Jump to content

Talk:Abu Lu'lu'a/Archive 2

Page contents not supported in other languages.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Archive 1Archive 2Archive 3

Why is the motive stated as a fact when there are multiple possible motives.

The article only states that umar was killed by abu lulu due to an arguement about tax payments expected to be payed from abu lulu to his master. This is simply one account of what the motive could be. Another possible motive which is more likely is the fact that abu lulu was taking revenge for the invasion and conquering of his nation and people. It seems a little odd that this possible motive is listed in the Wikipedia page on Umar Ibn al khattab, but it is completely left out from this page. May I ask, what is the reason for this? Thank you. 216.181.132.21 (talk) 08:49, 2 September 2022 (UTC)

The reason is that our Umar ibn al-Khattab article was citing unreliable sources, while this one is a good article strictly based on reliable sources. I fixed that now by copying content from this article to Umar's article.
Do note, however, that multiple possible motives are indicated in our article: first the motive that Abu Lu'lu'a did not want to pay taxes to his master is given, but then the article clearly states that although this is the reason given by most historical accounts for Abu Lu'lu'a's assassination of Umar, Umar's harsh policies against non-Arabs are also likely to have played a prominent role. One of the footnotes also indicates the alternative explanation given by some medieval sources that rather than himself not wanting to pay the tax, Abu Lu'lu'a's was angry about the caliph's raising a kharāj tax on his master al-Mughira.
In contrast, 'revenge for the invasion and conquering of his nation and people' is not given as a motive by any reliable source. Even if some semi-reliable source would be found that claims this, it would probably be wp:undue to include it given the fact that the many experts cited in this article (Pellat, Madelung, Levi Della Vida & Bonner, Ishkevari, El-Hibri) do not even allude to it as a possible motive. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 12:47, 2 September 2022 (UTC)
If the "harsh policies" claim is merely Madelung's hypothesis, as indicated by the footnote, then it shouldn't be asserted as fact. Perhaps an "according to" statement and a move to the views paragraph (i.e., last paragraph in section) would be more suitable for an opinion. There is also a hint to what the OP is talking about in El-Hibri (p.112): By depicting Abū Lu’lu’a and Rustam as equidistant from ‘Umar in their expressions of national frustration, narrators intended to show a vindication of Sasanid political pride and Rustam’s final failure.. Wiqi(55) 22:17, 2 September 2022 (UTC)
We're not asserting it as fact, we're saying likely, and this only in one clause (vs. the multiple references to the tax dispute throughout the article). We're also contrasting this likely additional motive with what historical accounts are saying, indicating that it is somewhat more hypothetical. Using 'according to' would clutter up the sentence and is inadvisable, and simply not needed for what is after all an uncontested point of view by a recognized expert (Madelung).
Regarding El-Hibri, as you know, he is talking about 9th-century historians and their 8th-century sources rather than about the 7th-century Abu Lu'lu'a himself. We're already using El-Hibri to talk about how these 9th-century historians regarded the assassination of Ali's perceived enemy Umar by a Persian slave as foreboding the special affinity between Persia and the Hashimid family of the prophet (including Ali), so maybe something could be added there with regard to these historians understanding the killing as an act of national revenge. However, this is rather complex for a Wikipedia article (we're already not doing a great job of it as it currently stands), so we would need to explain this very clearly (especially the fact that modern historians do not endorse these 9th-century views). If it is to be done at all, I think the best way to go about it would be to write an entire new section on 8th-/9th-century narratives about Abu Lu'lu'a, based on El-Hibri 2010. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 01:48, 3 September 2022 (UTC)
I've changed Umar's harsh policies against non-Arabs are also likely to have played a prominent role to Umar's harsh policies against non-Arabs may also have played a prominent role. I think that's cautious enough; Umar's harsh policies against non-Arabs are established fact, so Madelung's inference here doesn't seem far-fetched. Of course, if some other expert would explicitly contradict it, it would have to be rewritten to reflect that, but I think we're good now as is. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 02:07, 3 September 2022 (UTC)

You have made the article worst. Please explain how the source used in umars article was unreliable. What guidelines was it not in line with? Why not include both possibilities? What is the harm in including the possibility that the killing MAY have been motivated by revenge for the Muslim conquests? The harsh treatments are not the same as what I stated. To be frank, you seem to have a dismissive attitude about what the Iranian people were enduring during the Muslim conquests, you do not take into consideration how that could manifest itself into an assassination.

With all due respect, your bias is very evident in your work. You also stated that Omar Koshon is a anti Sunni festival, when it is purely a nationalistic pride festival. If it is anti Sunni as you put it, why was it only celebrated in Iran? Why don’t Iraqi Shias or any other shia muslims celebrate? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.181.132.21 (talk) 04:36, 4 September 2022 (UTC)

The sources you have cited also include that the motive was not clear before giving the “tax dispute” story that you included in this article and umars article. If you are not willing to include both accounts (revenge for Muslim conquests and tax dispute), it would at least improve the neutrality of this article if you state that the motive was not clear, before stating the “tax dispute” story, like you have done in umars article. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.181.132.21 (talk) 04:45, 4 September 2022 (UTC)

Let me also be frank: I have absolutely no stake in this. I don't care about either Umar or Abu Lu'lu'a, Sunni or Shi'i, Arab or Persian. The problem is that too many editors who come to this talk page do care about those things, but have little or no care for what expert sources are saying.
The problem specifically with the source removed at Umar, Modern reformist thought in the Muslim world by Mazheruddin Siddiqi (1982), is that it apparently presents a point of view not found in any expert source, advanced by someone (Siddiqi) who is not himself an expert (he is not cited by any of the other sources). That is what we call wp:undue: minority opinions by no-name scholars are generally not given much weight, and are often excluded. I don't have access to Siddiqi 1982, but if you would like to quote the relevant paragraph (p. 147) here on the talk page (it would be especially helpful to know what sources if any Siddiqi himself quotes) and propose some way to integrate it in the article, please feel free to do so.
As for Omar Koshan being anti-Sunni, see the title of one of the expert sources this is based on: Johnson, Rosemary Stanfield (1994). "Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran: Anti‐Sunni Activities During the Reign of Tahmasp I". Iranian Studies. 27 (1–4): 123–133. doi:10.1080/00210869408701823. JSTOR 4310889. The festival absolutely was anti-Sunni in origin, being part of the political instrumentalization of Shi'ism by the early Safavids. The article used to explain this better, also containing more information about how the festival evolved into Iranian folklore in more recent times. I have restored some of that for clarity.
As you requested, I have added to the lead that Abu Lu'lu'a's motive for killing Umar was not entirely clear, per Pellat 2011. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 10:08, 4 September 2022 (UTC)

Thank you for taking the time to respond to my concerns and clarify the points I tried to highlight. I appreciate the effort. As for the source that doesn’t meet the guidelines , I will do more research to see if I can find sources that meet the requirements. As for the origins of the Omar Koshon festival, you may be correct. However, as someone who lived in Iran, I can assure you that the festival was most cherished by the Iranians who were not as religious/agnostic. Now obviously my claim is meaningless without a source that meets the guidelines, so I will also see if I can find any source relating to that festival. Once again, thank you for not dismissing my concerns, I really appreaciate it!! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.181.132.21 (talk) 19:25, 4 September 2022 (UTC)

Yes, the festival is now largely folkloric and focused more on carnaval-type elements such as role reversal rather than on any type of religious feeling, with few people in Iran even still being aware of its original nature. Torab 2007 contains much useful information on that, but it's still quite superficial. It would be very interesting to have a reliable source that goes more in-depth, though I'm afraid that such a source won't be easy to find. Anyway, if you find a good source, be sure to add it here. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 20:24, 4 September 2022 (UTC)

His motifs

His motifs are not clear? His country was attacked, his people were killed, he was taken as slave. Then people think he did it for tax reasons? 2406:3400:313:B310:1904:7D90:E84A:7B30 (talk) 23:02, 28 October 2022 (UTC)

As an encyclopedia, Wikipedia summarizes scholarly consensus on a given subject. The questions you raise are irrelevant to Wikipedia. These belong to the domain of original research. AhmadLX-(Wikiposta) 00:42, 29 October 2022 (UTC)
Not a country, an empire, and one that was also constantly at war and enslaved others with gay abandon. All this is 100% par for the course at the time. Iskandar323 (talk) 04:47, 29 October 2022 (UTC)

Policies against free non-Arab Muslims?

Apaugasma, could you please mention which Umar policies are you referring to? You're claiming that they were policies against all non-Arabs in Medina (including Muslims?), and not just the captives. What are those policies specifically? And which secondary sources give details or analyze the primary sources that mention them? In general, an assertion made by one or two historians shouldn't be turned into fact without some details. Furthermore, Madelung's Succession has received some criticism with regards to biased language and selective handling of the primary sources (see our article). We need to be aware of this. Wiqi(55) 05:06, 2 February 2023 (UTC)

Like our article says, where earlier works had a known pro-Sunni bias, Wilferd Madelung's 1997 work seems to have a pro-Alid bias, but this was welcomed by a luminary like Hugh Kennedy. Madelung's work is regarded as a much-needed corrective, even though it may at times tip the balance in the other direction. So sure, Madelung should be used with care, but do we repeat that too for all the pre-1997 accounts of early Islamic history which all but ignored Shi'i or pro-Alid perspectives? There's no more reason to use Madelung with care than any of the pro-Sunni biased works that preceded him.
But so yes, use with care. We do this. I will quote the entire relevant passage here:
The task of organizing the government and administration of the conquered territories fell to Umar. He did this on the basis of largely identifying Islam and the Arabs. At this time Islam came close to becoming a national religion for the Arabs. Most of the remaining non-Muslim Arabs, also outside Arabia, quickly followed the summons to Islam, while the number of non-Arab converts was initially insignificant. The tolerance that the Qur'an offered to the 'People of the Book', mostly Christians and Jews, was extended to all other religious communities in the conquered territories. The Arabs of the tribe of Taghlib in northern Mesopotamia, who refused to give up their Christian faith, were nevertheless incorporated into the Muslim army and were given a special tax status under which they paid double the tithe (ushr) imposed on Muslims as zakat but not the humiliating head tax (jizya) and land tax (kharaj) levied on other non-Muslim subjects. Umar no doubt expected that they would soon become Muslims. When the Christian Arab tribe of Iyad sought refuge in Byzantine territory, Umar wrote to the emperor demanding that he expel them and threatened to drive non-Arab Christians into Byzantine lands. Under Byzantine pressure some 4,000 of the tribesmen returned to Muslim territory. It is evident that the caliph regarded all Arabs, whether Muslims or Christians, as his primary subjects.
In contrast to the conquered territories, Arabia was to be, as far as feasible, purely Muslim and Arab. The relatively large Christian and Jewish communities in Najran and Khaybar were summarily expelled by Umar to the conquered territories. Non-Muslims were generally not to be allowed to settle in the Hijaz or to stay in any place there for more than three days. Umar was also anxious to keep most non-Arab Muslims out of Arabia, in particular Medina. There was a general restriction on bringing captives (saby) to the capital. This restriction was certainly not confined to non-Muslims, since captives in particular tended to convert to Islam. It was obviously more difficult, however, to keep Arabic-speaking Muslims out of Arabia. After having been struck by Abu Lu'lu'a, Umar is reported to have addressed the accusation to Ibn al-Abbas that he and his father were eager to multiply the non-Arabs (uluj) in Medina. Ibn al-Abbas answered, assuring the caliph that al-Abbas and he would do with them whatever the caliph wished. Umar then questioned how anything could be done now that these non-Arabs had learned to speak the language of their masters, prayed their prayers with them, and shared their acts of devotion. In contrast, Umar ordered before his death that all Arab slaves held by the state be freed. The strong bias against non-Arabs in Umar's policies evidently contributed to creating the atmosphere in which the Persian captive Abu Lu'lu'a Fayruz, outraged by a perceived slight on the part of the caliph, was prepared to assassinate him in a suicidal attack and in which the caliph's son Ubayd Allah was equally prepared to murder any non-Arabs whom he could reach.
Umar's deep commitment to Qurayshite and Arab solidarity was balanced by an even deeper commitment to Islam. He was fully aware that it was only Islam that had raised him to the top and was turning the Arabs into the masters of a vast empire. Like other men of great power he saw in his stupendous success a clear sign of divine favour which he could only attribute to Islam. He might be inclined at times to bend the rules of Islam, as in the case of the Christian Arabs of Taghlib; yet when he perceived a conflict between his Arab bias and his loyalty to Islamic principles, he did not hesitate to obey the latter. This is well illustrated by an anecdotal, but perhaps true, story reported by al-Azraqi. When Nafi' b. Abd al-Harith al-Khuza'i, Umar's governor of Mekka, left the town to meet him, the caliph asked him whom he had appointed his deputy there. On being informed that it was his client Abd al-Rahman b. Abza, Umar flew into a rage and reproached Nafi': 'You have appointed one of the clients over the people of God.' Nafi' told him, however, that he had found Ibn Abza the one who knew best how to recite the Book of God and the one most informed about the Law of God. Umar calmed down and remembered a saying of the Prophet that God raises some in this religion and abases others.
Let me summarize. According to Madelung, Umar's policies were based on identifying Islam and the Arabs. Islam was a national religion for the Arabs. But Christian Arabs were also exempted by Umar from paying the humiliating jizya which non-Arab Christians had to pay. Umar wanted Arabia to be purely Muslim and Arab. But just Muslim wasn't enough. He was anxious to keep most non-Arab Muslims out of Arabia, which presented a problem when these Muslims spoke Arabic: it was quite difficult to keep Arabic-speaking Muslims out of Arabia. Umar reproached Ibn al-Abbas that he was eager to multiply the non-Arabs in Medina. There was nothing to be done against them, because these non-Arabs had learned to speak the language of their masters, prayed their prayers with them, and shared their acts of devotion. Since most non-Arabs coming to Arabia were captives and slaves, one way to keep non-Arabs out was to restrict access to captives and slaves, even though these in particular tended to convert to Islam. Umar in fact had nothing against captives or slaves as such, which is illustrated by the fact that he ordered before his death that all Arab slaves held by the state be freed. Clearly, the fact that there was a strong bias against non-Arabs in Umar's policies had nothing to do with any bias against captives or slaves, but with his Arab bias and his deep commitment to Qurayshite and Arab solidarity. Ultimately he would be even more loyal to Islam, but this was still a far cry from the type of anti-nativist Islam purporting to be 'ethnically blind' that would develop in later times: Umar was loyal to Islam because it had raised him to the top and was turning the Arabs into the masters of a vast empire.
So, how much of Madelung's narrative here is in fact reflected in our article? Do we mention Umar's preferential treatment of Arab Christians? Do we contrast the fact that he was killed by a Persian slave with the fact that he freed Arab slaves? Do we expound upon the ways in which he tried to keep out non-Arabs out of Medina? No, three times no. All we say is that "Umar's biased policies against non-Arabs may also have played a prominent role" (emphasis added) in creating the climate that lead to Umar's murder. We say may precisely where Madelung says evidently. As a whole, that very much is using Madelung with caution, especially given the fact that we don't have any other source which dwells upon this theme as long as Madelung does, much less a source that explicitly contradicts or rejects Madelung's narrative.
Do you seriously question whether Umar had any bias against non-Arabs at all, or whether that this may have played a role in Abu Lu'lu'a's motivations? Because the thing is, I have never seen any reliable source question this, and my impression is that all reliable sources in fact agree with Madelung this far.
But impressions aside, it is becoming inappropriate for you as a Wikipedia editor to keep on laying your own doubts about Madelung upon this article without any recourse to reliable sources that do so too. I would like to raise the bar here, and ask you to refrain from commenting unless you have found a source that specifically argues against Madelung's view, to such an extent that it would invalidate even the minimalist version of it that we give in our article here. Let me stress that I haven't even come close to looking at all the sources which may be relevant: to give just one example, I have no idea what the recent works by Fred Donner say about this. Please do check recent sources if you have the time. I will also say that Madelung relies far too much on the traditional sources for my personal (revisionist) tastes. But revisionist or not, if some more recent scholar should be able to show that Umar's purported bias against non-Arabs is in fact a myth, I would personally be inclined to accept that. In any case, that would necessitate a overhaul of this article, whatever I think of it. But the sourceless arguments against an authoritative and (as far as we're aware here) uncontested treatment like Madelung's just have to stop. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 16:24, 2 February 2023 (UTC)
I agree with Kennedy's assessment that Madelung's Succession is a partisan source. Kennedy expresses this viewpoint with great emphasis: "Madelung's work is vigorously, and at times disconcertingly, partisan.". For dealing with biased sources, the RS policy suggests attribution and a brief note on perspective (see WP:PARTISAN). Citing another source for balance may be useful as well. A GB search turned out this passage also by Kennedy:

A short anecdote shows ‘Umar reproving a governor who paid the ‘atā’ to Arabs but not to the mawālī. In response to what must have been a common situation, ‘Umar is said to have written to the governors that non-Arab prisoners who converted to Islam and were freed and became mawālī should have the same rights and obligations as other Muslims and be paid the same ‘aṭā’.[1]

This is a straightforward case of a partisan source needing attribution and balance. Wiqi(55) 22:19, 2 February 2023 (UTC)
There is no balance to be made when there is no other source. To do this, we would need a source specifically saying that Umar had no significant bias against non-Arabs and that Madelung's suggestion that a supposed bias against non-Arabs contributed to creating the atmosphere in which Abu Lu'lu'a killed Umar is far-fetched and unlikely. We don't have that source.
Your quote from Kennedy here is cherry-picked and merely shows that some later sources depicted Umar as equitable to the mawālī. As Kennedy notes on the same page you're selectively quoting from,

The reports which come down to us are often tendentious and polemical and reflect not just the original form of the dīwān but the fierce and sometimes violent controversies to which it gave rise through the next century. One of the points at issue was whether non-Arabs could be paid salaries. The status of non-Arab Muslims (mawālī) was to be a major source of conflict and some of the traditions about the dīwān certainly reflect this.

Kennedy gives one other example, and then gives the Umar anecdote you quote. Is Kennedy arguing here that Umar actually was equitable to the mawali? That this report and others show he was not biased against non-Arabs? Is Kennedy referring to Madelung claims regarding this and arguing that he was wrong? None of that: he cites it as an example of later polemical reports coming down on one side of an issue that was controversial in that later period.
In his review of Madelung 1997, Kennedy apparently (unfortunately I don't have access) criticized Madelung for being partisan, which is probably fair. That's why we use him with caution, ignore his most strenuous claims, turn his evidently into may, etc. We were very clear in the main text that this is not a fact but a hypothesis (it may also have played a prominent role), and we actually attributed the hypothesis in as many words to Madelung in the footnote (This is the hypothesis of Madelung 1997, p. 75. According to Pellat 2011, Abu Lu'lu'a's true motivation is not clear).
What do you want to do with the article? Changing "non-Arabs" to "non-Arab captives", as you did here, downright misrepresented Madelung's view, which was still the source cited. I think this is really concerning. But from what we had, it was just one small step to put the attribution in the main text, which I just did. I hope this finally puts your concerns to rest. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 23:50, 2 February 2023 (UTC)
Thanks for adding the attribution. I'm generally content with this outcome, although we should briefly note Madelung's perspective following the examples in WP:PARTISAN. Several sources have characterized his work as pro-[Imami] Shia. Speaking of Fred Donner, he also criticized Madelung's as biased:

Madelung, unfortunately, has allowed himself to become virtually a partisan in the conflict, unequivocally supporting the claims of ‘Ali. [2]

Also, Umar giving high salaries to non-Arabs and decreeing equal treatment is an example of Madelung being selective. Baladhuri recorded the decrees and Madelung frequently cites him, however, they were entirely omitted in his analysis. I also think Kennedy's assessment is more positive:

As already noted, other evidence makes it clear that bodies of Persian troops like the Āṣāwira were paid salaries like the Arabs, from a very early stage.

Signing. Wiqi(55) 00:48, 4 February 2023 (UTC)
I think it's important to put other scholars' criticisms of Madelung in context. For a scholar of his stature (those who criticize him also praise his great learning; Kennedy calls him perhaps the greatest authority on early Islamic traditions and sects at the present day and his 1997 monograph a work of massive scholarship), he seems to have allowed himself to be unacceptably partisan. Despite Donner's criticism, he still follows closely the detailed accounting given in Wilferd Madelung. Madelung's account is described as partisan and pro-Alid, but also as learned and authoritative.
Clearly, it's impossible to add all these qualifiers in the main text. On the other hand, something brief like "according to the pro-Shia scholar Wilferd Madelung" would be wildly undue. An explanatory footnote might be helpful, provided that it is balanced, sourced, and concise.
But before we do this it might be useful to have a wider discussion about Madelung's 1997 monograph, involving more editors, for example at WT:ISLAM. I have seen this work used rather uncritically on dozens of Wikipedia pages (I even found myself warning other editors about relying too much on it). A broader consensus on how to use it, and perhaps on how to describe it, would probably be helpful. I also still have questions whether it is due to single out Madelung for this type of qualification, which would be somewhat resolved by seeing other editors agree that this is necessary. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 02:07, 4 February 2023 (UTC)

Madelung is without doubt a great scholar and has contributed a great deal to various areas of Islamic Studies including Kharijism, Ismaili Studies, Twelver Shi'ism, Islamic Theology, Eschatology and Messianism and more. But his Succession without doubt becomes a problem if used in a sloppy way or relied on heavily. It is true that the work has garnered both praise and censure, but they are not of equal magnitude nor of same nature. While his thoroughness and depth is almost universally praised, his conclusions and his analysis of the sources are almost universally derided. His use of sources as if they were documentary films which he could watch and draw his conclusions from lies outside of mainstream consensus in the field of Islamic Studies, and makes his conclusions border on our definition of fringe. When relied exclusively or mainly upon, it creates articles which present his opinions as scholarly consensus or uncontested truth statements in Wikipedia's voice and gives unsuspecting readers a very skewed presentation of the material. However, it is, AFAIK, the only dedicated source on the history of the Rashidun period (that of El-Hibri being historiography rather than history and is in fact a very daunting read, his conclusions being often unclear to lay reader, like myself). As it happens, Succession is sometimes the only RS dealing with the subject/point at hand. The question then arises, what do we do in such situations? My position on it is that it is of course better to use Succession instead of using primary sources. But care must be taken to separate his narration of events from his conclusions and analysis and use the source to support reporting of plain non-controversial facts and when presenting his opinion becomes necessary for balanced presentation, as it often happens, to present his opinion as opinion in the text and not as a matter of fact. This of course should apply to not just Succession but to any other sources whose conclusions/opinions are not accepted in the mainstream of the field. But this source in particular lies so much outside the mainstream that its use demands extra caution. Not just Donner or Kennedy, there are many others who have criticized the work in very strong terms, including Morony, Elton, and Lewinstein. The last of these goes as far as to say that (rephrasing) it was unfortunate for Ali that he did not have Madelung to represent him at the arbitration in place of Abu Musa. In fact, Madelung himself has rejected his Succession thesis in his more recent works to present an even more radical theory in which it is not Ali who is Muhammad's rightful successor but his daughter Fatima whom he could not appoint because he was afraid of Umar, who from being an emotional fool in Succession is turned into a mini-God genius who could foresee from the Meccan period that the persecuted movement was one day going to turn into a phenomenal empire the ruling position to which he envied and converted to obtain. Abu Bakr is turned from a "coolly calculating Meccan businessman" who robbed the prophet's household of their rights in Succession to a sincere partisan of Muhammad who did all he could to save the prophet's household from the evil of Umar.

Our article on Succession gives a wrong impression that the work is criticized and lauded equally, which is simply incorrect. I will expand the article with as many reviews as I could find to bring things in balance.AhmadLX-(Wikiposta) 16:29, 4 February 2023 (UTC)

Despite the fact that I rewrote the Abu Lu'lu'a article here I'm really a bit out of my depth when it comes to early Islamic history. I could sense that Madelung's account of it was a little idiosyncratic and should be used with care, but I'm quite surprised to hear it called wp:fringe. If that is the case then the Abu Lu'lu'a article may need some more work to give Madelung less weight (I did not by any means solely rely on him, nor took his account at face value, but his views do somewhat weigh on the article as it stands).
More important, however, is the fact that many other articles rely much more heavily on Madelung, precisely for his conclusions and analysis. I feel that if Madelung's views on early Islamic history are truly wp:fringe, in-text attribution may often not be enough, and there may be many cases where it would be better to leave his views out entirely. Just one example is Hasan ibn Ali, which is chock full of references to Madelung (pinging Albertatiran and Ghazaalch as the two main editors there).
Updating and improving The Succession to Muhammad sounds like a great idea, but at this point I feel that following this up with a discussion on WP:RSN and a subsequent entry in WP:RSP might be helpful? I'm not going to participate in any of that (I'm trying to do the wiki-break thing), but it may be a really useful thing to have for future editors, especially if the WP:RSP entry could formulate some alternative sources which may be used instead of Madelung for analytical and evaluative approaches to early Islamic history. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 18:10, 4 February 2023 (UTC)
@Apaugasma: My subject above was not your use of Madelung in this article, although now I can see that it is slightly overused, but its use in general and the approaches we take to its use. I should also say that my classification of it as fringe was a bit of exaggeration, and taking it to perennial sources should not be on cards IMO. It has wealth of info on narratives and could be used well when one avoids overuse and giving articles outlook of Madelung's stance (just like Wellhausen's Oppositionsparteien is a bit outdated in its analysis of Kharijism and Shi'ism but nevertheless contains a great deal of straightforward information on these topics and can be used with preference over primary sources, or when quoting Wellhausen's stance, as I've done in many articles, especially Kharijites–I even translated it for the purpose). My point above is that his trust in and use of source is not shared by the majority of the historians and his conclusions that he draws are widely criticized, so its use should be minimized in favor of other sources wherever possible and his conclusions should not be presented with emphasis and preference (as is done in the article you linked above), but presenting them is sometimes necessary (e.g. in analysis of Mu'awiya's reign) and can be done with direct attribution. My approach in last couple of years has been to do that with all sources unless the thing being said is obvious fact.AhmadLX-(Wikiposta) 19:35, 4 February 2023 (UTC)
Thanks, that's very helpful. I just feel it would be even more helpful if there would be some kind of consensus-bearing notice we could point to in order to make more editors aware of it. I wish I had known about it before I started work on this article.
AhmadLX, after you've worked a bit on the Succession article, would you be willing to come back here and create a sourced explanatory footnote to place after our first in-text mention of Madelung, briefly putting his views in context? That note could then perhaps be copied to other articles where appropriate. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 19:58, 4 February 2023 (UTC)
Thanks for the ping, Apaugasma. My view is that of Mahmoud M. Ayoub, who points out the pro-Umayyad bias of the Western classical orientalists, with the exception of Madelung (see Ayoub 2014, p. 64) Perhaps cynical, but to me this also explains why some editors want to minimize Madelung. As for its use in Hasan ibn Ali, this and my other articles survey Madelung and other sources to avoid any bias. In any case, my priority right now is to improve Shia articles which doesn't leave any time for conversations like this. Maybe later... Albertatiran (talk) 09:44, 5 February 2023 (UTC)
@Albertatiran: We don't follow what Ayoub thinks, we follow what majority of the scholars think. Ayoub but confirms that Madelung's Succession lies outside scholarly consensus. If you really are here to right alleged "wrongs" of historians by extensively using Succession, you are really at a wrong website. @Apaugasma: regarding the foornote thing, will ping you when done expanding the article. AhmadLX-(Wikiposta) 15:23, 5 February 2023 (UTC)
Hi AhmadLX, I hope you don't mind me leaving this unanswered. Peace. Albertatiran (talk) 10:05, 6 February 2023 (UTC)
Hi, Apaugasma! Citing Madelung for his comprehensive and unique collection of early historical accounts and listing his views alongside others' views (when available) has doubtless improved my articles. He is also a leading researcher in the field. So it's safe to say that there are no breaches of NPOV here (and won't be any going forward). Albertatiran (talk) 09:59, 6 February 2023 (UTC)
Well I do have my doubts now, not about using Madelung for uncontroversial facts taken from primary sources but for his analysis and opinion, because even when attributed it can create a wp:falsebalance. If multiple historians of early Islam reject Madelung's analysis then the opinion of one scholar of religious and inter-faith studies like Ayoub cannot be held to carry the same wp:weight in issues involving early Islamic history, however much an editor personally agrees with Ayoub. If Madelung's account is largely or universally rejected by other historians, he can't be seen as leading. I do think it's worth for anyone writing on early Islam here to take a close and honest look at this.
But if discussion about it would produce more heat than light, then sure, ignore it and go on improving articles. It looks like we are going to solve the issue here with a footnote, which may make its way to other articles later, but I don't expect that to ruffle too many feathers. There's one thing I couldn't agree more with, and that's: peace. Personally, I'm going to continue studying my Latin. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 15:36, 6 February 2023 (UTC)
@Apaugasma: I've now added to Succession all reviews that I know of, except for Crone's, which I don't have access to. I've asked for it somewhere and will add when I get it. AhmadLX-(Wikiposta) 21:47, 10 February 2023 (UTC)
Thanks for that! I'm not feeling particularly inspired now and I have some off-wiki priorities, so I will leave writing the qualifying footnote on Madelung's work to you or to someone else who feels like doing it. Thanks again, ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 22:17, 10 February 2023 (UTC)
Instead of a footnote, I'd consider linking to the book article and thus allowing the reader to make up their own mind. Something along the lines of "According to Madelung's Succession, ..." Wiqi(55) 00:10, 11 February 2023 (UTC)
Like this? I spelled out the whole title and clarified that it's a monograph, because I think a lot of readers would otherwise be stumped as to what Succession is supposed to mean. A sourced footnote would still clarify much better and allow to remove the added clutter again, but this can always be written later. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 14:28, 11 February 2023 (UTC)

Title review

I'm not convinced that the title of this page really needs to be anything other than the kunya: Abu Lu'lu'a. It appears that the main scholar who uses the current title used on the article is Madelung, but he's just one scholar. The kunya alone seems amply precise, concise and aligns with more sources overall, so why the complexity that we currently have instead? Iskandar323 (talk) 15:53, 2 May 2024 (UTC)

I think part of my reasoning when I proposed and eventually made the move was that by naming it Abu Lu'lu'a Firuz the 'Firuz' part, (the Arabicized form of) his original Middle Persian name, would remain highly visible. Quite a few sources do mention that his given name was Firuz, so it's at least verifiable.
To be entirely honest, I would have simply named it Abu Lu'lu'a without second thought if I had not feared that it would lead to accusations of Arabization of Persian history as Peroz is Persian and Abu Lu’lu’a is of Arabic origin, as eventually did happen recently. As I've said before, if someone would open a wp:rm to move to Abu Lu'lu'a I would probably support. It is undoubtedly the wp:commonname. ☿ Apaugasma (talk ☉) 16:29, 2 May 2024 (UTC)
Whoops, it appears I'm a broken clock. I thought we'd had a similar discussion, but not the exact same one. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:43, 2 May 2024 (UTC)
As per above, "Piruz Nahavandi" is also presented in the English language and Persian language sources per WP:COMMONNAME. The Persian Wiki also has the article title based on the common name of Piruz Nahavandi.--Ronnnaldo7 (talk) 19:09, 2 May 2024 (UTC)
Common name means that it is the most common name in English language sources, which it definitely isn't. It's rare compared to Abu Lulu'a. It may or may not be an example of the "Arabization of history" as you say, but editorially overruling that here would be WP:RGW. He lived and died in an Arab empire performing a famous assassination, so it's not surprising that his name has the greatest historical currency and prevalence in Arabic. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:24, 2 May 2024 (UTC)
This has nothing to do with WP:RGW. Let's stick to the facts here - the point is, as per above, there are scholarly sources, both in English and in Persian, with both Piruz Nahavandi and Abu Lu'lu'a Firuz. The common name in the Persian language is most certainly Piruz Nahavandi (hence the Persian Wiki's article title), and both the former and latter names are used in scholarly English language sources and in search engine sources (e.g. Google).--Ronnnaldo7 (talk) 19:46, 2 May 2024 (UTC)
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Abu_Lu%27lu%27a/Archive_2&oldid=1238406035"