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Acceptance of incompatibilism

The article states:

Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defence, with its implicit incompatibilism…

Yet Compatibilism and incompatibilism:

  • seems to indicate that compatibilism has widespread support:

Compatibilism, as championed by the ancient Greek Stoics, Hobbes, Hume and many contemporary philosophers…

  • and that it is compatibilism that tends to be supported by theists (see 'Compatibilism in Theology' section) and little indication (just discussion of CS Lewis & indeterminism) that incompatibilism and theism overlap.

This seems rather incongruous. HrafnTalkStalk(P) 16:12, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Interesting. Meister (2009) is specific in that most philosophers accept Plantinga's argument, and Peterson (1991) says that incompatibilism is implicit in Plantinga's defense. My guess is that the contradiction is due to the poorly sourced nature of the compatibilism article. Gabbe (talk) 18:53, 28 August 2009 (UTC)
This appears to be WP:SYNTH. Meister does not say that they accept incompatibilism, only that they accept the argument. You are synthesising that they accept incompatibilism from the combination of Meister & Peterson. HrafnTalkStalk(P) 19:23, 28 August 2009 (UTC)
All that Meister says on incompatibilism is "As long as it is logically possible that incompatibilism is true, then the necessary conclusion of the logical problem of evil is undercut." HrafnTalkStalk(P) 19:26, 28 August 2009 (UTC)
Meister doesn't, but Peterson does. Peterson says that "Many contemporary philosophers accept that Plantinga's free will defense, with its implicit incompatibilism, is a strong and effective response to the logical problem of evil" and Meiser says that "Currently, however, most philosophers have agreed that the free will defense has defeated the logical problem of evil". Since Peterson was written two decades ago, and Meiser is from this year, I thought that it was OK to write "Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defence, with its implicit incompatibilism". Do you have a suggestion how to reword to avoid the synthesis? Gabbe (talk) 20:28, 28 August 2009 (UTC)
I've reworded to avoid implying that most philosophers accept incompatibilism. Gabbe (talk) 04:18, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Gabbe

  1. I think your current rewording is probably the optimal.
  2. If we wanted "implicit incompatibilism" in, we'd probably have to cite purely to Peterson, as Meister appears to be saying that (full-blown certainty of) incompatibilism is not implicit in the argument, merely that the logical possibility of it is.

Incidentally, the opening sentence of Plantinga's defense appears to be loaded with explicit & implicit assumptions:

  1. That free will exists
  2. That free will is more valuable than the lack of it
  3. Explicitly that "all else [is] equal" (clearly untrue) and implicitly that the value of free will is greater than the disvalue of the amount of evil observable
  4. That the observable amount of evil is the minimum required for the existence of free will (i.e. that it is not possible to conceive of a world with free will with less evil than the current -- which appears to be a fairly heroic assumption)

Has there been any discussion of these assumptions in the literature? HrafnTalkStalk(P) 05:49, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

I think what both Meister and Peterson are saying is that "Plantinga has argued that if incompatibilism is logically possible, then it is logically possible that God and evil both exist", rather than "Plantinga has shown that incompatibilism is true".
Regarding the assumptions, I did think about them, but I couldn't find anything in Meister/Peterson, nor in Plantinga's summary. I'll see if I can find an elucidation on the matter in God, Freedom, and Evil when I get the time to go to the library. Gabbe (talk) 09:34, 29 August 2009 (UTC)
The question "Is God's Existence Compatible with the Amount of Moral Evil the World Contains?" is given its own subchapter in Plantinga (1974), but it gets a bit technical. To wit:

The following, however, is possible. There is an action A, a maximal world segment S´ and a member E of S such that

(a) E contains the properties: is significantly free with respect to A in W´ and goes right with respect to A in W´
(b) S´ is included in W´ and includes E's being instantiated, but includes neither E's instantiation's performing A nor E's instantiation's refraining from A

and

(c) if S´ had been actual, E's instantiation would have gone wrong with respect to A.

If this possibility is actual, then God could not have actualized W´.

And so on. I did add Plantinga's own counterargument regarding Mackie and Flew's compatibilism argument to the article, but I haven't yet found an explication regarding the value of free will. Gabbe (talk) 08:31, 2 September 2009 (UTC)
Looks more than a little obtuse. The more I think about it, the more difficulty I have in viewing 'incompatibilist free will' as either meaningful or valuable. Incompatibilist 'free will' cannot have its basis in deterministic influences (knowledge, beliefs, instincts, emotions, etc -- anything that can be reduced to neurons firing/brain chemistry/etc), so must be either random (e.g. the influence of quantum fluctuations) and/or externally generated (God/the devil made me do it). I have difficulty seeing either as particularly 'free' or morally valuable. I know that lacking a RS, this is effectively OR. But it seems odd to me that no philosopher has noticed what would appear to be fairly obvious flaws. But even apart from that, I think an article on an argument that is based on an incompatibilist interpretation of free will needs to give the reader some understanding of what 'incompatibilist free will' would look like -- particularly as none of the related articles seem to do so. HrafnTalkStalk(P) 09:57, 2 September 2009 (UTC)
Is the viewpoint that Plantinga is taking Libertarianism (metaphysics)? The chart in the article appears to be implying so. HrafnTalkStalk(P) 10:14, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Some problems

Before marking this a Good Article, a couple of things should be resolved. The article starts off stating that Augustine's theodicy is widely criticized, but it doesn't make clear how Plantinga improved on it. The summary of Plantinga's argument seems very generic. More specifially, I'm not happy with the following statements:

  1. "The argument says that it is possible (or possibly true) that God would create a world of free creatures, who chose to do evil." This is just a plain truism. The argument really needs to show that God could not have done otherwise.
  2. As Mackie asked: "Why could [God] not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?" Indeed, that is precisely what Transworld Depravity was supposed to address. I believe (but I'm not sure) this is completely orthogonal to concerns about compatibilism. The free will defense relies on a libertarian notion of free will, but even granted incompatibilism, one may wonder why God could not have actualized a world where agents freely choose only the good, a world in which, to use a religious language, people are only tested to their limits. Plantinga's real contribution, I thought, was to argue that God could not actualize such a world.
  3. Some criticism is lacking. Michael Tooley's insistence on the concrete logical problems of evil. Marilyn McCord Adams refers to this as the Logical Problem of Horrendous Evil. Then, David Kellogg Lewis accounts of selective freedom. A good summary of critique is available in this article by Derk Pereboom.
  4. Acceptance. This article includes three sentences about the widespread acceptance of the defense. Furthermore, the sources used here, with the notable exception of William Rowe, are committed theists. It would strengthen the neutrality of the article to include the assessments from atheist philosophers of religion as well, e.g., Graham Oppy's "Arguing About Gods", p. 262, where he admits that most philosophers "seem to suppose" the logical argument is refuted, but adds "I do not think this is an accurate assessment of the current state of play." He goes on to argue that Plantinga's defense is inconsistent and relies on controversial assumptions.

Hope this helps, Vesal (talk) 09:41, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

I haven't been working on this article, but I agree with your points. Well, all your points except for 1), that is. :) Plantinga doesn't need to show that God could not have done otherwise, as that would entail a traditional theodicy. Instead he just needs to offer a logical possibility. If his new premise held (that moral good entails moral evil) then it would follow that there is a case where the presence of (moral) evil would not logically deny the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God, and thus the logical problem of evil would no longer be a disproof. This lessens the burden of proof for Plantinga. - Bilby (talk) 14:43, 21 September 2009 (UTC)
Yes, you're absolutely right. I shouldn't have said it like that, but the phrasing in the article feels a bit empty. I will try to fix it. This is a minor issue, though. The most critical thing would be to say something about transworld depravity. It really can't be evaded if this is to be a Good Article on Plantinga's Defense. Vesal (talk) 21:11, 22 September 2009 (UTC)
I agree there. It might also be worth mentioning the transworld sanctity response. I'm inclined to suggest that some coverage of Leibniz's lapse would be valuable as well. Even though it is commonly accepted that omnipotence doesn't mean doing the logically impossible, a formal statement of such seems valuable to Plantinga in forming the groundwork. - Bilby (talk) 22:17, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Plantinga's actual argument isn't really touched on by this article. Wes Morriston sums it up here: http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/wes/plantfwd.html While the language is technical, this stuff belongs in the article. This article has more details on the criticisms of the FWD than on the actual argument! This is why I believe this article needs serious expansion. 88.68.118.143 (talk) 17:29, 24 October 2009 (UTC)

GA Review

This review is transcluded from Talk:Plantinga's free will defense/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Jezhotwells (talk) 16:39, 11 November 2009 (UTC)

GA review (see here for criteria)
  1. It is reasonably well written.
    a (prose): b (MoS):
    In a truncated form, Plantinga's argument goes something like this: Could this be reworded in a more encyclopaedic manner - e.g. Plantinga's argument can be summarized as:
    Lead: can we have one sentence summarising the position of those who oppose this idea. The lead should adequately summarize the whole artcile which it does not do at the moment.
  2. It is factually accurate and verifiable.
    a (references): b (citations to reliable sources): c (OR):
    I accept all references to print sources in good faith as I cannot check them. The Harvard citation template used {{harvnb}} doesn't seem to work as documented at Template:Harvard citation no brackets. Reading User:RexxS/Cite multiple pages. It might be to do with the naming of the inline citations. Can this be sorted as currently nothing happens when you click on the wiki links, but in fact one should be taken to the citation fo teh summarized work. Fixed the Harvard referencing. It needed the addition of |ref=harv into the target cite book or journal.
  3. It is broad in its coverage.
    a (major aspects): b (focused):
  4. It follows the neutral point of view policy.
    Fair representation without bias:
  5. It is stable.
    No edit wars, etc.:
  6. It is illustrated by images, where possible and appropriate.
    a (images are tagged and non-free images have fair use rationales): b (appropriate use with suitable captions):
  7. Overall:
    Pass/Fail:
    Some attention to the lead and making the Havard inline citations work corrcetly. On hold for seven days.
    Thanks for fixing my concerns. I am happy to pass this as worthy of GA status. A good concise and clear explanation of a tent of philosophy. Jezhotwells (talk) 14:32, 13 November 2009 (UTC)

Acceptance again

The section claims that Plantinga's argument is widely accepted. There are some references said to be supporting this claim, but they are not quoted. The people actually quoted are partisan sources (in so far as they were on Plantinga's side anyway). Some doubt is shed by the last quote, but then, nothing is really said in it.

The section and the article (as well as other parts of the Wikipedia) completely misses Mackie's answer - or rebuttal - in The Miracle of Theism. Other aspects of the reception are left out, too. I fail to see the neutrality in that. -- Zz (talk) 00:23, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Do you have non-partisan sources saying that Plantinga's argument is not accepted by most philosophers? If not, this feels like a moot point. Meister 2009 explicitly says that the argument is accepted by most philosophers, as does Gutting 2009. I'll look up more exact quotes from them if you'd like. The quotes by specific philosophers are merely meant to reflect this range of opinion. Believe me, I've tried looking for standard textbooks by big university presses saying that Plantinga's argument is hotly contested by scores of other philosophers, but there doesn't seem to be any reliable sources to this effect.
That being said, I'll see if I can find a copy of The Miracle of Theism. Gabbe (talk) 05:57, 21 April 2010 (UTC)
The burden of proof lies on the side asserting something. After checking Gutting and Meister, I rate them as partisan sources as well. Giving one partisan source is ok, as it reflects philosophical debate. But listing partisan sources only is clearly POV.
The Miracle of Theism is a well known work. Even theists like Swinburne rate it as Mackie's magnum opus. I do not trust sources that do not at least address Mackie's answer. It works basically like this: Creating beings with transworld depravity is not logically necessary, but contingent. So god, without need, creates beings condemned to do evil. Complete failure. -- Zz (talk) 12:30, 3 May 2010 (UTC)
What do you mean when you say that Gutting and Meister are "partisan"? They're typical textbooks published by well-renowned presses, is that insufficient? Anyway, if you have suggestions for other reliable secondary sources with contrasting opinions regarding FWD's acceptance among philosophers I'd gladly welcome them, I'm just saying I haven't been able to locate any. Furthermore, regarding the quotes there are as many of them from detractors (Rowe and Oppy) as from proponents (Alston and Adams). Gabbe (talk) 14:21, 3 May 2010 (UTC)
You can be an established philosopher with books by renowned publishing houses and yet clearly be on one side of a philosophical debate. It is quite telling that all your sources are this. And I have already pointed to other views exactly where one would look for them, namely the opposing side of the debate, in this case Mackie. It seems your secondary sources do not even mention that. If they really missed that, they would not be scientific. Do they? And with Mackie's book, you have a pointer to a lot of further literature. -- Zz (talk) 16:36, 3 May 2010 (UTC)
Oh, I thought you were disputing the statement "Most philosophers accept Plantinga's argument". As I said, I haven't found any secondary sources saying that most philosophers do not accept Plantinga's argument, and neither have you provided any. Whether the secondary sources that are cited in the article (ie. Meister, Gutting and Peterson) are "on Plantinga's side" is irrelevant, as long as theirs is the dominant view among philosophers there's no violation of WP:NPOV. Without sources contradicting them (ie. secondary sources that say Plantinga's argument is not widely accepted) we can't just assume that they're wrong, can we? Also, Peterson 1991 (p. 130-133) does address Mackie's objection at length, and still concludes that most philosophers accept the FWD as a persuasive response to the logical problem of evil. Anyway, as I said, I'll try to find a copy of The Miracle of Theism and see if I can get around to including more details of Mackie's argument(s) against the FWD to the Criticism-section. Gabbe (talk) 17:09, 3 May 2010 (UTC)
We are making progress. It is nice to hear that at least one of the sources addresses Mackie's answer. I am careful when statements about numbers come from one side of the debate only, but as long as it is is attributed to the source, it should not be a problem. I suspect the numbers might be different in European philosophy, but I have no numbers anyway. As for English language philosophers still disagreeing with Plantinga, there are Quentin Smith and Raymond Bradley. -- Zz (talk) 17:51, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

From one of the articles that is cited where you got most of the quotes from they state that they will go on to argue against Plantinga's defense. So how is this acceptance? 94.170.104.189 (talk) 19:14, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

Neither this article nor that source claim that all philosophers accept the FWD, but they do claim that most philosophers accept the FWD. Gabbe (talk) 21:02, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

Validity of Meister as a source

I've started a discussion of this edit at this place. Please take any discussion there rather than here. Gabbe (talk) 07:52, 7 June 2010 (UTC)

Argument

I quote the following arguments in the article and my comments are found under each argument, numbered accordingly :

1.There are possible worlds that even an omnipotent being can not actualize. 

    1.1. This is acceptable if and only if what God creates does not defeat or nullify His own nature or
         existence.

2.A world with morally free creatures producing only moral good is such a world. 

    2.1. Following from 1.1., this imagined world does not defeat or nullfiy God's nature or existence,
         hence, God can create it.
    2.2. What may constrain God from creating such a world is that it defeats its very concept or purpose.
         But as an omnipotent being, He can actualize.
    2.3. It is not impossible that morally free creatures can attain a point wherein their actions are
         consistently morally upright. If we have to cite the Scriptures, there are individuals there
         whom God called righteous, Prophet Job, for example. This means that they were able to produce
         moral good only out of free choice.

These 2 arguments denies God's omnipotence on another ground and despite the Scriptural evidence, doubts man's ability to be morally upright consistently. In short, these arguments clearly run counter to Christian theology.

Montenegro620 (talk) 09:03, 22 August 2010 (UTC)

Interesting. However, this talk page is for discussing ways to improve the article (preferably sourced ones), not a general discussion page on the topic. See WP:NOTAFORUM, WP:TALK and WP:V. Gabbe (talk) 16:12, 22 August 2010 (UTC)
Not bad. I do wish that this defense got more attention, if not just so could have more sources for more arguments like this and responses. If you got this from a credible source, you should consider putting it in the article. 68.227.169.133 (talk) 19:30, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Annoyance

I'm a bit annoyed with the definite wording of article , i.e. that Plantinga "solved the problem" , which he obviously did not . There is only proposition that free world with evil is somehow better than world without freedom and evil , but no proof of it . Also , whole concept of "greater good" in incompatible with concept of perfect good (God being perfectly good) . Even more so , Plantiga only demonstrated that God cannot be omnipotent because he need to tolerate certain degree of evil in order to achieve freedom . —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.30.188.198 (talk) 19:51, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

Feel free to make any changes to the article that you think would be improvements, but be prepared to discuss here if you get reverted. See, for example, WP:BRD as well as policies such as WP:V and WP:NOR. Gabbe (talk) 07:03, 30 August 2010 (UTC)
The part that says that it is "solved" is a quote. It's a pretty flawed defense, to be sure, and the acceptance section might be able to use a bit of refining. You also might note the introduction. 68.227.169.133 (talk) 19:23, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Most philosophers accept it?

Does anyone have the actual text that backs up the claim of a majority? All I see is the implication and statement that many do (as Oppy says). That's quite a difference from most. Just asking, really. I just find it curious that there are both 3 critics (including Oppy in the acceptance section) and 3 whom seem to accept it. I also somewhat take issue with the idea that most accept it, as just before the section, it states clearly that it doesn't account for the problem of natural evil, which is almost contradictory with it having been "thoroughly rebutted" since it leaves a significant gap. I accept that it's probably the case, but just out of curiosity. Really, I'd just like to see the actual wording that backs this up this assertion if it's available. 68.227.169.133 (talk) 10:08, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Meister 2009 says that "Most philosophers have agreed that the free will defense has defeated the logical problem of evil" and "Because of [Plantinga's argument], it is now widely accepted that the logical problem of evil has been sufficiently rebutted" as cited in the article. Gutting 2009 and Peterson 1991 say the same thing, more or less. I will look up their exact wording. Also, Rowe and Oppy don't say that they accept the argument themselves, they merely take note of the argument's general acceptance among philosophers — a quite different thing. Gabbe (talk) 09:33, 16 September 2010 (UTC)
Also, the article is supposed to present multiple sides of an issue simultaneously in a balanced fashion. That is the reason why the article quotes non-theists like Mackie, Flew, Rowe and Oppy in addition to theists like Alston and Adams. Gabbe (talk) 09:53, 16 September 2010 (UTC)
But most philosophers are compatibilists. Platinga's argument requires incompatibilism. So either most philosophers don't agree with Plantinga's argument, or there is something seriously screwy going in on the world of philosophy. My guess is that it's the former; the sources you quote are wrong, most philosophers don't agree with Plantinga's argument, although most philosophers of religion might. TiC (talk) 12:38, 20 November 2010 (UTC)
Your argument is interesting and I would like to see it added to the article. However, it can't be included unless there's a source, such as a textbook (or similar) saying that "most philosophers are compatibilists" or "most philosophers don't agree with Plantinga's argument" or something along those lines. I've looked hard for such sources, but haven't been able to locate them. Do you know of any? Gabbe (talk) 18:16, 20 November 2010 (UTC)
Yeah, I agree. It's an WP:OR argument, no way around that -- can't explicitly include it in the article. To the extent that the article discusses compatibilism generally, it might be appropriate to point out how philosophical opinion breaks down on that issue.
Info about philosophers' positions can be found in the PhilPapers survey of philosophers. There are inherent questions of selection and response bias, so I wouldn't take exact numbers as definitive statements of "philosophic consensus." But they found that 59% of respondents accepted or leaned towards compatibilism, compared with only 14% libertarianism. But those numbers are almost reversed among philosophers of religion -- 26% and 58% respectively. So that's what lead me to speculate that there is a break between philosophers of religion and philosophers more generally. TiC (talk) 22:43, 20 November 2010 (UTC)
I think you're definitely on to something, but I wouldn't feel comfortable including the PhilPapers survey (a primary source) in the article without a good secondary source backing it up — especially since the survey doesn't mention Plantinga's argument explicitly. As I said before, all claims that the FWD supposedly has such wide acceptance have always seemed rather strange to me, but I've been unable to locate decent secondary sources indicating otherwise. Gabbe (talk) 10:29, 21 November 2010 (UTC)

Hi there, I'm new to wikipedia so be quick to tell me if I'm missing something. One of the books cited as source for the acceptance of this FWD is Chad Meister's "Introducing Philosophy of Religion", seeing as Chad Meister is a Christian person who is the Professor of Philosophy in a Christian college, would this not count as a confirmation bias? Mightygethol (talk) 13:14, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Not necessarily. For example, in the article on Evolution, we might quote a source saying that "Evolution is widely accepted among biologists". If the person behind the source happens to be one of those himself, that would not—by itself—speak against the validity of the statement they're making. Gabbe (talk) 14:57, 13 May 2011 (UTC)
There is an essential flaw in that comparison: it is right that it need not be confirmation bias when a biologist says that evolution is generally accepted among biologists. But the point is exactly that we will find many other biologists accepting evolution - a corroboration of the claim. And this would be noted by people on the other side of general argument as well. The sources given for the claim that most people agree with Plantinga, however, are all from the Christian side of the argument.
I have no idea on which base Chad Meister founds his claim. But I remember that back at my university the pretty much atheist and naturalist philosophy department saw Mackie's argument as a refutation. -- Zz (talk) 15:44, 4 April 2012 (UTC)
If there's an improvement (based on a reliable, published source) that you would like to make to the article, don't hesitate to do so! :) Gabbe (talk) 20:49, 4 April 2012 (UTC)
I saw that coming, and in its way, it is fair. I aim at something different, though, that makes me feel uneasy. Namely, it started with the claim that most philosophers see the logical problem of evil as refuted. Then, it showed that the source for this claim consisted entirely of American philosophers from the Christian side of the argument, one of which was a even a fellow faculty member of Plantinga's. So, other sources were looked for which might or might not invalidate the claim, adding a layer of information in the article. But that is not the right way to get rid of a bias, assuming it has existed in the first place.
I'd wish I knew a better approach. -- Zz (talk) 13:09, 5 April 2012 (UTC)

Merely verbal

Regarding this request for clarification: I think what Plantinga means is that Flew's argument has nothing to do with logic or reality, it is "merely verbal". I believe what he is asking for is not so much a "non-verbal objection", as one which (in Plantinga's view) is more than just a combination of words. Gabbe (talk) 16:28, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

The reasoning in the clarification tag was maybe not the most helpful... What really needs clarification, however, is the context: what exactly is Flew's objection? That paragraph only talks about compatibilism where Mackie and Flew are discussed together. We then state what Plantinga thinks of compatibilism, but the last sentence reads as if some specific (and distinct) critique of Flew has been discussed, doesn't it? Vesal (talk) 22:28, 21 May 2011 (UTC)
Ah, OK. I think that quote appears at the end of a long diatribe against Flew's argument, the whole point of which (if I recall correctly) was that Plantinga insists that compatibilism is bonkers. I'll see if I can skip past the library and have another look. Gabbe (talk) 06:15, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

An Edit

I recently included a statement in the acceptance section which says ""Concurring with Oppy, A.M. Weisberger writes “contrary to popular theistic opinion, the logical form of the argument is still alive and beating.”" The quote comes from her book "Suffering Belief" written in 1999. the quote is on p. 39. Can anyone include this information in the reference section for me? Thanks. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.171.71.1 (talk) 03:29, 25 August 2011 (UTC)

Done. Gabbe (talk) 06:30, 25 August 2011 (UTC)

According to some sources

Afasmit (talk · contribs) recently made this edit, which I reverted with this edit. My rationale is as follows: I believe that you are probably right, Afasmit, in that it's probably not the case that most philosophers accept Plantinga's argument. But if we don't have a source explicitly saying that his argument is not widely accepted, it would be a novel synthesis to take a poll as a reason to imply it. We cannot stray from what the available sources actually say, whether we do so implicitly or not. Gabbe (talk) 09:42, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

Surely wikipedia has policies to discourage stating the dubious opinions of some people as fact, even if these people have published their opinion in a scholarly way. This should be a much more basic offense than referenced synthesis. If these are not simply opinions, then we should specifically write "Polls among (American, compatibilist, etc.) philosophers show that a majority of them accept Plantinga's free will defense". If they are merely opinions, we should write something like: "Chad Meister, professor of philosophy at Bethel College, and Gary Gutting, Plantinga's fellow faculty member at the University of Notre Dame, believe that most contemporary philosophers accept...". This approach is used in the relevant section in Plantinga's wiki. Given Gutting's association with Plantinga, we probably even want to leave him out altogether. Afasmit (talk) 21:14, 16 December 2011 (UTC)
Why do you say that their statements are "dubious opinions"? The books used as sources here are textbooks published by mainstream publishers, not editorials. I see no reason to assume that they are merely conjecturing. While both of us may disagree with the conclusions made by Gutting and Meister, our personal disagreement is not (by itself) a sufficient reason to rephrase this article in favour of what we believe the truth to be. That is the essence of WP:V. If you have a single reliable source explicitly saying that Plantinga's argument is not widely accepted, I would not hesitate to reword the paragraph in question.
If we are to reword the sentence anyway I would rather go with the latter than the former of your two suggestions. I would, however, avoid the word "believe". I would instead go with "According to X, ..." or "X says that ..." or some similarly neutral variant (see WP:SAY). Gabbe (talk) 21:47, 16 December 2011 (UTC)
Sorry, I used the wrong word. I meant "contentious" (as in disputable/debatable). "According to Meister etc..." will do fine, though if they actually did a study (i.e. some kind of poll) to determine the acceptance level, "According to a study by xx..." would be the right thing. Would you like to keep or skip the Gutting reference?
By the way, I think we are not debating to "rephrase this article in favour of what we believe the truth to be". We are changing an argument from authority to a verifiable truth: these authors have written that there is a majority acceptance level of Plantinga's defense. I'm sure there is tons written on this in WP discussions; e.g. the essay Verifiability, not truth reads "what is verifiable is that the source expresses a view, not that the view is necessarily accurate." Afasmit (talk) 23:27, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

Mackie Redux

The articles references two papers by John Leslie Mackie. However, these papers are from 1955 and 1962 respectively. As far as I see, they predate Plantinga's argument being published. Yet, they are presented as an answer to what Plantinga wrote. And that cannot be true.

Further, Mackie's argument is described as attacking Plantinga's argument on compatibilist grounds. The argument Mackie gives in The Miracle of Theism, Oxford 1982, works differently. Mackie analyses Plantinga's argument and concludes that he must weaken both the claims of omnipotence and omniscience to be practically meaningless. A sentence of the argument is quoted in a reference for the Plantinga's article, but curiously it does not appear here. -- Zz (talk) 16:24, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

The 1955 and 1962 articles by Mackie are more about the argument from evil in general, rather than Plantinga's argument in particular. The 1955 article, for example, is used to demonstrate what the essence of the problem of evil really is. If it appears as if they are quoted as replies by Mackie to the FWD, I believe this is an unfortunate consequence of an overzealous use of <ref>-tags. Peterson is the secondary source used as a basis for Mackie's argument against Plantinga.
If you would like to improve this article using The Miracle of Theism as a primary source for Mackie's rebuttal to Plantinga, please go ahead. Gabbe (talk) 20:49, 4 April 2012 (UTC)
The 1955 and 1962 articles by Mackie are more about the argument from evil in general, rather than Plantinga's argument in particular. The 1955 article, for example, is used to demonstrate what the essence of the problem of evil really is. If it appears as if they are quoted as replies by Mackie to the FWD, I believe this is an unfortunate consequence of an overzealous use of <ref>-tags. Peterson is the secondary source used as a basis for Mackie's argument against Plantinga.
If you would like to improve this article using The Miracle of Theism as a primary source for Mackie's rebuttal to Plantinga, please go ahead. Gabbe (talk) 20:49, 4 April 2012 (UTC)
The article states: Critics of Plantinga's argument, such as philosophers J. L. Mackie and Antony Flew, have responded that it presupposes a libertarianist, incompatibilist view of free will (free will and determinism are metaphysically incompatible), while their view is a compatibilist view of free will (free will and determinism, whether physical or divine, are metaphysically compatible). The reference for Mackie is: Mackie 1962, i.e.: Mackie, John (April 1962). "Theism and Utopia". Philosophy 37 (140): 153–58.
I have several issues with that. 1. The article quoted is hardly an answer to Plantinga's Free Will Defense. 2. I am not sure, if Mackie was generally or at times criticizing anyone from a compatibilist point of view. Maybe others can fill in the details. 3. Mackie's actual rebuttal does not appear.
Lacking an English original of Mackie's Miracle of Theism (it got translated into German immediately), I propose the following: Mackie and the reference are deleted from the sentence referring to a compatibilist counter-argument. Mackie's answer is described along the lines that Mackie's counter-argument tried to demonstrate that Plantinga had to weaken the concepts of omnipotence and omniscience so far as to be practically meaningless, sourced by the sentence which appears in the Plantinga article and its origin in the book. -- Zz (talk) 13:24, 5 April 2012 (UTC)

It is silent now. May I understand that as approval? Further, a bit of googling gave the website of Ray Bradley, professor of Philosophy, who analyses Plantinga's Free Will Defense (http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/people/faculty/emeritus/raybradley.html and http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html ). His critique is scathing. Of course, that does not constitute proof, but the more I look into it the more I am puzzled by the claims that the logical problem of evil is considered mostly dead ever since Plantinga. I think the Meister quote from the lead should be dismissed. The section referring to the state of the discussion is enough. -- Zz (talk) 11:54, 4 May 2012 (UTC)

Feel free to make any changes that you think would improve this article. If I (or anyone else) should disagree with them, there's always the possibility to revert and discuss here, per WP:BRD.
To clarify with regards to Mackie's stance, the following paragraph:

Critics of Plantinga's argument, such as philosophers J. L. Mackie and Antony Flew, have responded that it presupposes a libertarianist, incompatibilist view of free will (free will and determinism are metaphysically incompatible), while their view is a compatibilist view of free will (free will and determinism, whether physical or divine, are metaphysically compatible). The view of compatibilists such as Mackie and Flew is that God could have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil. In such a world people could have chosen to only perform good deeds, even though all their choices were predestined.

is note due to Mackie 1962 and Flew 1973. The references to Mackie 1962 and Flew 1973 were included by me to further support that these are indeed Flew's and Mackie's stances on compatibilism/incompatibilism. The paragraph is sourced to the summaries by Peterson 1991 and Meister 2009 of Flew's and Mackie's respective views. I apologise if this isn't clear by the way the citations are utilised in the article, but I thought it would be ridiculous to have more than two references after every single sentence, especially when they are to the same sources over and over again.
Regarding the "prevalence" bit: My position, as I have said before, is that I've looked for secondary sources gauging the prevalence of Plantinga's argument among contemporary philosophers. The only ones I have been able to find have said that his argument is widely accepted. We could, of course, dismiss this statement from the lead, but in my view it seems disingenuous to do so based solely on primary sources (such as, for example, individual philosophers disagreeing with Plantinga). Gabbe (talk) 17:55, 4 May 2012 (UTC)

Compatible with God's omniscience?

Hello all. I am not presently a Wikipedia user, although I hope to be at some point. I am interested in philosophy however, and I have read somewhere that a potential objection to Plantinga's Free Will Defense states that it is incompatible with the God of Classical Theism's omniscience; in other words, if He really knows everything, then we are not truly free agents, because all of our actions have already been predetermined, but if they haven't been predetermined, then He does not know everything, and therefore cannot be said to be omniscient. (I think that's how it goes anyway. If I've made a mistake I'm happy to be corrected) Now, my question is this: what kind of source would I need to find to support the existence of this objection, and if I found a good one, would it be acceptable for this article? Thanks for reading. 62.7.191.247 (talk) 10:07, 10 March 2013 (UTC)

There's an content guideline available at "Wikipedia:Identifying reliable sources" which I think will answer your question. In short, a quote from an article published in a peer-reviewed journal or a book published by a university printing press would be ideal, but don't be afraid to add something to the article if you you think it is appropriate. Gabbe (talk) 22:16, 10 March 2013 (UTC)
Okay, thanks. :) 62.7.191.225 (talk) 16:48, 11 March 2013 (UTC)

Recent papers??

Someone has added references to recent papers. These papers, written by Daniel Howard-Snyder, Mike Almeida, and Alexander Pruss, really should influence our general assessment. Unfortunately, this is all so very technical, but Howard-Snyder's abstract is rather clear: "J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence suffers from transworld depravity." Either way, we ought to update this article when some of the most notable contemporary theists philosophers are rejecting the argument. Vesal (talk) 09:40, 6 September 2013 (UTC)

Sounds good. I don't think I have access to that source at the moment, are you willing to update the article accordingly? Gabbe (talk) 11:14, 6 September 2013 (UTC)
Sadly I don't have a sufficiently technical understanding of these papers, and I'm not eager to do something based only on the abstract. Howard-Snyder qualifies his judgment as "contrary to current mythology", so there is no major harm in Wikipedia perpetuating common "mythology". We should maybe just start with moving the mention of these sources to a bit more prominent place. Vesal (talk) 19:11, 6 September 2013 (UTC)

Just one more note: Daniel Howard-Snyder's assessment is from a preprint of a chapter in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. That book will be published in October 2013, but this is without a doubt an extremely high quality source, and you don't get tasked to edit this kind of volume unless you are well-respected expert in the field. It is probably safe to just include his assessment in the lead. What do you think? Vesal (talk) 23:03, 11 September 2013 (UTC)

Recent edits and reverts

I reverted the recent additions because this is not acceptable use of sources. We should not refute contemporary secondary sources that comment explicitly on scholarly acceptance by using primary sources that are instances of people arguing against the defense, especially when most of the primary sources predate the secondary sources. While claims of scholarly consensus in this field can rarely be trusted, what has convinced us to keep these claims of mainstream acceptance is that we have found no secondary sources that reject these claims. On the contrary, most notable atheist sources, such as Graham Oppy and Derk Pereboom, while offering their own dissent and reservations, have confirmed the widespread acceptance of the defense. Unless we find anyone notable explicitly rejecting the claims of Alston and Meister, please stop these attempts to "reveal" their bias. This article does desperately need updating, but we have to be more sophisticated than this. Vesal (talk) 22:18, 11 September 2013 (UTC)

At least 2 of the sources I provide do fit your criteria, see Howard-Snyder and Pike, but even if they didn't, it wouldn't matter. The position is that "there are some people who disagree", and referencing individual sources to back this up is completely fine. Your need to cite only philosophers who specifically write "there are some people who disagree" is silly. Imagine a universe in which no philosopher in the world did such a thing (i.e., no one specifically wrote a global statement about whether other people disagree with the argument). Does that mean that in this world, no one disagrees with the argument? Obviously not. Is it fair then to say in an article that "everyone agrees with the argument"? Obviously not. It IS useful to have such sources, but when not having any suggests a false conclusion or otherwise inhibits clarity, it is more important to provide alternate sources which reflect the actual state of reality. TrustworthyPerson (talk) 20:28, 12 September 2013 (UTC)
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