Talk:Argument map/Archives/2016

Recent changes

Thank you for updating the references. That's much better.

I updated the entry because as it stood it was heavily skewed towards the approach and particular terminology used by Austhink/ReasoningLab and their associated commercial software. That is still evident in places, e.g. in the prominence given to their software in the history section.

I understand why the 'detailed instructions' were removed but they were not intended as such. They were Beardsley's own example of the process. As an example I think it is important. 1. It illustrates the general principles of constructing the standard argument map, 2. Historically, it is a very important example as it seems to be the first example of its kind. That alone makes it appropriate for inclusion. It also shows that Beardsley was advocating a number and arrow method nearly forty years before Kelley who is credited with introducing the method in the history section. Indeed, Beardsley also uses the terms convergent, divergent and serial. Including the Harrell version of the map is also important in that it illustrates the key divide in approach as things currently stand with the standard method.

Philosophyclass HSOG (talk) 16:59, 1 January 2016 (UTC)

Philosophyclass HSOG: I appreciate the work you did. The addition of Monroe Beardsley was especially important and overdue; as you said, Beardsley's absence gave the appearance of undue weight (WP:UNDUE) to later writers such as David Kelley. I don't mind that Kelley is mentioned, but he's not especially important (in fact he's barely mentioned at all) in the scholarly literature on argument mapping. On the other hand, Beardsley's Practical Logic has only a slightly higher citation count on Google Scholar than Kelley's The Art of Reasoning even though Beardsley's book was published almost four decades earlier, and only a few texts in Google Scholar cite both Beardsley's book and Kelley's book. In contrast, Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument may be one of the most highly cited books in philosophy, with over 9500 citations on Google Scholar (in comparison to around 150 each for Beardsley's and Kelley's books).

So I am doubtful that it is a good idea to spend so much space on Beardsley's method of diagramming texts, when his book has little influence today and the approach of numbering statements has largely been superseded by various "box and line" approaches, as far as I can see. (If you have evidence to the contrary, please share.)

Contrasting the example from Beardsley's book with a Harrell-style "box and line" diagram of the same argument for the purpose of illustrating the difference between the two approaches is redundant because the difference between a numbered diagram and a "box and line" diagram is already illustrated in the previous section. After reading your comment above, I had second thoughts and took a second look at the "detailed instructions" that I cut. But I still think the example from Beardsley's book is too detailed for an encyclopedia article. Beardsley is now mentioned in the history section before Kelley, so there's no longer any need to feel that Beardsley is not receiving due credit. If you think there should be a few more sentences there (in the history section) describing Beardsley's contribution, go ahead and add it. I am sorry to delete the work you did in the "Representing an argument as an argument diagram" section, but for the reasons just mentioned I don't think it is appropriate. Feel free to respond with a counterargument if you wish.

Your observation that there may be undue weight given to the Austhink software is worth considering. I will try to add a well-sourced sentence at the end of the history section mentioning more of the history of argument mapping software. I will take another look at Walton's Methods of Argumentation (2013), which has a review of software if I remember correctly. Biogeographist (talk) 21:22, 1 January 2016 (UTC)

Biogeographist:I still think that the example is important for historical reasons as it is the first example of an argument being analysed in that way. Jacquette in 'Enhancing the Diagramming Method in Informal Logic' refers to Beardsley's approach as 'the gold standard for diagramming arguments'.

I agree that the box and line approach is widespread but the use of numbers is still the main approach in numerous textbooks (The Art of Reasoning, The Power of Logic, the various introductions to critical thinking by Roy van den Brink-Budgen, etc) and for good reason. Box and line is really only preferable when using software and with that there are all sorts of decisions to be made. Software comes and goes (I think Araucaria has now been replaced by OVA) and each has its own quirks. Rationale is aimed at the educational market and is highly regarded but costs and uses its own idiosyncratic approach to terminology. OVA assumes some knowledge of schemes and is not suitable for beginners and is aimed more at those doing research. iLogos is useful but inflexible and, oddly, not mentioned in the Wikipedia article.

I agree that it might not be necessary to include the diagram after outlining the Harrell principles but, personally, I would prefer that to be there as an example of the box and line approach rather than having the two earlier examples as that would then mean the example related to some specific content in the article.

I like your most recent changes but I think we could go still further. In the paragraph about the early software I would delete the sentence "This also permitted reasons to be edited for clarity.." as that wasn't an innovation with the software—it is standard practice when writing the reasons out in a legend. I would keep the sentence about Reason!Able being superseded by two subsequent programs, but then delete the rest of the paragraph as I don't think this article is the place for specific details of a particular piece of (proprietary) software. Perhaps there should be a separate page for Rationale just as there is a separate page for Compendium, etc.

Kelley still needs some pruning. I'm not sure what he introduced. Beardsley certainly used the terms 'convergent' and 'divergent'. I don't have an early edition of Kelley but I believe he did use the terms 'additive', etc. However, 'additive' seems to be have been superceded by 'linked' which was introduced earlier by Thomas and Kelley doesn't use the terms in the latest edition of his book.

I agree that more needed to be said on Toulmin but I think care is needed. His influence seems to have been more to do with the understanding of argument theory rather than argument maps per se and may have had more influence in other aspects of argument rather than informal logic.

Philosophyclass HSOG (talk) 11:08, 2 January 2016 (UTC)

Philosophyclass HSOG: Thanks for the response. First, regarding Dale Jacquette's estimation of Beardsley's approach as some kind of "gold standard" in informal logic: that's an interesting opinion, but I see several problems with using his opinion to justify detailed description of Beardsley's approach. First, I'm not sure how widely Jacquette's opinion is shared; second, and ironically, in that article Jacquette is proposing to modify Beardsley's approach, which implies that Beardsley's approach is in some ways inadequate; third, and more importantly, argument maps are not only used in the small academic field of informal logic.

My own principal interest in the topic of argument maps is their use in nonacademic, practical applications. I have read widely in the scholarly literature on the topic, but my principal concern is the practical application of argument maps and not purely academic discussions. Looking at your username ("philosophy class") I imagine that your interests are more academic. One of your edits removed information from the lead on practical applications of argument maps, and that removal may reflect your disinterest in practical applications. I mention this not to "pigeonhole" or typecast each of us, but just to point out that there are different perspectives here that need to be integrated. One of the interesting aspects of Wikipedia is that the articles that have received attention from diverse editors integrate a wide range of interests by different communities that use the same concept in slightly different ways. This is one of the strengths of Wikipedia, in my opinion. (Of course, Wikipedia also has its weaknesses.)

Many of the other details you mention were not added by me, so I would encourage you to be bold and make whatever edits that you think need to be made. If we have any further disagreements, we can discuss them here. As a compromise, what do you think about adding back the deleted material on Beardsley but omitting the Harrell diagram? I will make that edit now.

The software list comes from Scheuer et al. (2010), as stated in the article. That article is now, of course, almost six years old, but any more recent software additions would need to be credited to a similarly reliable source. In any case, that paragraph is in the history section, so the point is that these were software applications that were developed in the 1990s and 2000s, not that they are the cutting-edge applications. I will add iLogos to the list, since Scheuer et al. mention it.

Toulmin's The Uses of Argument has been influential in many fields, which partly accounts for the book's high citation count. Toulmin wrote about the book's reception in his essay: Toulmin, Stephen (2006). "Reasoning in theory and practice". In Hitchcock, David; Verheij, Bart (eds.). Arguing on the Toulmin model: new essays in argument analysis and evaluation. Argumentation library. Vol. 10. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 25–29. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_2. ISBN 1402049374. OCLC 82229075. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) The opening sentence of that essay is one I heartily agree with: "Let me begin with a word of gratitude to John Dewey, whose book Essays in Experimental Logic was regarded with some contempt by my colleagues in Britain, but which is very much to his merit. Long before most of us, he saw the need to consider how reasoning enters, not only into technical life, but also into everyday life, so that the ways in which we express ourselves and—more important—the activities within which we express ourselves, set the stage without which judgments of soundness and acceptability can never be formulated or put to work." Biogeographist (talk) 12:45, 2 January 2016 (UTC)

While restoring the Beardsley example, I changed my mind and decided that if we're going to include the Beardsley example then it's a good idea to include the box and line diagram of the example as well, so I restored all of it. Thanks for your work. Biogeographist (talk) 13:17, 2 January 2016 (UTC)

Biogeographist: Yes, you are right 'gold standard' is over egging it. Beardsley put in place the basic approach and introduced some terminology that has become standard but when it comes to detail there are significant omissions. It was an important and significant first step but not at all the final word. I will try to find some wording for the history section to say something like that.

I approve of the way you have put the two diagrams off to the side where they have less prominence. That's probably as it should be.

I confess that I didn't give too much thought to the material I left out of the introduction and am happy for it to be back. Actually, I think the article is in need of a significant section detailing the use of argument maps in different fields particularly AI and the automated analysis of arguments. Indeed, that would be far more important and valuable than the three headed paragraphs under Applications which read as if they have been taken from promotional material of some kind. Philosophyclass HSOG (talk) 17:08, 2 January 2016 (UTC)

Philosophyclass HSOG: I agree that the Applications section could use more detail, although I'm not likely to add much myself. I don't have any problem with the first two subsections of that section as they stand. The third subsection has some good points but is too long, which gives the somewhat "promotional" flavor that you mention. I think there are some very important points in there; it just needs to be condensed. Perhaps I'll do it later.

I only found one point of disagreement with your latest edits. I cut the following sentence that you added: "Toulmin had less initial influence on the field of informal logic." You attributed this claim to page 175 of the book: Eemeren, Frans H. van; Grootendorst, Rob; Snoeck Henkemans, A. Francisca; Blair, J. Anthony; Johnson, Ralph H.; Krabbe, Erik C. W.; Plantin, Christian; Walton, Douglas N.; Willard, Charles A.; Woods, John (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory: a handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. doi:10.4324/9780203811306. ISBN 0805818618. OCLC 33970847. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

I don't have that edition of the book, so I can't check the source. However, I do have the more recent edition of what appears to be essentially the same book (in structure if not in content): Eemeren, Frans H. van; Garssen, Bart; Krabbe, Erik C. W.; Snoeck Henkemans, A. Francisca; Verheij, Bart; Wagemans, Jean H. M. (2014). Handbook of argumentation theory. New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5. ISBN 9789048194728. OCLC 871004444. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) In this more recent edition, the chapter on the Toulmin model says: "In philosophy, Toulmin's work has also been of influence on the rise of informal logic, [Footnote 47: In citing the influences that have led to the rise of informal logic, Johnson and Blair (1980) explicitly mention the Toulmin model.] and since the late 1980s his model has been taken up in the theorizing (see Chap. 7, "Informal Logic" of this volume). Like Toulmin, informal logicians tend to hold the view, albeit not always for the same reasons, that formal logic does not constitute the best, and certainly not the only, tool for analyzing and evaluating argumentation. [Footnote 48: As is explained in Sect. 7.2 of this volume, Toulmin's radical critique, and the new perspective on argumentation he provided, has been an inspiration to explore this territory with other models and instruments than those supplied by formal logic.] Several argumentation theorists with a background in informal logic, such as James Freeman (1985, 1988, 1991, 1992), Mark Weinstein (1990a, b), and David Hitchcock (2003, 2006a), have scrutinized Toulmin's philosophical ambitions and have appropriated his model." In this account, Toulmin had an influence on informal logic right from the start.

Thanks for adding the bit about Stephen N. Thomas; that's interesting. Biogeographist (talk) 02:45, 3 January 2016 (UTC)

Biogeographist: No problem with the sentence being cut but, just for the record, the source I was referring to says:

"As noted, Toulmin's model had little sway until recently on informal logic. Beardsley's (1950) diagramming convention, with its distinction between "convergent", "divergent", and "serial" arguments, was more influential" p175

"Some informal logicians turned to Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric (1958, English trans!. 1969), not so much for theoretical details as for general orientation and affirmation...So far as doctrine goes, Toulmin's model—data-warrant-backing-qualification/rebuttal—claim-was not picked up by informal logicians the way it was by the argumentation branch of the speech communication community. Instead, it was the spirit of Toulmin's approach to argumentation that was influential: Be sensitive to context; be empirical rather than a prioristic; expect differences in standards in different domains." p172

Philosophyclass HSOG (talk) 15:22, 3 January 2016 (UTC)

I have now had time to review the references you gave above. Yes, the quote you give does comment on his influence on the rise of informal logic but this isn't necessarily incompatible with my original statement—"Toulmin had less initial influence on the field of informal logic." There can be an early rise and a later rise. Counting against this is the footnote you cite but if you check what Johnson and Blair actually say (1980) it supports my original statement. Having completed a literature review they do say that Toulmin (1958) is, in their judgement, one of "only three monographs of significance to informal logic (to) have appeared between 1955 and 1978". However, they go on to say, "None of these monographs has had the impact it deserves in the philosophical world at large, nor even within the discipline of logic" and "Despite these very interesting suggestions, if Toulmin’s monograph has had much influence, it has gone largely unacknowledged." and again "Few monographs have been written on informal logic. While especially those of Toulmin, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca and Hamblin are in our view important works, they have had little influence upon work appearing in journals and textbooks – with the exception that Hamblin is widely mentioned."

Blair in an article specifically addressing the significance of Toulmin ('The pertinence of Toulmin and Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca for informal logic' in 'Rhetoric and Argumentation in the Beginning of the XXI Century' 2009) says, "As a result of the very limited influence of these two books on anglophone philosophy at the time and for many years, what came to be called the informal logic movement, which began in the 1970s among a few philosophers in Canada and the United States, was not a consequence of Toulmin’s or Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work on argument and argumentation. Instead, it was an independent outgrowth of the anti-Positivism rooted in the later Wittgenstein and in Oxford ordinary language philosophy, combined with social factors in those two countries: by the anti-establishment social attitudes of the 1960s and by the post WWII baby-boom- -fuelled expansion of post-secondary schooling." and "By the late 1970s and early 1980s, several of those who identified with informal logic were beginning to scan the literature and to think about theoretically grounded bases for these new tools for analysis and new criteria for evaluation. It was only then that we encountered The Uses of Argument and The Treatise on Argumentation...The first reaction was a sense of validation...The theoretical influences, however, did not really take hold for another 15 years."

Finally, I would cite Alec Fisher who, writing in 1992 (INFORMAL LOGIC XIV.2&3, Spring & Fall 1992) and reviewing Freeman 1991, says, "Most writers in the field have rejected Toulmin's data-warrant-backing distinction as unworkable..." I suspect, but cannot substantiate, that it was specifically following Freeman that Toulmin became more considered in informal logic.

I will try to come up with an appropriate form of words.

Philosophyclass HSOG (talk) 22:35, 11 January 2016 (UTC)

Philosophyclass HSOG: Thanks for following up with your detailed explanation. I have no objections to the sentence as it now appears: "Whilst Toulmin eventually had a significant impact on the development of informal logic he had little initial impact and the Beardsley approach to diagramming arguments along with its later developments became the standard approach in this field." That's more balanced and less ambiguous than the previous sentence that I deleted: "Toulmin had less initial influence on the field of informal logic." I say "ambiguous" because the previous sentence implied that Toulmin had less initial influence than someone else but didn't specify who that someone else was; the new sentence adds the missing clause and more. Your quote from Johnson and Blair (1980) indicates that, as far as monographs are concerned, Toulmin didn't have much competition!

By the way, if you haven't already looked at it, you may be interested in reading Reed & Rowe's paper "Translating Toulmin diagrams": Reed, Chris; Rowe, Glenn (2006). "Translating Toulmin diagrams: theory neutrality in argument representation". In Hitchcock, David; Verheij, Bart (eds.). Arguing on the Toulmin model: new essays in argument analysis and evaluation. Argumentation library. Vol. 10. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 341–358. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_23. ISBN 1402049374. OCLC 82229075. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help) The paper concludes: "This work has shown that theory neutrality in designing tools is a goal that can be met, and that solutions that do so are implementable in software that is still simple enough to use that students working within any of the supported theoretical frameworks find little challenge in working with the software. Inevitably, as with any translation, some of the subtlety or nuances that can be captured in one theory or language might be rendered imperfectly in another. But what has been demonstrated here is that such translation can be carried out with a sound theoretical basis..." Reed & Rowe cite this paper in their later paper "A pluralist approach to argument diagramming", which you cited in your additions to this article. Biogeographist (talk) 01:40, 12 January 2016 (UTC)

Philosophyclass HSOG: And when I was reading the quotation you provided on informal logic as an "outgrowth of the anti-positivism rooted in the later Wittgenstein and in Oxford ordinary language philosophy, combined with social factors", I was reminded of an interesting paper by Doug Walton that portrays argumentation theory as a successor (if not the successor) to analytic philosophy: Walton, Douglas N. (January 1992). "After analytic philosophy, what's next?: an analytic philosopher's perspective" (PDF). Journal of Speculative Philosophy. 6 (2): 123–142. doi:10.2307/25670025. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Biogeographist (talk) 02:04, 12 January 2016 (UTC)