Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 2

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Because of their length, the previous discussions on this page have been archived. If further archiving is needed, see Wikipedia:How to archive a talk page.

Previous discussions:

• Archive 1 (2002 to 1 March 2005)
• Archive 2 (1 March to 31 December 2005)

Surprise attack by Japanese?

fish n chips r 2 be eatin a sailin boat There appears to be some controversey with regard to this being a surprise attack by the Japanese. This attack did not come out of nowhere. Almost certainly the Japanese were goaded into it. But even more compelling is the plausibility that the government and military of the USA knew this attack was coming and did nothing about it so as to propel the USA into WWII.

http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=127

http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2001/06-04-2001/vo17no12_facts.htm

http://whatreallyhappened.com/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

erich / 12 march 2005

I agree to erich, this is not the cause but only the trigger. (But, some people say "excuse", I don't think so...)

Takatoriyama 17:09, 2005 Mar 17 (UTC)

What a complete load of crap. Conspiracy is fashionable. Stupidity is more likely, & what really happened. Trekphiler 08:01, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

On the question of prior knowledge (by DC, by ONI, by the Brits, by the Dutch, by Roosevelt / Knox / Stimson / Gen Marshall / Adm Stark, etc,) see a long comment by ww in the talk archive linked above. On the question of why conspiracy should be taken so seriously in the absence of anything other than plausible sounding allegations thereof (like more than suggestive evidence, even compelling evidence), I can suggest only two things.

First, FDR (and Eleanor and all those eggheads he brought to Washington when he was elected) really annoyed (scared, infuriated, , <pick your own term(s)>) a hefty percentage of folks, usually those with a vested interest in keeping things 'as they had been'. The Republicans generally were not very favorably inclined as he kept beating them at the polls, sometimes embarrassingly so. The Supreme Court was certainly opposed to many of the initiatives FDR got going and closed them down in many cases, which resulted in the FDR attempt to dilute opposition amongst the Supremes by expanding the Court. A case in serious oppositional point is the coup attempt (if it really was one) exposed by Smedley Butler (retired Marine Corps Gen and winner of the Medal of Honor) and a Philadelphia journalist. It involved a DuPont heir/executive, some high powered corporate lawyers, and even, apparently, Al Smith. Probably. These folks were so irritated at FDR that they (may have) organized a coup. The House UnAmerican Activities Committee was begun as a result of Butler's exposure of the approach made to him. Its first task was to look into the supposed coup. It was unable to conclude there was a real plot, beyond a few irresponsible folks looking into something, which may have died a very early death as a result of Butler's exposure.

Second, there are always people whose minds don't work the way most folks' do. And I don't mean clinically committable, though there are a non-trivial number of those as well; just characteristically conspiratorial. They always see sinister forces behind the scenes, or at least reason to suspect such things are there. Suspicious folk these are. Perhaps from long unrequited practice, they are skilled at explaining their view(s) and patient in repeating it over and over. Most folks don't trouble themselves to study somewhat remote issues, aren't familiar with any of the groundwork or 'evidence', and are somewhat easily convinced by a passionately and sincerely argued seemingly plausible case for conspiracy. It's in the nature of things that there aren't very many people arguing passionately and sincerely for the common sense, non spectacular, non conspiracy, account of <whatever>. And so, there is, in a mass media saturated world (in which large numbers of not very informed folk can be readily reached) a ready audience for such advocates, especially in the absence of any media sales market for the non spectacular, non conpiratorial, not very exciting, perspective.

I can only recommend to those encountering conspiracy theories about prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor, that they consider this structural difficulty in media prsentation and be willing to settle for "I don't know" or "I don't agree with <whatever> without my putting some real effort into studying the subject". Not very exciting, nor very satisfying, but the most sensible and intelectually responsible approach. There's clearly too much fanatic enthusiasm about many a current issue, some deadly and thus important, to rush to judgement on an historical issue based on a one-sided account designed to persuade and enlist. Consider only the WTC attack and all that's followed it (in the US, Europe, Asia, ..., and amongst the jihadists (or pick your own fanatic group) hidden here and there) as an example.

Apology?

"In 1991, it was rumored that Japan was going to make an official apology to the United States for the attack. The apology did not come in the form many expected, however. The Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement that said Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the US at 1 PM, twenty-five minutes before the attacks at Pearl Harbor were scheduled to begin (it appears that the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message", which did not even formally break off negotiations..."

What? American soldier are still in Japan now, and ride my train every day and walk around like they own my place! How should there be apology? The apology made was for not following the order of battle, not for the battle itself.

This was a time of war already started, it was defensive! United States was arming enemies of Japan, American pilot were joining Chinese air force while still under orders from American Army Air Force. FDR was looking for excuse already. Some people say he knew about the attack before it happen, but I don't think it was that kind of conspiracy at all; if the Japan Navy didn't make this attack, FDR would have joined the war against them anyway. Maybe not as immediately but within a few years at least. There was no mistaking the American preparations. This attack maybe only served to step on the coiled snake tail.

So my point is, this paragraph in its entirety seem to be very not neutral point of view. Should it be counterbalanced somewhere? Maybe should be an explanation of why American think there is need for apology of the attack? The Japanese government apology was because of course, nobody wants to make a complete sneak attack, it was planned from the very first to be a declaration first. This is what the Japanese goverment said in 1991. That is, apologize for not playing by the rules of war by delcaring war before starting attack. But apologize for the attack?? if this attack was not made, America probably would find other no reason to enter the war soon, so what to apologize?

I know this is the English Wikipedia but does that also mean Anglo-American point of view?

I would write myself now, a complementary section showing other POV but I maybe can't be NPOV right now, sorry!

Please take this comment in consideration. Takatoriyama 17:07, 2005 Mar 17 (UTC)

"Still under orders"? On what planet? By that reasoning, Japan should have attacked Russia or Germany, both doing the same... AVG didn't become operational until 12 Dec (I think), contrary to the popular myth. And I don't recall the U.S. assassinating Chinese leaders in an attempt to annex Manchuria, as far back as 1931. Apologize? No, because it's the usual American stupidity, just apologize & it'll all be OK, "kiss it better"; the very idea makes me nauseous. Trekphiler 08:12, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

The first combat for the American Volunteer Group was 20 Dec 1941 at Kunming, China. And it was defensive in nature, the AVG shooting down three or four bombers attempting to raid Kunming as a continuation of Japan's prolonged and undeclared war upon China. Sorry, Takatoriyama, but that dog won't hunt! --Cubdriver 11:39, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

Forget Apologies to the Americans — How About the Chinese, Indo-Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos and Indonesians and Allied prisoners of war?

Around 1991 was a period of rampant apology and apology demands. The issue of "apology" was not restricted to Japan for Pearl Harbor, but also covered America and slavery, America and the Indians, The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, all colonial powers and their subjects, etc. And then there was Japan and the above-cited peoples. The issue of "apology" was not a major part of this article. Anyway, it does not matter what the Japanese government intended, with respect to a war declaration before the attack. What matters is that there was not one.

With respect:

Since opinionating is permitted here, this is my opinion: Apology for Pearl Harbor is no big deal; apology for the barbarous treatment of conquered peoples and of prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese is a big deal.

While you may be correct in your opinions, they remain opinions until you provide facts. The aim of Wikipedia is not balance. Sometimes the truth is not fair or balanced. For example, you say "United States was arming enemies of Japan". If you mean China, then, while this may be technically correct, was it not Japan who invaded China and not the other way around? If America was arming Japan's enemies, it was doing so to aid a victim of Japanese aggression — hardly the conduct of a "snake". If Japan had continued to expand its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, you are right, perhaps eventually FDR or Truman would have declared war to stop Japan from invading other countries, like England did with Germany.

It's true that Japan had valid grievances against the United States and other Western powers. In particular was the bullying of Japan by these powers after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which denied Japan colonial rights and military parity corresponding to those of the Great Powers. This can be seen as a grievance as valid as that of Germany over the Versailles Treaty. However, this article is concerned with the Pearl Harbor attack, not with the origins of the Pacific War, which may be a more appropriate place to address the issues you raise

About the American soldiers you see on the train, walking around "like they own my place": that is your impression. It is the same impression locals have about Japanese tourists in foreign countries. Perhaps you don't like Americans anyway, so when you see them, you attribute the worst to them. Perhaps what you see are not soldiers walking around "like they own my place" but people having been in Japan long enough to be as familiar and comfortable as you are. Also consider, that it is in the nature of a soldier to act confident; perhaps you are confusing this with arrogance. If you were well-disposed to Americans perhaps you would see the soldiers in this way rather than the hostile way you see them. Anyway, if you compare the way American soldiers behave in Japan with the way Japanese soldiers behaved in Nanking in 1937-38, I think you would have a healthier perspective.

This article is about history, not current events. The Japan of history is different from today's Japan, which I hope you agree is a better Japan because of Japanese-American coöperation after the war and later, by a democratic Japan, in building a strong, humane, wealthy nation which enjoys the status of Great Power it should have had in 1905. Today, Japanese-American relations are like Wikipedia — a collaborative effort. — J M Rice 18:31, 12 Apr 2005 (UTC)

This article is limited in scope to the actual attack, and we should avoid the tempation to add long explanations of the factors leading to hostilities. Does anyone know of a website, preferably an official one, which covers the attack from a Japanese perspective? It would be interesting to add some material about how it is perceived in Japan. -Willmcw 04:56, May 9, 2005 (UTC)

There's 1 ish I'd love to see covered: Japanese revisionism. I've heard there's a manga that claims the U.S. started the war & the attack was self-defense. Anybody seen it? Can somebody include a ref? Trekphiler 08:16, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Automedon and the Japanese move to war

I don't believe that this has been referenced here, as the article appears to be more of a general review. However, the author may find it useful to research the sinking of MS Automedon by the German raider Atlantis; during this assault (9/10/40 - http://www.nesa.org.uk/html/automedon-ultra.htm) the Germans captured a secret British document indicating an inability of Britain to defend her Far East colonies.

This document was returned thru diplomatic channels from Japan to Germany; after reviewing it, Germany turned it over to its Japanese ally on 12/12/40. This document told Japan that it would only need to fight one major power in the Pacific; the British torpedo attack on the Italian naval fleet at Taranto (11/11/40) provided a clear example of how Japan could incapacitate a rival.

From the link above:

"There is no doubt that possession of these documents profoundly affected Japanese war planning in January 1941, this intimate view of Churchill’s War Cabinet decisions and opinions enabled the Japanese to dismiss any serious fears that the British could make a worthwhile military intervention in the Far East, it also provided the Japanese with a clear picture of British knowledge of their armed forces (for example. that we were unaware that the Japanese Air Force possessed torpedo-carrying aircraft).

It is fair to argue, therefore, that the capture of the Chiefs-of-Staff report from the Automedon was the catalyst that sent the Japanese on the path to Pearl Harbour and precipitated the ruinous attack on America’s Pacific fleet.

After the fall of Singapore in 1941, Captain Rogge of the Atlantis was presented with a Samurai sword by the Japanese Emperor in recognition of his achievement, only two other Germans received such an award, Hermann Goering and Erwin Rommel, later, Admiral Kondo was to tell Wenneker on several occasions how valuable this particular document had been in planning the attacks on Pearl Harbour, the Philippines, and Singapore, on the 8th December 1941, thus opening the war between Imperial Japan and the USA"

Thoughts?

I'm not the author, so apolgies for butting in with these thoughts: First, intelligence about Churchill's ruling out intervention in the East was no more than confirmation of what the Japanese already knew — that because of the European war, the British, French and Dutch colonies were indefensible. Second, as Admiral Yamamoto was well aware, the strategic threat to Japanese expansion lay with the United States alone and that no matter how successful the attack on Pearl Harbor, he could at best promise a year for Japan to engage in its expansion unchallenged from the United States, not Great Britain. Third, the business with the Samurai sword sounds apocryphal. In short, the Japanese were never concerned about the British, so whatever was found on the Automedon (and Rusbridger's page reveals less than rigorous scholarship) could hardly be considered a "catalyst".

By the way, since this Rusbridge piece is based on eighties research, it's not much of a basis for any conclusion. Since then, the fifty-year rule has long expired, and if one thought the issue worth taking up, they would have checked the B.M. or P.R.O for the declassified docs. Frankly, I don't think it's that important. — J M Rice 20:46, 22 Apr 2005 (UTC)

more on PH attack as self defense

(Takatoriyama) It is interesting to read the new, long discussion here. The reason I complain about the article first, is that it implied that US was taken by suprise. Not, in the sense of the day and time of the attack (which was by all account suprising to the people there on the day), but in the sense that Japan wasn't expected to confront US in the Pacific region. Since US had been preparing for many years to improve the Pacific Fleet, since at least the time of the Manchurian Rail incident, this implication was absurd and offensive. It perpetuate the stereotypical image of Asian--and especially Japanese--people as being inscrutable, devious, underhanded and unknowable. Yet, American policy at the time was to cut off Japanese supply lines for oil, coal, metals and materials to starve and cripple the Japanese war economy while waiting for the right moment to enter the worldwide fray. Waiting from 1930s until 1941 to enter the war against an enemy which had finally overextended itself, is also a long-term devious and calculating policy. So long as the article has balance showing that confrontation in Pacific was already expected, and that the specific attack not the regional balance was the surprise, I have no argument.

Regarding the comment that I 'already dislike American', you are unfortunately completely incorrect. I am an American citizen, and though again residing in Japan, vote every year by absentee, and maybe return someday to the US. When I complain about Americans, I specifically talk about the soldiers and sailors who swagger around with the attitude that Japan is a country which deserve to be below them. My point about the military Americans, is that they still act like recent victors who deserve the spoils of the country. They talk loud on the train and expect that nobody understand the rude and derogatory thinks they say in English in front of everybody. These are not the Americans I know and love like my many friends, these are a special case and the only ones I complain about. Mainly, not from hatred of Americans, but from embarassment that these are the emissaries by which Japanese and other countries learn the American character. They show the wrong character, especially in a country which value respect and politeness like Japan. (Takatori)

(A.T. Cook) "Waiting from 1930s until 1941 to enter the war against an enemy which had finally overextended itself, is also a long-term devious and calculating policy." And the Pearl Harbor Attack was not "devious and calculating"? True, America was not selling its scrap iron and oil to Japan in 1941, but this was in response to the Rape of Nanking and other atrocities committed by Japanese forces in Southeast Asia. Let's go to the source of the problem: Japanese imperial expansion, for which there will certainly never be an apology. Regardless of who "knew" what, the Japanese ordered the attack, bombed the harbor, etc. The article should focus on facts, not fabricated justifications. The Germans do not resort to such revisionism, and neither should the Japanese.

Surprise attack was a long established and long admired Japanese military tactic; consider several battles in the 1905 Russian War. Yamamoto's PH plan was thus not out of line with Japanese doctrine. I have come across no hint that it was opposed on the grounds of being a sneak attack. Yamamoto himself is said to have been, privately, distressed that the delivery of the diplomatic note in Washington had been late, but that's it -- as far as I've heard. His plan was opposed in part because he proposed it; he was regarded by many in the Navy as a member of the "Treaty Faction", to be distrusted. And it was opposed on practical grounds -- how could it actually be carried off? would we be able to achieve tactical and strategic surprise? A great deal of coordinated and sustained effort went into achieving strategic surprise (surreptitious recall of merchant vessels, ONI agents on at merchant vessel calling at Honolulu that summer, keeping all -- including Japanes diplomatic personnel -- in ignorance, training pilots for the mission, manuvering the Attack Force to the North to avoid inadvertent reports to the wrong ears, arraqnging for radio spoofing by leaving behind in Japan the Attack Force's radio operators, two secret Imperial Councils before permission was given to go, lots and lots of planning for the simultaneous (and more important) moves to the South (which were directly suspected by the West (UK, US, Dutch, ...)), ... The case that PH was self defense is more than a little dubious given the months long effort needed to prepare for it and to pull it off. This arguement leads, in the extreme, to the WTC attack being in self defense as a result of Western actions taken in say, 1200CE, in the Middle East against the local Muslims there at the time. It will be of interest to recall that at the time of the Crusades, neither of the American continents were known of in the rest of hte world, except perhaps as a tale of their ancestors long before, by a few Greenlanders, exactly none of whom took part in any of the Crusades. So attacking the WTC can not possibly be, at least in some sense, the justifiable and legitimate result of long embedded hostility going back most of a thousand years. That's bogus reasoning, just as a US decision to beef up the Pacific Fleet taken well after the 1931 outbreak of war in Manchuria/China (at Japan's choice, and in a surprise attack) is a hostile action. Especially given its more or less null result by a decade later. Basing the Fleet 'forward' at Pearl was a dim political decision, protested by Adm Richardson (in command) at the cost of his career, but even so not a hostile action. Except by a kind of twisted propaganda sort of reasoning, akin to which was Goebbles defense of hitler's assorted landgrabs and war bluffing between 33 and 39. Evne the sneak attack on Poland was so structured as to be explained as a Polish attack across the border (dead prisoners in Polish uniforms scattered around the radio tower in the night...). Not credible reasoning at all, I'm afraid.

It is certainly true that the US was taking action designed to thwart Japanese policy in China and what was feared would be eventual Japanese policy in the East Indies. A well advised fear indeed, as those expectations came almost exactly true. Indeed, that summer, the Japanes pressured the French into an arrangement turning over French IndoChina. indeed, it was that action which prompted the trade (oil and scrap metal) embargo against Japan. Would you claim that the US, and the rest of the world including the League of Nations, should not have taken effective action in the case? Or perhaps it is the effectiveness of the US action (ie the embargo) which is being protested as being hostile? Short of war, what actions are acceptable in such cases? States do not always act sensibly or reasonably or morally (fuzzy words all and there is clearly dispute about all of them, but a war begun 10 years earlier at Japan's election, particularly brutally carried out, makes much of the fuzziness moot in this case), and when they do not, what should other states do? In Europe, Hitler's assorted landgrabs and war bluffs in the 30s weren't very effectively opposed by other states, nor by the League of Nations; near unanimous opinion is that this was a failure on their part and they should have been more forceful, or at least, more effective in resisting.

In any case, I find the entire issue rather moot. Japanese Naval Aviation had already taken surprise hostile action against the US in the case of the Panay, a small US ship stationed in China, some years before. People killed and all that. It was not, as claimed by the Japanese Foreign Office. Intercepted and decrypted instructions made it clear that the attack was deliberate; it was in any event unprovoked by any action of the Panay or its crew. Japanese behavior while under control of fanatic military factions (whether members held government office or not) was poor and unacceptable by any standard. It continued during the War after Dec 41 in prisoner treatment and the chemical/biological warfare station near Harbin under the command of Gen Isshi. There is indeed much for the Japanese govenrment to apologize for, and to the extent it has not done so, the rest of the world is entitled to wonder what that failure means. Reaching hard conclusions as to what it means is perhaps not warrented, but doubt and suspicion certainly are.

This article might benefit by including some account of Japanese propaganda explanations about how it really wasn't a sneak attack, not really. But is suspect such material would be best in a new article of its own with a link from here.

Request for references

Hi, I am working to encourage implementation of the goals of the Wikipedia:Verifiability policy. Part of that is to make sure articles cite their sources. This is particularly important for featured articles, since they are a prominent part of Wikipedia. Further reading is not the same thing as proper references. Further reading could list works about the topic that were not ever consulted by the page authors. If some of the works listed in the further reading section were used to add or check material in the article, please list them in a references section instead. The Fact and Reference Check Project has more information. Thank you, and please leave me a message when a few references have been added to the article. - Taxman 19:24, Apr 22, 2005 (UTC)

Re-organization and copyedit

This is a great article, but there are some organizational problems. The material is out of sequence: for example, the first shots of the attack come after the main attack and the various diplomatic messages are covered in different locations. Also, the prose would benefit from some plain old copyediting. So I am working to correct both isues without changing any of the interpretations or facts in the article (I made a couple of minor additions and no significant deletions). My motivation, apart from the usual Wiki participation, is that I am preparing to record the article for the Spoken Wikipedia project. Reading an article aloud highlights problems with flow and grammar (try it sometime). This article has great information and I look forward to making it available to the blind and visually-impaired. I hope these edits, though seemingly major, are acceptable and seen as an improvement. If not, edit away! Cheers, -Willmcw 10:35, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

Japanese view

The Japan Times, Japan's premier English-language daily newspaper, has run a number of columns in the early 2000s] that assert various causal and extenuating factors leading up to the attack. Among the aggravating factors seen leading to the attack are the U.S.'s racist policies on Japanese immigrants [1], the U.S.'s shared responsibility for pushing Japan into invading Asia and attacking Pearl Harbor [2], the belligerant boycott that cornered Japan [3], and loose U.S. morals [4]. The thousands of U.S. military deaths are repeatedly contrasted with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed by U.S. air attacks.[5][6] The paper also runs articles expressing other views, including complaints about politicians who minimize Japanese culpability. [7] Says one writer:

The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow.[8]

---

I think that this article would benefit with by adding some discussion of [historical and current] Japanese perspectives on Pearl Harbor. I looked on the Foregn Ministry's website, but their history begins in 1945. The Japan Times is perhaps the most mainstream English language source according to the CIA Factbook. [9] So it is the closest to an official view that I've found yet. I hope to find more sources, but I think the views expressed in the Times are repesentative. Can any editors help boil this down in an accuracte, NPOV way? Cheers, -Willmcw 07:47, May 9, 2005 (UTC)

PS I don't know how to summarize this reference, a summary history of the Showa Period (1926-1989), but it is so, uh, charmingly roundabout that I had to share it here.

The financial crisis of 1927, which occurred in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 that devastated the Tokyo area, eventually led to a long period of economic depression. In these circumstances, the power of the military increased, and it eventually gained control of the government. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 launched a series of events that culminated in Japan's entry into World War II. This war ended in Japan's defeat, with Emperor Showa accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Japan rose from the rubble of defeat, going on to achieve an almost miraculous economic recovery, which has allowed it to take its place among the world's leading democratic powers. [10]

"...a series of events that culminated in Japan's entry into World War II." Whew, that sure covers a lot of territory. -Willmcw 09:08, May 9, 2005 (UTC)

external vs wikipedia references

I like Willmcw's recent work on this article. It's better now. And I see that he uses external references a lot. This is of course good, and in line with Taxman's request a few posts up. But in many cases I feel the refs could have been made into wiki-links to our own articles, and have the refs put there instead. Take the "Japanese preparations" section. There are 2 references regarding the various coordinated attacks occurring at the same time as the one on Pearl Harbor. But we do have articles on those attacks, Battle of Prachuab Khirikhan, Battle of Hong Kong, Battle of the Philippines (1941-42) and maybe more. Shouldn't we be "building our web" and link to them instead?

Normally I would just be bolding in and wikify the hell out of that section. But I'm a bit reluctant to do that here, since Willmcw has improved upon an already Featured Article to this extent. And his 'writing with the article being read out loud in mind' is a new concern I haven't thought about before (although I probably should, sounds like excellent advice). Personally I would for instance trade the trivial links to Hong Kong and the Philippines with more specific links to the battles in question. But, well, I'm unsure about external-internal references here and also how it plays in on the reading out loud concern. So I'm asking here now instead of going nuts in the article. Shanes 10:41, 9 May 2005 (UTC)

I left those external references in as they seemed to be sources for specific assertions about the timing of the attacks. However internal links are more important and should be developed. (regarding the reading aloud- I tend to ignore external links in the text, and just read the ones listed at the end). The other battles you mentioned mostly are included at the bottom of the "battle box", but I've revised the paragraph to link to all of those that occured in the following 24 hours - (actually there's no article for the Battle of Malaya). Cheers, -Willmcw 23:05, May 9, 2005 (UTC)

misplaced reference

It seems to me that the following quoted comment on the internment of U.S. Japanese citizens belongs in the existing Japanese internment article and not in the Pearl Harbor article.... "Another important factor was the view of General John DeWitt, commander of the West Coast Defense District. In support of his recommendation to President Roosevelt that those of Japanese descent be interned, he claimed to have evidence of the intent to commit sabotage and espionage. It is now known that he had no such evidence." Paul.h 01:18, July 12, 2005 (UTC)

I can see the point: an aftereffect of the attack was that the perception of it as a "stab in the back" fed into fears of sabotage and espionage by "seemingly-loyal" Japanese Americans. However this article should stay focused on the event and avoid bogging down in analysing secondary or teriary effects. There might be a way of tacking the internment issue onto an existing paragraph so as to avoid belaboring it. I've added this into an paragrpah on the immieditate outcome: The perception of the attack as a "stab in the back" sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese Americans and was a factor in the later Japanese internment in the western United States. Is that more relevant? -Willmcw 01:44, July 14, 2005 (UTC)

Yes, that is a better solution. It doesn't quite fit the theme of those two paragraphs, but it is close (treachery, wake-up call, etc). I have made one more pass at the second paragraph striving for a bit more clarity. Paul.h 18:18, July 14, 2005 (UTC)

Pacific Fleet carriers

Just a clarification. There were three (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga) assigned to the Fleet; only "big E" and "Lady Lex" were nearby that morning; "Sara" was back in Puget Sound under refit. Trekphiler 08:20, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Missed targets

More important than the machine shops were the power station, without which Pearl could not function, and the Navy Yard, without which major hull repairs could not be done.

In the long run, even more important still was the fact the Submarine Base was not attacked, since it was the Sub Force that did more to win the war than any other, by cutting Japan's sea lanes. Nor did Japan destroy the Force's torpedo store (although, given the problems with the Mk XIV its Mk VI exploder, it might have been a net loss).

And by a miracle, untouched was a priceless asset, in the basement of the old HQ Building--Rochefort's crypto unit, Hypo.

I rely on Blair's 'Silent Victory', Prange 'Verdict of History', Holmes 'Double-Edged Secrets', & 'Barrier & the Javelin'. Trekphiler 08:26, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Cypher intelligence

It did include military intelligence; USN had broken JN-25 in December 1940 (though it was not read solid). What was not routinely read was the lower-grade J-19 consular code, in which the revealling 'bomb plot' signals were sent, due to a perennial lack of manpower (which can be traced to Stimson's scruples over interception and decryption and closing the Black Chamber in 1929.) The 'winds' messages are a red herring; no important information was carried in them.

I rely on Kahn's 'Codebreakers', 'Double-Edged Secrets', 'Verdict of History', 'Silent Victory', Yardley, 'Barrier and Javelin', Stinnett's 'Day of Infamy', and other sources (which I can't recall offhand). Trekphiler 08:22, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Japanese targeting

"Did not ignore other ships"? There were some 78 cruisers and destroyers in harbor that morning; far and away the bulk of them did not suffer a scratch. They would form the basis of the carrier task force escorts, which the old battlwagons alongside Ford Island were too slow for anyhow. I rely on Blair and 'Barrier', among others. Trekphiler 08:22, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Nagumo's no third strike

His excuse, "The location of the American carriers was and remained unknown", does not stand scrutiny. He had orders to risk the loss of up to half his carriers to find and sink the Americans'. Nagumo took no action to find them, reflection of continuing Japanese weak reconaissance. Emphasis on attack puts paid to it.

I rely on numerous sources here, most notably 'Barrier' and TME 30-480, U.S. Army Handbook on Japanese Forces.

Moreover, being a battleship sailor, why did Nagumo not use his surface assets to SHELL Pearl Harbor? Surely his six decks could hold off the American three he expected, and certainly the two he actually faced. Personally, I suspect Nagumo's disapproval of the attack plan led him to subtly undermine it and not give it his best. The other option seems to be cowardice. Trekphiler 08:22, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Portents of Japan's defeat

The "sleeping US behemoth" of industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, would have made no difference. Japan was defeated by loss of control of her sea lanes through indifferent, indolent antisubmarine warfare efforts, what Adm Chihaya called "shiftless" (and it is hard to argue). American submarines cut off the Home Islands from supplies, and deliveries of weapons and supplies to island garrisons.

Why, then, did it take 44 months? U.S. Sub Force torpedoes were abysmally bad, and a colossally stupid decision by U.S. Customs and Intelligence men (one each) prewar caused Japan to change her merchant marine code (which OP-20-G did not have the manpower to break again until January 1943). Between them, they doubled the effectiveness of U.S. submarines when they became available--in September 1943! In short, the U.S. Sub Force drove Japan's economy to ruin in just over a year: by January 1945.

Here, I rely on Blair, Kahn, Prange's 'Pearl Harbor Papers', and Barhart 'Japanese Merchant Marine'. Trekphiler 08:23, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Tripartite Pact

Hitler not obligated under the terms of the agreement... Trekphiler 08:24, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Air defense of Pearl Harbor

Actually, AAC was responsible for long-range patrol; local harbor defense was the Navy's responsibility. Trekphiler 08:24, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Battleship hoarding

Yamamoto and all IJN, just like USN and RN prewar, were in the grip of the doctrine of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who advocated "decisive battle" to control the seas in his seminal, overly influential 'Influence of Seapower'. Mahan had misread the record, ignoring 'guerre de course' (commerce war), and the major navies did, too. When reduced by circumstance to rely on it, both Germany and the U.S. did--with a vengeance.

I rely on various sources here. Trekphiler 08:26, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Spanish Translation of the Week

This article is the current Spanish Translation of the Week. Please help in translating this page if you can. The destination article is at es:Ataque a Pearl Harbor.

This article has been selected as the Spanish Translation of the Week. However, we're trying something new and we're going to translate from English to Spanish, not the other way around. Any bilingual editors of the article are welcome to go to es:Ataque a Pearl Harbor to help. Titoxd^(?!?) 05:08, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

Man, I wish I could help out more, but my old computer isn't fullty compatible with Wikipedia; the accent marks in particular won't translate properly. Could be I just don't know what I'm doing? Hell of a fine job coming along though! Doovinator 03:35, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Info on corrections

WILLMCW:

Inside Pearl Harbor at time of the attack: Battleships: Maryland, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Tennessee, West Virginia, California, Oklahoma, Arizona; Cruisers: Raleigh, Detroit, Honolulu, Phoenix, St. Louis, Helena, New Orleans, San Francisco.

Walter Lord in "Day of Infamy" states that there were 96 ships inside Pearl; other books give differing figures, so I said "approximately 50 other ships".

Sunk: West Virginia, California, Oklahoma, Arizona

Damaged: Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Nevada (grounded, not sunk; still afloat, but with her nose in the mud).

Cruisers damaged: Raleigh (2 torpedos), Honolulu (bomb fragment damage), Helena (torpedo).

Destroyers: Cassin, Downes, (both constructive total loss in drydock); Shaw (sunk with floating drydock)

Other ships sunk: Oglala (capsized at 101 dock), floating drydock holding Shaw

Other ships damaged: seaplane tender Curtiss, repair ship Vestal. Not including several ships that were strafed.

The other information was elsewhere in the rest of the article; I just made the table consistent with that information.

147.240.236.9 21:58, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

Thanks. It's always a good idea to use the "edit summary" to let your fellow editors know what you're up to. Cheers, -Willmcw 01:56, 9 December 2005 (UTC)

Can you confirm 4 BBs sunk? I've seen 5 & 6 other places, & 7 or 8 present. Trekphiler 13:05, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Dept of corrections

The article says, "when the Navy requested to use the Army's communications system". I'm unaware of this. In fact, what I've read of Marshall's notorious message was, the Army's system was having trouble & the messenger refused to request aid from the Navy (rivalry again...), so it went via commercial cable. Trekphiler 13:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Smooth operator

Can somebody settle an issue N covered in the article (tho it should be mentioned!)? I've seen claims the attack was as "Operation Z" (after Togo's pennant) & "Operation AI" (after the Japanese name for Hawaii). I tend to believe AI, but I'm N certain (only 1 source, Prange's Pearl Harbor Papers). Can somebody confirm? Trekphiler 14:10, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Not a suprise....

The atack is not a suprise. A radar station on the island detected a large number of aircraft. They tought it was a B-17 Flying Fortress bomber but it was the enemy planes. An enemy "Mini Sub" was detected by an American Destroyer outside the harbour. They fire at it and succesfuly sunk it. Another one was in Pearl Harbour. Again, sunk by another American destroyer. About 5 mini-subs were found. The destroyer (I only the first one) that sunk the first mini-sub was the USS Ward. An ageing Curtiss P-36 shot down a Zeke. The pilot was rewarded. The P-36 has 200+ bullet holes! Irfanfaiz 02:46, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Other than the bullet holes in the P-36 I think we've included all of that in our article. Have you read it? More generally, Pearl Harbor is popularly known as a "surprise attack". It isn't for us to decide if it was or not, only to provide all viewpoints. If there's some sourced information that you'd like to add, go for it. Cheers, -Willmcw 07:08, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Built like a tank

Flagship of the Kido Butai tanker train was Kyokuto Maru, Genda is credited with inventing the CVTF, Pennsylvania (CO by Charles "Savvy" Cooke, Jr.--a former submariner, if I'm not mistaken) was flag of the PacFlt, & Seaman Lawrence McCutcheon (Maryland) was first American KIA, all according to Pearl Harbor Papers (I think). See also Willmott's Pearl Harbor. Trekphiler 06:40, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

Retro Battle

Yeah, this is a bit late; I just checked the archive. I'd agree, "battle" is a wrong usage, but RAF called their attacks on German cities "Battles", including "Battle of Berlin". Trekphiler 06:55, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

Are you referring to the article title? I think "attack" is accurate and common usage. "Raid" would be accurate too, but I don't think that it is used as often. "Battle" implies a greater degree of opposition than the U.S. forces were able to muster.

That reminds me, what is it called in Japan (in translation)? We should include that detail too, if we can. -Willmcw 08:53, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

The British "battles" were prolonged campaigns, lasting weeks, months, or even years in the case of the Battle of Berlin. I admit that I was surprised to see this article titled as it is. Seems to me that "Pearl Harbor Attack" would put the words in better order, as well as being truer to contemporary (1940s) usage. (Indeed, the word "attack" was superfluous. Everyone knew what was meant by the words "Pearl Harbor" unadorned.) --Cubdriver 11:45, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

However this is the 2000s, and we obviously need to have a separate article on Pearl Harbor, the place. I think this title is fine as it is. -Willmcw 17:56, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

More Retro

Yeah, this is a bit late, too:

"Did anyone here actually read R. Stinnett's book? All the way through? I'm dissapointed that some people would call evidence from the US Navy 'conspiracy theories'. To do so is petty slander and simple name-calling. I mean really, denying evidence from the US Navy?! Admit it, we were lied to for 50 years. -- 65.176.192.146 23:07, 16 Sep 2003"

Actually, I have read it. It's a fantasy. It's got fundamental flaws, not least being unable to tell the difference between DF fixes & bearings (not 1 I noticed, I confess), nor being able to realize his premise is wrong, despite quoting one of his sources to that effect. Trekphiler 07:13, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

In reply...

On the archive page, WW said:

"Navy stole them (cf, Budiansky's Battle of Wits and his reporting of the slush fund held by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the black bag jobs it financed), or because of considerable inspired work (as by the Friedmann/Rowlett team that broke Purple). We didn't even begin to (illegally, for Congress had passed a law enacting Stimson's "gentlemen don't read other people's mail" attitude)"

Red was stolen, that's true. By the time of Purple & JN-25, which follow Friedman's seminal work on rotor solutions, theft wasn't needed. As for "illegal", it was, if it came from cable companies, per Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. It didn't cover interception out of the air, which is what crypto was doing, & wouldn't have been considered illegal per SCotUS jurisprudence anyhow until 1968. (I looked it up after reading intercept officers feared it might be. A 1928 decision said to the effect possession of the cables was illegal; not until Katz would interception of the signal alone be prohibited.)

Budianshi's report was in regard to the 20's mostly, as I recall. The slush fund was returned to the Treasury in a fit of acounting virtue by an ONI chief, to the irritation of his troops, sometime in the 30's, IIRC. Your points on intercepted from the air vs copies of cables are well taken, save that cables were being (illegally) copied in NY throughout the pre-War period. They only began to be copied in Hawaii after Sarnoff agreed to cooperate the week before PH. ww -- have just noticed I've been logged out by WP.

"they changed pretty regularly as is only sensible for any sane crypto system. Such success as was achieved against the Japanese military by US crypto folk was largely in China (as for instance during the Panay incident) and was largely irrelevant by mid-late 41. In particular, Stinnet says in his book (and in the Independent Institute talk whose transcript is referenced above) that the US was able to read the '5-num' JIN superencrypted code (ie, JN-25) well before 12.7.41. There is no credible evidence that this was actually so."

Everything I've ever read on the subject suggests there were breaks into JN-25 as early as Dec '40. Not enough to read solid, N, but... That includes Kahn (who would know, I'd guess); I seem to recall Holmes & Blair back it up.

Breaks into systems like JN-25 are incremental and, until some critial mass or tipping point is reached, are not very productive. Nothing I've ever seen suggests that JN-25 was sufficiently well broken to return useful intelligence, by anyone or any combination, prior to 1.12.41 when a new addition took effect. With more traffic, a break into that edition was far enough along to produce useful intelligence in a few months. ww again -- still logged out

"battlewagon admirals (of which Yamamoto had once been one, but uncharacteristically he had seen the light early on)"

That's the myth. I wonder. Cf his dispositions at Midway: classic BB sailor, CV scouts in van, heavies under strong escort behind.

My reading of the Midway plan is two fold. 1st: JIN carriers were out ahead to take down whatever might be found including, Y hoped, any American carriers that might come to the rescue. After the British loss of capital ships off Malaysia (uncovered by aircraft), and the fight which stopped the Japanese advance in New Guinea (despite Fletcher's hesitance), it was, I think, becoming clear to all that carriers were more important as fighting ships than most anyone had appreciated, pre War. More imagination here than the usual battlewagon admiral, I think. 2nd: Y took along almost everything he could find as a result of the loss of face from the, otherwise minor, American bomber raid on Tokyo. He was in a big hurry to do something to get back at 'em. Y's change of mind and early advocay of aviation is reported from a translation of a biography. Lots of research in the book, and it seems credible to my eye. Others more familiar with the original book (in Japanese) would be in a better position to evaluate its report of Y's early career choices. ww again

"Remember that Mitchell was court-martialed and convicted."

He was: for N shutting up when ordered to... Recall, he was criticising his superiors & policy, in the newspapers....

True, but the criticism was the result of 'stick in the mud' reactions on the part of his superiors. Shut him up and we'll not have to deal with his ideas... A not unheard of bureaucratic pheomenon. ww again

"This further implies, I suspect, that more than a mere statement that no such conspiracy has been shown is required."

What's req is to subject conspiracy theories to ridicule they deserve.

Actually, what's required here at WP is to cover them, and give an evaluation of their credibility and why the evaluation. I have little sympathy with most, because I see little actual evidence for any flavor I've come across, but ridicule is, I think, not appropriate here on WP. However tempting. ww again

On the archive page, also:

"The embargos on oil and scrap steel were clearly something that was going to cause something to break - either it would cripple the Japanese military, and he'd get what he wanted without having to have a war (which I would expect is what he preferred), or they'd go to war."

FDR didn't want a total embargo, just enough to "get Japan's attention". Unfortunately, I can't source it offhand; it's Mosely, On Borrowed Time, I think.