Talk:Baruch Spinoza/Archive 1

This is an archive of past discussions about Baruch Spinoza. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Requested move

It was suggested that this article should be renamed Benedictus de Spinoza. The vote is shown below:

"Benedictus" was the name under which he published his work, and corresponded with his peers. "Baruch" was his formal name within the Jewish community, but since they viciously anathematized him as a young man, severing all ties and even denying him his inheritance, I don't believe it would be appropriate to use it as his "real" name -- he was not a part of that community after the age of 23. Personally, I doubt he would've appreciated it. creases

Agree, and welcome to the editors fold. Please think about using descriptions that might be less likely to provoke those who may disagree with you. --Blainster 17:21, 1 August 2005 (UTC)

I'm afraid I'm not yet familiar enough with Wiki to know what anyone will think is provocative or not. His synagogue anathematized him in the strongest language; the community severed ties with him; and his family denied him his inheritance. The whole affair was horribly bitter. Thenceforth neither he nor they considered him a part of the community that used that name. My use of the word "vicious" was meant to suggest the acrimony and the strong language of the anathematization, not meant to be a judgment on those who did it. My last remark was only personal opinion, obviously purely speculative, and not meant to represent a judgment on anything but the use of the name, which is the topic under consideration. If you could let me know how my tone could be made less provocative, I'd appreciate it, so I can be more confident in my future Wiki activity. --creases 03:58, 4 August 2005 (UTC)

That's fine. Just remember that noone can see the expression on your face online, so it's important to be careful with communication. You might want to have a look at Wikipedia:Wikiquette.--Pharos 04:23, 4 August 2005 (UTC)

Agree. Also normal English usage. Septentrionalis 19:24, 1 August 2005 (UTC)
Keep. Not normal English usage; in English he's generally known as "Baruch Spinoza." (Google finds five times as many hits on "Baruch" as "Benedictus *", and that's the name by which he's known in every philosophical overview I've ever seen.)

"Baruch" seems to be common among Jewish scholars, and has caught on with amateurs. Nonetheless, "Benedictus" is the standard. The Library of Congress information on the publication page of my copy of Hackett's edition of Spinoza's Complete Works, for example, uses "Benedictus". --creases 21:12, 1 August 2005 (UTC)

Google tallies should be carefully done and evaluated. If you compare "Baruch Spinoza" to "Benedict Spinoza" OR "Benedictus Spinoza" the difference is actually a more narrow 2:1. Blainster

Keep. At first I was supportive of the move, despite the nominator's tone, because "Benedictus de Spinoza" is certainly how he has traditionally been refered to among philosophers. However, the striking Google results convince me otherwise; apparently "Baruch" has caught on popularly, and the Wikipedia policy is to go with common names.--Pharos 20:27, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
- Consider: Google "Spinoza": 787,000; "Baruch Spinoza": 69,000; "Benedict Spinoza" OR "Benedictus Spinoza": 29,000. So by the Google test either first name is cited less than 1/10 as often as the last name. I don't think popularity on Google is always the best criterion, although it certainly should be one element. A search of my local libray (500k volumes) gives 23 volumes on Spinoza, 2 on Baruch Spinoza, and 3 on Benedict or Benedictus Spinoza. --Blainster 00:19, 4 August 2005 (UTC)
Agree. Searching Google is a silly way of figuring out what to call a person. He went by "Bento" among his friends, and Benedictus after his Writ of Cherem. The fact that some people think the "English" speaking world calls him Baruch is just silly... no we don't. I'm a Philosopher, and I specialize in Spinoza, and he is most certainly not called Baruch, except maybe by some Jewish philosophers who just like to say it that way... Benedictus de Spinoza is the name you will always see published. (oh, and by the way, there are 301,000 pages on Google for: "Benedictus de Spinoza").

It was requested that this article be renamed but there was no consensus for it be moved. violet/riga (t) 09:16, 18 August 2005 (UTC)

Judeo-Portuguese Origin

Even if it is a minor aspect of Spinoza's life, why should it not be said, in the article, that he was of judeo-portuguese origin (of course Sephardic), as stated in many sources (see, for instance, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online here [1]). He was, in fact a member of the Judeo-Portuguese Congregation of Amsterdam (Synagogue Talmud Tora - see the pages in Portuguese [2] and Dutch [3]; you can see also the references done by the World Jewish Congress here [4]). Even if this congregation could receive jews with other origins (such as Spanish; or even Ashkenazim, whom they help establish in the Nederlands and to build their own synagogues), the fact remains that it was a Sephardic Portuguese community, as can clearly be verified in situ in Amsterdam. Spinoza was born in Amsterdam to Miguel de Espinosa and Ana Débora, Miguel's second wife who died when Spinoza was a little boy of six - they were Marranos who had fled from Portugal in order to escape the Portuguese Inquisition and return to Judaism. Some say that the Spinoza family had, in fact, its remote origins in Spain, others claim that they were portuguese jews who had moved to Spain and them returned in 1492 to their country of origin - Portugal. There, they were forcebly converted to Catholicism in 1498. Spinoza's father, Miguel de Spinoza, would be born about a century after this forced convertion in the small portuguese city of Vidigueira, near Beja in Alentejo. When Spinoza's father was still a child, Spinoza's grandfather, Isaac de Spinoza (who was from Lisbon), went with all his family to Nantes in France. They were expelled in 1615 and moved to Roterdam, were Isaac died in 1627. Spinoza's father and his uncle, Miguel and Manuel respectively, them moved to Amsterdam, were they assumed their judaism (Manuel even changed his name to Abraão de Spinoza, though his «commercial» name was still the same). Spinoza spoke portuguese and this was the language he spoke at home and in the jewish community he was a member of before expulsion. He also spoke hebrew, latin, dutch and spanish. Portugal and Spain are not the same reality and the Iberian peninsula, with all it's internal differences, should not be reduced to Spain (and even more so to Castille!). I'm not reverting your change, Blainster, but I'm adding the fact that Baruch Spinoza was a member of the Portuguese-Jewish Community of Amsterdam. The Ogre

I intended no slight of the origins of this great philosopher. It simply seems that to describe him as both Sephardic and from Portugal is partly redundant, because the term Sephardic means his family is from either Spain or Portugal. But you responded as if I had removed the word Sephardic, too. In an encyclopedic article I think that book length explorations of family origins should be subordinate to the philosophical work of the man. Notice that I have removed two additional redundancies (Amsterdam and Jew were both listed twice in the same sentence! Shouldn't we have a goal of communicating as concisely as possible? The word Sephardic is good for this purpose since it communicates both religious and geographical background in a single term. I like that. --Blainster 23:52, 12 July 2005 (UTC)

Remember, this is a wiki. It is useful to have both Sephardic and Portugal as links. Septentrionalis 00:06, 13 July 2005 (UTC)

I agree with Septentrionalis, in any case I think Blainster is right about redundacies, but Sephardic and Portuguese are not redundant (then why not just say he was European?). I do not think a small reference to his family origins is a book length explorations. For me the last edit is a good compromise. What's your opinion? The Ogre 04:23, 14 July 2005 (UTC)

His ideas

All this discussion about his name and his ethnicity. What about his ideas? I could read the whole Wikipedia article and learn very little about what Spinoza thought. I find this to be true of other Wikipedia articles, for example, on Thomas Reid. 64.12.116.12 12:37, 11 September 2005 (UTC)Bruce Partington

This is the discussion page intended for those who are working on the article to discuss their differences and achieve consensus. Click on the article tab at the top of this page to read the actual Spinoza article, which does discuss his ideas. If you have something that you would like to contribute, feel free to do so. Incidentally, the fact that you have entered your name indicates that you are unregistered but not intentionally anonymous. Click on the Log In tab at the top of the page to register and receive a number of advantages, such as the ability to create a "Watch list" to keep track of articles you are interested in. We can always use more people with knowledge of their favorite subjects to assist in improving Wikipedia. --Blainster 04:53, 12 September 2005 (UTC)

Einstein & Spinoza's God

Einstein may not have believed in God at all, personal or impersonal. Since Spinoza equated God with Nature, Einstein might merely have been asserting that he worshipped or contemplated Nature. Lestrade 18:30, 5 October 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

Thank you for your comments. Einsteins views on God and religion have been made quite clear through his extensive publications and correspondences. See Einstein and Religion by his friend Max Jammer, Princeton U. Press, 1999, ISBN 0-691-00699-7 for a detailed examination of these views based not only on Einstein's published work, but also on the Einstein Archives at Jerusalem. However, the use of the term God may be a semantic stumbling block for some. Einstein stated that he had "a clear idea of God", but not "a clear image of God.. for of God no image can be made". He said that his view could be considered pantheistic (p. 75 ref. Jammer). He never discussed miracles, and did not believe in influence of prayer, but saw scientific pursuit as a form of revelation. In his opinion, "the laws of nature manifest the existence of a spirit vastly superior to that of men." (p. 93) So he did believe in what he described as God, just not a personal God --Blainster 19:05, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

If Einstein's view is pantheistic, that means "everything is God." It is another way of saying that all of Nature is God. This makes the concept of God so different from the traditional definition that it almost destroys it as a meaningful concept. As you say, Einstein thought that scientific pursuits and study of the laws of nature were similar to religious activities. I would venture to say that this explanation by Einstein was his way of appeasing the common person's curiosity while, at the same time, not indulging in an untruth.

Lestrade 02:07, 6 October 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

The link to Einstein in the section of thinkers he influenced doesnt work. I don't have the knowhow to repair it. -dirk noordzij-, ip 129.125.103.83, 19 May 2006

Causa Sui

Someone feel like mentioning Causa sui? Here's Germany's wikipedia on it [translated via babelfish], since I just wrote some bollocks for the English one so people wouldnt go insane searching for the blasted term. I think a central thesis might be worth mentioning. --Anon. 14 November 2005

Spinoza's G-D

Spinoza's Ethics 1:Def. VI—

"By G-D, I mean a Being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality"

From Samuel Shirley's – Baruch Spinoza; The Ethics: Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters; ISBN: 0872201309; p. 23.

Although Spinoza gives repeated warnings that his "Deus" is far from the anthropomorphic {transcendent} conception of God prevalent in the {Judaeo-Christian-Islamic} theology of his time, the reader will find it difficult to bear this constantly in mind. It is not until E1:XIV, that G-D, by definition, is shown to be identical with the infinite, all-inclusive, unique substance, and thereafter it is all too easy to lose sight of this, as the religious overtones of the word "God" keep asserting themselves. So Spinoza's frequent use of the phrase "Deus sive Natura"—G-D that is Nature—is intended as a salutary corrective. For Spinoza G-D is all Being, all Reality, in all its aspects and in all its infinite richness.

Atheism

Let's admit that Spinoza , by asserting that the whole natural world is God, was an atheist. If God is not anthropomorphic, or humanoid, then he is not God. Nature is simply nature, not a god. Spinoza used the word "God" to signify the concept "Nature." This is totally opposed to Judaism, and its appendix, Christianity. It is no wonder that he was excommunicated.Lestrade 02:06, 10 January 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Dear Lestrade; Thank you for your comment. I believe, that because of our different World view on the concept of God we are talking past each other. It is not a new problem; but, pray, we respect each other. Kindly see JBYnote1 and Theisim. Yesselman 14:52, 10 January 2006 (UTC)

A cranky German once wrote, "...the word God, honestly used, expresses ... a cause of the world with the addition of personality. On the other hand, an impersonal God is a contradictio in adjecto. " (a logical inconsistency between a noun and its modifying adjective) Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §8. Any World view that develops from monotheistic Judaism must consider God as man writ large and Nature as his creation. God the maker is then separate from his product. By equating God with Nature, Spinoza has removed the Hebrew God and retained Nature. But, I guess, if God is said to have infinite attributes, then one of those properties would be personality.Lestrade 17:37, 10 January 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

It is important to note that Spinoza doesn't use a standard definition of attribute, either - an attribute for him is a way for the intellect to perceive substance. . . so human beings can perceive the two attributes of mind and body. God for him is not a cognitive being, being the entirety of everything. God is also necessarily bound to do everything that God does, unless you accept Spinoza's definition of freedom, which is something whose grounds for its existence is contained within itself. Spinoza's god is not the standard judeo-christian god. WriterPhilosopher 08:48, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

to say that not believing in the common judaochristian conception of god makes you an atheist strikes me as very narrow-minded. how did you mean that? --dan 08:31, 7 July 2006 (UTC)

User dan, Please note that User:WriterPhilosopher is the person who wrote "Spinoza's god is not the standard judeo-christian god."

"If God is not anthropomorphic, or humanoid... This is totally opposed to Judaism, and its appendix, Christianity" means the same thing, as i understand it. --dan 03:25, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

I wrote, in agreement with Schopenhauer, that the word "God", with a capital "G", designates the concept of a cause of the world that possesses a humanoid personality. This concept is what Spinoza wisely eliminated, leaving only Nature or Substance as the cause of itself, which is obviously the truth.Lestrade 16:41, 7 July 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

i disagree with both of you on this point (for example, jewish mysticism has a long history of people saying that God is utterly incomprehensible to, and totally unlike, humanity. also, i'll note that atheism does not specifically refer to capital-g God, but to theism generally. (i hope this isn't coming off like an attack, by the way. i like debates). of course, if you wanted to mention schopenhauer's view in the article with claims people have made about spinoza being an atheist, that would fit well. --dan 03:26, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

There is a quote, I cannot remember from where, that compares Spinoza's 'God' to the Hindu concept of Brahman. The quote goes something along the lines of "Spinoza would have been happy on the banks of the Ganges" though this is a paraphrase. Spinoza, for his whole life, protested the label of "atheist" upon him. He has been referred to as a "God obssessed atheist" (though again, the reference escapes me).

A great reference material for this article is the book "The Courtier and the Heretic", which delves into the relationship between Leibniz and Spinoza. The summary of the book states that Spinoza's 'God' is one in which no one could believe. However, it is a stretch to go from this to then call him an atheist.

His Treatise Theologico-Politicus, and his use of God as a ground for reality (as in "Deus sive Natura", properly translated as "God, or Nature") seem to exclude him from status as an atheist, unless by "atheist" is meant "not a believer in the Judeo-Christian God."

Which is hardly atheism. Philosopher Torin 06:37, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

To me, it is obvious that he was an atheist. He denied a personal God. I am not alone, because that is, by the way, why he was excommunicated. "You that way; we, this way." Shakespeare, Love's Labor's Lost, V. 2. 940Lestrade 15:36, 8 July 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Being

<Comment on the following phrase in Spinoza's Philosophy—Spinoza contended that "Deus sive Natura" ("God or Nature") was a being of infinitely many attributes, of which extension and thought were two.> From Paul Wienpahl's "The Radical Spinoza; ISBN: 0814791867; p. 49.

Spinoza's Grammar of the Hebrew Language calls attention to another fact about that language which is of surpassing importance for understanding Spinoza. This is that all the words in the language with a few exceptions made by later grammarians) were originally verbs. Thus all the words whether or not they are still used as verbs contain the verbal idea. Thus, to be brief, when Spinoza uses the word "Being" as a name {a title} for G-D (and he often does, regarding it as the proper name for G-D), the word has the verbal sense {a process}, not the nominal {a noun}. It is not used as in "a being" or an entity but in the sense of "a state or act of being," or a way of doing something: living, say. It might be said that Spinoza's is a philosophy of change. Reality for him is active, not static or unchanging Yesselman 19:16, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Its fine to analyze the Hebrew, but weren't all of his notable writings done in Latin?--Blainster 21:27, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the majority; but not all, some were in Dutch, in Hebrew, or perhaps in some other. Yesselman 16:20, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

Analogies

<From Spinoza (2nd paragraph)—Spinoza contended that "Deus sive Natura" ("God or Nature") was a being of infinitely many attributes.> E2:Endnote N.11 - Analogies to help understand 'G-D' and 'G-d':

I am as a G-d to my heart, lung, etc.—all parts of my body and ownings. If they are all integrated (organically interdependent); I am well, even if individual cells of the parts of my body are dying and new ones constantly being re-born. I have no emotions concerning the life and death of the cells; but if the parts are not lntegrated I am sick and unhappy.

My car is as a G-d to all its parts—motor, wheel, brakes, fuel pump, etc. If are all integrated it runs well; if not, I am stuck and unhappy.

In the same way, G-D, in which everything finds its being and who is eternal (all by hypothesis), has no emotions because you and I are like that cell or that fuel pump. Yesselman 21:39, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza's Synthesis

From R. H. M. Elwes' Introduction to Works of Spinoza 1951; ISBN: 0486202496; p. xxii:

[37] The biography of the philosopher supplies us in some sort with the genesis of his system. His youth had been passed in the study of Hebrew learning, of metaphysical speculations on the nature of the Deity. He was then confronted with the scientific aspect of the world as revealed by Descartes. At first the two visions seemed antagonistic, but, as he gazed, their outlines blended and commingled, he found himself in the presence not of two, but of ONE; the universe unfolded itself to him as the necessary result of the Perfect and Eternal G-D.

Spinoza's Message

[i-15] Spinoza's message is not new. It was heard by the men of Abraham and the men of Moses. It was written out by the two great kings of antiquity, David and Solomon. It is found in the teachings and legends of the Talmudic sages; it is hidden like a buried treasure in the dreamy symbolism of the Kabbalah—it is the essence of the testaments of all the prophets of all nations and times. Yesselman 16:19, 1 January 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza's Definitions

<Comment on the following phrase in Definition—<A definition may be a statement of the essential properties of a certain thing,> From G. H. R. Parkinson's Benedict de Spinoza - The Ethics and On the Improvement of the Understanding"; ISBN: 0460873474; p. 260.

"Spinoza's definitions are of the kind now commonly called 'stipulative'; that is, they tell the reader how Spinoza proposes to use certain words. Spinoza is not concerned (as a Dictionary is concerned) to describe the standard uses of words. His purpose, as he observes in the Ethics

(E3: Def. XX. Expl.- p. 130) is to explain, not the meaning of words {i.e. the properties}, but the nature {i.e. the causes} of things. One may compare what is done by scientists, when they introduce new technical terms, or give old words a new sense, with a view to explaining what it is that interests them. For Spinoza's views about definition, cf. On the Improvement of the Understanding:95-98; p. 253.

Yesselman 21:06, 4 January 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza's Excommunication

<Comment on the following phrase in Spinoza's Life—The terms of his excommunication were quite severe...> Quoted from The Divine Philosophy of Baruch de Spinoza with the kind permission of the Endeavor Academy.

After the judgment of the Angels, and with that of the Saints, we excommunicate, expel and curse and damn Baruch de Espinoza with the consent of God, Blessed be He, and with the consent of all the Holy Congregation, in front of the holy Scrolls with the six-hundred-and-thirteen precepts which are written therein, with the excommunication with which Joshua banned Jericho, with the curse with which Elisha cursed the boys, and with all the curses which are written in the Law. Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down, and cursed be he when he rises up; cursed be he when he goes out, and cursed be he when he comes in. The Lord will not pardon him; the anger and wrath of the Lord will rage against this man, and bring upon him all the curses which are written in the Book of the Law, and the Lord will destroy his name from under the Heavens, and the Lord will separate him to his injury from all the tribes of Israel with all the curses of the firmament, which are written in the Book of the Law. But you who cleave unto the Lord God are all alive this day. We order that nobody should communicate with him orally or in writing, or show him any favor, or stay with him under the same roof, or within four ells of him, or read anything composed or written by him.

Two possible reasons for Spinoza's excommunication are:

Spinoza violated Aben Ezra's dictum of "silence." This violation is seditious in that it tends to break down a functioning society. It takes away an existing Judaeo-Christian faith without quickly replacing it with a new faith; only evolution can do this peaceably. This resistance to change is the society's (inertia) stability.
See Heinrich Graetz's Censure of Spinoza.
Another example of the "silence" violation is the inquisitorial denunciation of Galileo in 1632.
The Jewish Authorities feared the wrath of the ruling Calvinism against the Jewish community; where they, the Jews, were just a tolerated minority. There is credence in this cause because the Jewish Authorities ".... endeavour(ed) to retain him in their communion by the offer of a yearly pension of 1,000 florins ," if he would not set forth or teach publicly his ideas of an abstract indwelling, immanent G-D instead of the prevailing transcendent, anthropomorphic God . See State ban. Yesselman 21:22, 8 January 2006 (UTC)

Another reason cited in Popkin (2004) is because of his involvement with radical Protestants who were exploring Cartesian ideas (condemned in Descartes' day by the Catholics too). Lewis Feuer argues that Spinoza was guilty by association with such figures. --Knucmo2 11:39, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

As this discussion shows, and from what I read in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry:[5]¨("We do not know for certain what Spinoza's "monstrous deeds" and "abominable heresies" were alleged to have been...") it seems that the cause of the excommunication seems less certain than what the article suggests.

Spinoza proposed a God who had no personality. Spinoza's God is not a person. That was a deadly serious issue to the Jews of his time. As a result, they expelled him.Lestrade 15:35, 21 August 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Two things: 1-Call him the greatest Jew; 2-His names

I am writing a paper on Spinoza currently, and from what I can tell he was born as Baruch Despinoza, not Baruch Spinoza as is mentioned in the article.
Secondly, it is someone what offensive to call him the greatest Jew, because he was in fact given the herem. So it seems some what anti-semetic to call the greatest Jew a man who was banned from Judaism. --Anon. 19 December 2005

On your second point; I think the "Greatest Jew" comes from Ernest Renan's book Life of Jesus where he writes: "The greatest men of a nation are those whom it puts to death. Socrates was the glory of the Athenians, who would not suffer him to live among them. Spinoza was the greatest Jew of modern times, and the synagogue expelled him with ignominy. Jesus was the glory of the people of Israel, who crucified him."

Although it is questionable whether the quotation in this book is a sufficient authority for calling Spinoza the Greatest Jew (unless it is used anywhere else I am not aware of), I think calling that particular quote anti-semetic is somewhat of a misuse of the word.

I do have to add that Ernest Renan was apparently the inspiration for the term anti-semetic (see wikipedia article on anti-semitism). Mcmvanbree 20:53, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

I have seen Spinoza called the greatest Jew on several occasions. I think this is in an effort to say that he was great because he was less like a Jew. -Unknown

About the names used by Baruch Spinoza (information taken from the book "Inquisicão de Evora 1533-1668" by António Borges Coelho, published in 2002):

In his herem (excommunicate) from the synagogue he is called "Baruch Espinoza" and "Baruch de Espinoza".

In the tax list of the Judeo-Portuguese community of Amsterdam of the years 1654 and 1655 his name is written "Baruch Espinoza" and "Baruch de Espinosa".

In 1655/5/21 he is witness at a notary document and signed "Bento despinoza". At the same year the notary writes "Bento d'Espinosa" (twice) and "Bento d'Espinoza" (once).

The letter "e" of his family name was rapidly left out. Many of his letters were signed with "B. de Spinoza", "B. d. S." or "B. de S." - Bodof 2006/02/28

Animal use

'Animals can be used in any way by people for the benefit of the human race.' This is a quote from the main article. ANy reference to any articles will be helpful. Also, does this mean Spinoza endorsed meat-eating? Sam mishra 19:01, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

I located this quote on page 100 of Spinoza's Ethics: "men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against men. I’m not denying that the lower animals can feel. But I do deny that their having feelings debars us from considering our own advantage, using them as we please, and treating them in whatever way best suits us." He is talking in the passage about not having a problem with killing animals, but he does not explicitly state (at least here) whether he eats them or not. It appears Spinoza would not have endorsed PETA. --Blainster 23:55, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

when quoting, could you* please use section numbers, eg IIIP57S, instead of page numbers; I don't have the same edition of the Ethics and it took a fair while to locate that quote.

FYI, the standard system for quoting the ethics is as so: WXYZ, W=part number, X=type of comment, eg definition, proposition etc, Y=number of that type, Z=the sub-part, eg demonstration or scholium. Hence to quote the Scolium to 57th proposition of part three, I'd say IIIP57S, or 3P57S. This way, the quote can be located in any copy of the ethics. Many thanks.

* by which I mean anyone, not just you.

--User24 13:24, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza on Mind-Body

<Comment on the following sentence in Spinoza 2nd paragraph--This formulation is a historically significant panpsychism solution to the mind-body problem known as neutral monism.> From Antonio Damasio's Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain; 0151005575 2003; p. 209, 217—Dualism (Body and Mind):

[1] This is the time to return to Spinoza and to consider the possible meaning of what he wrote on body and mind. Whatever interpretation we favor for the pronouncements he made on the issue, we can be certain Spinoza was changing the perspective he inherited from Descartes when he said,

in The Ethics, Part I, that thought and extension, while distinguishable, are nonetheless attributes of the same substance, G-D or Nature. The reference to a single substance serves the purpose of claiming mind as inseparable {organically interdependent} from body, both created, somehow, from the same cloth {Mark Twain}.The reference to the two attributes, mind and body, acknowledged the distinction of two kinds of phenomena, a formulation that preserved an entirely sensible "aspect" dualism , but rejected substance dualism. By placing thought and extension on equal footing, and by tying both to a single substance, spinoza wished to overcome a problem that Descartes faced and failed to solve: the presence of two substances and the need to integrate them. On the face of it, Spinoza's solution no longer required mind and body to integrate or interact; mind and body would spring in parallel from the same substance, fully and mutually mimicking each other in their different manifestations. In a strict sense, the mind did not cause the body and the body did not cause the mind.

[2] (p. 216)..... At numerous junctions in The Ethics, namely in Part V, Spinoza defines eternity as the existence of eternal truth, the essence of a thing, rather than a continuance over time. The eternal essence of the mind is not to be confused with immortality. In Spinoza's thinking the essence of our minds existed before our minds ever were, and persists after our minds perish with our bodies. Minds are both mortal and eternal. (p. 217) Besides, elsewhere in The Ethics and in the Tractatus, Spinoza declares the mind perishable with the body. In fact, his denial of the immortality of the mind, a feature of his thinking from his early twenties, may have been a principal reason for his expulsion from his religious community (Damasio:326note26).

[3] What is Spinoza's insight then? That mind and body are parallel and mutually correlated processes, mimicking each other at every crossroad, as two faces of the samething. That deep inside these parallel phenomena there is a mechanism for representing body events in the mind. That in spite of the equal footing of mind and body, as far as they are manifest to the percipient, there is an asymmetry in the mechanism underlying these phenomena. He suggested that the body shapes the mind's contents more so than the mind shapes the body's, although mind processes are mirrored in body processes to a considerable extent. On the other hand, the ideas in the mind can double up {memories, plans, etc.} on each other, something that bodies cannot do. If my interpretation of Spinoza's statements is even faintly correct, his insight was revolutionary for its time but it had no impact in science. A tree fell silently in the forest and no one was there to serve witness. The theoretical implications of these notions have not been digested either as Spinozian insight or as independently established fact.

Kindly read Descartes' Error. Yesselman 17:26, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

This comes back again to what I've been saying elsewhere in the discussion about defining the basic prinicples of Spinoza's metaphyics. You need Substance as something that contains the ratio (that's rat-ee-oh. Latin.) for its existence within its essence. You should probably define essence as well in order to highlight how Substance necessarily exists. Regardless this doesn't matter too much so long as we agree that there is only ONE substance that is infinite.

Once you've got Substance you need Attribute - a way of perceiving substance. There are an infinite number of attributes; humans can perceive two (maybe one): the mind and the body. All attributes are isomorphic (I have argued that they are STRICTLY isomorphic but that might not be the case) so that any even that happens in one has an indenticate in the other. In all of them even though we can't perceive them. That's ANY event; even events that aren't contained as ideas in our minds.

So a tree in the material world has as its identicate an idea of a tree in the mental world that doesn't have to be in anyone's mind. Ideas, the kind we think, have as their identicates in the material world brain states. That's it. If you are thinking of a tree then this is a neurological state that is reflected in the mental realm as an idea of a tree. This is where the argument about strict/non-strict isomorphism comes in, because in one way it is possible to have disanalgous events in one attribute that don't translate perfectly to the other.

So Spinoza, as you said, basically sidesteps the entire problem that comes hand in hand with Descartes' acceptance of the intential model of perceptual awareness.

I just want to mention that youre comment about "there is a mechanism for representing body events in the mind" is somewhat off kilter. All events happen in Substance; these events can be perceived in different ways. Two of these ways are the mental and the material perceptions. There is no mechanism; there is Substance. As for the comment about one shaping the other more readily, that's just silly. There's an idea of ME that has as its identicate the material ME. Attributes don't affect each other in a casual way. Substance affects itself.

When in doubt appeal to Substance. Spinoza is so logical. I love him. WriterPhilosopher 09:23, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza "simply" was addressing Descartes' alleged solution to the mind body "problem" and of course the ridiculous pineal gland solution given by Descartes. The way Spinoza addresses this issue is to imply that all matter is concious. So-called mind is nothing but the inward sence that all matter contains, thereby tying mind to matter, this does not admit to the primacy of matter. It disregards the importance of mind, along with "problems" such as free-will("A stone in flight no doubt believes it is the cause of it's own flight...") mind/body mechanics and so on. If all matter is concious, not imbibed with a spirit or soul, just self-aware (like coma victims that dream) then matter is the only thing one need worry about in philosophizing (my own conclusion). The implications of his monist view are myriad and indeed logicaly, one can call him an athiest in his time. The monist doctrines of India however cast his philosophy in an entirely different light to "moderns." I have seemed to meandered off track but I hope this is helpful. 71.212.242.187 19:32, 18 November 2006 (UTC)Gmoney the funkster, Spinoza enthusiast.

Philosophy - Overview

1P1: Substance is by Nature prior to its modifications.

Premise 1. Substance exists and cannot be dependent on anything else for its existence.

1P2: Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

Premise 2. No two substances can share an attribute.

Proof: If they share an attribute, they would be identical. Therefore they can only be individuated by their modes. But then they would depend on their modes for their identity. This would have the substance being dependent on its mode, in violation of premise 1. Therefore, two substances cannot share the same attribute.

1P3: Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

Premise 3. A substance can only be caused by something similar to itself (something that shares its attribute).

1P4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Implied is Premise 4. Substance cannot be caused.

Proof: Something can only be caused by something which is similar to itself, in other words something that shares its attribute. But according to premise 2, no two substances can share an attribute. Therefore substance cannot be caused.

1P5: There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Implied is Premise 5. Substance is infinite.

Proof: If substance were not infinite, it would be finite and limited by something. But to be limited by something is to be dependent on it. However, substance cannot be dependent on anything else (premise 1), therefore substance is infinite.

1P6: One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Implied is the Conclusion. There can only be one substance.

Proof: If there were two infinite substances, they would limit each other. But this would act as a restraint, and they would be dependent on each other. But they cannot be dependent on each other (premise 1), therefore there cannot be two substances. Yesselman 14:51, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

Ethics

There should definitely be an article on Spinoza's Ethics, it's a very major philosophical work. -Unknown

It is curious that Spinoza titled his book Ethics because ethics are one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. As Schopenhauer wrote: "It is true that here and there Spinoza attempts to save it by sophisms, but he often gives it up altogether, and with an audacity that excites astonishment and indignation he declares the difference between right and wrong, and in general between good and evil, to be merely conventional, and therefore in itself hollow and empty (e.g., Ethics, IV, prop. 37, schol. 2)." (The World as Will and Representation, vol. II, ch. 47) There is a contradiction between pantheism and ethics. "All pantheism must ultimately be shipwrecked on the inescapable demands of ethics, and then on the evil and suffering of the world. If the world is the appearance of a god, then everything done by man, and even by the animal, is equally divine and excellent; nothing can be more censurable and nothing more praiseworthy than anything else; hence there is no ethics." (The World as Will and Representation, ibid.) Such an obvious contradiction between pantheism and ethics deserves a place in an encyclopedia article.Lestrade 18:31, 20 January 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Yes, it is clear that his work would be better served if it were called "Metaphysics", just as Hegel's "Science of Logic" isn't particularly scientific or logical. Try not to get too bogged down by the title though, as it is the contents that are important. --Knucmo2 11:35, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

I have to disagree with this point. Spinoza named his Ethics so because this is its primary concern. The fact that you quote Schopenhauer to make this point only confirms that you are stuck within the post-Kantian paradigm of ethics and judge Spinoza accordingly, but of course, Spinoza was no Kantian and his conception of Ethics cannot be so judged. The "metaphysics" of the first part and the "epistemology" of the second are all ancillary to the task of describing human flourishing, and nothing could more clearly show this than the appendix to the first part of the Ethics, where Spinoza unveils his critique of teleology and all of its consequences.

On the other hand, I agree the contradiction between pantheism and ethics deserves some mention because it is a remarkable moment in the effective history of Spinozism, especially considering the latter's effects during the Pantheismusstreit of the 1780s and Schelling's own Freiheitsschrift which takes up this precise problem. But the key here is to acknowledge that Spinoza did not understand his system as pantheistic (if not merely because the word hadn't yet been coined) and his ethics are not Kantian, so the effective history rests on a misinterpretation.

Mr. or Ms. Anonymous, Schopenhauer's historical position as a Kantian has nothing to do with the truth of his words. His judgment on the absence of ethics in Spinoza's Ethics stands alone and is not related to a period or phase in the history of philosophy.Lestrade 13:05, 22 June 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Actually, it does, because it is his understanding of ethics from a post-Kantian position which allows him to cast this judgment. The basis of that ethics is the freedom of the will, but Spinoza is very clear in abandoning the concept of the will that his contemporaries, Descartes and Leibniz, for example, cling to. Rather, his conception of ethics is based on removing the prejudices that restrict our capacity for acting, undermining the power of passive affects which determine us, and appropriating our affects positively such that we are agents, such that we approach something like human freedom. Second, as far as the incoherence of pantheism with ethics, this is certainly not true. Even Schophenhauer's predecessor Schelling saw this in his Freiheitschrift. Namely, that pantheism does not neutralize the possibility of freedom, but require freedom to be conceived in a specific way. Herder was Schelling's predecessor in this matter (see his dialogue God, Some Conversations). Far from ethics being a secondary concern for Spinoza, everything only makes sense in the context of an ethical project. --Ashleyuv 05:28, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

(1)"The basis of that ethics is the freedom of the will…"

Ethics is the study of the concepts of good and right. Whether anyone is able to freely will good or right behavior is a separate study.

(2)"Spinoza is very clear in abandoning the concept of the will…"

Spinoza considers will to be the essence of man. (This endeavor, when referred solely to the mind, is called will … it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence …. – Pt. III, Prop. IX, Note)

(3) "… such that we approach something like human freedom."

Spinoza is adamant in asserting that there can be no free will. (In the mind there is no absolute or free will; – Pt. II, Prop. XLVIII)

(4) "…pantheism does not neutralize the possibility of freedom, but require freedom to be conceived in a specific way."

This sentence does not communicate any information. With pantheism, the universe, or all of nature, is a divine God. As such, every event occurs in accordance with God or Nature (Deus sive Natura), not through freedom. (We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent, is pronounced good or bad … .– Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note 2)

(5) "… everything only makes sense in the context of an ethical project."

Everything in Spinoza's philosophy makes sense only in the context of a rational project. He establishes principles, then analyzes concepts to make deductions through reason. His philosophy is an attempt to understand and to know God or Nature merely through the rational analysis of concepts. Whether God or Nature is good, bad, evil, wrong, or right is not the main issue, and therefore his philosophy is not a philosophy of ethics. It is a contemplation of the eternal necessity of God or Nature, followed by submission or acquiescence.

(6) The above is restricted solely to Spinoza, and not concerned with Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, Schelling, or Herder.

Lestrade 14:23, 14 November 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Spinoza's "Ethic's" is a book whose title is it's essence! Yes there is much meaphysical talk in the begining, it is the basis for everything later. Spinoza is interested in ethics in the same way as the Epicurean, Stoic, and other Helenic schools of philosophy were, as a guide to the best way to live your life. His metaphysics go to pains to remove the good/evil dichotomy, as well as the divine/sinful, etc. These ideas (including free-will) are nesecarilly left out of a mechanist philosophy. So why then do we percieve ourselves to suffer, the only real question in ethics, is the only problem the philosopher addresses throughout the entire book, in a very roundabout way I will concede. The method though is, when understood, the only real conclusions a rational mind will come to (alright this is my belief but one really should give him an earnest try)! If you are still confused about where the ethics in the "Ethic's" are, here is one goal Spinoza gives: controll your passions. 71.212.242.187 19:49, 18 November 2006 (UTC)Gmoney the funkster

Natural World Made Itself

User Thinkingfreely changed, in the article, the sentence "The natural world made itself" to "The natural world is infinite." But, in Spinoza's philosophy, Substance is another name for Nature. Nature, in turn, is another name for God. "...[B]y nature viewed as active we should understand ... God...." (Part I, Prop. XXIX, Note) The world of nature, therefore, made itself. Spinoza wrote, "Substance cannot be produced by anything external, it must, therefore, be its own cause ...." (Part I, Prop. VII, Proof).Lestrade 14:30, 14 February 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

His change is correct if you think about it logically. Substance is infinite; it is not finite and unbounded. (I am using Substance and God interchangeably). Substance has the ratio for its existence contained within its essence; therefore it necessarily exists. Substance is. There can't have been a time when Substance didn't exist because it necessarily exists. It didn't make itself; it is. What you describe would require substance to prior exist itself which is logically impossible.

The next issue is with the definition of cause. Spinoza doesn't prescribe to a push-pull mechanical theory of causeality a la Descartes. For Spinoza, something causes another thing if it can logically explain the other thing. In essence, X causes Y if, and only if, X contains all the ratio (rat-ee-oh. Latin) for Y. And X contains the ratio for Y because W contained the ratio for X, which necessarily contained the ratio for Y. . . and so on all the way back to Substance, the ultimate antecedent. Thus Substance contains the ratio for its existence within itself, and that is why it caused itself.

I'll go one step further. Since Substance IS the Universe, Substance contains time within itself. Thus substance transcends time. The argument for the causation of substance falls down right at the start because the notion of "prior" can't possibly be applied to the definition of an entity that is atemporal. It's like saying the Universe "began" 13 billion years ago; no, as far back as we can perceive began 13 billion years ago. WriterPhilosopher 09:05, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

Confusing Philosophy, point 2

No two substances can share an attribute.

Proof: If they share an attribute, they would be identical.

I find this confusing. Wouldn't this imply that all substances possessed only a single attribute? As far as I know, sharing an attribute only means you are similar, since we have multiple attributes. For example, I am similar to my dog in that we have four limbs, we share that attribute. We are not identical, because I am bipedal. Tyciol 08:07, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

You're confused because the article is misleading in not establishing the basic principles of Spinoza's metaphysics. Substance has an infinite number of infinitely complex attributes. An attribute is a way for an intellect to perceive substance. Since there is only one substance, which is ontologically complete (having its essence contain existence), and it has the infinite number of infinitely complex attributes, a second substance would have to have an attribute that it does not. Since attributes are ways of perceiving substance, this second substance would be imperceivable; an imperceivable attribute is not an attribute. This conclusion is reached by way of Identity of Indiscernables, where a two things are the same thing if they share ALL of the same properties. You are not your dog because you have properties it does not. However, you are both a "part" of substance. Thus, if two substances shared an attribute they would both be perceived the same way, and they'd both be perceived the same way because they'd have to have identical properties. I think. WriterPhilosopher 08:55, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

Substance in Spinoza's philosophy is singular, and the substance is God conceived in the nature of thought and nature when conceived under the attribute of extension. If this isn't clear in the article at the moment, I shall make it so. --Knucmo2 11:33, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Yes, exactly, one would have to have read and understood the first 11 propositions of The Ethics before being able to understand the proposition... It's relatively simple (this is a ridiculously shortened version of the argument in the first 11 props... Attributes are (what the intellect conceives of as constituting) the essence of substance. Substance is that which is conceived of through itself and in itself... if attributes were shared by two substances, you could conceive of one of them through another... but we can't do that because by definition, that just isn't substance (that would be Modes...), so there can only be one Substance. Hope that clears it up... (basically, just read the axioms and definitions before reading the propositions, lol)

Stoicism

Spinoza's philosophy has much in common with Stoicism inasmuch as both philosophies sought to fulfil :a therapeutic role by instructing people how to attain happiness (or eudaimonia, for the Stoics). :However, Spinoza differed sharply from the Stoics in one important respect: he utterly rejected :their contention that reason could defeat emotion. On the contrary, he contended, an emotion can be :displaced or overcome only by a stronger emotion.

This is incorrect - no stoic ever claimed to be able to "defeat" emotion but instead develop clear judgment (apatheia) by not allowing our emotions to cloud our judgment. Stoicism asks us to not be ruled by our emotion, but it never says to remove (defeat) emotion. Although a stoic may love a woman he should not let this love spell the end of his country because she wants a exotic palace that would deplete the treasury. SO although stoicism does say we must control our emotions so that they do not compromise rational judgments, decisions and actions, it never asks us to supress emotion altogether.--Baalhammon

I think the point here is that Spinoza would have denied that reason could control emotion. For Spinoza, the only thing that could check an emotion, would be another stronger emotion. Propostion VII of Part IV of Ethics: "An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion."--Archmagusrm 13:38, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza's intellectual love of god is the emotion necessary and great enough to overcome the other passions.71.212.242.187 19:53, 18 November 2006 (UTC)Gmoney the funkster

the chronology of Life

"Also, his Theologico-Political Treatise was highly critical of orthodox readings of the Torah and challenged the idea that Jews were a chosen people. In the summer of 1656, he was issued the writ of cherem, or excommunicated because of apostasy from the Jewish community for his claims that God is the mechanism of nature and the universe ... By the beginning of the 1660s Spinoza's name became more widely known, and eventually Leibniz and Henry Oldenburg paid him visits. He corresponded with the latter for the rest of his life... In 1665 he notified Oldenburg that he had started to work on a new book, the Theologico-Political Treatise, published in 1670."

my interpretation of this section is that in 1656 he is excommunicated for a book that he published in 1670. this section is just generally confusing for me. i am not remotely qualified to fix it, but hopefully someone who knows about him can. --dan 08:19, 7 July 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza's Double Negatives

When he says, in Ethics Part 4, Proposition 37, Note 1, that he denies that we may not consult our own advantage and use animals as we please, he means that he affirms that we may consult our own advantage and use animals as we please. This confusion is the price we pay for reading a philosopher who delights in the play of concepts and the words that designate them.Lestrade 03:29, 12 July 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

In the article's "Overview of his philosophy" section, User Sightbeyondsite read about Spinoza's thoughts on the treatment of animals. Naturally repelled by its lack of feeling, the user asked for a reference. I indicated the reference as Ethics, Part 4, Prop. 37, Note 1. Then User Détruire claimed that Spinoza actually said the opposite of what the article asserted. However, it is my opinion that Détruire was confused by Spinoza's use of double negatives. Below is the passage with the double negatives converted into clear and simple affirmatives:

Such are the matters which I engage to prove in Prop. xviii of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I affirm that beasts feel. But I also affirm that we may consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions.
— Ethics, Part 4, Prop. 37, Note 1

Lestrade 15:41, 12 July 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Found photos

The Spanish wikipedia has some apparent photos of Spinoza's library and house. Use them in the article if appropriate:

Spinoza's grandfather's name was d'Espinoza, which is why it's marked that way in the pictures.

FranksValli 04:57, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

van den Enden's influence

I remember reading an article in the Cambridge Companion to Spinoza that much of Spinoza's philosophy may have originated with van den Enden, whom the author, one Klever, calls a "proto-Spinoza," and "the genius behind Spinoza." Does anyone know more about this?--WadeMcR 09:26, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Ultimi Barbarorum !

"Look at the barbarians their ultimate deed !" Spinoza wanted to post these words next to the eviscerated bodies of Cornelis and Johan de Witt when they hung exposed at the gallows in the Hague (1672), after they had been lynched and mutilated by a crowd of fanatics. His friends had to retain him with force.

It's a detail one misses in the present description of his life.

After his stay in Rijnsburg with the Collegiants (1660-1663) and in Voorburg near the Hague (1663-1670), he moved permanently to the Hague in 1670 eventually to stay at the home of the painter Van der Spijck, bringing with him his "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus" in which he developed ideas on religious tolerance as a matter of state, ideas held by Johan de Witt (following Johan van Oldenbarnevelt) who provided Spinoza with a pension. In 1674 the "Tractatus..." was officially prohibited in the Netherlands...

In the accessible Dover edition (1951:"Works of Spinoza" reprint of G.Bell & Son ed. 1883; VOL.I): Benedict de Spinoza translated by R.H.M.Elwes, the latter uses the biography of Johannes Colerus (1703) to paint a touching portrait of the philosopher. Colerus told how Spinoza himself used to draw portraits in charcoal and ink of his friends; Colerus owned a book of such drawings that included a self-portrait of Spinoza "in the costume of Masaniello".

Ultimi Barbarorum ! Today the words are often jokingly used to designate the rape of Spinoza by the editors of cheap encyclopediae. We, as it so happens.

Lunarian 17:56, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

Unusual Argument

In Section 2, Overview of his philosophy, there is an argument that concludes :"There can be only one substance." However, the conclusion is drawn from five premises. An argument of this nature should have only two premises: a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. See Kant's The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures. Lestrade 19:01, 12 October 2006 (UTC)Lestradef

The Greeks?

I remember having read something about Spinoza along the lines that he had not much to learn from the more renowned Greek philosophers - Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and instead regarded other lesser known Greeks like Epictetus as influences. Can anyone confirm this? --Bluerain ^talk 18:24, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

Spinoza and Malebranche

As I recently pointed out on the Malebranche talk page, the suggestion in the Schopenhauer quotation (which also keeps turning up in the Malebranche article) of an influence from Malebranche to Spinoza, cannot be right. Spinoza's system was already firmly in place before Malebranche's philosophy started to appear in print (1674), and there is no evidence of any private contact between them either. Spinoza also didn't endorse anything like Malebranche's occasionalism or vision in God. (It is of course true, for Spinoza, that all causation and knowledge, and everything else too, are 'in God' in some sense: but he spells this out in a very different way from Malebranche). Since, among the various claims contained in the quotation, the only ones that have any bearing at all on the subject of the present article are false, I would be inclined to propose that it should be removed altogether, together with the preceding sentence about "his reading of Malebranche". Hce1132 01:14, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

I've gone ahead and removed the Schopenhauer remark, on grounds of both historical and philosophical innaccuracy, as well as irrelevance. I've also added references to George Eliot and Somerset Maugham, and I've rewritten the Wittgenstein bit. On the last of these, I left in as much of the existing material as I felt, in all good conscience, that I could; and I even went so far as to add the 'sub specie aeternitatis' reference. My principal concern about the previous paragraph was that Spinoza's Tractatus simply does not possess the structure that was ascribed to it. Whoever wrote that was almost certainly thinking of his Ethics. But then, although, in my revision, I suggested a comparison between Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the Ethics, I'm really not even comfortable with that. Moore's suggestion of a title for the translation of Wittgenstein's Abhandlung might well be worthy of a mention in this article: but I'm really not certain that any more than that is genuinely worth mentioning, even the new bit that I myself added. Hce1132 23:58, 25 December 2006 (UTC)

birthday/name in Hebrew jumbled

and I cant figure out how to change it

Previous comment was from 20:48, 3 February 2007 Kangaru99. This was due to language rendering assuming that the bracket and numerals at start of the birth date string were in Hebrew, not in English. My ugly solution was to add a clearly English string ("lived") to the start of dates. This was only in the inline text, not in the infobox. Ferg2k 19:11, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

Kant's rejection

The entire issue became a major intellectual and religious concern for European civilization at the time, which Immanuel Kant rejected, as he thought that attempts to conceive of transcendent reality would lead to antinomies in thought.

What did Kant reject? Was it European civilization? Was it "the issue"? How can a person reject an issue? 71.240.95.179 13:24, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

Is Spinoza a "former Jew" or a "person who has renounced Judaism?"

Spinoza has been categorized here as a "former Jew". There is a proposal right now to eliminate the category "former Jews," or to change the name of that category to, "people who have renounced Judaism." If it changes name, Spinoza certainly did not renounce Judaism. Rather, after his excommunication, he went on living his life and did not seek to recant. Furthermore, an excommunication does not make a Jew a former Jew. Let me give the reasons:

First of all, no Jewish organization has the authority to make somebody no longer Jewish. When rabbinical decisors (I am using this word, a translation of the Hebrew poseqim, because it is a better translation than "authorities") excommunicate somebody, it means that in the community that follows their lead, they are telling their followers to shun Spinoza until he recants. But he remains a Jew.
Since the Jewish enlightenment, the authority of such rabbis as decisors has decreased, except within Haredi and Hasidic communities. For example, note that Mordechai Kaplan, the founder of Reconstructionist Judaism was excommunicated in the 1940s for his publication of a new prayer book. At the time, Reconstructionist Judaism did not exist, and Kaplan was considered one of the outstanding faculty members at Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. He remained on the faculty for another two decades, and was still considered one of the most esteemed members of the faculty at JTSA. Did Kaplan's "excommunication" by some group of rabbis make him no longer Jewish? Of course not. Indeed, most of the older generation of Conservative Jewish rabbis that are practicing today had him as a teacher. Furthermore, that prayerbook that he first released in the 1940s (Sidur Sim Shalom) has evolved and is still one of the most popular sidurim in use today, by both Conservative and Reconstructionist Jews.
Historians, philosophers, commentators, and so forth have continued to regard Spinoza as Jewish over the last three and a half centuries, and a number of Jewish commentators, including Orthodox ones, have expressed their regret for the excommunication of Spinoza. Judaism lacks normative beliefs about how to believe in God. Rather, Judaism places an emphasis on commandments, not beliefs. --Metzenberg 20:42, 1 April 2007 (UTC)

Moved

The just-previous paragraph, like much of this article, contains numerous errors. It is not known, for example, why Spinoza was handed a writ of cherem; there is absolutely no evidence on this point, although some guesses have been made. It makes very little sense, furthermore, to assume that this was because of his statements on G-d, for the reason mentioned above: because the Rabbis were notoriously broad-minded in their conception of God. It seems unlikely, moreover, that Spinoza, who did not openly claim that God was identical to Nature even in his most shameless and bold work, the Theologico-Political Treatise, would say this loudly in a synagogue. Again, however, this is all mere speculation, as is the silly claim that Baruch was expelled "for the apostasy of how he conceived God."

It should also be noted that Spinoza's most important work is not the "Ethics," which is somewhat popular with some philosophers, but the "Theologico-Political Treatise," which founded modernity in broad swaths, creating whole subjects and studies which had towering influence in the years to come. It is the origin, for example, of the notions of the importance of freedom of speech, and of biblical criticism, and of the peaceful coexistence of religion and science, and of Zionism. In large part, Spinoza was the creator of modernity. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 71.196.138.187 (talk • contribs).

The above anon posted this in the article so I moved it to the talk page. — MichaelLinnear 07:31, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

Scott Adams Blog Link

For interest, Scott Adams recently linked to this page on his blog here. Please don't take his offence to his summarising all us contributors as "strangers with no credibility". Funny people are allowed to be offensive. Bernard S. Jansen 03:55, 4 May 2007 (UTC

What are Spinoza's dates ?

Russell's chapter on Spinoza in his History of Western Philosophy opens most ironically:

"Spinoza (1632-77) is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers. Intellectually some others have surpassed him, but ethically he is supreme. As a natural consequence, he was considered, during his lifetime and for a century after his death, a man of appalling wickedness." [p552]

However, Russell, joint author of the renowned Principia Mathematica on the supposed logical foundations of mathematics, also tells us "At the early age of forty-three, he died of phthisis." It would thus seem phthisis is a miraculously potent disease, on Russell's analysis even capable of breaking the laws of arithmetic, which entail he could not have died younger than 44 on Russell's 1632-77 dating. Since this anomaly occurs in the 1961 second edition of Russell's popular work, it seems improbable it was not spotted by proof-readers nor anybody else. So is it a blunder or typo, or is it possibly explicable by some rejigging of the calendar in the 17th century...? How old was Spinoza when he died ? Wicked answers on the back of a copy of Spinoza's supreme Ethics please ! --Logicus 18:03, 12 June 2007 (UTC)

Controversial ideas and excommunication

This section contains some statements, without sources, and that represent a non-neutral point of view. For instance, it is claimed that Spinoza was excommunicated because of his views on God, but that is far from certain. There is much supposition about the reason, but no evidence. It would be a good idea to give this section a little more balance. Kwork 00:01, 5 July 2007 (UTC)

The current version of the article mentions "The terms of his cherem were quite severe: he was, in Bertrand Russell's words, 'cursed with all the curses in Deuteronomy and with the curse that Elisha pronounced on the children who, in consequence, were torn to pieces by the she-bears'." -- Now, I think this is actually a little misleading, at least according to current biographies of Spinoza ("Spinoza: a life" (1999) by Steven Nadler; "Spinoza" (2004) by Richard Popkin). For instance, people now believe that, sure, the terms of the pronouncement were severe, but they were also formulaic, and you could receive cherem for quite trivial offences, like buying meat from the wrong butcher (whereas the Russell quote makes it look like Spinoza was a monstrosity in Jewish eyes). Not sure how to fix this section, but I've added a footnote reference to a webpage that discusses some of these issues and references the primary sources. -- Twocentsdude, 27 September 2007 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 60.240.167.128 (talk) 05:55, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

Baruch de Spinoza

Shouldn't the main page be Baruch_de_Spinoza, with the title: "Baruch de Spinoza"? That is his real name!

Hebrew transliteration

Why is this mentioned? I'm not attacking, only asking. Was he very Jewish in his life or something? Mallerd (talk) 22:23, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Well, he did write a Hebrew grammar... 194.171.56.13 (talk) 14:55, 29 May 2008 (UTC)

Suggested Major Edit

I think it might be better, to raise the quality of this entry, to make some major edits. For example, right now there is an overview of his philosophy followed by a section on ethical philosophy. And although the overview includes some description of that, it seems to me to suggest that the ethical component of his philosophy is secondary. It might be more advantageous to break this overview into subheadings of "Metaphysics," "Epistemology," "Ethics," "Politics and Theology" (this order does not represent the importance of these sections).

After that, it might be good to have a section on his Ethics and by this I mean the text, in which the five books of the Ethics are briefly summarized. As well, a summary of the Theological-Political Treatise might also be in order. In this way, we can avoid some of the very contentious arguments which have appeared on this discussion page without subscribing ourselves to one position or another.

Also, I think the section on the Pantheismusstreit should be cut or moved to the entry entitled Spinozism. It could be reference in the influences sections in a sentence or two (although granted it is not modern in the contemporary sense).

Would love to know what others think.--Ashleyuv 05:36, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

For a good example of what I think it should look like, you might consider the German wiki page on SPinoza: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinoza .--Ashleyuv 05:54, 16 July 2007 (UTC)