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If Germany had invaded Britain, it would have to have left its Eastern flank denuded and exposed to a Soviet invasion (which almost certainly would have happened). This threat of a Soviet attack is what led the Germans to abandon the idea of invading Britain, and to invade Russia instead. Is there a good way to work this into the Battle of Britain page?


1) I added an OKH-wiki

2) I think that would rather belong to the Sealion page, which is not even made.

3) I disagree. Mostly Sealion was canceled because Hitler feared that a failure would have consequences out of proportion with the risk, and a success would allow Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union to grab pieces of the Empire, which he did not like. Besides, even a complete success in Britain would not have necessarily led to a British surrender, they could've fought on from Canada.


I read in a novel (Connie Willis - To say nothing of the Dog) that the British attack on Berlin was triggered by an accidental bombing of London: A German plane got lost, wanted to get home and just threw out its bombs, as it happens on some part of London. In the book, this is a possible reason Germany lost the war, because (as stated here) the RAF could recuperate. Is that true? --Yooden


On the 25th August 1940 the Germans attacked a oil depot at Thameshaven; one aircraft got lost, continued west and dropped it's bombs on the City of London. This angered the War Cabinet and that night 80 bombers bombed Berlin in reprisal. But London had already been bombed, albeit only in the suburbs. It wasn't until later the Germans decided to concentrate on bombing cities - and while this benefited the RAF it is difficult to claim it lost the Germans the war. Invading Russia lost the war.


Once the British had bombed Berlin then the Nazi's felt compelled to retaliate in kind. After the easy victory over France bombing Berlin was one way of returning the war to German territory. Many Nazi officials felt nervous about public morale if the bombing was sustained. As a totalitarian government there was a feeling public support could not be taken for granted and that serious deprivation might provide support for the Nazi's political opponents.

Regardless of who started bombing civilian populations first (and I think there is a consensus that neither side entered the Battle of Britain with an intention of carrying out widespread urban bombing) the decision was a strategic and political mistake as other contributers have pointed out.

As for whether the decision lost the war for Germany it is unlikely that just one decision could have that much impact. It was however one of a series of mistakes that culminated in the German defeat. It could be possibly said that Hitler's failure to either settle with or decisively defeat the British was his first mistake in the war, one which he compounded by embarking on the invasion of Russia without having achieved a decision in the west.

I have another question about this entry, was Churchill really "Master of the Cabinet"? I thought that Churchill's appointment as Prime Minister settled the conflict between the peace faction and that for continuing the struggle. Appointing Halifax would have indicated success for the peace faction.

Even then though the terms of the peace the British were considering were unlikely to be accepted by Hitler as few of the British politicians could accept the dismembering of the Empire or a peace that involved humiliating restrictions on British military power. Any peace terms would have proven difficult to sell to the British public I think. Hitler hoped that Britain could be persuaded to join his attack on Russia which seems naive as well. Were there any realistic proposals being considered that of could have led to peace? Most of those I have heard of seem to be nothing more than pipe dreams.


I don't thik that the Enigma information was critical in the BoB, it was too early in the war and the information flow too slow. Does anyone known the truth.

From my reading of a book called "The Ultra Secret" by F.W. Winterbotham (a personal account of his involvement in reporting the intelligence to various Allied leaders), he claims it was important, as the British knew the overall German strategy (force the British fighters up so they could be shot down) from intercepts from Goering, and thus led to the tactics of using minimal aircraft at once against the wishes of lower-ranked officers (something I've read about independently in a biography of Douglas Bader, a remarkable gent who despite losing both legs in an accident in 1933 was one of Britain's most successful aces of the war). However, more information on this would probably be good, as one person's personal account (and probably one predisposed to overemphasise Enigma material) isn't ideal for making such assessments. -- Robert Merkel
See also : World War II

The Germans new from quite early on that even if they had won the Battle of Britain, an invasion of Britain would not be practical for one reason the Royal Navy. As Hitler said "On Land i am a Hero, But on Sea i am a Coward"


Are the V1 Flying Bomb and V2 rocket considered part of the Battle of Britain per se? If so, could someone add a note on this? Thanks.


The V1 and V2 bombings occured 4 years after the Battle of Britain. Mintguy 09:44, 11 Oct 2003 (UTC)



Any reason why The Blitz is a separate article instead of a redirect here? --mav 08:33, 11 Oct 2003 (UTC)

Because the Battle of Britain is about the German attempt to acheive air superiority prior to an invasion, whilst The Blitz is about the sustained bombing of civilian targets after that attempt failed. They are two different things. Mintguy 09:44, 11 Oct 2003 (UTC)

OIC - I've always thought of the whole thing as the Battle of Britain. Yes, of course the first part was aimed at softening the UK's defenses to prepare for an invasion, but when that failed Hitler wanted to break the will of the British people so that they would surrender (which nearly happened; the RAF, Radar and American supplies saved the day). It was still a battle for control of the island. But I see your point. --mav

Part of The Blitz happend during the Battle of Britain, but the night bombing continued after the B Of B had ended and is usually considered part if the Blitz.Philip Baird Shearer 08:27, 20 May 2004 (UTC)

When did the battle end?

From October 31:

Is this true? If so then please update this article. If not then please delete the above line from October 31 and 1940. --mav 03:22, 1 Nov 2003 (UTC)

When it ended depends on your definition. But officially as far as the RAF are concerned the Battle of Britain ran from 10 July - 31 October. Operation Sealion was postponed on 17 September. There wasn't a complete cessation of action 31 October, but there was considerably less activity in the air and no serious bombing by the luftwaffe. Mintguy 09:14, 1 Nov 2003 (UTC) ____________________________________

Regarding comment above on Churchill's mastery of the cabinet at that time, I don't think this was true. Recent information suggests that there was still an ongoing issue between the peace faction and the carry-on-the-struggle group. Halifax was in the former. Churchill, in the latter, won out, but not without a fight.


Movies

I think it's a bad move to start listing films on this page. Why mention films and not books. There are dozens if not hundreds of films and TV programmes about the Battle of Britain. Can we shove this off into 'list of films about the Battle of Britain' or something. Mintguy


I don't regard the movie list as a problem, as it seems appropriate. But I'm agreed on adding a bibliography to the page, as this is far more important. Having just completed a thorough top-to-toe edit of the page material, I shall compile a booklist from my sources. Prune


I have finished a major edit of the entry. This has expanded it considerably and now touches upon most of the major factors impinging on the battle, binding it together into a more coherent narrative. Where possible I have tried to keep previous materials and in many cases have rewritten them into the main strand.

A handful of pieces of information became casualties. Some material on Sealion was deleted and replaced with a link to the Sealion entry. A discussion of the peace faction in England overemphasized the degree of pro-peace sentiment and was cut down (including a reference to Lord Halifax). A set of bombing figures for the early battle was cut out as I had trouble locating the source for the figures and it was unnecessary to the narrative at that juncture. At some later point I shall add some verified bombing figures to the article. Some figures on kill claims were replaced by a sentence on overclaiming and the verified post-war figures.

A further point: claims in earlier versions of the article that the RAF was losing a war of attrition are simply untrue, as borne out by modern scholarship (see Williamson Murray and Hough/Richards). If anything, the RAF finished the battle stronger and the Luftwaffe was seriously depleted by it. What was critical about the third phase battles were the attacks on the infrastructure and command and control system and it was the pounding that this took that could have resulted in Fighter Command withdrawing from the south.

In addition, I have added a bibliography based on my main sources. There are several other sources not listed here that will probably be added in a future edit.

Many new links have been added and several of these (such as Big Wing, Keith Park and some other biographies) have been expanded on in the relevant entries. Note that I have generally moved discussion of the Big Wing issue to be more neutral in tone. This was not the black-and-white issue some tabloid commentators (such as Deighton and Bungay) paint it as. I recommend the John Ray history listed in the Bibliography as a more sober and reasoned view of the controversy. Prune

[ Other's contributions and inaccuracies ]

Except for Polish pilots, there were also Czech pilots, and they should be mentioned too, i believe. SAlso, there is inconstency inthe numbers: in one place the article mentions that Poles scroed 201, in other that score is 276 or soemthing Szopen 15:31, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

There were a number of nationalites who fought for the RAF in the battle of Britain. The Few' were 2353 young men from Great Britain and 574 from overseas. American, Australians,Belgians, Canadians, Czechoslovakian, Free French, Irish, Jamaicans,New Zealanders,Palestinian, Polish, South Africans,South Rhodesian. I went through this list by eye so may have mist a country or two, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/roll.html perhpase someone would like to put it into a spread sheet and put the summery on the Battle of Britain page. See also: http://www.taphilo.com/history/BofBamericanpilots.shtml Philip Baird Shearer 08:27, 20 May 2004 (UTC)


Does anyone know if the quote in the film B of B is from real life? When responding to accusations of exaggerated claims, Dowding states "I'm not very interested in propaganda. If we're right they'll give up. If we're wrong, they'll be in London within a week". If it is a real quote then it would fit well after the paragraph which starts "Modern military historians have suggested..." Philip Baird Shearer 08:27, 20 May 2004 (UTC)


I know it's hard to find aircraft photographs, but that Mk. V in the battle box is just wrong. It would be OK to sneak in a much later mark if there were no Mk. I or Mk. II pictures were available and if the particular MK. V wasn't so immediately and unmistakably different, but the tropical nose and the cannon give it away on even a casual glance. Better no picture at all if we can't get one that's even approximately right. Or, seeing as we are using a later aircraft, why not this one? It's nearly as accurate.

Surely there is a picture of a Mk I or Mk II Spitfire somewhere we can use? (Though come to think of it, it really ought to be a Hurricane: Hurricanes were far more numerous during the battle, and did the lion's share of the fighting. The Spitfire's time as the primary air defence weapon came later. Tannin 00:34, 26 Jun 2004 (UTC)


I've had to edit the following:

For almost a thousand years, the island of Britain had never been invaded, which gave rise to its name "Fortress Britain." But during the Battle of Britain doubts were raised as to the survival of the small island; continuous attacks on the RAF and later the civilian population caused tremendous damage (damage that has only recently been fully recovered from). Many people both at home and throughout the world feared for Britain's survival for if Britain fell then the whole Empire could fall under German contol

Some of this is overblown and unnecessary prose. Speaking as an inhabitant of the island, I can confirm the damage was fully recovered by the '60s and '70s, rather than recently.

The Empire would probably have not fallen under German control should Britain have surrendered. However, the fleet might have. And the continent certainly would have.

I have edited this section down.

The Battle of Britain brought the once mighty country to its knees; Buckingham Palace and Westminster had both been bombed and the great fires that came with the bombings spread throughout the capital and almost destroyed St Paul's Cathedral. Tens of thousands had been killed and almost as many injured with no end in sight, but throughout the whole battle Britain stood alone with no allies and dwindiling resources but eventually the country pulled through as the tactics of the enemy changed and Hitler turning his attention to Russia. (It was not until later in the war that the United States joined the UK in its fight; however, it should be noted that the US only joined Britain in its struggles after the UK was forced to sell much of her interests to the US and accept vast loans with huge interest rates that have not been paid off to this day. There were deep feelings of betrayal by many British people at the time.)

The Battle of Britain most certainly did not bring the country to its knees. Quite the opposite. A story of resistance and defiance was born. London was not razed by fire, though some individual buildings and small sections were. Most of the parenthesized section simply does not belong in a discussion of the battle and should be lodged elsewhere. It is inappropriate and has been edited out.

To be honest these two paragraphs should probably be removed entirely as they are: (a) conclusions rather than opening paragraphs, and (b) add little to the narrative. Prune

After some further thought I reckoned it best to remove the paragraphs entirely. They added nothing to the article and disturbed the flow.


Note that in spite of this cut the article is currently 2Kb overlength. We need to judiciously edit further. I recommend that we remove the reference to the Polish contingent in the battle and transplant it to its own article (or as part of an article on the Polish Air Force). Not to diminish the bravery of the Poles one jot, but they were but one foreign national contingent in the battle, alongside the Czechs and more numerous Canadians and Australians, as well as French, Belgians, Americans and others. It seriously unbalances the article to make the Poles so prominent. I shall look at ways to transplant the Poles elsewhere but leave a link in the main article.

I shall have to check the veracity of the Polish claims. Claim ratios that were at least 200% of the actual claims were common in the battle. So the assertion that the Poles contributed 12% of kills may be in error if it is comparing raw claims against post-war verified kills. Furthermore, Polish cliams might not have been made by Poles. Interestingly, the highest-scoring pilot in the Polish squadrons was actually a Czech, Josef Frantisek. Prune

Whilst I think you were right to remove the verbose prose from those two paragraphs, I don't think you should remove the references to the Poles. There were more Poles, some 150, flying for the RAF during the Battle of Britain, than any other nationality (including Australian and New Zealanders) except the British. Mintguy (T) 22:07, 28 Jul 2004 (UTC)
LOL I shall look at ways to transplant the Poles elsewhere That's what Poland's neighbours like to do and was a contributory factor to the B of B! Philip Baird Shearer 19:11, 30 Jul 2004 (UTC)
Focussing on 150-odd Poles seems a little rough on the 103 New Zealanders, 90 Canadians and 86 Czechs, amongst others (29 Belgians, 13 Free French, etc.) who all deserve their moment in the sun. There is an excellent article on the Polish Air Force here and this is really the best home for a detailed discussion of the Polish contribution to the battle (the article even has a specific section on it). I say we transplant the detail of the Poles to there, and shrink the Polish entry in the Battle of britain article to a discussion or list of all the allied nationals, but make sure to include a link to the Polish Air Force article. That seems much fairer to me. Prune
I was one which was ealier contributing to the "Poles in BOB" and one who mentioned that others should also be mentioned. This would be OK by me, but let me remind you that Polish contribution was somehow special: 150 Polish (as in: POlish Air Forces pilots) pilots inflicted more losses on Axis side than (proporitonally) any other foreign contigent; the treatment of the pilots was also special (the few which after the war were not allowed to victory parade and in home they were awaited by NKVD) etc. Anyway, i believe that list of foreign nationalities with numbers, numbers of claims, links to proper articles would be nice Szopen 06:49, 2 Aug 2004 (UTC)

umm, i don't know where this would go but according to the Guinness Book of Air Facts and Feats, the Allied pilots with 10 or more victories in the Battle of Britain were:

Josef Frantisek 17 (Czech) 303 Sqn [Hurricane]

Eric S Lock 16 + 1 shared (British) 41 Sqn [Spitfire]

B J G Carbury 15 + 1 shared (New Zealander) 603 Sqn [Spitfire]

Ginger Lacey 15 + 1 shared (British) 501 Sqn [Hurricane]

Bob Doe 15 (British) 238 Sqn [Hurricane] & 234 Sqn [Spitfire]

P C Hughes 14 + 3 shared (Australian) 234 Sqn [Spitfire]

Colin Gray 14 + 2 shared (New Zealander) 54 Sqn [Spitfire]

Archie McLellar 14 + 1 shared (British) 605 Sqn [Hurricane]

W Urbanowicz 14 (Polish) 303 & 601 Sqns [Hurricane]

C R Davis 11 + 1 shared (South African) 601 Sqn [Hurricane]

R F Boyd 11 + 1 shared (British) 601 Sqn [Hurricane]

A McDowall 11 (British) 602 Sqn [Spitfire]

J W Villa 10 + 4 shared (British) 72 & 92 Sqns [Spitfire]

D A P McMullen 10 + 3 shared (British) 54 & 222 Sqns [Spitfire]

Bob Tuck 10 + 1 shared (British) 92 Sqn [Spitfire] & 257 Sqn [Hurricane]

H C Upton 10 + 1 shared (Canadian) 43 & 607 Sqns [Spitfire]

G C Unwin 10 (British) 19 Sqn [Spitfire] Logger 8:18, 27 Oct 2004 (EST)


The following was recently contributed to Wiktionary:


The Battle of Britain was not a single fight - but instead a series of air engagements fought between the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the German Luftwaffe that started in May 1940 till the end of September 1940. Stated simply – The Germans needed to establish air superiority over the UK in order to allow them to suppress the Royal Navy who would attempt to oppose their planned invasion – Operation Sea Lion. The available German aircraft outnumbered the Royal Air Force aircraft 2,400 to 600.

There has been much revisionist history of the event but it can be fairly summarised as follows:

1. Spurred on by German bombing in Spain during the Spanish Civil War - from 1935 the British develop Radio Direction Finding (later known as RADAR) and construct a chain of stations around the UK to form an early warning system against approaching air raids.

2. The system was complemented by the civilian, land-based Observer Corp (later the Royal Observer Corp) who reported aircraft movements over the UK mainland (where the early RDF could not “look”).

3. Signal Intelligence from the only recently declassified (1986) ULTRA signal intelligence unit contributed sporadic but accurate intelligence about German intentions and orders for the day.

4. The above intelligence was co-ordinated by UK Fighter Command, Group Headquarters (4) and many Sector Offices around the country. Sector Offices would then “scramble” squadrons of aircraft to intercept incoming raids. By preserving aircraft on the ground till needed the British conserved their resources of aircraft and pilots.

This system developed by Hugh Dowding (later knighted)– Commander of Fighter Command is an early example of a Command and Control system integrating diverse elements to produce an integrated response.

The battle had three main phases – all designed by the German’s to lure the Royal Air Force into the air to destroy it:

1. In May the Germans started bombing coastal shipping convoys to draw up protecting British aircraft to defend the vital convoys of small ships that made up much of the British bulk transport system that supported her industries.

2. In August (generally considered to be Aug 15th – Eagle Day) the Germans switched to attacking RAF RDF stations and airfields to further disrupt the RAF’s ability to respond to their attacks.

3. On September 7th the Germans switched to attacking London by day and by night to further draw up the RAF to destroy them.

This switch away from airfields at the point when they Germans had nearly reduced the RAF’s southern airfields and infrastructure to ruin is considered by many to be a pivotal error. Provoked by an errant bombing raid by the Germans on London and a British retaliatory response on Berlin the next night the Germans switched to vengeance tactics rather than continuing their systematic approach to destroying the RAF. This respite for the airfields allowed the RAF to reorganize and attack in strength on September 15th (in the UK recognized as “Battle of Britain Day”) severely demoralised the German aircrews and breaking their command’s will to continue the attack by day. With air superiority NOT established an invasion was considered too risky and Germany withdrew her forces to the East for a 1941 attack on Russia.


Many factors influenced the battle on a daily level and contributed to the final result but these included:

For the British

1. A Command and Control System that successfully vectored small units of defending aircraft onto German raids on a continuous basis meaning the German’s were harried throughout the process of a raid. Though it only worked about 50% of the time to start with (not often realised in histories of the event) this gave the British sufficient edge to not have to fly wasteful standing patrols “just in case” a raid flew by.

2. Sufficient numbers of robust modern Hurricane (the real winner for the British) and Spitfire (only recently introduced and though famous – not the real killer is became later in the war) aircraft with which to oppose the modern German Luftwaffe.

3. The – relative – ease with which British fighter types could be flown compared to their training intensive German counterparts allowing poorly trained pilots to have a marginal chance of successfully defending Britain..

4. The British mode of allowing devolved responsibility to Sector Offices and fighter leaders meant that outmoded and practiced tactics were quickly recognized as outdated and fighter leaders could change tactics on their own responsibility.

5. Recovery of shot down British pilots over their own territory – allowing them to fly again if they survived.

6. The British habit of rotating pilots out of the combat area for a “rest” - even though desperately short of pilots in the front line – meant experience was shared among other pilots and with elementary training to new pilots. The practice also meant there was no particular area without some experienced pilots covering the coast. A fact that shocked the Germans on occasions when they probed from other directions – like raiding from Norway.

7. A significant failure by the Germans to realise the importance of RDF. Though they tried to initially knock out the stations – and had some success. Built in redundancy in the system and poor German evaluation of the true importance of the potential of the system meant they did not pursue this target.

8. The strength in depth offered by the civilian manned Observer Corp linked to the command system by telephone – their network , coupled with RDF and signal intelligence is an early example of an Information Net

9. The switch to bombing London which allowed the British time to re-group and attack again in force.


Against the British

1. In-fighting within their command between Group commanders as to the best air combat tactics to use to oppose German attacks. The southern 11 Group was severely mauled on many occasions and had infrastructure destroyed when 12 Group too long to cover their airfields for them. Dowding’s failure to knock his commander’s heads together was a contributory factor to him being sacked after the battle.

2. A desperate shortage of pilots that meant that new pilots were flying with only 10 hours (or less) training in how to fly their combat aircraft and with no combat training. The losses amongst these pilots was significant.

3. Though the RAF of the period is often portrayed as a University elite – post war analysis shows this to not be the case – all UK social classes were well represented as pilots. But the RAF did suffer from latent racism in the command who failed to appreciate early enough the significant reinforcement offered by escaped French, Czech and Polish pilots and who side lined them far longer than they should have. When allowed to fight after an accidental training engagement with a German raid the Poles went on to have the highest kill ratio of any pilot type during the entire battle.

4. Failure to analyze German Spanish Civil War tactics and tactics used against the RAF in France meaning they flew outdated combat tactics in the early part of the battle.

For the Germans

1. A well trained and combat hardened air force who had fought in Spain, Poland, France, Belgium and Holland

2. Relatively modern aircraft that were as good as or slightly better than RAF types at the start of the battle.


Against the Germans

1. Lost pilots were lost - and prisoners - so as the RAF’s experience increased the Germans’ experience among fighter leaders actually decreased.

2. Overconfident evaluation of losses they were inflicting on the RAF leading to mistaken tactical decisions.

3. Failure to appreciate RDF actually worked and that the British Command and Control system was conserving and judiciously using their limited resources.

4. Single point, hierarchical management (the Luftwaffe leader Hermann Goering) who ordered tactical switches - pinning fighters alongside bombers and so having them fly with out the fighting advantage of height and in a fuel inefficient mode.

5. Hitler’s order to switch bombing to London - and so away from RAF infrastructure when it was on the point of breaking.

6. After switching on London their fighter aircraft were operating at extreme range and had little spare stores for prolonged fighting over London leaving their bombing force unprotected as it was attacked by husbanded British fighters.


The end of September - when the German’s disbanded their invasion forces - is generally considered to be the “end” of the Battle of Britain

Sustained air warfare continued over Britain through the winter of 1940 / 41 as the Germans progressively bombed British cities, sea ports and centres of industrial production by night – something that the RAF, without effective airborne RADAR or night fighters could not yet counter.

None the less the Battle of Britain is an example of how a carefully organized and well briefed inferior force can fight a superior force to a standstill.

In commenting on the battle – Winston Churchill, the UK’s wartime Prime Minister commented with reference to the pilots that:

”Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few”

While correct and of a needed and rousing propaganda nature – there is not one of “the few” British pilots who would not also add:

“and aircraft manufacturers, training squadrons, delivery pilots (often women), signal intelligence, radar, observer corps, aircraft fitters, rescue launch drivers et al”.

--GJWS 16:35, 31 Dec 2004 (UTC)