Talk:All or nothing (armor)

Citations

I am not sure how long this article has existed but whoever wrote it needs to place inline citations all over this article. I've a copy of Norman Friedman's work and it is quite authorative where US designs are concerned. This was an article I myself wished to write but held off because I lacked sources on the other major powers and their armor suites. You have lots of declarative statements but you are just begging a fact bomber to riddle this with {{Fact}}s and then delete it when you can not supply the citations. Tirronan 20:05, 14 August 2007 (UTC)

In use

I'll refer you to the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14–15 USS Washington/USS South Dakota action off of Salvo Island as an actual use, also the 1st battle of denmark straight another. In South Dakota's case she was pounded by 14" AP projectiles from IJN Kirishima at close range without armoured suite being comprimised. Note here that Naval Weapons Systems Command looked and confirmed that AP and not HE shells were used as was 1st thought and can be confirmed on that web site and cited here also. USS Arizona blew up because she had hatches open to her magazines this wasn't a failure of the all or nothing system. Battle of Denmark Strait HMS Prince of Wales sailed away from Bismark more from internal issues than 15" shells hurting her. HMS Hood didn't have such a system and blew up with a shell in her magazine. Regardless of which magazine (there are still arguments as to the 4"/15" detonating 1st) blew its still a failure of its armour system. Further I would highlight the turret roof armor which was part of the verticle protection system and a noted point of failure at Jutland on both sides.

Let me know if you wish help on this article Tirronan 20:22, 14 August 2007 (UTC)

Yes. Please. KTo288 19:05, 14 October 2007 (UTC)

Evolution

This isn't correct:

Although the US navy had begun work on the first all or nothing ship USS Nevada (BB-36) in 1911[3] , the Royal Navy did not believe that long range gunnery would be important nor of the vulnerability of the ship's magazine spaces. Experience in the First World War showed that a ship could survive extensive damage as long as this was outside their magazine spaces, however any shell that breached the defences of these spaces had catastrophic effects. The logical conclusion was that there was no point in having armour which could not stop a shell penetrating into the magazine spaces, and that any armour that did not contribute to this goal was wasted armour.

The Battle of Jutland showed that the turrent roof armour was way too thin as well as the deck armour. Turrent roofs were pierced by both sides but the British had less flash protection so when the roofs failed to keep out the shells (the whole purpose of having armor) the flash went straight through the anti-flash doors that were clipped open by the Brits (for faster reloading) and straight through to the magazines. To my knowledge not one of the BC's had a shell land in the magazines. Thus this is a failure of the armouring system and the anti-flash measures. Notice on US Battleships Nevada on start having 5" plus turrent roofs and older ships starting getting turrent roof as well as deck armour upgrades. Now if you have a source on British and French Battleship deck and turrent roof armours this is more to your point. Tirronan 23:14, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

Here is a data point on turret roof thickness and how important it was to the all or nothing scheme note that turret roof armor was 7" thick her deck armor was pure shit but that was seen as a 1 off design for a quick fast BB, South Dakota was much thicker:

USS North Carolina face plates 16.0" (406 mm) sides 9.8" (249 mm) back plates 11.8" (300 mm) roof plates 7.0" (178 mm) Tirronan —Preceding comment was added at 23:22, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

Bismarck's Damage

Using Bismarck as an example of banded armour isn't really impressive. While Bismarck was indeed tough to sink, all battleships generally are. What really matters is how well the ship was able to resist damage or continue fighting, and Bismarck failed miserably in that department. Bismarck spent most of its last battle an impotent, burning wreck. Unable to control itself and barely able to return fire. If an enemy's battleship has been reduced to such a point, it is of little consequence either way if the hull is still floating or resting on the bottom. The point is simple, a ship doesn't need to be sunk in order to be defeated. CaptHawkeye (talk) 18:26, 7 December 2008 (UTC)

But Bismarck was probably the best example of banded armor, my friend. Why wouldn't things be compared to the best? —Ed 17 ^{(Talk / Contribs)} 18:43, 7 December 2008 (UTC)

If Bismarck was the best example of Banded Armour, then that doesn't speak very highly of the scheme, does it? The article talks as if the amount of damage Bismarck sustained was impressive or unique to battleships. If Bismarck was unique among battleships for anything, then it was probably unique for being disabled in such a short time. I guess that's just what happens when you design a battleship for merchant raiding and not for fighting other battleships. CaptHawkeye (talk) 19:44, 15 December 2008 (UTC)

Minor correction. Upon reading into Plan Z with more detail it appears Bismarck was not designed expressly as a merchant raider but in fact as a dedicated ship of the line. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.161.18.165 (talk) 02:38, 2 January 2009 (UTC)

(@ Hawkeye) - it was disabled quickly becuase its rudder was taken out by Fairey Swordfish... (sorry, missed your reply on my watchlist before) —Ed 17 ^{(Talk / Contribs)} 05:38, 2 January 2009 (UTC)

Biased?

"From the Nevada class on to its Iowa class, the United States Navy pioneered the all or nothing approach without taking it to its logical conclusion. For example, giving the crew additional protection by armoring the secondary armament, and rather than just rely on the armored deck of the citadel, persisting with having three armored decks: a sacrificial armored top deck to decap, and set off bombs and shells; a splinter deck between the top; and citadel decks to protect the majority of the crew from shell and bomb fragments."

I don't know that the logical conclusion would be that. Not to mention, there's no support statement, and half of the phrases in there should have their own articles explaining what a citadel deck and splinter deck are. This article also needs a lot more citations. Especially that paragraph, considering it has a declarative statement. L.cash.m (talk) 20:21, 7 December 2008 (UTC)

The USN did pioneer the approach for sure. That's not biased at all. :) However, I agree that there is too much jargon in here... I'll try to put this on my to-do list of articles to improve. —Ed 17 ^{(Talk / Contribs)} 23:06, 7 December 2008 (UTC)

I'm of the opinion that the entire section needs to be re-written. The author of the section misunderstood the concept of "all or nothing". All or nothing means that an area of the ship is protected to the highest level possible or it is entirely unprotected. It does not mean that there is only a single layer of armor protecting the armored raft. Many ships that are considered all or nothing armored had multiple armor layers. See Czarnecki http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-070.htm. Plsuh (talk) 02:52, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Alternative

the article describes the "failures" of the all-or-nothing scheme as if there was some alternative that would have given different results. It's impossible to fully armor the entire vessel with full armor, it can't be done. So that leaves you with what, putting lighter armor over the entire ship? Would the Prince of Whales been better off with 6" armor covering whole hull when she was getting hit with 8" and 15" shells? The secondary turrets were already given compromise armor and were still penetrated, so I don't see any difference there, and I don't really see how more thinner armor would have helped the Yamato avoid the flooding of her bow, unless it was caused by light cruisers whose shells would have been stopped by thin armor. But it could have just as easily been heavy guns, in which case the whole ship might as well not be armored at all. Which brings me to the description of the scheme. It's not wrong, but the way it's usually explained in tank design is that armor that is not quite thick enough is much worse than no armor. If you expect to face tanks with 75mm guns and you build a tank with armor that can stop anything up to a 70mm shell, all you have is a tank that can be killed just as easily as an unarmored tank but which weighs and costs far more and has worse mobility. You would be better off just using unarmored SPGs that can move quickly. To be worth having, armor has to be sufficient to stop the most likely threat. Armor designers came to the same solution as naval designers, it required 5 or 6" of armor to stop an enemy tank or AT gun shell, but it was impossible to fully armor the tank with that amount. So they concentrated all the armor in the front of the tank, where it's most likely to be hit, because it was not worth including otherwise. They also had to compromise and give the rest at least a little protection, but that's because the entire vehicle is essential to operation, and it needs to at least stop light fire and fragments from other directions. ' 2600:1000:B114:CF4:C506:210B:A50F:A036 (talk) 18:25, 9 September 2024 (UTC)