Talk:Battle of Chemnitz

• Even though the German page states that 20,000 Swedes were present, it's very likely that 6,000 Swedish cavalry attacked 8,000 Allies, both infantry and cavalry. Marzin should have learned from his defeat at Wittstock in 1636 where the allies also had superiority in numbers but seemingly discounted an attack. I don't know where the rest of the Swedish army was, probably chasing food.
• Someone claimed that Marzin himself was captured, that is not correct, several subordinates were.
• Raimondo Montecuccoli, who fought for the losers is not to be confused with his cousin Ernesto, Wallenstein's #2 in command
• The number of captured is a consensus 1,500, the number of other allied casualties seems much too low at 500 when they were just routed, though I have no other numbers.

German.Knowitall (talk) 00:11, 7 September 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for drawing attention to this rather neglected article (both by Wiki authors and literature).

I restored some of the content you removed because it seemed oversimplifying to me. The dire supply situation that lead to the Imperial retreat from Pomerania (and thereby enabled Banérs advance) was a bit more than Gallas "doing Heerverderber things". The Protestant allies of the Emperor in nothern Germany were very reluctant to spend any of their resources to support the Imperial army and Gallas was obliged not to just take them by force. Banér however had no political restrictions and could convince them by brute force to supply him.

Also, Banérs rapid and far advance was unexpected because he marched across a very large devastated area (Mecklenburg, archbishopric of Magdeburg, thereby ignoring main strongholds of his enemies like Dömitz or Magdeburg). This made his supply lines very vulnerable but lead him to regions where he could still live off the land.

I did not find any direct number for the Swedish engaged in the battle. Wilson gives them an overall strength of 18,000 of which not all actively participated in the battle. However, most of them are likely to be present at the battlefield because Banér had joined forces with Torstensson's detachment prior to the battle. According to the source E. O. Schmidt, the Swedish routed the left flank of the Imperial-Saxon army, then their right flank chose to flee (which would explain the low number of killed or wounded). That left the infantry without support, most of it was subsequently captured. This victory was apparantly fought only by the Swedish cavalry whose exact strenght is not known. But the rest of the Swedish army was there, it was still crossing a swamp in front of the Imperial-Saxon lines when their cavalry shattered the enemy.--Palastwache (talk) 11:24, 7 September 2023 (UTC)

Hello Palastwache, the last offensive action in Pommern by Gallas was in Usedom in 1637. In mid 1638 he had 15,000 of 40,000 men left and had no chance against a reinforced Baner who went from 7,000 to 20,000+. Gallas was an alcoholic and incompetent Source and only in charge because he had one glorious win at Nördlingen.

It was therefore 1638, not 1639, when Sweden marched South. They spent the winter in Thüringen and Anhalt. The first (minor) battle in Saxony was in Elsterberg/Vogtland in March 39.

German.Knowitall (talk) 18:40, 7 September 2023 (UTC)

Usedom was conquered by the Imperials in December 1637, that is true. The last conquest of the Imperials and their allies might have been Gartz in February 1638 by Brandenburg. Until mid 1638, significant Imperial contigents moved off to the south (Götz to Breisach) or west (Hatzfeld to Vlotho) but it was expected that the Brandenburgian armament would compensate for them - spoiler: it did not. Banér was however still occupied with reconquering Pomerania and Mecklenburg until he could move south. Banér retook Gartz in Juli, Loitz in August and Wolgast in September 1638. Then he moved to Mecklenburg in the west. Gallas held out until December because he wanted to resupply Demmin (which succeeded) and distract Banér from an attack the Brandenburgers planned on Stettin (which they aborted when they realised that the defenses were too strong). Gallas retreated in December while Banér crossed the Elbe and moved south to Lüneburg in January. That's still early 1639 but I will change it to January to be more precise. The action at Elsterberg/Ruppertsgrün against the Imperial detachment under Salis is also worth mentioning. But to describe to campaigns of 1637 and 1638 in depth, an own article would be needed.

Gallas already has his own article. While he definitely had the undying trust of Ferdinand III since the Nördlingen campaign, he was actually a good tactician. His former subordinate Raimondo Montecuccoli often cites actions of Gallas as positive examples in his writings about military theory. However, he was overcautious and overly obedient to impracticable orders of the Emperor (e. g. containing Banér in Pomerania without any means to possibly sustain an army there for longer). Gallas knew and complained and protested about it but did it anyway. His unwillingness to take risks and his possible lacking skills in organising and logistic matters (in contrast to e. g. Piccolomini or Torstensson) made him not the best candidate to lead an offensive campaign. There was however no one else available and he had excelled too often in the defensive for the Emperor not to trust in him. He probably was an alkoholic, like Banér too, but this is mainly portrayed in the descriptions of Swedish "Rikshistoriograf" and propagandist Bogislaw Chemnitz (one of two main contemporary sources on the war, the other being the Theatrum Europaeum), while authentic descriptions are mostly missing. Gallas possibly suffered harder from gout and the kidney stones that killed him in the end. Palastwache (talk) 08:22, 8 September 2023 (UTC)