Talk:Battle of Passchendaele/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

The verdict of history

Edmonds, J. OH 1917 II.

Does anyone have views on historians' judgements on 3rd Ypres? I have these as pro-(British)success:

Hussey, J. The Flanders Battleground and the Weather in 1917

Griffiths, P. The effects of weather conditions of the Third Battle of Ypres, 1917

Sheldon, Jack (2007). The German Army at Passchendaele

Sheldon, J. The German Army at Cambrai

Simpson, A. The operational role of British corps command on the Western Front, 1914-18

Terraine, J. The Road to Passchendaele

Marble, S. The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less: The Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918, 2001

Lee, J. Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 September 1917

Sheffield, G. and Todman, D. Command and Control on the Western Front, The British Army's Experience 1914–1918 (2004)

Freeman, J. A Planned Massacre? British Intelligence Analysis and the German Army at the Battle of Broodseinde, 4 October 1917

Robbins, Simon (2005). British generalship on the Western Front 1914–18: Defeat into Victory

and these as 'failure'

Liddell Hart

Lloyd George

Doughty?

Denis Winter

Wolff?

MacDonald?

ThanksKeith-264 (talk) 10:40, 25 January 2012 (UTC)

S. Marble (it's online) does not say 3Y was "a success", other than to observe that the British artillery were getting good at their jobs, with which most of us would probably agree. He says (and his comments on Gough's failure are instructive, and tally with the comprehensive verdict of those who knew the man and were in a position to judge - it wasn't just a wet August that did for him):

"The Third Battle of Ypres famously did not go as planned, and later phases literally bogged down in mud that drowned men and horses. The first assault was on 31 July; it gained ground in unimportant sectors but was fiercely counter-attacked in key sectors, and the overall British gains were operationally unimportant ... Gough... tried to maintain a high tempo of operations. There were attacks every few days, not necessarily very large and generally poorly prepared. Gough was trying to wring the last benefits out of the massive preliminary bombardment rather than treating his subsequent attacks as separate operations. Most of the attacks failed, some gaining no ground, others unimportant ground, and others being rebuffed by German counterattacks ... (after the handover) Plumer regained the counter-battery edge that had eroded in August when Gough switched the artillery to other targets, and Plumer also extensively bombarded the defenses. In large measure he did this by concentrating guns to a greater extent than previously; he simply had more material to work with, and he took his time to make sure things were done properly. He took about a week between each bite to build supply routes, rotate in fresh infantry, familiarize the troops with the ground, and bombard adequately. His operations tempo was slower than Gough's, but he was more successful. He gained ground, held his gains, and was chewing up the German reserves. The Germans tried various tactical changes to stop or throw back the British infantry, but only increased their own losses ... there was a dim realization that momentum had to be built up via a bombardment. That the Royal Artillery was able to do so well in such an unfavorable sector as the Ypres Salient suggests that the same effort would have been even more successfully applied elsewhere. Plumer's successes brought pressure from Haig to increase the tempo of the advance, and Plumer yielded somewhat."

IIRC Terraine doesn't really claim 3Y as a victory the way he does the Somme, although rather cheekily he invites the reader to draw that conclusion in R2P by limelighting quotes from Kuhl and Trenchard. For a really damning verdict on Third Ypres try John Keegan (1998) - "the point of Third Ypres defies explanation" for its effect on British morale and burning up of British manpower. But there are plenty of others, including some from the 50th anniversary in 1967 when it was still recent history. Some of it is mistaken, eg. AJP Taylor's History of WW1 which shaped the views of a generation. But mythology grows up for a reason. Paulturtle (talk) 14:32, 26 January 2012 (UTC)

Conclusion

I'm inclining towards a conclusion summarising historians' and politicians' verdicts along these lines

'Writers like Liddell Hart, Lloyd George, Tim Travers, Ben Elton and Denis Winter have called the Third Battle of Ypres a British failure; others say it was not a 'military' failure but a Pyrrhic victory, some like the British Official Historian and General von Kuhl called it a success. Research (particularly in primary sources) over the last 25 years suggests that the British commanders, including Gough, thought carefully about what they were doing and adapted quickly to new conditions. An attempt to take Passchendaele Ridge was extremely difficult, due to the skill and determination of the German army and the problems of trying to attack without great advantages in numbers, technology or tactics. The course of the battles of Arras and the French battles of the Nivelle Offensive earlier in the year suggest that it would have been impossible to avoid a Passchendaele-like campaign, no matter where and when the Germans were engaged. Smaller limited operations like Messines Ridge, Hill 70, the Second Offensive Battle of Verdun and Malmaison were strikingly successful but would not in themselves force the German army out of France. This was not because of poor generalship but a form of warfare conducted with the means made available by industrialisation, fought by two closely matched opponents, both of whom made mistakes but fought with determination, skill and technology.'

any thoughtsKeith-264 (talk) 21:47, 25 January 2012 (UTC)

Those who claim success for 3Y usually do so only in the most tenuous terms. Kuhl - depends which translation you look at - did he say it was "fully justified" or "not entirely in vain"?

Be very wary of "research" that claims to be "new" and relies on a naiively literal reading of documents - certain web-based pundits tend to be quite prone to this kind of thing, once you get beyond being impressed by their knowledge and look at the weird and wonderful theories they advance. At its worst this is simply a source of crass error when some idiot like Winter makes "deductions" from a document, unaware of the context (eg. Henry Wilson's infamous order to ditch equipment in August 1914 which Mosier thought "proved" the British were "routed" at Mons - in fact iirc the order was issued in error and was largely ignored). 3Y was 95 years ago - not the era of Charlemagne - the secondary narrative and its evolution, continuous since the events in question, is also evidence. Plenty of people who were in a position to know, and who were still alive in the late 40s and early 50s when the narrative was being formed, thought Gough was an idiot, that DH was intent on achieving a victory by "penetration" (whatever these gents were canny enough to commit to paper - almost anyone can be made to look like a far-sighted genius if you rely only on extrapolating from that they committed to paper), that DH's "worries about French morale" were a lesser factor or possibly even largely invented afterwards, or that the operation had gone horribly wrong in Gough's hands.

Whatever happened, a lot of men were going to die, but the poor generalship was persisting in 3Y when there were better uses of time and energy, eg. conducting limited attacks elsewhere and waiting a year for the Americans to turn up. This was the verdict of everyone outside GHQ at the time, incl French generals and British politicians and generals in London. LG bears a lot of the blame, both for a) putting DH in the position where he felt he had to go hell for leather in 1917 and b) letting him do so, possibly (certainly Henry Wilson thought so) in a deliberate piece of cynicism. What the Germans thought at the time is not clear - we only know what they claimed after they had lost the war.

Also be wary of argument that relies on hindsight and omits the fog of war, eg. "3Y inflicted x amount of damage on the Germans, therefore it was fully justified in that it pushed the Germans x% closer to defeat." Key people at the time did not know for certain how much damage the other side was suffering or what the future held. Given the way morale had snapped in other countries the politicians were absolutely right to grow worried that DH was expending men and munitions (and making clearly exaggerated claims about German losses) for minimal apparent result, at the very moment when a wad of German reinforcements were about to turn up. Unlucky with the weather, sure - but he also would have been sacked at the end of the year of there had been any obvious replacement.

I have a lot of material on 1916-17, but am not ready to start posting yet.Paulturtle (talk) 14:32, 26 January 2012 (UTC)

Most of the scholarship of the last 25 years can be found in PhD theses not pot-boilers and interweb crack-pots. I got Harris's book from the library today and at a glance the 3Y chapter seems to agree with the facts of the post revisionists but disagree with their explanation. Quite a lot of the mud and blood interpretation relies on hindsight and the worst example of hindsight I've found is in OH 1917 II! Notice how many people slight it and then use it as the basis of their own books?

conducting limited attacks elsewhere and waiting a year for the Americans to turn up.

This seems the only alternative strategy, yet in Haig's memo of 8 Oct 17 he demolishes it. If you reject contemporary records as inherently unsound, what else have you got? Historians' judgements and the comments of those who were there are surely more prone to ex post facto distortion than rigged BEF paperwork (apparently 17 miles of shelving worth by 1918). I think it would really help the article for an out-and-out 'the British failed-ist' to go through it but despite asking several times the military history 'establishment' on Wiki plays dead. As for Gough, The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18 Andrew Simpson is free on ethos, he thinks that Gough was much improved in 1917.Keith-264 (talk) 16:42, 26 January 2012 (UTC)

Much of the main critique of Third Ypres, that DH was consuming British resources at the moment when the balance of power might be about to swing in Germany’s favour, was being made at the time, by French generals, by British politicians and increasingly by British generals, and continues yet.

I did not say that contemporary records are “inherently unsound” or to be rejected. I said that they need to be understood in the context of other evidence, not taken literally. For example, just because X writes a memo to his boss saying “it’s really difficult, can’t guarantee success this year, indeed we may only be able to make a little progress” does not in itself prove that X is a borderline genius who foresaw how long it would take, or that he only ever seriously intended to make limited progress, and that generations of historians who have claimed otherwise are “wrong”. What you say about PhD theses may or may not be true, although for top-level who-said-what-to-whom there probably isn’t a great deal new to say and a lot of the tactical research is probably rediscovering stuff which would have been obvious to the likes of Wynne and Edmonds. The danger is that people start cherry-picking evidence to suit themselves, which is why, for purposes of Wikipedia at any rate, it is preferable to make sure the analysis is filtered through the views of reputable historians.

The British Cabinet rejected the Petain Option earlier in the year, hoping for some kind of western front victory, and once it was clear that neither France nor Italy were going to take the lead that made it much harder to resist the joint advice of DH, Robertson and Jellicoe back in June.

Haig’s memo of 8 October 1917 does not “demolish” the Petain Option – it does not even address it. It simply asserts that the best way is to send all available materiel for further attacks on the Western Front. Now, allowance must be made for the fact that DH was writing after Broodseinde – the one moment of 3Y when Big Results seemed possible – and before the fiasco of Poelcappelle, but even so, given that he was asked for his views on the effect of Russia dropping out he got a poor mark for “not answering the question”. LG told H Wilson the memo was “preposterous” and said something equally rude about in his memoirs. Robertson thought the memo “splendid” in a post which reveals his own fragile and insecure state (“I have big feet”), but nobody else did, and it was what prompted the War Cabinet to seek a second opinion from French and HW. Again, allowance must be made for the fact that HW was – one presumes – already angling for Robertson’s job, but his argument was (I paraphrase from memory) that although the Western Front was still the key front, staff college concepts were all very well but 3Y was not the decisive time or place and the decisive numbers did not exist. Robertson had to be carefully handled as the Tory ministers would have brought down the government had he resigned at this point, but even DH’s ally Derby found HW’s arguments “too unanswerable”.

All of this is covered in Terraine R2P (the late John Terraine was a fine and honest historian, even if his opinions did occasionally veer off into silliness, like claiming that the War Cabinet were acting unconstitutionally by taking advice from other generals).

Just as an aside, DH’s 8 Oct 17 memo mentions that the French are staunch in defence and good for limited attacks, and indeed DH was urging Petain to attack at this point, so whatever the reasons were for persisting with 3Y by then, Saving the World probably wasn’t one of them. (There are of course those who argue that DH did not share his concerns about the French with the British War Cabinet, for fear they would veto his offensive, and some of them doubtless believe such behaviour, if true, is acceptable in a senior general. Believe what you will.)

As for Gough, Simpson’s chapter is complex so I need to reread it with a clearer head than I had when I got home last night, but Sheffield is scathing about his Somme performance in “Command & Control” (as is Prior – he dismisses him in a single para of the conclusion!) so if he improved in 1917 it was from a low base. The poor reputation of Fifth Army, so much so that officers of all ranks seem to have dreaded serving under Gough is quite hard to explain away altogether.Paulturtle (talk) 15:36, 27 January 2012 (UTC)

Funny that you mention Terraine R2P because that's one of the sources I find most convincing. Much of your point of view sees to come from your research into the 'politico-strategic' sphere which I would think leaves records much more prone to distorton and charlatanry; I doubt you'd buy a used car from LL G. If you're familiar with the difference between tactics, operations and strategy then I think that much of the wirting about Haig can be deconstructed using it as a heuristic. Harris's recent book seems to me to be a classic case of a writer lacking clarity on which criterion he's basing judgements. One minute he interprets Haig's behaviour according to the tactical situation then adduces a matter to do with operations or strategy as evidence or vice-versa. Haig's memo seems to be clear that you can't fight a war without fighting, that the foundation of the Central Powers' war effort was the German army and that Britain's allies were a seriously wasted asset by mid-1917. I think that the addition of the strain of defending Flanders in late 1917 to the cost of fighting the war from 1914 is what led the German leadership to hazard all on their version of the Nivelle Offensive in March 1918. Surely if there was any prospect of digesting the conquests in the east the Germans would have taken it and stayed on the defensive in the west in 1918? Why the hurry when US troops were only filling the gap left by the Russians?

Much of the main critique of Third Ypres, that DH was consuming British resources at the moment when the balance of power might be about to swing in Germany’s favour.

So the British army/allies had a comparative advantage in 1917, it wouldn't last and they tried to make the most of it. Isn't that what the Germans did in early 1918? Clearly operations which weakened both sides in 1917 would be more expensive for the Germans than comparable efforts when their numbers in the west increased, British casualties in 1918 show that. Cambrai was the first time that the Germans got a boost from the eastern front peace dividend, just when Haig had to send troops from Flanders to Italy. If the British army was that badly damaged by 3rd Ypres how did it manage to fight another battle and bail out the Italians? Imagine if the Germans hadn't been battered somewhere after the Nivelle gig ended. Jack Sheldon is no Haig apologist but he ends his book on Cambrai with (my paraphrase) The experience of the failure to contain the British attacks at Ypres and the drastic reduction in areas of the western front which could be considered 'quiet', after the tank and artillery surprise at Cambrai left the German Oberste Heeresleitung with little choice but to stake all on offensive action early in 1918. Sheldon, J. The German Army at Cambrai, p. 312. He got a lot of that from Der Weltkrieg which is also one of Terraine's sources.Keith-264 (talk) 10:23, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

You are entitled to “think” what you like, but it’s best to argue from the basis of as wide a range of evidence as possible. Nobody is suggesting that you can win a war without fighting, simply that there is a bigger picture which also needs to be engaged with. There is also extensive treatment of the DH 8 Oct 17 memo in David Woodward “Lloyd George and the Generals” (1983) – Woodward is also the author of a sympathetic biog of Robertson.

Politicians are – most of them – not stupid (several of them – Smuts, Curzon, Milner were academically brilliant fwiw – Milner thought the Allies were at “the eleventh hour” that autumn). Their scribblings are subject to the same rules of evidence as anyone else’s, and indeed have usually been raked over more thoroughly, and by better historians, than a lot of the purely military stuff. LG’s claim in his memoirs that Robertson withheld information about 3Y from him is almost certainly false, as is DH’s claim, ten years later, that Petain had been begging him for help well into the autumn – in both cases they are contradicted by contemporary evidence. On the other hand LG’s remark at the time that the 8/10/17 memo was “preposterous” is an historical fact, as is the fact that the rest of the War Cabinet agreed and were persuaded by HW’s analysis not by DH’s. As already noted above, it was by no means clear to the politicians at the time that British morale and manpower resources were not going to run out before the Germans cracked, and their view was that DH had had more than enough of a chance.

Jack Sheldon is a fine historian but to assess Cambrai, as he does, without any reference to the UK domestic political situation is a grievous omission – the important things weren’t that a break-in was achieved, it was that a) it stalled, a fact blamed at the time on lack of reserves (some sent to Italy, some killed at 3Y) and b) the counterattack which was an utter embarrassment, costing DH his press support and what remained of his political credibility after 3Y, was one of the final nails in Robertson’s coffin, and was one of the reasons why LG was not interested in listening when Derby and Robertson warned him that winter that reinforcements were needed to resist the imminent German offensive.

The Allied advantage in 1917 is not comparable to the German advantage in early 1918. The Allied advantage was only going to grow larger with time, provided they managed to sustain public patience by containing losses and winning a few headline victories against Turkey (to take a slightly tangential analogy, the American Civil War was won largely by attrition, but Sherman and others had to win enough headline victories to get Lincoln re-elected – Grant’s attrition in Virginia was not, in itself, enough, and indeed would have looked moronic had Lincoln lost the 1864 election). That is why it was not necessarily sensible for the Allies to overplay their hand in 1917. Operations which weakened both sides were not necessarily sensible if they left the British facing a much-reinforced German Army – which is what happened.

There is very little evidence that the Germans were planning any major offensives in 1917, apart from some small-scale stuff at St Quentin and on the Chemin des Dames, whatever Kuhl later claimed.

The excellence of British artillery was a pretty small part of the reason for Germany’s do-or-die offensives in 1918. Certainly, the Allies had learned how to conduct relatively successful offensives, but given the balance of resources in the first half of 1918 they were not in a position to conduct any. The German outnumbered them, which is why the British War Cabinet vetoed any continuation of 3Y. Ludendorff & his cronies had a choice of attacking, with a slim chance of winning some kind of knock-out against Britain or France before the Americans arrived, or else defending, in which case German morale - domestic and military - would have dwindled and they might well have been made to walk the plank sooner or later.Paulturtle (talk) 14:26, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Sheldon wrote a book on the German army not British domestic policy. His value is in resurrecting German sources and uncovering others, particularly to us monoglots. Does any of your exposition above address the other side of the hill? I suggest that you take more notice of war aims - being on the winning side was important but having the main say at the peace conference qua allies was also important. The Nivelle gig was a sign of French weakness and desire to win the war while still playing the principal role, the Germans were in the same boat in early 1918. Waiting for the Americans may have been viable for the French after they'd shot their bolt but conceding the initiative to the Germans in the meantime was never acceptable to the Cabinet, not with the U-boat war causing so much concern matters which Terraine's extracts in The Road.... demonstrate. Much of what passes for military history is rubbish but then much political history is too, all too often being an unreliable record of the gossip of fools and frauds. Again, would you buy a used car from Ll-G? I have footnoted according to Wiki policy and have culled information from a large number of sources. I'm not sure what the 'mainstream' view of 3rd Ypres is now since the main change I have made to the page is to add detail from sources in English from the last thirty years, much of it from secondary literature and much of it contradicting the revisionists of the 1930-1970 era by reference to contemporary records rather than polemic.Keith-264 (talk) 11:23, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

The overriding British war aim was to win, and they weren't going to achieve that if they ran out of chips first, as the War Cabinet were becoming worried they might - that was why they basically decided to wait for the Americans at the end of 1917 and LG wanted to shift more effort against the Turks. In June 1917, it was Jellicoe more than the War Cabinet who was swayed by the U-Boat threat (it's complicated), and the War Cabinet had to defer to a monolithic bloc of military advice (it is unclear how far Jellicoe was "put up to it" by others). Paulturtle (talk) 20:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Britain's chips were originally the French and Russian armies. The government could have imposed its views on the army any time it wanted, French had been given the boot after all. If they wanted rid of Haig he was gone. Jellicoe might have wet his knickers but the cabinet fretted over the Belgian coast from the moment that the Germans arrived in 1914. That's why the genesis of the battle has two parts - the general one about plans 1915-1917 and the 1917 context, Arras, Nivelle, delays. On that point, does your material on the UK political context include the fact that Haig didn't gain the authority to begin 3rd Y until about a week beforehand? Ll G was clearly not the victim of an army camarilla. Would you buy a used car from him?Keith-264 (talk) 22:21, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

It’s nowhere near as simple as that. Just because one has the right to overrule or even sack a major subordinate does not make it sensible to do so. French was removed long after he had lost the confidence of colleagues and subordinates and had been severely criticised in the press. DH still had a lot of political and press cover in mid-1917, especially after LG had made a bit of a fool of himself by the Calais/Nivelle Affair, permanently poisoning his relations with Robertson (who was increasingly sceptical of DH’s offensives, but felt he had to take his side against the politicians). The War Cabinet were very reluctant to authorise 3Y, which is partly why they waited a month after the June talks, but it would have been extremely tricky to overrule the CinC, the CIGS and the First Sea Lord all giving the same advice. All this is part of the story of 3Y, as is the fact that DH’s political cover eroded to the point that GHQ was purged and he himself would have been sacked (as the other two were) had any alternative been available. As discussed above, the War Cabinet were not fools, whether you like politicians or not.Paulturtle (talk) 19:02, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Haig & the Annales School

"the first two phases of the battle cannot be of "une durée prolongée", as you suggest", wrote DH in his letter to Nivelle of 6 January 17. What do we reckon he meant by this Braudel-esque phrase? Was Nivelle suggesting the pinning offensives and breakthrough had to be short and DH was disagreeing with him? Or were they agreeing that these phases should be brief?

(This isn't really the correct article for a ton of detail on the Nivelle Offensive, of course, except in so far as it provides necessary background and sheds light on DH's planning thoughts.)Paulturtle (talk) 14:26, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

I'd rather you didn't alter the page because you disagree with what I put there without discussing it here first.

There isn't a ton of detail on early 1917, there's an exposition of the importance of Flanders in British strategy 1914-1917 (which wasn't dictated by Haig). The decline in the French army after the breakthrough didn't materialise was one of the factors impinging on the British in the second half of the year. That's why I also put summaries of the reciprocal effect of 3rd Ypres and the rest of the war.

Duree Prolongee - is this really difficult to understand? Haig was telling Nivelle that the spring offensive couldn't be allowed to drag on since he was going to have to do the Flanders gig that year. As he wrote in the letter he hoped that the French attempt at a decisive battle would succeed quickly as intended and that it would solve the Flanders problem automatically by forcing the Germans into a general withdrawal; if not Haig wasn't willing to be bogged down in Picardy.Keith-264 (talk) 14:45, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Thankyou for sharing your opinion with me, but I am as entitled to edit the page as you are, no more and no less. Reverting edits without extremely good cause (eg. vandalism) is inflammatory and best avoided. The edits I made refer to a) a completely unnecessary direct quote, which adds nothing whatsoever to the narrative other than to take up space and more importantly is not even intelligible without commentary and b) putting an extremely tendentious opinion in the intro, where it will inevitably be read by the general reader - I have never seen this quote in any book printed in the last fifty years, so you can't seriously pretend it represents any kind of academic consensus. (The Lloyd George quote, incidentally, would be more defensible to hawk as a conclusion as it does sometimes get quoted - but I'm not suggesting that really belongs in the intro either).

The sentence about "longue duree" is ambiguous as it stands, for reasons I have explained: it is not clear whether Nivelle did or did not expect a "longue duree" and whether DH was agreeing or disagreeing with himPaulturtle (talk) 18:12, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

All the above is a matter of opinion. You didn't edit the page you took out someting because you didn't agree with it. It is sourced so you can look it up. Your reading is as synthetic as mine so what you haven't read is no grounds for removing material. Your views about intelligibility are also personal, I wouldn't make assumptions about a hypothetical reader's ability to understand plain English. In deference to your views I put an opposite conclusion so that anyone can see that opinions vary. Even J P Harris's hatchet-job on Haig doesn't go as far as you. Do you know what an intro is for?Keith-264 (talk) 18:49, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

I did not remove material - I am usually careful never to completely remove material, unless it is total rubbish, because I get so irritated by editors who cull beyond their knowledge and competence. I edited material for clarity, for reasons which I explained, added back in some material of mine which you had deleted (I'm happy to accept by accident, it's not an issue), and moved material which I do not accept as anywhere near mainstream and possibly even mistranslated to an appropriate section where it can be assessed with other views. See further down for my comments on the deleted quote and "duree prolongee". I do wish you could discuss these matters without reaching for personal insults though. Paulturtle (talk) 20:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Yet again you infer, I think I have demonstrated considerable patience. I even looked up sicheren untergang. http://en.bab.la/dictionary/german-english/untergang Keith-264 (talk) 22:32, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

It is not even clear whether the quote refers to the battle itself (I don’t dispute that had the British been a bit luckier with the weather the Germans might have been pushed out of western Belgium) – or to the entire German war effort. The latter would probably be an absurd claim, yet given the literary connotations which the word sometimes has (cf. Oswald Spengler, or the 2005 movie about Hitler in the bunker) the reader might infer that.Paulturtle (talk) 19:02, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Referee intervenes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV Editing from a neutral point of view (NPOV) means representing fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without bias, all significant views that have been published by reliable sources. All Wikipedia articles and other encyclopedic content must be written from a neutral point of view. NPOV is a fundamental principle of Wikipedia and of other Wikimedia projects. This policy is non-negotiable and all editors and articles must follow it.... "Neutral point of view" is one of Wikipedia's three core content policies. The other two are "Verifiability" and "No original research".

I think I've followed these policies but I am open to persuasion that I haven't. Dogmatic assertion about a subject that just about every writer on it calls controversial and which is historiographically fragile due to the quantity of writing that hasn't been translated into English seems to me to be insufficient.Keith-264 (talk) 19:20, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

As requested I've had a chance to read through the above few sections. The following points come to mind, in no particular order and in support of no particular thesis:

• The lede/lead (depending on your preference!) is intended to be a potted summary of the rest of the article; it should be capable of standing alone as a mini article in its own right and is therefore more akin to the abstract of an academic paper than an introduction to the article. I find it's best written last because it should broadly reflect the content of the article body, so ideally that should be stable first.
• NPOV is a core content policy but often needs to be considered in the light of WP:UNDUE. In general majority respectable viewpoints should set the article narrative, respectable minority viewpoints can be mentioned in proportion to their preponderance in the sources (this may be a paragraph, sentence or even just a footnote in the article body), and crackpot viewpoints should be ignored. It would be unusual to include a minority viewpoint in the lede because doing so might cause a reader to believe it has the same acceptance as more mainstream views. A mention that controversy exists would be appropriate along with a succinct summary if possible, but the article body is really the place to expound on the details.
• Given that the article should in general follow mainstream thought with minority views introduced at the appropriate time and with due emphasis, it may be useful to include a section examining the differences in source viewpoints (as we did with many of the Normandy articles). The danger can be that we wander away from merely documenting the differences in sources and end up interpreting them (ie indulging in WP:OR). If such a thing exists, a meta source examining the historiography of earlier sources is a real goldmine; if not, I think it can still be done but needs a very light touch. Perhaps just enough 'original' editorial commentary to link passages together and join up the narrative?

I hope this is of some use. I'm no subject expert on WWI, but I'm happy to assist in what areas I can :) EyeSerene^talk 10:39, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for that. There's room in the conclusion for a historigraphical survey which perhaps lists views of writers and groups them into periods or schools of thought. I've asked for a second opinion several times of late but the milhists seem busy on other things. My original concern about the article was the usual one I have when I read a wiki page about a subject I know something about - a historiographical obsolescence due to a shortage of references to sources from the last 15-20 years. On this subject I thnk that the orthodoxy after the war was that it was hard fought, there were plenty of mistakes but the Allies overcame theirs and won. There was then a revision which gave us the mud, blood and poetry version with 'Passchendaele' as a synonym and since 1980 (but more from 1990) a return towards the orthodoxy informed by the sort of sources used by the OH (but not available afterwards until the Official Secrets Act was relaxed) plus an interest in the fate of individuals. I think that Paul's sources reflect the middle period and mine the current one so I have tried to rewrite the lead as a simpler and more descriptive summary. (I do not accept that this is the casePaulturtle (talk) 20:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)).

I'd still like your views on what to move from the main page into the other ones. Would leaving something like a lead on the page and a link to (say) Polygon Wood suffice? ThanksKeith-264 (talk) 11:45, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I assumed that was where and why the differences are showing up :) I should probably have added above that in assessing due weight, preference is usually given to more modern sources over older ones. That would seem to place the onus on following your post-1990 sources more than others, but again some consideration has to be given to the degree of mainstream acceptance and we shouldn't just ignore or override earlier work. As always it's a narrative we're after, documenting which sources said what and when and with how much authority, and as far as possible leaving the reader to draw their own conclusions.

Assuming the leads of the linked articles are of a reasonable standard, I agree that's probably an ideal way to fill in those sections (and compliant with WP:SS). The sections can always be trimmed later if necessary. EyeSerene^talk 12:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I've been toying with listing the verdicts on 3rd Ypres (in those sources in the references section that give any) into 'pro' and 'con', since there doesn't seem to be a definitive source that does it (there are fragments along those lines in Terraine and Green but nothing like Colossal Cracks). A quantitative analysis could then be refined by following the sources in them - a lot of recent stuff leans on Prior & Wilson for example (which I find unfortunate). I would prefer to wait though as I'd like to get on moving the stuff I put on the page before Labatt made the new ones. I'm thinking of 2-3 paragraphs about the specifics ('Polygon Wood, 26 Sep blah, rain blah, not a breakthrough attack blah, tempo not interrupted by rains blah....') and developments relating them to the bald description in the lead; weather, tactical changes by both sides and results (Pilckem Ridge 2-1aet, 10 Aug 0-1 Langemarck score draw, Menin Rd 2-1, P W 2-1 Broodseinde 3-0 Poelcappelle score draw 1st Y 0-1 2nd Y 2-1) ;O). Would something about the length of the section on Broodsende be about right? By doing things piecemeal I've wished a few sync problems on myself. Oh and does 'published' include academic writing that is pdf'd and download-able off the interweb? Several of the sources I've referred to are off Ethos and Brum University, some are published as books as well and some not. British Intelligence and the German Army, 1914-1918 by James Beach turned out to be very useful on what the Germans were up to, the dog that so often doesn't bark in British writing on the Great War.Keith-264 (talk) 13:14, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Just in case that wasn't rhetorical, I'll chip in. While "published" can include such things as theses, that in no way guarantees their reliability. Even a successfully defended thesis may contain errors not caught, but without a way to know how the defence went, we'd be pretty far out on a limb using them. At best they should be treated as primary sources. LeadSongDog come howl! 16:23, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Re academic writing I think I agree. If you're referring to papers that've been published in peer-reviewed academic journals, collections of essays and the like, I think they'd be acceptable, but otherwise probably not. We can and do use primary sources on occasion but with great care and generally only to prove that what we report someone has said is indeed what they said. If there's any doubt the question can always be asked on the reliable sources noticeboard.

Re section length, the Broodsende one might be a little on the long side at the moment but frankly I think too much is better than too little :) Per WP:SS, it can sometimes be easier to add whatever content you feel is necessary to the main article and then, at a later stage, look at trimming down and moving content to daughter articles.

Re getting the German perspective, it's unfortunate that you've had no assistance from milhist but that often seems to be the case in my experience. The level of response depends on catching members with free time and similar interests, the chances of which are fairly low. Have you tried posting to Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Operation Great War Centennial (though I believe that special project isn't particularly active)? Generally the best thing is to do as you've been doing: plough on and see who else turns up. EyeSerene^talk 17:22, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Does 'published' have a criterion such as it has an ISBN? You can see the Beach thesis on Amazon but it has an ASIN only. Since a lot of academic books start as theses I find it's a lot cheaper to go to Ethos. I wouldn't assume that a published book is reliable per se and I wouldn't assume that peer review is a panacea either. Last question, what is an sfn template? Labatt's been using one and I'd like to find out how. Thanks.Keith-264 (talk) 17:48, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Good question :) WP:SOURCES and the following section on that page might go some way towards answering it. You're right that we can never really guarantee the accuracy of the sources we use, but according to policy we don't really have to. As long as there's an indication of the purported quality of the source (peer reviewed, fact checked, written by an acknowledged expert in the field etc) we pretty much have to take it on trust. I suppose it comes down to our mandate as an encyclopedia - we merely document what others have written without much in the way of editorial freedom. Ideally consulting a wide selection of sources will reveal the preponderance of respectable opinion on a subject, and we are expected to fall into line with that (while of course noting where the sources differ). Where it gets difficult is in regards to very recent sources; they may meet all other criteria but may be too recent to have achieved mainstream acceptance and therefore might need to be treated for the moment as minority or even fringe viewpoints. Not to say they can't be noted, but they shouldn't be used to take an article in a radically different direction that contradicts mainstream scholarship. Again it's the nature of how we're constrained to work - we follow not lead. EyeSerene^talk 18:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Oops, forgot. See {{Sfn}} for the shortened footnote documentation and Template:Sfn/testcases for some examples. It does look quite useful (though complicated!) EyeSerene^talk 18:19, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I find an unpublished thesis is likely fine when it has been employed as a source in academic or peer reviewed material. In the case of the Beach thesis, I believe it has been used more than a couple of times by others as a source. I noticed that Keith Jeffery used it his recent historiograpy of MI6. It appears to have also been used as a source in papers published in the journals War in History, Diplomacy and Statecraft and Intelligence and National Security. Not bad coverage for an unpublished.--Labattblueboy (talk) 13:51, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

That's encouraging, thanks. I notice that recent books have taken to putting theses in their bibliographies so perhaps Ethos etc are becoming respectable.Keith-264 (talk) 14:06, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

I don't really accept Keith's caricature of certain views as "orthodoxy" or confined to time periods, but that argument will resolve itself as more conclusions are added.

What is missing from the article, apart from conclusions, is the UK domestic political context, and to some extent I have been at fault in whingeing about this rather than posting this. That said, I have explained several times on this page why it is important and it is rather disappointing that Keith, who has done a lot of work on this article, most of it well-directed, is so reluctant to engage with this aspect of it.

There should also be a bit more detail on the writing of the Official History (again, I have material on this), as that sheds light on the way this battle was regarded by those who were involved in the planning.

All of this is a good reason to trim direct quotes a bit, not least as quotes inevitably get cherry-picked. Paulturtle (talk) 20:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Bearing in mind the controversy which we all agree is part of the battle and the writing about it then and since, I used a lot of quotations and a lot of sources other than pot-boilers. The subject has moved on quite a distance since the 90s. It isn't vital that the quotes stay if the sense of them remains. As for cherry picking, that's yet another judgemental term for a process of selection which isn't necessarily done in bad faith or incompetence. If you want to add material on the UK domestic political context then what about France and Germany? Anglocentrism is far less pronounced in the current version, it would be a shame to put it back. Having read several of the Official Histories I think that they deserve to be treated as reliable sources (i.e. subject to the usual historian's scepticism but no more). Andrew Green's work bears this out and Travers' doesn't. I would also prefer it if you avoided using terms like caricature, inferring Lloyd George or Haig's motives is tedious enough. As for the conclusion, well, all in good time, there's plenty to do in the body of the article first.

The article needs to reflect published literature by respected authors, and Third Ypres was proportionately a much larger part of the British war effort than it was of Germany’s. Holger Herwig’s lengthy account of WW1 from the German pov gives a page or two to this battle, others a chapter; Ludendorff said iirc that his heart was in the west but his head in the east, ie. that 3Y was painful but did not distract him from the job in hand of knocking Russia out. For the British it was the main blot on DH’s reputation for many years, and even now British accounts tend to devote a lot of attention to the question “why did the politicians agree to this and why didn’t they call a halt?” The article needs to reflect that. Whether or not to continue 3Y was never really a political decision in Germany, although there was some discussion as to whether or not to trade Belgium for peace (L not in favour). French comments on British antics will be included but they ain't complimentary.

The OH is a good source for matters of fact, but the mud-slinging (no pun intended) and multiple rewrites which went into its genesis shed light on the fact that even in the 1940s nobody seriously thought 3Y was a “success” in other than a very technical sense. That is why it is not really true to claim that it was ever an “orthodoxy” that the battle was much of a success. Nor is it true to say that recent books which stress improvements in British fighting technique etc (with which I have no quarrel) really alter the bigger strategic picture, nor that anyone else (eg. me) is relying on out-of-date evidence – “caricature” is a pretty mild description of this claim.

Again, this argument may resolve itself as more material is posted.Paulturtle (talk) 19:02, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Beach's thesis is called seminal in the introduction of the paperback of Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 visible on the Amazon page.Keith-264 (talk) 21:45, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

Old intro

The Battle of Passchendaele was a campaign of the First World War, taking place between July and November 1917. In a series of operations, Entente armies under British command attacked the Imperial German Army. The battle was fought for control of the ridge and village of Passchendaele (modern Passendale) near the city of Ypres in West Flanders, Belgium. The British objective of the offensive was, 'wearing out the enemy' with bite-and-hold attacks in quick succession, intended eventually to force the German army into a general withdrawal, then 'securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier'. The British commander Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig anticipated three phases in the campaign: the capture of Passchendaele Ridge, an advance on Roulers and then Operation Hush, an amphibious landing combined with an attack along the coast from Nieuport when the advance from Ypres reached Roulers.<ref>Sheffield G. The Chief, p. 227, 2011</ref> The offensive also served to distract the German army from the French armies on the Aisne, which were debilitated by mutinies in the aftermath of the Nivelle Offensive.

The repacement intro is written with the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Lead_section and recent criticism in mind.Keith-264 (talk) 09:03, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Intros always vary because they tend to be the places where random people come and scribble nowadays. The objectives are also a bit more controversial than that and may need hiving out into a separate section. I think it should just have a sentence saying the outcome of the battle is controversial otherwise we shall have to argue about which opinions (and there will be many) get quoted in the intro.Paulturtle (talk) 20:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

In general, there should be no quotes in the lead and I'd be of the view they should be removed here. The lead is a location to summarize information. In y view the last sentence should be "The British advance beyond the ridge to Roulers and the linked coastal operation did not take place and the German army managed to avoid a general withdrawal, which had seemed inevitable to them in October." Everything else after that deleted.--Labattblueboy (talk) 20:51, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I disagree, controversy is one of the notable aspects of the battle and the historiography. If you don't like the quotes, describe the polar views then and now without them, after all the arguments began during the battle.Keith-264 (talk) 21:11, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

The lead should be able to stand alone as a concise overview. It should define the topic, establish context, explain why the topic is interesting or notable, and summarize the most important points—including any prominent controversies.Keith-264 (talk) 21:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I guess I should clarify. I have no issue with a recognition of controversies, it just concerns me if the content does not relate to any material in the body of the article. Either way, quotes have got to go--Labattblueboy (talk) 21:21, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Even with this: Some material, including direct quotations[my italics] and contentious material about living persons must be provided with an inline citation every time it is mentioned, regardless of the level of generality or the location of the statement.

Even with this?: Some material, including direct quotations[my italics] and contentious material about living persons must be provided with an inline citation every time it is mentioned, regardless of the level of generality or the location of the statement.Keith-264 (talk) 22:01, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

That direction regarding direct quotations only applies to articles that are biographies. It does not apply in this case.--Labattblueboy (talk) 01:47, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Oh right. Have I been looking at the wrong page?Keith-264 (talk) 07:51, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

You've quoted WP:LEADCITE so no you haven't. I hope Labattblueboy doesn't mind me offering a correction to their above post. There's a school of thought that dislikes citations in the lead: the argument is that because the lead is a summary of the rest of the article, any information in the lead should be supported by cites where it's treated in depth in the article proper. This is a preference rather than a rule and does not apply to quotations. What is required however is that the lead should contain no 'new' information not found in the article body. Biographical articles about living people are treated as an exception to the "no citations" preference because of the need to always back up potentially controversial information wherever it's found. The potential danger of quotes in the lead is that unless chosen very carefully they could have the effect of elevating a single historian's opinion to the level of setting the tone of the entire article. As I mentioned above, it's often best to ignore the lead completely until the rest of the article is sorted :) EyeSerene^talk 09:05, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

I see, Labatt had mentioned something similar about leads a few weeks ago so had intended to leave it alone but changed it recently to try to come to terms with Paul. That backfired so I'll back off from it again. He wants more on UK policy on the page so I'm looking forward to that instead. Thanks for the time you've taken.Keith-264 (talk) 10:02, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

That is a considerable misrepresentation of the course of events. For a few weeks the only opinion in the intro was the “Untergang” quote, about which I have listed my reservations on here and which more importantly has not to my knowledge been quoted in works since the Official History over sixty years ago, so given the tendentious views, way beyond mainstream opinions, which have been aired on this page and elsewhere it is hardly surprising that I objected to its being (apparently) passed off as a considered verdict. As EyeSerene says, "The potential danger of quotes in the lead is that unless chosen very carefully they could have the effect of elevating a single historian's opinion to the level of setting the tone of the entire article". I would have objected just as strongly, and moved it elsewhere, had there been a vehemently-anti quote. Now Keith seems to have a great deal more time on his hands than some of the rest of us (which does not of course entitle me to special treatment), but I shall do my level best to get something posted this weekend, as it is obviously not reasonable to pontificate on talk pages without ever posting anything. Paulturtle (talk) 19:02, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Objectives, Duree Prolongee, etc

Why did Haig want Nivelle’s Offensive to be brief? This is a classic example of how a great deal of analysis of this type boils down to close reading of documents which have been in the public domain for fifty years or more, and that one needs to read widely and understand the documents in context, rather than deciding first, then finding what one wants to find by selective and often naively literal quotation. The Blake edition of DH’s papers is the fullest easily available.

To recap, phase 1 is pinning offensives by the British at Arras and the French on the Oise, phase 2 is Nivelle’s breakthrough on the Aisne, phase 3 is pursuit & exploitation and phase 4 refers to an Ypres Offensive in the event of 2 or 3 failing.

DH wrote in his diary (Blake p188) of his 20 Dec 16 meeting with Nivelle “He is confident of breaking though the enemy’s front now that the enemy’s morale is weakened, but the blow must be struck by surprise and go through in 24 hours. This necessity for surprise is after all our own conclusion. Our object on the Somme was the relief of Verdun, and to wear out the enemy’s forces with a view to striking the decisive blow later, when the enemy’s reserves are used up.” (Note DH is either fibbing or kidding himself in the final sentence – documents from 1916 show that at the time he thought the Germans had been “worn down” enough by Verdun that the initial Somme attack could be decisive, but that’s a debate for another occasion.)

Charteris (quoted in R2P) wrote that DH was sceptical after the 20 Dec 16 meeting that Nivelle could achieve the breakthrough. Terraine notes that this doesn’t really tally with DH’s account of the meeting, but I would point out that Charteris’ diary was published in 1931. Although it is often put about that DH’s papers were all falsified, they are vast in quantity, the published selections have all been prepared by proper historians and it seems to me more likely that it was Charteris who was emphasising, over a decade later, aspects of DH’s thoughts that showed his old boss in a better light.

Terraine quotes Nivelle as saying that if Phase 3 failed there would still be plenty of time for Phase 4 in good weather, but on 4 Jan 17 (Blake p189) DH records that Nivelle’s writeup of the 20 Dec 16 meeting had just reached him, and that Nivelle had, despite verbal assurances at the meeting, omitted any promise that if Nivelle’s offensive failed Nivelle would, by mid June, take up line up to the Ancre to free up British reserves for Phase 4. The purpose of the 6 Jan letter was to get this promise in writing.

Blake does not include the ambiguous sentence about “duree prolongee” in his fuller version of the 6 Jan letter.

On 6 Jan 17 (Blake pp190-1) DH wrote to Nivelle that he had not agreed to “an indefinite continuation of the battle to use up the enemy’s reserves (Phase I). Such continuation might result in a prolonged struggle, like that on the Somme this (sic) year, and would be contrary to our agreement that we must seek a definite and rapid decision”. DH is clear, in the rest of the letter, that he won’t commit to Phase 3 unless there is a good chance of it being successful enough to lead to a German withdrawal from the Belgian Coast (this was part of the reason why LG intervened and tried, clumsily, to place DH under Nivelle’s direct command).

It is simply not clear from any of this whether Nivelle thought phase 1 (pinning offensives by the British at Arras and the French on the Oise) should be brief or not, or whether this was DH’s insistence to avoid a long Somme-type battle. It does rather suggest that it’s not just a matter of Dh wanting to attack in Flanders – he also wanted something quicker and more decisive than the Somme, and if phase 3 was going to drag on without leading to some kind of general withdrawal, then he wanted his own separate shot. There is evidence (below) that DH thought phase 4 (what became 3Y) could also be quick and decisive.

The late Robert Blake was as pukka an historian as they come (and as well as being an army officer had been in MI6!). He was writing, aged in his 30s (ie. still with a reputation to make), when some key players were still alive and there were still oral trails now gone cold. His view was that DH’s papers did not give any clear answer as to what the real objects of 3Y were (note that it was already a “dispute”), but his reading of the evidence was that DH’s objects were, in order of importance, 1) winning a decisive victory, 2) knocking out the U-Boats, even though the threat from Zeebrugge was exaggerated, and 3) there is some evidence of worries about French morale (Blake has to explain away the fact that DH never shared his concerns with the frocks, but rejects the charge that this one was completely invented as a posthumous excuse for 3Y – but note that the charge was serious enough to be worth answering, and that nobody was trying to trumpet 3Y as a “victory” in anything other than a very limited and technical sense – that hasn’t changed!). Note also that Blake does not even entertain the view that DH was aiming at inflicting attrition for its own sake, in– a view shared by most other historians.

As for the genesis of 3Y (Phase 4 as it still was at that time):

Kiggell to Plumer 6 Jan 1917 (quoted in R2P p26) “It is therefore to be anticipated that the enemy will have been severely handled and his resources drawn away ... it is essential that the plan should be based on rapid action and entail the breaking through of the enemy’s defences on a wide front without any delay ... the object of these operations is to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and to free the Belgian Coast. The immediate intention is to break through the enemy defensive systems ... with the object of securing the line Roulers-Thourout and, by advancing in a north-easterly direction, to threaten the coast defences in rear” The Belgians and French were also to attack further north.

This document is a smoking gun, making plain that the object of 3Y was decisive victory via breakthrough . Kiggell, whatever his other shortcomings, was a smart man and can be presumed to know DH’s mind unless proven otherwise – particularly when giving the job description for the next major offensive!

Tavish Davidson of GHQ (instructions quoted in R2P p27) was also explicit that Plumer’s initial plan was rejected for overcaution, and that the Germans would be left “weak” by the Nivelle Offensive and vulnerable to an offensive that moved quicker than the Somme. Tavish (although famous for his memo recommending shallower “bites” in summer 1917) was one of those who was claiming as late as the 1950s that DH’s real object at 3Y was a decisive victory, whatever he committed to paper about “wearing out and having a goal”. The “real object” of decisive victory via breakthrough, of course, doesn’t show up much in the document trail, apart from the occasional smoking gun like the ones I’ve quoted (just as before the Somme it took the form of DH occasionally letting slip that he wanted a cavalry pursuit like Murat after Jena etc) – it took the form of putting Gough in charge, chivvying him to get a gait on – a message which Gough then passed down the command chain etc etc. It also took the form of DH’s infamous presentation to the War Cabinet (6/17) where he moved his hands over the map and, as has been said, LG never forgave the little finger of DH’s left hand (caveat: assuming LG was telling the truth – but Hankey was still alive in the 1930s and I’m not aware he refuted the claim, as Carson did a number of LG’s whoppers about how he invented convoys etc).

I take the point that DH told the frocks in summer 17 that Nivelle’s failure meant that more “wearing out” was needed – but then this is sort of true by definition and DH always said this kind of thing after every failed “decisive” blow, especially if he knew he was on the record. (Just as he always said, but seldom in an official memo, that victory might be round the corner – whilst DH was eventually vindicated, I rather agree with de Groot that one shouldn’t go overboard with praising DH for the Hundred Days as he had been saying the same thing like a stuck record for years).

I also take the point that WW1 cavalry divisions did not have the firepower to conduct strategic penetration and destroy enemy communications like a 1940 panzer division, and the German armies, if “broken through”, would probably have shuffled back shoulder-to-shoulder like they did in 1918, at any rate until their morale crumbled altogether. Breakthrough would not, in itself, have led to rout.

So, what relevance does this have for the article? The objectives of Third Ypres are just as much a matter of debate as the outcome (and that is the opinion of historians who can be referenced in the article, not original documents which are quoted here solely for illustrative purposes). And sticking in an ambiguous quote about the planned length of Nivelle’s attack probably isn’t wise.Paulturtle (talk) 20:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

You're referring to Haig's diary and I was referring to Haig's letter to Nivelle which comes in a sequence and is related to Terriane's narrative of the Cabinet's insistence on the Flanders gig in 1917, Nivelle's assurances that his decisive battle would make the Flanders gig redundant and Haig making it clear that he wasn't putting all his eggs in Nivelle's basket. You can read Terraine's excerpts or you can look in the Appendix volume for OH 1917 I.

one needs to read widely and understand the documents in context, rather than deciding first, then finding what one wants to find by selective and often naively literal quotation. The Blake edition of DH’s papers is the fullest easily available.

I think you would do well to heed your own advice. Clearly your mind is made up as is your preference for psychological exegesis. If you claim that a document is a fraud then you can't object if one you trust is also dismissed. If you look at the battles on the western front they all resemble slower, bloodier versions of Gorlice-Tarnow (1915), regardless of whether they were fought by the British, French or Germans. The front began to unstick in the second half of 1916 and by 1918 turned into a concertina,

Plumer’s initial plan was rejected for overcaution, and that the Germans would be left “weak” by the Nivelle Offensive and vulnerable to an offensive that moved quicker than the Somme.

Plumer's plan represented an evolution in a process that began in 1915. Gough's plan was an amendment which (in short) was Plumer's plan plus an arrangement for an opportunistic advance by separate troops where the Germans folded while the main force consolidated. Davidson recommended a depth of no more than 3,000 yards and that's what Gough arranged except for a small area where the objective was 3,500 yards. Haig and Gough wanted to move quicker by a higher tempo not by deeper advances. In the middle period they managed it and pulverised the Germans. Even with the October rains the Germans were hanging on by their fingernails in November.

A decisive victory freeing the Belgian coast clearly not a strategically decisive victory like the one Nivelle planned then. Note also that plans change and that what might have seemed on on 6 January wouldn't necessarily seem on on the 7th. If Haig aimed at a breakthrough why didn't the plan for 31 July reflect that intention?

As for the Somme and 3rd Ypres, British Intelligence and the German Army, 1914-1918 by James Beach has a lot of material which tells us a lot about what the Germans were doing behind the line and what the British thought they were doing and what they were going to do about it. Same goes for Simpson, Marble, Sheffield et al. This makes the shrewder historians who are tertiary sources look more convincing when they explain events in structural-functionalist terms rather than ego. The claim that Haig planned a breakthrough offensive over Rawlinson's head is moonshine. What he did do was ensure that arrangements had been made to exploit an opportunity if it offered. What did he do with his 'strategic reserve' (Reserve Army) after 1st July? He put it in the line and sent 4th army round the flank of the high ground.Keith-264 (talk) 22:02, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

You're referring to Haig's diary and I was referring to Haig's letter to Nivelle which comes in a sequence ... You can read Terraine's excerpts or you can look in the Appendix volume for OH 1917 I. ..I think you would do well to heed your own advice (to read widely and understand the documents in context). Clearly your mind is made up as is your preference for psychological exegesis. If you claim that a document is a fraud then you can't object if one you trust is also dismissed.

With great respect Keith, I must ask you to be more polite and to read other people’s posts more carefully before rushing to denigrate. Anyone who reads what I’ve posted on this page can see that I have read Terraine. The 6 Jan 17 document which I quote is exactly the same letter which you have seen, except that Blake quotes it more fully, along with other docs, but minus the ambiguous sentence about duree prolongee which set my historiographic minefield alarm ringing. I did not claim any document is a fraud, nor dismiss any document altogether, nor should you dismiss any of the ones I’ve quoted. My mind is not “made up”, other than that to observe that DH’s intentions at 3Y remain a bit of an open question, a view shared by better historians than me, despite what one sometimes finds in certain quarters about how "no breakthrough was ever intended" or "attrition was always top priority".

Given the much lower force-space ratio in the east, and the eventual major Russian retreat in 1915, I’m not sure Gorlice-Tarnow is really a very helpful comparison, nor do I think it’s really very useful to spin Gough’s planning as just a minor amendment to Plumer’s. I agree that “Haig and Gough wanted to move quicker by a higher tempo ...”, but the point is that if Plumer or Currie had been in charge the moves would probably have been slower and more concentrated and methodical, as they were in the middle period (greatly helped, of course, by the much better weather) and at the very end. Note that Plumer “agreeing with” Gough’s plan when asked doesn’t really prove much – Gough himself, when reminded 30 years later, basically said “well he would say that, wouldn’t he”. Plumer may just have been disinclined to start a major row by saying he thought that the plan of a colleague (the boss’ golden boy) was poor, or any number of other reasons.

If Haig aimed at a breakthrough why didn't the plan for 31 July reflect that intention?

Because there were lots of German defence lines, many of them far beyond field artillery range, and it wasn’t going to be achieved in one go. Certainly there were reserves ready to exploit later on, around the time of Broodseinde.

Marble has already been discussed on this page – I posted an extract. His view of Gough’s generalship is not high.Paulturtle (talk) 19:02, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

UK domestic political context

"What is missing from the article, apart from conclusions, is the UK domestic political context."

I don't want to go round in circles any more but I would like to see what you have in mind about this. If it's in another page perhaps you could put a link to it on the Pdaele page?Keith-264 (talk) 19:58, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Diet

I have slimmed the main page by moving paragraphs of detail to the linked pages. Where the paragraphs have duplicates already there I have taken the ones from the main page and put them here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Keith-264/sandbox for the moment so any sync problems cn be cured. Keith-264 (talk) 07:48, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

Archive

Does anyone know how to set up an archive for this page? I obviously don't....Keith-264 (talk) 08:01, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

Ahem! There already was one....Keith-264 (talk) 08:34, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

"Notes"

I wonder if we're exploiting the full benefit of putting some of the more recondite information on the page in notes? Trouble is I don't know how, there's a help page which is as unhelpful as usual and copying the note in the lead didn't work. Any suggestions? ThanksKeith-264 (talk) 08:26, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

Notes aren't too complicated. Use something along the lines of; {{#tag:ref|The stuff you want to say|group="Note"}}

The note will appear in the Notes subsection, so long as there is a {{reflist|group="Note"}} tag in the notes section.

Do keep in mind that a reference is required for each note. Good?--Labattblueboy (talk) 04:46, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

Good.Keith-264 (talk) 07:11, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

It occurs that using notes won't slim the page only move material within it.Keith-264 (talk) 09:15, 8 February 2012 (UTC)

Lead

Just stumbled on this in the Ger OH 1915 *Humphries, M. O. &, Maker, J. (eds) (2010). Germany's Western front : Translations From the German Official History of the Great War Volume II: 1915. Ontario: WLUP. ISBN 9781554582594. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) There's an introduction by Hew Strachan which follows Green on the value of the British OH contra French, Travers and Winter. Markus Pohlmann has done a similar generally positive study of Der WeltkriegKeith-264 (talk) 11:47, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

OH 1917 II has 26,631 German prisoners taken 21 Jul-31 Dec, p. 363Keith-264 (talk) 23:04, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

Historiography

The Evolution of the British Army's Logistical and Administrative Infrastructure and its Influence on GHQ's Operational and Strategic Decision-Making on the Western Front, 1914-1918 by Ian Malcolm Brown free here http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do has an interesting discussion on the schools of thought about the BEF in the G. War, pp 12-32. He gets P&W and Travers wrong but then lots do.Keith-264 (talk) 15:20, 13 February 2012 (UTC)

It's strange

Its strange. Since passchendale was a significant battle in WW1, shouldn't this at least be a featured article? It's had enough books written about it that a good Wiki article shouldn't be that hard. Your thoughts? 192.148.117.110 (talk) 02:36, 7 May 2012 (UTC)

• The topic is indeed significant, but whether something is featured or not on Wikipedia has to do with the quality of the article's writing and references, not the importance of the topic. In that rating system this is graded a "B" (pretty good!) but would need to go thru an improvement and review process to be rated "GOOD" (see WP:GA) and finally "featured" (see WP:FA). -- Ultracobalt (talk) 03:20, 7 May 2012 (UTC)

It is pretty good but has a long way to go.Keith-264 (talk) 06:59, 7 May 2012 (UTC)

Moved details

I have moved lots of detail to the separate page here

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_development_on_the_Western_Front_in_1917

and parked the removals here for the moment

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Keith-264/sandbox

I would be grateful if people could review the changes to see if they are satisfactory.Thanks Keith-264 (talk) 07:33, 3 June 2012 (UTC)

Page structure

A suggestion about the page has been made, does anyone else have a view?

"In regards to the section headings on the Battle of Passchendaele article, my personal opinion is that the current configuration is a bit confusing, as there are currently at least three "Battles of 3rd Ypres campaign" sections, which doesn't seem intuitive to me. I'd just delete that heading and use level 3 subheadings of "First phase, Gough's command: May–August 1917", "Second phase, Plumer takes over: 25 August–10 November" and "Third phase, the rains return: 4 October–10 November" beneath a generic "Battle" level 2 heading."

Opinions about the structure of the associated pages describing the battles would also be welcome.Keith-264 (talk) 06:51, 17 July 2012 (UTC)

Keith-264 (talk) 05:36, 17 July 2012 (UTC)

Have revised the layout as suggested and synchronised with the associated pages. Considering that the page covers the period from July–November the exposition of the campaign's relationship with the rest of the Western Front and the wider war looks a bit awkward loaded at the front. Any suggestions? Thanks.Keith-264 (talk) 07:48, 18 July 2012 (UTC)

G'day. Looks good, only one minor observation: in the First phase section (just above the "Air operations" header), how long is the block quote? Currently it appears that the "Air operations" and subsequent subsections are also block quotes due to the indentation. I think the issue is just that the "block quote" html mark up code hasn't been "closed". For instance, "</blockquote>". As I don't know where the block quote ends, could you please fix this? Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 08:56, 19 July 2012 (UTC)

Copyedit (major)

Made a start on removing duplicated material, material made redundant by the creation of separate pages and detail not needed for the article however interesting....Keith-264 (talk) 17:02, 18 July 2012 (UTC)

The pruning continues; suggestions for the lead and conclusion are requested. ThanksKeith-264 (talk) 07:02, 20 July 2012 (UTC)

Tidied casualties and conclusion sections.Keith-264 (talk) 11:02, 20 July 2012 (UTC)

Lead

Wrote a new version trying to adhere to the Wiki Lead criteria.

The Battle of Passchendaele was a campaign of the First World War, taking place between July and November 1917. In a series of operations, Entente and Allied armies under British command attacked the Imperial German Army. The battles were fought for control of the ridge and village of Passchendaele (modern Passendale) near the city of Ypres in West Flanders, Belgium.

The British intention was to wear out the German army with a quick succession of broad-front attacks moving short distances into the German defences, eventually to force the German army into a general withdrawal,{{sfn|Griffith |1996 |p=87}} then to advance on the Belgian coast and connect with the Dutch frontier. The British commander Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig anticipated a campaign in three parts: the capture of Passchendaele Ridge, an advance on Roulers and then Operation Hush, an attack along the Belgian coast from Nieuport combined with an amphibious landing.{{sfn|Sheffield |2011 |p=227}} The offensive also served to distract the German army from the French armies on the Aisne, which were debilitated by mutinies in the aftermath of the Nivelle Offensive. {{sfn|Prior & Wilson |1996 |p=50}} The German Army fought to contain the British attacks using large amounts of artillery fire and many infantry counter-attacks, trying to keep control of the higher ground around Ypres which they had held since 1915.

Much of the fighting took place in unusually wet weather, which turned parts of the battlefield into a sea of mud churned by shell-fire,{{sfn|Liddle |1997 |p=39}} yet at other times, particularly in September, the weather was hot and dry enough for men to wear shorts.{{sfn|Liddle |1997 |p=343}} The campaign ended in November when the British army captured Passchendaele village and part of the ridge. The British advance beyond the ridge to Roulers and the linked coastal operation did not take place and the German army managed to avoid a general withdrawal, which had seemed inevitable to them in October.{{sfn|Terraine |1977|p=299}} The campaign is controversial; in a German General Staff publication of 1927 Theodor Jochim, first head of the Reichsarchivs documents section{{sfn|Humphries & Maker |2010 |p=xv}} wrote: "Germany had been brought near to certain destruction (sicheren Untergang) by the Flanders battle of 1917."{{sfn|Edmonds|1948 |p=xiii}} In contrast, in his memoirs of 1938 Lloyd George wrote, "Passchendaele was indeed one of the greatest disasters of the war.... No soldier of any intelligence now defends this senseless campaign....".{{sfn|Terraine|1977|pp=xix–xx}} In 2008 J. P. Harris condemned Haig and the offensive, "For the troops taking part, however, some phases of Third Ypres had a quality more nightmarish than anything previously experienced."{{sfn|Harris |2008 |p=382}} In 2011 G. Sheffield claimed the opposite, quoting General von Kuhl, who said "The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified."{{sfn|Sheffield |2011 |p=248}}

Old lead here for comparison. Any thoughts? TaKeith-264 (talk) 08:10, 23 July 2012 (UTC)

Nomenclature

Shifted note 1 to the first sentence to avoid confusion (in between laptop frenzies).Keith-264 (talk) 20:11, 13 October 2012 (UTC)

Strength?

Where is it? It's usually always in the infobox, even in antique wars that are practically based on nothing on hearsay. In this case, even if it's disputed it must exist and be less disputed than the losses, which are given! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 141.53.210.221 (talk) 03:46, 19 October 2012 (UTC)

Remedied.Keith-264 (talk) 23:00, 21 October 2012 (UTC)

Infobox

Changed participants to be consistent (no German corps commanders listed).Keith-264 (talk) 21:08, 22 December 2012 (UTC)

Infobox Belligerents section

Tried to make the section consistent. Must we have attempts to treat sub-sections of each empire as if they were countries or states when they weren't?Keith-264 (talk) 08:21, 15 January 2013 (UTC)

There must be a project-wide principle to this, we should not need to have the same discussion over every individual article. Talk:Allies_of_World_War_I#Dominions_of_the_British_Empire seems to pertain, but perhaps there is something more general established? LeadSongDog come howl! 23:03, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

Having moaned about this on other pages too, the replies from other editors tend to the view that there will be drive-by inclusions of Dominion flags whatever is agreed.Keith-264 (talk) 08:16, 27 April 2013 (UTC)

The thing is that in some cases (such as this one, or Gallipoli if you prefer) the subject battle figures much larger in the history of one Dominion than it does in the overall history of other parts of the Empire, even to the extent of motivating their later independence. To exclude listing of such particularly-engaged parts of the whole seems perverse. LeadSongDog come howl! 01:50, 28 April 2013 (UTC)

Sixth Ypres...

...Starring Keith and Paulturtle Basket _Feudalist 09:02, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

O)Keith-264 (talk) 19

03, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

Shifted some references into External Links and replaced them in the text where isbn, issn or oclc not found. I doubt anyone would disagree so no 7th Ypres. ;O)Keith-264 (talk) 22:32, 24 January 2013 (UTC)

Lack of commemoration from German perspective

The commemoration section only discusses Commonwealth commemorations. There is no mention other countries like France, Belgium and, in particular, Germany. Are there any such commemorations, and if not, why not? 138.38.106.244 (talk) 15:39, 15 July 2013 (UTC)

Lack of sources in English is the usual problem. If you have any feel free to share.Keith-264 (talk) 16:59, 15 July 2013 (UTC)

Infobox flags.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Military_history/Archive_120#Name_of_.22Britain.22_in_1914-1918

The discussion is archived here.Keith-264 (talk) 20:15, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

And you had no support for your change... either to remove flags or add them. Please don't add WP:POINT to your behavioural issue with WP:IDHT. Resolute 22:06, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

I suggest you adopt the gait of Arkell versus Pressdram and then try to behave constuctively.Keith-264 (talk) 22:09, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

I had to look that one up. Have to admit, I can respect such creative immaturity. Resolute 22:36, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

WP:GAMING WP:CIVIL you should stop setting such bad examples.Keith-264 (talk) 23:14, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

Battle of the Menin Road Ridge

I've noticed that the phrase "Battle of Menin Road" redirects here, but there is another page for that, as well as double listings in some categories. I will clean this up, unless there is any particular reason for this? laurelenril (talk) 05:20, 5 November 2013 (UTC)

I think both terms were used when the page began and some moving took place (It was the first new page I worked on). Menin Road Ridge is the Official History term but most historians write Menin Road.Keith-264 (talk) 07:43, 5 November 2013 (UTC)

Der Weltkrieg Comment

Added a casualty table gleaned from the German Official History, which records a 27,000 discrepancy with the Sanitatsbericht but that appears to have been resolved, since that source also refers to 217,000 casualties.Keith-264 (talk) 22:06, 17 November 2013 (UTC)

Contents box

Reduced the dates to slim the box and added dates to the text to compensate as an experiment. Keith-264 (talk) 13:13, 31 December 2014 (UTC)

External links modified

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Dominions

Added Belgium since it only seemed fair. Can't we have one flag for British Empire forces? If not must we have a flag icon for all the German contingents too?Keith-264 (talk) 12:23, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

In other articles I'm familiar with, such as Battle of Albuera, the convention has been to use a single flag icon (the French forces there included, for example, Polish Uhlans, but these weren't an independent force so are lumped in under "French Empire"). Also, WP:MILMOS#FLAGS may be of some use. EyeSerene^talk 13:14, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

Thanks.Keith-264 (talk) 13:30, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

I was of the impression that no Belgian units participated as they were stationed further north. Can you offer any clarification. Certainly such a change should be cited.--Labattblueboy (talk) 04:26, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

The battle took place in Belgium, an allied country, its air service was involved and in the text the concentration on both sides for the battle is described from the Lys to the sea. P. 109, OH "The six Belgian divisions ... were to advance immediately an opportunity offered in the Dixmude sector ...."Keith-264 (talk) 07:21, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

The location of battle is not relevant to the combatants section. Take for instance take many battles (ex: Combat of Barquilla (1810) of the Peninsular War. Although the battles take place in Spain, Spain is not necessarily listed as a combtant. The only question is whether or not Belgian units participated. Belgium should only be listed if it can be shown they participated in one of the battles.--Labattblueboy (talk) 17:33, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

I think that's a little harsh, since Belgian army units were part of the plan even if the plan didn't get past the first stage. 40 artillery observation aircraft of the Belgian air service were counted in the RAF OH figures for air operations (Vol IV, p.141). Remove the flag if you must but also remove the ridiculous unofficial Dominion flags too.Keith-264 (talk) 18:25, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

OK, there we go. If you have confirmation of the participation of the Belgian Air Service then everything is fine by me.--Labattblueboy (talk) 20:25, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

Hmmmm, it appears that the Canadian flag at the time looked like a union flag https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_flags#Historical_flags although to be fair the British Empire flag would have been a skull and cross-bones.;O)Keith-264 (talk) 07:59, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

"Next day the French continued their advance in concert with Belgian troops, who crossed the Yser opposite Knockehoek, and captured Aschhoop, Kippe, and Merckem. The southern end of Blankaart Lake was reached on the same day, and early on the 28th October French and Belgian troops completed the capture of the whole Merckem peninsula." Haig Despatches, Boraston, J. H. (1920) p. 131.Keith-264 (talk) 07:15, 8 February 2012 (UTC)

I've added the four great Dominions of the British Empire along with the Raj and Newfoundland to that of the UK and British Empire because it informs the reader of the key participants and gives due visible recognition to their signficant contribution to the Battles of Paschendaele and, indeed, the First World War. pidd (talk) 20:58, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

I've reverted again because the dominions and colonies were part of the British empire and had the Union Flag as the emblem. The dominions did not become sovereign states until the Statute of Westminster 1931 and some not until after the Second World War. Military contingents from the dominions and colonies were not allied to the British army, they were part of it.Keith-264 (talk) 21:40, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

Rubbish. Show me a single reference which says the Australian/Canadian/New Zealand Armies were part of the British Army. Closely linked obviously (especially in terms of command), but administratively completely separate. Each state had responsible government which was elected by their own people and which decided on the extent of their own involvement in the war. The argument that they were all part of the British Empire then is a fairly unsophisticated one and sounds like OR to me. 200.241.132.155 (talk) 11:48, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Laws_Validity_Act_1865
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Westminster_1931

No government in 1914 was representative, not even New Zealands which had a form of universal suffrage. Please take a deep breath and familiarise yourself with the details before sounding off again.Keith-264 (talk) 12:08, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

So no references then for your ridiculous claim that the dominion armies were part of the British Army then? 175.23.78.87 (talk) 10:00, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Sorry Mr. Number Talk, Keith-264 is absolutely correct. The Dominion forces were not 'armies', they were 'Corps' of the British Army. When the Dominion troops first assembled in Britain to cross the channel, they were distributed among other regiments and corps of the British Army. The Permanent Active Militia in Canada didn't become the Canadian Army until 1940. Similarly in Australia the Citizens Military Force became an 'Australian Imperial Force'. Yes, each of the Dominions had Canadian or ANZAC commanders, as any regiment or corps would, but all them were under the direct command of the senior British officers. By the way, and just to underscore Keith's point, every soldier and citizen in the Dominions and colonies were British. There was no citizenship.

The historic importance of this is the recognition of the development of national identities towards the end of the Great War. The Canadian Corps, for example, fought as one unit together for the first time at the Battle of Vimy Ridge (a part of the larger Battle of Arras)in 1917. Because of the achievement of the Corps (more than half of whom were born in the UK) the Canadian Corps remained a unit through to the end of the war; although always under the senior command of the British Army. Whilst Vimy was a marked victory for the Empire, Gallipoli, especially for the ANZACS was a disaster as was Beaumont-Hamel at the Somme for the Royal Newfoundland Regiment which was virtually wiped out. The events of the Great War and the accomplishment of the Dominion Troops presented the Dominion government with a legitimacy that they had not previously had and so were permitted to have a place at the Paris Peace Conference. This was a prelude to the Dominions being recognised as equal with the Mother Country within the British Commonwealth and established by the Statute of Westminster, 1931.

There is much revisionism today as if the British Empire barely existed. Some historians refer to the Dominions as 'Allies' in the Great War. They were not, as all foreign policy and authority ultimately remained with the British Government. One of the complaints from the Canadians and ANZACs following both World Wars was the lack of identity given them because they were troops of the British Empire or Commonwealth. There is some truth to this. Although the Dominion Troops remained thoroughly British, there was a palpable increase in national pride, from 'esprit de corps' to 'esprit du pays'. Popular 'historians' often portray the Canadians, for example, as being 'anti-British' which is utterly ridiculous. One need only look at the recruiting posters to see that. What is certain is that all of the British troops, UK and Dominions, enlisted and officer corps, had varying degrees of contempt for officers who came across as 'Toffs'. I learned from my grandfather and father how much Haig was loathed. My commission as an officer, like those who went before, is from HM the Queen, the Sovereign, and so it is in all the former Dominions as well as the UK. The brilliance of the British Empire's development of nationhood through its colonies remains unmatched and the events of the Dominion soldiers in the Great War were very much an important part of that history. pidd (talk) 19:43, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

175.23.78.87 is another singleton, also in China. [1]. So far, this discussion has attracked 4 single use IP accounts from China, China, Brazil and Vietnam. Odd, that. Hamish59 (talk) 10:46, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

I saw these on the AmazonUK site today: Anzac's Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History by Craig Stockings and The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australi​an Relations during World War I by Eric Montgomery Andrews and Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment by Geoff Hayes, Andrew Iarocci & Mike Bechthold which might shed light on contemporary views of Dominion nation-building. I haven't changed anything on the main page yet as I've got a terminal case of ManFlu and can't cope with the aggravation.Keith-264 (talk) 21:03, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Since when do the objectors to a proposal have to gain consensus for that in a community forum? If YOU propose wholesale changes to the infoboxes of many articles (the implication seems to be that you are) YOU need to get the support of the community, that seems fairly obvious. Currently there are no other articles (that I know of) that lump the Dominions together as you are prosing. All you have done is rejected any objection raised by any IP with bluster rather than facts, and YOU still have not gained a consensus. If you change it back that would be edit warring. So far I've only seen uninformed opinion being passed off as "scholarship", and not a single reference which supports the assertion that these armies were part of the British Army. Show me a quote from a book written by a professional historian of note please which states this and I'll be satisfied. No one is questioning the legal reality that the British Empire existed, it clearly did, and many / most subjects of the Dominions would have no doubt considered themselves British (legally they were of course British subjects although many Irish immigrants probably would not have felt much loyalty to the crown), but to claim their armies were merely "corps" of the British Army does not hold weight. They were clearly administratively separate, if obviously integrated into the British Army in terms of command. The Australian Army for one was formed on 1 March 1901 and operated under an act of the Commonwealth government (the Defence Act 1903). It included both citizen and permanent forces and had its own higher command arrangements with a GOC (from 1909 Chief of the General Staff). The Australian Imperial Force (AIF), formed for service overseas in the First World War, was enlisted under this act also and was used as an expeditionary force. One presumes if they were part of the British Army they would have operated under British legislation but that was not the case, with the Australians having their own regulations regarding discipline and conditions of service (notably the death penalty and pay). Unlike the British Army it was an all-volunteer force and Australia held two referendums on the issue of conscription, both of which defeated. So it was the Australian people and their elected representatives, and not Whitehall, that determined their level of involvement in the war. The citizen force did not become the AIF, rather both the citizen and permanent forces continued to exist during this period as legally they could not be sent overseas. Not sure about the other dominions but ones assumes a similar situation existed. What we are left with then is the recognition that what existed was a form of coalition warfare, albeit one without the national command elements / caveats etc that exist today. Merely applying a "British Empire" flag and not listing the Dominions does not accurately portray this in my opinion, while the current situation seems to work and is used across most articles on Wikipedia. If you want to change that get consensus from the community to do so. 200.229.206.109 (talk) 07:32, 26 May 2013 (UTC)

This seems to be a conversation that Wikipedians writing military history articles have to have over and over again. As a citizen of a Commonwealth Realm (as the former Dominions are now technically known), who has studied such matters in depth, and written about them for Wikipedia, I am happy to provide people a summary of where the Dominions stood in terms of political independence, the emergence of local nationalism (as distinct from loyalty to the British Empire) in 1914–18.

200.229.206.109 is essentially correct about the political situation. There is no escaping the fact, apparently little-known, that by 1914–18, "Dominion" status meant that the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa were elected by the citizens of each Dominion (whereas the Crown Colonies and India were controlled, to varying degrees, by the UK government). The Dominion armies (as well as the Australian and Canadian navies) were technically separate from the UK services and their respective headquarters remained in the Dominions. Their pay, recruitment and training and deployment were the responsibility, and occurred at the discretion of, the Dominion governments. Dominion units in Europe and the Mediterranean were usually attached to British Army formations for operational purposes and sometimes commanded, even at divisional level, by generals of the British Army. In the interests of Empire kinship and solidarity, Dominion politicians and senior commanders did not, usually, "rock the boat" – a tendency that seems to have been misconstrued by subsequent generations, in the UK especially. (Exceptions include Australia's refusal to introduce conscription, its distinctive system of military justice and the New Zealand government's unilateral repatriation of long-serving personnel.)

The main point, in any case, is not the political status, control or leadership of the Dominion governments or militaries. By 1914, using "British" as a blanket descriptive term, for people and things (e.g. military units) from outside the UK was already unacceptable to many, if not most people from the Dominions, Crown Colonies and the Indian Empire. In all of the Dominions, many people saw no contradiction between membership of and loyalty to the Empire, even though they did not regard themselves as "British". There is no reasonable excuse for using "British" in a way that was dying out by WW1. Various alternatives were already in use during WW1, including "Imperial", "British Empire", "British and Empire", even "Allied" or – better still – the specific nationalities concerned. Grant | Talk 03:58, 14 June 2014 (UTC)

It seems to me that you're inventing a criterion to determine a conclusion. If a legalistic criterion like carrying a British passport is to be ignored then history will be reduced to an opinion poll. As for contemporary public opinion, what did the real Australians/Canadians/New Zealanders think? On a practical note, what changes do you want?Keith-264 (talk) 07:22, 14 June 2014 (UTC)

Keith, I don't really know what your point is there. You seem to think that certain formalities and symbols have more weight than others, although on what basis I'm not sure. The lingering of terms like "British subject" was driven by things like pragmatism and economics: initially, the Dominions borrowed the UK's diplomats and their own diplomatic corps were tiny until around WW2. (British embassies continue to represent Australians and new Zealanders in some countries.) But I doubt if any former "British subjects" born in a Dominion and life-long residents there had passports that were actually issued by a UK passport office. Or even greatly resembled UK-issued passports. Sheer inertia, too, meant that New Zealand law referred to NZ-born New Zealand citizens as "British subjects" until some time around 1980!! Likewise, until the 1980s at least, Australians and Brits emigrating, or even residing temporarily, in each other's countries automatically received voting rights in each other's elections. But I wouldn't feel confident, had I been around in 1914–18, telling the members of the Māori Pioneer Battalion that they were "British"!

All the quaint terminology and archaic symbolism is trumped by the institutions that people in the Dominions/realms have now, in every case, taken for granted for over a century, including: the federation of separate colonies, national parliaments, Prime Ministers, high/supreme courts, national armies and navies with home-grown staff officers and separate ceremonial commanders-in-chief etc. If it were true – which it isn't – that none of these institutions amounted to real independence in 1914–18, their constituents and founders would have been exceptionally gullible. But they weren't. Grant | Talk 09:57, 14 June 2014 (UTC)

It seems as though you're trying to explain something now, rather than describe something then. Were the Dominions sovereign or not in 1914? From the point of view of the rightful owners of Australia, Canada etc, the settlers were illegal immigrants with even less right to be there than the Germans had to be in Belgium. Did the Koori consider the "Australians" to be Australian or terrorists and squatters?Keith-264 (talk) 10:22, 14 June 2014 (UTC)

Keith, it does seem that there is still much that I need to "explain", although not for the reasons that you seem to be implying. (As an aside, I find it amusing and curious to see the word "explain" used in such an [apparently] disdainful fashion.) I have to say that, 96 years later, people everywhere (including the Dominions/realms themselves) clearly have quite different understandings of the nature of the Dominions' involvement of in 1914–18. At one extreme, some people see it as a case in which independent nations followed their traditional allies in declaring war on the Central Powers; at the opposite extreme, other people see it as a question of mere obligation and obedience on the part of the UK's minions. In fact, both of these views are misunderstandings, as I will happily explain.

Sovereignty is a quality, not a quantity. It must always be assessed in terms of two dimensions:

• formal appearances (e.g. ceremonial niceties and legalistic jargon), versus real, de facto power and;
• domestic (popular mandates/suffrage and their relation to public opinion etc), versus external (i.e. the extent to which power is circumscribed by international commitments/treaties etc) dimensions.

So: yes, the governments of the Dominions in 1914–18 were sovereign. They had both formal sovereignty, especially domestically, but also externally (and which, in the latter case, they exceeded without sanction by Westminster in many cases) and real sovereignty that exceeded that of the government of the UK, i.e. most adults had the vote in the Dominions (except South Africa) while only about 30% of their counterparts in the UK could vote, before the election of December 1918 (when the Representation of the People Act was first applied).

As a result of years of reading about intra-Empire/Commonwealth politics during the 19th and 20th centuries, I think I can explain the misunderstandings mentioned above. First, both the UK and the Dominion governments had formal, legal obligations to each other, which limited their ability to act independently (even though all of these parties, at least occasionally, exceeded their authority in this respect. Second, the national government of each Dominion had absolute responsibility for and control of recruitment and deployment of the individual armies and navies (even when those governments waived operational control, out of "team spirit" etc). Third, to portray the millions of citizens of the Dominions as mere obedient minions of the UK government becomes ludicrously untenable when one has substantial knowledge of the history of the Empire/Commonwealth, and of the Dominions in particular; the force majeur for Dominion involvement in WW1 was not, as you suggest, the authority of Downing St, the War Office or the Admiralty (all of which were dependent upon the cooperation of Governors-General had they wished to discipline a Dominion government in any case), but the individual politics of millions of individual Dominion citizens who wanted to fight and/or volunteered to fight, purely because of their own individual, personal ties to Britain (e.g. in WW1, about 10–20% of the Australian Army was actually UK-born, without counting the children of emigrants from the UK to Australia).

I'm not sure what point you are trying to make about the indigenous peoples of the Dominions. Yes, many, perhaps most of them regarded non-indigenous, including native-born whites, as oppressors and invaders. Nevertheless, quite a few joined up and fought in the Middle East and Europe.

My TL;DR, assuming it is possible to generalise about the Dominions, is this.

1. The peoples of the various Dominions cooperated so closely with the UK government and its military leaders to the extent that they felt a strong kinship with the people of the UK (whether actual blood or cultural ties). See, for example, the pro-German Maritz Rebellion of 1914–15 in South Africa and World War I conscription in Australia
2. The governments of the Dominions were clearly answerable, first and foremost, to their electors and in that sense were the equal of the UK government. (FWIW and for better or worse, WW1 weakened that "kinship", at the same time as it strengthened he assertiveness of the Dominion governments. See, for example, Dominion representation at Versailles in 1919 and Canada's attitude to the Chanak crisis of 1922

Grant | Talk 07:29, 23 June 2014 (UTC)

Clearly we differ and clearly this matter has been debated exhaustively already. I'm much more interested in your comments about having better sources for the article and the substantial revisions that they imply. Can we move on please?Keith-264 (talk) 08:58, 23 June 2014 (UTC)

Keith, no-one likes an inconvenient truth, but you asked to discuss it.

And I'm not sure that we can move on so easily, if some egregiously irrelevant, arrogant and/or demonstrably fallacious statements above are the strongly-held views of many editors of this article. I am referring, for example, to:

• "the dominions and colonies ... had the Union Flag as the emblem" (Keith-264);
• "ridiculous unofficial Dominion flags " (Keith-264);
• "The Dominion forces were not 'armies', they were 'Corps' of the British Army" (Pidd);
• Keith-264's raising of irrelevancies like "British passports", how settlers were regarded by indigenous peoples, the German ground forces in WW1 being composed of several separate armies, belonging to independent German states and so on;
• barely-relevant fallacies, such as a lack of "sovereignty" on the part of the Dominions (Keith-264)

No-one in their right mind disputes that most of the British Empire forces in WW1 were from the United Kingdom (which after all, included all of Ireland at the time). That being the case, I'm not sure why some editors insist on upholding the archaic, lazy and always controversial conflation – under "British" – of a myriad of disparate peoples making up the Dominions, Indian Empire and the Crown Colonies. Especially when there were alternatives in use long before 1914–18, especially "United Kingdom" (for the British Isles) and "British Empire" (for the rest).

Grant | Talk 05:48, 24 June 2014 (UTC)

There's a difference between discussion and repetition. If you have something to add to the 3rd Ypres pages rather than a resurrection of a dead horse, then good luck to you. Keith-264 (talk) 07:31, 24 June 2014 (UTC)

Personnel of all races, creeds, and religions, from all of the countries of the British Empire, with the exception or the Protectorates, were all British subjects (equivalent today of being British citizens) meaning that upon volunteering or call up to the services they all swore an oath of allegiance to King George V.

FYI, this also applied later in 1939 when the King in question was King George VI.

This meant that also without exception all members of HM's services were required to obey lawful orders from any superior officer (irrespective of respective dominion or colony army or service) holding The King's Commission.

I nearly forgot. Merely by the fact of being British subjects all such persons owed a de facto allegiance to The King. To act in a contrary manner could constitute mutiny or treason, which at the time were capital offences. That's why the Indian Mutineers (who had also sworn an oath to The Queen upon joining the Indian Army) were all hanged. And that's why Breaker Morant, also a British subject, was tried for murder - unlawful under British law, convicted, and shot.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.56 (talk) 09:09, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

I agree but sadly I'm outnumbered.Keith-264 (talk) 14:15, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

Yes, I know. It must be so frustrating for you that you are not able to alter history to suit your own desires. Resolute 15:13, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

See what I mean; has Resolute ever contributed anything to the Third Ypres articles other than bile? Keith-264 (talk) 15:28, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

Thank you, Keith-264. None of the territories of the British Empire had separate citizenship until after the war, most did not get it until after WW II. That means all the Empire participants at the time of Passchendaele held British nationality. As, for that matter, did all those at Gallipoli.

FYI, New Zealanders didn't get separate citizenship until 1949. For Australians it was 1948. Canadians were still British until 1946.

... .and relevant national law (linked above) trumps other people's opinions, whether they outnumber you or not.

... and they also trump the opinions of some so-called 'historians', both in print, and on film, who with a little effort could have found out the true facts, instead of choosing to manipulate and omit the facts to suit their own particular petty-nationalistic agenda(s).

...and the other constituent territories such as India (including what later became Pakistan and Bangladesh), Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Kenya, Rhodesia, South Africa, Zambia, Uganda, Nigeria, Fiji, etc., also didn't get separate citizenship until independence after WW II. Which means they also held British nationality in both World Wars.

BTW, when Mahatma Gandhi travelled to England to continue his education at University College London he did so on a British passport. That's because, outside the Protectorates, there was only one nationality within the British Empire. IIRC, passports issued by the constituent territories had the name of the local issuing authority at the top of the front cover, e.g. "Government of India", "Dominion of Canada", etc., followed below with "British Passport" at the bottom. The latter was necessary because 'British' was the only national status recognised by third-party countries outside the Empire. This BTW, is why, when captured, Empire POWs were all held in the same POW camps - which were supposed to be, under the relevant Geneva Convention, segregated by nationality - which is why twenty years later the American inmates of Sagan (Stalag Luft III) were moved in to a separate area of the camp from the British before the Great Escape.

I nearly forgot. In World War II at least, conscription in the British overseas territories was entirely confined to the 'white' colonists and settlers, etc. The local 'natives' were not subject to compulsory military service, and every one of the non-white personnel who joined the Empire forces was a volunteer.

The above is all JFYI as it may help to understand some of the attitudes and views held by some people at the time.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.10.248 (talk) 19:12, 13 August 2017 (UTC)

"choosing to manipulate and omit the facts to suit their own particular petty-nationalistic agenda(s)" - says the IP dismissing the credentials of any historian that disagrees with their POV. Sorry mate, but we write based on those works by historians. Not based on what your own petty nationalistic agenda is. Resolute 22:45, 14 August 2017 (UTC)

Have you contributed anything to the 3rd Ypres pages apart from carping? Keith-264 (talk) 23:09, 14 August 2017 (UTC)

The above-linked nationality law articles prove that these countries did not get separate citizenship until after WW II which means that all the 'Empire' troops involved in both World Wars were indisputably British subjects, and why the so-called 'historians' chose to either remain unaware of this simple fact, or chose to ignore, it, is best left to the reader to surmise. The earliest of these Acts was 1946 and so the 'historians' have had plenty of time to get acquainted with them.

The relevant nationality of the personnel involved was not secret at any time, and any person interested in the subject, let alone a so-called 'serious historian', could have easily found out the above facts, instead of making spurious statements on nationality that are so easily disprovable. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.0 (talk) 09:45, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

Sadly, reason is powerless against national chauvinism, ahistorical prejudice and lack of scholarship. Keith-264 (talk) 10:28, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

Quite so. And the fact that the poster is apparently mistaking national law as being just my particular 'POV' says a lot. He/she could have quite easily found out what I have stated above first, before making a stand on here on what is so very obviously unsafe ground. Perhaps the poster might ask himself/herself why the 'historians' he/she has consulted neglected to mention any of the above easily checkable facts on the relevant nationality of the Empire personnel involved in both World Wars. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.0 (talk) 10:51, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

You need to learn how Wikipedia operates, friend. We write based on reliable sources, and reliable sources include these nations that both of you POV pushers want to pretend don't exist. It would be helpful if the two of you stopped nailing each other to a cross and gave up on the martyr routine. Resolute 14:07, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

You aren't worth the bother, ignoramus.Keith-264 (talk) 15:30, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

Oh, I forgot, what have you contributed to the 3rd Ypres articles apart from contumely?Keith-264 (talk) 15:33, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

"There are none so blind as those who do not wish to see". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.52 (talk) 09:35, 9 December 2017 (UTC)