is a purely political exercise, then as now. Politicians and monarchs who never got anywhere near the action, delight in handing out awards later to all and sundry – it gives them a sense of personal participation, as well as probably gaining some expedient political leverage at the time. You forgot to mention that Wellington was also a field-marshal in the French Army – interesting, yes? More recent examples include nominating Stalin for the Nobel Peace Prize, actually giving Barak Obama the Nobel Peace Prize, and the US government awarding both the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the Congressional Gold Medal to Tony Blair. The expedience of “ruling elites” is the very antithesis of meritocracy. Wdford (talk) 10:17, 16 July 2016 (UTC)

User:Wdford What is your source for "a field-marshal in the French Army" because the article Arms, titles, honours and styles of Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington quotes the London Gazette's list of his honours and titles and there is no mention of a French Marshal's batten (The French did not have the military rank of field-marshal see Marshal of France which has a list that does not contain Wellington). Your tone is becoming more and more trollish eg "Wellington discovered that the Prussians were no longer keeping Napoleon away from him – he then abandoned his Quatre Bras position and ran for it;". Wellington retreated it was no route and he would have been a dam fool to have done anything else on the 17th. The difference between Wellington's orderly withdrawal with that of the French 36 hours later could both have been more marked. See for example the holding actions of Genappe (17 June 1815) and Genappe (18 June 1815), but you must already know this so why use such language? You repeat such language time and again eg "Waterloo Wellington spent the whole afternoon hiding behind a ridge".

User:Wdford you also make statements such as "My goal is exactly as I have previously stated it to be on this very page – I strive to uphold the Wikipedia policy on neutrality by identifying and correcting instances of bias and propaganda. This extends from blatant lies, such as “Waterloo was a British victory”" -- where does any Wikipedia page state that “Waterloo was a British victory” because this article states it was a "Decisive Coalition victory". I suggest that we archive this section and instead you can raise specific issues about what you consider to be bias in the text and we can then develop this article further if you gain a consensus that there is indeed bias unsupported by the majority of reliable sources that needs in text attribution or even removal. -- PBS (talk) 19:11, 16 July 2016 (UTC)

For Wellington’s award of the title of Marshal of France, see {Napoleon and Wellington: The Battle of Waterloo- and the Great Commanders Who Fought It, By Andrew Roberts, pg 286 here [10]} and also {Memoir of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, by John Marius Wilson, pg 612 see [11] }. I note that Wellington doesn’t appear on the wikilist of List of Austrian field marshals or on the List of German field marshals either, although he does appear on the List of Russian field marshals.

To see where Waterloo is referred to by some as a British victory, just look a few entries higher up on this very talk page.

Re my choice of words (which are fully accurate although not politically correct), I use them deliberately on the talk page specifically to highlight the inherent bias. Quatre Bras is considered a British victory even though Wellington was ultimately driven from the field under fire, and you yourself state that “Wellington retreated it was no route and he would have been a dam fool to have done anything else”. Well when Gneisenau retreated as darkness fell on Ligny it was also “an orderly withdrawal and no route”, and when Thielmann retreated at Wavre on day 2 it was also “an orderly withdrawal and no route”, and both would have been damned fools to have done anything else, but nonetheless Wellington being driven from the field of Quatre Bras under fire is a victory but Ligny and Wavre are defeats. I don’t think this disparity is a coincidence.

The Prussians held Wavre until dark, as the Allies held Quatre Bras until dark. The Prussians left the field to the French the next day when the strategic value of Wavre had been eroded, and the Allies left the field to the French the next day when the strategic value of Quatre Bras (if any) had been eroded. The one salient difference was that after Wavre Grouchy retreated from the field almost at once – as soon as he also became aware that the strategic value of Wavre had been eroded, whereas at Quatre Bras the French drove Wellington up the road under fire and all the way to Waterloo. If anything Quatre Bras was more of a defeat than Wavre, but it is not reported thus – due to bias?

Since I wrote the article Battle of Wavre The Prussian's held the position until 10 AM the day after Waterloo. Thielmann didn't see the point of fighting a losing battle anymore. He was out numbered over 2 to 1. As stated in that article that it was a tactical defeat and strategic victory. Grouchy correctly deduced that he was in dire straights and began a retreat by forced march 30 minutes later. Total length of "victory" 30 minutes.

Your choice of Genappe as an example is very interesting. You refer to Genappe as a “holding action”, and the article Waterloo Campaign: Quatre Bras to Waterloo uses the sub-heading “Action at Genappe”, when an equally-accurate description would be “British defeat at Genappe”. Wavre was also just a “holding action”, as was Quatre Bras. However although the Prussians actually succeeded admirably in their holding objective at Wavre it is hailed as a Prussian defeat, while at Genappe the British were sent packing with the French hot on their heels but the article makes it sound like a British success – one of a long history of “successful retreats”. In fact the article quotes Siborne at length, with lines such as “must ever render that retreat a perfect model of operations of this nature”, and “evince altogether a degree of skill which had never been surpassed”. I am concerned also that this article uses Siborne’s actual language in Wikipedia’s voice – there may be plagiarism issues here as well as neutrality issues?

The way the articles on Quatre Bras are structured is itself biased – it’s like reporting on a football match in two halves - where the England team won the first half 1-0, its hailed as a victory and it gets its own article called “England wins the first half”, while the second half of the match was won by the French 2-0 for an overall French victory but the second half is reported as part of a larger separate article called “the rest of the season up to the cup final”. The scope of the existing article called Waterloo Campaign: Quatre Bras to Waterloo is not appropriate. The first part of this article should properly be combined with Battle of Quatre Bras as it is a continuation of that event, and the last part of the article should be combined into Battle of Waterloo as much of it already duplicates parts of that article. Size will not be a problem at the Battle of Quatre Bras article. The content also needs to be seriously copy-edited to convert it out of Siborne’s flowery language, to make it more encyclopedic and more neutral. Wdford (talk) 14:37, 17 July 2016 (UTC)

OK, so this is what I thought it was. You have a torch to carry and you will blog on this page endlessly getting whatever emotional kick you are receiving for doing so. Everyone else is biased and you alone in the population of however many billions on the planet have the sole vision to correct said bias. You are therefore now empowered to drag the rest of us through your unending drivel contesting every point as hopelessly British bias. (I'm an American and actually wrote most of the Prussian segments here but never-mind.) As said banner bearer you feel free to slander the rest of us with labels and complain when our (specifically my) language isn't perfectly diplomatic. So I have looked at your edits and they actually seem fine. Muffling did stop Ziethen from leaving the British left and joining Blucher and Placenoit. (I had that in there but people are always editing) However, I object to your endless blogging. If you have a point to make then make it and your edits and move on. If you start making edits that are out of the mainline historiography without stating they are a minority view I'll revert them. Stop wasting my time, stop wasting the other editors time. I'm asking everyone to stop feeding this guy.Tirronan (talk) 17:25, 17 July 2016 (UTC)

Notes on Quatre Bras and Wavre as pertains to this article: It is my opinion that Wavre should be listed as French tactical victory/strategic defeat. I do not agree with British tactical victory/strategic defeat. What was the thinking on that point? The British had won then retreated in communications with their allies and rejoined at the right battlefield at the right time. That to me would say British tactical and strategic victory. Both commanders in this case understood that even if they could continue to hold the battlefield that they should not. (Blucher could have come thundering back down the road with 90,000 troops) The French held the interior lines of communication between Ligny and Quarta Bras. That would be a stupid battle on the 6th Coalition's part. Thus the retreat to Mons St. Jeans and Wavre did fulfill the goals of Wellington and Blücher at the strategic level. Regardless all three articles should be in conformation with each other.Tirronan (talk) 18:16, 17 July 2016 (UTC)

User:Wdford Please read WP:PLAGIARISM the article Waterloo Campaign: Quatre Bras to Waterloo is fully compliment with that guideline it explicitly states under Attribution "This article incorporates text from a work in the public domain: Siborne, William (1848), The Waterloo Campaign, 1815" and contains about 60 inline citations that book

User:Wdford The following source has a description of what a holding action is:

• Naveh, Shimon (3 April 2013). In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory. Routledge. pp. 20–23. ISBN 978-1-136-30925-0.

The reason why Quatre Bras and Wavre are not called actions is because they are considered to be battles in reliable sources. Whether something is a action or a battle is a matter of judgement, but in the case of two actions at Genappe they are not usually called battles. The two sources you quote for a marshal of France both presumably use the same primary source (or the more modern one is based on older secondary sources). The primary source would appear to be a somewhat inaccurate newspaper account. The second of the two sources you gave was the older one which Google mis-dates -- it was published in 1853 or 1854 (see here). It had to be published after his death! As I said above the the article Arms, titles, honours and styles of Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington quotes the London Gazette (a definitive primary source). And it is obvious that the primary source referenced by your two secondary sources is incorrect becasuse not only does it state a Marshal of France it does not mention that he was a field-marshal of Hanover. One can still go to Apsley House in London and see this field marshal baton.[12][13] Wellington's army did not fight to withdraw from Quatre Bras. The Anglo-allied had withdrawn all its infantry (apart from some skirmishers over the brigade a Genappe before the French engaged the cavalry rear-guard. You write "Well when Gneisenau retreated as darkness..." has anyone said any different? It was you who used terms like "he then abandoned his Quatre Bras position and ran for it;" no one has suggested that Gneisenau or Thielmann "ran for it".

Tirronan I think Quatre Bras was a tactical victory for Wellington because at the end of the battle he held the field. But the French gained the strategic victory by preventing him combining his army with the Prussians. Ney's orders were to push up the Brussels Road (to block Wellington or capture Brussels (which ever came first). If the Dutch had not been there on the night of the 16th then the blocking action would have taken place further north, so Ney was strategically successful. -- PBS (talk) 19:11, 19 July 2016 (UTC)

Thank you PBS for clearing up the plagiarism issue – much obliged.

The following books all note that Wellington was made a Marshal of France – apparently by the grateful King of France after being restored to the throne:

• The Life of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington by J. H Stocqueler, Volume 2, pg 306 at [14];
• A Memoir of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, by John Marius Wilson, vol II, pg 423 also 612, at [15];
• History of the Life of Arthur, Duke of Wellington, Volume 4, By Alexis Henri Brialmont, pg 371, at [16];
• Life, military and civil, of the Duke of Wellington: digested from the materials of William Hamilton Maxwell, pg 485 at [17] .

Thank you also for the Naveh link. It takes a very mechanical approach to what is a very human process, but it is interesting reading nonetheless.

By your definition of a tactical victory in your post above, Pearl Harbor in Dec 1941 was a resounding American victory and a total Japanese defeat, because the Japanese attackers all withdrew at high speed after the attack, leaving the Americans firmly "in possession of the field". Surely analysing the "result" of battles is not so simplistic?

It seems to me that Ligny should be described as a Prussian strategic victory. The reason being: Napoleon’s strategy at Ligny would not benefit from capturing the insignificant village, but rather it needed him to split the Prussians and the Allies, to shatter them individually and thereby to knock each of them out of the war before the Russians and the Austrians arrived. In the event Napoleon achieved the part about splitting them (courtesy of Wellington, who deviated from the Ligny plan about one hour after he agreed to it), but Napoleon failed to destroy the Prussian army when he had them alone at Ligny. Blucher retired in good order to fight on, and his army turned defeat into victory at Waterloo a few days later, so Ligny was thus actually a French tactical victory but a French strategic defeat. Do you agree?

The similarities between Wavre and Quatre Bras are obvious. In both cases the Coalition army was attempting merely to block a French advance, not to hold strategic ground. In both cases the Coalition army held the field successfully until nightfall. In both cases the Coalition army retreated under fire the next morning, yielding the field to the French, because the greater objective had been achieved already. The main differences are that a) at Wavre the French in turn retreated immediately to avoid annihilation, while at Quatre Bras the French charged on after the Allied army inflicting defeats on them, and b) Wellington suffered twice as many casualties at Quatre Bras as did Thielmann at Wavre. On that basis it is clearly biased to state that Quatre Bras was a French tactical defeat but that Wavre was a French tactical victory. Wdford (talk) 17:06, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Do you have a realistic expectation that the article will ever be allowed to reflect your prejudices? That the article will ever show that the British participation was negligible, that when they, grudgingly, are allowed to have had an impact they were uniformly, stupid, inept and/or cowardly? That Wellington was a cynical and lying manipulator? That the Prussians never made mistakes and were always victorious - even when their positions were overrun and their C-in-C knocked off his horse and ridden over by the French? If you do have these expectations then they will be disappointed, always and completely. Why do you persist? Urselius (talk) 11:35, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

At a guess, he persists because he's an Anglophobic Irish-American who is 16 years old and has read one book on Waterloo. Unfortunately, it was the one written by the mentally-ill paedophile who's now in jail; the "historian" whose defence to the charges of possessing 20,000 indecent images of children was that it was actually the arresting officers of the police who were the paedophiles, who along with the judge who ruled against him in a libel action, were conspiring to steal his mother's house. That was his actual defence of himself in court last month (http://www.yorkpress.co.uk/news/14612062.Historian_who_had_36_000_indecent_photos___videos_gets_two_and_a_half_years/), and that is the "historian" to whose "Germans" pottiness we owe the constant troll attacks on this page. I mean, what kind of clown writes "It seems to me that Ligny should be described as a Prussian strategic victory"? Tirailleur (talk) 10:22, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

I persist in order to protect Wikipedia from the biased, provocative and uncivil ranting of editors like Tirailleur. To answer Urselius in detail:

A) I am not prejudiced as you uncivilly allege, I am in fact seeking to avoid bias and propaganda, by ensuring the articles contain all the actual facts.

B) The British participation was not “negligible”, but the British contingent did make up less than 20% of the coalition force at the end of the day – assuming you count the Irish as British – and it is thus inappropriate to credit the British with “winning it, basically”.

C) I have never described the British soldiers or officers as stupid, inept and/or cowardly – they seem to have acquitted themselves as well as any. However Wellington himself clearly made some serious errors, which tend to be whitewashed by apologetic British authors.

D) Wellington was indeed less than entirely honest – the issue at the windmill was a serious matter that resulted in thousands of extra casualties, and his apologists cannot even agree on exactly what qualification he supposedly used to hedge his broken promise. In addition, Professor Ian Beckett, professor of Military History at the University of Kent, has written on the record that “ … adds materially to the story of Wellington’s many historical deceptions”. I found this line in the foreword which he wrote to this book here [18]. I have seen other similar comments in other works, and will add them here as I stumble across them again in future.

E) I have never said that the Prussians never made mistakes – that is yet more mendacious provocation. However it is fact that by far the most serious mistake the Prussians made was to trust Wellington’s promise to participate at Ligny. The Prussians were not thrashed at Ligny as Wellington (dishonestly) alleged – rather Pirch was driven backward a mile or so in the center just as night fell, Ziethen and Thielmann actually held their ground, Gneisenau could have kept them in place overnight and tried to pincer Napoleon at dawn, but instead he stuck to the strategic plan – avoid being separated from Wellington while keeping Napoleon busy until the rest of the coalition armies arrived. When Wellington withdraws under pursuit he is apparently a genius, so why is Gneisenau judged differently when he withdraws with no pursuit? Blucher being unhorsed is immaterial - the Prussian leadership depth was more than adequate to manage without him, as events proved. In fact Wellington was lucky that Blucher returned to command that same night - Gneisenau would have been much less inclined than Blucher to bust a gut getting to Waterloo.

We note that when Wellington accidentally encountered the enemy at Quatre Bras earlier that day he ran away, leaping his horse over his own men in his haste to get clear. No doubt that was more genius at work? Wdford (talk) 20:12, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

I do admire your knowledge and commentaries Wdford. In your honest opinion, we know Wellington arrived to speak with Blucher just before Ligny's battle started - it was at that point the Duke made his unquestionably deceitful statement that he could try to support Blucher that day when he knew full well the scattered chaos his army was in the hastily muddled up plans to draw up on Quatre-Bras [ which we know was saved by Perponcher and the Netherlands Army commanders alone in advancing to that point without orders right away; Saxe Weimer's Nassauers occupying the buildings merely just before French Guard Lancer probes ventured to the spot ]; my question is did Blucher not choose to set-up in battle positions without first confirming Wellington's true army deployments? Muffling should have engaged himself in ascertaining the true real-time position of the allied army himself; he could have seen for himself only a division and a half of Netherland troops were nearby and they were defiantly stuck at Quatre-Bras blocking Ney's route to Quatre Bras - only Picton's division were nearing the scene probably close to Genappes by 2 pm. My point being whether Wellington confirmed or deceived or not, Blucher was already stuck in battle-mode well before Wellington's appearance in person.I'm not sure if Blucher would retreat in fighting withdrawal north towards Brussels if Wellington had said he could definitely not give help since Quatre Bras was going to be hit hard imminently. A few biased readers will hate my next statement declaring the Prince of Orange sticking with his veteran subordinate generals decisions to hold Quatre Bras saved Blucher from assured overwhelming destruction and thus subsequently saved Wellington from a humiliating flight back past Brussels up to Antwerp. Wellington was not honest at all in his baloney false assurances to Blucher, but Blucher had already chosen to give battle beforehand anyway. and as point in fact, he did expose his troops badly on the slopes to what he knew would be a hellstorm of French cannonfire. I think though you somewhat detracts your obvious hefty knowledge by declaring Wellington's dramatic escape from capture or death as something comical and cowardly; much like I find the attacks by others earlier on Hofschroer peculiar re; his mysterious-laden conviction meanwhile British rock star Peter Townsend got afree pass on his more concrete evidence of similar charges.68.235.53.15 (talk) 02:01, 16 September 2016 (UTC)

Blucher did indeed choose to fight at Ligny – his reasons were given by Clausewitz here [19]; see also Uffindell & Corum, here [20]. See also Siborne pg 212 at [21]. However Blucher arranged his positions based on his understanding of the forces available to him. His lines were arranged to protect his communications with Bulow on his left (III Corps), and to facilitate the arrival of Wellington on his right (I Corps & II Corps). He did not need to confirm the status of Wellington’s units with anybody other than Wellington, who told him that an Allied Corps would arrive by 4pm. In the event Wellington never arrived, so the disposition on Blucher’s right was unnecessarily extended – and this over-extension ultimately cost him dearly.

The plan was actually a good one – if Wellington had arrived at Ligny as planned instead of D’Erlon, the battle would have been won easily. We can judge this by Napoleon’s initial reaction to D’Erlon’s arrival – Napoleon certainly realised the danger posed by an Allied attack from that angle, and obviously anticipated the enemy plan.

If the Dutch had obeyed Wellington and left Quatre Bras undefended than Blucher would indeed have been in severe difficulty at Ligny. However by the time Wellington was making false promises at the windmill, this danger had already passed. Had Ney taken Quatre Bras when he could have, there would have been no windmill promises to begin with, and at that point Blucher still had time to withdraw from the ambush, or to arrange his forces differently. Alternately if Quatre Bras had fallen to Ney before the Dutch arrived, then those very Dutch forces which held Quatre Bras on the 16th might well have joined Blucher at Ligny instead as per the original plan. Napoleon enjoyed some amazing good luck here, just as he experienced amazing bad luck with the weather that prevented him from crushing Wellington on the retreat of the 17th, and which delayed his attack at Waterloo on the 18th long enough for the Prussians to arrive and rescue Wellington.

Blucher seemingly had to choose between putting his men into the villages and buildings, or putting them on the heights and reverse slope. The heights were too far back for men at those positions to properly support the villages. Unless he gifted the natural defensive position of the stream and the string of villages/farms to the French, he had to keep his support units on the slopes behind the buildings, and thus expose them to cannon fire.

I mentioned Wellington's “dramatic escape” specifically to contrast him with Blucher, who in a similar situation lead his cavalry in person toward the enemy. Wellington went to a ball and dithered, while Blucher concentrated effectively and prepared for battle. Wellington ran from the enemy, while Blucher lead by example. Wellington promised support and then got distracted by Ney, Blucher trusted Thielemann to deal with Grouchy and dragged the rest of his army by force of will to Waterloo to rescue Wellington. Two very different men. Wdford (talk) 14:58, 17 September 2016 (UTC)

If it hadn't been for Wellington and the British none of the others would have been at Waterloo to win in the first place. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.215 (talk) 16:31, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

True. In that case the Prussians would have fought a slow rearguard action back along their lines of communication towards Prussia, until the huge Russian and Austrian armies came up behind them - about two weeks at most. Then the three combined armies would have smashed Napoleon back to Paris - unless he woke up and negotiated a truce quickly first, which is unlikely since nobody trusted him anymore and his army was heavily outnumbered. The presence or absence of the British army and their continental Allies would not have changed the outcome much at all. What's your point? Wdford (talk) 21:50, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

Napoleon's backside decisive?

"Mysteries at the Museum" TV series argued that it could have been. Au contraire, says:

References

— Preceding unsigned comment added by NanooGeek (talk • contribs) 01:48, 17 March 2017 (UTC)

Duke of Marlborough

see also Talk:Battle_of_Waterloo/Archive_10#reconnaissance

In 1705 the Châteaux Frischermont was for a time the headquarters of the Duke of Marlborough. While here Marlborough wrote that the escarpment of Mont-Saint-Jean would be a good place to defend Brussels if it was attacked from the south.

Is there any evidence that Wellington or his staff knew of Marlborough's thoughts on this battle field. -- PBS (talk) 19:08, 21 October 2016 (UTC)

• "Napoleon and the legends of Waterloo". www.belgique-tourisme.be.
  • slide 5: The Battle of Waterloo that never was. Marlborough’s!: The plain of Waterloo was familiar to military strategists long before 1815. Located at the gates of Brussels, and crossed by a paved highway greatly coveted by armies, it had been repeatedly used as a battlefield. For example, on 17 August 1705, it witnessed a battle between the troops led by Marlborough (the one in the popular French song!) and those under Jacques Pastur ...
  • slide 6: The victory of the husband of Madame Sans-Gêne: Military academies teach about another Battle of Waterloo: the one which took place on 6 and 7 July 1794 between the troops led by generals Kléber and Lefebvre, husband of the famous “Madame Sans-Gêne”, and those of the Austro-Dutch allies. ...

-- PBS (talk) 23:38, 17 December 2016 (UTC)

Battle of Fleurus (1794)

In 1794 the Austrians, acting on the same line as Blucher now, and defeated on nearly the same ground in the battle of Fleurus, commenced a retreat towards the Rhine, which soon carried them away from their English and Dutch Allies under the Duke of York; and their so doing gave a decided advantage to the French invaders of Belgium, which from that hour was never lost. Napoleon was too close a student of the revolutionary wars not to be fully aware of these facts.

— Chesney Waterloo lectures

• Chesney, Charles Cornwallis (1874), Waterloo lectures: a study of the campaign of 1815 (3rd ed.), London: Longmans, Green, p. 142

--PBS (talk) 10:56, 15 May 2017 (UTC)

Animated map of battle

I'm just going to leave this link here for anyone who is interested. It's an animated map of the full battle, step-by-step, in high-speed, without any narration or analysis. The labels are in French, but it can still be easily understood. It's very simple but well made. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhuPbXJ9wVc

— Marcus^(talk) 22:16, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

Very nice. Thanks - gives me inspiration to try and get my own planned version up.Joey123xz (talk) 03:22, 5 August 2017 (UTC)