Talk:Argument from authority/Archive 4
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Opening Sentence Changes
Currently, the opening sentence says this:
Argument from authority (Latin: argumentum ad verecundiam) also appeal to authority, is a common form of argument which leads to a logical fallacy when used in science or argument.
I changed this opening sentence to this:
The Argument from authority (Latin: argumentum ad verecundiam) also appeal to authority, is a common argument form which can be fallacious, such as when an authority is cited on a topic outside their area of expertise, or when the authority cited is not a true expert.
This change has been reverted a couple times so I will explain the reasons for my changes here. I have four primary problems with the original sentence.
1) As established in discussion above, numerous authoritative sources distinguish between fallacious and non-fallacious versions of the argument from authority. Thus, it would not be representative of expert views on this subject to say that this kind of argument is always fallacious. However, saying that the argument from authority is "a common argument form which leads to a logical fallacy when used in science or argument" will be taken by many readers to mean that it is always a fallacy when used in science or argument. Putting in the "can" clarifies that while arguments from authority can be fallacious, they are not always fallacious.
2) It is unnecessary and misleading to specify "science or argument." "Argument" is too broad--it includes everything and so can be dropped. "Science" is too specific. There is nothing in the cited sources to show that this is a problem specific to scientific reasoning any more than to philosophical or historical reasoning, or any other form of reasoning.
3) The original sentence says the argument from authority leads to a logical fallacy, which links to the page for formal fallacies. However, fallacious uses of the argument from authority are informal, not formal fallacies. Thus, using "fallacy" (or fallacious) is better than "logical fallacy," since it includes both formal and informal fallacies.
4) Finally, the citations here are not appropriate. The point of citing expert sources is that you want to get closer to the original research that established the claim you are making. Thus, ideally you want a citation from an expert on the direct issue being discussed writing about that very issue. None of your citations are of this sort.
The Gass citation is from an okay source, a professor of communication with a specialty in critical thinking (although nothing directly on the argument from authority that I can see from his CV), but you cite what appears to be a class handout, not anything from his published work. Furthermore, this handout is not about the argument from authority, but is just a single sentence summary of a number of fallacies.
The Appleby citation is from an lecture on cybernetics and philosophy of science that has nothing to do with the argument from authority. It mentions it in a brief aside, pointing out that modern science relies on more than just authority (which everyone here accepts), but is on an entirely different subject. It is a bit difficult for me to tell what Appleby's expertise is in as I was not previously familiar with cybernetics, but it isn't a traditional expertise in philosophy or logic as far as I can tell.
Finally, the Sadler citation is from an study on the results of teaching prospective science teachers methods of argumentation. It is, again, not about the argument from authority, although it again mentions it in passing as part of the curriculum of the course taught. Sadler is also not clearly an expert on this manner, as he is a professor of education, and almost all of his published research is on science education.
We don't need three citations here--one good one is enough. That is why I replaced it with a citation from Douglas Walton's Informal Logic. This is a textbook from a major university press, published in 2008, written by an expert on the subject (he has published an entire book and several articles on the nature of the argument from authority). Furthermore, I cite from an actual discussion (almost 40 pages worth) directly on the nature of this argument. This is the author that all those other people you cited would look to as the expert on this topic.
Walton says that arguments from authority (or as he calls it "expert opinion") is a "reasonable, if inherently defeasible type of argument." He spends most of his time attempting to show the logic of this type of argument. However, he does also discuss how it can go wrong, and lists three common ways it does so, of which I mentioned two in my edited version of the listed sentence. Is that not exactly what we are supposed to do here? Find the best sources and then accurately report what they say? Original Position (talk) 04:18, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
References
Sources explicitly saying it is a fallacy
The literature clearly and repeatedly states this sort of argument is a fallacy. One example I recently added to the page[1] says: "Common Fallacies to Avoid in Argumentation" and then lists "Appeal to authority" and says it is done when "Using an authority figure as the primary means of supporting an argument". How much more clear and explicit could it get? There's no need for anyone to discuss it on and on. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 03:52, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- You have a source which uses the term in a generalized sense to decry one specific example under a specific set of highly formal circumstances. Let's take a look at sources which directly address the question of defining the appeal to authority, shall we?
- For example, appealing to expert opinion could be reasonable if the field of the expert is appropriate, and other conditions are met. But, of course, as the logic texts have so often pointed out, such arguments can sometimes be fallacious appeal to authority.
- F. Bex, H. Prakken, C. Reed (2003) "Towards a formal account of reasoning about evidence: argumentation schemes and generalisations" [1](PDF). Artificial Intelligence and Law: 133.
- APPEAL TO AUTHORITY. Basing a belief on what some authority says. A legitimate form of appeal to authority goes as follows:
- X holds that A is true.
- X is an authority on the subject.
- The consensus of authorities agrees with X.
- There is a presumption that A is true.
- It is a fallacy if we appeal to someone who is not an authority on the subject, if the authorities widely disagree, or if we say something must be true (and is not just probably true) because authorities support it.
- Gensler, Harry J. (2010) The A to Z of Logic. Lanham, MD Scarecrow Press
- Appeal to Authority: Not always fallacious, but always something a critical thinker must consider. It is where you are asked to accept something as true based upon the word of an expert (authority). The main question is, "Are they really an expert?" Perhaps they're not an expert in that field, perhaps they've got an ax to grind, or perhaps they are being paid by someone.
- Foothill College
- Although appeals to authority can be erroneous, it must also be recognized that some appeals to authority can be reasonable and legitimate in argument. For example, suppose you have a toothache and you go to your dentist for advice. He replies as follows.
- This tooth is badly decayed, but not beyond repair. I propose to replace the decayed portion with a filling immediately.
- Your dentist's advice in [this example] is the judgement of a suitably qualified expert in his field. In asking for his or her advice, therefore, you have appealed to an expert authority. However, it by no means follows that by acquiescing to his proposals you have committed a fallacy.
- Walton, Douglas (2008) Informal Logic. London: Cambridge University Press
- The appeal to authority is a fallacy of irrelevance when the authority being cited is not really an authority.
- ...
- Finally, it should be noted that it is not irrelevant to cite an authority to support a claim one is not competent to judge. However, in such cases the authority must be speaking in his or her own field of expertise and the claim should be one that other experts in the field do not generally consider to be controversial. In a field such as physics, it is reasonable to believe a claim about something in physics made by a physicist that most other physicists consider to be true. Presumably, they believe it because there is strong evidence in support of it. Such beliefs could turn out to be false, of course, but it should be obvious that no belief becomes true on the basis of who believes it.
- The Skeptic's Dictionary - appeal to authority
- Appealing to authority is valid when the authority is actually a legitimate (debatable) authority on the facts of the argument.
- APPEAL TO AUTHORITY — argumentum ad verecundiam
- Often we add strength to our arguments by referring to respected sources or authorities and explaining their positions on the issues we’re discussing. If, however, we try to get readers to agree with us simply by impressing them with a famous name or by appealing to a supposed authority who really isn’t much of an expert, we commit the fallacy of appeal to authority.
- UNC Chapel Hill Writing Center
- Appeal to Authority:
- the authority is not an expert in the field
- experts in the field disagree
- the authority was joking, drunk, or in some other way not being serious
- Stephen Downes, by way of a Stanford University handout
- The fallacy of irrelevant authority is committed when you accept without proper support for his or her alleged authority, a person's claim or proposition as true. Alleged authorities should only be used when the authority is reporting on his or her field of expertise, the authority is reporting on facts about which there is some agreement in his or her field, and you have reason to believe he or she can be trusted. Alleged authorities can be individuals or groups. The attempt to appeal to the majority or the masses is a form of irrelevant authority. The attempt to appeal to an elite or select group is a form of irrelevant authority.
- Texas State Department of Philosophy
- Well, there's nine sources, all directly addressing the question of what an appeal to authority is (or in one case, what a fallacious appeal to authority is) which all state that it is sometimes valid. Some of them are in the article already. One is from FL or Atlanta. You are wrong. It is not always a fallacy. It's worth pointing out yet again that when you bring in any source to support your position you are appealing to an authority. This makes your own argument nothing but a fallacy, by your own admission. Why should anyone listen to someone who's arguing that they're wrong? MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 05:26, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- Aren't these already addressed elsewhere? Skepdic certainly isn't in favor of appeals as general arguments. Your last source says it should only be when "you have reason to believe he or she can be trusted", when it has "proper support", etc. As the sources (including one I just added) on the page talk about, unless that reason and support is independent evidence, you have no non-circular basis for appealing to the authority. Can someone who's wrong be an authority you should presume to be right? Also the sources are necessary because of WP:VNT. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 06:19, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- How about a few more, then?
- We all rely on the advice and counsel of others. Sometimes when we present arguments, we appeal to what experts have said on the matter instead of presenting direct evidence to support the claims that we make. Critical thinking allows for this, for it would be difficult and wasteful to always repeat arguments already made by experts. Thus, many arguments that appeal to some legitimate authority can be construed as strong inductive arguments.
- ...
- ...many arguments that appeal to a legitimate authority are strong inductive arguments...
- Salmon, Merrilee Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (2012) Cengage Learning
- What is wrong with arguing from authority? The short answer is, nothing – if the authority is a good one (for the conclusion in question). The reason why arguing from authority as such is sometimes classified as a fallacy is that it is not distinguished from arguing merely from putative authority.
- ...
- Paying too much attention to the latter kind of case, that of the deliberate, sophistical use of false authority to persuade an opponent, is one thing that leads to the traditional view that arguments from authority are always fallacious. Another is focussing on the case where an arguer (perhaps a solitary one) is indeed convinced of the genuineness and relevance of the authority to which she is appealing but is, in our view, mistaken in that conviction. Each of these pictures of argument from authority mistakes one species of such argument for the genus and, having done so, is unable to account for the obvious fact that we regard some arguments from authority as perfectly good arguments and are right in doing so. In this way they fail to save the phenomena and fail to provide an explanation of them.
- Bire, John & Siegel, Harvey "Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies" Argumentation August 1997, Volume 11, Issue 3 pp277-292
- Fundamentally, the [ad verecundiam] fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who is taken to be an authority but is not really an authority."
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Fallacies
- "...many of our trusted beliefs ... rest quite properly on the say so of others..."
- Gensler, Harry Introduction to Logic (2012) Routledge
Are you contending that these sources are all incorrect? Can you debate it using some evidence other than the sources you quoted? Can you explain why I or anyone else should believe you, when your argument is that your argument is a fallacy? MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 07:07, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- All the first really says is "Hey! It's tough to argue for yourself – so just assume someone else got it right and trust them". The questionableness of that reasoning aside, it's not even an independent argument at that point, it's more of a token that stands for the arguments the authorities are actually making. So the basis of the authority goes back to those arguments – to the evidence. The second source admits that it is "the traditional view that arguments from authority are always fallacious". Wouldn’t that mean, by definition, that the force of most authorities is that it's always fallacious? The third source describes a type of the fallacy the page already discusses. The fourth isn't even talking about an argument. You're simply not listening to me with the "your argument is that you’re wrong" stuff. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 07:27, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- Going along with what your second source said, a new editor brought up http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/authority.html. That also says "Although many logicians today use the Latin phrase “argumentum ad verecundiam” (or often, more simply, the phrase “ad verecundiam”) as the name of a fallacy....historically those phrases were used for appealing to any authority, relevant or otherwise, as evidence in an argument and were not used specifically to denote the fallacy of appealing to evidence provided by an irrelevant or ill-suited authority." So the sources we're seeing agree that the consensus view, historically, has been that this is fallacious reasoning. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 07:35, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
All the first really says is...
So you are contending that your own interpretation overrides what is explicitly stated in every reliable source which defines the term?Going along with what your second source said, a new editor brought up http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/authority.html.
Ahh yes, the one which says "an appeal to the testimony of an authority outside the authority's special field of expertise." after making it explicitly clear that they are defining only the fallacious use of the argument in the opening.That also says "Although many logicians today use the Latin phrase “argumentum ad verecundiam” (or often, more simply, the phrase “ad verecundiam”) as the name of a fallacy....historically those phrases were used for appealing to any authority, relevant or otherwise, as evidence in an argument and were not used specifically to denote the fallacy of appealing to evidence provided by an irrelevant or ill-suited authority." So the sources we're seeing agree that the consensus view, historically, has been that this is fallacious reasoning.
Wait a second... You just quoted the source saying that the phrase historically means any appeal to authority, yet you take that to mean that, historically, the phrase refers only to the fallacy? Did you even bother to read the quote before you copied and pasted it? The quote explains exactly what you don't seem to get: namely that in modern discourse, the term is sometimes used to refer to the argument (which may or may not be a fallacy), and sometimes used to refer to only the fallacies.- Also, I'm still waiting for you to give me even one reason why I should believe you when you continue to argue that your argument is untrustworthy. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 15:30, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- We've already seen a source saying that it has traditionally been considered a fallacy, that reference just supports it. Its not a matter of my interpretations but of the ambiguity of how we'd use that source for the page. Why do you keep talking about how "every source" says its not a fallacy when we have multiple on the page that do just that, including with a direct quote? And I already have addressed what you're saying about me supposedly being contradictory. Per WP:VNT it doesn't matter so much what's true, it matters what the sources say. So I could give evidence and arguments for why this is a fallacy, but it would be irrelevant. All that matters is what the sources say. Like how http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10972-006-9025-4/fulltext.html outright and directly says, as "Common Fallacies to Avoid in Argumentation", one of them is "Appeal to authority", which is done when "Using an authority figure as the primary means of supporting an argument". Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 23:54, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- Further, http://www.geol.utas.edu.au/geography/EIANZ/Ignorance_is_contagious_%28July_2008%29.pdf says the argument from authority fallacy is "Stating that a claim is true because a person or group of perceived authority says it is true", and says it is fallacious because "the truth of a claim should ultimately rest on logic and evidence, not the authority of the person promoting it". Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 00:34, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- Going along with what your second source said, a new editor brought up http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/authority.html. That also says "Although many logicians today use the Latin phrase “argumentum ad verecundiam” (or often, more simply, the phrase “ad verecundiam”) as the name of a fallacy....historically those phrases were used for appealing to any authority, relevant or otherwise, as evidence in an argument and were not used specifically to denote the fallacy of appealing to evidence provided by an irrelevant or ill-suited authority." So the sources we're seeing agree that the consensus view, historically, has been that this is fallacious reasoning. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 07:35, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
- Everyone agrees that appeals to authority can sometimes be fallacious. The question is whether it is always fallacious. Neither of the sources you cite really address this. They both talk generally about how and why an appeal to authority can be fallacious, but neither of them definitively state that they are always fallacious.
- However, even if they did, this is not how you cite sources. If you want to know the answer to a question, you look at the most authoritative sources for the answer. In this case, textbooks, articles written by experts on the subject, and good encyclopedia articles can suffice. Here you instead seem to be looking only for sources that agree with your own view, which is why you are citing articles in obscure journal or online sources, written by non-experts, and on subjects other than the one under discussion.
- The irony here is getting a little thick. You actually are engaged in an appeal to inappropriate authority here, by citing education professors and environmental scientists on a logic question. The correct, non-fallacious appeal to authority in this case would be to appeal to the appropriate authorities on the nature of argumentation, such as logicians or philosophers who have studied this specific topic. Original Position (talk) 02:47, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- @Perfect Orange Sphere: Please read this. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 03:29, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- That's a very busy admin who obviously hadn't read all the relevant discussions, as can be seen with the clear misunderstanding about the video, what it was being used for, and what you said about it above. I rectified those concerns by making it clearer what it is being used as a citation for.
- Also, the argument from authority as you're trying to say it should be used would be deductive reasoning. Your reasoning is "All things an authority says should be assumed to be true. Authorities A say B. Therefore B should be assumed to be true". Is that not deductive reasoning? You wouldn't let any evidence sway you, since you'd appeal to the authority. For all practical intents and purposes, you would be holding B as something logically certain. Even sources that are somewhat in favor of appeals to authority don't treat them like the iron-clad, end-all-be-alls that everyone must presume to be true that you see them as. We have enough reliable sources showing failed appeals to authority or authorities that turned out to be unreliable or outright saying appeals to authorities are fallacious to leave no room for anyone to reasonably argue we should presume an argument from authority means something is correct. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 05:29, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- I think you are confused about the nature of deductive arguments and their relation to certainty (hint: the conclusion of a valid deductive argument is only as certain as its premises), but that is a side-issue. The main question I would like you to answer: Is it possible to make an argument from authority in a non-fallacious manner? If not, then why do so many logic textbooks and other sources say it is possible? Shouldn't we then at minimum revise the article so that it tells the reader that many experts think it is possible? If so, then shouldn't we revise, or allow revisions, to the article to make this clear? Original Position (talk) 07:28, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- I'd agree a good consensus version would be to note that there are a minority of philosophers and the like who argue its only fallacious in certain circumstances. As we've seen so far, sources directly state the traditional and prevailing view is that the appeal is a fallacy - but would a version of the page that discusses the views of that minority be an acceptable version to end the disputes? Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 02:10, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- That is not an acceptable consensus version. The view that there are non-fallacious arguments from authority is not a minority view among philosophers. It is the established consensus of the field, as demonstrated by the fact that the major contemporary logic textbooks make this point explicit (please let me know if you find one that is different). It is also not correct to say that it was traditional to claim that it was always a fallacy. I would suggest you look at the historical background chapter of Walton's Appeal to Expert Opinion (it's at Amazon). There he notes that it has only been regarded as a fallacy within the last few hundred years, while previously it was an accepted part of argumentation. Even since then, major philosophers such as Locke and Bentham in their discussions of this argument have not treated it as always fallacious. Anyway, the main point is that it is now widely acknowledged to not always be fallacious.
- I'd agree a good consensus version would be to note that there are a minority of philosophers and the like who argue its only fallacious in certain circumstances. As we've seen so far, sources directly state the traditional and prevailing view is that the appeal is a fallacy - but would a version of the page that discusses the views of that minority be an acceptable version to end the disputes? Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 02:10, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- I think you are confused about the nature of deductive arguments and their relation to certainty (hint: the conclusion of a valid deductive argument is only as certain as its premises), but that is a side-issue. The main question I would like you to answer: Is it possible to make an argument from authority in a non-fallacious manner? If not, then why do so many logic textbooks and other sources say it is possible? Shouldn't we then at minimum revise the article so that it tells the reader that many experts think it is possible? If so, then shouldn't we revise, or allow revisions, to the article to make this clear? Original Position (talk) 07:28, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- Look, it is obviously your view that the argument from authority is always fallacious. That's fine, believe what you want. But if you want the encyclopedia to reflect this view then you need to produce expert sources writing on the argument from authority that explicitly say this. Not just people who refer to the argument from authority as a fallacy, but who in discussions of this argument claim that it is always fallacious. I've looked through this Talk page and you have not yet done this. Original Position (talk) 05:34, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
That's a very busy admin who...
Fine. I'm trying to help you avoid sanctions by making sure you understand what you're getting into. If you want to ignore me, you have every right.Your reasoning is "All things an authority says should be assumed to be true. Authorities A say B. Therefore B should be assumed to be true".
First, that's not my reasoning. Second, that's not my reasoning. The argument -as it has been explained multiple times- is; "Experts are more likely to be correct about their field of expertise than non-experts. Expert A says B about subject X. Expert A's field of study is X. B is not a contentious claim. Therefore B is likely true." Notice the use of explicit qualifiers and premises. This is the general form as it is given by every authoritative source on the subject, so it is nothing I came up with.You wouldn't let any evidence sway you, since you'd appeal to the authority.
There is NO part of that structure which says anything about ignoring evidence. At no point has anyone even implied that authority trumps evidence. It is extremely dishonest of you to suggest it.For all practical intents and purposes, you would be holding B as something logically certain
Ladies and gentlemen, I present to you: The Non sequitur. To say "X is likely true" is a world apart from saying "X is logically certain."We have enough reliable sources showing failed appeals to authority or authorities that turned out to be unreliable or outright saying appeals to authorities are fallacious to leave no room for anyone to reasonably argue we should presume an argument from authority means something is correct.
I'm going to ask you a question, and it's going to sound insulting, but it's not an insult, it's a rhetorical device.- Do you know how to count? You know, 1... 2... 3...
- The reason I ask is because your argument literally presumes that you don't. I've shown you 14 definitive sources which define the term as a form of argument that is sometimes fallacious. You've presented 2 non-definitive (also, non-expert so by every standard espoused here, your citing of them is a fallacy) sources that use the phrase to refer to the fallacious form of the argument. You are (in more ways than one, as pointed out by both I and Original) arguing that you're wrong. Besides which, this statement explicitly constitutes synthesis, which runs against WP policy. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 13:48, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- If I may, allow me to do something similar: "I'm going to ask you a question, and it's going to sound insulting, but it's not an insult". Would you be willing to let Original Position be the one who does the advocacy for your side and maybe take a back seat for awhile? He makes truly constructive edits like identifying incorrect sources in one of the sections and building consensuses like with him and the IP. I really think this would all go much better with him as the main one involved.
- Anyway, the problem is, saying "if an argument from authority supports X, there is a presumption X is true" is, for every practical intent and purpose, saying it must be believed. What is the difference between saying that and "if an argument from authority supports X, then X is true"? In practical terms, absolutely nothing.
- As for how it trumps evidence, let me ask: is there any belief you hold that you hold in spite of the prevailing view of authorities on the subject because you were convinced by evidence? If so, what is it?
- I've already addressed multiple of your sources, many of them just focus on the most common form the fallacy is encountered in. How are the sources cited non-expert? They're journal and university publications. What you're really saying is that someone who disagrees with your position isn't an expert. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 02:10, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
Would you be willing to let Original Position be the one who does the advocacy for your side and maybe take a back seat for awhile?
No. I have invested time and energy in this article, in an attempt to improve it. I do not intend (and should not be asked) to excuse myself from a discussion simply because you disagree with me. As it stands, even with all the improvements OP has made to it, it is not at all accurate. I do not intend to accede to any demand that I allow one new, not particularly active user shoulder the entire burden of correcting this article. It is not fair to him, nor is it fair to me. You may prefer it, but to be perfectly honest, I would prefer if you would do the same. I'm not asking you to because I have enough respect not to ask you something like that.
Anyway, the problem is, saying "if an argument from authority supports X, there is a presumption X is true" is, for every practical intent and purpose, saying it must be believed. What is the difference between saying that and "if an argument from authority supports X, then X is true"? In practical terms, absolutely nothing.
The difference is that the conclusion of the first is an inductive one, and the conclusion of the second is deductive. Whether you are aware of it or not, it is humanly possible to take something as true while purposefully maintaining an open mind to the possibility of being wrong.
As for how it trumps evidence, let me ask: is there any belief you hold that you hold in spite of the prevailing view of authorities on the subject because you were convinced by evidence? If so, what is it?
No. But that is due to the fact that experts are better than me at interpreting evidence. Every time I have been presented compelling evidence of something which flies in the face of the expert consensus on the subject, I have made an effort to educate myself in at least the very basic principles of the field, then familiarized myself with the evidence as best I can. Each time, without fail, I have changed my mind. That is not to say I don't believe anything that experts themselves don't believe. However, those beliefs are all things the experts should be expected to have no belief on. They involve people and factors that experts have no knowledge of. For instance, I believe one of my coworkers will greet me on Monday morning with a hearty "Good morrow!" yet there is no sociological or psychological consensus on the specific greeting that specific person will make me on Monday, January 11th, 2016. This is also a perfect example of an inductive conclusion: I presume my coworker will greet me that way. I have good reason to believe this. However, I also accept the possibility that he may not. I freely admit that it is possible he will simply mutter "'Morning," to me as he shuffles towards the coffee pot.
I've already addressed multiple of your sources.
You haven't shown how they are not reliable sources. You haven't even implied they aren't, you've simply argued with them. You're sitting here explicitly telling me that legitimate authorities on the subject are wrong, while you (some rando off the internet) are right. I will admit, at least, that this much is consistent with your position, even if your own quoting of sources is completely at odds with your position.
many of them just focus on the most common form the fallacy is encountered in.
Yes, and they do so by explicitly stating that certain conditions must be met to consider it a fallacy. The rest of them explicitly state that certain conditions must be met for it not to be a fallacy. Quite a few of those explicitly state that it is not always a fallacy.
How are the sources cited non-expert? They're journal and university publications.
They are journal and university publications, yes in completely different fields from philosophy.
What you're really saying is that someone who disagrees with your position isn't an expert.
Stop putting words in my mouth. There is a huge difference between saying "None of the experts I've found disagree with me," and "Anyone who disagrees with me is not an expert." MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 04:19, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- I wasn't saying it'd be better to step aside because of any disagreement, it's just that I don't think you're trying to build a consensus or have an NPOV here. There's already been a mediation attempt on this issue that blew through two mediators in the space of a few hours because you didn't trust the mediator - that speaks to the lack of cooperation we're getting here. How can progress get made on the page if someone insists that their version has to be the only version and that's the end of the story? What should have taken hours ("I could live with a page that said X as long as it said Y too" "OK, let's get that made!") is taking days. There's gonna have to be compromise here: what would a version of this article you could at least bear the existence of look like?
- You didn't answer my question: what is the difference between the two when it comes down to practical terms? Like you yourself say, its not only the evidence, but even the interpretation of evidence that's subject to appeals to authority. You're forcing a radical interpretation of authority and its reliability onto sources that talk about the appeal. It goes way beyond "this can be useful when weighing sides in an issue" or "this is not always a fallacy", you're wanting to turn authorities into something like a Magisterium that is beyond doubt, and whose word we must assume is true no matter what - since we must presume they are correct even about interpretations of evidence. Only one single source you've given mentions anything about an automatic presumption authorities are always correct. We have a source given by FL or Atlanta that explicitly says this is a minority, and other sources saying the traditional view is that the argument is a fallacy. If only one source says we have to assume any statement support by the appeals is true, and so many others contradict them, then trusting that source and that source alone violates WP:UNDUE. Perfect Orange Sphere (talk) 05:42, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- Two points about the source you are citing here. First, it is forty years old, so it is no longer an accurate guide to the dominant view in the field today. Second, the position described as the "minority view" in that article is not the one we are discussing. The author is there describing a dispute about how laymen should weigh the relative merits of empirical data and scientific authority. He describes a "vocal minority" who claim that the authority of the scientist should take precedence even over the empirical data. That is an interesting view, but it is not the one being put forward here. Mjolnirpants and I are making no assumptions about the relative weight of these two kinds of arguments (although I would guess that both of us think that empirical data should have more weight than authority). Rather, we are arguing over whether arguments from authority should be taken to have any weight at all. If they are always fallacious, then they shouldn't as they would then add no evidence for the conclusion. But if they are not always fallacious, then they can function as evidence that the conclusion is true.
- You seem to think that Mjolnirpants is arguing for the claim that non-fallacious arguments from authority are definitive arguments proving their conclusions. He is not. Rather, he is arguing that you are not making an error in reasoning if you take as evidence for the claim that you have a cavity that your dentist tells you that you have a cavity. This isn't proof. Obviously you could go to another dentist who tells you the first dentist is wrong, and then shows you pictures proving this. But nonetheless, it is generally taken as a sufficient reason to believe that you have a cavity if your dentist tells you so. It is this kind of argument that all these logic books want to bracket off as non-fallacious arguments from authority. Original Position (talk) 06:48, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- (Edit conflict with Original Position)
You didn't answer my question: what is the difference between the two when it comes down to practical terms?
Let's set aside the fact that I have a laundry list of questions posed to you which you haven't answered and deal with this. The rest, I leave to OP and the admins. - Yes, in fact, I did. You do not posses the necessary grasp of philosophy or logic to understand what I said. Original Position, however, said it in much plainer language: The former is evidence, the latter is proof. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 07:15, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- (Edit conflict with Original Position)
References
- ^ Sadler, Troy (2006). "Promoting Discourse and Argumentation in Science Teacher Education". Journal of Science Teacher Education.
Semmelweiss Example
I started looking through the citations for this case and so far am not finding much support for the story as told in this article. I already edited it a little, but before doing more I wanted to post what I found so if anyone has more expertise they can do it right.
Here are the basic issues: this article states that the rejection of Semmelweis's view was based on an inappropriate appeal to authority. To support this it claims that only a very few supported Semmelwies, that there was no academic literature supporting his view, and that it was this academic consensus against Semmelweis that led to his views being ignored for many years.
However, this view doesn't seem to be upheld by the cited sources. For instance, Carter quotes at length from an Oliver Wendell Holmes article that predates Semmelweis that also puts forward the contagion view, and in fact claims that this is the dominant view at the time. Second, I can't find support in these articles for the claim that the reason Semmelweis's view was rejected was because of an overreliance on authority.
I don't know much about this topic--am I missing something here? Original Position (talk) 15:56, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- I started looking into the sources, and I have to agree with you. The Carter source, which is used to support the statement "Multiple critics stated that they did not accept the claims in part because of the fact that in all the academic literature on puerperal fever there was nothing that supported the view Semmelweis was advancing." does not say that at all. Instead, he writes about opposition to Semmelweiss' claim to have been the first to make this discover, and the importance of the methods Semmelweiss used. In fact, the source admits in the very first paragraph that Oliver Wendell Holmes had published extremely similar findings, and points out that it has been recently said that "...a Finnish physician preceded Semmelweiss in his discovery". Meanwhile this source is about the importance of the laboratory work Semmelweiss did, as opposed to all of the credit going to his clinical work. It is behind a paywall, but the abstract clearly outlines the scope of the work. Even if it did mention appeals to authority, it would necessarily do so as an aside to the focus of the article, and as such, may well have been mistaken.
- A review of the Semmelweiss article's sources paints a different (though similar) picture, as well.
- Semmelweiss' work was announced by Ferdinand Von Hebra in December 1847 and April 1848, and the subsequent publication of some of his findings by his students. However, the issue of the communication of diseases by means of an infectious agent -which explicitly included the transmission from corpse to patient by way of the doctor- was addressed in an 1843 paper by Oliver Wendell Holmes, On The Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever, a paper which was not dismissed at all. In fact, it seems to have been published and quietly accepted by the medical community at the time, though it did spark some controversy in the mid 1850's, either prompting or as a result of his re-publication of the work as a pamphlet.
- Those sources note the specific lines of evidence used to achieve the then-current understanding of disease, and point out that Semmelweiss offered no underlying theory for his discovery, and little evidence which could be used to construct an underlying theory. (this contradicts the narrative in this article, because it shows that his findings were not dismissed entirely based on appeals to authority, but based on a lack of evidence to support them, with plenty of evidence to support the established view.) They point out that no-one really doubted his results (he had implemented changes in his hospital prior to any publication of his work, and thus had concrete results to show), only his explanation of them, by way of those who published on his behalf.
- They also plainly state that much of the initial reaction was to say that his findings were not new, with people pointing to the prior work of Oliver Wendell Holmes and others as already establishing a link between the handling of corpses by doctors and the infection rates of those doctors' patients.
- They point out that Semmelweiss himself never published until 1860, only his students and colleagues published at the time, leading to some misunderstanding about his findings. (This is tied to the protests that his findings were not new, as the misunderstandings were over the specific method of infection.)
- All in all the picture painted by the sources is more one about science's self-correcting apparatus than a cautionary tale about appeals to authority. I'm sure that appeals to authority were used to dismiss his claims by some, but it only appears to be a major part of the narrative in pop culture (to be fair, the portrayal in this article is one I've heard before from pop culture sources). The truth is apparently that there was good reason to not treat his work as the revolutionary change it would eventually become. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 14:49, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- Oops, forgot to sign my comment, thanks for fixing that. The Scholl article has a non-paywall version at the PhilSci Archives here.[1] Your summary seems largely accurate, it doesn't directly say anything about the rejection of Semmelweis being the result of an overreliance on authority. Original Position (talk) 15:56, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
- No problem (sorry for taking so long to respond, by the way). I think we're in agreement that the sources do not support the claims in the article. I'm going to remove all references to this example from the article. This was one which bugged me from the beginning. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 18:47, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- Oops, forgot to sign my comment, thanks for fixing that. The Scholl article has a non-paywall version at the PhilSci Archives here.[1] Your summary seems largely accurate, it doesn't directly say anything about the rejection of Semmelweis being the result of an overreliance on authority. Original Position (talk) 15:56, 9 January 2016 (UTC)
controversy
what about a controversy section to funnel all this into like other pages have? if cites disagree we can make it to our advantage by making that improve a controversy section!
- I moved this up above the references hearing. Controversy sections are sometimes necessary on articles but I doubt that is the case here. ----Snowded TALK 09:50, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- The problem is that there is no controversy among experts on the subject. The other, very good, online philosophy encyclopedias note that not all arguments from authority are fallacious. The major logic textbooks note this. The scholarly literature on the subject notes this. So far, neither Perfect Orange Sphere nor FL or Atlanta have posted a single reference to a contemporary expert on this subject that unequivocally states that all arguments from authority are fallacious.
- I'm willing to change my mind on this. If they can show that there is a real controversy among experts about whether the argument from authority is always or only sometimes fallacious, then let's add a controversy section. But until then, we don't have a good reason to do so. Original Position (talk) 17:22, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- There isn't any such controversy that I'm aware of. There is an unfortunately common misconception among the lay populace, but philosophers all seem to be in agreement. If someone can dig up some sources showing that there are a reasonable number of philosophers (15-20% might be enough, IMHO), then I would support a section about the controversy. I tried to find some sources upon which to build a section on the misconception, but so far, it seems to have been ignored by professional philosophers. Likely because they don't often discuss philosophy with lay people, but with other experts. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 17:45, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
One thing that occurs to me which might be a step towards the other side would be to note in the lead that the fallacy is often referred to by the same name as the argument. We have pretty much irrefutable evidence of this with the links the other side provided, however using those to support such a statement would be synthesis. We'd need to find a source which says that the fallacy is often referred to by the same name as the argument. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 17:55, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- For instance, here is the entry from Reese's Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion:
- "The Argument from Authority...is the fallacy committed in appealing to the feeling of respect people have for the famous in order to win their assent to a conclusion. Not every appeal to authority commits this fallacy, but every appeal to an authority with respect to matters outside his special province commits the fallacy." (1980, 168)
- I think we might have a use/mention error here. This source says that the Argument from Authority is the name of a fallacy which afflicts some, but not all arguments/appeals from authority. This is obviously confusing and so it is understandable that some might think that when an expert says that the Argument from Authority is a fallacy that they are saying all arguments from authority are fallacious, even if the expert only means to refer to the specifically fallacious versions of those kinds of arguments.
- The correct way to fix this would be to include a sentence noting that some modern logic textbooks refer to this fallacy as "The Argument from Inappropriate Authority" or something to disambiguate it from the category: argument from authority.Original Position (talk) 19:24, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- That might work. I think maybe having a section on fallacious uses that opens with that might be the way to go. Do you agree? MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 21:34, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
Another thing I notice is that Perfect Orange Sphere is correct about the "dismissal of evidence" section being unsourced and possibly warranting removal as he did with this edit. Indeed, though I've seen that exact structure being used, I don't think I've ever seen it referenced as a fallacious example. I'm not even sure it is. After all, that is the form of "If aliens built the pyramids and put hieroglyphics on them depicting this, every egyptologist would know about it. Since no serious egyptologist asserts that aliens built the pyramids, those hieroglyphics that you are showing me must either be either forgeries or misinterpreted." I contend without reservation that this argument is both valid (the conclusions necessarily follow from the premises) and sound (the conclusion is valid and the premises are true), albeit in an inductive, not deductive sense. I may be wrong, however, which is why I'm raising it here. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 18:41, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
John Locke claim in history section
I can't access the source given, and I can't find (with an admittedly brief search) any other source to support this, and I find it a bit fishy. I seem to recall some classical Greek Philosophers mentioning the appeal to authority, which would certainly predate anything by John Locke. Can anyone confirm or refute this for me with? MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 21:50, 10 January 2016 (UTC)
- Sorry I don't the Hamblin book in front of me anymore, I read it in the library. However, here is from Walton's Appeal to Expert Opinion': (p.33-4)
- "What then happened to make [the argument from authority] a fallacy? There are two things to be taken into account. The first factor is that Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), claimed to have invented the expression argumentum ad verecundiam, using the term to refer to a distinctive species of argumentation where one party in dispute tries to exploit the respect of the other party in order for an established authority to make him submit to the first party's argument. There is no evidence that anyone prior to Locke used the expression argumentum ad veredundiam in this way, to refer to a distinctive type of argumentation of this kind, so we presume Locke did in fact invent this phrase."
- and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
- "It is John Locke who is credited with intentionally creating a class of ad-arguments, and inadvertently giving birth to the class of ad-fallacies. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), he identified three kinds of arguments, the ad verecundiam, ad ignorantiam, and ad hominem arguments, each of which he contrasted with ad judicium arguments which are arguments based on “the foundations of knowledge and probability” and are reliable routes to truth and knowledge."
- If you look through the rest of that chapter in Walton you'll see that while there were discussions of the argument from authority in Ancient and Medieval philosophy, it wasn't then classified as a fallacy. Original Position (talk) 00:03, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
- Also, fwiw, there is some debate over whether the argumentum ad verecundiam identified by Locke should be identified with the typical Argument from Authority fallacy referred to in this article. So the historical story is definitely more complicated than what I put into the article. Original Position (talk) 00:10, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
- Ahh, thank you. I was misreading the section as saying that John Locke was the first to discuss the veracity of appealing to experts. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 00:46, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
- Also, fwiw, there is some debate over whether the argumentum ad verecundiam identified by Locke should be identified with the typical Argument from Authority fallacy referred to in this article. So the historical story is definitely more complicated than what I put into the article. Original Position (talk) 00:10, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
Argument from authority as a statistical syllogism.
The argument from authority is referred to in the opening paragraph and in the section on it's general form as being a statistical syllogism. This is problematic in a couple ways. First, and most obviously, it says this in the section on General Form:
As a statistical syllogism, the argument has the following basic structure:
X holds that A is true.
X is an authority on the subject.
The consensus of authorities agrees with X.
There is a presumption that A is true.
The problem here is that this is not a statistical syllogism. Statistical syllogisms are like deductive syllogisms except they use percentage based quantifiers (or terms like "most," "few," etc) in the general premise. There is no such premise in the argument above. This is probably the result of a mashup of two earlier edits, one using the form of the argument as given in Gensler's The A to Z of Logic (the cited source), but the idea that its general form is that of a statistical syllogism from Salmon's Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking. However, note that Salmon, in calling it a statistical syllogism claimed its general form was this:
Most of what authority a has to say on subject matter S is correct.
a says p about S
p is correct
That is a statistical syllogism. So if we are going to continue calling it a statistical syllogism, we should substitute Salmon's version of its general form for Gensler's.
The second problem is that the page is not consistent in its description of the argument's form. It says in the section on General Form that it has many forms, of which the statistical syllogism is one. But in the opening paragraph it is less measured, stating without reservation that it is a statistical syllogism.
I looked at a few sources and this seems to be the lay of the land. There have been a number of different attempts to capture the logic of arguments from authority of which the statistical syllogism proposal by Salmon is just one. It is prominent enough to end up in a major logic textbook, but doesn't seem to be the consensus view based on the variety of different ways it is presented in other logic textbooks (such as Gensler's or Walton's). Furthermore, in Walton's book he listed three different general attempts to categorize these arguments: deductive, inductive, and presumptive. Salmon's is a specific inductive interpretation, but I can't find support for the idea that it is the dominant one.
Thus, I would suggest removing the claim that it is a statistical syllogism from the opening paragraph. I would suggest going with Gensler's version (or Walton's) in the General Form section while also clarifying that it is only one of several proposals for the general form of the argument (I prefer using Gensler's and Walton's vs. Salmon's because I think it is easier to understand for most people who probably don't know what a statistical syllogism is). Original Position (talk) 04:42, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
This is probably the result of a mashup of two earlier edits
It was. I wasn't sure if the implication (that the authority is usually right, instead of always right) needed to be spelled out to make it a statistical syllogism, so I left the phrase in. Perhaps adding in another form in the general section might be appropriate. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 13:36, 11 January 2016 (UTC)- Here is the definition of statistical syllogism from Salmon's book:
- "The statistical syllogism is an inductive form that closely resembles the deductive form of syllogism, but its general premiss is a statistical generalization rather than a universal generalization." (111)
- So I think we do need to keep it in if we are going to refer to this argument as a statistical syllogism, otherwise it would be some other type of inductive argument. I've also thought about adding another form to the General Form section. Here is the issue. Probably the most accurate thing to do would be to say that there is disagreement among contemporary scholars as to the exact logical structure of arguments from authority. This disagreement might in part be because there are numerous different forms it can take, or because these are actually normative attempts at constructing this argument. Then list a few of the more prominent attempts at capturing the logic of the argument with a brief explainer for each of them.
- My concern would be that this would be too much information for an encyclopedia article. You have more experience here than I, so your judgement is probably better about that. On the other hand, three examples is probably more than we need to illustrate the argument, it might be good to tilt the article back a bit more towards theory. Original Position (talk) 18:15, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
- That sounds overall like a good idea. There's no real principle against putting too much information in, especially when that information may be used by a layman. For instance, I could clearly see two neckbeards arguing in youtube comments over what the precise formal structure of the appeal to authority is. One side says it must include the clause that the authority is espousing the consensus, while the other insists that it's not, because he might be speaking about his particular speciality, about which there is no formal consensus.
- There is one problem I see, which is the problem of synthesis of information. While we do have two reliable sources which give different forms of the argument, we don't (to my knowledge) have a source which explicitly says that there is some controversy over the specific form. Now, that's apparently true, but it's still against WP policy. The reason for this is because one of those sources might represent a a minority view (after all, for there to be any dissent from the consensus, there must be experts who hold the minority view), or because one of those sources may have made a mistake, and would actually agree with the other, were it brought to the author's attention, or for any of a hundred other reasons. I've seen the former example happen here, where an editor was making edits to the String theory article, using a reliable source about Loop quantum gravity. They were making the article state certain conclusions which arise naturally from LQG, but which were mutually exclusive with the conclusions of ST and introducing a conundrum to any reader who put serious thought into it. I've seen the latter situation happen as well, though not here. So I think we should at least try to find a source which states there are different forms of the argument, then put a few of those in the article to illustrate the difference. MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 20:52, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
I saw you deleted that sentence about it being a statistical syllogism, which is good. The cited sources didn't really support it and it was too unambiguous. However, I did find this source in which Walton says clearly that Salmon considers it a statistical syllogism. It's never explicitly stated, but strongly implied that Salmon considers it to always be a statistical syllogism. (in case you don't want to go over it, the source is arguing against Salmon, putting forth that it's not a statistical syllogism because the conditions under which the statistical clauses are formed are not themselves statistical in nature, making the statistical clause a binary one. I don't buy this argument, but I -of course- defer to the judgement of philosophers and let them argue the case for me). This might be something we want to put in there, maybe as a quick one-off sentence, such as "The argument is sometimes said to be a form of statistical syllogism, because it can be formulated such that the authority is likely correct, though this is not universally accepted.[2]" MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 13:35, 13 January 2016 (UTC)
- Added Salmon's version to the Logical Form section.Original Position (talk) 18:27, 16 January 2016 (UTC)
References
- ^ http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9556/
- ^ Walton, Douglas (Nov 1, 2010). Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority. Penn State Press. pp. 100–101. Retrieved 13 January 2016.
Presumption
Since some people seem to be some confused about this, Walton is not ambiguous about what he means by "presumption." I discuss this at length with quotations from Walton [here.] A presumption that p means that we have a defeasible conclusion that p and the burden of proof is on those who claim ~p. Since Walton and Gensler are the main sources for that formulation of the argument from authority, if that is what they mean by "presumption," then that is what our article should mean as well. That is also (roughly) the sense of presumption in the linked wiki page. Original Position (talk) 02:10, 4 February 2016 (UTC)
Are legitimate arguments from authority evidence?
MjolnirPants and PerfectOrangeSphere added this to the General Form section:
Arguments from authority are generally not considered a form of evidence, but rather a reason to believe a statement.
I deleted PerfectOrangeSphere's initial edit because it went beyond the cited article in claiming that arguments from authority don't provide proof of a claim. "Proof" is a notoriously misused concept among non-academics, as what constitutes proof is generally taken to be domain-specific (that is, a scientific proof that p wouldn't count as a mathematical proof that p). So POS might be right about arguments from authority, but that claim isn't supported in Hardwig's article.
There are a couple of problems with the amended edit. First, Hardwig doesn't claim that arguments from authority are not a form of evidence (indeed he says they are evidence), but rather that they are evidence for a different claim. For example, suppose you wanted to know whether free trade increases GDP growth. Hardwig would say that an appeal to the opinion of economists that it does isn't evidence that free trade increases GDP growth. Instead, it is evidence for the claim that economists have conducted the inquiry necessary to have evidence for believing that free trade increases GDP growth.
So at minimum we should clarify that if we are going to include this here. The contrast drawn here between reasons and evidence isn't accurate as it stands.
Second, I think MjolnirPants's concern that this is not a consensus view is warranted. While I am not knowledgeable enough on the subject to know what current views are, the literature does indicate disagreement, including from at least one very prominent philosopher. The main controversy seems to be over whether we should really regard someone who relies on authority as the reason to accept p doesn't have evidence that p (e.g. see Ben Almassi in "Experts, Evidence, and Epistemic Independence" and Frederick Schmitt in "On the Road to Social Epistemic Interdepedence.").
Anyway, some interesting stuff here on testimony and the different kind of reason for p that expert opinion can give versus direct evidence, but we need to work this out a bit more first imo. Original Position (talk) 18:57, 9 February 2016 (UTC)
- I don't think there's any working out to do. I think what you've said is a better way of stating it than my re-write, and if at least one other person thinks that Hardwig is speaking his own views and not a consensus view, then I say we attribute the statement to him. I'll change it right now, let me know what you think (or go in and fix it further if you like, I'm not very protective of my writing, just the accuracy of the article). MjolnirPants Tell me all about it. 20:16, 9 February 2016 (UTC)