Strictly determined game

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In game theory, a strictly determined game is a two-player zero-sum game that has at least one Nash equilibrium with both players using pure strategies. The value of a strictly determined game is equal to the value of the equilibrium outcome.^[1]^[2]^[3]^[4]^[5] Most finite combinatorial games, like tic-tac-toe, chess, draughts, and go, are strictly determined games.

Notes

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The study and classification of strictly determined games is distinct from the study of Determinacy, which is a subfield of set theory.

References

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^ Waner, Stefan (1995–1996). "Chapter G Summary Finite". Retrieved 24 April 2009.
^ Steven J. Brams (2004). "Two person zero-sum games with saddlepoints". Game Theory and Politics. Courier Dover Publications. pp. 5–6. ISBN 9780486434971.
^ Saul Stahl (1999). "Solutions of zero-sum games". A gentle introduction to game theory. AMS Bookstore. p. 54. ISBN 9780821813393.
^ Abraham M. Glicksman (2001). "Elementary aspects of the theory of games". An Introduction to Linear Programming and the Theory of Games. Courier Dover Publications. p. 94. ISBN 9780486417103.
^ Czes Kośniowski (1983). "Playing the Game". Fun mathematics on your microcomputer. Cambridge University Press. p. 68. ISBN 9780521274517.

v t e Topics of game theory
Definitions	Congestion game Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game Mechanism design
Equilibrium concepts	Bayes correlated equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Gibbs equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Risk dominance Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Trembling hand equilibrium
Strategies	Appeasement Backward induction Bid shading Collusion Cheap talk De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Forward induction Grim trigger Markov strategy Pairing strategy Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat
Classes of games	Auction Bargaining problem Global game Intransitive game Mean-field game n-player game Perfect information Large Poisson game Potential game Repeated game Screening game Signaling game Strictly determined game Stochastic game Symmetric game Zero-sum game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers All-pay auction Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Lewis signaling game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Electronic mail game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Bertrand competition Cournot competition Stackelberg competition Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and monster game Rendezvous problem
Theorems	Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Negamax theorem Purification theorem Revelation principle Sprague–Grundy theorem Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin John Conway Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
Search optimizations	Alpha–beta pruning Aspiration window Principal variation search max^n algorithm Paranoid algorithm Lazy SMP
Miscellaneous	Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons

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