Talk:Battle of Jutland/Archive 4

This is an archive of past discussions about Battle of Jutland. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

→

Gunnery ranges

The article seems to take as a matter of faith that bigger gun=longer range. Is this actually true? I've read a few scattered sources indicating that the smaller-calibre german guns might have had a longer effective range than the more powerful British weapons. If this is true then a lot of the specific criticism against Beatty (not my favourite person) is unjustified. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 116.125.84.170 (talk) 15:54, 24 December 2008 (UTC)

RP C/12

I found this in a search, it might be helpful.

RP - Rohr-Pulver. "Tube powder," the descriptive designation given to German gun propellants. These propellants were manufactured in the form of hollow tubes. The propellants were classified by model year and by the external and internal diameters of the tubes in millimeters. For example, propellant designated as RP C/38 (14/4.9) would be a tube powder first introduced in 1938 that had an external diameter of 14 mm (0.551 in) and an internal diameter of 4.9 mm (0.193 in). There were several compositions used from 1912 to 1945. Earlier ones used nitroglycerin while later ones used diethylene glycol dinitrate which was cooler-burning and less bore erosive. All were resistant to exploding even when exposed to a hot fire. For instance, the small battleship Gneisenau was bombed at Kiel in 1942 and had over 23 tons (24 mt) of propellant ignited in a forward magazine. There was no explosion even though turret "Anton" was lifted at least 20 inches (50 cm) from its mounting by the gas pressure. The British did extensive studies of RP C/12 following World War I and developed "Solventless Cordite" (SC) based upon the results.

[[1]] Tirronan 01:55, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

Tables

I love the tables but they can't stay unless you can reference them to a source worth citing. The whole article is begging for a fact bomber to drop about 50 thousand ^{[citation needed]}s on the article as is. When they are done you can't even read the article but that is ok in their minds. Tirronan 19:15, 12 June 2007 (UTC)

99% sure they are ripped untimely from Campbell. Greglocock 00:34, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

British BC Gunnery

I've just completed Castles of Steel and it confirms that the BC squadrons were notoriously bad shots and that this was noted by both Jellico and Betty. The reason that Evan-Thomas was with the BC force was that 1 squadron was off performing gunnery practice. Note in the Tables Evan-Thomas Battleships were giving a much better account of themselves than the BC's. In this Betty has to bear the blame as he was responsible for having his ships ready for combat. Tirronan 23:23, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

Ah, before leaving this I should have noted that the U.S. Navy thought of itself as a superb gunnery fleet, exposure to the British convinced them otherwise and every BB in Squadron Six underwent extensive gunnery drill till up to spec. Tirronan 23:28, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

Archive 3

I've moved old discussions to archive 3 if you wish to view them. I've moved all the lessons of Jutland on BB designs to archive since the All or nothing page has been created and this is a mute point now. Tirronan 23:35, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

Reread

I've gone over Castles of Steel again, I've been unhappy with this article and was never quite sure why. Here is what I think we missed:

Communications throughout the battle were sloppy in the Grand Fleet and in the Admirality.
- Radio intercepts showing that the High Sea's fleet as a whole where in hand (this is covered in the article)
- Room 40 passed on intel that clued in on the dogger bank run by Hipper and where never passed on.
- 5th BS was continually out of range and struggling to keep up with orders Evan-Thomas never saw.
- Beatty never brought Evan Thomas over for a meeting before the battle though both ships where anchored next to each other.
- Throughout the Battle sighting and position information was not relayed to Jellico by commanders close enough to see what was going in
  - 1st battleturn away from the GF Jellico couldn't see what was going on and the BS commanders that oould never sent the info to Jellico
  - BB's spotting enemy Dreadnoughts at 0000 to 0100 didn't open fire on them nor pass the information to Jellico. (As Hipper was sliding away)
  - It wasn't until Jellico asked by signal the next day about missing BC's that Beatty informed him of the loss of 3 BC's (he only knew about 1)
The whole of the High Seas Fleet BC squadron was a floating wreck with 1 exception.
4 of the KM Dreadnoughts were badly damaged, so much so that the order of the battleline was changed to protect them.
The desperation of the High Seas Fleet to get away
The fury and accuracty of the Grand Fleet fire in both crossings of the T. Castles of Steel reports the front of the High Seas Fleet columns being engulfed in waterspouts and bearing away under the fury of the fire. This isn't captured by the article.

Tirronan 22:04, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

Battle Result

Just a quick point - the battle was infact a strategic victory for the British despite the losses. The german fleet remained in harbour for the rest of the war and the British had total control of the sea. For example 5 million men were moved accross the channel to the western front with not a single one lost. This would not have been possible with the High Seas fleet still around. What does eveyone think?? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.139.100.183 (talk) 16:42, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

This has been argued ad nauesum in the archives. The consenus is that the battle was a draw accomplishing nothing. Despite higher losses the Grand Fleet retained the battlefield/The High Seas Fleet caused more damage. From the long view nothing had changed. Tirronan (talk) 21:43, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

Actually a lot changed as a result of this battle. The German High Seas Fleet could not beat the the Grand Fleet in battle and as a result it remained in port for the rest of the war and never put to sea again. As a result, the British could move troops to France with impunity. Therefore, it was at least a strategic victory for Britain. (Trip Johnson (talk) 20:15, 12 June 2008 (UTC))

The view of the battle as a strategic victory for the British is covered in the article and gets at least as much weight as alternative views. There's no need to debate it in the talk page, since the job of the article is to report the views of historians and other experts, not our own.JQ (talk) 23:45, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

Fundamentally the British did achieve a strategic victory by the merit of being the default winner of any naval outcome that didn't change the balance of power. As long as the British didn't lose deceisively in battle they simply couldn't lose strategically. In the greater scheme one can easily say that the last thing Imperial Germany did need to fight WW1 was a surface fleet. However on basis of the battle it cannot be called a strategic victory by Britain because Britain didn't achieve anything that they wouldn't have received if the battle never happened in the first place. The German Fleet was still intact and a less timid Emperor with a more imaginative Grandadmiral could still have used it for major operations to challenge the British Royal navy. That this battle was the last major engagement was not really British doing but German one. I believe to call it indeceisive is the most neutral position. Looking at the whole war one could summarize that the British managed to destroy all oversea detachments and effectively bottle up the German High Seas fleet in the North Sea but to attribute this to one bungled battle is imo fundamentally flawed. The only thing Jutland proved was that Dreadnaughts were too expensive to waste in a battle of attrition... 84.154.3.52 (talk) 20:00, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

Room 40 relations with Beatty and Jellicoe

In at least two places, the current article faults Admiralty intelligence/Room 40 with late or poor intelligence. This stands in contrast to other articles which fault Beatty for ignoring Room 40's warning that Scheer had sailed, which is not mentioned at all. Can we get a more balanced perspective on where the blame goes? Is there anything to add on German sigint leading up to the battle? Dvunkannon (talk) 00:17, 18 December 2007 (UTC)

German Destroyers

So, according to the info box the German Fleet lost 5 destroyers... out of none. The British Fleet lost 3 armoured cruisers... out of none. Hm... the box is not a that long text so the terms have to be inconsistent. --89.53.50.84 (talk) 15:56, 31 December 2007 (UTC)

The British Side has been corrected, thank you. At the German side destroyers obviously refers to torpedo boats; there was no distinction in the german navy between torpedo-boat-destroyers (the origin of destroyers) and torpedo-boats itself. Constructive they equalized. So in the german casualities section it should be called torpedo-boats, too. --89.53.4.108 (talk) 17:46, 1 January 2008 (UTC)

I'm sure that if you signed up for an account an made the change yourself, no-one would complain. --Harlsbottom (talk) 15:43, 5 January 2008 (UTC)

"Procedural Lapses"

To put it mildly this whole section is flawed;

During the summer of 2003, a diving expedition examined the wrecks of Invincible, Queen Mary, Defence, and Lützow to investigate the cause of the British ships' tendency to suffer from internal explosions. On this evidence, a major part of the blame may be laid on lax handling of the cordite propellant for the shells of the main guns. This, in turn, was a product of current British naval doctrine, which emphasised a rapid rate of fire in the direction of the enemy rather than slower, more accurate fire.

"On this evidence" - what evidence? No body of work is cited in this entire section.

Granted, a proportion of blame may be laid at the door of poor handling and shoddy damage-control, but not the "major" part. "A product of current British naval doctrine" is ridiculously vague, unspecified and un-sourced. It may have been localised to the BCF, but we'll come to that later.

In practice drills, emphasizing speed of firing, the cordite could not be supplied to the guns rapidly enough through the hoists and hatches; in order to bring up the propellant for the next broadside before the time when it had to be loaded, many safety doors which should have been kept shut to safeguard against flash fires were opened, bags of cordite were locally stocked and kept locally to need creating a total break down of safety design features and this 'bad safety habit' carried over into real battle practices.

Furthermore, whereas the German propellant RP C/12 was supplied in brass cylinders, British cordite was supplied in silk bags, making it more susceptible to flash fires. The doctrine of a high rate of fire also led to the decision in 1913 to increase the supply of shells and cordite held on the British ships by 50 per cent, for fear of running out of ammunition; when this caused the capacity of the ships' magazines to be exceeded, cordite was stored in insecure places (Lambert, 36).

At last, something approaching a source, however poorly cited. Nicholas Lambert's theory regarding the performance of the BCF at Jutland, while well-laid out, is not perfect, has not been elaborated on or added to in nearly a decade and therefore can not be cited as an authoratative explanation of the loss of the British battle cruisers. Also, it would be helpful to point out that the use of brass cylinders by the Germans was dictated by their breech mechanisms, not by safety concerns.

Quoting Grant is good, but it should be made clear (which it isn't) that his observation obviously reflects on the whole fleet, and not just the Battle Cruiser Force, which the author of this passage seems to have wished to imply. Either that or the person is seeking to use the unpublished memoir of a Chief Gunner to make unsound safety precautions seem utterly indicative across the whole battle fleet. Hardly sound history.

After the battle the Admiralty produced a report critical of the cordite handling practices. By this time, however, Jellicoe had been promoted to First Sea Lord and Beatty to command of the Grand Fleet; the report, which indirectly placed part of the blame for the disaster on the fleet's officers, was closely held, and effectively suppressed from public scrutiny.

This would be quoted from Lambert again, and is obviously trying to imply a cover-up, while being utterly vague (the chief person upon whom blame being fixed being the new C-in-C Grand Fleet).

Quite frankly the whole section is a waste of space - the main loss of the battle cruisers being due to their inadequate armour protection and improper tactical use in the opening stages of the battle. In the "Battlecruisers" section this is supposedly highlighted by a quote from Jellicoe which does nothing of the sort.

Comments welcome. I may be wrong, but in my eyes this section is an enormous red herring which detracts from the actual reasons why the British lost three battle cruisers. --Harlsbottom (talk) 16:31, 5 January 2008 (UTC)

If you will check two sections above you will see my thoughts on the other sections of the article as well. This section should be rebuilt and in my opinion the turrent roofs were very thin. Regardless of flash protection the fact that shells were exploding inside of turrents is damning of itself. USS Nevada and USS Okalahoma were sailing with 4.5" of turrent roof armor soon thickend to 6" after the war. The armor suites failed, and the visits to the sunken BC's showed doors clipped open all the way to the magazines. The UK switched to SC cordite after looking at the RP propellent of the Germans. The arguements are valid but they need to be rewriten and most of all everything needs to be cited. Tirronan (talk) 17:51, 5 January 2008 (UTC)

Thanks for the comment Tirronan, and sorry for the belated reply. It looks like someone has been having fun with the "Result" box again, which needs changing.

I agree with most of your comments above, however I have a couple of misgivings. One is that you're using Castles of Steel. While Massie produces one hell of a good narrative he produced no original work and his method of referencing things drives me up the wall. And as with any book which seeks to produce a grand overview invariably we all make mistakes. Not that I've spotted any serious errors in his book, it's just that I'm still amazed that in a supposedly "Featured Article" about Jutland there is not ONE mention from the Jutland Despatches, i.e. the official account. This will change however when I can be bothered to re-read my copy.

One thing which annoys me is the continuing habit of people to denigrate the BCF's gunnery and then ignore the quality of 3BCS's shooting. There is no way in hell a few day's firing could produce such a good standard, and I have yet to see anyone explain why exactly. Also the fact that Beatty didn't report the loss of Queen Mary and Indefatigable, as by that time Lion had lost its main W/T and therefore had to communicate via Princess Royal. From the signal record, Jellicoe seems to have been getting enough information to know the size of the force his fleet was about to encounter. God help me for actually defending Beatty, but he did do some things right.

I really don't know how this became FA. There's so much speculation and so little of the actual facts reflected, it's awful. It does convey roughly what happened thanks to an excellent series of maps and decent narrative, but then is spoiled by some shoddy reasons as to why this happened and that happened. Whine fest over... --Harlsbottom (talk) 11:26, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

I notice Rep07 has just factbombed this section. Coincidence, as I was just thinking today how to deal with this entire section. If noone disagrees, I think the whole section should go, and something on the battle-cruisers be placed in the Losses section or even in the Orders of Battle section - my reasoning is thus;

I think it's fair to say that three things contributed to the loss of the three British battlecruisers - the German shells aside, of course:

Poor armour protection - the shells shouldn't have been able to penetrate the gunhouses or turrets in the first place.
Inadequate flash protection. One could go on and on about it, but in the end it simply wasn't adequate. In the earlier BCs a door had to be kept open to pass charges from the magazine to the handing room.
In some cases British cordite was poorly manufactured and consequently unstable, contributing to magazine explosions where no end of sub-division could have saved ships. These three things can be easily cited, most importantly to John Roberts, an expert on British capital ships.

I have Lambert's article and most of it is speculation, and most of his conclusions speak more to the administration of the BCF rather than what sank the battlecruisers. In my opinion it is therefore irrelevent to the discussion of the battle and what actually sank the ships. Comments? --Harlsbottom (talk|library)

Since the bulk of the article is now cited rather than un-cited, I was tagging the (relatively few) remaining exceptions, to draw attention to them. "Procedural Lapses" in its present form doesn't fit in well with the rest of the article, and duplicates some of the ammunition discussion under "Orders of Battle". Useful content of "Lapses" should probably be absorbed into other sections. The "British Self Critiques" segment as a whole should probably be restructured, renamed, and revised, I'm not fond of it. Also something should be said somewhere about the German assessment of the battle and the reaction of their public. That being said, in general if large chunks are deleted care should be taken to transfer or restate any relevant/half-decent info somewhere else--for example the mention of the expedition to the wrecks. Rep07 (talk) 22:34, 24 May 2008 (UTC)

I really can't see any useful content in that section. Nothing that can be really substantiated anyway. Mention of the expedition to the wrecks can be made in the status section at the end of the article. I'll check my sources, but as far as I'm aware little or nothing has been published on the result of the expedition, and it should be noted that Lambert's article was written 5 years before the wrecks were dived on. Anyway, I'm sure it'll work itself out. Back to my copy of The German Perspective now I think... --Harlsbottom (talk|library)

I reread the article because of your comments, Harlsbottom and Rep07, and I don't think either of you really read or understand the Lambert article in the slightest. For starters, it is certainly not his theory--it is his reporting of the Admiralty investigatory board's analysis--their theory and their evidence. The article concludes (based upon observer statements from other battlecruisers in action at the time) that the gun crews put too many charges into the main working areas of the turrets, thus exceeding the designed safety limits. When the German shells hit, the handling practices had bypassed the designed safety features. Surely you're joking when you say that the fact that something hasn't been added to in a decade makes it "not authoritative," and by what basis can you even make such a statement. Most people take that to means that it has become the standard interpretation. I strongly recommend reconsidering this section in light of the existant scholarly research. Get with the program.Vermone (talk) 13:44, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Featured article review

How are we going to kick the in-line referencing process off? I find the content non-confrontational and at least am happy enough with the content. It is no worse than many professional accounts, and is better than most. in other words, short of sticking cn by every fact then it is hard to see where to put in-line references. Greg Locock (talk) 10:02, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

I'd propose taking each section and giving it a hard cold look as to factual correctness, if it passes then ^{[citation needed]} bomb the section till it is cited correctly then move to the next. Some sections don't pass the test at all, or leave much out while having a almost triva section within them.

The night section should contain the shape of the HSF the BSC being torn up and leading BB's being shuffled down the line for damage as it gives the flavor of the reality that Scheer was dealing with, nor his desparation to get the hell out of the area and back into port, he was facing anilation.
The tactics section needs overall revision and perhaps removal
nowhere is the lack of deck and turret roof armor really explained as the FC allowed greater ranges and plunging fire.
No naval commander will turn his main force into a torpedo attack as he would increase the chances of a hit and 1/4 his reaction time to evade yet that stupid argument sits on the article.
Command control in the GF was tight but this was not Nelson's band of brothers, Battle squadron commanders showed no initative and that is style of command and fairly damning of Jelico. The communications showed a marked 1 way down style that reinforces this view and again isn't more than a sentence or two talking about this.

Those would be some of the areas to be addressed where I look, I'm hardly the only editor your thoughts? Tirronan (talk) 20:18, 29 January 2008 (UTC)

- I like the suggested section by section approach. The best book I've read on Jutland is The Rules of the Game. It starts with an account of the battle, and at the point Beatty is trying to link up with Evan-Thomas, suddenly jumps back 50 years and restarts from there to explain why the Royal Navy functioned (or rather malfunctioned) as it did that day. Essentially his thesis is that military history doesn't provide an adequate account unless it also takes in social history.

- So let's start with the summary box. I liked it when it just said "Inconclusive" because that's the short version and the article gives the long version. As it stands, the summary box is questionable on at least two factual counts.

- First, a tactical victory isn't based on who inflicted more losses. On that basis, every German WW2 defeat was a "tactical victory" including Kursk, Stalingrad, D-Day, and Berlin. Or if one prefers, Isandhlwana was a British victory because they killed more Zulus. Or again, Waterloo was a French victory because they inflicted 22,000 losses and took about the same (ignoring post-battle captures and desertion).

- Second, the stuff about the fleet being confined to port by the Kaiser isn't true. The German fleet sortied several times after Jutland, but Scheer's advice (which rather belies the German spin of the day that he'd won) was that Germany wasn't going to win this way and that unrestricted commerce warfare was the only way forward. The Royal Navy didn't control the North Sea before or after Jutland but did not need to in order to blockade Germany.

- On those two counts I move we reinstate the summary box as "Inconclusive". Any takers? Tirailleur (talk) 12:41, 30 January 2008 (UTC)

I agree with all the points above except a couple. I think too much has been written about supposed British inflexibility at Jutland. As Jellicoe wrote in his official report, as his Squadron and Division commanders wrote in their reports, the Fleet Action proceeded pretty much as planned. The list of signals made to and from the C-in-C show enough Wireless transmissions which were then forwarded on to other ships. Also it's all very well focussing on the British side then not being able to compare it to what the Germans were doing.

I would really advise against quoting "The Rules of the Game" too much. It is a good read yes, but Gordon was out on a mission to "prove" why the British didn't do so well at Jutland. In my opinion the work is seriously flawed because it tries to find reasons and excuses from the past far too hard. On a topic like this, we are best sticking to the military facts. --Harlsbottom (talk) 13:05, 30 January 2008 (UTC)

Okey doke, let's see what Tirronan et al add. I wasn't planning to rely excessively on TROTG but I think Gordon did a good job showing the systemic and structural reasons why the various favoured what-ifs could never have come about. Gordon and Massie are both good on dispelling certain myths too. British battlecruisers weren't especially flimsy; several took a beating and survived to tell the tale, and German ships' robustness wasn't really tested given that the shells they were hit by were significantly defective.Tirailleur (talk) 13:37, 30 January 2008 (UTC)

As my understanding of the battle grows it isn't the inflexiblity of the Grand Fleet that bothers me as much as lack of intel coming into Jellico that I find striking. With the exception of Goodnough there seems to be very little determined contact with accurate reporting of same to Jellico, what would later be termed C3I failures. Then again I am not sure what was envisioned trying to control a line of battle 7 miles long had been entirely worked out. It also seems that Scheer had some of the same issues when he ran into the Grand Fleet with one author claiming he didn't have a very good idea what was going on. One author points out that the Battle Squadron commanders were not expected to act independent of orders and that Jellico took offense when Sturdee offered up the opinion that they should be allowed and encouraged to do so. The damning thing is not that Jellico turned away from the torpedo attack, every single naval commander of a capital ship squadron had done the same Beatty included, but that he wasn't kept informed of the HSF position, course, and speed.--Tirronan (talk) 04:29, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Incidentally, is the basic format and structure of the article OK? I must confess to a bias towards sorting this out before getting down to the nitty-gritty. Greg Locock (talk) 00:13, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

I believe that it is. That being said I am waiting on the arrival of several books from Amazon on Jutland before I begin this. I'm going to read and compare before starting on this. --Tirronan (talk) 00:45, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

Which books are you planning to use, Tirronan? I know you said on the Review about comparing booklists, so it may be a plan to stick down our reference works here? --Harlsbottom (talk) 15:48, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

Just a thought on referencing. If a paragraph is basically non-controversial, then it is more than enough to give a reference at the end of that paragraph. I anticipate that much of the material about the battle meets this criterion. Obviously, if we start to get into more controversial areas (just why an order was given in a particular way or a particular ship exploded at a particular time) then denser citations are required. The Land (talk) 17:53, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Reference List

I have;

Admiralty. Official Despatches: Battle of Jutland
Bellairs, C. The Battle of Jutland: The Sowing and the Reaping
Bingham, B. Falklands, Jutland and the Bight
Brown, D.K. The Grand Fleet
Campbell, N.J.M. Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting
Fawcett, H.W. & G.W.W. Cooper. The Fighting at Jutland (Abridged version)
Frothingham, T.G. A True Account of the Battle of Jutland
Gill, C.C. What Happened at Jutland
Gordon, A. The Rules of the Game
von Hase, G. Kiel and Jutland
Hodges, P. The Big Gun
Jellicoe, J.R. The Grand Fleet 1914-16
King-Hall, S. A North Sea Diary
Parkes, O. British Battleships, Warrior to Vanguard 1860-1950
Roberts, J.A. Battlecruisers
von Scheer, R. Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War
Tarrant, V.E. Jutland, The German Perspective

I have access to;

The Beatty Papers
Brooks, J. Dreadnought Gunnery & the Battle of Jutland
Chatfield, A.E.M. The Navy & Defence Both vols
Gordon, A. The Rules of the Game - Jutland and British Naval Command
Herwig, H.H. Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1868-1918

And many many more books and articles. I'm away from my collection for a few days and I need to find some time to have a browse through it for the relevent details. --Harlsbottom (talk) 15:48, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

The Jellicoe Papers
Marder, A. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow All Vols

I've got:

Massie, Robert K. Castles of Steel
London, Charles Jutland 1916
Hawkins, Nigel The Starvation Blockades
Bennett Geoffrey The Battle of Jutland

--Tirronan (talk) 04:29, 26 February 2008 (UTC) Note: somebody needs to put Hawkins detail entry in the article reference list. It's not there now, yet there's a footnote to it.Rep07 (talk) 04:28, 25 April 2008 (UTC)

WEASEL WORDS

- there are far too many - school of thought, some say etc etc. These need to be eliminated. They are non encyclopaedic, and render the article meaningless. Greg Locock (talk) 22:20, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

Yes there are Greg, I believe we can tackle those one at a time per section. --Tirronan (talk) 16:13, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

I've been combing through the article again, and realised there just so much rubbish in there it's ridiculous. Rather than weeding out the actual article I've started my own edit, stripping out kilobytes of junk. --Harlsbottom (talk) 15:01, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

The "Damage to major ships" section

Is this section necessary? If so, could it not be written better in prose? The section currently has several MOS flaws (capitalisations and such) and the tables give an ungainly vertical extension to the article (read: large white space on the right, and a sudden break of readable text between the preceding and following sections). There are unnecessary statements as well, "They provide good insights into when conditions favoured each of the navies and an image of the standard of gunnery in both forces." and "hinting at how much conditions favoured the Royal Navy between these times" which could fall under WP:OR or WP:SYN. Jappalang (talk) 05:42, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

I am deleting this section and the Accuracy section as they serve no distinct purpose which is not covered by other sections of the article, and contravene WP:NPOV, WP:OR, and WP:IINFO. Jappalang (talk) 01:48, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

I concur --Tirronan (talk) 04:06, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Just how do you think that N.J.M. Campbell counts as "OR"?. Even with the statements you used above, you said they could fall under the various guidelines, not rules. I can understand why the tables may clutter up the page a bit, but they do serve a very defintie purpose in allowing a reader to study very easily the hits obtained at the battle. At the very least the information should be transeferred to a sub-page, Damage to major ships at the Battle of Jutland or something similar. --Harlsbottom (talk) 10:16, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

None of the sections indicated which source provided the data. Commenting that the tables would "hint at an image of the standard of gunnery in both forces" and what conditions favour them is questionable (how many shells were fired in one of the time classification, are the readers to assume both fleets' accuracy are constant throughout all the time frames to have an "image" of them, what about visibility and blind/impaired firing), especially where the end results in another section show one force losing less ships and tonnage than the others. What point do the tables bring into the picture? Was the point really a contentious and notable point in the scheme of things? Wikipedia is meant for all readers. Statistics dwelving into the percentages of shots made; the number of hits scored on each ship; who made the hits; etc; are of questionable importance to these readers. This is specifically outlined in WP:IINFO. The Fleet action and Outcome sections are more than enough to give the readers an account of how the battle went.Jappalang (talk) 11:17, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

To quote WP:IINFO;

Wikipedia articles are not simply:

4. Statistics. Long and sprawling lists of statistics may be confusing to readers and reduce the readability and neatness of our articles. In addition, articles should contain sufficient explanatory text to put statistics within the article in their proper context for a general reader. In cases where this may be necessary, (e.g. Opinion polling for the United States presidential election, 2008), consider using infoboxes or tables to enhance the readability of lengthy data lists.

The bold text is obviously where I've highlighted it. This article is under review, which means there is a lot of work still to go into it. I should know because I asked for the review. Anyone with a serious interest in the Battle knows that the statistics can come from only one source, N.J.M. Campbell's Jutland - An analysis of the fighting, which is even linked to at the bottom of the page. Repeatedly mentioning that quote "hint at an image of the standard of gunnery in both forces" doesn't mean you have to delete the entire section. Cutting and running without trying to either improve or source something is not helpful.

On a subject as convoluted as Jutland, any reader needs to be made aware of the full facts, which simple prose cannot quite convey. There is a far-reaching debate which people love to engage in that the battle was indecisive, a tactical this a strategic that. While most historians nowadays look on it both a tactical and strategic British history, the reader won't know that unless a conclusion is reached in the article and is adequately backed up by the facts so that if necessary they can reach their own conclusion.

As to WP:IINFO, this article obviously wasn't simply a big line of statistics. The tables were well presented and if necessary I'll drum up enough support to show that they are necessary, since everything here works via democratic means when push comes to shove and reason fails. --Harlsbottom (talk) 11:37, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

There is no context where the lists are concerned, and my concern is of them being unsightly and breaking up the flow of the reading experience. They distinctly "reduce the readability and neatness" of the article. Again as I have stated earlier, the lists and the statements accompanying them do not help the reader at all, hence they become confusing. What is the point of those statistics? Claiming that "anyone with a serious interest in the Battle knows that the statistics can come from only one source" already proves one thing; that the original design of these lists were catering to only military buffs. Wikipedia is to serve everyone; whether they be military buffs, people who have a passing interest in military history, casual readers, or those just "passing through". How would the latter three categories know where the list datum come from, and most importantly what they are for? I seriously doubt the notion the latter three are very interested in knowing how many shells landed on each ship, or the percentage of accuracy of the battle groups. Fleet action detailed what happened during the battle. Outcome stated the losses on each side. That is more than enough. The statistics give no additional notable value to the reader. They certainly play no part in the debate to the claims of victory either; the amount/tonnage of ships lost and the effects the battle had on the war strategy from that point on do. Anyone wishing to purvey the statistics are welcomed to visit the reference source itself (or "External link" or "Further reading" sections). Lastly Wikipedia is supposed to be operating on a consensus with content-based policy (see Wikipedia is not a democracy), getting a majority vote is not a wise decision as per WP:VOTE. Please kindly state why the lists are so important to casual readers, and what purpose they serve in backing up victory claims as you put it. Jappalang (talk) 12:52, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

I don't think the material you're talking about belongs in the article. I would prefer to see it forked off and linked to. The MOS dislikes lengthy lists and tables and rightly so because they hinder the casual reader. A separate article with this information in would be more useful, and other articles (e.g. dreadnought, battleship gunnery) could link directly to the tables. The Land (talk) 17:43, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

I have restored the material Jappalang deleted at Damage to major ships at the Battle of Jutland. The Land (talk) 17:48, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

My objection is not with the tables themselves but the fact that they are not cited. I think that a condensed version should be in the article because it lends support to what is said via the run to the south/north and 2 encounters between the fleets afterwards. However break it up to the supported section and keep it short and concise. Tirronan (talk) 00:19, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

Tactics section

I was in favor of removing that section and have since reconsidered my position. One author is asserting that the GF was married to the line ahead formation for all fighting between main fleets and that this was in fact part of the problem, to wit that the GF had in all but name reverted to the old "Fighting instructions" that prevailed before Adm. Hood decided that piercing the enemies line was a better solution. He insinuates that the Battle Squadron commanders did not have the freedom of action to initate action as they needed to under Jelico's Battle instructions. Right, wrong, or indifferent, it is going to have to be discussed and dealt with.

A dicussion about torpedo tactics is also going to have to be worked in one way or the other, mostly because of the controversy that the right tactic should have been turning into the attack. For a number of reasons I think the whole thing is hogwash but if we don't discuss and deal with it effectively the issue will be inserted for us by every anon that ever heard of the battle however faintly.

Greg, Harl, your opinions please? Tirronan (talk) 00:56, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

You're right of course, it needs dealing with. I'm "married" however to the position that the line of battle was the best strategy for the battle fleet and I believe I've got the evidence to back me up, but for NPOV's sake all view points need to be included.

It's Gordon's contention that the BS commanders, even if given the freedom to do what they wanted, wouldn't have had the initiative to do so, even though Arbuthnot graphically displayed what doing the unexpected could result in.

This still leaves the German side uncovered (the tactical decisions they made are far worse than anything on the British side really), and I'm just praying that Tarrant covers it in Jutland, The German Perspective when it comes through the door on Monday. --Harlsbottom (talk) 10:11, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Ah yes, since I am limited to secondary sources here, still bundering into the Grand Fleet once I could understand, the 2nd time leaves me a bit confused and the explainations have been less than convincing. As for Arbuthnot, driving armored cruisers between the fleets didn't seem like an overly bright idea though I rather doubt he thought the HSF would show up even when he should have been aware of the relative positions. Tirronan (talk) 01:06, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

Outcome section

The outcome section seems to contradict itself, the intro (which notes that both sides made plausible claims to victory) and the general historical evidence

At a strategic level the outcome was, in the last analysis, clear-cut. The High Seas Fleet survived as a fleet in being. Most of its losses were made good within a month — even Seydlitz, the most badly damaged ship to survive the battle, was fully repaired by October and officially back in service by November. However, the German fleet would only sortie twice more, on 18 August and in October 1916. Apart from these two (abortive) operations the High Seas Fleet – unwilling to risk another encounter with the British fleet – remained inactive for the duration of the war. Jutland thus ended the German challenge to British naval supremacy, and must be ranked as a decisive strategic victory of the utmost historical importance.

It's hard to see how a battle that merely restored the status quo ante can be seen as a strategic victory, let alone one of the utmost historical importance. And, far from "ending the German challenge to British naval supremacy", Jutland was followed the switch to unrestricted submarine warfare. A decisive British victory would have made this much more difficult, while a decisive German victory would have made it unnecessary.JQ (talk) 07:05, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

" A decisive British victory would have made this much more difficult" Why? surely if the GF sank 5 HSF BBs (say) the ability/desire to switch to submarine warfare would be completely unaffected, or even strengthened. I don't follow your logic. The status quo was maintained in materiel terms, but the GF demonstrated that the HSF's game plan was faulty, so there was a change in intent after the battle. To say that both fleets were the same as before is a wargamer's fallacy, sea-battles aren't fought to sink ships, they are fought to enable aspects of the land-war. Greg Locock (talk) 07:19, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

A decisive victory, as implied in the quoted passage, would have been one that destroyed the HSF as a fleet in being. That would have permitted attacks on German home waters which would have made submarine operations a lot more difficult. It would also have freed much of the RN for operations elsewhere. But a decisive victory was always unlikely because submarines and mines ensured that pursuing even a heavily outnumbered enemy into home waters was suicidally risky. So, to the extent that the British hadn't already abandoned the hope of decisively defeating the HSF, Jutland decided it for them. That is, Jutland confirmed the pre-existing stalemate, and destroyed the hopes, on both sides, of breakng it. JQ (talk) 08:21, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

In any case, what matters here is WP:RS. The standard view, supported by numerous sources [2] (see also [3] is that Jutland was indecisive. By all means quote experts to the contrary, but don't use the narrative voice to advance a revisionist conclusion.JQ (talk) 10:01, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

Technically the German fleet sorties again in 1918, so three times after Jutland. "That is, Jutland confirmed the pre-existing stalemate, and destroyed the hopes, on both sides, of breakng it." If so Scheer wouldn't have put to see again on 17 August, 1916. And Jellicoe definitely wouldn't have rushed to sea (he took a light cruiser from Edinburgh and joined his flagship at sea) to try and catch him with no less than 29 capital ships. Surprise, however, was the key and although difficult to achieve it was not impossible. The problem being that Scheer and Jellicoe both knew that if push came to shove the High Sea Fleet would just keep pulling Gefechtskehrtwendung and head for the nearest minefield or U-boat cruising zone. --Harlsbottom (talk) 10:04, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

Come now, you really can't be expecting us to call that "reliable" - for the most part the usual mix of shoddy web reviewing and a Britannica article, which is hardly the paragon of reliability. Yes, the battle was tactically indecisive, but the strategic effects did contribute to the decisive defeat of Germany, which should be reflected in the article. --Harlsbottom (talk) 10:08, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

Britannica may not be a paragon, but it's better than unsourced OR, which is what the outcome section contains at present. If Jutland was generally agreed to be "a strategic victory of utmost historical importance" presumably authoritative sources would say so. As far as I can see, even those making this claim admit it's a revisionist view. Here's a couple of recent examples [4], [5] not RS in themselves but indicative that the "strategic victory" claim is generally regarded as revisionist.JQ (talk) 11:47, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

The entire article is unsourced, so really it's all technically OR. And you're citing an American website and a blog for "revisionist" claims. At least cite somthing from a book other than the publisher's blurb which suggests the Battle of Jutland wasn't a strategic victory for British. Granted the HSF was still a fleet in being, but the Grand Fleet had absolutely no qualms about going out and sweeping the North Sea for 2 and a quarter years after. The Germans at least were under no illusions as to the outcome; see my draft at User:Harlsbottom/Battle of Jutland#The outcome. Harlsbottom (talk) 19:38, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

I much prefer your draft to what is there at present. I think the main point is to avoid endorsing a conclusion on one side of a controversial issue. To give my personal view, I think Jutland demonstrated the correctness of the view that battleships were obsolete in the era of the submarine, mine and torpedo. I don't think the article should say this, but it should cite the relevant views according to WP:WEIGHT. JQ (talk) 20:05, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

Admiral Hipper returned to the Kaiser and declaired that there was no hope of defeating the GF at sea. This to me says it all. So long as the blockade remained in place they saw themselves as losing and indeed it was one of the primary reasons. However on to another point... What do the Battle of Borodino, Battle of Jutland, and the Battle of Waterloo, have in common? Endless argument inserted by folks that never add a thing to the article other than changing the results box, and filling up the talk pages. This isn't constructive, this wasn't a war game, it was rather all out war, not knights tilting for points. The failure of the HSF to break the blockade was the end of her, who wanted that kind of victory... time would be better spent fixing the article. Tirronan (talk) 09:45, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

"time would be better spent fixing the article." True. I'm just waiting upon my copy of Tarrant, should be here today. JQ, although I agree with you that such things shouldn't go into the article, I have to disagree with you about the theory that the battleship's obsoleteness in the face of mines, submarines and torpedoes. A ridiculous number of people peddled it after WWI and yet they were emphatically proven wrong in World War II, when despite mines, torpedoes, submarines and aircraft BBs performed valuable and much needed service. WWII showed the battleship being superseded by the aircraft carrier, but they were quite capable of sinking as well. But we could argue this sort of think till the cows come home, so back to the article! Harlsbottom (talk) 10:38, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

"time would be better spent fixing the article." Also agreed. I've had a go at a version that comes closer to satisfying WP:NOR and WP:WEIGHT and to addressing the problem of lack of citations noted in the tag. I'm sure it's possible to give a better presentation of, and better citations for, the main schools of thought. But the important thing is to note that there is a controversy (surely there's no controversy about that!) and avoid endorsing a particular viewpoint in narrative voice.JQ (talk) 13:28, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

Let me be clear here, although we will talk about various points here to reach concenus, I don't believe for one second that anyone is crossing a line into WP:NOR or pushing a pov. It is a complex battle where the failures are many and both fleets were working with a technology that was just at the point of maturity. At no point had either fleet had more than a squadron engaged previous to this battle. What we are trying to wrinkle out is what happened according the published fact, that is a long way from OR and no one is pushing a point of view, even more to the point you can see both Harl and I are trying to figure out both sides according to sources and we are not sure even now as to where this will end up. Tirronan (talk) 19:35, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

Sorry if I have appeared overcritical. It's an excellent and informative article. But on unresolved issues, where there is significant weight behind two or more competing viewpoints, it's important to let the sources speak for themselves, without adjudicating between them. I've tried to do this in my edit.JQ (talk) 21:39, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

We're ok here, I am not defending the article its a mass of contradictions and you are correct, Its the current editors I have faith in. Tirronan (talk) 01:11, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

Battlecruisers

"The weak design and faulty use of the battlecruisers were important in the serious losses of the British. The battle is often regarded as demonstrating that the Royal Navy was technologically and operationally inferior to the German Navy. Jellicoe wrote in his dispatch:"

I hate this, am I alone? Tirronan (talk) 01:09, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

I think it is a biased interpretation of whichever source it was from (be it Jellicoe's dispatch or something else). If it is based on Jellicoe's dispatch, I fail to see how weak design is equated to indifference in armour placement; how searchlights alone consitutue technological superiority; how nighttime opeartional efficiency means the German Navy is even superior to the Royal Navy in daytime; and where "faulty use" (whatever that means) is construed from. I also feel Jellicoe's quote should be broken into prose. If however kept as it is, it should be blockquoted as recommended by WP:MOSQUOTE Jappalang (talk) 01:36, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

I've changed it, it was basically an unsupported essay. --Tirronan (talk) 02:52, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

It was a butchery of what Jellicoe wrote in his depatch. He did comment on the defects of battle cruisers in the line of battle, but this was hardly news to anyone in the aftermath of the battle. He also stated that with regards to night-fighting the Grand Fleet was definitely out-classed by the KM, which it was. Whoever wrote that excerpt above seems to want to take it way too far though.

P.S. My copy of Tarrant finally arrived. It looks very extensive for a Cassell pb and has a list of all German signals in the back. I'm mildly impressed before even reading it properly. Harlsbottom

Flawed Paradigm

Other analysis[citation needed] of the battle showed that the British concept and use of the battlecruiser was wholly flawed.[citation needed] The battlecruiser had been designed according to Jackie Fisher's dictum that "speed is armour". They were intended to be faster than battleships, with superior fire control, and able to pound lighter enemy cruisers at ranges at which the enemy could not reply. In the event, the whole concept was negated when British battlecruisers were asked to fight German ships which were just as fast,[citation needed] exercised better gunnery,[citation needed] and were better armoured instead of holding the enemy beyond his maximum range.[citation needed]

Unless there is serious objection I would like this removed as what isn't repetitive is just flat wrong. Tirronan (talk) 06:10, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

No objection here. It's a very poor summary at best. Time to look at battle cruiser and see whether that needs improving. Harlsbottom

Ah, it's sort of right. However the superior fire control thing is a furphy, I've never seen any evidence that BCs were assumed to have it. I agree that putting them in the line of battle was a misuse of the original concept, since 'speed is armour' makes no sense unless you are allowed to manouevre. Greg Locock (talk) 09:59, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

Check out the Battle cruiser section and see if that doesn't cover it for you. Tirronan (talk) 12:55, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

Re: "Superior fire control" - Queen Mary was fitted with Argo fire control gear at Jutland. It has been spuriously suggested that this was a "superior" form of fire control, however it is now generally accepted that this was untrue. See "Dreadnought Gunnery at the Battle of Jutland" published in '05. Friedman fudges it a bit in his new book on naval gunnery, but the Argo system has lost the martyred lustre it possessed when a slew of Jutland and RN books and articles came out in the '90s and early noughties. Harlsbottom (talk)

18:25, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

My problem with that whole deal was mist/smoke/light really effected both sides to the point that the HSF shot worse than the BCs. The finest FC computer residing in American ships with the Ford computer, the finest Optics were German, and Admirality table was supposed to be damn good. Friedman on the Ford computer by the way. Tirronan (talk) 20:04, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

Wehre did you get your copy of Friedman's new book from? I ordered it from Amazon but they kept delivering the wrong thing... GRRR! The Land (talk) 20:13, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

I was talking about US Battleships a design history had it forever. Tirronan (talk) 20:45, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

My comment was aimed at Harlsbottom. I've got US Battleships, and wonderful it is...

I read the pertinent chapters of Friedman in my local bookstore, believe it or not. I'll be honest, it's not worth 40 pounds or 80 dollars. I;ve had a lot of constructive criticism hit back at me and while it's a good overview, some of the overviews just aren't comepetent. I assume you got the "Age of Sail" book then? The Ford was good, but it was worth bugger-all without the requisite FC procedures... Harlsbottom (talk) 01:25, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

I did indeed! Hmm, might give it a miss then - though I suspect it's a more useful resource for someone without hte luxury of a research library to work from. The Land (talk) 15:59, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

It did introduce quite a few new things to me, so if you already ordered it you may as well get it! There probably won't be any better naval books coming out this year (albeit Naval Firepower was five months late??). I just object severely to paying so much money for something which could quite easily be superseded by magazine articles and the like. If you haven't read Brooks' Dreadnought Gunnery at the Battle of Jutland already it covers the British FC in great detail, and as Friedman says in his book pretty much all decent Fire Control is descended from Britain's efforts before WWI. It only costs twenty pounds as well from Routledge. Harlsbottom

16:11, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

outcome

A third view is that Jutland illustrated the irrelevance of battleship fleets following the development of the submarine, mine and torpedo.[7] In this view, the most important consequence of Jutland was the subsequent decision of the Germans to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare.

Did I miss something here? While the submarine was a nasty threat that effected the deployment of the fleets (both) it should be pointed out that both main fleets sailed at will utterly denigning the sea to anything not a fleet of battleships. 2nd, while this sounds good in a contraian light its utter bullshit. The Germans went to unrestricted sub warfare BECAUSE they couldn't defeat the Grand Fleet and sought to impose a counter-blockade not because the battleships were irrelevent, but rather in this case, because they didn't have enough of them. Tirronan (talk) 14:54, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

I agree. We already know that Jutland forced the Germans to resort back to unrestricted submarine warfare because they knew that they would never be able to at best equalise the strengths through a surface action. Submarines proved fairly useless in holding battlefleets, mines were regularly swept by both sides throughout the war and both sides were prepared to manoeuvre either to inflict or avoid torpedo attacks in battle. And this term "battleship fleet" confuses me. The ultimate decline of the large battleship force was one of cost, not of vulnerability. If you would please give page number references JQ for Kennedy's book. Harlsbottom

15:17, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

The ultimate refutation of that was that Scheer went to the Kaiser in August of 1916 and announced in no uncertain terms that no operation mounted by the High Seas Fleet could defeat the Grand Fleet and demanded a turn to unrestrited submarine warfare. Speaking of which why are we not talking about the blockade and its effects that drove this entire battle? Tirronan (talk) 18:06, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

Tarrant discusses the blockade quite a bit in his book on the German Perspective. However he doesn't mention the Sussex pledge for some reason. And somewhat confusingly I didn't mention it in my draft article even though I found the relevant Wikipage, which I'll stick in now. Harlsbottom

18:20, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

If I had my way I think I would write exactly that, the return to the Uboat campaign, the continuation of the blockade, its effect on the civvie populus, and the entry of the US into the war... for an indecive battle, quite an outcome. Tirronan (talk) 16:15, 22 March 2008 (UTC)

Responding a bit belatedly, it's important to remember that the purpose of the article is to describe the competing views with reference to WP:WEIGHT not to offer our own assessment. That said, I'm a bit surprised by the vigour with which this view is dismissed here. After all, battleships did become obsolete over the first half of C20, and it seems reasonable to look for some point at which this obsolescence became evident. Jutland is not the only candidate, but it's a pretty good one.JQ (talk) 10:48, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

Its fine to sling around WP:Weight but this isn't the place for that and no one is denigning that the mine and the torpedo had strong influences on the battle fleet deployment of both sides, however, jumping from those facts to the BB being obsolence in WWI is in my opinion well out there by a shot. The Battleship was still useful through WW2 though as in WW1 it had to be escorted by the proper ship type destroyers. I would arugue that Jutland is no such thing as the declaration of the retirement of the battleship, rather it was it zeith. The arrival of aircraft with useful warloads signaled the end of the reign of the battleship and I have not read much about the weight of the view you profess to be honest. I think a more historically correct view would be the adversion of risk that countries were willing to subject there line of battle to would be a more useful tact (that was a hint by the way). Tirronan (talk) 16:41, 28 March 2008 (UTC)

If there are reliable sources that say "Jutland spelled the end of the battleship" then we should mention them. I don't think there are many such sources. An important point is that battleships had a contradictory existence right from the beginning; they were always vulnerable to torpedos, mines, etc. Jutland offers evidence for this, as does every episode of naval history since the 1860s. The balance changed critically away from the battleship in the 1940s, not before; the amount of military and diplomatic effort spent on naval arms limitation in the 1920s and 1930s surely illustrates this. Saying battleships were obsolescent in 1918 is a bit like saying nuclear bombs are obsolescent now! The Land (talk) 23:00, 28 March 2008 (UTC)

Needless to say if battleships had been considered useless after Jutland then a grand total of 36 wouldn't have been completed after the end of World War I. On the issue of mines and aircraft, as D.K. Brown told me and some others a while back, the aircraft carrier was just as vulnerable as a battleship - only it was more capable. It wasn't until 1942 that the British Admiralty resolved that the Aircraft Carrier would be the new capital ship (see "Nelson to Vanguard"). That battleships were still a necessary part of the Royal, United States and even French Navies at the end of the Second World War proves that they were still adaptable to an extent.

To illustrate, after WWI and the limitations The Land referred to everyone said the battleship was dead. Twenty years they were proved entirely wrong. And in my copy of Siegfried Breyer (whose work I despise for the number of errors it contains) there's a marvellous passage where he pooh-poohs the idea of battleships ever coming back into active service (he instead puts forward his own little idea for a fire-support ship). He wrote that in the 1970s. I wonder how crow tasted when Reagan became President? Harlsbottom (talk) 08:37, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

The fact that battleships continued to be built between the wars (or, for that matter, that Reagan recommissioned the Iowa class) is evidence that some decisionmakers believed they weren't obsolete, but not proof that these decisionmakers were correct. It's obvious that Reagan's decision was a mistake, and highly plausible that the interwar battleship race was similarly mistaken. The fact that the British Admiralty didn't learn the lesson until 1942 doesn't mean it wasn't there to be learned much earlier. As a reliable source for this point, let me offer this NY Times review of Keegan [6]

as Mr. Keegan makes clear, a little more than a decade later the battle of Jutland called into question the chief assumptions on which the great ironclad fleets, of which the dreadnoughts were the ultimate embodiment, had been built. After World War I, Jutland was misread by the gun club of battleship admirals in the British and American Navies who revived and held on to their dated conception of naval warfare for another generation.

Again, the point here isn't to resolve the question one way or another (is anything about Jutland ever resolved?) but to cover the controversy in an encyclopedic fashion. JQ (talk) 11:22, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

And in the second half of that quote you see evidence that the battleship was far from dead. We're not here to say "Were the navies of 1918-1939 right to be concerned with battleships?" but "What was the impact of the Battle of Jutland". The Land (talk) 12:02, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

A fair point. Perhaps "Outcome and implications" might be a better title.JQ (talk) 21:11, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

I can point you to a number of reviews of The Price of Admiralty which are hardly flattering, pre-eminent of which is the Journal of Military History's from April 1990. It's worth noting that after he wrote the book and the slating it got in certain quarters I am reliably informed that Keegan stated that he'd never write a naval history book again, which normally suggests you're not winning an argument, you're out of your depth or that you can't be bothered. Harlsbottom (talk) 11:48, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

My reading of this is that historians in general, including military historians like Keegan, quite commonly take the view being discussed here, while specialist naval historians tend to stress the continuing importance of surface fleets, and battleships in particular. This kind of divide is pretty common, and not too hard to explain in sociological terms (I know you don't like O'Connell but he has a point here), and tends to produce the kind of clash you just mentioned. Again WP:WEIGHT is our friend here. The correct thing to do is to cite Keegan, Kennedy and others, as well as the critical responses. JQ (talk) 21:11, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

What we need to do is put their views in their proper context without wandering into weak pop-history. As written, the sentence which sparked the argument is a bit the latter: the submarine had been around for 20 years and the mine and torpedo for 50, battleships were around for a further 40. I am sure an appropriate form of words can be found to reflect that viewpoint, it always be can. But that sentence wasn't it. The Land (talk) 23:19, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

I'm late to the conversation here, but I have to say that JQ seems to be quite attached to the point of view which believes Jutland proved the obsolescence of the Battleship. Forgive my saying so, but believing the sea mine signalled the death of the surface fleet is like believing the land mine signalled the death of the infantryman. The advent of the submarine certainly gave Germany another means of throttling trade between north america and europe, but naval superiority was obviously their preference. A proper naval blockade in the context of WW1 is a far more effective means of closing the sea lanes to your foes. While it was certainly possible to disrupt trade using hit-and-run submarine attacks, the advantage a strong surface fleet confers over this tactic should be quite obvious. That is why Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare only after it became clear they would be unable to wrest naval superiority from the british.

A surface battlefleet is analogous to a strong conventional army, while submarines are analogous to guerilla fighters(think of indians raiding wagon trains headed west during american expansion). Guerilla tactics can be effective, but in a context of total war(not Vietnam/Iraq), the conventional army clearly has the upper hand.

I and most historians believe it was the aircraft carrier which signalled the end of the BB, not the submarine.--Ironzealot (talk) 08:16, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

I think this somes up my views nicely

"The problem for a maritime nation that does not maintain a balanced fleet, with at least some ability to contest a set-piece battle, is that it surrenders the use of the sea for its own purposes, whether economic or military. In addition, such a nation lacks the ability to interdict enemy shipping movements which are protected by a sufficient escort. Such a strategy exposes the nation to blockade or even, in the worst case, invasion. In addition, while a navy optimised for sea denial(as opposed to sea control) operations may maximise its potential against a stronger opponent, it will be at a disadvantage against nations of similar strength of its own, but which have invested their resources in a more conventional fleet. For this reason, maritime nations which are unable to compete with the dominant naval power have usually sought to achieve an accommodation with that power, thereby allowing them to resource a balanced fleet with which to deal with their more direct rivals."--Ironzealot (talk) 09:38, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

Let's be clear here. Your views are of zero relevance, as are mine. What matters is the views that have been expressed in WP:RS reliable sources. Deleting material that cites reliable sources is a clear violation of Wikipedia policy. JQ (talk) 11:43, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

OK lets, JQ you haven't shown the weight of historic opinion that would demand such a claim beyond John Kegan's work, and even that is admitted that his isn't a naval expert's opinion which would however count. I'm not interested in fax paus history or the latest in contraian views by non military historians with little or no background in the subject. The view has to be counted to some degree but certainly the fact that 2 fleets of battleships were meeting in a narrow shallow sea in the face of both mines and submarines, both of which existed and were used before and after the battle, would seem to put this a decade or two before its time. I don't mind a short sentence that this has been forwarded by Mr. Kegan and whoever else subscribes to this but there are far more important issues than this that has seem to have highjacked the entire effort to improve this article... I object to this use of our time... Tirronan (talk) 16:21, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

I've just a look through Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. The thrust of his argument in the sections I've found is "the end of the battleship was in sight when it was no longer able to command the seas without a bevy of escorts". (p. 249 of my edition) This by no means heralds the end of the battleship as the dominant force on the ocean waves (as opposed to beneath the waves). His argument seems to be that battleships without escorts were useless in the face of submarines. This was hardly new, and the fact that battleships always operated in company with escorts slapa this one right back in Kennedy's face. Of course the threat of submarines influenced Jellicoe, but that was most evident at the sortie of 19 August, 1916 - NOT at Jutland.

Furthermore, I doubt there is any historian who will deny the importance of Jutland in compelling the Germans to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare, and logic dictates that it was the battleship, and numbers thereof, which brought this about. The final comment about the number of battleships constructed beneath the war is strange to say the least. The battleship was considered so important that it was found necessary to have a massive battleship disarmament conference. If something's irrelevent, to use your word, you don't do that. The number of battleships built in TWENTY years was paltry compared to the previous 15, and that includes another arms race in the build-up to the Second World War. Harlsbottom (talk) 16:30, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

I don't think that the battleship went unescorted since the invention of the locomotive torpedo. I guess what bothers me the most about this is that there are areas that still need to be discussed, the lack of destroyers on the GF side, seems to me they needed about 1/2 again more than they had. Another of the issues is that the dreads were considered to valuable to hazard unless there existed a very good chance of winning with them. I would like to see discussions on these subjects, as well as F/C D/C Greenboy shells, and C3I issues. before coming to a conclusion on what needs to be done. Tirronan (talk) 19:50, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

I'd count myself qualified to discuss gunnery issues, but for the time being there are other issues to be dealt with. I'm still trawling through my Rules of the Game (there is some good stuff in it) and Jutland: The German Perspective. As usual, everyone harps on about the British did this, the British responded to that, when there really needs to be more coverage of the German activities in this.

Out of interest, does anyone have any information on the German honours awarded after the battle? I know that Scheer and Hipper both received high grades of the Iron Cross, and Hipper was made a "von" by one of the German kingdoms. It's rather strange having just VCs on. The Honours section should in fact be renamed, as the number of honours the British alone awarded after the battle, be they medals, ranks or M.I.D.s is rather large, and who knows what the Germans did in their initial euphoria post-Jutland.

There's far too much actual battle information to be dealt with before we start messing about with debateable consequences. What we need are facts. Harlsbottom (talk) 15:51, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

A few brief points. First, I don't think I've hijacked the discussion as suggested above. I've made only occasional comments on a single point, and I can't see how this disrupts work on other parts of the article. Second, I agree that naval historians tend to take a different view from that of military historians in general, which in turn is probably different from that of non-military historians. It's not surprising that, of these groups, the naval specialists are least sympathetic to views that downplay the significance/usefulness of navies (particularly surface navies). Obviously, the naval specialists are the authoritative sources when it comes to detailed description, but on the bigger issues all perspectives should be represented according to WP:WEIGHT.JQ (talk) 22:18, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

'

I think those that advance the position that the torpedo made the battleship obsolete have some gaps in their historical understanding. In the late 19th century, when the torpedo and the torpedo boat were developed, the navies of the world were in a panic. They pictured hoards of tiny vessels swarming over the seas and sinking their beloved capital ships with ease. Thus the development of the Torpedo boat destroyer(eventually known as simply the destroyer).--Ironzealot (talk) 02:52, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

Honestly though, they need not have worried, the early Whitehead self propelled torpedos were nearly useless in combating enemy warships. They were first put to the test on a large scale in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. When the Japanese declared a state of war through a suprise attack on the Russian naval base of port arthur. The attack consisted of primarily torpedo boats which fired at russian warships at anchor. Despite this being a surprise attack and the fact that the russian warships were docked and unable to evade or defend themselves only three torpedos successfully struck their targets and detonated, damaging two battleships. People fail to realize that early torpedos were incredibly inaccurate and unreliable, and had a maximum effective range of only just over 1,000 meters.--Ironzealot (talk) 02:54, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

The torpedo boats of the period weren't the fast, agile little PT boats we think of today either. They were fast and agile by the standards of the time, but the capital ships of the day and their destroy escorts had little difficulty driving them off or destroying them before they were in effective range to launch a torpedo attack. The naval masterminds of the 1880s and 1890s had high expectations for the torpedo boat, expectations that were proven unrealistic through the russo-japanese war.--Ironzealot (talk) 02:55, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

The story only gets slightly better for the torpedo in world war one. Where, despite some early successes, the submarine was proven to be near useless in a set piece battle and hence relegated to the role of commerce raider(where they were the ultimate predator until the development of the depth charge and hydrophone). Torpedo boats once again were proven to have a greater psychological impact than tangible impact, as fleet commanders were reluctant to expose their dreadnoughts to potentional torpedo attack despite the limitations of the torpedos of the day.--Ironzealot (talk) 02:56, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

The expectations of the torpedo boat pioneers, the vision of numerous small craft descending on capital ships and destroying them easily through torpedo attack, was not fully realized until world war II. But the small, fast, and agile craft envisioned did not take the form of torpedo boats, but rather the form of torpedo planes and dive bombers. Unlike early torpedo boats, these planes were fast and agile enough to reliably maneuver their way past the battleship/carrier's circle of escorts and make the kill.--Ironzealot (talk) 02:58, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

Even in world war II the locomotive torpedo still had a woefully short maximum effective range and serious reliability issues(thus subs were still only effective as commerce raiders). However, the torpedos of world war II were far more lethal than the torpedos of the russo-japanese war or world war one. So through sheer force of numbers the naval bombers could be counted on to score a few direct hits, which was usually enough.--Ironzealot (talk) 02:59, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

Thus we can see that it was the devlopment of advanced naval aviation, and not the development of the torpedo, which spelled the end of the Battleship's dominance of the waves.--Ironzealot (talk) 03:01, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

Well its always good to see an enthusiast. You don't have to sign every paragraph. Long Lance was available in WW2, it did not have a woefully short maximum range, what it lacked was a guidance system. I agree with your main point in hindsight, but throughout that period many (eg Fisher in ~1910) were convinced that mines, submarines and aircraft were threats that would eliminate capital ships in the long run. So, although in retrospect it wasn't actually subs that killed the BBs, they were a strong influence on people's decision making, even though that emphasis was misplaced. As usual any absolutist statement over simplifies a complex story involving hundreds or thousands of people over a period of forty years.Greg Locock (talk) 09:34, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

What are we calling a "woefully short maximum range" here? The latest German torpedo, the G/7 19.7-inch introduced the year before the Great War had a maximum range of a little over 10,000 yards and had an adjustable gyroscope.(Eberhard Rössler, Die Torpedo der deutschen U-Boote: Entwicklung, Herstellung und Eigenschaften der deutschen Marine-Torpedos (Herford: Koehlers Verlagsgessellschaft, 1984), 42–43)) As early as 1908 the Royal Navy was perfectly aware that torpedoes in the future could make 12,000 yards if so required.(Captain Bernard Currey, Assistant Director of Torpedoes (ADT), Memorandum, 17 December 1908, Ship’s Cover Australia/New Zealand, 324) And despite the decree that from 1911 onwards every capital ship was to have an extra torpedo tube, the German battleline at Jutland could still loose off a greater number of torpedoes than the numerically superior Grand Fleet battlefleet. --Harlsbottom (talk|library)

10:14, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

allow me to clarify, i didn't mean the torpedos of the time were incapable of travelling more than 1.2-1.5 km, i meant it was nearly impossible to hit anything beyond this effective range, and that remained true through WWII. Uboat captains were instructed to close to 1,000 meters before launching a torpedo attack, and even at that range is was extremely difficult to hit a target that wasn't travelling at a constant speed or bearing. That is why subs were most effective at attacking merchants.--Ironzealot (talk) 02:40, 21 April 2008 (UTC)

I believe that it was Morrison that did the statical research but the fact that torpedos lauched from maximum ranger in daylight resulted in hits = 1% to .5% this is WW2 with better computers and better torps. Lets get to the objection though, are you stating that surface fleets were obsolete or battleships, and this forced the return to submarine warfare? --Tirronan (talk) 16:55, 21 April 2008 (UTC)

If anything, the battle showcased the inability of torpedoboats/destroyers at the time to deliver a damaging torpedo attack against an opposing line of capital ships. Both Beatty and Hipper sent their respective light craft in in the hope of altering the stalemate and all that resulted was an exciting punch-up of the torpedo-carriers between the battle lines, without altering the situation one way or the other. I fully agree with the statement at the top. The battle didn't show battleships were irrelevant, rather the reverse. It simply showed that Germany didn't have enough of them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 116.125.84.170 (talk) 15:31, 24 December 2008 (UTC)

Berwick-Upon-Tweed?

What does Berwick-Upon-Tweed (2nd image) have to do with any of this? 189.130.19.204 (talk) 09:23, 10 April 2008 (UTC)

I think the person who put it up was trying to show the German's target. However, I find it trivial at best. It does not matter where the German target was. It only mattered the Germans were intercepted en route. Hence the picture is of superfluous nature to the article. I find this also applies to Image:Jutland campaign map.png. It is a lesser copy of Image:Jutland1916.jpg which is in the Infobox. Per WP:IMAGES, images must be pertinent and not redundant. Hence I propose clearing this article of:

Jappalang (talk) 05:52, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

I always thought the german target was the bristish battlecruiser arm. Actually, they succeeded quite well there. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 116.125.84.170 (talk) 17:21, 24 December 2008 (UTC)

Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

Ensured that the article is within project scope, tagged for task forces, and assessed for class. --Rosiestep (talk) 21:15, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

What was wrong with the Admiral gallery??

I'm not seeing in the policy where it says you can't have a gallery of public domain images (which all of the admiral pics are, according to Commons). It says no galleries of fair use images, but that's a very different thing which is more sensitive. I rather liked the little gallery of admirals, though unfortunately there is no Commons pic of Scheer. Finding one would be a good contribution. Please explain to me what the trouble was, or if it's a misunderstanding, please restore the gallery, unless someone has a reasonable objection.Rep07 (talk) 04:17, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

I removed it and under WP:IUP#Photo galleries, "No decision on photo galleries has been made yet. Please discuss pros and cons of each option on the talk page. In general, galleries are discouraged in main article namespace; historically, such galleries are more often deleted than kept. As a result, there are relatively few namespace galleries in the encyclopedia (see this list) and good reasons must be given for creating them." The photos used as they were also fitted none of the four options listed in the same section.

Having read through several recent FACs, there are several concerns with excessive images or images that serve no purpose other than decorative purposes. If this article is aiming for the FA again, then it would be better to nip a potential problem in the bud. Pasting the portraits of the admirals without context is definite material for the image-reviewers to oppose the article.

Instead, I set up a list of the admirals concerned and asked for other editors with greater knowledge on them to write up short bios containing their relevant information leading up to the battle. Once fleshed out, it can be discussed if the admirals' portraits can be placed next to their paragraphs. It would be best to first write a substantive section of the article on the admirals relevant to the battle, and then enhance it with images. Jappalang (talk) 05:16, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

? As far as I can tell, the "namespace galleries" they are talking about (see the list) are separate articles--purely collections of photos. It is these they appear to be discouraging. For example, if someone created a separate page "Images of Jutland", containing only photos, that would fit the profile of the discouraged practice. I don't think they are trying to prevent a simple (and in this case, efficient and appropriate) array of 3-4 portraits of major protagonists from existing within an article (nor can I imagine any reason why this would be seen as a problem, as long as it is reasonably small and doesn't overwhelm the structure of the article). Or to put it another way, in-article galleries are not "namespace galleries". On the other point, why duplicate bios here, since there are articles for each admiral? As long as their command is identified.Rep07 (talk) 05:49, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

No. The section is talking specifically about photo galleries in any articles. This is explicit when they give a list of acceptable photo galleries in articles.

"There are four different approaches to photo galleries. Some approaches may be suitable for specific subjects, or it may be possible to set a standard. The options are:

Photos at bottom of article (Erotic art in Pompeii)
Photos on "images of" page (e.g., sheep, images of sheep)
Photos on an image description page (e.g., cattle)
No photo galleries allowed — only include a limited number of relevant photos accompanying article text"

I stated short bios for the admirals, not full blown versions (which would be their own articles). Summarised bios relevant to events leading to the battle would be good and lend greater context to the article. The approach to this can be seen in various FA articles. Jappalang (talk) 07:40, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

No. The gallery in the "heraldry" section of the cattle example is exactly like what we had here. Take a look. Therefore we're within the accepted practice(s). The policy is not discouraging galleries "in any articles": review the list accompanying the "namespace galleries discouraged" sentence and you'll see that all of those pages are "photo only pages", a special species which apparently is disliked.

"In general, galleries are discouraged in main article namespace; historically, such galleries are more often deleted than kept. As a result, there are relatively few namespace galleries in the encyclopedia (see this list)"

Again, what was done here does not fall in the discouraged category of "namespace galleries"--that phrase specifically refers to separate gallery pages presented as if they were main articles, and/or with names similar to existing main articles. There is no reason they would have used such a phrase if they wanted to categorically discourage all galleries everywhere; they would have said so much more simply and directly. Common sense. I agree that the policy is poorly written, difficult to decipher, and should be revised. But I've established that the policy as written does not justify removal of the admirals gallery; therefore I recommend that it be restored. Let's concentrate on constructive contribution (which is hard), rather than high-handed deletion (which is all too easy) and leave the finer policy debates to the next GA review as Harlsbottom suggests. (And please, sombody find a public domain portrait of Scheer!)Rep07 (talk) 18:35, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

No, you have not. You must understand the history of the policy. The "cattle" option is on an image description page, i.e. a page describing the subject concerned. Hence you can have a "cattle" page talking about the various breeds of cattle and listing them out in a photo gallery. You can have a "Models of Ferrari cars" page talking about the various makes of Ferraris and a gallery with the models through the years. A "Battle of Jutland" page is supposed to be talking about what? The policy was written as a "Photo montage" section on 15 Apr 2003 following a discussion in the Village Pump. Of course due to the "controversial discussions", the page was constantly evolving and at the time of the writing of the policy, the cattle page was actually devoid of a photo montage on 12 Apr 2003. It was supposed to have pointed to the concerned "cattle" page that was on 22 Sep 2002. As evident, the page itself points to a page talking about various breeds of cattle with their pictures. I see nothing in "Battle of Jutland" discussing about the various types of admirals. Jappalang (talk) 00:37, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

No, the link in the current policy points to the current cattle article and that contains an example of the exact type of montage that was here. We're not required to consider what might have been meant five years ago. You seem to be saying that the policy is a "dead relic" of former discussions, with obsolete links; if so, it is obviously not a valid basis for pre-emptively deleting someone else's work. You haven't answered my point about the "namespace" language, and it seems to me that you're unduly prolonging this discussion with absurd theories. Feel free to be a gentleman about it and restore the obviously relevant and appropriate gallery that a contributor placed here, and that no one else had any objection to.Rep07 (talk) 02:43, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

My thoughts; If the photo gallery would prove a hindrance at FAC, then we can cross that bridge when we get to it. Considering this article first has to get to B-class, then GA or A-class before that, this is rather premature. It would be better to write the short bios beneath the gallery then delete it. And to be perfectly honest, wouldn't it have been better to discuss this before deleting it, as the guidelines seem to indicate? --Harlsbottom (talk|library)

I think I am going to have to agree with Harl on this one, look this article needs a lot of serious work and this kind of editing to little or no effect goes about a far as one editor pushing a pov that surface fleets were useless in WW1 because he thinks so... Tirronan (talk) 19:12, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

Harlsbottom, the bridge is much closer than you think since one of the WP:GACR is "(b) the images are appropriate to the topic, and have suitable captions." GAC is less strict than FAC and you could possibly fluster an inexperienced reviewer enough to get pass it, but the point stands that the photo gallery was not doing much for the article other than "I like it", "It's pretty", or "It doesn't hurt the article". In retrospect, what did removing the gallery do in terms of hurting it? Nothing. Discussion is recommended for issues that might hurt the article. In this case, the issues regarding the battle and the points of views being pushed across the tables are those that should be discussed. Removing non-critical elements to follow policy is being bold. Jappalang (talk) 00:37, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

I don't think the gallery added much to the article, and it was probably bad style. However, the process of writing this article is getting quite heated, which is a shame. If people could approach it in a more collaborative and collegial tstyle that would be helpful... The Land (talk) 19:22, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

What is happening here is not a collegial style, 1st its all the energy that gets directed to a rather strange opinion all works stops... Followed by this edit with no talk whatsoever again with a basic here it is and no give or take whatsoever and that of course is collegial. Perhaps we can help the article out more by having a in depth discussion about the margins and left vs. right alignment of the pictures... I really am sorry that I feel this way but litterally nothing substansive has happened here since this started and there is much to be worked out... but instead we have what amounts to a "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin" discussion. To be perfectly honest, we have got to have something better to add to the article than what has been done as of this date than championing arguments out of left field or mashing formatting in the name of a better MOS then for God's sake get out of the way and allow us to fix this thing, there is real work to be done and frankly this is not doing it... --Tirronan (talk) 23:39, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

I agree. There are two species of editors on Wiki, the positive contributors and the juvenile power-trippers. The former work hard to add, improve, and reference collaborative content. The latter primarily gratify their fragile egos by deleting and reverting the work of others, seeking any technicality to do so. Unfortunately contributors then have to waste time patiently debating with the "little bigshots" until, as you say, they get out of the way, gratified by the attention they've received and the frustration that they've caused.Rep07 (talk) 00:23, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

Fully agreed with you, Tirronan. If editors take the time to learn the policies, they would avoid many pointless and frivolous debates. Jappalang (talk) 00:37, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

Good news, I complained about the indecipherable photo gallery policy on the policy talk page, and an admin who has also been struggling with that policy, actually changed WP:IUP#Photo galleries yesterday. He added a clarifiying lead, though he left the dysfunctional relic text below it. Rep07 (talk) 19:48, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

enough is enough

Sooner or later we all have or points where as the movie lines goes "My hypocracy only goes so far..." unless proof is rendered that more that two rather off beat historians, one of whom never before nor ever again attempted a naval history, then I am going on record that the irrelevancy of the Battleship or Surface fleet needs to be deleted or at least marginalized as what it is... a highly controversial and much reputed opinion by two non experts in the field. WP:Weight till the cows come home, both the weight of the vast majority of historians and the consensus of most of the editors seems to be that this is an exotic and frankly stupid statement 24 years ahead of its time. I am asking each of the editors to weigh in with an agree or disagree and I am done with the article hi-jack. When we are done with this issue please prepare areas that you want to be addressed and we will proceed. This warning clearly given... either be prepared to actually contribute to the work in a meaningful way or stay out of the way. Tirronan (talk) 01:02, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

Quotes for Color?

What do people think of adding in a few eyewitness quote blocks for depth, as has been done so well in Battle of Waterloo? Rep07 (talk) 20:45, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

I've always thought that the quotes in Battle of Waterloo lent the article its humanity and emotion where it otherwise would not exist. Tirronan (talk) 23:39, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

So long as they are clearly relevant and not too frequent I think it's a good idea. I think we should ditch the "Quotes" section at the bottom of the article, though... The Land (talk) 11:37, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

The problem with ALOT of eyewitness accounts from Jutland is their reliability - not unnatural when you're in the middle of the largest naval battle in history. Look at Rules of the Game for example; Gordon either attacks their reliability or treats them with his usual disdain. If we put some in here, I foresee a big ring-around-a-rosie of people wanting to add more quotes or swap them. The only quotes I feel are necessary and relevant for now are those which pertain to the actual conduct of the battle - i.e. Jellicoe and Scheer, or Beatty's well-known "There's something wrong..." line. My two cents on that score anyway. On the matter of the "Quotes" section I fully agree. The quotes are long-winded, over-elegant and ultimately superfluous.--Harlsbottom (talk|library)

11:55, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

Hmmm. I take the point. I think we should limit ourselves to quotes whose accuracy is either disputed or, perhaps, unimportant. The Land (talk) 13:32, 13 May 2008 (UTC)